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DOI: 10.1177/0191453709348431
2010 36: 57 Philosophy Social Criticism
Debora Spini
Authenticity and commitment

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Debora Spini
Authenticity and
commitment
Ritual and sincerity
Is it that ritual does not require any degree of sincerity? Perhaps sincer-
ity is not required for any individual performative action (i.e. a prayer, or
a given set of mourning practices), but a sincere, authentic commitment
is the precondition for being part of a given ritual of family or tradition.
In other words, an individual member of a religious community may not
be sincere and authentic in every word and in every gesture of his or her
everyday ritual life, but has been authentic in his or her decision to be
part of that community. My question therefore is: is he or she sincerely
committed to that tradition as a whole, though the individual ritual
action may not be performed sincerely?
An authentic life
Seligman argues that the quest for sincerity and authenticity may make
interpersonal relationships vulnerable and fragile; he also argues that as
it is not always possible to live in a condition of as is, it is thus necessary
to live in a condition of as if, made possible by a set of practices that
do not require authenticity and sincerity. The example brought by his
article is about love: I can say I love you, but it does not matter if I am
actually loving you in this very moment. Yet, the article seems to suggest,
words and actions take up a life of their own, which allows interpersonal
relationship, and society at large, to survive and function.
My question concerns the possibility of refecting on sincerity and
authenticity from a slightly different point of view, in light of the concept
of narrative identity developed by Paul Ricoeur. In this perspective, what
matters is not the authenticity perceived in a single moment, but the over-
arching narrative of ones biography. According to Ricoeur, individuals
PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM

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http://psc.sagepub.com DOI: 10.1177/0191453709348431
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58
Philosophy & Social Criticism 36(1)
must be able to recognize themselves in their past. Narrativity implies the
imperative to make sense of ones life in order to make it understand-
able to others. Owning ones past, furthermore, makes it possible to take
on commitments for the future.
In this sense, could it be said that the ritualistic dimension fnds its
performative force in a conscious, authentic commitment and assump-
tion of responsibility which encompasses not an isolated moment in
time, but the overall narrative of a persons biography?
Furthermore, I would like to hear more about Professor Seligmans
concept of the modern self. In the article, the modern self seems to be
caught in a trap. Modernity enhances the scope of the action of the self
which ultimately becomes the sole judge of what is right or wrong and
then ends up annihilating it: the true self is no self at all.
What then are the marking features of a modern self? It seems to me
that modernity presents us with a variety of answers. More specifcally,
a sacrifcial dimension can also be seen as the constitutive element of
modern selfhood: the reference is to Hobbes. In order to enter the dimen-
sion of civil society, individuals must renounce not only their natural
rights, but also a wide array of their natural passions, such as the desire
for glory, or the desire to know and establish the truth.
Homo democraticus
An implicit question, it seems to me, runs through this article: how big a
sacrifce do liberal polities require from their citizens?
For accepting these principles (i.e.: of toleration) essentially means
accepting as well a certain liberal, post-Protestant vision of selfhood and
society that is not shared across the globe and across human civiliza-
tions. Seligman argues that the required attitude in liberal polities is that
of a principled indifference.
My question therefore is: could there be something more in the
anthropological repertoire of modernity? Stating that one has no right
to judge other peoples beliefs does not necessarily mean that nobody
has the right to ask questions. On the contrary, we could say that the
real democratic citizen must experience deeply rooted beliefs. We know
that indifference may become the worst form of intolerance. Democratic
citizens learn to be tolerant exactly because they may recognize in other
groups, or in other individuals, the same deeply rooted beliefs that they
experience.
Syracuse University, Florence, Italy
PSC
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