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Analytical Political Philosophy: (January 2010)

1. Political Philosophy and the Founders of Analytic Philosophy
Political philosophy is not, initially, easy to place in terms of the foundation and early
development of analytic philosophy. If, following the traditional understanding, one takes
analytical philosophy to have been founded by Frege, Russell, Moore and ittgenstein, it
is not obvious what influence these figures have had on the subse!uent development of
the discipline. "o take them in turn, Frege did not write professionally on any political or
social topics #although famously $ummett reports his shock and dismay at finding anti%
&emitic comments in Frege's diaries $ummett, 1()1, *ii. "hese diaries are now published
#Frege, 1((+,, as are some suggestions Frege made about an electoral system, #Frege
-...,,. Russell is more comple*. /s a public intellectual he was known primarily as a
political campaigner, especially for his pacifism, and opposition to nuclear arms, and
indeed, was imprisoned for his views during the First orld ar. 0e wrote widely on
political topics, and gave the first Reith 1ectures for the 223, later published as
Authority and the Individual #Russell, 1(+(,. 4et The Problems of Philosophy #Russell,
1(1-, does not have any discussion of political philosophy, and neither is it mentioned in
his My Philosophical Development #Russell 1(5(,. Russell's political writings have had
very little, if any, influence on subse!uent debates. $espite the attention given to political
philosophy in Russell's History of Western Philosophy #Russell, 1(+(,, and the fact that
his first published book was German Social Democracy #Russell, 1)(6,, Russell
appeared to consider political writing as something rather separate from philosophy.
Moore's reputation as a moral philosopher in a way holds out more hope that he would
have made a contribution to political philosophy, but even in his case he did not e*plicitly
write on these topics, and one struggles to find more than a few scattered remarks.
ittgenstein, of course, had little to say about political and legal matters in his early
writings. 0is later writings, such as ulture and !alue #ittgenstein 1().,, do bear on
politics, and other writers in political philosophy, such as 0anna Pitkin in Witt"enstein
-
and #ustice #1(7-,, $avid Rubinstein in Mar$ and Witt"enstein #1()1, and, from a very
different perspective, even 8ean%Paul 1yotard, who makes e*tensive use of the term
9language game' in #ust Gamin" #1yotard and "h:baud 1()5,, have found inspiration in
Philosophical Investi"ations. 0owever, it would be hard to argue that ittgenstein's later
writings remain firmly within the analytic tradition.
3asting the net more widely, 3arnap and ;eurath bear some interesting similarities to
Russell in holding radical political beliefs and contributing to intense contemporary
political debates, while never becoming part of a tradition of academic political
philosophy. <ne way in which they differed from Russell was in claiming that their anti%
metaphysical contributions to philosophy were somehow continuous with emancipatory
political struggle, although how e*actly this connection is to be made, and especially
whether they developed a 9left philosophy of science', remains a topic of contemporary
debate #=ebel, -..5, Richardson, -..(, =ebel, forthcoming,. /nother point of difference
was that ;eurath engaged in and contributed to academic debates in political theory, as
well as taking part in political activism and holding political office. 4et there is little trace
of attention to ;eurath at least in >nglish%language political philosophy, e*cept as a
figure worthy of scholarly interest, and, perhaps rediscovery #3artwright et al 1((6,
<';eill -..-,.
/.8. /yer, who also was a political activist, albeit in a more conventional party%political
vein, and also lectured on political theory in the late 1(?.s, e*plains his own lack of
writing in political philosophy with the comment that he found that concepts such as 9the
social contract' and 9the general will' 9did not repay minute analysis', but he had nothing
of his own to replace them with #/yer, 1(77, 1)+,. 0e did, however, later publish an
essay entitled 9"he 3oncept of Freedom' in which he offers an analysis of the
measurement of freedom #/yer, 1(++,. /yer claims that his friend Isaiah 2erlin turned to
political philosophy because, according to /yer, 2erlin's lack of knowledge of
mathematical logic made him come to the view that to work in central areas of
philosophy was 9beyond his grasp' #/yer 1(++, (),. "his e*planation, however, does not
!uite tally with 2erlin's own, in which it was the non%substantive ambitions of
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contemporary philosophy that led to his disillusionment and turn to the history of ideas.
#Ignatieff, 1((), 1?1,. e will, though, return to 2erlin's writings later. $espite /yer's
evident interest in political matters, his own brand of positivism bears on political
philosophy in possibly devastating fashion, apparently by reducing arguments in political
philosophy to either disagreement about facts, to be resolved by the social sciences, or
sub@ective e*pression of emotions, about which there can be no rational debate #/yer,
1(?6,. /ll that is left, it appears, is logical analysis of concepts. /gain we shall return to
this below.
"he impression, therefore, is that most of the central figures in the foundation and further
development of analytic philosophy A even those with strongly held and argued political
views % did not see political philosophy as part of their activity as philosophers. Indeed, at
least in the case of /yer, their philosophical position appears to rule out the possibility of
political philosophy at least as a normative discipline. "he only ma@or e*ception to this is
Barl Popper who is known both for his contributions to philosophy of science and
political philosophy. Popper's The Poverty of Historicism, first published as a series of
articles in 1(++%5, dates back, he says in the 90istorical ;ote' accompanying the first
publication in book form, to 1(1(%-.. #Popper, 1(57, 0is ma@or two%volume The %pen
Society and Its &nemies #Popper 1(+5a, 1(+5b,, which, with The Poverty of Historicism,
he described as his 9war effort' #Popper, 1(7+C1((-, p. 115,, famously argues in favour of
the 9open society' and against the possibility of 9historical prophecy' and in favour of
9piecemeal social engineering'. The %pen Society, Popper says, was 9well received in
>ngland, far beyond my e*pectations' #Popper, 1(7+C1((-, p. 1--,. 4et although scholars
were prepared to engage, highly critically, with Popper's readings of Plato #1evinson,
1(5?, and Mar* #3ornforth, 1(6), few political philosophers seem to have responded to
the substantive content of Popper's own position.
In some ways it seems strange that Popper remained on the sidelines to the development
of academic political philosophy, despite the wider recognition of the power of his work.
Indeed in social science and broader political theory Popper is regarded as a ma@or
contributor, especially for his theory of the demarcation between science and
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pseudoscience #Popper 1(?5C1(5(, 1(6?, in addition to the themes mentioned above. 4et
he was largely ignored by political philosophers. In the Preface to the first volume of the
series Philosophy, Politics and &ociety, the founding editor Peter 1aslettt, in 1(56, refers
to Popper as 9perhaps the most influential of contemporary philosophers who have
addressed themselves to politics' #1aslett, 1(56a, *ii,. In this series, however, which we
will discuss in detail shortly, not only does Popper not appear in any of the volumes, but
his work is not engaged with in any of the 7. or so papers in the seven volumes that have
appeared to date. ;either did Popper publish in the yearbook of the /merican &ociety of
Political and 1egal &ociety, 'omos, the first number of which appeared in 1(5) and has
been published annually since #Friedrich, 1(5),.
2. Political Philosophy and the Focal Points of Early Analytic Philosophy
>ven if few of the ma@or figures in the early rise of analytic philosophy attended to
political philosophy, this does not e*clude the possibility that others would do such work
inspired by developments elsewhere. "his, therefore, raises the !uestion of what
constitutes the emergence of analytic philosophy. "his comple* story is told elsewhere
within this volume, but to simplify, it may be possible to identify three initial strands,
which I will term the re@ection of idealism, the introduction of the new logic, and,
distinctly, the insistence on conceptual analysis.
"he first strand, then, is a negative oneD the re@ection of forms of idealism descending
from 0egel. In the conte*t of political philosophy the leading te*t is 0egel's Philosophy
of (i"ht, first published in 1)-1, although not translated into >nglish until 1)(6 #0egel
1)-1C1)(6,. &uch delay may indicate a neglect of 0egel in the mid%1(
th
3entury, but may
also be a conse!uence of the facility of 2ritish scholars in the 1(
th
3entury to read
Eerman, and their habit of interacting with Eerman scholars.
"he most influential works of the ma@or idealist political philosophers include ".0.
Ereen's 91ecture on 1iberal 1egislation and Freedom of 3ontract', and )ectures on the
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Principles of Political %bli"ation which were included in the volumes of his works
published between 1))?%5, shortly after his death in 1))- #Ereen, 1))?%5,. /lso
important is 2ernard 2osan!uet's, Philosophical Theory of the State, first published
1)((, with the fourth and final edition published in 1(-? #2osan!uet 1)((C1(-?,, as well
as F.0. 2radley, including his essay 9My &tation and Its $uties' in &thical Studies, first
published in 1)76 #2radley, 1)76,. 0astings Rashdall's Theory of Good and &vil #1(.7,
also bears on many political issues #Rashdall, 1(.7,.
Idealism, as understood in 0egelian terms, for a long time remained largely of historical
interest in contemporary thought. /lthough there is a revival of interest in idealist
political thought it still remains only on the fringes of /nglo%/merican political
philosophy, e*cept as an ob@ect of intellectual history. It seems that we are yet to see any
serious attempt to revive any strong form of neo%0egelianism in political philosophy,
although some of 0egel's ideas about moral community have influenced current
criticisms of liberal thought. 0egelian idealism is notable for its social holismD the idea
that the state or society e*ists as a moral and metaphysical entity in its own right. /s
developed in the =B, idealism took many forms, and it would be wrong to think that it is
defined by any one doctrine or position. 0owever, Russell's account of his own reasons
for departing from idealism are instructive. Bey to idealism, argues Russell, is the
doctrine of 9internal relations'D that 9every relation between two terms e*presses,
primarily, intrinsic properties of the two terms and, in ultimate analysis, a property of the
whole of which the two compose' #Russell, 1(5(, +-,. Russell accepts that this is
plausible for some relations, such as love, but argues against generalising it to all. In
particular it cannot apply to asymmetrical relations as are common in mathematics.
/ccording, Russell replaces it with the doctrine of 9e*ternal relations' allowing for
contingent relations between ob@ects #Eriffin, this volume, 3andlish -..7, ch 6,.
It is clear that the doctrine of internal relations leads to a form of holism, in which all
must be seen as components of a whole, and thus, in political philosophy, it is natural that
the legacy of the re@ection of idealism appears #at least, two%fold, in the implicit adoption
of two forms of individualism. First, there is an assumption that some sort of high regard
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must be given to the moral importance of the individual, running from utilitarianism in
which total value is a simple sum of individual values, to rights theories in which
autonomy must not be violated. &econd, a form of methodological individualism appears
also to be widely assumed, in which it is presumed that e*planations of social facts
should be conducted in terms of facts about individuals. <f course a wide range of
positions can be held, but the general tenor of contemporary political philosophy is to
give moral and e*planatory priority to individuals over social collectives. "his
dramatically contrasts with 2radley's famous doctrine that the individual is a bare
abstraction #2radley, 1)76,. hile it is also often noted that Rawls, in A Theory of
#ustice, !uotes 2radley approvingly #Rawls, 1(71, 11.,, it has to be recognised that
Rawls reads this phrase largely in institutional terms A i.e. what duties you have depends
on institutional facts A rather than in the metaphysical and moral terms implied by holistic
forms of idealism.
/ second part of the initial foundation of analytic philosophy is the invention of modern
logic, especially !uantification and the predicate calculus, with Frege and Russell #Frege,
1)7(, Russell 1(.?, 1(.5, Russell and hitehead 1(1.%1?, and the application of logical
techni!ues to other areas of philosophy. 0ere it is hard to see how such concerns
immediately e*erted any influence on political philosophy, in that it is hard to find
e*amples before the 1(5.s of any attempt to use any form of formal theory in moral and
political philosophy. Matters changed to some degree with the publication of /rrow's
Social hoice and Individual !alues #/rrow, 1(51, and, to a lesser e*tent, 1uce and
Raiffa's Theory of Games and Decisions #1uce and Raiffa, 1(57,, in that political
philosophers felt that they had at least to acknowledge the e*istence of such work. 4et
few seriously attempted to use formal methods until 2raithwaite's Theory of Games as a
Tool for the Moral Philosopher #2raithwaite, 1(55,, and 8ames 2uchanan and Eordon
"ulloch's The alculus of onsent #2uchanan and "ulloch, 1(6-,. 2ratihwaite's, though,
was a somewhat anomalous work in that 2raithwaite, a philosopher of science, had been
appointed to the Bnightbridge 3hair at 3ambridge, at that time considered to be a chair in
moral philosophy, and for his inaugural lecture felt that he should make a contribution to
the sub@ect. /nd indeed this lecture seems to have been 2raithwaite's only attempt to
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connect with moral philosophy. <thers, such as 2rian 2arry, $avid Eauthier, /martya
&en, and 8ohn Rawls would see possible applications of game and decision theory #2arry,
1(6), Eauthier, 1(6(, &en, 1(7., Rawls, 1(71,. "his strand of political philosophy
remains alive and active, although its connection with logical developments in
philosophy is much less marked than its debt to game theory, rational decision theory and
social choice theory.
0owever, a third strand is often claimed also to be central to analytic philosophy, the use
of conceptual analysis, as e*emplified by Moore #Moore 1(.?,, as distinct from the
logical analysis of Frege and Russell. hether this amounts to an innovation, however, is
not obvious. /t its most prescriptive, it would be the pro@ect of analysing concepts by
providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their application, or, at least, to
make as much progress in this direction as the sub@ect matter allows. 0owever, it is not
clear how this differs from the pro@ect of seeing the philosopher's task as including the
provision of definitions, which has been part of philosophy since the ancient Ereeks. If,
on the other hand, conceptual analysis is thought to be a term to describe a broader
approach to philosophy which emphasises rigour, argument and attempts to achieve
conceptual clarity, then it is e!ually hard to see it as anything new. /fter all, 8eremy
2entham #e.g. 2entham 1)-?C1(7., and 0enry &idgwick, whose Methods of &thics, first
published in 1)7+, and going through seven editions, the last of which was published in
1(.7 #&idgwick, 1)7+C1(.7,, e*emplified these virtues arguably to a higher degree than
Moore. Indeed, outside political philosophy, 2entham's 9theory of fictions' was later
recognised as anticipating Russell's theory of descriptions #isdom 1(?1, Fuine, 1()1,
2eaney -..?C-..(,.
0owever, to return to the first strand, it appears that the re@ection of idealism left a void in
political philosophy, rather than an alternative programme. hen one looks for ma@or
works of political philosophy published between the wars, it is hard to find anything of
comparable importance to those published at the turn of the century. 0arold 1aski
produced a stream of books during this period #e.g. 1aski 1(-5,, yet he is rarely referred
to within contemporary legal and political philosophy. &imilar remarks can be made with
)
respect to 8ohn $ewey's prolific output. "awney's &*uality #1(?1, remains a point of
reference, yet it would be a great e*aggeration to claim that it has been central to the
development of political philosophy. /lso notable is PlamenatG's onsent+ ,reedom and
Political %bli"ation #1(?),, although this is an interesting transitional work, engaging
with Ereen and 2osan!uet, yet producing a contribution to the liberal individualist
approach to political obligation that still receives notice today. Perhaps Mar*ism made
more enduring contributions, with 1ukacs' History and lass onsciousness #1(-?C1(67,
and the first writings emanating from the Frankfurt &chool. In passing it is worth also
noting that ".&. >liot, who wrote his Ph$ thesis on 2radley, delivered the lectures that
became The Idea of A hristian Society, in 1(?( #>liot, 1(?(,. "his work, idealist in
general conception, also gives a powerful sense of a struggle between three competing
ideologies and political systems A liberal democracy of the =&/, =B and France, fascism
of Eermany and Italy, and communism of the &oviet bloc A dominating world politics.
>liot seemed far from certain, as he wrote, which would prevail. It is e*traordinary to
contrast the uncertainty and tensions of the world >liot was writing in with the relative
stability of our own. Perhaps, between the wars, political theory took a back seat to real
world political conflict.
2ut in considering the development of political philosophy in the twentieth century it is
important also to consider the place of utilitarianism. /t the start of the twentieth century,
idealism vied with utilitarianism, especially in the version defended by &idgwick, as
leading approaches to ethics #$river, this volume,. /t least in some !uarters, however,
utilitarianism was seen as outdatedH Russell ruefully remembered that as a young man he
and his friends referred to &idwick as 9old &idg' #Russell, 1(5(, p. ?.,. <n the other hand
it is sometimes thought that the lack of substantive progress in political philosophy before
Rawls is a somehow related to the dominance utilitarian thinking had on political
philosophy, which it is said, obtained a kind of 9dominance%by%default in the >nglish%
speaking liberal democracies in the twentieth century' #Miller and $agger, -..?, p. ++(,.
4et whether utilitarianism remained dominant as a theory in political philosophy #as
distinct from economics and public life, in the decades before Rawls is not obvious.
=tilitarianism was most obviously represented by &idwick's &lements of Politics, which
(
was published in 1)(1 and reprinted several times, including in 1(1( #&idgwick 1)(1,. In
terms of the development of utilitarianism the most significant innovation may be that of
the economist Roy 0arrod's paper setting out a version of rule%utilitarianism #0arrod
1(?6,, and utilitarianism was taken very seriously within economics. 4et if one looks at
the political philosophy te*tbooks of the 1(?.s and 1(+.s there is no sign of a discipline
in the grip of utilitarianism. >.F. 3arritt's Morals and Politics #3arritt, 1(?5, provides a
history of the sub@ect from 0obbes to 2osan!uet without even a mention of 2entham,
Mill or &idgwick, while in his later &thical and Political Thin-in" utilitarianism appears
in a chapter entitled 93rude Moral "heories' and 3arritt presents several ob@ections to
utilitarianism, including a version of the now notorious 9scapegoat' ob@ection in which
under certain circumstances utilitarianism would @ustify punishing an innocent person
#3arritt, 1(+7, p. 65, Indeed Rawls critically responds to this argument in his most
utilitarian early paper, 9"wo 3oncepts of Rules' #Rawls,1(55, p. 1.%11,. In Mabbott's The
State and the iti.en #Mabbut 1(+), 2entham and Mill are mentioned primarily for their
errors and &idgwick is ignored entirely. ".$. eldon's States and Morals, contains no
significant discussion of utilitarianism and only passing mention of Mill and &idgwick. If
utilitarianism was dominant, it is hard to find evidence.
$espite this, the idea that contemporary analytic political philosophy owes a great deal to
utilitarianism is very plausible, if the claim is interpreted as a comment about form rather
than content. e have noted several times that the distinctive virtues of analytic political
philosophy were already present in the writings of 2entham, Mill and &idgwick. /gree
with it or not, utilitarianism offered a model of what a clear and rigorous political
philosophy could be, and how it would be established.
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3. Post-ar Analytic Political and !e"al Philosophy: Philosophy, Politics and Society
/lthough 0ayek's (oad to Serfdom was published in 1(++ #0ayek, 1(++,, the immediate
post%war period saw little revival of political philosophy, to the point where in 1(56, in
the preface to Philosophy+ Politics and Society #first series, the historian Peter 1aslettt
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I owe this point to /lan 0amlin
1.
famously wrote that the long tradition of political philosophy, 9from 0obbes to
2osan!uet', appeared to have stopped, notoriously observing 9For the moment, anyway,
political philosophy is dead.' #1aslett, 1(56a, p. vii, 1aslett's volume was conceived as a
parallel, to Flew's 1ogic and 1anguage series, which, encouragingly, contained papers in
political and legal philosophy by Margaret Mac$onald and 0.1./. 0art #Flew, 1(51,. 4et
for the editor of a collection of papers in political philosophy to announce the sub@ect
9dead' is !uite e*traordinary, especially when important work was still been done not
only by 0ayek, but also, for e*ample, /dorno and 0orkheimer in their Dialectic of
&nli"htenment #/dorno and 0orkheimer1(++C1((7,, although to be fair to 1aslett he
restricts the scope of his claim to writing in >nglish. 1aslett considers three possible
diagnoses of the situation. First, the horrors of the second world war. 9Faced with
0iroshima and with 2elsen, a man is unlikely to address himself to a neat and original
theory of political obligation.' #1aslett, 1(56a p. vii, &econd, the rise of sociological
thought, including Mar*ism, has tended to e*plain away political philosophy as
sociologically determined by its conte*t, and hence as a symptom of deeper causes to be
understood through social analysis #1aslett, 1(56a, p. viii,. 2ut finally, and most
importantly, 9"he 1ogical Positivists Ikilled political philosophyJ. It was Russell and
ittgenstein, /yer and Ryle who convinced the philosophers that they must withdraw
unto themselves for a time and re%e*amine their logical and linguistic apparatus. K I"his
re%e*aminationJ called into !uestion the logical status of all ethical statements K and
Iraised the !uestionJ of whether political philosophy is possible at all' #1aslett, 1(56a, p.
i*,.
"he first of these e*planations, though often repeated, may seem, however,
uncompelling. Popper, as we noted earlier, referred to his writings in political philosophy
as his 9war effort' #Popper, 1(7+C1((-, p. 115,, and, as 1aslett himself notes, it seems @ust
as likely that a war of such magnitude should inspire reflection on political matters rather
than suppress it. "he second A where ideology is a reduced to a sub@ect of sociological
study A may well be more significant in undermining political theory as an autonomous
discipline. "he third A the rise of positivism #though here rolled together with logical
atomism and ordinary language philosophy, A again looks a promising e*planation but
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we will see that it is also more problematic than it looks. 2ut still the appearance is a
powerful one especially when combined with the introspections of ordinary language
philosophy, with its concentration on clarification of !uestions rather than proposing
solutions. >ach could have a dampening effect on the prospects for political philosophyH
together they threaten to be stultifying.
"he particular implications of positivism for political philosophy are said, by 1aslettt, to
have been drawn out by ".$. eldon, whose !ocabulary of Politics #eldon, 1(5?, is
summarised by eldon in a paper entitled 9Political Principles', included as the second
essay in 1aslettt's collection #eldon, 1(56,, after an elegant, and now well%known,
essay by Michael <akeshott, on 9Political >ducation'. 3learly untouched by logical
positivism, <akeshott makes the case for the priority of tradition over ideology, and
conversation over argument #<akeshott, 1(56,. 2y contrast in 9Political Principles'
eldon, in a somewhat irritated tone, applies a fairly direct form of logical positivism to
deflate the ambitions of traditional political philosophy arguing that political principles
have no firmer epistemological foundation than individual @udgement or collective
agreement.
1aslett subtly describes 9Political Principles' as a 9terser' form of the argument of the
eldon's 1(5? book The !ocabulary of Politics. "he term 9terse' is accurate both in the
sense of the paper being more concise but also rather brus!ue in tone. "he !ocabulary of
Politics was published in a series edited by /yer, and in his editorial forward /yer
suggests that eldon aims to 9e*hibit the logic of the statements which characteristically
figure in discourse about politics'. 3ertainly eldon makes what appear to be
straightforward assertions of a logical positivist creed. In certain places eldon argues
that the role of philosopher in respect to politics is not to answer what have been taken to
be the traditional !uestions, but to clarify the meaning of the vocabulary in which they
are couched. 0e even goes as far as to say that 9IJhen verbal confusions are tidied up
most of the !uestions of traditional political philosophy are not unanswerable. /ll of them
are confused formulations of purely empirical difficulties.' #eldon, 1(5?, p. 1(-,. 4et,
as is the case so often, eldon's own analysis rather betrays his theoretical claims. Much
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of eldon's argument is that traditional political philosopher has implicitly accepted a
type of Platonism, in which terms like 9freedom' and 9the state' stand for concepts with
real essences, and that the task of the political philosopher is to discover such essences,
which then will provide 9philosophical foundations' for particular political ideologies.
eldon claims that this approach is mistakenD there are no essences or foundations.
eldon plausibly links the search for 9foundations' with the fear of sub@ectivism. In 1(5?
this manifests itself as the concern that unless it is possible to find philosophical
foundations for western liberal democracy, one would have nothing to say in opposition
to soviet communism, or, indeed, the ;aGi regime which of course was a very recent
memory. eldon attempts to disarm this line of ob@ection by the plausible contention that
it is possible to support and oppose political positions with reasons even if there is no
definitive set of foundations or philosophical test against which any political position can
be @udged.
/t the same time, eldon suggests, it does not follow that politics collapses into
individual sub@ectivismH foundations are not necessary for rational politics. Rather he
sketches an account in which politics is a practice with its own internal standards of
e*cellence #although eldon does not use this language himself, rather like art criticism
or wine tasting, in which there can be genuine @udgements. eldon also takes time to
sketch out the virtues of a statesman, and how such a person compares with e*perts in
other fields. In this respect eldon appears far closer to <akeshott than to /yer or Ryle.
More generally, eldon curiously combines a great respect for the genius of many of the
great political philosophers, with a readiness to accuse them of rather simple logical and
grammatical mistakes.
&till, it is evident that eldon's relation to logical positivism and linguistic analysis is a
comple* one. "he analytic pro@ect of conceptual analysis is sometimes implicitly guilty of
1?
the Platonism which eldon re@ects, and he is very keen to avoid the accusation that
re@ecting Platonism leaves one only with a 9booChurrah' approach to political philosophy.
Indeed, the special difficulties of applying positivism to political philosophy was pointed
out even before 0iroshima and 2elsen, in a paper called 9"he 1anguage of Political
"heory' by Margaret Mac$onald #Macdonald 1(+.%+1,. Mac$onald points out that
political disagreement does not always seem to be based on empirical !uestions or
linguistic confusion, and remaining disagreements can have enormous impact on human
lives. Implicitly, she seems to admit that crude application of logical positivism is
insufficient to diagnose all disagreement in political philosophy. 2y way of case study,
she turns her attention to the problem of political obligation, arguing that none of the
leading accounts A social contract, tradition, utilitarian A provide a general answer, and
that instead each holds part of the truth and there is an indefinite set of vaguely shifting
criteria, differing for different times and circumstances.
"he value of the political theorists, however, is not in the general information they
give about the basis of political obligation but in their skill in emphasiGing at a
critical moment a criterion which is tending to be overlooked or denied
#Mac$onald 1(+.%+1,11-,.
Mac$onald's better known paper, 9;atural Rights', first published in 1(+7%) is reprinted
by 1aslett, and given the historical importance of the 1aslett volume it is worth looking at
all the papers in the volume, if briefly. In her contribution Mac$onald argues against both
the idea that natural rights can be founded on the natural law, revealed by reason, and a
crude 9boo%hurrah' positivism #Mac$onald 1(+7%)C1(56,. 1ike eldon at his best,
Mac$onald struggles to find a middle ground. "he view she presents is that statements of
natural rights are akin to decisions, declaring 9here I stand', and, like eldon, uses an
analogy with another area of critical @udgement A in her case literary appreciation A to
point out the possibility of rational argument through the presentation of reasons. ith
both eldon and Mac$onald, while it is clear that a positivist orientation, and
concentration on !uestions of language, strongly inform their thinking, neither is
prepared simply to apply a positivist formula, and both make contributions to political
1+
philosophy of a pragmatist, conte*tualist, form which are independent of considerations
of linguistic analysis.
More generally, many of the essays in this volume have a tendency to try to e*plain away
disagreement in political philosophy on the grounds not of substantial doctrinal
difference, but in terms of confusion about the logic or grammar of concepts. <ne
e*ample is Rees' essay, which is an application of a type of linguistic philosophy to
diagnose apparent philosophical disagreements about the nature, importance and use of
the concept of sovereignty as resulting from a failure to distinguish different concepts of
state and sovereign. /lthough by no means a simple application of positivism, Rees'
argument shows a positivist spirit by its general architectureD essentially that once
linguistic confusions are cleared up then remaining disagreements can generally be
settled in empirical terms #Rees, 1(56,. Fuinton presents a somewhat similar
methodological approach, albeit with, potentially, a more interesting pay%off. 0e attempts
to reconcile retributive and utilitarian doctrines of punishment by claiming that the
former is a logical doctrine concerning the use of a word, and the latter a moral doctrine
about the @ustification of punishment #Fuinton, 1(56,.
2ambrough makes a methodologically self%conscious attempt to apply new modes of
linguistic analysis to Plato's use of analogies, with the 9dual purpose of making Plato's
doctrines clear and making a contribution to the understanding of the logic of political
theories' #2ambrough, 1(56, p. ((,. Indeed 2ambrough's discussion of Plato is
e*ceptionally illuminating, but it is very unclear that it depends in any way on a new
philosophical method. "he essay concludes with a much more methodological discussion,
focusing on the issue of what follows from the recognition that !uestions in politics and
ethics are not factual !uestions with empirically verifiable answers. 0ere 2ambrough has
even less to offer than eldon and Mac$onald on the topic, merely suggesting that such
deliberative !uestions re!uire decisions, but can be reasonable if made with thought and
knowledge.
15
Eallie, as a methodological preliminary, considers the debate between those who hold the
9monarchic' view of ethics A that there is one true theory for all times and places % and the
9polyarchic' view, which claims that different moralities are valid in different times and
places, and he argues that considerations of 9the logic of ethics' cannot settle this dispute
as any !uestions about logic are internal to a language and cannot rule on whether there is
more than one possible language. "he rest of the paper is devoted to trying to defend the
claim that there are distinct liberal and socialist moralities, which not only conflict with
each other but can also both be found within the moral thought of each individual in
contemporary society #Eallie, 1(56,. It is worth noting that the argument has some
affinities with Eallie's much better known paper, 9>ssentially 3ontested 3oncepts'
published the same year #Eallie, 1(55%6,.
<ther papers, though, seem somewhat less bound by their historical conte*t. 2ernard
Mayo's very short paper, on the general will, assumes an anti%metaphysical account of an
individual, and of the notion of individual will, which is then applied to society as an
entity. Mayo suggests A in a move that anticipates later philosophy of mind A that the
interpretative attitude we take to individuals can also be applied to societies. 8ust as we
posit an individual will to make sense of individual behaviour, we are e!ually @ustified in
positing a 9general will' to make sense of social action #Mayo, 1(56,. 1aslettt's own
contribution to the volume is a lengthy e*position of the important point that modern
society is not the sort of 9face to face' society theorised by Plato or even Rousseau.
0owever, this is offered as a type of rebuke to sociologically and historically ill%informed
political theorists rather than an insight of which creative use can then be made #1aslett,
1(56b,.
"he overriding character of the essays in the book #with some e*ceptions, is a conviction
that previous theorists, for all their genius, went badly wrong often because they were
confused about the meaning, logic, or grammar of particular words or concepts. 2ut very
little, if any, real use of logic is madeD one might think that 9logic' is used in the sense in
which it appears in the title of /yer's )an"ua"e Truth and )o"ic, rather than that of Frege
or Russell. 3ertainly there is no sense of modern logic having a transforming effect on
16
the presentation of political philosophy. Indeed the mood is much more one of linguistic,
rather than analytic, philosophy, in any obvious sense. 2ut it is also unclear that there is
much, in terms of methods of argument, that marks a break with, say, 0obbes and
2entham, who each sought out clarity and rigour in argument, and were e!ually prepared
to accuse their predecessors of confusion.
#. $he %e&i&al of Ad&ocacy
"here is a character to the writings of the First &eries of Philosophy, Politics and &ociety
that is brought out very well in the Introduction to the second series, published in 1(6-,
this time edited by the sociologist Runciman, alongside the historian 1aslett. "he editors
contend that the papers of the first volume, and other writings of the time, are much more
concerned with diagnosis than with advocacy #1aslett and Runciman, 1(6-, p. viii%i*,.
/nd indeed, looking back to the first series there is virtually no assertion or defence of a
substantive position in political philosophy.
"he mood, however, had changed to some degree by 1(6-, and between 1(56 and 1(6-
there had been significant developments in the area. For one, Isaiah 2erlin's classic paper
9"wo 3oncepts of 1iberty' was presented as an Inaugural 1ecture and published in 1(5)
#2erlin 1(5)C1(6(, . "he tone and general character of 2erlin's writing makes him an
unlikely champion of analytic philosophy, especially in the light of 2erlin's warning
against attempting to impose methods of logical and linguistic analysis in political
philosophyD
"o neglect the field of political thought, because its unstable sub@ect%matter, with its
blurred edges, is not to be caught by the fi*ed concepts, abstract models and fine
instruments suitable to logic or to linguistic analysis % to demand a unity of method
in philosophy, and re@ect whatever the method cannot successfully manage % is
merely to allow oneself to remain at the mercy of primitive and uncriticised
political beliefs #2erlin, 1(5)C1(6(, p. 11(,
17
4et the central contrast of his paper is very interesting for our purposes. In distinguishing
positive from negative liberty, 2erlin is distinguishing a collectivist view of liberty, in
which, for e*ample, the state knows best what makes you free, from an individualist
notion in which liberty involves the pursuit of a plan of one's own. "he collectivist view
is associated by 2erlin with 0egel, Fichte, 2radley, 2osan!uet and Ereen, the
individualist notion with 0obbes, 1ocke, &mith, 2entham and Mill. In other words,
2erlin's essay is one of the main sites in which analytic political philosophy emphasised
its decisive break with the idealist tradition, and by reviving an older tradition, 2erlin is
helping support a new one.
/ second development was the publication of the ma@or te*t Social Principles and the
Democratic State, by &tanley 2enn and Richard Peters in 1(5(, which, on the first page
of 3hapter 1, asserts its analytic credentials with a phrase later to be made famous by
Margaret "hatcher 9"he first and obvious observation to make is that there is no such
thing as society' #2enn and Peters, 1(5(, p. 1?,. 0owever, rather than an assertion of a
form of individualism it is part of a programme of conceptual analysis in which a series
of political concepts, such as e!uality, democracy, authority and freedom are probed in
depth, as an attempt to introduce a form of analytic reasoning into issues of politics.
/nother highly significant event during this period was the publication of 0.1./. 0art's
The oncept of )a/ 1(61 #0art 1(61C1((+,. "his work, the founding te*t of analytical
@urisprudence, also has to be regarded as a classic of analytic philosophy. 0art e*plicitly
describes his book as an e*ercise in 9analytic @urisprudence', as well, more surprisingly,
as 9descriptive sociology', and develops a version of legal positivism, re@ecting both
natural law theory and the crude 9command' theory of law identified with earlier
positivist views. 1egal positivism is a form of positivism in that it makes central use of a
factCvalue distinction, asserting that the e*istence of law does not depend on its moral
content #the 9&eparation "hesis',. 0art introduces the idea that any legal system needs a
9rule of recognition' by which new laws are made and legitimised, and that the e*istence
of law depends on the social facts by which it is recognised #"he 9&ocial "hesis',.
1)
$espite the power of argument and general clarity of e*pression, however, 0art's own
view has been surprisingly resistant to precise capture, especially in the light of the
inclusion of an unfinished postscript to the second edition of the work #published in
1((+,, primarily responding to $workin's criticisms.
It is also worth noting that 0art's important paper 9/re "here /ny ;atural RightsL' was
published as early as 1(55, a year before the first series of Philosophy, Politics and
&ociety, and much more constructive than most of the papers in that volume #0art, 1(55,.
In addition to the substantive contributions 0art makes to the theory of rights, and, by
means of his 9principle of fair play' to the theory of political obligation, this paper is
notable for perhaps one of the clearest statements of the methodological assumptions of
post%positivist conceptual analysis, included in the following statement, 9Perhaps few
would now deny, as some have, that there are moral rightsH for the point of that denial
was usually to ob@ect to some philosophical claim as to the Montological statusM of rights,
and this ob@ection is now e*pressed not as a denial that there are any moral rights but as a
denial of some assumed logical similarity between sentences used to assert the e*istence
of rights and other kinds of sentences' #0art, 1(55, 176,.
2oth 2erlin and 0art are represented in the second series of Politics, Philosophy and
&ociety. "he preface of the second series includes a reflection on the remark in the
preface to the first concerning the alleged death of political philosophy #indeed all other
volumes in the series either discuss or allude to this remark,. "he 9heyday of eldonism'
was said to have ended #1aslett and Runciman, 1(6-, p. vii, and eldon in fact had died
in 1(5), according to some accounts taking his own life #Bing, 1((+,. "he second series
contains much of interest. 2erlin's contribution is his famous paper 9$oes Political
Philosophy &till >*istL' #2erlin, 1(6-,. 0ere he continues his sideswipe against
prescriptive methodology, mentioned above, suggesting that political philosophy arises
out of disagreements about the conception of man, and while it can be suppressed, it
cannot be legislated out of e*istence. 2erlin is able to convey a sense of history in which
positivist strictures are a passing fad which cannot suppress human curiosity and
1(
inventiveness. 2erlin invites us to observe that in a historical perspective such concerns
will eventually appear parochial, local and a product of their time. 4et 2erlin is still
somewhat guarded about the current state of political philosophy, observing that no
9commanding work' had been published in the -.
th
3entury #2erlin, 1(6-, p.1,.
"he second series of Politics, Philosophy and &ociety includes a number of papers that
have e*erted an influence on subse!uent debates, and in several cases continue to do so.
Richard ollheim's 9/ Parado* in the "heory of $emocracy' #ollheim, 1(6-, set off a
small industry, and 2ernard illiams' 9"he Idea of >!uality' is widely reprinted and still
discussed #illiams, 1(6-,. 0art's 9Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment' is
thorough, illuminating, and informed by detailed understanding both of political theory
and practices of criminal law #0art, 1(6-,. In passing, it is interesting to note that the
editors remark that they asked 2ertrand Russell to contribute a piece on nuclear
disarmament, but he declined to do so, although, perhaps, the fact that he would then
have been around (. years old may have had some bearing on this #1aslett and
Runciman, 1(6-, i*,.
Part of the e*plicit agenda of the volume is to bring the social sciences into contact with
political philosophy. 0ere, I think, we have to say that the volume is not entirely
successful. MacIntyre's 9/ Mistake /bout 3ausality in &ocial &cience' is much more a
contribution to the philosophy of social science, rather than a contribution to social
science or an attempt to show how social science can be of use to philosophers
#MacIntyre, 1(6-,. 2ut the volume does contain several papers by social scientists,
including Runciman #the co%editor,, $ahrendorf and Reinhard 2endi*, all of whom draw
on empirical research or sociological theory to attempt to illuminate !uestions of issues
of democracy and of ine!uality.
0owever, there is little doubt that the highlight of the collection is the reprint of Rawls's
98ustice as Fairness', first published in the Philosophical (evie/ #Rawls, 1(5)C1(6-,.
"he editors seem clear that Rawls is doing something new, and highly stimulating, and
even at that time there seems to be a sense that the future health of the discipline is in his
-.
hands. "he character of Rawls' paper is !uite different to anything else in the first two
volumes. First, it is the only paper in the volume to set out and defend a particular
substantive conclusion. &econd, it has a distinct approach to methodology. Many other
authors of the era chide previous philosophers through the application of methodological
dogma, and then find themselves hamstrung by their own methodological strictures. 2y
contrast, Rawls lays out elements of a methodology, and then uses it to constructive
effect. "hird, Rawls's relation to the previous history of the sub@ect is to find inspiration
in it, rather than either to ignore it, or treat it as a series of informative mistakes. &o, for
e*ample, Rawls rather over%generously suggests that 9a similar analysis' to his principles
of @ustice can be found in the now largely forgotten work The Principles of Moral
#ud"ement, by . $. 1amont #1amont, 1(+6, #Rawls, 1(5)C1(6-, p. 1?+n,. Indeed the
original Philosophical (evie/ version of Rawls's paper contains many more referenced
footnotes, and clearly demonstrates Rawls' e*haustive engagement with the recent
literature. Fourth, Rawls does not restrict himself to philosophical te*ts, but is !uite
happy to make use of work in related fields, such as welfare economics. ith Rawls,
under the influence of 0art, 2erlin, and &tuart 0ampshire, whom Rawls encountered in
<*ford in the academic year 1(5-%? #Pogge, -..7D 16, one sees political philosophy
rediscovering its confidence.
<ne has to ask, though, whether political philosophy in the =nited &tates ever suffered
the same degree of loss as confidence as it did in the =B. "he first volume of 'omos, the
yearbook of the /merican &ociety of Political and 1egal Philosophy was published in
1(5), with a collection of essays on /uthority, by a range of authors including Frank
Bnight, 0annah /rendt, 2ertand de 8ouvenal and "alcott Parsons #Friedrich, 1(5),. "he
general character of the volume is one of historical reflection and conceptual analysis,
with little, if anything, of the spectre of 9eldonism' that haunted 2ritish political
philosophers at the time. Nolumes continued to be produced on an annual basis, with
Nolume NI, 8ustice, produced in 1(6?, a particular highlight with 8oel Feinberg's 98ustice
and Personal $esert', perhaps the most enduring of the papers included, alongside other
important contributions such as 8ohn Rawls's 93onstitutional 1iberty and the 3oncept of
-1
8ustice', Robert "ucker's 9Mar* and $istributive 8ustice' and 0ugo 2edau's 98ustice and
3lassical =tilitarianism' #Friedrich and 3hapman, 1(6?,.
'. ()ford %eadin"s and !aslett and %unci*an $hird to Fifth +eries
"he third series of Philosophy, Politics and &ociety, again edited by 1aslett and
Runciman, appeared in 1(67 #1aslett and Runciman, 1(67,, the same year that Fuinton
produced the edited collection Political Philosophy for the <*ford Readings in
Philosophy series. Fuinton included 0art's 9;atural Rights' paper as well as 2erlin's
9"wo 3oncepts of 1iberty'. <ther highlights include a symposium between R.&. Peters
and Peter inch on 9/uthority', and two papers by 2rian 2arry, 9"he Public Interest' and
98ustice and the 3ommon Eood'. 2arry's Political Ar"ument, a ma@or work of analytic
political philosophy, had recently also been published #2arry, 1(65,. Indeed in the first
paragraph of Political Ar"ument 2arry e*plicit describes his approach as 9analytical',
which, interestingly, he contrasts with 9causal', by which he appears to mean the
collection of data or historical information for purposes of scientific e*planation #2arry,
1(65, p. *vii,. 3learly 2arry's intention is to use a method of analysis, involving
arguments, ob@ections to the arguments of others, and distinctions, rather than supporting
or undermining theories through the accumulation of evidence.
"wo more methodological papers are included by Fuinton, 8ohn PlamenatG's 9"he =se of
Political "heory' and P.0. Partridge's 9Politics, Philosophy, Ideology'. "hese both
respond to the allegation that political philosophy is dead. PlamenatG appears to agree
with his contemporaries that most of great philosophers of the past were hopelessly
confusedH nevertheless, he claims, political philosophy is a branch of practical
philosophy, needed to guide conduct, despite the claims of the positivists #PlamenatG
1(6.C1(67,. Partridge suggests that one reason for the apparent decline of morally
informed political philosophy is the triumph of democracy, and the development of a
broad political consensus. ;evertheless, he argues, political theory of other sorts
flourishes #Partridge 1(61C1(67,.
--
For present purposes, however, Fuinton's introduction to the volume is of greatest
interest. 0e begins by en!uiring after the nature of the sub@ect of political philosophy,
suggesting that the 9most uncontroversial way of defining political philosophy is as the
common topic of a series of famous books' #Fuinton, 1(67, p. 1,. 2ut Fuinton then
suggests that 9a comparative definite place has now been marked out for philosophy
within the total range of man's intellectual activities'. "his place is 9the task of classifying
and analysing the terms, statements and arguments of the substantive, first%order
disciplines' #Fuinton, 1(67, p. 1,. From this, Fuinton concludes, remarkably, that 9the
works that make up the great tradition of political philosophy are K only to a small,
though commonly crucial, e*tent works of philosophy in the strict sense' #Fuinton, 1(67,
p. 1, For, as Fuinton remarks, they also contain factual or descriptive elements falling
under the heading of 9political science' and recommendations of ideal ends, which he
calls 9ideology'.
Returning to Philosophy+ Politics and Society series three, the editors report a sub@ect in a
productive phase, with a good number of books and important articles appearing in recent
years. /s with previous volumes the contributions range over a variety of sub@ects, but
there is a greater awareness that positivism is a theory that needs to be engaged with
critically, rather than a formula or straight@acket. Interestingly, the collection begins with
a paper by /yer, 9Man /s / &ub@ect for &cience', which asks why the social sciences
have failed to achieve the apparent success in the natural sciences. /yer's conclusion is
relatively modestD the fact that human action has a social meaning does not rule out the
type of determinism that would allow scientific e*planation of human behaviour #/yer,
1(67,. 0owever, a more critical engagement with positivism appears in the following
essay, 3harles "aylor's 9;eutrality in Political &cience', which attempts to undermine the
fact%value distinction by arguing that certain combinations of descriptions and value
@udgments cannot coherently be combined, and thus it is mistaken to suppose that
!uestions of facts and values are entirely separable #"aylor, 1(67,. "his is complemented
by the interesting inclusion of 0annah /rendt's 9"ruth and Politics'. ithout making the
point e*actly in these terms, /rendt provides an important counterweight to the naivety of
a positivistic approach to politics that supposes that scientific en!uiry will be sufficient to
-?
settle empirical conflict. In contrast, /rendt shows with some plausibility how impotent a
dispassionate search for empirical truth can be in the face of political power that has an
interest in an opposing view #/rendt, 1(67,.
"he collection also includes contributions from /rrow, summarising his impossibility
theorem, 3.2. MacPherson, R.M. 0are, &tephen 1ukes, 8ohn PlamenatG and 2ernard
3rick. 2ut once more the highlight of the volume is Rawls's paper, this time 9$istributive
8ustice', in which he argues that a competitive market, if appropriately regulated, can be
made to satisfy his two principles of @ustice #Rawls, 1(67,. Much of this paper, if not the
main thrust of the argument, re%appears later in A Theory of #ustice.
For the fourth series, published in 1(7-, 1aslett and Runciman are @oined as editor by
Fuentin &kinner #1aslett, Runciman and &kinner, 1(7-,. It is, presumably, no coincidence
that the 3ambridge school of the history of political thought is well%represented here with
papers by &kinner, 8ohn $unn and Richard "uck #then aged -?,. "he preface comments
that the recovery of political philosophy was partly a matter of rebutting the 9end%of%
ideology' theorists who proclaimed ideology to be over, on the basis of 9a high degree of
governmental stability Iin estern democracies togetherJ with a high degree of popular
apathy' #1aslett, Runciman and &kinner, 1(7-, p. 1,. It is curious, however, that the end
of ideology theorists, by which the editors presumably mean $aniel 2ell and followers,
were neither represented nor discussed in any detail in the earlier volumes, although they
were discussed by Partridge in the Fuinton collection. /nother previous bogey A crude
positivism, as so often problematically attributed to eldon among others A is said to
have been overcome by the realisation by "aylor, Foot, 0ampshire and others that
identification of 9the facts' often involves a description which is 9normatively weighted'
#1aslett, Runciman and &kinner, 1(7-, p. ?,. "he overwhelming impression given in the
Introduction is relief at the defeat of the smothering forces of the 9end%of%ideology' and
positivism, and the resurrection of political philosophy, which now takes on a variety of
forms. 4et it is worth noting that the preface makes no mention of Rawls. Presumably the
volume went to press before the publication of A Theory of #ustice #Rawls, 1(71,,
published in 1(7- in the =B, and so at this point nothing usefully could be said. <nce
-+
more the collection reprints some highly notable papers, such as 0anna Pitkin's
9<bligation and 3onsent' #first published 1(65 and 1(66,, Robert ;oGick's 93oercion'
#first published 1(6(, and Eerald Mac3allum's 9;egative and Positive Freedom #first
published 1(67,, with other contributions from /lasdair MacIntyre, 8ames 3ornford,
/lan Ryan and 8ames 3oleman.
2efore moving on it is worth adding a very brief word about &kinner's paper O9&ocial
Meaning' and the >*planation of &ocial /ctionP, for this is part of a programme of work
by &kinner that may well be among the most ambitious attempts to connect political
philosophy with other work in contemporary philosophy. $rawing on the work of /ustin,
&trawson, Erice and $avidson, alongside inch and 0ollis, &kinner attempts to apply
/ustin's notion of 9illocutionary force' in analysing the social meaning of action
#&kinner, 1(7-,.
For the fifth series, published in 1(7(, co%edited this time by 8ames Fishkin alongside
1aslett, political philosophy has clearly entered its Rawlsian phase #1aslett and Fishkin,
1(7(,. "he preface begins by suggesting that the e*istence of A Theory of #ustice at last
falsifies 2erlin's earlier contention that no commanding work of political philosophy of
the twentieth century e*ists #1aslett and Fishkin 1(7(, p. 1,. "he editors also note the
importance of the publication of ;oGick's Anarchy State and 0topia #;oGick, 1(7+,, and
the foundation of the @ournal, in 1(71, Philosophy and Public Affairs. "he editors
comment that they have a 9twinge of regret' that so little of the work that has led to the
revival of the sub@ect was conducted in the =B. Indeed, of the work they present only two
papers were produced by authors based in the =B, 1aslett himself and the relatively
unknown Eeoffrey 0arrison of the =niversity of Reading, whose paper 9Relativism and
"oleration', first published in &thics in 1(76, is really a work of moral philosophy. 2rian
2arry, who has a paper in the volume, was then based in 3hicago. <n the other hand,
they say, they are delighted that the field is now flourishing. /s noted earlier, however, it
is unclear that political philosophy in the =nited &tates ever went through the paralysing
methodological an*ieties suffered in the =B. It may well be that the dominance of
linguistic philosophy in <*ford e*erted an effect on political philosophy in a way that
-5
was not e*perienced elsewhere. "o take one e*ample, the <*ford obsession with the
!uestion of whether a claim in philosophy is analytic or synthetic may have forced
discussion into unpromising cul%de%sacs, whereas elsewhere in the world, especially at
0arvard under the influence of Fuine, the straight@acket was applied with a lower degree
of pressure, and political philosophers felt freer to advance their case by whatever means
were at hand #for related reflections see 3ohen, -..., pp. 17%1(,.
"he fifth series was published at what may well be close to the high point of political
philosophy in the twentieth century. "he previous few years had seen, as we have noted,
the publication of Rawls's and ;oGick's ma@or works, and within two years #1()1,
$workin's two papers 9hat is >!ualityL Part 1 and Part -' would also appear #$workin,
1()1a, $workin 1()1d,. "he years 1(71%1()1 are rarely celebrated, but they are the
years in which the contemporary canon in political philosophy was created.
1aslett and Fishkin speculate that three causes, in addition to Rawls's towering work,
brought political philosophy to its new vibrant state. "he first is the growth of human
populations and its effect on the environment. "he second they cryptically call 9arithmetic
humanity in relation to politics' by which they mean what would now be called global
ethics and problems concerning our duties to future generations. Finally, they list
concerns over the obligations owed by the 9sub@ects of contemporary authoritarian states',
especially in relation to the &oviet =nion #1aslett and Fishkin, 1(7(, p. -,. "he second of
the themes is well%represented by the reprint of Peter &inger's famous 1(71 paper
9Famine, /ffluence and Morality' and also 1aslett's 9"he 3onversation 2etween the
Eenerations', although the first theme #environmental concerns, is not to be found in the
volume, and the third #authoritarianism, only partially. It is true that several papers
discuss democracy and the limits of authority, yet only Fishkin's own contribution
9"yranny and $emocratic "heory' e*pressly takes non%liberal societies as its ob@ect.
Perhaps for this reason it is worth comparing 1aslett and Runciman's account of the
revival of political philosophy with one which is now more familiar. "his is the claim that
the =& civil rights movement and /merican involvement in the Nietnam war created a
series of urgent problems concerning the goals and limits of state power, sparking a
-6
variety of critical responses including defences of anarchism #olff, 1(7.C7-,, detailed
reflection on the nature of a @ust war #alGer, 1(77, and e*tensive discussions of civil
disobedience and freedom of e*pression. <n this view, these urgent problems not only
drew in the finest philosophical minds to the debate but also rendered any last vestiges of
positivistic sub@ectivism an irrelevance.
Returing to 1aslett and Fishkin's introduction, they also raise the !uestion of whether the
series has now served its purpose and ask whether there will be any point in the future in
producing such a general work collecting together papers in political philosophy. In fact
the series still continues, but changed in form so as to be focused on a single topic. "he
ne*t volume, also edited by 1aslett and Fishkin, appeared in 1((- and, for the first time,
had a substantive titleD #ustice 1et/een A"e Groups and Generations #1aslett and
Fishkin, 1((-,. "his was followed by Debatin" Deliberative Democracy, in -..? #1aslett
and Fishkin, -..?,. 1aslett, sadly, died in -..1, but the series continues, with Population
and Political Theory, edited by Fishkin and Robert Eoodin published in -.1. #Fishkin
and Eoodin, -.1.,.
3omparing the later volumes with the earlier parts of the series, the most obvious point is
that the sub@ect had developed to a point where a short volume devoted to political
philosophy generally had little purpose. "o some degree the same development occurred
with the <*ford Readings series, where Political Philosophy, edited by Fuinton,
published in 1(67, can be compared to 8eremy aldron's edited collection Theories of
(i"hts #aldron, 1()5,. "he second change is the shift from what the editors of the
second series aptly called diagnosis to advocacyD arguments for substantive views, which
re%emerged with Rawls and gave others the courage to continue. "his, I think, is a matter
more of overcoming some of the dogmas of positivism and linguistic philosophy rather
than applying other aspects of analytic philosophy. "he third development concerns the
engagement of the papers with the social sciences. "he editors throughout the series made
various valiant attempts to connect political philosophy with allied sub@ects such as
history and sociology. <ver the decades it may be possible to detect the rising importance
to political philosophy of economics, rational choice theory and formal models, and
-7
possibly the diminishing importance of !ualitative social science, especially sociology. "o
some degree this may be part of the remaining legacy of positivism for political
philosophyD the refusal to countenance empirical theory unless it yields determinate
predictions that can be tested by observational or statistical methods. 0owever, a
powerful counter%current also e*ists in the work of writers such as Michael alGer,
2ernard illiams and 3harles "aylor who act on a much more inclusive view of what
counts as successful and useful social science #see, for e*ample, alGer 1()?, illiams
-..5, "aylor 1((.,.
,. Analytic Political Philosophy since 1-,0
e noted in the opening section of this paper that, at its foundation, it is possible to
define analytic philosophy in terms of the re@ection of idealism, and the use of the new
logic and of conceptual analysis. In recent decades, however, analytic philosophy has
tended to be defined much more in terms of its <therD continental philosophy. 4et how
e*actly to characterise this distinction in relation to political philosophy is contested
#Elock, -..), pp. 17(%-.?,. &o, for e*ample, it is often thought that analytic political
philosophy aims at conceptual clarification, while continental political philosophy is
more politically engaged. hile this is plausible as a tendency it will hardly do as a
criterion. >!ually, it may often appear that analytic philosophy looks towards
mathematics and the empirical sciences for models of methodology, whereas continental
philosophy looks more towards literary and interpretive studies. /gain this seems fair as a
broad characterisation, although there are many counter%e*amples. Perhaps the best we
can do is to say that a broad distinction can be seen in that there is a line of intellectual
tradition that runs from 8ohn &tuart Mill and another from 0egel.
/ny list of 9leading contemporary analytic political philosophers' is bound to be
contested. 4et it is possible to identify a broad grouping of political philosophers who
-)
have in common respect for a particular type of discipline of thought, in which argument,
distinctions, thesis and counter%e*ample characterise their work, and there is a self%
conscious attempt to achieve rigour and clarity. "hey also take each other's work
e*tremely seriously, and will naturally attempt to position their own contributions in the
light of the positions they attribute to others in this group. 4et there is a great deal of
difference in their styles of writing too. <ne thing that is especially striking is their use of
e*amples. Rawls, in a Theory of #ustice+ is relatively sparing #Rawls, 1(71,. Anarchy+
State+ and 0topia, by contrast, bristles with e*amples, almost all of which are stark,
small%scale, abstract and entirely fictional, and many carry a great deal of argumentative
weight, especially by way of counter%e*ample #;oGick, 1(7+,. "his approach is also to
found in $workin, 3ohen and some work of &en #although in other work &en also uses
many real%world cases too, as for e*ample, in &en 1(((,. ;oGick notes that his approach
to political philosophy may strike some as troubling D
I write in the mode of much contemporary philosophical work in epistemology or
metaphysicsD there are elaborate arguments, claims rebutted by unlikely
countere*amples, surprising theses, puGGles, abstract structural conditions,
challenges to find another theory which fits a specified range of cases, startling
conclusions, and so on. "hough this makes for intellectual interest and e*citement
#I hope, some may feel that the truth about ethics and political philosophy is too
serious and important to be obtained by such 9flashy' tools. ;evertheless, it may
be that correctness in ethics is not found in what we usually think #;oGick, 1(7+
p. *,.
Many political philosophers now argue in the style brought out most clearly and
e*plicitly by ;oGick, although it had already been pioneered by 8udith 8arvis "homson,
most notably in her 9/ $efence of /bortion', published in the first issue of Philosophy
and Public Affairs in 1(71 #"homson 1(71,, and, to some degree, in work published by
0.1./. 0art and Philippa Foot in the %$ford (evie/ #0art 1(67C1(6), Foot 1(6)C1(7),.
&uch use of abstract, generally fictional, e*amples is one half of what often is most
-(
distinctive in contemporary analytic political theory. In this respect, although Rawls
theory has been far more influential than ;oGick's in the substantive development of
subse!uent political philosophy, much of contemporary political philosophy is written in
a style far closer to ;oGick than to Rawls.
If the elaborate use of abstract, fictional e*amples is one half of what is most distinctive
about contemporary analytic political philosophy, the other half is abstraction of another
sortD the largely unstated ambition to develop theories with the precision and economy
one finds among scientists or economists, with fewest possible concepts, all as clear as
they can be made, and with widest possible application. /s with the use of conceptual
analysis, the search for a concise but powerful theory is not new but nevertheless it is a
type of paradigm of rigour which characterises many of the writings most recognisable as
contributions to the tradition of contemporary analytical political philosophy. It is often
accompanied by a lack of comprehension of, or respect for, writing that does not conform
to this model, supposing that it is somehow deliberately obscurantist, evasive or
otherwise of poor !uality.
&uch a negative attitude to other approaches is e*emplified in one of the very few
movements within political philosophy which has self%consciously termed itself
9analytic'D 9analytic Mar*ism'. "he theorists comprising this group, included E./. 3ohen,
8on >lster, 8ohn Roemer, >rik right, 0illel &teiner, Philippe van Pari@s and Rober van
der Neen, among others #see in particular 3ohen 1(7)C-..., Roemer 1()-, and >lster
1()5,. "hese theorists were attracted, albeit to considerably different degrees, to elements
of Mar*'s thought but were also united in their dissatisfaction with the standards of rigour
with which Mar*ist topics were treated in the literature, especially by those influenced by
the French Mar*ist 1ouis /lthusser #/lthusser 1(65C1(6( and /lthusser and 2alibar
1(6)C1(7(,. &o, for e*ample, in a footnote 3ohen !uotes the following from >tienne
2alibar 9"his is precisely the first meaning to which we can give the idea of dialecticD a
logic or form of e*planation specifically adapted to the determinant intervention of class
struggle in the very fabric of history.' 3ohen comments. 9If you read a sentence like that
?.
!uickly it can sound pretty good. "he remedy is to read it more slowly' #3ohen
1(7)C-..., **iii,.
>lster, in his review of 3ohen's 2arl Mar$3s Theory of History4 A Defence, wrote that it
9sets a new standard for Mar*ist philosophy' #>lster 1()., p. 1-1,. In a similar vein, /llen
ood commented, in reference to his own e*cellent book on Mar* published in 1()1
9while it is easy to write an above average book on Mar*, it is very difficult to write a
good one' #ood, 1()1, p. *,. 3ohen writes in the preface to the first edition of Barl
Mar* that in his attempt to state Mar*'s theory he will be guided both by what Mar*
actually wrote and by standards of clarity and rigour of analyic philosophy. 0e remarks
9it is a perhaps a matter of regret that logical positivism, with its insistence on precision
of intellectual commitment, never caught on in Paris' #3ohen 1(7)C-..., p. *,.
3ohen's Introduction to the -... revised edition contains a substantial discussion of the
nature and history of /nalytic Mar*ism. 0ere he introduces the term analytic by means of
two contrasts. In what 3ohen calls a 9broad sense' analytic is opposed to 9dialectic'
thinking, and in a narrow sense opposed to 9holistic' thinking. 3ohen suggests that
Mar*ism has been hampered by the assumption that it had its own 9dialectic'
methodology, and thereby eschewed other, powerful, methodologies that had developed
in the analytic tradition of philosophy and social scienceD logical and linguistic analysis,
neo%classical economics and rational choice theory. /nalytic philosophy in the supposed
narrower sense of the re@ection of holism is to adopt a form of methodological
individualism in e*planationH in essence an important part of the re@ection of idealism
identified above #3ohen, **%**v,. "he work of >lster #>lster 1()5, and Roemer #Roemer
1()-, e!ually deploy such methodology, and indeed >lster has criticised 3ohen #in his
adoption of functional e*planation, for being insufficiently rigorous #>lster, 1().,.
Part of analytic Mar*ism's motivation for making its methodology so e*plicit is its
competition with, and antagonism to, a 9dialectical' school, influenced by 0egel and by
French Mar*ism, each side contesting the other's right to stake their claim on the same
sub@ect matter of en!uiry. &ubse!uently, this group has produced a significant body of
?1
important writings that are not about Mar* but continue to be characterised by a number
of the features of the analytic style we have identifiedD re@ection of idealism, preference
for !uantitative over !ualitative social science, use of abstract e*amples and simplified
models, methodological and moral individualism, self%conscious search for clarity and
precision of thesis and argument, intolerance of the claimed obscurity of others, and the
ambition of presenting simple theories or principles of great power and application.
Philippe van Pari@s (eal ,reedom for All #van Pari@s, 1((5, and 3ohen's later work
(escuin" #ustice and &*uality #3ohen, -..), are e*cellent e*amples, containing many of
these features. 2ut 0illel &teiner's An &ssay on (i"hts may well be the purest e*ample of
such a methodology, in which the most of the main features we have identified are
deployed at length. For e*ample, e*plaining his focus on rights as a means to illuminating
issues of @ustice, &teiner suggests. 9/ sensible strategy, it seems to me, is to begin at the
elementary particles, since all big things are made from small ones. "he elementary
particles of @ustice are rights.' #&teiner 1((+, p. -, In an echo of ;oGick's comment cited
above, &teiner remarks that those concerned with oppression, e*ploitation, discrimination
and poverty may find his treatment of these topics abstract and detached from the real
issues, even to the point of frivolity. 2ut, he replies, conceptual analysis must be done, by
the most effective means, if the issues are to be dealt with in a suitably rigorous fashion.
.. /onclusion
It could be argued that the emergence of analytic philosophy was not, initially, a helpful
development for political philosophy. "he most prominent early contribution was the
re@ection of idealism, especially the work of writers such as 2osan!uet and Ereen. 4et, as
we have seen, such re@ection was not accompanied by the acceptance of an alternative
approach, or at least not on any significant scale. "he new logic had no influence on
political philosophy, and the confines of linguistic philosophy and logical positivism left
political philosophers with a very narrow understanding of their disciplineD so much so
that, as we noted above, in 1(67 Fuinton went as far as to suggest that many of the
historically great works of political philosophy were only in small part strictly speaking
political philosophy at all #Fuinton, 1(67, p. 1,. Political philosophy became
?-
introspective and unambitious, although not averse to criticising the apparently crude
errors of the great theorists of the past. ith a few e*ceptions, such as the work of 0ayek
and Popper, it was not until the publication of Rawls's A Theory of #ustice in 1(71 that
political philosophers began to return to write on a broad canvas and pursue advocacy of
substantive positions. &ince then, the sub@ect has flourished and a distinctive
methodology of analytic philosophy has developed, although much more in the idiom of
;oGick than Rawls, and most self%consciously by /nalytic Mar*ism.
/longside, of course, has also developed a counter%tendency, ob@ecting to the abstraction,
individualism, ahistoricism, reductionism, over%simplifying tendencies, and, sometimes,
the apparent frivolity, of analytic political philosophy, or, at least, of some e*amples of it.
4et often even the counter works, such as >liGabeth /nderson's important paper 9hat is
the Point of >!ualityL' #/nderson, 1(((, display many of the methodological
characteristics of analytic political philosophy and by means of entering into critical
debate can be thought to be part of the same methodological tradition. In a sense it may
appear that analytic political philosophy is almost inescapable, unless one self%
consciously adopts a 9continental' style. 4et it is also possible to see what it would be to
write in a manner which is less obviously analytic. &o, for e*ample, the writings of
Michael alGer, /martya &en, and Martha ;ussbaum #alGer 1()?, &en 1(((,
;ussbaum -...,, taking sociology and history seriously, and attempting to be politically
engaged, provide different approaches which, at the least, are on the outer fringes of
analytic political philosophy, without being identifiable as continental philosophy. "he
abstract, politically unengaged, and ahistoric character of much analytic politically
philosophy affords it certain advantages in terms of sorting valid from invalid arguments
and coherent from incoherent propositions. ;evertheless it would be a great pity if other
styles of thinking about political !uestions, informed by history and sociology, and not
only neo%classical economics and rational choice theory, disappeared from the menu
available to political philosophers.
-
-
I am e*tremely grateful to Michael Rosen, Michael 2eaney, Qofia &tempslowska, 0illel
&teiner, &hepley <rr, Michael <tsuka, /le* Noorhoeve, /ndrea &angiovanni, 1eif enar,
Paul Belly, /lan 0aworth, $avid 1loyd "homas, /lan 0amlin, Eeraint Perry, Ian 3arter,
??
/nalytic 1egal and Political Philosophy
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