art.

12 Imbecility
People vs Ambal
Facts: Honorato Ambal and wife Felicula engaged in an altercation which eventual
ly infuriated the former to attack his wife. He surrendered to a policeman but p
leaded not guilty for parricide. His defense was insanity.
Issue: Whether or not Honorato should be exempt from criminal liability given hi
s defense of insanity.
Held: No. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of w
ill when he mortally wounded his wife. The fact that immediately after the incid
ent he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is incontestable
proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be
punished for it. He was convicted for parricide.
Longer version:
People vs Ambal
Facts:
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found Felicula VicenteAmbal, mortally wounded, under some flowering plants near the house of Honorato
Ambal (victims husband). She was brought to the hospital but died 40 minutes afte
r arrival.
On the same morning, Honorato Ambal went to the barangay captains house and infor
med the latters spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife. Ambal then went to
the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, confessing the same.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels w
hich were exacerbated by the wife not staying in the conjugal abode and choosing
to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao.The immediate provocation for t
he assault was a quarrel induced by Feliculas failure to buy medicine for Ambal
who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in an altercation. Felicula t
old her husband that it would be better if he were dead, which infuriated Ambal
and impelled him to attack his wife.
A police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. It was
then elevated to the CFI where the fiscal filed an information against him for p
arricide. In the arraignment, Ambal pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution ha
d presented its evidence, accuseds counsel de oficio manifested that the defens
e of Ambal was insanity.
Issue:
Whether or not Ambal should be exempt from criminal liability given his defense
of insanity.
Held:
No. Ambal was therefore charged with parricide (with the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender to the authorities).
An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a
mental disease or a mental defect. A defendant in a criminal case, who interpos
es the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of establishing that fact, m
eaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. In or
der that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be compl
ete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused
acted without the least discernment.
Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. An extre

mely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person
acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word
"crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane.
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any
sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not co
mpletely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally wo
unded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or defect. The fact
that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enfor
cing authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was w
rong and that he was going to be punished for it.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentri
city, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The St
ate should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general pl
ea of insanity.
People v. Formigones
87 Phil. 658
Facts:
Defendant Abelardo Formigones stabbed his wife, Julia, because he suspected that
Julia and his brother, Zacarias, were maintaining illicit relations. Abelardos c
ounsel presented testimonies of two guards of the jail that his conduct during h
is confinement was like that of an imbecile.
Issue: Whether or not Abelardo is exempt from criminal liability given the defen
se of imbecility.
Held:
No. Abelardo is not exempt from criminal liability.
Ratio:
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of Ar
ticle 12 of the RPC so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be depri
ved completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of c
ommitting the crime.
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the exte
nt of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him could hardly
be regarded as an imbecile.
Insanity
People vs Bascos
Insanity (art 12 par 1)
December 19, 1922
Facts: The accused Donato Bascos was charged in an information filed in the Cour
t of First Instance of Pangasinan with the murder of Victoriano Romero. On arrai
gnment, he entered a plea of not guilty. The proof for the prosecution establish
ed that the accused was the one who had killed Victoriano Romero, while the latt
er was sleeping. The defense was that of insanity. Following the conclusion of t
he trial, the presiding judge rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of th
e crime of homicide. However, that the execution of the sentence should be suspe
nded in accordance with article 100 of the Penal Code, and the accused placed in
a hospital for the insane, there to remain until such time as his mental condit
ion shall be determined.
The errors assigned in this court are to the effect that the trial court erred i
n making application to the present case of the provisions of article 100 of the

Penal Code, and in not making application of article 8 of the Code. It is, ther
efore, for us to determine if the plea of insanity is sustainable under article
8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, or if the case falls under article 100 of the
Code.

Issue: WON insanity was present during the commission of the crime which would b
ar to the acquittal of the accused.
Held: The accused should be acquitted. Insanity was proven to be present during
the commission of the crime.
Ratio: We find it more practicable to dispose of this case on the facts. The wif
e of the accused and his cousin testified that the accused had been more or less
continuously out of his mind for many years. Doctor Gonzalo Montemayor, assista
nt district health officer, who, by order of the judge, examined the accused and
conducted an investigation, found that the accused is a violent maniac, and tha
t from the information he had received from the neighbors of the accused, the la
tter had been insane for some time. The physician expressed the opinion that the
accused was probably insane when Victoriano Romero was killed. The official dec
laration of Doctor Montemayor in his capacity as acting district health officer
was "that this accused, according to a physical examination and investigation, i
s a violent maniac, and that this mental state has continued through many years,
constituting a danger both for himself and for the community." The total lack o
f motive of Bascos to kill Romero bears out the assumption that the former was i
nsane.
We are convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felo
ny described in the record and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liab
ity, and should be confined in an insane asylum .
For further reference (not part of the digest)
In the Philippines, among the persons who are exempted from criminal liability b
y our Penal Code, is the following: An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter ha
s acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a gra
ve felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums establish
ed for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court. (Art. 8-1.)
Article 100 of the Penal Code applies when the convict shall become insane or an
imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced
In criminal cases where the defense of insanity is interposed, the two fundamen
tal propositions must be followed: First, that the burden is on the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime; and s
econdly, that the law presumes every man to be sane.
The rather strict doctrine "that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes
the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upo
n him," has been adopted in a series of decisions by this court. (U. S. vs. Mart
inez [1916], 34 Phil., 305; U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona [1910],18 Phil., 62.) T
he trial judge construed this to mean that the defense must prove that the accus
ed was insane at the very moment the crime was committed.

People v. Aquino
186 SCRA 851 GR No. 87084
June 27 1990
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
Facts:
On the evening of February 13, 1987, the defendant Juanito G. Aquino forcefully
had sexual intercourse with the victim Carmen Morado against her will. The accu
sed then struck her with the use of a stone. A member of the Integrated Nationa
l Police had the chance to talk to the victim where her ante-mortem statement wa
s thumbmarked by herself. After being admitted at the Virgen Milagrosa Medical
Center, she died the following morning. The complaint was filed but before appel
lant could be arraigned, a Motion to Commit appellant to the National Center for
Mental Health was filed by appellants counsel. Appellant was duly committed so
metime in July1987. He was released in 1988. He was duly arraigned and pleaded
not guilty and put up the defense of insanity. Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a psyc
hiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health was of the opinion that the de
fendant was insane when he committed the felonious act. Appellant was also prev
iously confined at the Mental Hospital in 1985 when he was caught wandering arou
nd naked, and his own father testified to his insane acts. On the other hand, t
he prosecution presented an array of witnesses to prove that appellant was lucid
before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with discernment, an
d even the member of the Integrated National Police who was in charge of the cas
e believed that he was acting normally. The Court of Appeals rendered its verdi
ct convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to
suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amoun
t of P35,000.00 as damage.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant-appellant was able to overcome insanity when he com
mitted the crime.
Ruling:
The Court modified the principal penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpe
tua, and reduced civil indemnity to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprud
ence.
Ratio:
Sanity is the normal condition of the mind, the law presumes that everyone charg
ed with crime is sane and thus, supplies in the first instance the required proo
f of capacity to commit crime. Under the Revised Penal Code, a person is crimin
ally liable for a felony committed by him; that a felonious or criminal act (del
ito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with
freedom, intelligence and malice because the moral and legal presumption is that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the abs
ence of evidence to the contrary; that one of the causes which will overthrow th
is presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which event the
actor is exempt from criminal liability as provided for in Article 12, Paragraph
1. The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant under the assistance of
the CLAO lawyer Atty. Liliosa clearly revealed how the crime charged against him
was perpetrated. The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane immedia
tely before or at the very moment the crime was committed is too nebulous and co
njectural to be convincing. Sanity must be proven by the defense, and in this c
ase, the defense simply failed to do so. The trial court imposed the penalty of
life imprisonment on appellant. In a judgment of conviction for a felony, the c
ourt should specify the appropriate name of the penalty, which in this case shou
ld be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment.

People v Valledor
FACTS:
Enrico Valledor appeals for his conviction for the crime of consummated, frustra
ted and attempted murder. On March 6, 1991, the appellant attacked Roger Cabigue
n (stabbed on the forearm), Elza Rodriguez (stabbed on the chest), Ricardo Magla
lang (was inflicted with physical injuries on different parts of the body) There
were two other people inside the room but they were not harmed. Roger and Ricar
do were both wounded, while Elza died from the stab wound. After his arrest, acc
used-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Hea
lth. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not gui
lty. Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-a
ppellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial. This time, accused-appell
ant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumst
ance of insanity.
The appellants plea of insanity was anchored on the following instances:
1.) On January 1990 the Mother of the appellant noticed that he is behaving abno
rmally. The mother brought the appellant to Dr. de Guzman. She disclosed to the
doctor that insanity runs in the family
2.) Dr. de Guzman diagnosed the appellant as suffering from psychosis with schizo
phrenia and prescribed the appellant with an anti-depressant known as thoracin wh
ich kept the appellant sane for a period of 2 months
3.) On 06 March 1991 he was seen swimming across the river by the Barangay Capta
in and Councilman took him out of the water. Inside the boat, accused kept on cr
ying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting
that appellant was mentally ill, the Barangay Captain, asked the Councilman to
accompany accused to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga took a jeepney with appellant
, while on the jeepney the appellant jumped off the jeepney and boarded a tricyc
le.
5.) On 11 March 1991 he was interviewed by the City Health Officer and was recom
mended to be committed to the NATIONAL MENTAL HOSPITAL
6.) The medical findings of the hospital for the appellant was that he was suffe
ring from: Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Can Insanity as an exempting circumstance be granted to the accused?
HELD:
No. The courts found him guilty of the murder of Rodriguez and attempted murder
of Cabiguen and Maglalang (reduced from frustrated)
RATIO:
In considering insanity as a defense, it presumed that all persons are to be of
sound mind. The law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to pre
sume that acts were done unconsciously.The acts made by the appellant shows that
he does not have complete absence of the power to discern as shown by his stabb
ing of the victims while leaving the other two people in the room unharmed. His
action of fleeing from the scene after the incident indicated that he was aware
of the wrong he committed.The actions performed by the appellant does not suffic
iently prove his insanity at the time of commission of the crime: "A man may act
crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.
" Although it can be argued that the appellant is suffering from mental illness
what is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the
offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane w
hen he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.

People v. Robios
Facts:
On March 25, 1995 in Camiling, Tarlac, Melencio Robinos (accused) upon coming hom
e, had a heated argument with his wife, Lorenza, who was then six months pregnan
t. Their son witnessed the event. Upon Lorenzas utterance of Why did you come home
, why dont you just leave?, the accused stabbed Lorenza with a double-bladed kni
fe at the shoulder causing the latter to fall to the floor. Their son, upon witn
essing the events, went to his grandmothers house to tell his relatives what happ
ened. Lorenzas brother, Benjamin upon knowing the incident, did not try to go to
his sisters house (which was just 150 meters from his mothers house) for fear of w
hat the accused might do to him. However, the accused saw him and shouted Its go
od you would see how your sister died.
Benjamin sought the help of the barangay and police officials to catch the accuse
d. Upon entering the house, they saw the accused and his wife lying on the floor
. The accused was embracing his apparently dead wife and was holding a blood sta
ined knife with his right hand. When they tried to bring him away, the accused s
aid to a barangay kagawad that he killed his wife. The death of the wife was lat
er confirmed.
Robios was accused of the complex crime of parricide and unintentional abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not insanity as an exempting circumstance can be invoked in this case
.
Held:
The court ruled that insanity cannot be invoked in this case.
Ratio:
It is important to note that the accused did not deny that he killed his wife. He
merely invoked insanity to absolve him of criminal liability.
Insanity presupposes that the offender was deprived of reason and will during the
commission of the crime. Any person who seeks to invoke insanity must prove tha
t the same was existent during the commission of the crime. Failure to do so wou
ld mean that insanity cannot be appreciated in a case. Furthermore, the presumpt
ion of law is always in favor of sanity. In the absence of proof of insanity, th
erefore, it is presumed that the person acted with a sound mind.
Both testimonies from prosecution and defense do not indicate any substantial evi
dence that the accused was deprived of reason when he performed the act. Further
more, since it was claimed that there was an argument between the couple prior t
o the commission of the crime, it can be inferred that the accused acted with re
ason. His action was a consequence of the insulting remarks said to him by his w
ife. His sanity can also be gleaned when he even bragged to his wifes brother tha
t he killed his wife. Moreover, the barangay and police officials also confirmed
the clarity of his mind when the accused disclosed to them that he indeed kille
d his wife.
From the testimonies of the witnesses, it can be deduced that the accused had uns
ound mental condition after the commission of the crime. It was said that to be
appreciated, insanity should exist during the commission of the crime or the per
iod immediately preceding the commission.

E. PEOPLE v. MAGALLANO || Art. 12 || Insanity

FACTS: The accused voluntarily informed, and surrendered to, the Davao City Poli
ce Department that he had killed his wife. The accused had suspicions that Exequ
iela had been unfaithful to him. After a heated argument, he strangled Exequiela
to death. The next day he confided the killing to Peping Orais.
Andres Magallano was charged before the CFI of Davao City with parricide for hav
ing killed his lawful wife, Exequiela Costa. Counsel for Magallano claimed insan
ity and the accused was referred to the Davao General Hospital for examination.
After the psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Corazon San Pedro, she submitted a repor
t to the effect that the accused was quiet, no bizarre behavior noted, but recom
mended for his further examination in the Regional Mental Hospital. The findings
in the medical report was almost the same as Dr. San Pedros, therefore Magallano
was fit and ready for trial.
In Pepings testimony, the accuseds face was covered with blood because the latter
smashed his head against a tree because he had choked his wife to death. The wit
ness remarked that the accused was all right although there were times when he a
ppeared out of his mind for he could not easily answer the questions. The accuse
ds father, son, and three neighbors testified in attempt to prove the accuseds men
tal disorder. They cited several instances, including one wherein Magallano trie
d to commit suicide.
ISSUE: WON Magallano should be acquitted in interposing insanity
HELD: Magallano was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetue and indemnity
of P12,000 to the victims heirs.
RATIO: The defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance was not established
and did not overcome the legal presumption that a persons acts are of his own f
ree will and intelligence. The evidence presented by the defense does not outwei
gh the certifications submitted by government psychiatric doctors. Statements by
witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense have pictured a mental condi
tion that is consistent with sanity, such as the manifestation of the accuseds re
morse in striking his head against a tree. It revealed an awareness of a wrongdo
ing.
In Magallanos voluntary surrender, the public officials also remarked that the ac
cused was able to answer coherently and intelligently. The testimonies of his fa
ther, son, and three neighbors illustrate the accuseds unusual behavior, which at
most could only be eccentricities which do not mean complete deprivation of int
elligence or discernment.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ
G.R. No. L-45130, February 17, 1937
FACTS:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippi
ne Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable motive
and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and sta
b the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, which
directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards. On Ja
nuary 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defe
nse counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defenda
nt was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopathic Hospit
al.
On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused committed the cri
me he talked and behaved as an entirely normal man. Policemen Damaso T. Arnoco a
nd Benjamin Cruz testified that the accused, after having been asked why he had
attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it was because Guison owed him P55 for a lo
ng time and did not pay him. The accused stated that he bought the knife with wh
ich he had stabbed Guison on Tabora Street for fifty centavos and he had been wa

iting for two days to kill Guison. The state- ment of the accused which was take
n in writing by detectives Charles Strubel and Manalo on December 12th was left
unfinished because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor arrived and told the accused not
to be a fool and not to make any statement. Thereafter the accused refused to co
ntinue his statement. All of these show that on that day the accused behaved as
a sane man and he even appeared to be prudent, knowing how to take advantage of
advice favorable to him, as that given him by Cruz of the Bureau of Labor. Furth
ermore it cannot be said hat the accused had stabbed Guison through hallucinatio
n because it is an established fact that his victim really owed him money as con
firmed by the fact that when Guison was stabbed he cried to the accused I am goin
g to pay you, according to the testimony of an eyewitness. Therefore the motive o
f the aggression was a real and positive fact: vengeance.
ISSUE:
W/N defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime of murder th
at he should be exempted from criminal liability.
HELD:
NO. The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendant was not insane
at the time of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theo
ry that the insanity was only occasional or intermittent and not permanent or co
ntinuous.
People v. Taneo
58 Phil 255
Facts: Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parents house in Dolores, Ormoc
. Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao were the familys houseguests. One afternoon, While
Potenciano was sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, up
on meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her in the abdomen. He also a
ttacked Fred and Luis and tried to attack his father, after which, he wounded hi
mself. Potencianos wife, who was 7 months pregnant at that time, died five days l
ater as a result of the wound.
The trial court found Potenciano guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclus
ion perpetua.
Issue: WON Potenciano is criminally liable for the offense.
Held: No. He is not criminally liable for the offense. It was also ordered that
he be confined in the government insane asylum and not be released until the dir
ector finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace.
Ratio: The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore, werent volunta
ry in the sense of entailing criminal liability. In the case at hand, the court
found not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained but also motives for not committing the acts. The defendant acted wh
ile in a dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind
.
Art. 12, Par. 1 ELEMENTS:
People v. Gimena
No. 33877 February 6, 1931
The People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff and appellee
Vs.
Juan N. Gimena, defendant and appellant

FACTS:
On April 9, 1930, Gregorio Diana found defendant Juan Gimena attacking Crispina
Diana, Greogorios daughter and wife of defendant, after hearing the latter cry fo
r help. Although Gregorio, with the help of a brother of the defendant, was able
to disarm the defendant, the extent of the injuries sustained by Cristina led t
o her death hours after the attack. When the defendant was questioned on why he
attacked his wife, he answered that it was because his wife gave one Apolinar Se
reo, whom he suspected of having illicit relations with his wife, a sum of money.
The court found the defendant guilty of parricide. In his appeal, defendant cla
imed that he was in the state of somnambulism when attacked his wife.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the defendant was in a state of somnambulism when he attacked his
wife.
RULING:
No. Based on the results of the observation of the defendant, the doctor found n
o proof that defendant was suffering from somnambulism. Judgment appealed from i
s AFFIRMED with costs against appellant.
RATIO:
For the exempting circumstance of insanity, there must be a complete absence of
intelligence or total deprivation of the freedom of the will. A defense of that
character must be proven and such proof is lacking in this case. The defense tha
t the offense charged was committed by the accused during the prevalence of, or
in a state of, somnambulism is not well taken by this court other than that embr
aced plea of insanity.
US v. ODICTA
4 Phil 309, March 21, 1905
FACTS:
The accused, Fortunato Odicta, was charged with the crime of parricide for killin
g his wife, two children, and one Martin Abana, one night in his house. Odicta
pleaded guilty, saying he was drunk and did not know what he was doing. Witness
es assert that they did not notice that Odicta was drunk that morning and that h
e was not in the habit of getting drunk. Physicians found Odicta to be physical
ly and mentally healthy and normal. Defense argues that Odicta committed the cr
ime in a state of somnambulism (sleepwalking), which is akin to insanity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Odicta is crimally liable for parricide.
HELD:
The Court held yes. Odicta failed to prove that he hacked his wife and other vict
ims in a state of somnambulism, which is akin to insanity. The burden of proof
to establish insanity rests on the accused. Otherwise, the presumption is that
the accused acted in his right mind and willfully committed the crime.
Minority
Jose v. People G.R. No. 162052 Jan. 13, 2005
Facts:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of
Laguna, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there wilfull
y, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE H
YDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation
of the aforestated law. The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge.
Issue:
Whether or not Alvin Jose acted with discernment when the crime was committed, a

nd if he is expempt from criminal liability

Held:
The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed th
e Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASI
DE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of evide
nce.
Ratio:
Under Article 12 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age a
nd under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The
law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by
a special penal law.
Llave vs. People
488 SCRA 376. April 26, 2006.
Facts:
On September 24, 2002 petitioner Niel Llave, twelve (12)
cal fashion, dragged the resisting Debbielyn Santos, who
old, behind a pile of hollow blocks near a vacant house
y would not be able to discover his dastardly acts, laid
arnal knowledge with her against her will and consent.

years old, with methodi

is only seven (7) years
to insure that passersb
on top of her and had c

When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud (witness) who shouted at him, the petit
ioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his fa
ther and her mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by
policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into c
ustody.
Petitioner was a consistent honor student and has, in fact, garnered several aca
demic awards.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, who was a minor above 9 years but below 15 years of a
ge at the time of the crime, acted with discernment.
Held:
Accused-appellant acted with discernment and is sentenced to an indeterminate pe
nalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional medium as the
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the maxim
um.
Ratio:
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over ni
ne years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he a
cted with discernment.
The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the p
ower necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit fr
om an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to und
erstand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to p
rove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance,
attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, bu
t also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances demonstrate tha

t the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance incl
udes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
In addition, the fact that petitioner was a recipient of several academic awards
and was an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed o
f intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better th
an other minors of his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally re
prehensible.
Guevarra v. Almodovar | Minority
FACTS:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best fr
iend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morni
ng of 29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed ar
ound fifteen to twenty meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. I
n the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone
which caused his unfortunate death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an eleven year old boy could be charged with the crime of homicid
e thru reckless imprudence
HELD:
Minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act,
while minors above nine years of age but below 15 are not absolutely exempt; th
ey are presumed to be without criminal capacity but it could be proven that they
acted with discernment.
RATIO:
Discernment. mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wron
g
Accident
US vs. Tanedo
No. 5418 February 12, 1910
The United States, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Cecilio Tanedo, defendant and app
ellant

Facts: Tanedo invited Sanchez on 26 Jan 1909 to hunt wild chickens, with the int
ention of killing the latter, shot in the chest and hid his body in a well. Moti
ve is unknown.
The intention of killing the victim was denied by the accused. There Sanchez wen
t to kill a wild chicken in the woods. He shot at a chicken with one shot and ki
lled it but he also heard a shout of man. Apparently the victim was shot by the
same bullet. Then Tanedo, scared, tried to cover it up.
There were no bad relations between the accused and deceased.
Issue: whether tanedo had incurred criminal liability through the incident.
Held: we are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the jud
gment of conviction.
Ratio:
If life is taken by misfortune or accident while the actor is in performance of a
lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is

no criminal liability
When the accused, under the plea of accidental killing, offers testimony to prove
the substance of his plea, the burden of proof is upon the State to show beyond
reasonable doubt that the killing was intentional.
US V. TAYONGTONG
FACTS
Policarpio Tayongtong was a thoroughly qualified driver, having served his appre
nticeship before being employed as a driver of an automobile that transported pa
ssengers. One day while he was driving at about 10 to 15 miles an hour, Severino
Resume was engaged in painting telephones poles located along the highway. Pabl
o Tayson was standing within a few feet of Resume, talking with him. When the au
tomobile Tayongtong was driving was approaching the place where Tayson stood, Ta
yson turned his back toward the road and placed his cap over his face in such a
way as to cover his nose, mouth and eyes to protect them from the cloud of dust
which was rolling from behind the automobile over toward the side of the road on
which he was. Resume, as the automobile approached, started to cross the road t
o the other side just before the automobile reached a point opposite him, eviden
tly to escape the dust which would inevitably drift in his direction. Resume mis
judged the distance and started too late, in attempting to cross he placed himse
lf squarely in front of the automobile. His movement was so sudden and unexpecte
d and, when he reached the road, he was so close to the automobile that it was i
mpossible to stop it in time. He was run over which resulted in his death. Tayon
gtong did everything that was possible to be done to avoid the accident, he put
on both brakes as hard as possible and turned the automobile as much as could be
done under the circumstances. Only the front wheel of the automobile passed ove
r the body of the deceased, having been turned by Tayongtong sufficiently so tha
t the mind wheel missed Resume.
ISSUE
Whether or not Tayongtong committed homicide by negligence.
HELD
The Court found that Tayongtong cannot be held for homicide and acquitted him.
RATIO
Although it was held in U. S. vs. Reyes that a criminal action for homicide by i
mprudencia temeraria, contributory negligence on the part of the person killed i
s no defense, provided the driver of automobile himself was negligent and that n
egligence was the proximate cause of the death, nevertheless, that doctrine does
not in any way inveigh against the proposition where death is due to the neglig
ence of the decedent himself and not to the negligence of the driver of the auto
mobile. In this case the death of the deceased was due entirely to his own negli
gence. There is not sufficient reliable proof in the record to establish neglige
nce on the part of the accused. There being no negligence, he is not responsible
, no matter what the result of the accident may have been.
US v Knight
Facts: E.M. Knight, a chauffeur of the quartermasters department of the United St
ates Army, was proceeding in charge of a heavily loaded automobile truck. Except
for a steam road roller, which was slowly making its way in the same direction,
the street was wholly unoccupied at that time. Just as the truck was passing th
e slow-moving road roller, a boy 10-12 years of age jumped from the step or side
board of the road roller directly in front of the truck, was knocked down, run o
ver and instantly killed.
It further appears that the truck was running at the rate
ur as it came up with the road roller; that at a distance
from the road roller, the defendant, Knight, sounded his
gan to turn to the right to pass the road roller; that at
was 14 meters wide and that it was wholly unoccupied and

of about 8 miles an ho
of about 45 or 50 feet
horn twice and then be
that point, the street
clear of all obstructi

on.
The Court of First Instance of Manila convicted defendant and appellant of reckl
ess negligence resulting in homicide. He then seeks to reverse its judgment, hen
ce the appeal.
Issue: WON Knight was recklessly negligent on the occasion when the accident occ
urred. WON he is liable for said crime.
Held: The accused cannot be said to have been negligent in the management of his
machine. He must be acquitted of all criminal liability arising out of the unfo
rtunate accident which resulted in the death of a boy.
Ratio:
- It is true that a statute penalizes the operation of a motor vehicle recklessl
y or at an excessive rate of speed or as to endanger he property or safety or rig
hts of any person but this does not mean that in any case where an accident occur
s it can be resumed that there was a violation of the provision of the statute.
- If it appears that the machine was being operated carefully, prudently and ski
llfully (or with due care) at the time when the accident occurred, having regard
to all surrounding circumstances, it cannot fairly be said to have been operate
d so as to endanger he property or safety or rights of any person.
- A driver of a vehicle seeing a boy 10-12 years of age on the street may fairly
assume that he has sufficient intelligence to direct himself under ordinary condi
tions. Hence, he is not required to exercise extraordinary care and precaution,
but it would be necessary to have great care and skill.
- The accused cannot be said to have been negligent in the management of his mac
hine, merely because he did not anticipate the boy, 10-12 years of age, who was
riding on the road roller, to jump down directly in front of him at the moment w
hen he turned his machine out into the open street in an effort to pass by (whic
h is a right of way the traveler may pass to the front when he has good and suff
icient grounds to believe that he can do so in safety).
Case Digest - NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, R
espondent
G.R. No. 158057
September 24, 2004
Facts:
Noe Toledo was found guilty by the trial court, which was also affirmed by the Co
urt of Appeals, of Homicide for stabbing Ricky Guarte in the stomach with a bolo
. According to the testimony of Toledo, Guarte, his nephew and had threatened to
stab the petitioner, after he had ordered them not to make loud noises. Guarte,
inebriated, had tried to push against the door of the house of Toledo. Accordin
g to Toledo, his nephew was armed with a balisong, and so he got his bolo and pr
oceeded to block the door with his left hand and pointed the bolo towards his ne
phew with his right. The bolo then accidentally hit Guarte on the stomach when the
latter lost his balance and fell to the floor.
In both courts, Toledo used as Article 12, par. 4 on Accident as a defense. Howe
ver, both courts ruled Homicide was committed given the evidence presented. Tole
do then proceeded to invoke self-defense under Art. 11, par. 1, in his appeal to
the CA, which was also dismissed by the said court, and hence this petition to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is exempt from criminal liability for satisfying requi
sites under Art. 12 Par. 4 of the RPC. Accident.
Held:

No.
Ratio:
According to the court, it cannot permit the accused to change theories on appea
l for it would be unfair to the adverse party. Furthermore, it opined that there
is no such defense as accidental self-defense in criminal law. To invoke Art. 1
2. Par. 4. as a defense requires: (a) performance of a lawful act; (b) with due
care; (c) causes injury to another by mere accident; and (d) without any fault o
r intention of causing it. All elements should concur to claim accident to be ex
empted from criminal liability.
The court mentioned that evidence presented were not clear and convincing enough
to support the claim of mere accident, requirement (c) under Par. 4 of Art. 12.
It would be incredible that Toledo could escape unscathed from the testimony ma
de by him on how the struggle between him and the decease proceeded. Had the for
ce of the struggle caused the door to fall to the sala of Toledos house, victim w
ould have fallen on top of the door instead of the bolo held by the Toledo. The
court further reasoned that the accused fail to adduce real evidence that the do
or of his house was destroyed and that he sustained any physical injuries in the
process. Further, failing to surrender the bolo or the balisong held by the dec
eased to the authorities negated his claim of accidentally hitting the stomach o
f Guarte and that he acted in self-defense.
Nevertheless, the court further evaluated the evidence presented in court and op
ined that they were insufficient to claim self-defense.
People vs. Nocum
FACTS:
The case being appealed from is a decision held by the Court of First Instance o
f Manila.
In the evening of Nov. 21, 1945, there was a fistic fight between between Federi
co Bautista and Vicente Aurencio at the corner of Mayhaligue and Magdalena Stree
ts, City of Manila. Defendant Bienvido Nocum yelled at the combatants with the i
ntention to stop it. They paid no attention, and the defendant drew his .45 cali
ber pistol. He shot twice in the air, yet the bout continued. Because of this, h
e fired another shot at the ground. The bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Franci
sco (VICTIM), an innocent by-stander and resident of the place. The wounded man
was promptly carried to the St. Lukes Hospital, where he expired soon after.
The lower court found the defendant guilty of homicide through reckless negligen
ce.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court should affirm the lower courts decision, which held the defen
dant guilty of homicide through reckless negligence.
HELD:
The Court affirmed the lower courts decision
RATIO:
The defendant wilfully discharged his gun without taking the precautions demande
d by the circumstance he was in. In particular, he did not take into considerati
on the fact that the district was populated and the likelihood that his bullet w
ould glance over the districts hard pavement.
*In relation to the topic under which this case is placed (Art. 6, para. 4: Acci
dent), this case could not be considered a circumstance exempting from criminal
liability because although he had no criminal intent (i.e. To kill the victim),
he committed the act out of fault (reckless negligence).