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Constitutional Law

Case Digest

Macariola vs Asuncion
Political Law Abrogation
On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts
unbecoming a judge. The judge apparently bought a property (formerly owned by
Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; and on 31 Aug 1966, the
Asuncion couples conveyed their share and interest in the said property to The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. The act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is
said to be a violation of pars 1 & 5, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits
judges in active service (among others) to do so within the limits of the place where they
discharge their duties.
HELD: Art 14 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, effective Aug 1888) of the Code
of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce was political in nature and
so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country (Change of
Sovereignty to the US by virtue of cession, 1898).

People v. Perfecto
"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still
in force."
public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory
the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated --
"political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained
by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

FACTS:

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of
testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies.
The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it
to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe
of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured
their election through fraud and robbery."

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine
Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article
256 of the Penal Code.

The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in
the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUEs:
Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with
the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the
sovereign.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the
Military Commander, and byproclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in
so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who
were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer
is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the
citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius
and fundamental principles of the American character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established
its authority in the Philippine Islands.

"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes
contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the
entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies,
an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the
people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they
are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of
government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and
obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy
an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks."

DECISION:

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion,
although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant
and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.


Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs Pres. Aquino
G.R. No. 73748May 22, 1986

FACTS:1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurelwere taking power.2. On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by statingthat the "new government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the NewArmed Forces
of the Philippines."

ISSUE:WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate?

HELD:Yes

RATIO:The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.The Court further held that:
1. the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
2. it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
3. the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government

Peralta v. Director of Prisons
(1945)

Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan Co n s t a b u l a r y , wa s
p r o s e c u t e d f o r t h e c r i m e o f r o b b e r y a s d e f i n e d b y
t h e N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y o f t h e s o - c a l l e d Republic of the
Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve time by the Cour t of
Speci al and Excl usi ve Cr i mi nal Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7
promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition for habeas corpus is
b a s e d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e Co u r t s exi st ence was voi d ab
i ni t i o because i t was created as a political instrumentality u n d e r t h e
c o mm a n d o f t h e J a p a n e s e Imperial Army; that the provisions of said
ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the penalties provi ded for are much
mor e sever e t han t he RPC. Sol Gen i s of t he opi ni on t hat t he
pet i t i on shoul d be granted because the Ordinance mentioned i n c r e a t i n g
s a i d c o u r t i s t i n g e d w i t h politi cal complexion, that the procedure
does not af f or d a f ai r t r i al and vi ol at es const i t ut i onal r i ght of
accused per sons under a legitimate Constitution. The court is of the opinion that:
As t o t he val i di t y of t he cr eat i on of t he Cour t of Speci al and
Excl usi ve Cr i mi nal Jurisdi ction by Ordinance No. 7, t he onl y factor to be
considered is the authority of the legislati ve power whi ch promulgated said law or
ordinance. It is well established i n I nt er nat i onal Law t hat " The cr i mi nal
juri sdiction establi shed by the invader i n t h e o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y
f i n d s i t s s o u r c e nei t her i n t he l aws of t he conquer i ng or
conquer ed st at e, i t i s dr awn ent i r el y f r o m t h e l a w ma r t i a l
a s d e f i n e d i n t h e u s a g e s o f n a t i o n s . T h e a u t h o r i t y t h u s
der i ved can be asser t ed ei t her t hr ough speci al t r i bunal s, whose
aut hor i t y and procedure is defined in the military code of t he
conquer i ng st at e, or t hr ough t he o r d i n a r y c o u r t s a n d
a u t h o r i t i e s o f t h e occupied distri ct." (Taylor, International Public Law, p.
598.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental
instrumentality of t he bel l i ger ent occupant , had t her ef or e the power or
was competent to create the Cour t of Speci al and Excl usi ve Cr i mi nal
Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to wh e t h e r o r n o t a c o u r t i s
o f a p o l i t i c a l complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with
the duty of applying t h e l a w t o c a s e s f a l l i n g w i t h i n i t s
juri sdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of a pol i t i cal
compl exi on or not depending upon the nature or character of t he l aw so
appl i ed. Ther e i s no r oom f or doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the
creation of the court in question.

The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal J u r i s d i c t i o n w h i c h i m p o s e s l i f e
imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or
power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 whi ch puni shes t he
cr i me of which said petitioner was convicted.

I t a p p e a r s c l e a r t h a t i t wa s wi t h i n t h e power and competence of
the belli gerent o c c u p a n t t o p r o mu l g a t e , t h r o u g h t h e N a t i o n a l
A s s e m b l y o f t h e s o - c a l l e d Republic of the Philippines, Act No.
65 of t he sai d Assembl y, whi ch penal i zes t he crimes of robbery and
other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the
imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promul gated by the
President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as
ma x i mu m.

Al t h o u g h t h e s e c r i me s a r e defined in the Revised Penal Code, they
were altered and penalized by said Act No.65 with different and heavier penalties, as
new cr i mes and of f enses demanded by military necessity, incident to a
state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belli gerent
occupant, the p r o t e c t i o n a n d s a f e t y o f t h e a r my o f occupation,
its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations.

The last question is the legal effect of ther e o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e
P h i l i p p i n e s a n d r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h
Gover nment ; t hat i s, whet her or not , by the principle of postliminy
(the right by which persons and things taken in war are restored to their former status whe
n coming againunder the power of the nation to which they belonged,)
the puniti ve sentence which petitioner i s now serving f el l t hr ough or
ceased t o be val i d f r om that time.W e h a v e a l r e a d y
h e l d i n o u r r e c e n t decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs.Valdez
Tan Keh and Di zon, supra, that all j udgment of pol i t i cal compl exi on of
t he courts during the Japanese regime, ceased t o b e v a l i d u p o n
r e o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium.
Applying that doctrine to the p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e s e n t e n c e
w h i c h convi ct ed t he pet i t i oner of a cr i me of a political complexion
must be considered as havi ng ceased t o be val i d i pso f act o upon the
reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur

Laurel vs. Misa

Topic: Treason Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phi l. 856

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the
accused adhered t o t h e e n e my b y g i v i n g t h e l a t t e r a i d a n d comfort.
He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his al legiance to the
Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims t hat he cannot be
t r i ed under a change of sover ei gnt y over t he count r y si nce hi s act s
were against the Commonwealth whi ch was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO:The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absol ut e and
per manent al l egi ance t o hi s g o v e r n me n t o r s o v e r e i g n . No
t r a n s f e r o f sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the
Phi l i ppi ne gover nment st i l l had t he power . Moreover, sovereignty cannot be
suspended; it is either s u b s i s t i n g o r e l i m i n a t e d a n d r e p l a c e d .
Soverei gnty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the
exerci se of sovereignty that was suspended. T h u s , t h e r e i s n o
s u s p e n d e d a l l e g i a n c e . Regarding the c h a n g e o f g o v e r n m e n t ,
t h e r e i s n o s u c h c h a n g e s i n c e t h e s o v e r e i g n t h e F i l i p i n o
people is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name
of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

DISSENT:During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the
Philippines wer e suspended. Thus, t r eason under t he Revi sed Penal
Code cannot be puni shabl e where the laws of the land are momentarily halted.
Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasnt sovereign at
the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the acts of
treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now
indeed sovereign.



Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese
occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila
and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the
case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and,
without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he
declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those
courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de
facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto
governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws
of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or
changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the
existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do
away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were
not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase
processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other
judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de
facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been
liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial
processes, which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or
great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume
that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by
clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the
dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be
construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of
any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are
continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The
laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by
the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues
until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY
CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act
creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines,
and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said
courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force
until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction
over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government,
until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed
by the said government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws
continue even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on
judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before
it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets
possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself
against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of
paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Government vs Monte de Piedad

On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Dominions then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of
the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in
turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the
said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The bank argued that the Philippine
government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. Bank argues that the
government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank?
HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in
accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of
the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public
interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as parents of the people the
government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.


Summary: ACCFA vs. CUGCO (GR L-21484, 29 November 1969)

The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)
vs.Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), etc.[GR
L-21484, 29 November 1969]; also The Agricultural Credit Administration(ACA) vs.
ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA), etc. [GR L-23605]En Banc, Makalintal (J): 7
concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion

Facts: On 4 September 1961 a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which was to be
effective for a period of 1 year from 1 July 1961, was entered into by and between the
Unions and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA).
A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations
and non-implementation of said agreement. Finally, on25 October 1962 the Unions
declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on 26
November 1962. On 30 October 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a
complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA (Case 3450-ULP) for
having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the CBA in
order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and
refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and
special defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining
contract, expiration of said Contract and lack of approval by the office of the President
of the fringe benefits provided for therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the
CIR in its decision dated 25 March1963 ordered the ACCFA (1) to cease and desist
from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of complainant unions
in the exercise of their right to self organization; (2) to comply with and implement the
provision of the collective bargaining contract executed on 4 September 1961, including
the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance; and (3) to bargain in good faith and
expeditiously with the herein complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned
down in a resolution dated 25 April 1963 of the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought the
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (GR L-21484). During the pendency of the
ACCFA's case, specifically on 8 August 1963, the President of the Philippines signed
into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844),which among other
things required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural
Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration(ACCFA) and changed its name to
Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). On 17March 1964 the ACCFA Supervisors'
Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association filed a petition for certification election
with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case 1327-MC) praying that they be certified
as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees,
respectively, in the ACA. The trial Court in its order dated 30 March 1964 directed the
Manager or Officer-in-Charge of the ACA to allow the posting of said order "for the
information of all employees and workers thereof," and to answer the petition.
Incompliance therewith, the ACA, while admitting most of the allegations in the

petition, denied that the Unions represented the majority of the supervisors and rank-
and-file workers, respectively, in the ACA. It further alleged that the petition was
premature, that the ACA was not the proper party to be notified and to answer the
petition, and that the employees and supervisors could not lawfully become members of
the Unions, nor be represented by them. However, in a joint manifestation of the Unions
dated 7 May 1964, with the conformity of the ACA Administrator and of the Agrarian
Counsel in his capacity as such and as counsel for the National Land Reform Council, it
was agreed "that the union in this case represent the majority of the employees in their
respective bargaining units" and that only the legal issues raised would be submitted for
the resolution of the trial Court. Finding the remaining grounds for ACA's opposition to
the petition to be without merit, the trial Court in its order dated 21 May 1964 certified
the ACCFA Workers' Association and the ACCFA Supervisors' Association as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representatives of the rank-and-file employees and
supervisors, respectively, of ACA. Said order was affirmed by the CIR en banc in its
resolution dated 24 August 1964. On 2 October 1964 the ACA filed in the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari with urgent motion to stay the CIR order(GR L-23605). In a
resolution dated 6 October 1964, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for 'lack of
adequate allegations," but the dismissal was later reconsidered when the ACA complied
with the formal requirement stated in said resolution. As prayed for, the Court ordered
the CIR to stay the execution of its order of 21 May 1964.

Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions.

Held: The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not
proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson
described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to
the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of
political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the
State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of
which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern
society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left
to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare
than is any private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in
its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here
as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization
of economic forces. Hereof course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as
a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform
Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to
carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform
program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private
enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say,
the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when,
aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the
implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the
ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested
no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are
subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and
salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions
disappears. In view of the foregoing premises, the Unions are not entitled to the
certification election sought in the lower Court. Such certification is admittedly for
purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions
of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact
the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (GR L-21824). This is contrary to
Section 11 of Republic Act 875. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its
conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of the Court's ruling
as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the lower
Court, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by
the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in GR L-21484, has
become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with
the Unions is concerned.

PVTA v CIR Digest
Facts:
This case involves the expanded role of the
government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.
1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged
overtime services and the petitioners failure to pay for said compensation in
accordance with CA No. 444.
2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay.
Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising
governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No.
444.
3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary
functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the
government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its
people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the
ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government obsolete.

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant
consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As
such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA
case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between
constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is
futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in
governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond
the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that
petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear
the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would
have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required
private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its
chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment.
It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot
suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

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