What JFK Really Said

The author checked the Cuban-missile-crisis transcript in The Kennedy Tapes against the
recorded words. e disco!ered "errors that undermine its reliability #or historians$ teachers$
and general readers
Sheldon %. Stern %ay & '((($
%) twenty-three years as the historian at the John F. Kennedy *ibrary$ in +oston$ were
punctuated by intensi!e work on sound recordings. , conducted scores o# taped oral-history
inter!iews and !eri#ied the accuracy o# the transcripts$ edited -resident John F. Kennedy.s
recorded telephone con!ersations$ and$ in &/0&-&/0'$ e!aluated tapes made during the Cuban
missile crisis$ in 1ctober o# &/2'$ as the library prepared #or their declassi#ication. The work
was #ascinating and e3hilarating$ but the poor technical 4uality o# the tapes #re4uently
re4uired that , listen to the same words do5ens o# times$ sometimes to no a!ail. ,t was$
notwithstanding$ a historian.s ultimate #antasy6a chance to be a #ly on the wall during one o#
the most dangerous moments in history$ and to know$ within the technical limits o# the
recordings$ exactly what happened. , spent 7ust o!er a year on the tapes$ and in &/08 ,
recei!ed an award #or "care#ul and percepti!e editing and proo#reading o# the JFK tapes" #rom
the archi!ist o# the 9nited States. From &/08 to &//: the library declassi#ied twenty-two
hours o# tapes$ and , continued to re!iew them be#ore each declassi#ication.
,magine my surprise when$ in the summer o# &//:$ , learned that ar!ard 9ni!ersity -ress
was about to publish The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile
Crisis, edited by ;rnest R. %ay and -hilip <. =elikow6complete transcripts o# all twenty-
two hours. %onths o# lead time are re4uired to prepare a book #or the printer$ so , was
astonished that the editors could ha!e completed this task less than a year a#ter the ma7ority o#
the tapes were released to the public.
The editors e3plained that they had commissioned a team o# pro#essional court reporters to
prepare a set o# "dra#t transcripts" #rom the Kennedy *ibrary tapes. >udio e3perts$ using
?1?1,S;$ a "technically ad!anced noise-reduction system$" had then produced an impro!ed
set o# tapes$ subse4uently checked by the court reporters to be sure that nothing had been lost.
owe!er$ %ay and =elikow stressed their own responsibility #or the #inal product.
The two o# us then worked with the tapes and the court reporters. dra#ts to produce the
transcripts printed here. The laboriousness o# this process would be hard to e3aggerate. ;ach
o# us listened o!er and o!er to e!ery sentence in the recordings. ;!en a#ter a do5en replays at
!arying speeds$ signi#icant passages remained only partly comprehensible.... ?otwithstanding
the high pro#essionalism o# the court reporters$ we had to amend and rewrite almost all their
te3ts. For se!eral especially di##icult sessions$ we prepared transcriptions oursel!es #rom
scratch. ,n a #inal stage$ we asked some !eterans o# the Kennedy administration to re!iew the
tapes and our transcripts in order to clear up as many as possible o# the remaining pu55les.
The reader has here the best te3t we can produce$ but it is certainly not per#ect. We hope that
some$ perhaps many$ will go to the original tapes. ,# they #ind an error or make out something
we could not$ we will enter the corrections in subse4uent editions or printings o# this !olume.
>n un#orgettable moment in these uni4ue historical records concerns JFK.s apprehension that
military action in Cuba might touch o## the ultimate nightmare o# nuclear war$ which he
grimly describes at a meeting on 1ctober &0 as "the #inal #ailure." +rian %c@rory$ o# The
oston !lobe, who listened to this tape with me in &//A$ a#ter it was declassi#ied$ used those
words in the lead o# his article on the newly released tapes. +ut when , checked the transcript
recently$ , was unable to #ind "the #inal #ailure." Certain that the editors must be right$ since
they had technically cleaner tapes$ , listened againB there is no 4uestion that Kennedy says
"the #inal #ailure." The editors$ howe!er$ ha!e transcribed it as "the prime #ailure."
, decided to check the entire transcript #or 1ctober &0 against the tape$ and what , disco!ered
le#t me dismayed. The transcript abounds in errors that signi#icantly undermine its reliability
#or historians$ teachers$ and general readers. Spot checks turned up similar errors in all the
other transcripts. <espite the o#ten poor sound 4uality o# the Kennedy *ibrary recordings$
many o# the rele!ant passages are clear enough to be heard conclusi!ely. Since details are
e!erything in this kind o# microhistory$ in which an inaccurate word or phrase can distort our
perception o# the historical record$ we should e3amine some representati!e e3amples.
,? the #irst days o# the secret meetings between Kennedy and his ad!isers$ be#ore the
>merican people knew that the So!iets had missiles in Cuba$ the -resident grappled with
decisions that could determine the #ate o# the world. Should the 9nited States bomb the
missile sites or in!ade CubaC ,# it became necessary to take decisi!e action$ would the other
nations o# the >mericas condemn the 9nited States as the aggressorC The 9nited States
belonged to the Rio -act$ a mutual-de#ense treaty signed by more than twenty countries in
?orth and South >merica. > two-thirds !ote by the pact.s member nations would authori5e
9.S. action against Cuba$ and would preser!e a uni#ied #ront against the So!iets. 1n the
1ctober &0 tape Secretary o# State <ean Rusk clearly assures the -resident$ ", would suppose
there would be no real di##iculty in getting a two-thirds !ote in #a!or o# necessary action. +ut
i# we made an e##ort and #ailed to get the two-thirds !ote$ which , doubt would be the result$
then at least we would ha!e tried as #ar as the >merican people are concerned$ to ha!e done ...
to ha!e done our ... to ha!e done our best on that."
Twice Rusk said that he e3pected to get the needed two-thirds !ote. +ut here is how The
Kennedy Tapes transcript reads Dwords in brackets were added by the book.s editors #or
clari#icationEF "+ut , suppose the only way we ha!e o# Gusing that isH getting GaH two-thirds
!ote to take necessary action. +ut i# we made an e##ort and #ailed to get the two-thirds !ote
GunclearH$ then at least we will ha!e tried as #ar as the >merican people are concerned. We.ll
ha!e done that." +oth o# Rusk.s assurances are missing. To understand Kennedy.s decision-
making process$ readers must know what ad!ice he was gi!en. +ut this crucial e!aluation o#
the diplomatic situation by Kennedy.s highest #oreign-policy o##icial is lost in the gaps o# the
published transcript. DThe 9nited States did recei!e the two-thirds !ote.E JFK.s decision to
begin with a blockade rather than with air raids is all the more striking gi!en these assurances
o# hemispheric support #or "necessary action."
The discussion soon turned to se!eral proposed plans #or bombing So!iet nuclear missiles$
nuclear-capable bombers$ and anti-aircra#t sites in Cuba. ,# the missiles alone were struck$
Secretary o# <e#ense Robert %c?amara warned$ So!iet bombers could attack the 9.S. na!al
base at @uantanamo or e!en the ;ast Coast o# the 9nited States. > key #actor in any decision
was whether the sur#ace-to-air missiles DS>%sE were operational$ and i# not$ how soon they
might be. @eneral %a3well Taylor$ the Chairman o# the Joint Chie#s o# Sta##$ strongly urges
the -resident to destroy the S>%s. ;!en i# they are not yet #unctional$ Taylor insists$ "the
S>% sites would soon become operational" and compromise crucial sur!eillance #lights. JFK
obser!es that attacks on the nuclear missiles and bombers might be possible be#ore the S>%s
are armed. Taylor counters that "they may be operational at any time." The Kennedy Tapes has
Taylor saying the "S>% site #acilities ha!e become operational"6the !ery point about which
Taylor was so uncertain6and then meaninglessly telling the -resident that "they.ll be
operational at the same time." @eneral Taylor.s assessment$ crucial to JFK.s decision #or
military action$ is thus reduced to a contradiction and a non se4uitur.
> short time later Kennedy speculates about whether So!iet -remier ?ikita Khrushche!
should be gi!en twenty-#our hours. notice be#ore the 9nited States bombs the missile sites.
+ut no hotline between the Kremlin and the White ouse then e3isted$ and Kennedy was
unsure how to reach the So!iet leader. "ow 4uick is our communication with %oscowC" he
asks. The Kennedy Tapes substitutes ",# we ha!e a communication with %oscow ..."
obscuring Kennedy.s primary concern. 1ne ad!iser suggests that the -resident simply use the
telephone. Robert Kennedy then asks$ ",t wouldn.t really ha!e to go in code$ would itC" The
Kennedy Tapes misidenti#ies the speaker as JFK and turns the remark into the immaterial ",t
wouldn.t really ha!e to be a call$ would itC"
> #ew minutes later RFK #rets about the dangers o# the blockade$ including the military risks
in #orcing "the e3amination o# Russian ships." The Kennedy Tapes renders this as "the
in!asion o# Russian ships$" inaccurately suggesting the !ery sort o# con#rontation the
blockade was meant to a!oid.
S1%; o# the most gripping moments on the tapes occur during JFK.s tense meeting with the
Joint Chie#s on 1ctober &/. @eneral ;arle Wheeler$ the >rmy chie# o# sta##$ argues that only
air strikes$ an in!asion$ and a blockade "will gi!e us increasing assurance that we really ha!e
got the o##ensi!e capability o# the Cuban So!iets cornered." >s transcribed in The Kennedy
Tapes, howe!er$ Wheeler.s recommendation6these actions "will gi!e us increasing assurance
that we really ha!e gone a#ter the o##ensi!e capability o# the CubanISo!iets corner"6would
hardly ha!e made sense to Kennedy.
@eneral Curtis *e%ay$ the >ir Force chie# o# sta##$ also bluntly tells the -resident that a
#ailure to in!ade Cuba would be almost as bad as the appeasement at %unich be#ore World
War ,,. *e%ay then predicts that the blockade would appear weak to the >merican people and
our allies. ")ou.re in a pretty bad #i3$" he smugly warns the -resident. JFK$ always skeptical
about the military$ reminds the general with a mocking laugh ")ou.re in with me." The
Kennedy Tapes merely tells the reader that JFK makes "an unclear$ 7oking$ reply." ,n #act
Kennedy.s biting response is per#ectly audible.
+y %onday$ 1ctober ''$ the decision to begin with a blockade had been made$ and the
-resident was scheduled to gi!e a speech to the nation that e!ening. >s the a#ternoon meeting
begins$ JFK reiterates that the 9nited States must respond to the situation in Cuba to preser!e
the balance o# power and blunt the "ine!itability" o# So!iet ad!ances. +ut$ he cautions$ the
blockade may not work$ and i# it comes to bombing and in!asion$ "Khrushche! will not take
this without a response$" either in Cuba or against +erlin. The Kennedy Tapes renders this
critical line as "Khrushche! will not complete this without a response$" which makes no sense
and depri!es the reader o# the tension in JFK.s words.
%oments later$ acknowledging the dissatis#action o# the Joint Chie#s$ JFK concedes that the
blockade will complicate any subse4uent military stepsF ", want to say !ery clearly to the
military that , recogni5e that we increase your problems in any military action we ha!e to take
in Cuba by the warning we.re now gi!ing." The Kennedy Tapes transcribes this line as ", want
to say !ery clearly to the military that , recogni5e the appreciable problems in any military
action ..." thus losing Kennedy.s key pointF a #ailed blockade would increase the danger and
di##iculty o# any bombing or in!asion that #ollowed.
Kennedy goes on to argue that the 9nited States has commitments all o!er the world$ not 7ust
in Cuba. e concludes that hea!y air strikes without warning could be politically
counterproducti!eF ", think the shock to the alliance might ha!e been nearly #atal." The
Kennedy Tapes mangles these wordsF ", think we get shocked$ and the Gdamage to theH
alliance might ha!e been nearly #atal." Kennedy then raises the most chilling 4uestionF "What
happens when the work on the bases goes onC" The editors miss this !ital 4uestion entirely by
transcribing it as "What happens when work GunclearH."
T; ne3t day$ 1ctober '8$ JFK and his ad!isers discuss how to implement the blockade and
win support in the press and on Capitol ill. John %cCone$ the director o# the C,>$ o##ers to
call the #ormer -resident <wight <. ;isenhower #or permission to use his name in talking
with members o# Congress and to get "his !iew o# this thing$ as a soldier." The Kennedy
Tapes, ine3plicably$ has %cCone saying "his !iew o# this thing$ as a #acilitator." >t a meeting
that e!ening JFK 5eroes in on the So!iet ships approaching the 4uarantine line. "?ow$ what
do we do tomorrow morning when these eight !essels continue to sail onC" he asks. "We.re all
clear about how we handle itC" %cCone inter7ects$ "Shoot the rudders o## them$ don.t youC"
The Kennedy Tapes muddles JFK.s 4uestion6"We.re all clear about how we enterC"6and
omits %cCone.s reply entirely.
+y 1ctober '2 the discussion had turned to how to handle press 4uestions about ships stopped
at the 4uarantine line. %c?amara reports that 7ust one cargo ship has been boarded. ",n any
case$" he says$ "it.s been success#ul and , think to do any good the story must be put out
immediately." The Kennedy Tapes distorts this important conclusion beyond recognitionF ",n
any case$ it was success#ul and , think the destroyers GunclearH." %c?amara ne!er mentions
destroyers.
The participants then discuss e!idence that work on the missile sites is continuing. They
debate whether to add petroleum$ oil$ and lubricants D-1*E to the list o# 4uarantined materials
immediately$ or to wait twenty-#our hours to see i# talks proposed by 9? Secretary-@eneral 9
Thant produce a breakthrough. %c@eorge +undy$ Kennedy.s national security ad!iser$
suggests that they "lea!e the timing Gon adding -1*H until we.!e talked about the 9 Thant
initiati!e." The inaccuracy in The Kennedy Tapes is especially bi5arre in this case$ with +undy
saying "lea!e the timing until we.!e talked about the attack thing." These last two e3amples
6"the destroyers GunclearH" and "the attack thing"6could easily lea!e a reader wondering
what in the world these men were talking about. DThree days later$ on 1ctober '/$ 9 Thant
was mentioned again. JFK asserts$ "We want 9 Thant to know that >dlai G9? >mbassador
>dlai Ste!ensonH is our !oice." +ut The Kennedy Tapes transcribes this line as "We want you
GunclearH to know that >dlai is our !oice."E
1ctober ': saw the darkest moment in the crisis. >n uncon#irmed report was recei!ed at
midday that a 9-' spy plane had been shot down o!er Cuba by a So!iet S>% missile$ and the
pilot killed. 1n the tape o# the late-a#ternoon meeting Kennedy discusses whether to order an
air strike on the S>% sites i# the incident is repeated Da delay that produced consternation at
the -entagonE. e declares that two options are on the tableF begin con!ersations about
Khrushche!.s proposal to swap So!iet missiles in Cuba #or 9.S. missiles in Turkey$ or re7ect
discussions until the Cuban crisis is settled. Kennedy chooses the #irst$ with the ca!eat that the
So!iets must pro!ide proo# that they ha!e ceased work on the missile sites. e repeatedly
re#ers to "con!ersations" and "discussions" and concludes$ "1b!iously$ they.re not going to
settle the Cuban 4uestion until they get some con!ersation on Cuba." ,ncredibly$ The Kennedy
Tapes substitutes "compensation" #or "con!ersation." ,t.s easy to imagine how Cold War
!eterans like Rusk$ +undy$ and %cCone would ha!e reacted to any suggestion o#
compensation #or the So!iets in Cuba.
1n 1ctober '/$ the day a#ter Khrushche! agreed to remo!e the missiles$ the -resident and his
ad!isers$ relie!ed but not euphoric$ conclude that sur!eillance and the 4uarantine will
continue until the missiles ha!e actually been remo!ed. >#ter a lull in the meeting$ during
which the con!ersation turns to college #ootball$ the -resident obser!es$ ", imagine the >ir
Force must be a little mad$" re#erring to the di!ision o# responsibility #or aerial photography
between the >ir Force and the Joint Chie#s. photo-reconnaissance o##ice. The Kennedy Tapes
transcribes this as ", imagine the airports must be looking bad$" which must lea!e many
readers scratching their headsF the remo!al o# the missiles had nothing to do with Cuban
airports. Kennedy then ponders why$ in the end$ the So!iets decided to back down. e notes$
"We had decided Saturday night to begin this air strike on Tuesday." ?o e##ort was made to
conceal the military buildup in southern Florida$ and Kennedy wonders i# the impending
strikes pushed the Russians to withdraw their missiles. The Kennedy Tapes, howe!er$ has JFK
saying "We got the GunclearH signs o# li#e to begin this air strike on Tuesday$" making his
shrewd speculation unintelligible.
1?; particular error$ among scores not cited abo!e$ seems to epitomi5e the problems with
these transcripts. 1n the 1ctober &0 tape <ean Rusk argues that be#ore taking military action
in Cuba$ the 9nited States should consult Khrushche!$ in the unlikely e!ent that he would
agree to remo!e the missiles. "+ut at least it will take that point out o# the way$" The Kennedy
Tapes has Rusk saying$ "and it.s on the record." +ut Rusk actually said that this consultation
would remo!e that point "#or the historical record." The historical record is indeed the issue
here.
1# course$ the editors o# The Kennedy Tapes and other historians would ne!er assume that any
transcript is absolutely accurate. The tape itsel# must always remain the primary historical
document. ?onetheless$ as the editors a##irm$ "reliable transcripts6ideally$ annotated
transcripts6are essential to make the tapes intelligible." These published transcripts$
howe!er$ re4uire substantial work. The re!isions suggested abo!e will ine!itably contain
some errorsB the editing process can ne!er be #inal or per#ect. +ut i# the editors disagree with
these #indings$ we can listen to any o# these disputed passages$ in pri!ate or in public$ using
the Kennedy *ibrary tapes or the ?1?1,S; tapes.
%ay and =elikow$ both distinguished scholars$ ha!e assured readers that i# they listen to the
tapes and disco!er errors or make out unclear remarks$ corrections will be included in #uture
editions or printings. >nd as we go to press$ a #ourth printing o# the book has corrected three
o# the errors cited abo!e D"the in!asion o# Russian ships"B "What happens when work
GunclearH"B and "the GunclearH signs o# li#e"E. owe!er$ the editors ha!e not acknowledged
these corrections in the pre#ace or identi#ied them in the transcripts$ and$ o# course$
uncorrected copies continue to circulate. Readers deser!e to know that e!en now The
Kennedy Tapes cannot be relied on as an accurate historical document.
Sheldon %. Stern was the historian at +oston.s John F. Kennedy *ibrary #rom &/:: to &///.