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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
MarcelinoLontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J .:
Alenxander A. Kriventoralien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which
was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on
the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the
Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds,
from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been
granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon
a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this
reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our
judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment
simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because
we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different
considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs
have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case
had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the
Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice,
instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was
naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the
trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-
appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of
Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his
appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is
whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and
whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional
mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the
harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full
advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because
both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds
venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote,
with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote
was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, t he
constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
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Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain,
its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the
Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and
mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.
And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic
classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said
classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were
mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public
lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No.
926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in
long line of decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoavs. Insular Government, 13
Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocsonvs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankronvs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of
necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoavs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all
kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally
agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification,
and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually
agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the
time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and
timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as
including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind
when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior to
the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in
accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law.ed., 648;
Bronson vs.Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put
upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed,
technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written
Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have
been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of
construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so
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previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p.
758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including
residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the
rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a
legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted,
the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit
the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a
solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public
agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This
simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as
used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are
stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands
for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino
citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire
public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for
residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is
another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way
back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in
section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for
purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural,
timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as
the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and,
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs.
Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. .
. .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these
classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the land is
the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorchvs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility
of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or
not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to
devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also
because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the
constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon
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administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by
the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and executive have always maintained that
lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose
conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as
follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would
certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the
policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the
same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons
who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both
sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes
residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction
that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public
and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for
the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the
State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. TeofiloSison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that
residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be
so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a
discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public
domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become
superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands
will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private
individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into "no
agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word
"agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actuall y used for
agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify
concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to
include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same
would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above
indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are
agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land."
And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the
possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would
be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns
and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and
purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative
spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
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One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of
the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands,
minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved
for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.)
Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural
lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the
Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in
Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most
important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be
just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?"
(Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating
objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr.
Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an
alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the
Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public
Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as
follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their
charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens
of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent
improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such
laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to
public lands, terrenosbaldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public
domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization
by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as
to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not
thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for
industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands
and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise
period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No.
2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or
otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections.
Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon
express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came
the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
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acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their
charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal
decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenosbaldios y realengos,
or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other
form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided,
further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the
Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the new
provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy
contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants
them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly
who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no
proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case
under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their
constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more
comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential
land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any
kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real
property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and
private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is
again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that
private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to
authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the
Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify
that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may
desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where
they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name
of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for
residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential
lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.


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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.
VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.
Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MOIR, J .:
In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the appellants sought to register the three lots or parcels of
land involved in this appeal, which registration was opposed by the Director of Forestry.
The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small portion of lot 1154 and all of lots 1158 were "forestry"
lands, to which appellants had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and refused registration of the parts of these lots to which
opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and brought the case to
this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots 1104, 1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of
Hinigaran were possessed by BibianoJocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the year 1880, and, after his
death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were planted and now exists and that these latter are not spontaneous plants utilized
by said heirs.
2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is rice and pasture land that was possessed as
owner by BibianoJocson during his lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a possession continued by his heirs who still enjoy
the use of the land up to the present time.
3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot 1158, there has existed since the year 1890, and still
exists, a fish hatchery which has been possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of BibianoJocson, as owners, for more than 27 years,
not counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.
4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently
proven by the sole and absurd testimony of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of spontaneous growth and in not planted;
and , as the photographs only refer to small portions of the area of the lot, the court also erred in holding that the whole lot was
covered with firewood trees, while in fact but a very small portion of it is covered with trees which protect the nipa plants and
the fish hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot was sown with rice and used as pasture land.
5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158, covered by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land,
and in not holding to have been proven that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they are drained at low tide; errors
committed with manifest violation of law and disregard of the jurisprudence established by the Honorable Supreme Court of the
Philippine.
6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their peaceable, public, and continuous possession for
more than forty years, as owners, including that held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired by prescription lots 1104,
1154, and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190, section 41, which, without exception, is applicable to the State as well as to
private parties, and by extraordinary prescription of thirty years.
7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and appellants, in consideration of the possession they have had
for more than forty years, form the time of their predecessor in interest to the present time, thus violating the legal provision
8

whereby the holders of land who have been in its possession for ten years prior to the enactment of the land law, Act No. 926, by
the United States Philippine Commission, are to be deemed the absolute owners of such land, and to be presumed to have applied
for the same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and all the proceedings required by the Royal Decrees on the
composition of titles; and, therefore, pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question should be adjudicated to the
possessors thereof.
8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants, the motion therefor being based on the ground that
his findings of facts, if there are any, are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main question involved is whether manglares [mangroves] are
agricultural lands or timber lands. If they are timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten years prior to
July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them under the Public Land Act, and no grant or title is necessary.
This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states that lot 1104 was in possession of claimants and their
ancestors for more than thirty years and lot 1154 for more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be wholly "forestal." Theare of
the lots does not appear.
The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in possession of all of those lots quietly, adversely and
continuously under a claim of ownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There is not a word of proof in
the whole record to the contrary. They set up no documentary title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration are "mangles"
with nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing on them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they constructed a fishpond
(vivero de peces) which was later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part palay and part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied registration are public forest and cannot be acquired by
occupation, and that all "manglares are public forests."
In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of the Philippine Islands, and in mentioning forestry
land the Act of Congress used the words "timber land." These words are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act as
"terrenosforestales." We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be "terrenosmadereros." Timber land
in English means land with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has
only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be called "timber land."
The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two places there were trees growing on this land, but the
forester who testified for the Government always calls these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which are growing on the lands are of
no value except for firewood. The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not change the general
character of the land from manglar to timber land.
That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber lands" in the Act of Congress has been definitely decided
by this Court in the case of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the court said:
Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially together, all being covered by one brief
of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic citations he
described that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In
brief, it may be said that they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindered plants
which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also
germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists naturally, but which are also, to some extent,
cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the
sense in which the term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not
available for purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains."
The court on page 573 further said:
It is a kindred case to CiriloMapavs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep., 175).
As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the principle there laid down. The
issue was, whether lands used as a fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some desistance from the sea, and
9

asserted, thought not clearly proved, to be overflowed at high tide, could be registered as private property on the strength of ten
years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The point decided was that
such land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading up to that
conclusion being that Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included in tone of
the three, and being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into the division of agricultural land.
In the case of Mapavs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classified the
public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglaresfound in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its
enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural
lands then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking
effect of this Act, except when prevented by war of force majuere, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land
under the provisions of this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in possession of agricultural public lands under the conditions
mentioned in the above section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have a grant to such lands and are
entitled to have a certificate of title issued to them. (Pamintuanvs. Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep., 485.)
While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition and ownership when it is fully proved that the
possession has been actual, complete and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each case must stand on its own merits.
One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads of firewood from the lands occasionally. The
possession must be more complete than would be required for other agricultural lands.
The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and their ancestors before that date, and they should have
been declared the owners and title should have been issued to them.
There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower court, with instruction to enter a decree in conformity
with this decision. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.



10


FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3793. February 19, 1908. ]

CIRILO MAPA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-Appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellant.

Basilio R. Mapa, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. The phrase "agricultural public lands" defined by the act of Congress of July 1,
1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither mineral nor timber lands.

D E C I S I O N
WILLARD, J . :
This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares in
extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in favor of
the petitioner and the Government has appealed. A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but no exception was
taken to the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the evidence.

The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide
claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act, except when
prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the question whether the land in controversy is
agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted. The findings of the court below upon that point are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty years, in
the possession of the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and up to the present, as
fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the sea, the town of Molo being between the sea
and the said land."cralaw virtua1aw library

The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is found not
only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same construction must be given to the phrase
wherever it occurs in any part of that law.

The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands unless they are such by their nature. If the
contention of the Attorney-General is correct, and this land because of its nature is not agricultural land, it is difficult to see how it could
be disposed of or what the Government could do with it if it should be decided that the Government is the owner thereof. It could not
allow the land to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926 allows the entry of homesteads only upon "agricultural public
lands" in the Philippine Islands, as defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10 only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral agricultural public land in the Philippine
Islands, as defined in the act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two." It could not lease it in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter III of the said act, for section 22 relating to leases limits them to "nonmineral public lands, as defined by section eighteen and
twenty of the act of Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred and two." It may be noted in passing that there is perhaps some
typographical or other error in this reference to sections 18 and 20, because neither one of these sections mentions agricultural lands. The
Government could not give a free patent to this land to a native settler, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, for that relates
only to "agricultural public land, as defined by act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."

11

In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do nothing with this land except to lay out a town site thereon in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, for section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing about agricultural land.

The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has been given to that phrase by the act of Congress. An
examination of that act will show that the only sections thereof wherein can be found anything which could be called a definition of the
phrase are sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as follows:

"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this act and except as herein provided, shall classify
according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect of have the force
of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to
Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at
the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not
exceed sixteen hectares in extent.

"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered on such terms as it may prescribe, by
general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands
such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem
wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four
hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at
once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold
for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title
thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of
decedents."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the phrase "agricultural land." In fact, in section 15 the word
"agricultural" does not occur.

There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural land"
can be found in the act of Congress; the second, that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it means land which in its nature
is agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in the act and that the phrase means all of the public lands acquired from Spain except
those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below adopted this view, and held that the land, not being timber or mineral land, came
within the definition of agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No. 926 was applicable thereto.

1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of the phrase "agricultural land." The Commission in
enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that such a definition could be found therein. The President approved this act and it might be said
that Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in the act of
Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916, to which we
have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be granted can not be
determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the right to sell in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II, nor what
lands it can lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands for which it can give free patents to native settlers in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to follow, necessarily, that none of those chapters could be put into force
and that all that had up to this time been done by virtue thereof would be void.

2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has defined agricultural lands as those lands which are, as the
Attorney-General says, by their nature agricultural. As has been said before, the word "agricultural" does not occur in section 15. Section
13 says that the Government "shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness and shall immediately make rules
and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral land." This is the same thing as
saying that the Government shall classify the public lands other than timber or mineral lands according to its agricultural character and
productiveness; in other words, that it shall classify all the public lands acquired from Spain, and that this classification shall be made
according to the agricultural character of the land and according to its productiveness.

One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it would be very difficult to apply it in practice. What lands
are agricultural in nature? The Attorney-General himself in his brief in this case says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation by the hand of man."cralaw virtua1aw library

The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind of crops raised thereon. Mineral and timber
lands are expressly excluded, but it would be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was not agricultural in nature. Such
lands may be found within the limits of any city. There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly inhabited part thereof an
12

experimental far. This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the same city, is a large tract of land, Camp Wallace,
devoted to sports. The land surrounding the city walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the west, the Luneta on the
south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is of many hectares in extent and is in nature agricultural. The Luneta itself could at
any time be devoted to the growing of crops.

The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is emphasized when we consider that whether certain land was or
was not agricultural land, as defined by the act of Congress, and therefore subject to homestead entry, to sale, or to lease in accordance
with the provisions of Act No. 926, would be a question that would finally have to be determined by the courts, unless there is some
express provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers to determine this question for themselves. Section 2 of Act No. 926
relating to homesteads provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine whether the land described is
prima facie under the law subject to homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale of public lands, provides simply that the Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is
more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it says nothing about his decisions as to whether it is or is not agricultural land
in its nature. Section 26 relating to the lease of public lands provides that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the
certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes
and further summarily determine from available records whether the land is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or
salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents to native settlers makes no provision for any determination by the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands
in regard to the character of the land applied for.

After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made by the administrative officers on the theory that the lands were
agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the matter of their true character open for subsequent action by the courts would be to produce
an evil that should if possible be avoided.

3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a careful
consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below.
Section 13 says that the Government shall "Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other
than timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words,
that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands. As was said in the case of Jones v. The Insular Government (6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where these same section of the act of Congress
were under discussion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that would be entirely free from
objection."cralaw virtua1aw library

But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than any other one that has been suggested.

There is nothing in this case of Jones v. The Insular Government which at all conflicts with the result here arrived at. The question as to
whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands within the meaning of the sections was neither discussed nor decided.
In fact, it appears from the decision that those lands, which were in the Province of Benguet, were within the strictest definition of the
phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had been cultivated for more than twelve years. What that case decided was, not that
the lands therein involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration were not agricultural lands but that the law
there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were not rules and regulations within the meaning of section 13.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J. and Torres, J., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.




13

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
August 23, 1919
G.R. No. 14213
J. H. ANKRON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-appellant.
Assistant Attorney-General Lacson for appellant. P. J. Moore for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose was
to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel of land situated, bounded and particularly described in the plan and
technical description attached to the complaint and made a part thereof.
The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector] alleged that the land in
question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control and administration of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
During the trial of the cause two witnesses only were presented by the petitioner. No proof whatever was offered by the oppositor. After
hearing and considering the evidence, the Honorable Francisco Soriano, judge, reached the following conclusions of fact:
1. That the land sought to be registered consists of one parcel of land as marked and indicated on the plan and technical description
presented;
2. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north, the exact description and extension of which does not appear, has
been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to the date of this decision;
3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that
they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used as pasture land
whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses;
4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to the applicant, J. H.
Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all of the said former owners moved o n to adjoining lands where they now reside;
5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant and his predecessors in interest was shown to have been open, notorious,
actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four years past, and that their claim was exclusive of any other right adverse to all other
claims;
6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling house,
various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and improvements on
said land.
Upon the foregoing facts the lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said applicant, J. H.
Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and conditions
mentioned in said decision. The conditions mentioned with reference to the opening of the road, as found in said decision, are that the
applicant give his consent, which he has already done, to the opening of said road which should be fifteen (15) meters wide and should
14

follow approximately the line of the road as it now exists subject to the subsequent survey to be made by the engineer of the province of
Davao.
From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.
The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently identify the land in question. In reply to that argument, the record shows
that a detained and technical description of the land was made a part of the record. The evidence shows that the boundaries of the land in
question were marked by monuments built of cement. The oppositor neither presented the question of the failure of proper identification
of the land in the lower court nor presented any proof whatever to show that said cement monuments did not exist.
The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the appellant failed to prove his possession and occupation in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The important prerequisites for registration of land imposed by said
section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; (b) that
the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of said Act.
In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and
that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the
commencement of the present action. No question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the right of the Moros to
acquire the absolute ownership and dominion of the land which they have occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a
long period of years. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. Rep., 132 [212 U. S., 449].)
Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that said paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been fully complied with
and that the petitioner, so far as the second assignment of error is concerned, is entitled to have his land registered under the Torrens
system.
Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the existing
Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares. That question is not discussed in the present brief. The appellant, however.,
refers the court to his discussion of that question in the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep., 560). By reference to the
argument in the brief in the case, it is found that the appellant relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1148 in relation with
section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code). Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall include all
unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this chapter
'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all
forest reserves of whatever character."
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), which decision has been follows in numerous other decision, the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as defined by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was held to mean "those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither mineral nor timber lands" (forestry lands).
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public agricultural
lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for registration must be
denied. If the evidence shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for registration must be denied. Many
definitions have been given for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These definitions are valuable so far as they establish
general rules. In this relation we think the executive department of the Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in
view especially of the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148, define what shall be considered forestry lands, to the end that
the people of the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products."
(Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and definitely define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future
would be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts would be greatly aided in determining the question whether the particular land is
forestry or other class of lands.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture,"
"forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral
land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec.
7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
15

tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural
today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that
a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular
land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient
for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of
land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of
public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by
virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as
forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra.)
In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion, and so order and decree, that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
affirmed, with the condition that before the final certificate is issued, an accurate survey be made of the lands to be occupied by the road
above mentioned and that a plan of the same be attached to the original plan upon which the petition herein is based. It is so ordered, with
costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Moir, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13298 November 19, 1918
CORNELIO RAMOS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objector-appellee.
BasilioAromin for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J .:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying the registration of
the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the plan, Exhibit 1, of the
Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory
information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory information
title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that
Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first parcel was
forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the facts.
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General is based on the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for land to come under
16

the protective gis of the Maura Law, it must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously, and that it was not
land which pertained to the "zonasforestales." As proof that the land was, even as long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not
agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet found thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be possible, following the doctrine laid down by the United States Supreme
Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes within the United States, where some recital is claimed to be false, to say that the
possessory information, apparently having taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not now be disturbed. (Hancock vs.
McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192; Hornsby and Roland vs. United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It is sufficient, as will later appear, merely
to notice that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under color of title.
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and
two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-
sixth day of July, nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
There are two parts to the above quoted subsection which must be discussed. The first relates to the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of what, for present purposes, can be conceded to be agricultural public land, under a bona fide claim
of ownership.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise
over his own property. Relative to actuality of possession, it is admitted that the petitioner has cultivated only about one fourth of the
entire tract. This is graphically portrayed by Exhibit 1 of the Government, following:

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give
title to the entire tract of land?
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract
under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. (Barr
vs.Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of course, there are
a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually
in possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule.
17

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.)
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises
consisted of agricultural public land.
The second division of the law requires consideration of the term "agricultural public land." The law affirms that the phrase is denied by
the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, known as the Philippine bill. Turning to the Philippine Bill, we find in sections 13 to 18 thereof that
three classes of land are mentioned. The first is variously denominated "public land" or "public domain," the second "mineral land," and
the third "timber land." Section 18 of the Act of Congress comes nearest to a precise definition, when it makes the determination of
whether the land is more valuable for agricultural or for forest uses the test of its character.
Although these sections of the Philippine Bill have come before the courts on numerous occasions, what was said in the case of Jones vs.
Insular Government ([1906], 6 Phil., 122), is still true, namely: "The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to
them a construction that will be entirely free from objection." In the case which gave most serious consideration to the subject (Mapavs.
Insular Government [1908], 10 Phil., 175), it was found that there does exist in the Act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural
public lands." It was said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as used in Act No. 926 means "those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands."
The idea would appear to be to determine, by exclusion, if the land is forestal or mineral in nature and, if not so found, to consider it to be
agricultural land. Here, again, Philippine law is not very helpful. For instance, section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917 provides:
"For the purposes of this chapter, 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including
nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." This definition of "public forest," it will be noted, is merely
"for the purposes of this chapter." A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon
the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With
reference to the last section, there is no certification of the Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is better adapted and
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of trees and underbrush; a large wood." The
authorities say that he word "forest" has a significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not embrace land only partly
woodland. It is a tract of land covered with trees, usually of considerable extent. (Higgins vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp.,
262; People vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest Law of India,
states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be framed for legal purposes will be found either to exclude some cases to which the law
ought to apply, or on the other hand, to include some with which the law ought not to interfere. It may be necessary, for example,
to take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land which at present has neither trees, brushwood, nor grass on it, but which in
the course f time it is hoped will be "reboise;" but any definition wide enough to take in all such lands, would also take in much
that was not wanted. On the other hand, the definition, if framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and indeed would be
almost sure to) include a garden, shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not designed to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states as follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an economic factor, is by no means a mere collection of trees, but an organic
whole in which all parts, although apparently heterogeneous, jumbled together by accident as it were and apparently unrelated,
bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any other beings and conditions in nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, this question of forest and agricultural lands was
beginning to receive some attention and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of
Forestry the certification as to what lands are for agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act states timber lands, the Bureau has
in its administration since the passage of this act construed this term to mean forest lands in the sense of what was necessary to
protect, for the public good; waste lands without a tree have been declared more suitable for forestry in many instances in the
past. The term 'timber' as used in England and in the United States in the past has been applied to wood suitable for construction
18

purposes but with the increase in civilization and the application of new methods every plant producing wood has some useful
purpose and the term timber lands is generally though of as synonymous with forest lands or lands producing wood, or able to
produce wood, if agricultural crops on the same land will not bring the financial return that timber will or if the same land is
needed for protection purposes.
x xx x xx x xx
The laws in the United States recognize the necessity of technical advice of duly appointed boards and leave it in the hands of
these boards to decide what lands are more valuable for forestry purposes or for agricultural purposes.
In the Philippine Islands this policy is follows to as great an extent as allowable under the law. In many cases, in the opinion of
the Bureau of Forestry, lands without a single tree on them are considered as true forest land. For instance, mountain sides which
are too steep for cultivation under ordinary practice and which, if cultivated, under ordinary practice would destroy the big
natural resource of the soil, by washing, is considered by this bureau as forest land and in time would be reforested. Of course,
examples exist in the Mountain Province where steep hillsides have been terraced and intensive cultivation practiced but even
then the mountain people are very careful not to destroy forests or other vegetative cover which they from experience have found
protect their water supply. Certain chiefs have lodged protests with the Government against other tribes on the opposite side of
the mountain cultivated by them, in order to prevent other tribes from cutting timber or destroy cover guarding their source of
water for irrigation.
Dr. M. S. Shaler, formerly Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School, remarked that if mankind could not devise and enforce ways
dealing with the earth, which will preserve this source of like "we must look forward to the time, remote it may be, yet equally
discernible, when out kin having wasted its great inheritance will fade from the earth because of the ruin it has accomplished."
The method employed by the bureau of Forestry in making inspection of lands, in order to determine whether they are more
adapted for agricultural or forest purposes by a technical and duly trained personnel on the different phases of the conservation of
natural resources, is based upon a previously prepared set of questions in which the different characters of the land under
inspection are discussed, namely:
Slope of land: Level; moderate; steep; very steep.
Exposure: North; South; East; West.
Soil: Clay; sandy loam; sand; rocky; very rocky.
Character of soil cover: Cultivated, grass land, brush land, brush land and timber mixed, dense forest.
If cultivated, state crops being grown and approximate number of hectares under cultivation. (Indicate on sketch.)
For growth of what agricultural products is this land suitable?
State what portion of the tract is wooded, name of important timber species and estimate of stand in cubic meters per hectare,
diameter and percentage of each species.
If the land is covered with timber, state whether there is public land suitable for agriculture in vicinity, which is not covered with
timber.
Is this land more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes? (State reasons in full.)
Is this land included or adjoining any proposed or established forest reserve or communal forest? Description and ownership of
improvements.
If the land is claimed under private ownership, give the name of the claimant, his place of residence, and state briefly (if
necessary on a separate sheet) the grounds upon which he bases his claim.
19

When the inspection is made on a parcel of public land which has been applied for, the corresponding certificate is forwarded to
the Director of Lands; if it is made on a privately claimed parcel for which the issuance of a title is requested from the Court of
Land Registration, and the inspection shows the land to be more adapted for forest purposes, then the Director of Forestry
requests the Attorney-General to file an opposition, sending him all data collected during the inspection and offering him the
forest officer as a witness.
It should be kept in mind that the lack of personnel of this Bureau, the limited time intervening between the notice for the trial on
an expedienteof land and the day of the trial, and the difficulties in communications as well as the distance of the land in question
greatly hinder the handling of this work.
In the case of lands claimed as private property, the Director of Forestry, by means of his delegate the examining officer, submits
before the court all evidence referring to the present forest condition of the land, so that the court may compare them with the
alleged right by the claimant. Undoubtedly, when the claimant presents a title issued by the proper authority or evidence of his
right to the land showing that he complied with the requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him in the least
as such land should not be considered as a part of the public domain; but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then
the public or private character of the parcel is open to discussion and this character should be established not simply on the
alleged right of the claimant but on the sylvical condition and soil characteristics of the land, and by comparison between this
area, or different previously occupied areas, and those areas which still preserve their primitive character.
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation of the natural resources of the
Philippines. The prodigality of the spendthrift who squanders his substance for the pleasure of the fleeting moment must be restrained for
the less spectacular but surer policy which protects Nature's wealth for future generations. Such is the wise stand of our Government as
represented by the Director of Forestry who, with the Forester for the Government of the United States, believes in "the control of nature's
powers by man for his own good." On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in
nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private
ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy.
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to
a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry
should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great
consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with
authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported
by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
We hold that the petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions
of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.
Judgment is reversed and the lower court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan
Exhibit A, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 69969 December 20, 1989
ANTONIO L. TOTTOC, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SATURNINO DOCTOR, respondents.
20

Quirico L. Pilotin for petitioner.
Miguel M. Guevara for private respondents.

REGALADO, J .:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the former Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 00034,
1
reversing in
toto the decision in Civil Case No. 2212 of the then Court of nest Instance, Branch II, Nueva Vizcaya, the disposition of respondent court
being as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from not consistent with the facts and the law applicable, the same is
hereby set aside and another entered-
1. Declaring Patent of l24175 and Original Certificate of' Title No. 3428 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Vizcaya in the name of plaintiff Saturnino Doctor valid and existing:
2. Ordering the defendant-appellee to restore possession of the subject property unto the plaintiff-appellant and to
respect such possession;
3. Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the plaintiff the sum of P l,000.00 annually from the filing of the complaint until
possession is fully restored as actual damages.
4. Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the sums of P 2,000.00 as exemplary damages and P l,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees. Costs against the defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
REVERSED
2

The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the original action below are undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as synthesized by
the court a quo and adopted by respondent court.
3

On April 9, 1949, petitioner applied for the lease of a pasture land consisting of 78.6 hectares, situated at Lacangan, Barrio Madiangat,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, before the Bureau of Forestry, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thru the office of the Provincial
Forester at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. By virtue of said application, petitioner was granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps- 993 after a
survey of the area involved. Thereafter, petitioner occupied said 78.6 hectares of pasture land and fenced the same, without anybody
disturbing his possession thereof. Private respondent, being a neighbor of petitioner, was aware of such occupation of the land by
petitioner since 1949.
On September 21, 1951, petitioner was again granted Ordinary Pasture Permit Ps-993 Extension by Director of Forestry Florencio
Tamesis, authorizing the former to occupy the same area, the first permit having expired on June 30, 1952. Finally, on August 6, 1958,
petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Juan de G. Rodriguez, under Pasture
Lease Agreement No. 1228 covering the Identical area for a period of 11 years.
Meanwhile, private respondent, upon verification from the Bureau of Forestry supposedly before 1963 that the pasture land in question
was reportedly untouched and outside the pasture land of petitioner, filed his application for a homestead with the Bureau of Lands and
entered the northern portion of the land, clearing and cultivating an area of less than 4 hectares in 1963.
On January 7, 1965, private respondent secured a certification from Assistant Chief Maximo A. Abuan of the Bureau of Forestry office in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, certifying to the fact that the land in question is alienable and disposable. Private respondent further claims
to have secured another certification from an employee of the Bureau of Lands who based the same on a certification on file in the Bureau
of Lands office as furnished by the Bureau of Forestry.
21

On February 25, 1966, petitioner caused the relocation survey of his pasture land in the presence of Bureau of Lands Inspector
MarcelinoHernaez and private respondent. It was found in said survey that a portion of the land subject of private respondent's application
was within the pasture land of petitioner and within the so-called Forest Zone. In view thereof, petitioner requested Inspector Hernaez to
send a telegram to the Director of Lands in Manila reading: "Lands Director Jorge, Manila. Please hold action homestead application
Saturnino Doctor and Luis Carub, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Re- investigation in progress. Land claimed by Mayor Tottoc Investigator
Hernaez."
Aside from this survey, petitioner requested in a letter to the office of the Bureau of Forestry at Nueva Vizcaya the relocation survey of
his pasture land pursuant to which the district forester sent Forester Nicasio Pascua to relocate the same on April 26, 1966. A cartographer
of the Bureau of Lands, Eladio Miranda, herein petitioner and private respondent, as well as several laborers, were present during said
relocation survey. Thereafter, Forester Pascua submitted his memorandum, dated May 3, 1966, to the bureau director indicating the
different positions of the lots that had encroached on the pasture land of petitioner. Consequent to such findings, Forester Pascua
recommended that all certifications and/or patents issued in favor of the lot owners or claimants of said encroaching lots be nullified for
the good of the public service.
On March 8, 1967, petitioner was granted another ordinary pasture permit by Acting Director of Forestry Antonio Quejado to occupy and
use for pasture another 42 hectares of public forest land situated in InatubLacangan, Caroler and Buliwao, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya which
made a total of 120.6 hectares of land granted to petitioner for pasture purposes. Said additional area was likewise fenced by petitioner.
On June 17, 1968, Original Certificate of Title No. P-3428 under Homestead Patent No. 124175 was issued to private respondent over a
parcel of land situated in Inatub, Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya, containing an area of approximately 20 hectares. Thereafter, private respondent
and one Luis Carub requested the Bureau of Forestry to relocate the pasture land of petitioner to determine any encroachment on his land.
Forester Buenaventura Caguioa, on the instructions of the Director of Forestry dated November 25, 1971 thru District Forester Geronimo
Falloran conducted the relocation survey. On March 1, 1972, Forester Caguioa submitted his memorandum to the district forester
indicating that the area in the title granted to private respondent traversed a portion of the pasture land of petitioner and that only 3.5
hectares, more or less, was verified to be within the alienable and disposable area. In view thereof, a recommendation was made that the
application filed by petitioner for the renewal of the pasture lease agreement, which expired on June 30, 1969, be approved and that only
3.5 hectares of land be retained by private respondent.
On March 23,1972, said memorandum report of District Forester Falloran was forwarded to the Director of Forestry, Manila, through the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Forestry, Region No. 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, who in turn indorsed the same on June 23, 1972. On
November 29, 1972, Mr. AnicetoBueno, Officer-in-Charge of the Parks, Range and Wildlife Division of the Bureau of Forest
Development, furnished petitioner a copy of the renewed Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1228, dated November 9, 1972, entered into by
the petitioner with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Jose D. Drilon, Jr. The lease was for a period of 25 years, to expire
on June 30,1994, and covered the 1 20 hectares of pasture land in Lacangan, Inatub, CaroletMadiangat and Buliwao, Quezon, Nueva
Vizcaya.
With these documents in favor of petitioner, private respondent was prevented from occupying and cultivating the disputed portion of
16.5459 hectares. As a consequence, private respondent, filed an action for recovery of possession with damages. After trial, the court a
quo rendered judgment on May 28, 1981 in favor of therein defendant and against the plaintiff, and ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendant the amount of P l,400.00 as actual and litigation expenses, P 3,000.00 for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the suit.
4

On a "Partial Motion for Reconsideration" filed by petitioner, and a "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial" of private respondent,
as defendant and plaintiff, respectively, said decision was amended by a resolution issued on January 7,1982, the decretal portion whereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby:
1. Denies the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, dated June 29, 1981, for lack of merit; and
2. Grants the defendant's Partial Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 29, 1981. The dispositive portion of the
decision is, therefore, amended to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, tills Court:
22

1. Declaring Patent No.124175 and Original Certificate of Title No. 3428 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Vizcaya, in favor of the plaintiff, covering the land in dispute which is within the Forest Zone as null and void ab initio
for lack of jurisdiction;
2. Ordering the plaintiff not to molest the defendant in his peaceful and public occupation in the land in dispute the
same being still a part of the Forest Zone and a part of his pasture land; and
3. Condemning the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the amounts of P l,400.00 as actual and litigation expenses and P
3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the suit.
5

As stated at the outset, said decision and resolution were appealed to respondent court which reversed and set aside the same. A motion
for reconsideration, dated October 15, 1984, was filed by petitioner with respondent court with a supplemental memorandum in support
thereof, but the same was denied in respondent court's resolution of January 28, 1985.
The present recourse is before us as a consequence. Succinctly reduced to salient terms, petitioner's submissions are that respondent court
committed errors of law (1) in concluding that the land in dispute is alienable by relying on the certification issued by District Forester
Abuan and in disregarding the contrary testimonies and certifications of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa; (2) in concluding that petitioner, a
pasture lease permittee has no legal personality to question the patent and title of private respondent Doctor over the disputed area; and (3)
when it ruled that private respondent is entitled to the award of damages.
6

On the first assignment of error, petitioner maintains that respondent court should not have relied on the certification issued by District
Forester Abuan, it being hearsay evidence by reason of Abuan's failure to testify thereon. Moreover, petitioner assails respondent court's
disregard of the testimonies of Foresters Pascua and Caguioa who certified that the land was within the Forest Zone after having
conducted an actual verification survey of the area.
We agree with petitioner, but not only for the reason that the evidence-in-chief of private respondent may, in point of strict law, be
constitutive of hearsay. The question as to whether a particular portion of land is forestal or any other class of land is a question of fact to
be settled by the proof in each particular case.
7
Thus, the mere classification or certification made by the Bureau of forestry that a part of
the public domain is timberland is not controlling in all cases.
8

We have reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses for private respondent and nowhere do we find any cogent basis for the certification
made by District Forester Abuan. The testimony of SabinoDelizo, District Land Officer of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, which could
possibly have energized private respondent's case, is itself plagued with not a few vacuities. Aside from his assertion and admission that
the sole basis for his certification was merely an office copy of the certification also of Forester Abuan himself, Delizo further admitted
that he had not made any actual verification of the subject area.
9
Neither could he even conclusively establish that the lot mentioned in
his certification was Identical to the lot in question.
10

In diametrical contrast, the pasture lease permit granted to petitioner was issued after a series of actual investigations, ocular and
technical, of the subject area by Foresters Pascua and Caguioa conducted in the presence of all the interested parties, including private
respondent. While private respondent denies having received any copy of the memoranda executed by the foresters despite his admitted
presence during the surveys and investigations,
11
the same does not relieve him of the consequences of imputed knowledge of the
findings therein considering the facility in obtaining copies of the same. Besides, it is an affront to credulity that a person like private
respondent who, despite his zeal and desire to possess and own the land in controversy, would prefer to remain in deliberate ignorance of
the results of said surveys through his unexplained inaction and inexplicable indifference.
Notably, even before the relocation survey made by Forester Caguioa, Bureau of Lands Inspector Hernaez conducted his own survey and
found that the land subject of private respondent's application for a homestead patent was within the pasture land of petitioner and within
the Forest Zone. Precisely, an advice to hold said application was sent to the Director of Lands in Manila upon petitioner's request.
12

It will also be recalled that consequent to Forester Pascua's survey and findings, a further recommendation was made to the Director of
Forestry for the nullification of all certifications and/or patents issued in favor of the owners and/or claimants whose lots had intruded
upon petitioner's land area, including private respondent himself, such invalidation being necessitated for the good of the public service.
13

All these on-the-spot surveys, the findings wherefrom are unassailed and uncontradicted, more than preponderate over and definitely
override the enervated evidentiary value of the certification of Abuan and Delizo.
23

While we admit an exception to the rule that the Bureau of Forestry has the power to set aside for forestry or mineral purposes a particular
land in question,
14
and that is when there was prior intervention of private interests, said exception cannot find application in private
respondent's favor since petitioner's interests commenced and vested very much earlier than any claim thereon by the former.
Petitioner had open, uninterrupted and peaceful possession and occupation of the disputed land since 1949, being a grantee of pasture
lease permits which expired in 1969. Private respondent, on the other hand, started his controversial cultivation of the lot only in 1963 and
secured the questioned certification in 1965.
15
The long period of time from 1949 to 1969 during which the land was under pasture lease
permits granted to petitioner all the more lends credence to the fact that said land was within the Forest Zone as only lands of the category
of public forest land can be the subject of such permits.
16

The Court neither loses sight of the presumption, in lieu of contrary proof, that the land is agricultural in character, rather than forestal, as
it is for the good of the country to have the large public domain come under private ownership.
17
It is to be emphasized, however, that
such presumption obtains only when the conflict of interest is between a private citizen and the Government, not when it involves
opposing rights of private citizens against each other.
On the second assigned error, private respondent makes the riposte that petitioner cannot question the validity of the title registered in the
former's name. If there is any party who can question his title on the ground that it includes therein a forest land, private respondent
deposits that it should be the Bureau of Forest Development.
18
This counter-argument is an effete pretension.
In the case of Gatchalian vs. Pavilin, et al.,
19
the Court had the occasion to render the following ruling:
As to the alleged lack of personality of defendants-appellants to assail appellee's land grant and certificate of title for the
reason that said appellants are mere prospective homestead applicants, it is sufficient to remark that by reason of their
prior occupancy and cultivation, these parties have already acquired possessory rights that they may vindicate and
defend against intruders without better title. And if it be true that the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue a
patent in favor of appellee Francisco Gatchalian because the land involved was still inalienable forest land when
granted, then it may be plausibly contended that her patent title would be ab initio void subject to attack at any time by
any party adversely affected (Civil Code, Arts. 1409, 1421; Vano vs. Insular Govt. 41 Phil. 161; Adorable vs. Dir. of
Forestry, L-13663, 25 March 1960) ...
Moreover, in Vallarta, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
20
where the original proceeding was also between private
citizens, we held:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registrable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter
how long cannot convert it into private property. ... If somehow forest land happens to have been included in a Torrens
Title, the title is null and void insofar as the forest land is concerned. ...
Ironically, it was private respondent himself who initiated the original action below for recovery of possession with damages. As a
consequence, petitioner was virtually compelled to litigate in order to protect his own right to possession which in part hinged on the
nature of the land in dispute. Were we to uphold private respondent's theory that petitioner is devoid of personality to question the
invalidity of the former's patent and title, that would be a procedural inequity since it would thereby prevent petitioner from fully
protecting his interests or, at the very least, divest him of valid defenses. On the third supposed error, suffice it to state that the records are
bereft of any substantial evidence showing that private respondent was deprived by petitioner of the possession of the land through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. On the contrary, the evidence convinces us that petitioner was well within his rights in taking
possession of the lot in question a matter which we need not belabor with any further disquisition.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision and resolution of respondent court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
trial court, dated January 7, 1982, on the partial motion for reconsideration by herein petitioner as defendant therein, except as to the
award of attorney's fees and the payment of the costs of suit both of which have no legal bases and are consequently ordered deleted, is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
24


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29381 September 30, 1969
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and PANTALEON BINGABING, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations and PAMPILO DOLTZ,
respondents
Marcelino B. Bermudez for petitioners.
Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge V. A. Del Valle.
Abelardo Flores for respondent PampiloDoltz.

SANCHEZ, J .:
The decisive issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine National Railways (PNR) which are on
both sides of its railroad track, and are part of its right of way for its railroad operations but temporarily leased, are agricultural lands
within the purview of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code, such as would come within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
The facts of this particular case are these:
PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform width of 30. meters adjoining
one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way running from Manila to Legazpi. These strips of land lie within
the municipalities of Oas and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center thereof is a track measuring ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in
width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for running locomotives. On both sides of the track, or about (2) to five (5) meters
away from the embarassment of the track, are telegraph and telephone posts office (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain
communication wires necessary in the operation of PNR trains. PNR draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track whenever it
is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses them as depository of railroad materials for the repair of destroyed lines, posts, bridges
during washouts, or other damaged parts of the line occasioned by derailments or other calamities.
The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble. People occupied them; they reap
profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them cropped up. It is on the face of all these that, with adequate provisions to
safeguard railroad operations, PNR adopted temporary rules and regulations, as follows: (a) the possession and enjoyment of the property
should be awarded to interested persons thru competitive public bidding; (b) the rental of the premises is to be determined from the
amount offered by the highest bidder; (e) the duration of the lease shall be for a limited period, not to exceed three (3) years; (d) the lessee
cannot sublease the premises; (e) the lease contract is revocable at any time upon demand by the owner, whenever it needs the same for its
own use or for a more beneficial purpose; (f) the owner can enter the leased premises during the period of the lease to make necessary
repairs; and (g) the lessee shall not use the premises in a manner prejudicial to the operation of the trains.
Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on both sides of the track, after a
competitive public bidding, to petitioner PantaleonBingabing for a period of three (3) years and under conditions hereinbefore set forth. A
civil law lease contract in printed form was, on April 15, 1963, entered into by and between PNR and Bingabing. That contract expressly
stipulates that Bingabing was "to occupy and use the property ... temporarily for agriculture." Consideration therefor was P130.00 per
annum. Bingabing, however, failed to take possession because respondent PampiloDoltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon.
Doltz claims to be a tenant of previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.
Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the premises in the Court of First
Instance of Albay.
1
They there averred that sometime in January 1963, Doltz illegally entered the land, constructed a house thereon
25

occupying about fifty (50) square meters, and planted palay on the other portions thereof. They prayed that Doltz remove his house,
vacate the premises, restore possession to PNR or Bingabing, pay PNR P160 per annum as reasonable compensation for the occupation of
the premises from January 1963, and P2,000 as expenses of litigation, pay Bingabing P500 annually from 1963, and shoulder the costs of
suit.
Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that the had been a tenant on the property for over twenty years; that he had been placed
thereon by the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the then Manila Railroad Company (now PNR); that he became the
tenant of Demetrio de Vera, Gomba's successor; that he is the tenant of Bingabing, having given the latter's share of 1/3 during the last
two harvests; and that the case is properly cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. Upon the court's request, Doltz and Bingabing
agreed to temporarily liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of 70-30 in Doltz' favor.
It has been suggested in the record that said case Civil Case 3021 was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Albay upon the
ground that the subject matter of the action is tenancy; that petitioners have appealed. That case, parenthetically, has not yet reached this
Court.
While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered with the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and reliquidation
of past harvests. This is the present case CAR Case 692, Albay '67, Court of Agrarian Relations, Ninth Regional District, Legazpi City,
Branch II, entitled "PampiloDoltz, Petitioner, versus PantaleonBingabing, Respondent." PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein
there maintained the position that the premises in controversy are not an agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed
between the parties; that CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending case between the same parties in
another court involving the same subject matter and the same cause of action.
After trial, the CAR promulgated its decision of June 10, 1968. It upheld its jurisdiction over the case, maintained Doltz in the peaceful
possession of the parcels of land as tenant on a 70-30 sharing ratio in Doltz' favor, ordered Bingabing to pay Doltz P250 attorneys' fees
and the costs, but dismissed the latter's claim for reliquidation of past harvests for lack of substantial evidence. Petitioners' move to
reconsider the said decision failed. They now come to this Court. They specifically question CAR's jurisdiction.
1. Is the land here involved in agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform
Code?
According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a
price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both."
2
The term "agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural
Land Reform Code is not as broad in meaning as it is known in the constitutional sense. As interpreted in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds,
79 Phil. 461, 471, the phrase "agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor timber lands and
embraces within it wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes but also commercial,
industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes. On the other hand, by Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, "
"[a]gricultural land" means land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and
abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section, respectively."
3

It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to
agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture.
Indeed, the land which adjoins the railroad track on both sides is part of PNR's right of way. That right of way is not limited to the
particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also includes the portions occupied by the telephone and telegraph posts. It
extends to a width of 30 meters which reasonably gives the train locomotive engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its
switches ahead of him.
The entire width is important to PNR's railroad operations. Which should not be hampered. And, communication lines must not be
disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track. Because, it is not so easy to prevent people from walking along the
track; animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could be along the track itself which might cause derailment. All of these
could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the necessary precautions on time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the
trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of life.
26

Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural activities. The contract
of lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place its materials on the land. It may even take soil
from the land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by water during rainy days. What if PNR should decide to construct
another parallel track on the land leased? The occupant of the land cannot prevent or stop PNR from doing any of these. Security of tenure
so important in landlord-tenant relationship may not thus be attained.
The foregoing are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from adopting the view that the disputed land in narrow strips is
agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code. By destination, it is not
agricultural.
2. Nor may PampiloDoltz be considered as a true and lawful tenant.
To be borne in mind is the fact that PNR executed with PantaleonBingabing a civil law lease contract, not an agricultural
lease.1awphl.ntThis distinction is expressly recognized by the law.
4
That contract is temporary, at best for a short term. It is revocable
any time upon demand by PNR whenever it needs the same for its own use or for a more beneficial purpose.
Even on the assumption that the land is agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR prohibits the sublease of the premises. PNR's
lessees cannot give what they are not allowed to give. Any contract then of sublease between Doltz, the supposed tenant, and Pablo
Gomba or Demetrio de Vera, the previous awardees, or even of PantaleonBingabing, the present awardee without PNR's consent
cannot bind the latter. No such consent was here given.
This ushers us to a principle shaped out by jurisprudence that the security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy law may be invoked only
by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.
5
In Pabustan vs. De Guzman, L-12898, August 31, 1960, the tenant
sublet the landholding to a third person without the knowledge and consent of the landowner. In an ejectment suit brought by the
landowner against said third person in the CAR, this Court held that the CAR had no jurisdiction over the case because no tenancy
relationship existed between the parties, as the third person was, in reality, an unlawful squatter or intruder. Correlating Pabustanto the
present case, the lessee here had no power to sublet. There is also thus no legally cognizable relationship of tenancy between the parties.
We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case at bar and the proceedings below are thus null and void.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations of June 10, 1968 in its Case 692, Albay '67, under review is hereby
reversed, and said case is hereby dismissed.
Costs against private respondent PampiloDoltz.So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993
REMIGIO ISIDRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD GUTIERREZ, respondents.
Joventino A. Cornista for petitioner.
27

Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana& Associates for private respondent.

PADILLA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 February 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
26671 ordering petitioner to vacate the land in question and surrender possession thereof to the private respondent; and its 21 May 1992
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan,
NuevaEcija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to
occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) i ncome to
meet his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon
demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.
In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and
return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4120. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaint was triggered by
his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal
demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action.
1

Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in question is a fishpond
2
and, thus, in a decision
dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute over it is
agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act
No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board).
3

An appeal was filed by private respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 889.
In due course, the RTC rendered a decision on 5 November 1991 concurring with the findings of the MTC and affirming in toto the trial
court's decision.
The RTC decision held that:
Even conceding for the sake of argument that the defendant-appellee was allowed by the plaintiff-appellant, through her
sister Aniceta Garcia (her administratrix over the land in question) to occupy and use the landholding in question on
condition that the defendant would vacate the same upon demand of the owner or plaintiff herein, without paying any
rental either in cash or produce, under these facts there was a tenurial arrangement, within the meaning of Sec. 3(d) of
RA 6657, thereby placing the dispute involved in this case within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Perhaps, it would be
different if the defendant was merely a trespasser, without any right whatsoever, when he entered and occupied the
subject landholding. The defendant, as a matter of fact, was a legal possessor of the land in question and therefore to
determine his rights and obligations over the said property, the DARAB is the proper forum for such issue.
4

Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals and the appeal was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 26671. On 27 February 1992, as earlier stated, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate the parcel of land in question and surrender possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay
private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
5

The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:
The agrarian dispute over which the DAR may have jurisdiction by virtue of its quasi-judicial power is that which
involves tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture.
Tenurial arrangement is concerned with the act or manner of putting into proper order the rights of holding a piece of
agricultural land between the landowner and the farmer or farmworker.
28

In the case at bar, there can be no dispute that between the parties herein there is no tenurial arrangement, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over the land in dispute. Other than his bare allegation in the Answer with
Counterclaim, and his affidavit, private respondent has not shown prima facie that he is a tenant of the petitioner. The
affidavits of his witnesses Antonio Samin and Daniel Villareal attest to the fact that they acted as mediators in the
dispute between the parties herein sometime in October 1990, but no settlement was arrived at, and that the subject land
is a fishpond. To the same effect is the affidavit of Feliciano Garcia. Absent any prima facie proof that private
respondent has a tenancy relationship with petitioner, the established fact is that private respondent is possessing the
property in dispute by mere tolerance, and when such possession ceased as such upon demand to vacate by the
petitioner, private respondent became a squatter in said land. We hold that the Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija has jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case.
6

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing decision, but, also as earlier stated, it was denied in a resolution dated 21 May 1992

7
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner raises the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE AND WHETHER
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COULD LEGALLY EJECT THE PETITIONER CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:
1. THAT THE SUBJECT IS A FISHPOND AND UNDER THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FISHPONDS ARE
CLASSIFIED AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS;
2. THAT BEING AN AGRICULTURAL LAND THE SAME IS GOVERNED BY OUR TENANCY LAWS WHERE
RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT CANNOT BE SIMPLY APPLIED; AND
3. THAT UNDER THE RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,
THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON WORKING ON A FISHPOND IS A TENANT OR NOT IS
CLEARLY WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB.
8

The petition is devoid of merit. We hold for the private respondent.
It is basic whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the allegations of the complaint.
As held in Multinational Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:
9

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein a matter resolved only after and as a result of the
trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer
or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the
defendant.
In her complaint before the court a quo, private respondent stated that she is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Sta. Cruz,
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, which petitioner is illegally occupying; that petitioner has taken advantage of the tolerance of her (private
respondent's) sister in allowing him to occupy the land on the condition that he (petitioner) would vacate the land upon demand. Because
of petitioner's refusal to vacate the land, private respondent's remedy, as owner of said land, was to file an action for unlawful detainer
with the Municipal Trial Court.
In his answer to the complainant, petitioner alleged that the land involved in the dispute is an agricultural land and hence, the case must be
filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations (not the MTC). Moreover, petitioner contended that it was his refusal to increase his lease
rental (implying tenancy) that prompted the private respondent to sue him in court.
10

It is well settled jurisprudence that a court does not lose its jurisdiction over an unlawful detainer case by the simple expedient of a party
raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.
11
The court continues to have the authority
to hear the evidence for the purpose precisely of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction. And upon such hearing, if tenancy is
shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
12

29

The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the subject land is agricultural and therefore the
question at issue is agrarian. In this connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure,
13
provides
that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms and conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor or lessee.
14

It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a
fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in Republic Act No. 6657
15
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
16
Republic Act No.
6657 defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or
fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done by persons whether natural or judicial.
17

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has
jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of
them.
18
The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The
intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and
are not contrary to law, are even more important.
19

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a
sharing of harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a
person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the government under existing tenancy laws (Caballes v. DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988).
20

Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for
purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or
judicial person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation and use of
his land for a price certain.
21

Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or agricultural/leasehold relationship existing
between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private
respondent nor with the overseer of the private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his harvests.
Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the land.
Whether or not private respondent knew of the conversion by petitioner of the idle, swampy land into a fishpond is immaterial in this
case. The fact remains that the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the petitioner. And in the absence
of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided
in Sec. 33 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129.
Having established that the occupancy and possession by petitioner of the land in question is by mere tolerance, private respondent had
the legal right to demand upon petitioner to vacate the land. And as correctly ruled by the respondent appellate court:
30

. . . . His (petitioner's) lawful possession became illegal when the petitioner (now private respondent) through her sister
made a demand on him to vacate and he refused to comply with such demand. Such is the ruling in Pangilinan vs.
Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136, 144, wherein it was held:
While in possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate is
made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand (Prieto vs.
Reyes, 14 SCRA 432; Yu vs. De Lara, 6 SCRA 786, 788; Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684, April 28, 1957).
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him (Yu vs. De Lara, supra)."
22

The present case should be distinguished from the recent case of Bernas vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals.
23
In the Bernascase, the
land occupant (Bernas) had a production-sharing agreement with the legal possessor (BenignoBito-on) while the records in this case fail
to show that herein petitioner (Isidro) was sharing the harvest or paying rent for his use of the land. Moreover, the agreement between the
overseer (Garcia) and herein petitioner was for petitioner to occupy and use the land by mere tolerance of the owner. Petitioner Isidro
failed to refute that Garcia allowed him to use the land subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate it upon demand. In the
Bernascase, the petitioner (Bernas) was able to establish the existence of an agricultural tenancy or leasehold relationship between him
and the legal possessor. The evidence in this case, on the other hand, fails to prove that petitioner Isidro, was an agricultural tenant or
lessee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.


FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.

[G.R. No.L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE,
EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF
FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of
Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in
31

Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable
public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act
of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.

3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden
of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous,
open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.


D E C I S I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as
forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons.

These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an
area of 645,703 square meters.cralawnad

RoqueBorre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and MelquiadesBorre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose
Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and MelquiadesBorre. At the same time,
they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of PilarCadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the
names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.

Another oppositor, EmeterioBereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner RoqueBorre sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel
Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to EmeterioBereber and the rest of the land containing
527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to MelquiadesBorre.

Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to
the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was EmeterioBereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it
was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last question that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2)
private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .

". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to
be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area;
and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial
32

evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted into a fishpond was sometime after
1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester
that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even under
Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order for
applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.

"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the application;

the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required
period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of
thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had been in

"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,

it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and
applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating
that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to
who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme
Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to pass final judgment;

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions with the
exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to costs."cralaw
virtua1aw library

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession
of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of
registration and confirmation of title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act.
On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by RoqueBorre and EncarnacionDelfin, contending that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was
for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was
dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after
all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red

The need for resolving the questions raised by RoqueBorre and EncarnacionDelfin in their petition depends on the issue raised by the
Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a
"mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with
Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and
therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required
by the public interests to be kept under forest classification.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area
covered by the patent and title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void
33

ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land
of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have
been a virgin forest as stated by EmeterioBerebers witness DeograciasGavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts finding
that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut
timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for
is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title
such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the
filing of his application.

The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The
records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors in-interests since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public
land classified as forest.

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of
Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library

We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land. There
is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners RoqueBorre and EncarnacionDelfin, as such issues are rendered moot
by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.




34

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34463 September 27, 1977
ROSALINA TONGSON, applicant-appellee,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ET AL., oppositors-appellants, MACARIO BERMEJO, ETC., oppositor.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio for appellants.
Rafael B. Silva for applicant-appellee.
Victor A. Arches for oppositorMacario Bermejo.
FERNANDO, J .:
The sole appellant in this application for registration of title for Lot 855 of the cadastral survey of Pilar is the Director of Forestry, one of
the oppositors. It smiled the lower court decision in favor of another oppositor, Macario Bermejo.
1
The question raised is one of law,
whether or not a parcel of land, in the possession of the predecessors- in-interest and the oppositor Bermejo as far back as 1905, asserted
to have originally been mangrove swamps, thereafter converted into a fishpond, may still be considered as part of the timber domain
which is not disposable. As the sole issue is one of law, the Court of Appeals, where the matter was first elevated, certified the case to this
Tribunal. the decision must be affirmed, the facts as found by the lower court being entitled to respect. As noted in the decision: "After
examining very closely the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by Macario Bermejo in his capacity as judicial administrator
of the estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, the Court arrives at the conclusions that the claims of possession and ownership of the heirs
of said Santiago M. Bermejo are clearly supported by the evidence."
2

The facts as found by the lower court follow: "The testimonial evidence shows that as early as the year 1905 the parcel of land which later
became Lot 855 of the cadastral survey of Pilar, was under the exclusive possession of Francisco Boria who cut trees therefrom and
converted them into firewood. He also established a salt factory and that he sold the firewood and the salt without having been disturbed
by anybody. After the death of Francisco.Boria, his son Arturo Borja took possession of the land, continued to cut trees and converted
them into firewood without giving share of the products to anybody, up to the year 1910. On May 1, 1917 Antero Borja sold the land to
DeograciasGayacao as evidenced by a private document over thirty years of age, marked Exhibit '15-A-Bermejo.' The English translation
is marked Exhibit '15-A-Bermejo DeograciasGayacao took possession of the land and made use of the trees and the improvements
therein. On January 4, 1940, DeograciasGayacao sold five parcels of land to Santiago M. Bermejo and one of the parcels known as parcel
No. 4 is cadastral Lot No. 855. The sale is evidenced by the notarial instrument marked Exhibit '14- Bermejo.' During his lifetime,
Santiago M. Bermejo possessed said parcel of land, cut trees for the firewood purposes and also had a salt factory. Upon the death of
Santiago M. Bermejo in 1951, his children took possession of this parcel of land and when Macario Bermejo was appointed judicial
administrator by the Court of First Instance of Capiz, in Special Proceedings No. V689, this lot appeared in the Revised Inventory of the
estate of the late Santiago M. Bermejo (Exhibit '13-Bermejo'). Paragraph 21 of said Inventory (Exhibit '13-A- Bermejo') is Lot 855.
During his lifetime, Santiago M. Bermejo declared this land for taxation purposes as shown by tax declaration No. 10190, Exhibits '19-
Bermejo,' '20-Bermejo', '21-Bermejo,' '23-Bermejo,' and '25-Bermejo.' During the cadastral survey of the land in the municipality of Pilar,
Santiago M. Bermejo claimed Lot 855, and presented a cadastral survey of the land in the municipality of Pilar, Santiago M. Bermejo
claimed Lot 855, and presented a cadastral answer, a copy of which is marked Exhibit '29-Bermejo.' This cadastral answer was subscribed
on March 6, 1951.
3
It was stated further: "At present Lot 855 is a completed and producing fishpond. When Macario Bermejo took
possession of the land in 1953 he converted it into a fishpond and started to construct fishpond dikes. However, due to lack of funds, the
construction of the fishpond was not completed. On May 30, 1956, Macario Bermejo, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the
late Santiago M. Bermejo, leased the land to Leopoldo L. Somes with the approval of the Court of First Instance of Capiz. Said lease
contract is marked Exhibit Bermejo At present Leopoldo L. Somes is in actual possession of Lot 855 by virtue of said lease contract
(Exhibit Bermejo) ... The possession of Francisco Borja Antero Borja, DeograciasGayacao, and Santiago Bermejo was peaceful,
continuous, open, and adverse under claim of ownership. The possession of the children of the late Santiago M. Bermejo, represented by
judicial administrator Macario Bermejo, started after the death of Santiago Bermejo on April 1951. Nobody molested them.
Consequently, the possession of the heirs of Santiago M. Bermejo together with that of their predecessors-in-interest was likewise
peaceful, continuous, open, adverse and in concept of owners for a period of not less than fifty years."
4

35

As set forth at the outset, the appeal lacks merit, and the affirmance of the decision is called for.
1. It is admitted in the brief of appellant Director of Forestry that the lower court, in its decision, relied on Montano v. Insular
Government,
5
Jocson v. Director of Forestry
6
andGarchitorenaVda. deContrera v. Obias.
7
It is contended, however, that after the
Administrative Code of 1917 took effect, mangrove swamps were included in the category of public forest.
8
The Administrative Code
became effective on October 1, 1917. Jocson v. Director of Forestry was decided in 1919. This Court, in the opinion of Justice Moir was
quite categorical: "In the case of Mapa v. Insular Government ..., this court said that the phrase 'agricultural lands' as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July Ist 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber,
mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether
they are used as nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment,"
9
What is even more persuasive as to the
correctness of the decision reached by the lower court is that in the Garchitorena decision, this Court, through Justice Ostrand who was
famed for his authoritative opinions on public land controversies, promulgated in 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the
revised Administrative Code, was equally explicit: 'The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is
untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forests lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in
the Act of Congress ...
10
It could be said, therefore, that even on the assumptions that the parcel of land in question could be characterized
as mangrove swamps, the conclusion reached by the lower court is not without support in the applicable authorities.
2. ctually, it cannot be said with certainty that there was a finding in the appealed decision that to the disputed lot was originally mangrove
swamps. As stated therein: "Mangrove swamsp where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse fit only
for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land into public land. Such lands
are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain."
11
Based on such a finding which must be accorded due weight
and is control the sole question raised on appeal is one of law, the decision arrived at by the lower court is not open to any valid objection.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of April 5, 1962 is affirmed. No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J .:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, ormanglares, as they are commonly known. If they
are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may
be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
36

The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. RupertoVillareal
applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for
more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After
trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. ofCapiz.
1
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
2
The
Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature
and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no
dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner
claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us
is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the
country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural,
mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935,
until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories.
3
This provision
has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.
4

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be
alienated.
5
Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private
ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government,
6
promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court
as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which will not live
except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate
there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent
cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa
palm propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so
regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters
flowing over them are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the
public interest in what remains.
x xx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of converting manglares
and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the
change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would
destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the
public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820.Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise
specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever
character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later
it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry:
7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as
terrenosforestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be
'terrenosmadereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be
37

called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be
called 'timber land.
xxxxxxxxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general character of the
land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as
used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902,
classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are
not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which
vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If
they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in GarchitorenaVda. deCentenera v. Obias,
8
promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years
after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as
shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has
been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of
Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling
was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry,
9
with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litiswere agricultural in
nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for
firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land.
Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan,
10
the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,
11
reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that
"all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps,
manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
12
promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no
jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest
lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,
13
the Court was more positive when it held, again through Justice
Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not thickly
forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of
forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees
38

classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings
because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was
already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in
out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
14
where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission
that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable.
This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for
all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the
constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public
lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer
our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy
prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are
valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each
other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of
public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time
to time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition
shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
39

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from
one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826.Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of
Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from
the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and
thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest
uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of any forest
reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and
become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827.Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves,
upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the
Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no
less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is
thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove
swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it.
And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands
over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we
ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
15
where the possession of the land in dispute
commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor
forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not
be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for
registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director
of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands,
16
to prove that the land is
registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove
swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest
land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private
ownership.
40

Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are
released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease,
grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part
of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or
other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no
matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive
possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacionposesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring
title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacionposesoria has been inscribed or registered in the
registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as
required by the Spanish Mortgage Law.
17
These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in
this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining
his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest
ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases.
18

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly,
the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As
such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released
as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
DENR et al VS. YAP et al
G.R. No. 167707
October 8, 2008
41

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles
over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared
their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and
Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in totothe RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested
rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No.
1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No.
705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification
for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only
42

agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has
time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.
The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos
intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 75672 April 19, 1989
HEIRS OF GUMANGAN namely: ANTONIA GUMANGAN, BALBINA G. GOMEZ, IRENE KITDUD, LINA TOLAS,
MAGDALENA GUMANGAN, PABLO GUMANGAN and VICTORIA G. AMISTAD, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 75673 April 19,1989
HEIRS OF MOLINTAS, namely: MAGSIA M. LEUAN, PULMANO MOLINTAS, SERGIO MOLINTAS, SALINDIA CUYAN,
AMADO MOLINTAS, ALMAQUIO MOLINTAS, NENITA M. RILLERA, JOSEPHINE M. ABANAG, BELEN M. MARANES,
WATSON M. MARANES, EDUARDO M. MARANES and JOHN MOLINTAS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, HEIRS OF TIMOTEO
LAGASCA, SERA PATNAO, COMAD LIGARO, HEIRS OF ELEN JUAN and EDUARDO CUYAN, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J .:
Can a part of a forest reservation be titled in a land registration proceeding? This is the controversy in this petition for review of a decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
On October 3, 1975, the Heirs of Gumangan, represented by Victoria G. Amistad, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio
(now Regional Trial Court) an application for original land registration (Land Registration Case No. N-396) covering Lots "C" and "K",
as shown in plan II-13973 (RS-985), with a combined area of 14.3884 hectares (143,884 sq. meters) and both situated in Res. Sec. "D",
City of Baguio.
43

On November 13, 1975, the Heirs of MOLINTAS, represented by Josephine M. ABANAG also filed with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio an application for original land registration (Land Registration Case No. N- 400) coveting Lots "A-2", "B", and "C", as shown on
plan II-11935, with a total area of 23.3253 hectares (233,253 sq. meters) and all of which are situated in Res. Sec. "D", City of Baguio.
On May 5, 1977, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, filed Identical motions to dismiss in Land Registration
Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400 and several other land registration cases covering lands within the City of Baguio, alleging that the Court of
First Instance of Baguio has no jurisdiction over the said applications inasmuch as the parcels of land applied for have been declared
public lands, the disposition of which is the concern of the Director of Lands with the prior approval of the Secretary of Natural
Resources. It is also alleged therein that whatever registrable rights and/or claims the applicants may have over the subject lands are
barred by the Statute of Limitations and by prior judgment (the Decision dated November 13, 1922 in Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 211.).
Both applicants in LRC-N-396 and LRC-N-400, now petitioners, filed their oppositions to the said motion to dismiss on the following
grounds: the parcels of land applied for cannot be disposed of by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act; that the parcels of land
applied for, although classified as residential, fall under the term "agricultural lands," hence there is no valid reason to exclude them from
the coverage of Section 48 of the Public Land Act; that the applicants whose predecessors were not served with notices in Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, as required by Section 3 of Act No. 627, are not barred from applying for registration
of their titles to the lands applied for; that the declaration of the subject lands as public lands in the townsite proceedings did not disturb
their possessory titles or foreclose their right to apply for the benefits under Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
On February 15, 1978, the trial court issued an order dismissing Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the present motions to dismiss, the same are hereby granted and the applications in the
three above-entitled cases are dismissed, without costs.
On March 29, 1978, petitioners filed their motions for reconsideration of the dismissal order, anchored on the following grounds:
a. That the parcels of land covered by LRC-N-396 and LRC-N-400 are included within the boundary lines of Busol
Forest Reservation, which reservation was excluded from the proceedings in Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O.
Record
No. 211;
b. That the parcels of land subject matter of the said land registration cases are not among those declared as public land
in the Decision dated November 13, 1922 in the said reservation proceedings;
c. That the applicants-petitioners are not barred by the said Decision dated November 13, 1922 from applying for the
registration of their titles under Act No. 496, as amended.
On June 13, 1978, the Director of Lands filed his opposition to the motion for reconsideration, alleging that:
... the Court of First Instance of Baguio has no jurisdiction over the parcels of land subjects of land registration cases in
question; and that the claims of the Heirs of Gumangan and the Heirs of Molintas in LRC-396 and LRC-400 have
already been settled in previous proceedings.
On April 28, 1981, the trial court issued another order denying the motion for reconsideration.
On June 11, 1981, petitioners filed their notices of appeal in both LRC-N-396 and LRC-N-400 with the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals).
On May 8, 1985, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging therein as follows
On November 29, 1984, the Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 57112-21, entitled "Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner vs. Judge SinfrosoFangonil, et al., respondents," holding
that lands within the Baguio Townsite reservation may not be the subject of original registration proceedings; that said
lots may only be disposed of by the Director of Lands under the townsite provisions of the Public Land Act and that
44

claims for private lands not presented in Civil Reservation Case No. 1 are concluded or barred forever by the decision in
said case.
On July 1, 1985, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss filed by the Director of Lands on the following grounds
1. That the lands applied for in Land Registration Case Nos. N-396 and N- 400 are admittedly within the physical
boundaries of Busol Forest Reservation, which is outside the Baguio Townsite, hence the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City has jurisdiction to hear the cases;
2. That the parcels of land applied for in Land Registration Cases Nos.
N-396 and N-400, are not among those declared public lands in the Decision dated November 13, 1922 in Civil
Reservation Case No, 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, hence trial of said cases are (sic) not barred by res judicata;
3. That there is a necessity for the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City to conduct a regular hearing of Land
Registration Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400 to determine if petitioners, by themselves and through their predecessor have
acquired registerable titles to the lands claimed by them before the establishment of the Busol Reservation on April 27,
1922.
On November 6, 1985, petitioners submitted to respondent Court of Appeals a memorandum of evidence with documentary exhibits to
prove the grounds of their opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by the Director of Lands.
On January 13, 1986, the Third Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its Decision 1 in AC-G.R. CV Nos.
69847 and 69848, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
has to be, as it is hereby, granted, without the necessity of presentation of evidence.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on July 28, 1986. 3
Hence, these two petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the respondent appellate court. This Court gave due course to the
petition on February 23, 1987. 4
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioners admit that the property subject of their applications are within the Baguio Townsite Reservation that was established on April
12, 1912. In a decision in Civil Reservation Case No. 1 dated November 13, 1922, it was held that all lands within the Reservation are
public lands with the exception of (1) lands reserved specific public uses and (2) lands claimed and adjudicated as private property. It was
also held in said case that claims for private lands by all persons not presented for registration within the period fixed in Act No. 627, in
relation to the first Public Land Law, Act No. 926, are barred forever. 5
Of course petitioners claim lack of notice in the aforesaid case so that they may not be barred by the former judgment. This issue was
squarely disposed of by this Court in a case of other applicants similarly situated as petitioners. In Republic vs. Fangonil,6 this Court held
as follows:
That 1922 decision established the rule that lots of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public domain, are not
registerable under Act No. 496. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973 case the Baguio Court of First Instance "has no
jurisdiction to entertain any land registration proceedings" under Act No. 496 and the Public Land Law, covering any
lot within the Baguio Townsite Reservation which was terminated in 1932 (Camdas vs. Director of Lands, L-37782,
Resolution of this Court of March 8, 1974, dismissing petition for review of Judge Belmonte's ruling).
In the instant cases, after more than half a century from the 1922 decision declaring the townsite public domain, or
during the years 1972 to 1976, Modesta Paris, Lagya Paris, Samuel Baliwan, Pablo Ramos, Jr., Josephine Abanag,
Menita T. Victor, Emiliano Bautista and OdiDianson filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio applications for
the registration of lots (with considerable areas) inside the Baguio Townsite Reservation.
45

xxxxxxxxx
As already noted, the fact is that the notice in Case No. 211 was issued on
July 22, 1915. The clerk of court certified that 134 persons living upon or in visible possession of any part of the
reservation were personally served with notice of the reservation. Section 3 of Act No. 627 provides that the certificate
of the clerk of court is "conclusive proof of service." (Zarate case, pp. 158, 162).
xxxxxxxxx
We hold that the trial court erred in requiring the presentation of evidence as to the notice required under Act No. 627.
Such evidence cannot be produced at this time because the court record of Case No. 211 was completely destroyed
during the last war.
xxxxxxxxx
The period of more than fifty years completely bars the applicants from securing relief due to the alleged lack of
personal notice to their predecessors. The law helps the vigilant but not those who sleep on their rights. "For time is a
means of destroying obligations and actions, because time runs against the slothful and contemners of their own rights."
Thus, inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has
jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not the
courts.
Petitioners nevertheless contend that said properties are within the Busol Forest Reservation which was established on April 27, 1922
under Proclamation No. 15 and that they had the same surveyed in their behalf even before the creation of the said reservation. They cite
the aforestated decision of November 13, 1922 to the effect:
... , el Juzgadopororden de fecha 7 de Octubre de 1922 ordenoqueesteexpediente de reserve sea incluido en el calendario
de sessiones del Tribunal, correspondiente al 27 de Octubre de 1922 se celebroesta vista, y en estadia se ha dado
asimismoquenta el Juzgado de la mocionpresentadopor el Fiscal pidendoqueseanexcluido de esteexpediente de
reservalassequientesreservasforestales, administradespor el Oficina de Monte.
xxxxxxxxx
Busol, reserve forestalestablicidabajo la Proclama del Governador General de la Islas Filipinas, No. 15, de fecha 27
de Abril de 1922.
En suvirtud, y teniendo en cuentaque se hancumplidotodos los tramitesquerequiere la ley en los casos de reserve como
el quetramitaesta Tribunal concluyentemento
ORDENA, ADJUCIA Y DECRETA:
(a) Que con excepcion de lasreferidasreservaforestalestituladas "Forbes Park", "Busol", y "The Cave", cuyoslinderos y
superficiosconstan en los planosrespectivos; y de los terrenosmencionados en los Expendientereferidosnumerados...
,decididos y declarados a favor de susrespectivossolicitantes, lasparcelas de terrenosarribadescritas y objecto de
estaexpediente de reserva, asicomo los intereses o derechosrealescomprendidos en dicha reserve, sonterrenospublicos;
7
Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest
Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest
lands are inalienable 8 and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private property. 9 And the courts are
without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. 10
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
46

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.