THE CONSTITUTION AND THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

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I. IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Senate as Sole Judge
The characterization is in fact not accurate, because the constitutional provision reads as follows:
Art. XI, Sec. 3, 6: The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all members of the Senate.
In what does the exclusive power of the Senate consist? Clearly, in light of the paragraphs both preceding and
succeeding the cited provision, reference is to the trial of one who has been impeached by the House of
Representatives. Is the respondent guilty or not? That is the issue that the Constitution reserves to the
exclusive province of the Senate.
The Senate, however, may not claim too much. Nothing in this grant of power to the Senate derogates from
powers given to other branches of government. When therefore a question of law is raised such as: Does an
impeachment proceeding constitute an exception to the absolute confidentiality rule of the Foreign Currency
Deposits Act?, that is quite a distinct matter from the guilt or innocence of the respondent. In fact, the case
would not be an impeachment case. It would be the case either of the respondent, or the bank concerned
asserting its right under the law, against the Senates demand that it produce the documents the law forbids it
from disclosing.
A corollary point needs stressing. An impeachment trial does not engender a fourth branch of government that
rises above all others as some senators seem to believe. The court of impeachment is nothing other than
Senate performing, it is true, a non-legislative function. But it is precisely because it is Senate of the
Philippines that it has the power to try in cases of impeachment. Thus ordains the Constitution: The Senate
shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment xxx. Put more directly, it is precisely
because Senate is the Senate that it tries an impeachment case.
However, it is not only in respect to impeachment cases that the Constitution vests the chambers of Congress
with exclusive jurisdiction. In respect to the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals, the provision reads
thus: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an electoral tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.
But, complains Rep. Rodolfo Farinas, the Supreme Court has intruded into judgments of the House and Senate
Electoral Tribunals and, again he complains, Congress has been tolerant of such intrusions. The trouble with
Rep. Farinas is that he wants the Constitution to read otherwise, but does not take the effort to cause its
amendment!
The Scope of Judicial Power and of Judicial Review
The definition of judicial power in Article VIII, Section 1 is crucial: Judicial Power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Which branches, offices, agencies, or instrumentalities of government no matter how they may be acting or
by what colour of title or legality they may claim power are excluded from the pale of judicial review? The
clear answer is: none, because until the Constitution is amended, the judiciary shall have the duty (not only the
power) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Does this not give undue power to the Supreme Court over other branches of government? In the first place,
what powers are due the branches of government is a question of apportionment, and that is a question that
the Constitution is supposed to have settled. In thus granting so-called broadened certiorari power to the
Supreme Court to include any branch or instrumentality of the government, thus did the Constitution apportion
power. If there be lopsidedness in fact an exacerbation of what constitutional theorists call the counter-
majoritarian difficulty the solution is to amend the Constitution, not to ignore it!
This is the reason that Rep. Farinas is whining in wrong direction. Do not fault the Supreme Court, much less
bully it into submission by threatening to impeach its members; blame the framers of the Constitution, but that
will be nothing but throwing an inutile tantrum. What can be done is to re-write the Constitution, something the
present President claims he has no interest in doing! Who then is to blame?
The Senate President, at the February 14 hearing, read into the record his statement in which he articulated
key principles: the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the law and the interpreter of the Constitution; the scope
of judicial review is such that all agencies and branches of government are subject to it when there is a charge
of grave abuse of discretion; the Senate alone may try the respondent in an impeachment case and render a
verdict of guilty or not guilty; Separation of powers and the coordinateness of the branches of government
made it necessary for the Senate, sitting in an impeachment trial, to heed TROs and injunctive orders by the
Supreme Court, as long as these did not tread on the ground that the Constitution exclusively reserved for the
Senate. It was a necessary statement emanating from a seasoned lawyer and a statesman, especially in the
light of one Senators reckless declaration that he was ready to disregard all unlawful orders, implying that he
was the ultimate judge of what was a lawful order of not!
Even in the United States, where the power of judicial review is neither express nor as extensive as in this
jurisdiction, the US Supreme Court has asserted, in relation to the impeachment case of President Richard
Nixon, the power of the courts to interpret the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger, in United States v.
Nixon, taught:
Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at
variance with the construction given the document by another branch. Notwithstanding the deference each
branch must accord the others, the judicial Power of the United States vested in the federal courts can no more
be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the
veto power. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the
checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. We therefore reaffirm that it is the
province and the duty of this Court to say what the law is with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this
case.
When one senator therefore rose to announce that he was taking exception to some of the propositions the
Senate President asserted, that kept me wondering which of them he was doubting or denying, considering
that they were all foundational principles of political law.
It is not only by certiorari that the Supreme Court may pass upon interlocutory orders or resolutions of the
Senate. When, by reason of a citation for contempt, a witness seeks relief from the High Court by way of a
petition for habeas corpus, it is precisely the province of the writ to examine the legality of the detention. In
doing so, the Supreme Court exercises the original jurisdiction granted it by the Constitution to issue writs
of habeas corpus and to rule thereby on the legality or lack of it of the contempt citation.
Marbury v. Madison and its Progeny
In American constitutional theory, Marbury v. Madison (1803) is commonly taken as the landmark case on
judicial review and on the powers of the judiciary. There are, to be sure, many law professors who have
warned against reading too much into this case. To obviate that danger then, it will be safest to read from the
judgment of the US Supreme Court itself through the pen of Chief Justice Marshall.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the
courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does i constitute a rule as
operative as it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem,
at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. xxx It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
Thus has the US Supreme Court held to be the ambit of its power. Wherever a question of what the law in fact
provides in short of interpreting the law in order to resolve a dispute there, judicial power will lie.
And yet, it must be pointed out, the US Constitution does not grant the express review power that the
Philippine Constitution of 1987 vests on our judiciary. The point should be made clear that the Philippine
Supreme Court is by no means exaggerating its claims to the exercise of judicial power. Most certainly, the
eight who voted for a TRO against the sub-poenae of the dollar accounts of respondent Chief Justice Renator
Corona, were not committing an impeachable offense. They were exercising a sworn duty, unless of course
impeachable offense now means anyone who crosses Congress path!
One of the senators rose to advance a rather strange theory: that Supreme Court precedents did not
necessarily bind the impeachment court because of the sui generis character of impeachment proceedings.
Obviously, this is an good example of a non sequitur. The case of Francisco v. House of
Representatives (2003) surely constitutes binding precedent precisely because it dealt with the power of
judicial review vis-a-vis impeachment cases.
First, quoting Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the proponent of the provision on judicial review as now
enunciated in our Constitution, explained its breadth in no uncertain terms:
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. (I Record of
the Constitutional Commission 434-436, 1986), emphasis ours.
Consistent with the intendment of the Constitution, the Supreme Court through Madame Justice Conchita
Carpio-Morales, now Ombudsman, the Court ruled:
x x x
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the
power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application
for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC "[i]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have
long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include
the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
Unless Art. 8 of the Civil Code has been amended the latest time I checked, it was still there then judicial
decisions interpreting laws form part of the legal system. As long as the impeachment court deems itself to be
operating within the Philippine legal system (otherwise, which?), then it is bound by precedent as well.
US Constitutional Theory on Judicial Review in Impeachment Cases
One of the senators, in her remarks, citing American jurisprudence, sought to give the impression that judicial
review in impeachment cases was anathema to American constitutional theory. Without doubt, that is one
persuasion in the United States, but by no means is it the only one nor, necessarily, the most persuasive. In a
well received article, Impeachment: Trials and Errors, Prof. Irving Brant also examines the claim of the Senate
to the sole power to try all impeachments. Brant was attacking a House Managers (John Bingham) position
totally excluding judicial review. Argued Brant:
Had the clause relating to the Senates sole power stood alone, there would be some slight plausibility to
Binghams interpretation. But the true meaning is found in its relation to a preceding clause. Putting the two
together:
The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole power of impeachment.
The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.
In combination, what are these but a mere division of functions between House and Senate? They say that the
Senate shall have no part of the power to impeach, and that the House shall have no part of the power to try
impeachments.
x x x
Every unconstitutional action of Congress that works definite and substantial injury to a specific individual gives
that person standing to present a case in law or equity to the courts of the United States. The only question,
therefore, is whether removal by impeachment in violation of the Constitution produces substantial injury.
Financially, it may be no injury at all, but in social standing and human dignity the penalty is fearful...What
about the provision that the party convicted may be disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the United States? Nobody, surely, would contend that this lifelong punishment, if imposed in violation of the
Constitution, is too trivial to give rise to a case in law or equity.
There is yet another important point Brant argues: Should Senate convict on the basis of Articles of
Impeachment filed in violation of Constitutional requirements, the conviction would be in the nature of a Bill of
Attainder that both the Philippine and the American constitutions expressly proscribe.
What Francisco Teaches:
The question of whether or not Articles of Impeachment have been validly filed is, we know in the light of
Francisco, a justiciable question. It in fact raises the question of whether or not the requirements for a trial by
the Senate have been complied with. There are constitutional standards by which to abide, and that the House
of Representative, as indicting agency, must comply with. If there are standards, judicial review will lie.
Until the Constitution is amended and the vast power of judicial review now expressly vested by Article VIII,
Section 1 is pared down, then the power of the Supreme Court to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentality of government will extend precisely to that: any and every
branch or instrumentality of government. Most certainly, that includes the Senate sitting as an impeachment
court.
What the Certiorari Powers Cannot Reach
Whatever upsets the balance of powers established by the Constitution and impairs one or the other branch
from performing a constitutionally assigned duty will not be reached by judicial review. The Supreme Court
may very well declare a sub-poena to be in violation of law; it may declare that certain acts or orders of the
Senate in an impeachment trial, or of any of the officers of the court, violate the rights of the respondent; the
Supreme Court may also declare evidence inadmissible, if the reason for inadmissibility is constitutional in
nature. But the Supreme Court cannot, by a TRO, a writ of injunction, whether provisional or permanent, stop
the impeachment proceedings. That would be to usurp a constitutionally assigned duty of the Senate.
The Supreme Court has itself laid down the parameters of grave abuse of discretion. The pronouncement
in United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko is merely a reiteration of what he has commonly held:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution,
the law and jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross
misapprehension of facts.
A writ of certiorari, as understood in this jurisdiction, is not a writ of error. When all that one alleges is that there
has been an error in the application of the law or in the appreciation of facts these might properly constitute
assignments of error on appeal, but not for a writ of certiorari, especially when, as in this case, the writ has the
effect of the judicial branch reaching into the prerogatives of another branch of government.
Can a judgment of conviction by the impeachment court be reviewed by the Supreme Court on the ground that
the judgment was rendered with grave abuse of discretion? In the first place, the Constitution provides for no
appeal in impeachment cases. It would therefore seem that to turn to the Supreme Court by a petition for a writ
of certiorari, when this would result in an appeal the vacation of judgment of conviction would be to provide
a remedy that the Constitution does not grant. The Senate has the sole power not only to try, but also to
decide!
But Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals provides some guidance. There, the Supreme Court held that it is not
the office of the writ of certiorari to delve into the merits of a case, but is limited to correcting errors of
jurisdiction only. The writ of certiorari therefore points out the grave abuse of discretion that amounted to lack
of jurisdiction, and then the court that issues the writ remands the case to forum a quo for the latter to correct
its own jurisdictional error. In case, therefore, it is alleged that a judgment of conviction resulted from grave
abuse of discretion (e.g., a complete disregard of the evidence, or the admission or constitutionally excluded
evidence), then the respondent could turn to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. If the Court is convinced
that the abuse of discretion is properly characterized as grave so as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction,
then all that the Court does is point out in what the grave abuse consisted and remand the case to the
impeachment court for it to act in accordance with the findings of the Supreme Court which need not mean a
reversal of its judgment of conviction, but may call for the clarification of the findings of fact or application of the
law on which the judgment was based. But it is the Senate that must ultimately decide.
While it is true that a written judgment is not even required and that all that the Constitution requires is that the
senators vote on the verdict, still because the procedure is a trial and the senate sits as a court of record, it
stands to reason that the judgment arrived at must be based on evidence. Anything short of this results in a Bill
of Attainder. And if there is appreciation of evidence, there can be grave abuse of discretion that can consist in
totally ignoring the evidence presented. Obviously the same avenue is open to the prosecution, for although
impeachment proceedings have been characterized as highly penal in nature, I do not feel inclined to make the
constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy apply in impeachment cases.
I. IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES
The issue of what constitutes an impeachable offense does not arise only now. James St. Clair, counsel to
President Richard Nixon raised the issue when he argued that the president could only be impeached for
criminal conduct. While the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry of the House Judiciary Committee did not
subscribe to this limitation, it nevertheless laid down useful parameters: Impeachment could be based
upon conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles of our
government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of the presidential office.
Art. XI, Section 2 of the Constitution enumerates these grounds: "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Unless these deliberately vague
phrases are handled carefully, the impeachment process could be so easily trivialized by applying it to trivial
cases. It may be argued, for example, that an impeachable official who purchases a pirated DVD has betrayed
the public trust, since the public trusts that its officials will be law-abiding, even if most of the public will
patronize optical and magnetic media pirates! But are we prepared to say that the framers of our Constitution,
and the very structure of our government, allow the impeachment process to be used for such purposes?
If the provisions of our Constitution are read in light of the comments of the House Judiciary Committee of the
US, then what must be presented competently before the Senate sitting in impeachment proceedings is proof
that the respondent violated the Constitution in such wise as to transgress the constitutional form and principles
of our government, and the betrayal of public trust must be such that they have rendered him or her incapable
of the proper performance of constitutional duties of high office? Stringent? Perhaps, but necessarily so, lest
the impeachment process be trivialized.
In an American case, it was held that failure to perform just one duty required by law would not be sufficient to
uphold the action, but there would have to be a general failure to perform official duties.
What is also clear is that the respondent may, prior to trial, object to the sufficiency of the articles of
impeachment. This, to me, would be analogous to some procedures in ordinary judicial proceedings, one of
these being the Motion to Quash the Information, or the hearing conducted by the Sandiganbayn in cases over
which it has jurisdiction in R.A. 3019 cases to determine the due filing and sufficiency of the Information for
purposes of preventive suspension. Theoretically, therefore, the sufficiency of the articles is open to inquiry
and the conformity of the allegations with the grounds set forth by the Constitution can be the subject of pre-
trial argument and examination.
It is my position that despite the fact that there are constitutional standards culpable violation of the
constitution, betrayal of public trust, other high crimes, etc. the framers left them open-ended in anticipation
of the convoluted ways of human iniquity and the various forms that high officials may later prove undeserving
of high office. The Constitution has set minimal standards and while these minimal standards do constitute
constitutional standards that, by the Francisco doctrine, would provide an opening for judicial review, it would
be best for the Supreme Court to decline a petition for judicial review on the question of whether or not a
particular article or allegation rises to the level of an impeachable offense since the very nature of the issue is
intimately linked to and inseparably bound with the guilt or non-guilt of the respondent. To ask whether non-
disclosure of assets in the SALN rises to the level of an impeachable offense overlaps the question: Is the
respondent guilty of a crime for which he may be impeached and the latter question, quite very clearly, is left
to the sole authority of the Senate sitting in an impeachment trial.
That having been said, is it open to the defense to raise the issue of whether or not the House Managers have,
in the Articles, in fact alleged impeachable offenses at any time during the trial? Prevailing jurisprudence
suggests an affirmative answer. The impeachable offenses enumerated by Article XI of the Constitution are
the ground for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Senate sitting in an impeachment trial. When the defense then
challenges the articles because they do not allege impeachable offenses, it is in fact raising the question of the
jurisdiction of the impeachment court, and it is a settled rule that jurisdiction is a question that may be raised at
any time during the proceedings, particularly when not precluded by estoppel. But the challenge must be
addressed to the Senate for the reason discussed above.
It has always been my position that the articles of impeachment that arise from cases decided by the Supreme
Court should be given short shrift by the Senate. In fact, they can properly be the subject of what would be
analogous to a Motion to Quash. In the first place, a Supreme Court judgment is always a collegial judgment
and not even the ponente may be held to account for a court judgment. More importantly, however, turning a
decided case into an article of impeachment is an ill-disguised assault on judicial independence: that structural
feature of the Philippine Judiciary guaranteed by such constitutional provisions as have to do with the
appointment of judges and justices, the fiscal autonomy of the court and the prohibition against the reduction of
its budget and the exclusivity of its rule-making power. Unless it is clearprima facie that a judgment was
rendered totally bereft of basis in fact and in law, and it is alleged that the respondent coerced, intimidated or
deceived his colleagues into rendering the questioned judgment, an impeachment trial should not be a remedy
for a lost case before the Supreme Court.
I. CONDUCT OF TRIAL AND CONDUCT OF SENATORS
When the Senate sits in trial in an impeachment case, it sits as a court of impeachment, and as a court of
record, and its officers are officers of the court. If follows that the conduct of trial and the conduct of the
senators who sit in judgment must conform to the requirements of due process.
What popular sentiment might be, as polls and surveys show, should be irrelevant to the judgment the senators
arrive at, or to their votes on interlocutory matters. A judge rules and decides according to law and evidence,
and public preference is neither. It is, for purposes of a trial, noise! Much confusion has been occasioned by
reference to a phrase that is not found in the Constitution: political justice. What this means should be
nothing more than that the task of doing justice is entrusted to a political branch of government and to men and
women not appointed to the judiciary but elected to their positions. It must also mean that in reaching a
decision, policy considerations are relevant, principal among these being the consideration of whether the
respondent has acted in a manner that makes him absolutely unfit for office.
The basic persuasion of adversarial proceedings is that the judges, who are supposed to be neutral umpires,
are in the best position to arrive at a judgment when either side is given free rein to present the facts and the
law most favourable to his or her position. Obviously, the dynamics of an adversarial process is radically
altered when over-zealous partisans, sitting as judges, rush to the succour of either side and, through a
tendentious line of questioning, make up for the insouciance and lapses of counsel of either side. In a separate
opinion, Justice Ricardo Francisco, observing that the number of questions propounded by Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena (a jurist whose memory I revere) far outnumbered those of the prosecutor, had this to
say:
For starters, the court questions were so numerous which, as per petitioner Dans count, totalled 179 compared
to prosecutor Querubins questions which numbered merely 73. More noteworthy, however, is that the court
propounded leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions all rolled into one. xxx
The court questions were far from being clarificatory. They were, in the main, queries that have no basis on the
records. It has been said that purely abstract questions, assuming facts or theories for which there is no
foundation in the evidence, are not admissible as a matter of right, although such questions may be permitted
on cross-examination for the purpose of testing the knowledge of the witness as to the subject on which he has
testified. But cross-examination is the exclusive function of the advocate. Thus any trend of court
Anchorquestioning which shows even slight semblance of cross-examination is already offensive to
fundamental requirements of due process.
In fact petitions for inhibition which constitute yet another hindrance to the continuous flow of proceedings are
occasioned by the inappropriate posturing of senators. Since the senators rightly assert that in impeachment
trials, they constitute a court, then the rules governing trials including the conduct expected of judges must be
limitations and checks on their actions they must freely and voluntarily submit to.
The Senate has been repeatedly asked to relax the rules. In fact the Rules of Court that are suppletory to the
Senate Rules on impeachment contain an in-built provision on relaxation: They are to be liberally construed so
that the ends of justice may not be defeated by technical requirements. What may not be relaxed, however are
the rules that guarantee the respondent due process. Hearsay evidence, for example, cannot be admitted, as
this denies the respondent the chance to cross-examine the source of the statement. Neither may the rules
that deny the respondent an adequate defense of himself be set-aside on the pretext of relaxing the rules,
otherwise, the constitutional directive that Senate conduct a trial is ignored.
Conclusion:
That impeachment attempts in the past did not go so far or at least as far as they have gone in the present
case is no reason for the Senate, or for any branch or instrumentality of the government, to go free-style,
where anything goes. That would cease to be the Rule of Law, and the point to the sacrosanct character of the
Rule of Law is accountability of citizen and State alike to the law, particularly to the Constitution. We are not
really on terra incognita here. Aside from clear statements of intendment on the part of the framers of the
Constitution that should aid in the interpretation of nebulous constitutional provisions, argument can rightly be
constructed from the very structure of our government: a tripartite system of co-equal, coordinate branches with
a delicately calibrated system of checks and balances between them. There are finally, usefully clues from
American jurisprudence, particularly because our impeachment clauses find their origin in the US Constitution,
to which, however, must be added to the all-important caveat that nowhere in the US Constitution is there
granted to the Supreme Court as an express and as broad a power of review as does the Philippine
Constitution of 1987.