G.R. No.

145184 March 14, 2008

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, vs. HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). A behest loan may involve civil
liability for non-payment or non-recovery and may likewise entail criminal liability.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan
transactions between now Integrated Circuits Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a sworn complaint
3
for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned Members of the DBP Board
of Governors, and Concerned Directors and Officers of ICPI.
After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
Memorandum, finding that there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the instant case
in court. To start with, the cause of action has prescribed and the aforesaid Administrative and
Memorandum Orders both issued by the President in 1992, may not be retroactively applied to
the questioned transactions which took place in 1980 because to do so would be tantamount to
an ex post facto law. Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its
criminal complaint had prescribed; (ii) Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No.
61 are ex post facto laws; and (iii) there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for
violation under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman can acted with grave abuse of discretion
RULING: NO. The counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of
the offense in 1992. Thus, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the private respondents
had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed.
The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal
laws. Administrative Order No. 13 merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding
Committee on Behest Loans and provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum
Order No. 61, on the other hand, simply provides the frame of reference in determining the
existence of behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post facto laws.
Furthermore the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction in delving into the constitutionality of the
subject administrative and memorandum orders.
However, there was no probable cause to base the action. Mistakes committed by a public
officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. Petitioners utterly failed to show that private respondents
actions fit such description. In sum, petitioner does not persuade us that the contract between
ICPI and DBP was a behest loan.
The Ombudsman can hardly be faulted for not wanting to proceed with the prosecution of the
offense, convinced that he does not possess the necessary evidence to secure a conviction.
The petition is DENIED. The assailed Memorandum and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-
95-0443, are AFFIRMED.