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TAADA VS.

TUVERA

FACTS:


Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation and administrative orders.

Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question.

Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette
is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where
the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.

ISSUES:


Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?

RULING:


Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then
the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of
general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force
and effect.
Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs.
The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
Of the Department of Justice
G.R.No. 159747 April 13,2004

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons),
Powers of the Ombudsman (consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation
(consti)

Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil
Code

Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an
affidavit-complaint with theDepartment of Justice (DOJ) which
contains the following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military
personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo
Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided
by Senator Honasan in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of
the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement
aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to
the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the
National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they
believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:
o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan
arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they
concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to
achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will
run the new government. They had a blood compact and that he
only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when
he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya
din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain
Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were
present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press
conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw
that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter
"I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the
DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction
over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to
his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31
which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan
Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-
PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003
directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Issues:
1. Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001,
the office of the Ombudsman should deputize
the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
2. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is
ineffective on the ground that it was not published
3. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct
the preliminary investigation because the petitioner is a public
officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit

1. No.
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be
subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from
the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the
authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to
prosecute
The power to investigate or conduct
a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may
be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor
or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as
deputized Ombudsmanprosecutors.
circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman
that it is just an internal agreement between the
Ombudsman and the DOJ
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman.
The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to
conduct preliminaryinvestigation on charges filed against
public officers and employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by
the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminaryinvestigation
for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to
act as the principal law agency of the government and
investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised
Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative
Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not
being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a
need to delegate the conduct of
the preliminaryinvestigation to an agency which has the
jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the
Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage
of the investigation.
2. No.
In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only
circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation
should be published before becoming effective.
In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The
Honorable Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative
superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular
between the DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining
authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and
of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct
of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of
persons or the public, in general.

3. No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not
will not resolve the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of
the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
360 scra 32
Publication of Laws
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance
in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of
Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein
petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and
benefits.
On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which
was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was
published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the
bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing
the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and
reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation
proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in
the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect
after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as
indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada
vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted.
The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it.
Emeterio Cui vs. Arellano University
G.R. No. 15172
May 30, 1961

FACTS: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up
preparatory law course in the Arellano University. After Finishing his
preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the
defendant from school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law
studies in the defendant university up to and including the first
semester of the fourt year. During all the school years in which
plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R.
Capistrano, brother of mother of plaintiff, was the dean of college of
law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled
for last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but
failed to pay tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R.
Capistrano, having severed his connection with defendant and
having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the college of
law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of
law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he has
studying law in Defendant University was awarded scholarship
grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were
retured to him after the end of semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fess paid
by the plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from
the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year
in college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,003.87. After
Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take
the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he
needed the transcript of his records in defendant Arellano University.
Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts.
The defendant refused until after he paid back the P1,003.87 which
defendant refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum
under protest.

ISSUE: Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and
defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to
another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarship in cash, is valid or not.

HELD: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools
provides that When students are given full or partial scholarship, it is
understood that such scholarship are merited and earned. The
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to These scholarship
should not be subsequently charged to recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarship
should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school.

Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of
public policy. The defendant uses the scholarship as a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy
but also good morals. The practice of awarding scholarship to
attract students and keep them in school is not Good custom nor
has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation
except in some private institution as in Arellano University.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as
the costs, and dismissing the defendants counterclaim. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-65425 November 5, 1987IRENEO LEAL, JOSE LEAL, CATALINA
LEAL, BERNABELA LEAL, VICENTE LEAL EUIOGIALEAL PATERNO RAMOS,
MACARIO DEL ROSARIO, MARGARITA ALBERTO, VICTORIA TORRES,
JUSTINA MANUEL, JULIAN MANUEL, MELANIA SANTOS, CLEMENTE
SAMARIO,MARIKINA VALLEY, INC., MIGUELA MENDOZA,
and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL,petitioners,vs. THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division),
andVICENTE SANTIAGO (Substituted by SALUD M. SANTIAGO),
respondents.FACTS:
- Rever s al of I AC i n i t s Res ol ut i on dat ed Sept . 27,
1983 of t he ear l i er deci s i on dat ed J une 28,
1978 penned by J us t i ce Par as of t he
Cour t of Appeal s , i n t he s ame cas e, af f i r mi ng t he t r i
al cour t s di s mi s s al of t heprivate respondents complaint.
March 21, 1941: Vicente Santiago and Cirilio Leal entered into a
contract which wascalled the Compraventa where V. Santiago
sold to the latter three parcels of land.Ci ted i n the contract was:
En caso deventa, no podran vender a otrosdi chos tres lotes
de terrenosino al aqui rendedor Vicente Santiago, o los herederos o
sucesoresde estepor el niismo precio de P5,600 siempre y cuando
estos ultimos pueden hacerla compra.1960-1965: Parts of the
properties were mortgaged or leased to the co-petitionersor to third
party1966-1957: V. Santi ago offered re-
purchase of the properti es but the peti ti onerrefused the
offerAugust 2, 1967: V. Santiago instituted complaint for specific
performance. The trialcourt (Court of First Instance in Q.C.) rendered
its decision dismissing the case fori t wa s t h o u g h t t o
b e a p r e ma t u r e c a s e o r t h a t t h e r e wa s n o s a l e
a t a l l . T h e respondent was not contented at all that he filed
another complaint in the Court of Appeals June 28, 1978:
Jus t i ce Par as of t he Cour t of Appeal s af f i r med t he
t r i al cour t s dismissal of respondents complaint. Included in the
decision was the order for
thecancel l at i on of t he annot at i ons at t he back of t h
e T r ans f er Cer t i f i cat es of T i t l ei s s u e d w h i c h p r o h i
b i t s t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o s e l l t h e l a n d t o t h e t
h i r d p a r t y . R e s p o n d e n t s f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r r
e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d a n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e pet
i ti oners(Leal ) moti on to amend but the i nci dents were not
resol ved si nce theCourt of Appeals was abolished and was
replaced by the IAC.Sept. 27, 1983: The June 28, 1978 decision of the
CA was reversed. The petitionerswer e t o accept P5, 600
f or r e- pur chas e of Land and t hey s houl d pay
r ent al of P3,087.50 as rental from 1967-1968 and the same
amount every year after.
The T r a n s f e r Ce r t i f i c a t e o f T i t l e No . 4 2 5 3 5 wa s o
r d e r e d t o b e i n t h e n a me s o f V . Santiago & Luis
Santiago and to issue another TCT to S. Santiago.ISSUE/S:

Whether or not it is quoted in the Compraventa that the private
respondent hasthe right of re-purchase.Whether the annotations of
the prohibition to sell at the back of the TCTs should
becancelled.HELD: The Resolution dated Sept. 27, 1983 was SET ASIDE
and the Decision promulgatedon June 28, 1978 is Reinstated. The
annotations of the prohibition to sell at the backof TCT Nos. 138837-
138842 were cancelled cost against respondent.For the following
reasons:-In IACs resolution : repurchase was given birth by the
phrase siempre y cuandoultimos pueden hacer la compra (when
the buyer has money to buy). Under Article1508 (2
nd
Paragraph) there is agreement as to the time, although it is
indefinite,therefore the right should be exercised within ten years,
because the law does notfavor suspended ownership.-The right to
redeem must be expressly stipulated in the contract of sale in
orderthat it may have legal existence. Under Article 1606 of the Civil
Code of thePhilippines the right to redeem or repurchase, in
the absence of an expressagreement as to time, shall last four years
from the date of contract.-Prohibition to sell the lots to persons other
than the vendor (back of TCT) will becancelled or deleted since the
prohibition to alienate should not exceed 20 yearsotherwise there
would be subversion of public policy.-Civil Code of the Phil. Art. 1306
includes that contracting parties may establishsuch stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient,provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or publicpolicy. Public order signifies the
public weal public policy. Essentially, therefore,public order and
public policy mean one and the same thing.

One such conditionwhich is contrary to public policy is the present
prohibition to self to third parties(or perpetual restriction to the right
of ownership specifically the owners right tofreely dispose of
his properties.
Garcia vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian
family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In
1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner,
inCabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October
1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming
that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in
November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told
petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married.
Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a
divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared
that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce
issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence,
this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace
Garcia.

Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce
obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before
our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the
respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an
Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and
compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws
must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of
petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact
that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian
divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even
after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status.
Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.
139 SCRA 139

Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in
Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and
had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A.,
on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn
in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay
City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her
business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed
that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The
defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no
community property.

Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court,
between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the
latter.

Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the
parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an
American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality
principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from
the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to
his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped
by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

FACTS:

An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato
was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila.
This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz
Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28,
1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil
case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering
into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no
previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a
certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed
that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and
Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit
executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason,
the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz
until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning
that Donato already previously married.

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending
before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for
annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and
domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes
a prejudicial question.

HELD:

Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial
question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such
marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit
the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April
14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Petitioner: Eduardo P. Manuel
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Callejo, Sr.

Facts:
November 7, 2001, complaint was filed in the RTC of
Baguio City. The following facts were presented:
(a) On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines,
Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a second
marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC
of Baguio City. It so appeared in the marriage contract that
Manuel was single.
(b) Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally
married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved before the second marriage.
(c) Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the
existence of the first marriage of the respondent to Rubylus
Gana.
(d) On July 28, 1975, Makati, Eduardo was married
to Ruby.
(e) On January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in
Dagupan City. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio to visit
her and he proposed assuring her that he was single.
(f) Starting 1999, Manuel started making himself
scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year.
(g) Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his
clothes, left, and did not return. He stopped giving financial
support.
(h) Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that
Eduardo had been previously married.
(i) Eduardo testified that he declared that he was
single because he believed in good faith that his marriage
was invalid. He said he did not know he had to go to the
court to seek for nullification of his first marriage before
marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had not heard from
her for more than 20 years.

On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC,
and sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of from six (6)
years and ten (10) months, as minimum to ten (10) years,
as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private
complainant, Tina Gandalera, the amount of P200,000 by
way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.

Manuel appealed the decision to the CA. He insisted that
conformably to Article 3 of the RPC, there must be malice
for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He posited that
the RTC should have taken into account Article 390 of the
New Civil Code.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the RTC with modification to indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
ofprision coreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor as maximum, and affirmation in all other
respect, as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article
41 of the Family Code should apply.

Issues:
The issues of the petition are:
(1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law
when it ruled that petitioners first wife cannot be legally
presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as
provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law
when it affirmed the award of P200,000 as moral damages
as it had no basis in fact and in law.

Held:
(1) No. The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the
Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced. The presumption of death of the spouse who
had been absent for seven years, is created by law and
arises without necessity of judicial declaration. However,
Article 41, of the Family Code, which amended the
foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides that for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage (under its
preceding paragraph), the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
(2) No. The Court rules against the petitioner. The
petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code. The Court thus declares that the
petitioners acts are against public policy as they
undermine, and subvert the family as a social institution,
good morals, and the interest, and general welfare of
society. Because the private complainant was an innocent
victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from
claiming moral damages. Even considerations of public
policy would not prevent her from recovery as held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald.