Human Res - Ijhrmr - Challenges To Successful - Kiprotich Cheruiyot

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org
International Journal of Human Resource
Management and Research (IJHRMR)
ISSN(P): 2249-6874; ISSN(E): 2249-7986
Vol. 4, Issue 3, Jun 2014, 31-46
TJPRC Pvt. Ltd.

CHALLENGES TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERFORMANCE
CONTRACTING IN THE JUDICIARY, KENYA: A CASE OF NAKURU LAW COURTS
JUDICASTER NTHUKU, DMOKAYA SAMUEL OBINO & JUMA WAGOKI

Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, Nakuru CBD Campus, Nakuru, Nairobi, Kenya

ABSTRACT
Performance contracting refers to a binding agreement between two or more parties for performing or refraining
to perform some specified task(s) over a specified duration of time. For greater efficiency, service delivery and
accountability, performance contracts are highly emphasized not only in the private sector but also in the public service
globally, regionally and locally (in Kenya). Against the backdrop of the importance of performance contracting, the
Kenyas judiciary is yet to adopt and/or implement the same. The study examined the challenges to the successful
implementation of performance contracting in the Judiciary in Kenya with an object of coming up with relevant
recommendations to improve implementation. The study adopted an explanatory research design. The target population
was limited to the judges, magistrates, state counsels and judicial staff based at the Nakuru Law Courts. Structured
questionnaires with close-ended questions were used to collect the data.
The SPSS software was used to process and analyze the data collected. The study findings indicated that there is
performance-oriented culture in the Judiciary; the government has not ensured institutionalization of performance-oriented
culture in the Judiciary; there is an ineffective communication system in the Judiciary; there are no distinct performance
benchmarks in the Judiciary; and it is due and appropriate to entrench performance contracting in the Judiciary. It is
concluded that institutional culture and communication techniques would significantly affect the implementation
performance contracting in the Judiciary and that performance measuring tools are inconsequential to performance
contracting in the Judiciary. It is recommended that an institutional culture that would embrace performance contracting be
inculcated, effective communication system enhanced and performance measuring tools introduced in consultation with
major stakeholders.
KEYWORDS: Performance Contracting, Performance Measurement, Institutional Culture
INTRODUCTION
The definition of performance contract has been a subject of significant debate among scholars and human
resource practitioners throughout the world. A contract is a binding agreement between two or more parties for performing,
or refraining from performing some specified task(s) in exchange for lawful consideration. Performance is on the other
hand, defined as the results of activities of an organization or investment over a given period of time. CAPAM (2005) in
addition, defines performance contracting as a binding agreement between two or more parties for performing or refraining
to perform some specified task(s) over a specified duration of time. A performance contract can further be defined as a
range of management instrument used to define responsibilities and expectations between parties to achieve mutually
agreed results. Performance contracting is aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness, service delivery to the public
and reducing total costs (OECD, 1999).
32 Judicaster Nthuku, Dmokaya Samuel Obino & Juma Wagoki

Impact Factor (JCC): 4.9135 Index Copernicus Value (ICV): 3.0

Within the Kenyan public sector, performance contracting is defined as an agreement between the government,
organization and individuals on one hand and the agency itself specifying the expected levels of performance to be
achieved. It is, therefore, a management tool for ensuring accountability for results by public officials because it measures
the extent to which they achieve targeted results. The judiciary is an organ of the government which falls under the public
service and in many countries is subject to performance contracting. This, however, has faced challenges and resistance in
its implementation. According to Wittrup (2006), many Romanian magistrates strongly oppose the idea of performance
indicators based on external feedback. The scholar argued that this may partly be due to misunderstanding of how such
indicators should be used. The study recommended establishment of indicators for judicial performance with regard to
timelines, workload and productivity, external evaluation of quality and service, and internal evaluation of quality and
service.
Performance measurement has for some good reasons been widely seen in many developing countries as a way of
improving public service delivery (Mbua & Salisar, 2013). On their study on Cameroonian performance contacting,
Cantens et al., (2011) argued that successfully implementing performance contract programs require the understanding of
the preliminary details about how the organization actually works. They assert that such knowledge provides a framework
for self-evaluation. In Kenya, performance contracting in the public sector was introduced in year 2004. Mbua and Salisar
(2013), noted that the government of Kenya introduced performance contracting in the public service as one of the tools to
improve service delivery.
Nyamu (2007) noted that performances contracting is motivated by the idea that individual organizational
performances occurs when employment of individuals is strictly tied to results or concrete, visible, countable,
demonstrative and desirable outcomes and benefits occurring to the customers served by these individuals. In the Kenyan
context, the concept of performance contracting is defined as a freely negotiated performance agreement between the
government and the respective Ministry, Department or Agency which clearly specifies the intentions, obligations and
responsibilities of the two contracting parties. As such, it stipulates the results to be achieved by the contracted party and
the commitment of Government as the contracting party (GOK, 2003).
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Due the concern about the poor performances and service delivery to the public, most of Government ministries
and departments in Kenya have implemented performance contracts. This is a move that aims to ensure that the entire
public sector achieves the desired results or goals. Performance contracting was formally introduced in the Kenyas public
sector in year 2004. According to a number of studies, Kenyas judiciary has been ranked among some of the most
inefficient public institutions. Performance of judicial staff is very core in the administration of justice and as such the
staffs ineffectiveness and/or ill-performance is bound to result in backlog of cases and, needless to say, delayed justice.
In Kenya, the other two arms of the government (that is, executive and legislature) though assumed to be independent, seek
the intervention of the judiciary to solve any standoffs amongst their staff or in their operations.
Thus, the poor performance of the judiciary will indeed reverberate across not only in the public sector but also in
the private sector. This current study undertook to bridge this knowledge gap by seeking to establish the challenges to the
successful implementation of performance contracting in Kenyas Judiciary with the object of coming up with
Challenges to Successful Implementation of Performance 33
Contracting in the Judiciary, Kenya: A Case of Nakuru Law Courts

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recommendations which when implemented will go a long way in enhancing performance of the judiciary and indeed the
same being a pacesetter to the entire public sector.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The general objective of the study was to examine the challenges to successful implementation of performance
contracting in the judiciary in Kenya. The study was guided by the following specific objectives:
To assess the effect of institutional culture on the implementation of performance contracting.
To determine whether or not communication techniques hinder implementation of performance contracting.
To establish the relationship between performance measurement tools and implementation of performance
contracting.
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The theory of performance-based contracting (PBC) suggests that at least some risk performance failure ought to
be transferred from government contracting agencies to contractors with the object of encouraging the latter to focus more
on performance (McBeath & Meezan, 2007). In line with this theory, it is asserted that it is very crucial to align contracts
with financial incentives and maintain a link between performance and payment to reinforce the importance of achieving
outcomes. Globally, many publicly-funded human services are provided through contracting rather than directly from
agency employees. In some models of PBC, contracts simply emphasize that measurement be reported and the contract
renewal to be pegged on performance rather than tying performance to compensation.
Nevertheless, Blasi (2002), argued that performance failure, most of the times, does not occasion contract
termination since the government and the provider tend to be interdependent. He further notes that it is quite difficult to
terminate a contract for political reasons and also the high transaction costs (such as hiring and training new personnel).
It is further observed that the area of human service contracts is hampered by lack of competition and competent optional
organizations who can otherwise replace failed providers are more often than not unavailable. It was also noted that for the
case of PBC where there contract is not tied to payment of services, performance by the providers did not seem to affect
the fate of the contract. Indeed, it is not uncommon that contracts are renewed irrespective of performance
(Lamonthe, 2004). This is attributed to lack of competition or interdependence between the agency and the provider.
The theory of PBC is associated with several critical success factors. It emphasizes that there should be definition
of success, selection of performance measures, collaboration with providers, assurance of capacity in providers,
staff and contractor training, and internal management systems. In defining success, contracts should be designed to
address specific system deficiencies or inefficiencies, and should also involve different stakeholders and organizations in
planning effort. In selection of performance measures, performance indicators should be clearly measurable, fair and
reliable. Furthermore, baseline (that is, current performance level) ought to be defined and expected performance level
should also be set. Adequate training on processes and procedures should be carried out prior to implementation of
performance contracting.
Good data systems need also to be established since it would be key to measuring and monitoring performance
(Lamonthe, 2004).The performance-based theory can be contextualized into the Kenyas judiciary due to its inherent


assertions. As McBeath and Meezan (2007) observed, the Kenyan government can ideally engage the Judicial Service
Commission, the latter as the contracting agency, to ensure that performance contracting is implemented in the judiciary.
The contract should also be aligned with financial incentives and other forms of appraisals such as promotions; maintain
this link is bound to reinforce the rationale of achieving outcomes. In tandem with Blasi (2002) argument, performance
failure need not result in termination of the contract between the JSC and the judicial staff.
Such termination would lead to the judicial staff losing their jobs. This is partly advised by the fact, recruiting and
training new staff is very costly. In line with PBC, there should be clear performance measurement such as the number of
cases cleared within a given time. Such performance measurement tools need to be fair, reliable and mutually agreed upon
by both the JSC and the judicial staff. Moreover, as Lamonthe (2004) noted, good data systems ought to be established
since this would be crucial to measuring and monitoring performance. The subject of performance contracting in the public
sector has been studied by many scholars. The study reviewed the empirical literature bordering on aspects of PCs,
performance contracting in the public sector and more precisely in the judiciary.
Institutional Culture and Performance Contracting
Hofsted (2001), referred to institutional culture as the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the
members of one organization from another. Schein (2004) added that organizational or institutional culture embodies a
pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learnt by the organization or institution as it solved its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new
members as the collect way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems. In his study of New Zealand, Petrie
(2002) asserted that many countries have pursued a strategy of developing a more performance-oriented culture in the
public sector. This has generally comprised two closely related elements.
These are an increased focus on results, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and service quality; and a move from
centralized bureaucratic structures, to more decentralized managerial environments. Contracting within hierarchies is said
to take mainly the form of employment relation, which is argued to be an incomplete contract. In addition to internalizing
dispute resolution, there are a wide variety of control mechanisms available within a vertical integrated hierarchy. One of
these is posited to be the role of organizational or institutional culture in developing a climate of trust and limiting the more
aggressive and opportunistic bargaining associated with arms-length contracting (Williamson, 1993). The degree of
employee identification with the institutions goals reduces the need to verify employees performance explicitly through
the use of performance measures.
Institutional culture is further noted by Petrie (2002) to be a particularly vital means of influencing performance
where performance is very hard to measure. The study added that the broad cultural, social and legal environments are
crucial determinants of the need for, and usefulness of, more formal contract-like approaches. Trust and social conventions,
he opines, also play an important role in securing commitment and performance in long-term relationships,
especially where output is hard to specify and measure. The importance of these factors is said to vary across countries and
cultures, and can be expected to result in considerable variation in the optimal form of performance contracting across
public sectors.


According to the Government of Kenya (GoK, 2003), the expected outcome of the introduction of the
performance contracts includes improved service delivery, improved efficiency in resource utilization, institutionalization
of a performance-oriented culture in the public service, measurement and evaluation of performance, linking rewards and
sanctions to measurable performance, retention or elimination of reliance of public agencies on exchequer funding,
instilling accountability for results at all levels and enhancing performance. As such, institutional culture and performance
contracting are expected to be enjoined. In his study, Mbua and Sarisar (2013), opined that the Kenyas Vision 2030 has
recognized performance contracting among the key strategies needed to strengthen public administration and service
delivery. In the same light, the two scholars observe that these strategies will focus on among others,
entrenching performance as a culture in the public service.
They further assert that the governments motivation in embarking on the performance contracting was in order to
achieve a number of particular objectives. Two of these objectives were institutionalizing performance oriented culture in
the public service through introduction of an objective performance appraisal system, and also ensuring that the culture of
accountability pervades all levels of the government machinery. It is argued that in Kenya, performance contract system
has led to a culture of professionalism, competitiveness, innovation and target setting being inculcated into the public
sector. However, against this backdrop, a culture of non-performance and lack of accountability is said to be fighting back
to resist this change. A competitive culture is asserted to be necessary for performance contracts to be implemented
effectively. Public officials are as such mandated to adopt a culture of competition and benchmark their performance with
global standards set out by various institutions.
When a performance-oriented culture is institutionalized in the public service, through the introduction of an
objective performance appraisal system, performance contracting is bound to be implemented successfully. However, this
has been noted to be indeed a relatively tall order to accomplish; results are being realized albeit at quite a slow pace
(GoK, 2003). On paper, the Government advocates for open, fair and transparent recruitment especially of top public
officials however, the culture of sycophancy and incompetence in various departments and/or agencies is argued to be
commonplace where top officials are often known to employ their cronies not on basis of their competence, rather on tribal
or regional inclinations. This scenario is, needless to say, against objective management practices. For a country to be
competitive in the global stage, the public sector needs to adopt best management practices at all levels. Performance
contracting is observed to offer an opportunity for adoption of these practices (Mbua & Sarisar, 2013).
Communication Techniques versus Implementation of Performance Contracting
A negotiated incentive contract is viewed by its proponents as a device to reveal information and motivate
managers to exert effort (Jones & Thomson, 2007). They also argue that the contract can translate the multiple objectives
of the multiple principals who govern state owned firms into clear targets measured by specified criteria and weighted to
reflect priorities. Moreover, targets can be set to take into account circumstances where managers have less control over
their firms than comparable managers do in the private sector.
By specifying targets and evaluating results ex-post, the performance contract is seen by its advocates as a way to
encourage governments to reduce ex ante controls, giving managers more freedom and motivation to improve operating
efficiency.


Shirley and Xu (2001), expected that managers will exploit the opportunity to shirk, perhaps by negotiating lower
targets than they could potentially achieve, and performance will, thus, not improve. In their empirical analysis,
the scholars realized that reduction of information asymmetry is represented by bidding and a competitive environment.
First, they expect that bidding, by providing government with more information about the firms and potential managers
will reduce information asymmetry, thus allowing the government to use strong performance incentives and as such reduce
shirking.
However, several factors could reduce the positive effects on performance. The information problem may not be
solved by contracts, because of lack of information. Empirical studies by Crocker and Masten (1991), suggested that
high-powered incentives are a problem even for private firms in developed countries. Owners may fear that because of
information asymmetry they will not be able to measure achievement well and waste their bonus (Laffont & Tirole, 1993)
or reward managerial self-dealing (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). There may also be political barriers to paying successful
managers considerably more than ministers or legislators. According to Wittrup (2006), in order to assess the hitherto
system for individual evaluation of magistrates in Romania, a number of interviews with magistrates were arranged.
The evaluation system was geared towards improving the magistrates professional performance; enhance the
efficiency of the courts activities, and prosecutorial offices, and to increase the public trust in the judiciary. Based on this
scholars interviews with the magistrates, one of his observations is that if the objective of the performance contracting
system is to stimulate magistrates to self-improvement much more and much better communication between the evaluated
and the evaluators is needed. The researcher further asserts that magistrates in some cases have just received their marks
without any explanations. Indeed, some are not informed at all about the results of their evaluation. Wittrup (2006),
recommended that in order to improve the evaluation process specific guidelines for the evaluation should be developed.
The guidelines should mention very specifically what the evaluators must do in order to assess each aspect or criterion of
the evaluated magistrates performance, as well as guide the process of communication between evaluators and the
evaluated.
Performance data and other statistical data about public organizations should ideally provide public managers,
employees, users, politicians, researchers and other stakeholders with relevant and reliable information, which should make
these actors able to make better decisions and form accurate perceptions about the tasks performed by these institutions
(Wittrup, 2006). Magistrates and judges handling different cases or cases of varied complexity are deemed to have mixed
reactions to the performance contracts. The judicial staff handling cases of greater magnitude would explicably expect the
implementation of performance contracting to be alive to this situation.
Wittrup (2006), opined that they evaluators would base their evaluation on, for instance, whether the judges were
willing to discuss judicial problems with colleagues, or whether they, for instance, are engaging in gossiping about
colleagues. Danilet (2004), also asserted that since evaluators seem mostly to refrain from the use of external sources when
evaluating magistrates, the evaluation criterion for attitude towards citizens provides a certain challenge.
In Kenya, it is recommended in tandem with stewardship of the performance contracting process, that there
should be entrenchment of among others, information, education and communication of performance contracting.
Performance Measuring Tools


According to the study by Shirley and Xu (2001) on the empirical effects of performance contracts in China,
performance contracts on average were not significantly correlated with improvements in productivity. They noted that
performance contracts were found to have a negative and significant correlation with productivity when the endogenous
nature of performance contracts was factored in. From their findings, they noted that performance contracts can improve
productivity when they simultaneously specify sensible targets, offer strong incentives and signal commitment especially
in a competitive environment. As such, productivity was higher in more competitive firms whose performance contracts
had higher wage incentives, longer terms, managerial bonds, and profit-oriented targets. In fact, slightly more than half of
the performance contracts were associated with productivity improvements.
Finally, they argued that good performance contract features were more often observed under the oversight of
local government, faced more competition, were smaller in size, and had better previous performance. According to the
study by Mbua and Sarisar (2013), performance measurement is usually taken to be paramount in the delivery of improved
services. As argued by Balogun (2003), emphasis on performance management for results delivery is indeed influenced by
the basic assumption of performance management which lies in its professed ability to unite the attention of institution
members on a common objective and galvanize them towards the attainment of this objective. The use of performance data
to inform management is not a new concept.
The belief that concrete data on organizational performance, or performance metrics, should guide managers
decision making has framed most discussions of management in the public sector in the developed and developing
countries since the early 1990s. With the increased emphasis on quantitative measurement of outcomes,
the term performance measurement has become a higher priority. Measuring and reporting on organizational
performance focuses the attention of public managers and oversight agents, as well as the general public, on what, where
and how much value programs provide to the public (Hatry, 2006).
The quest for productivity, quality and speed has spawned a remarkable number of management tools and
techniques which include total quality management, benchmarking, re-engineering and change management amongst
others. All these, if pursued from strategy perspective, leads to emphasis being put on the wrong place. Obongo (2009),
asserted that emphasis on reforming the public sector has been slowly shifting in many developing countries more towards
operational effectiveness, which entails doing what one is doing better. With defined outcomes and appropriate
benchmarks to measure the outcomes, the rampant lack of focus is brought into the open. Managers begin to ask the right
questions, redefine the problem they are trying to solve and diagnose that problem afresh.
He further noted that in organizations where performance measurement systems are already established and
resources are already devoted to providing credible performance data in a timely fashion, performance data can be used
effectively to support these change efforts. Where performance measurement systems are not institutionalized, efforts to
develop useful performance measures can support change efforts in several ways.
It is agreeable that performance evaluation is essential and necessary in the public service (Kervasdoue, 2007).
Additionally, a performance indicator opined Wittrup (2006), for the number of cessations is not appropriate at the
individual level.


It is an important guiding principle for judicial evaluation of magistrates in most of European countries that the
individual evaluation of judges should never touch upon the content of the decision. He further adds that the risk of doing
just that by relying on the established indicators is obvious. He recommended indicators for judicial performance with
regard to: timelines, workload and productivity, external evaluation of quality and service, and internal evaluation of
quality and service.
The researcher also observes that indicators should be supplemented by standards, because evaluation by
necessity requires comparison. Such standards can come from past performance, from the performance of other courts,
from professional standards, or from expectations from users or politicians. However, without such a basis for comparison,
it is impossible to determine whether the court is performing well or poorly. It is generally recommended that standards are
elaborated in consultation with major stakeholders, and that they are reconsidered at regular intervals. The Judiciary in
Kenya has not adopted performance contracting, but it has adopted strategic management leading to the development of
strategic plans aligned to Kenya Development Blue-prints.
The Judiciary measures its performance in terms of case returns in every station. Work is allocated through the
head of station on a daily basis to court officials. The returns system is a management mechanism that the Registrar of the
High Court has put in place in a bid to ensure service delivery. As such, performance management systems,
and in particular performance contracting, therefore, have specific relevance in the administration of justice in Kenya.
Although there currently is no institutional framework in the judiciary performance contracting yet opportunity exists with
the Judicial Service Commission.
Implementation of Performance Contracting
Performance contracting has been employed in about 30 countries including United Kingdom, U.S.A and
Denmark among other developed western countries (Lienart, 2003). Further in Asia, it has been implemented in such states
as Bangladesh, China, India and Korea. Brazil, Argentina and Chile are examples of Latin America countries that have
embraced performance contracting. In Africa, it has been adopted in selected enterprises in countries like Gabon, Gambia,
Niger and Kenya. As outlined by Martin (2005), performancebased contracting represents one of those interesting
phenomena that emanate from time-to-time when practice has outpaced theory.
From his study, he notes that performance-based contracting appears to be accomplishing its primary objective
which is to change the behaviour of contractors to focus more on performance. Performance-based contracting, he argues,
can involve outputs, quality, outcomes or any combinations. It is posited that outputs, outcomes and quality can be
matched in performance-based contracts. Balogun (2003) asserted that performance measurement is often taken to be
paramount in delivery of improved services. Emphasis on performance management for results delivery, he notes,
is undoubtedly influenced by the basic assumption of performance management which lies in its professed ability to unite
the attention of institution members on a common objective and galvanize them towards the attainment of the said
objective.
Kobia and Muhammed (2006), asserted that public enterprises in Africa are suffering financially and many are
subsequently seeking financial aid. The results of performance contracting have been mixed. In some countries,
there has been a general and sustained improvement in public enterprise, whilst in other countries some public enterprises


have not responded or have been prevented by government policies from responding. In contract implementation, the
common issues that have hitherto been addressed include performance improvement so as to deliver quality and timely
services to the citizens, improve productivity, instill a sense of accountability an transparency in service delivery and the
utilization of resources and grant independence to government agencies without being subjected to the bureaucracies and
unnecessary procedures (Gathai et al., 2012).
It is posited that Kenya has adopted a theoretically sound institutional arrangement bordering on performance
contracting. The vetting of performance contracts at the beginning and the evaluation of agency performance at the end of
the year is a done by independent professionals. Gathai et al., (2012) argued that this is purposed to be in tandem with the
international best practice. Muhammed and Kobia (2006) carried out a survey of the civil servants with the object of
establishing the gains and challenges of implementing performance contracting in Kenya. From their study,
they established that most of the respondents opined that performance and efficiency improvement, and effectiveness in
service delivery through a transparent and accountable system were the object of performance contracting.
This is supported by Obongo (2009), who opined in his study, that performance management objects to attain operational
effectiveness which in a broader sense refers to a number of practices that allow an organization to better utilize its
resources.
METHODOLOGY
The study adopted a descriptive research design. The population of the study was limited to the Law Courts in
Kenya. They include the Supreme Court, the Appellate Courts, the High Courts, the Magistrates Courts and the Kadhis
Courts that span across the forty-seven (47) Counties in Kenya. The target population comprised of judges, magistrates,
state counsels and judicial staff working at the Nakuru Law Courts. The targeted respondents were made up of 121 judicial
employees.
The choice of these judicial staff was based on the account that they are the ones who ideally ought to be
subjected to performance contracting. The study employed simple random sampling method whilst using closed-ended
questionnaires to collect data. Eiselen and Uys (2005) observed that questionnaires usually form an integral part of
descriptive and opinion-relate surveys. Out of 93 questionnaires sent, 73 correctly filled were returned representing a 79%
response rate.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
The findings indicated that judicial staff constituted the bulk of the respondents at 79.5% while the state counsels
the least in number (5.5%). Most of the respondents (38.4%) had less than 5 years working experience in the Judiciary.
Cumulatively, more than two thirds (69.9%) had at most 10 years of experience while only 12.3% had more than 20 years
working experience.

Effect of Institutional Culture on Implementation of Performance Contracting


The findings indicate that the respondents were generally in agreement that there is performance-oriented culture
in judiciary; institutional culture develops climate of trust among staff; institutional culture and performance contracting
are enjoined; performance contracting system can lead to a culture of professionalism, competitiveness, and target setting;
and that non-performance culture and unaccountability impede performance contracting. More so, the respondents on
average strongly agreed (mean tending to 4.00) that change of institutional culture is paramount in implementation of
performance contracting; and institutionalizing performance-oriented culture would lead to successful performance
contract implementation.
Table 1: Description of Institutional Culture

n Min Max Mean
Std.
Deviation
There is Performance-Oriented Culture in
Judiciary
73 1 4 2.56 1.269
Institutional Culture Develops Climate of
Trust among Staff
73 1 4 2.78 1.261
Government has ensured
Institutionalization of Performance-
Oriented Culture
73 1 4 2.38 1.186
Institutional Culture & Performance
Contracting are Enjoined
73 1 4 2.77 1.034
Performance Contracting can lead to
Professionalism, Competitiveness and
Target-Setting
73 1 4 3.42 0.985
Non-Performance Culture &
Unaccountability Impede Performance
Contracting
73 1 4 3.47 1.055
Change of Institutional Culture Paramount
in Performance Contracting
Implementation
73 1 4 3.75 .683
Institutionalizing Performance-Oriented
Culture would lead to Successful PC
Implementation
73 1 4 3.70 .660

However, respondents generally disagreed that the government has ensured institutionalization of performance-
oriented culture in the Judiciary. Regarding this statement the findings returned a mean inclined towards 2.00 (disagree) as
shown I table 1. The objective was to investigate the effect of institutional culture on the implementation of performance
contracting in Kenyas Judiciary.
There was significant and positive correlation (0.325; p < 0.01) between institutional culture and implementation
of performance contracts. This implies that the degree of integrating organizational culture in the judicial system
determines how effectively or ineffectively the performance contracts can be implemented.
Effect of Communication Techniques on Performance Contract Implementation
The findings in this section are in line with the second study objective. Table 2 shows the findings relative to
communication techniques in the Judiciary.

Table 2: Description of Communication Techniques


n Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
There is a Negotiated Incentive PC in
the Judiciary
73 1 4 2.15 1.163
Targets to be achieved are
Communicated to all Staff
73 1 4 3.01 1.173
Progress Report on Performance is
often Received
73 1 4 3.22 1.121
There is an Open Performance-Based
Accountability
73 1 4 3.29 1.073
In Judiciary Performance Feedback is
Given
73 1 4 3.16 1.202
There should be Entrenchment of
Communication of Performance
Contracting
73 1 4 3.37 .993
Performance Appraisal Results should
be Communicated to the Relevant
Judicial Officer(s)
73 1 4 3.85 .569
Performance Contracting Benefits
should be Communicated to the
Judicial Staff
73 2 4 3.93 .347
There is an Effective Communication
System in the Judiciary
73 1 3 1.48 .530
Communication System Affects
Performance Contracting in the
Judiciary
73 1 4 2.41 .597

The respondents, on average, at least agreed that targets to be achieved are communicated to all staff; progress
report on performance is often received; there is an open performance-based accountability, performance feedback is given
in the Judiciary; there should be entrenchment of communication of performance contracting; performance appraisal
results should be communicated to the relevant judicial staff; and that the benefits of performance contracting to the
judicial staff ought to be communicated to them. However, the respondents generally disagreed (mean 2.00) that
communication system affects performance contracting in the Judiciary. On the same note, they strongly disagreed
(mean 1.00) that there is an effective communication system in the Judiciary.
The study further sought to assess the strength of relationship between communication techniques and
implementation of PC in the Kenyas Judiciary. From the correlation analysis, there exists a significant and positive
relationship (r = 0.336; p < 0.01) between communication techniques and implementation of PC in the Judiciary.
This is interpreted further to imply that the more communication techniques are harnessed in the Judiciary, the more
successful the implementation of performance contract is likely to be.
Effect of Performance Measuring Tools on Performance Contract Implementation
In this section the study has described various aspects touching on performance measuring tools. The findings are
shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Description of Performance Measuring Tools


n Min Max Mean
Std.
Deviation
There is a Relationship between Performance
Contracting & Service Delivery
73 1 4 3.40 .954
Performance Contracts can Improve
Productivity when Targets are Sensible &
Achievable
73 2 4 3.92 .363
Performance Measurement is Paramount in
Delivery of Improved Services in Kenya's
Judiciary
73 1 4 3.74 .646
There are Distinct Performance Measurement
Tools in the Judiciary
73 1 4 2.60 1.010
There are no Distinct Performance Benchmarks
in the Judiciary
73 1 4 3.45 .913
The Performance Measuring Tools are
Appropriate at Individual Level
73 1 4 3.37 1.007
Performance Measuring Tools in
Judges/Magistrates Evaluation Risk Touching
upon the Content of their Decisions
73 1 4 3.38 .995
Performance Measuring Tools should be
Supplemented by Specific Standards from Past
Performance, other Courts' Performance, etc
73 1 4 3.45 .867
Performance Standard and Measuring Tools
should be laid down in Consultation with Major
Stakeholders
73 1 4 3.36 .933
Marks & Ranking should be Incorporated in
Performance Evaluation Process in the Judiciary
73 1 4 3.03 1.124
Performance Measuring Tools enhance
Performance Contracting Implementation
73 2 3 2.12 .331

Regarding issues that touched on performance measuring tools, the statements returned means inclined towards
either 3.00 (agree) or 4.00 (strongly agree). As such, it was implied that respondents averagely agreed or strongly agreed
that, for instance, there is a relationship between performance contracting and service delivery; performance contracts can
improve productivity when targets are sensible and achievable; performance measurement is paramount in delivery of
improved services in Kenyas Judiciary; there are no distinct performance benchmarks in the Judiciary; and that
performance standards and measuring tools should be laid down in consultation with major stakeholders.
Conspicuously, it was established that the respondents disagreed (mean 2.00) that performance measuring tools
enhance the implementation of performance contracting in the Judiciary. When asked to comment on the suggestion that it
is due and appropriate to entrench performance contracting in the Judiciary, respondents averagely agreed (mean = 2.90);
though there are a number who held extremely different opinion as shown by the relatively large standard deviation
(std. deviation = 1.215). The results of the findings show that respondents averagely were of the view that the level of
performance contracting implementation in the Judiciary is very low (mean 1.00). In line with the third objective,
the relationship between the performance measuring tools and the implementation of performance contracting in the
Judiciary was determined through correlation analysis.
The findings indicate that there exist insignificant relationship (r = 0.17; p < 0.01) between the aforementioned
tools and implementation of performance contracting in the Kenyas Judiciary.


This can be interpreted to mean that implementation of performance contracts was very marginally influenced by
the performance measuring tools employed in the Judiciary.
CONCLUSIONS
The study concluded that the government has not ensured institutionalization of performance-oriented culture in
the Kenyas Judiciary. Institutional culture is inferred that it would be key in the implementation of performance
contracting in the Judiciary. In other words, it significantly affects the implementation performance contracting.
The study also concludes that there is no effective communication system in the Judiciary. Moreover, it is inferred that
communication techniques positively would influence implementation of performance contracting in the Judiciary.
Further, It is concluded that there are no distinct performance benchmarks in the Judiciary and that performance
standards and measuring tools should be laid down in consultation with major stakeholders. However, it was also inferred
that performance measuring tools do not enhance the implementation of performance contracting in the Judiciary.
In line with this conclusion, it was further inferred that the performance measuring tools have insignificant effect on
implementation of performance contracting. The study suggests further critical analysis of external factors affecting the
successful implementation of performance contracts in Kenya.
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