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NOTES AND CASES

LAW1

IN POLITICAL

(Volume II, June 2008 Edition for the September


2008 Bar Examinations)
(BILL OF RIGHTS)

Prepared by:
ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN
Professor of Law
(Political Law Review, Constitutional Law 1 & 2))
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS-BCF, BAGUIO CITY
June 2008
Pre-Bar Reviewer
CRC REVIEW CENTER
Baguio City Branch, Baguio City
BAGUIO POWER-HAUS BAR REVIEW CENTER
Baguio City
******************************************************
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE
STATE
(Police Power)
1. Define:
A. police power---is the power vested in the legislature by
the Constitution to make, ordain, establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare
of the State and its people. (ERMITA MALATE HOTEL
VS. CITY MAYOR, July 31, 1967)
The basic purposes of police power are:
a. to promote the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people; (ASSOCIATION OF
1

Exclusively for UC Bar Examinees and Students

SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY, 175


SCRA 343; US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85
b. to
promote
and
preserve
public
health;
(VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21,
1987; DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533
[NMAT]; LORENZO VS. DIRECTOR OF HEALTH,
50 Phil. 595apprehend and confine lepers in a
leprosarium)
PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS
COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE
GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004
POLICE
POWER/PUBLIC
HEALTH; THE RIGHT TO
PRACTICE A PROFESSION
Facts:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC)
released the names of successful examinees in the Medical
Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the
grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees
were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult
subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and
Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the
registration as physicians of all the examinees from Fatima College
of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools,
the results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but
unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation
found that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions.
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition
for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to
give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July
21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging
the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit
and recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be
nullified.

On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its


decision ordering the PRC to allow the respondents to take the
physicians oath and to register them as physicians. The same was
appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the
RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a
profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the
State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. However, the
regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution, their exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police
power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such,
mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue
licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to
the practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the
board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the
grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physicians license, or
revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the
examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing
authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short,
he shall have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.
c. to promote and protect public safety; (AGUSTIN VS.
EDU, 88 SCRA 195; TAXICAB OPERATORS VS.
JUINIO, 119 SCRA 897 )
d. to maintain and safeguard peace and order;
(GUAZON VS. DE VILLA)
e. to protect public morals; (DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS,
123 SCRA 569; ERMITA MALATE HOTEL VS. CITY
MAYOR, July 31, 1967; JMM PROMOTIONS VS.

CA, 260 SCRA 319; VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS,


February 13, 1983)
f. to promote the economic security of the people.
(ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 11155)
Not a valid exercise of police power:
a. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC VS. ERICTA, 122
SCRA 759; (6%)
b. YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659; the Director of Animal
Industry or the Chairman if the National Meat
Commission may dispose of the carabeef to charitable
agencies as he may deem fit. This is oppressive and
unreasonable since the owner is denied due process of law
and he is given so much discretion as the law is not
complete in itself nor is there a standard to guide the
official.
c. DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
B. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
3. POWER OF TAXATION
2. Differences and similarities
DIDIPIO EARTH SAVERS MULTI
PURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS. DENR
SEC. ELISEA GOZU, ET AL., 485
SCRA 586
Chico-Nazario, J.
1. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right
of the State to condemn or to take private property
for public use upon payment of just compensation
while police power is the power of the state to
promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property without
compensation;
2. In the exercise of police power, enjoyment of a
property is restricted because the continued use
thereof would be injurious to public welfare. In
such case, there is no compensable taking
provided none of the property interests is

appropriated for the use or for the benefit of the


public. Otherwise, there should be compensable
taking if it would result to public use.
3. Properties condemned under police power are
usually noxious or intended for noxious purpose;
hence , no compensation shall be paid. Likewise,
in the exercise of police power, property rights of
private individuals are subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.
While the power of eminent domain often results in the
appropriation of title to or possession of property, it need not
always be the case. Taking may include trespass without actual
eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property
was intended such as the establishment of an easement.
As such, an imposition of burden over a private property
through easement (by the government) is considered taking; hence,
payment of just compensation is required. The determination of
just compensation, however, is a judicial function (EPZA vs.
Dulay, 149 SCRA 305) and initial determinations on just
compensation by the executive department and Congress cannot
prevail over the courts findings.
Finally, service contracts with foreign corporations is not
prohibited under the 1987 Philippine Constitution with foreign
corporations or contractors would invest in and operate and
manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State; this time, however, safety measures were
put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.
3. Limitations in the exercise of said powers
4. Tests for a valid exercise of police power
a. the interests of the public, not mere particular class,
require the exercise of police power; (LAWFUL
SUBJECT)
b. the means employed is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive to individuals. (LAWFUL MEANS). In
short, the end does not justify the means.

5. Read:
a. JMM Promotions vs. CA, 260 SCRA 319
b. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS. MAYOR OF MANILA,
July 31, 1967;
c. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 1155
d. CHURCHILL VS. RAFFERTY, 32 Phil. 580
e. PEOPLE VS. POMAR, 46 Phil. 447
f. US VS. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85
g. VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983
h. ILOILO ICE & COLD STORAGE VS. MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL, 24 Phil. 471
i. AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195
j. YNOT VS. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
RESTITUTO YNOT VS. THE
ITERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
G.R. No. 74457,March 20, 1987
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. On January, 13, 1984, Ynot transported six carabaos
by using a pumpboat from Masbate to Iloilo. The six
carabaos, were, however, confiscated by the Police
Station Commander of Baratoc Nuevo, Iloilo for
alleged violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which
prohibits the inter-provincial transporting of carabaos
and carabeefs which does not comply with the
provisions of Executive No.626;
2.
That Section 1 of the said law provides that
"henceforth, no carabaos regardless of age, sex physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao
or carabeef transported in violation of the said law shall
be subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government to be distributed to charitable institution
and similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
meat inspection Commission may see fit in the case of
the carabeef, and to deserving farmers through the

dispersal of the Director of Animal Industry, in the


case of carabaos;
3. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were
returned to him upon the issuance of a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersede as bond in the amount of
P12,000.00;
4. After trial of the case, the Judge upheld the validity
of the act of the Police Station Commander in
confiscating the carabaos. Ynot was ordered to returned
the carabaos but since he could not do so, the court
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court refused
to rule on the constitutionality of the said Executive
Order on the ground of lack of authority to do so and
also because of its presumed validity;
5. The petitioner appealed to the IAC but the said
court upheld the decision of the Trial Court. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court where YNOT claimed that the penalty of
confiscation is INVALID the same was imposed
without according the owner the right to be heard
before a competent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed
by due process.
Issues:
1. May a lower court (like the MTC, RTC, of the
Court of Appeals) declare a law unconstitutional?
2. Is Executive Order No. 626-A constitutional?
Sub-issues under this are:
a. Was it a valid police power measure?
b. Was there an undue delegation of legislative
power?
Held:
1. While the lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional question, THEY
ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM RESOLVING THE

SAME WHENEVER WARRANTED, subject only to


review by the supreme court. This is so because under
Section 5,[2(a)], Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court has the power to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" or
certiorari as the rules of court may provide, final
judgements and orders of the lower courts in all cases
involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This
simply means that lower courts may declare whether or
not a law is constitutional.
2. In order that a measure or law may be justified
under the police power of the state, it must meet two
tests:
a. the subject must be lawful; and
b. the means employed is lawful.
Since the prohibition of the slaughtering of carabaos
except where they are at least 7 years old when male
and at least 11 years old when female is in furtherance
of the public interest since said carabaos are very useful
to the work at the farm, it is conceded
that the Executive Order meets the first test---- it has
lawful subject.
But does the law meets the second requisite or test
which is lawful method?
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute
ban not on the slaughtering of carabaos BUT ON
THIER MOVEMENT, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province
to another." The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the question measure is missing. We do not see how
the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter considering that
they can be killed any where, with no less difficulty in
one province than in the other. Obviously, retaining a
carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter

there, any more than moving them to another province


will make it easier to kill them there.
The law is unconstitutional because it struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving
him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guarantee of elementary fair play.
Since the Executive Order in question is a penal
law, then violation thereof should be pronounce not by
the police BUT BY A COURT OF JUSTICE, WHICH
ALONE WOULD HAVE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO
IMPOSE THE PRESCRIBED PENALTY, AND ONLY
AFTER TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF THE
ACCUSED.
Also, there is no reasonable guidelines or bases of
the Director of Animal Industry or the Chairman of the
NATIONAL Meat Inspection Commission in the
disposition of the carabaos or carabeef other than what
"they may see fit" which is very dangerous and could
result to opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
graft and corruption.
The Executive Order is, therefore, invalid and
unconstitutional and not a valid police power measure
because the METHOD EMPLOYED TO CONSERVE
CARABAOS IS NOT REASONABLY NECESSARY
TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AND, WORSE IS
UNDULY OPPRESSIVE. DUE PROCESS IS
VIOLATED BECAUSE THE OWNER OF THE
PROPERTY CONFISCATED IS DENIED THE
RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN HIS DEFENSE AND IS
IMMEDIATELY CONDEMNED AND PUNISHED.
THE CONFERMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITIES (like the police) OF THE POWER TO
ADJUDGE THE GUILT OF THE SUPPOSED
OFFENDER IS A CLEAR ENCROACHMENT OF
JUDICIAL
FUNCTIONS
AND
MILITATES
AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATIION OF
POWERS.

10

Also, there is undue delegation of legislative


power to the officers mentioned therein (Director of
Animal Industry and Head of the National Meat
Commission) because they were given unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the property
confiscated.
k. TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT, 119 SCRA 597
l. BAUTISTA VS. JUINIO, 127 SCRA 329
MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS.
ALFREDO JUINIO, ET AL, 127 SCRA
329
Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
1. On May 31, 1979, President Marcos issued Letter of
Instruction No. 869 prohibiting the use of private
motor vehicles with H (Heavy Vehicles) and EH (Extra
Heavy Vehicles) on week-ends and holidays from 12:00
a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning,
or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after
the holiday. Motor vehicles of the following
classifications are however, exempted:
1. S----service;
2. T----Truck;
3. DPL--Diplomatic;
4. CC---Consular Corps; and
5. TC---Tourist Cars
2. On June 11, 1979, the then Commissioner of Land
Transportation, ROMEO EDU issued Circular No. 39
imposing "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle
and cancellation of registration on owners of the abovespecified found violating such letter of Instructions";
3. Bautista is questioning the constitutionality of the
LOI and the Implementing Circular on the grounds that:

11

a. The banning of H and EH vehicles is unfair,


discriminatory, and arbitrary and thus contravenes the
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; and
b. The LOI denies the owners of H and EH
vehicles of due process, more specifically of their right
to use and enjoy their private property and of their
freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions,
outings on week-ends and holidays, while those not
included in the prohibition are enjoying unrestricted
freedom;
c. The Circular violates the prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power because the LOI
does not impose the penalty of confiscation.
HELD:
1. It must be pointed out that the LOI was
promulgated to solve the oil crisis which was besetting
the country at that time. It was therefore a valid police
power measure to ensures the country's economy as a
result of spiralling fuel prices. In the interplay of
Bautista's right to due process and the exercise of police
power by the State, the latter must be given leeway. The
police power is intended to promote public health,
public morals, public safety and general welfare.
2. The petitioners' claim that their right to equal
protection was violated is without basis. This is so
because there is a valid classification in this case.
Definitely, Heavy and Extra-Heavy vehicles consume
more gasoline that the other kinds of vehicles and it is
but proper to regulate the use of those which consumes
more gasoline. If all the owner of H and EH vehicles
are treated in the same fashion, or whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group is held equally binding on the
rest, there is no violation of the equal protection clause.
3. The penalty of "impounding" the vehicle as
embodied in Circular No. 39 has no statutory basis.
Therefore, it is not valid being an "ultra vires".

12

m. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS.


SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, 175 SCRA 343
n. DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533
o. VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987
5-a. Not a valid exercise of police power
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA,
122 SCRA 759
CHAPTER IIDUE PROCESS
Section 1---NO PERSON SHALL BE
DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW, NOR SHALL ANY PERSON
BE DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS.
Kinds of Due Process:
a. substantive due process---requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to life, liberty or
property. In short, it is to determine whether it has a valid
governmental objective like for the interest of the public as
against mere particular class.
b. Procedural due process---one which hears before it condemns as
pointed out by Daniel Webster.
Due process is a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial (Per
Daniel Webster in the DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE)
1. Requisites of judicial due process.
a. BANCO ESPANOL VS. PALANCA, 37 Phil. 921
Requisites:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it;

13

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of


the defendant or over the property subject of the
proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
a. GALMAN VS. PAMARAN (the 1st case)
b. IMELDA MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6,
1998
IMELDA R. MARCOS VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 126995,
October 6, 1998
Purisima, J.
Facts:
1. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE
DANS, as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into
a Lease Contract with the Philippine General
Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA
property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month
for 25 years;
2. On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said
property for P734,000.00 per month to the
Transnational Construction Corporation represented
by one Ignacio Jumenez;
3. After petitioners husband was deposed as President
of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of
alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan;
4. After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
failed to comply with the legal requirement that all
the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision
because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose
Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused
while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them;
5. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice
issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting

14

6.

7.
8.
9.

a Special Division of five and designating Justices


Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario;
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote
Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his
Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly
because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the
opinion of Justice del Rosario;
On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered
convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of
Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme
Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner but acquitted DANS;
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard
by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right
to due process of law, both substantive and
procedural, was violated:
a. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as
a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals
agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent
sub-lease contract between PGHFI and
Transnational Construction Corporation; and
b. the First Division convicted her after Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of
5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant
where they agreed to convict her in one case
and acquit her in her other cases. The said
meeting was attended by another justice who
is not a member of the First Division or the
Special Division in violation of the Rules of the
Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of
the court shall be done only in its principal
office in Manila and that only justices
belonging to the division should join the
deliberations.

Held:
The petitioner is hereby acquitted.

15

1. The great disparity between the rental price of the


lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00
per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per
month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of
P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government in the absence of any evidence using
rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in
the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed
very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS
PRESENTED
BY
THE
PROSECUTION
REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT
PROPERTIES.. As such, the prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt.
2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as
shown by his
leading, misleading and baseless
hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F.
CUERVO, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked
179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor
who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said
number of questions could no longer be described as
clarificatory questions. Another ground therefore for
the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied
IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is
one reason why the case could no longer be remanded
to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other
Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5
have retired. There is therefore no compelling reason
why the case should still be remanded to the lower
court when all the evidence are already with the
Supreme Court.
(NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa,
Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug
was the only Justice who voted for the return of the
case to the Sandiganbayan to allow the corrections of
the perceived irregularities in the proceedings below.)
c. DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999
d. MATUGUINA VS. CA, 263 SCRA 490
e. PEOPLE VS. CA, 262 SCRA 452

16

f. JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194


JAVIER VS. COMELEC
G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22,
1986
FACTS:
1.
The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private
respondent Arturo Pacificador were candidates in
Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May
1984;
2. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the
elections and the canvass of the election returns, Javier
went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending
proclamation of his rival;
3.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the
COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers
to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders;
4. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered
the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition
filed by Javier with the COMELEC;
5. On certiorari with the S.C. the proclamation made
by the Board of Canvasser was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5 - day period
of appeal, which the petitioner seasonably made;
6.
On July 23, 1984 the Second Division itself
proclaimed Pacificador the elected assemblyman of
Antique.
ISSUE:

17

Was the Second Division of the COMELEC,


authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984
proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ?
APPLICABLE
CONSITUTION:

PROVISIONS

OF

THE

The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution


are Art. XII-C, secs. 2 and 3, which provide:
"Section 2. Be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials."
"Section 3. The Commission on Elections
may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election
casesa may be heard and decided by divisions
except contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by
law, all election cases shall be decided within
ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision."
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
Petitioner:
The proclamation made by the Second Division is
invalid because all contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections en banc.
Respondents:
Only "contests" need to be heard and decided en
banc, all other cases can be - in fact, should be - filed
with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
There is a difference between "contests" and "cases"
and also a difference between "pre-proclamation
controversies" and "election protests". The pre-

18

proclamation controversy between the petitioner and


the private respondent was not yet a contest at the time
and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division
of the Commission on elections, consonant with Sec. 3.
The issue at that stage was still administrative and
could be resolved by a division.
HELD:
a. The S.C. decided to resolve the case even if the
Batasang Pambansa had already been abolished by the
Aquino government, and even if Javier had already died
in the meantime. This was because of its desire for this
case to serve as a guidance for the future. Thus it said:
"The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of
legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but
we must also give him justice. The two are not always
the same. There are times when we cannot grant the
latter because the issue has been settled and decision is
no longer possible according to law. But there are also
times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in
this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice
demands that we act, then, not only for the vindication
of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint upon the future."
b. The S.C. held on the main issue that in making the
COMELEC the sole judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials, the Constitution intended to give it full
authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning
to end and on all matter related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the winners.
The decision rendered by the Second Division alone
was therefore set aside as violative of the Constitution.
The case should have been decided en banc.
c. Pre-proclamation controversies became known and
designated as such only because of Sec. 175 of the 1978
Election Code. The 1973 Constitution could not have

19

therefore been intended to have divided contests


between pre and post proclamation when that
Constitution was written in 1973.
d.
The word "contests" should not be given a
restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive
the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that
the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted
liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the
term should be understood as referring to any matter
involving the title or claim of title to an elective office,
made before or after the proclamation of the winner,
whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in
dispute.
e. There was also a denial of due process. One of the
members of the Second Division, Commissioner Jose
Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. He denied the
motion to disqualify him from hearing the case. The
Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement we have held that the judge must not only
be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an
added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just.
FELICIANO
concurring:

and

MELENCIO-HERRERA,

All election contests involving members of the


Batasang Pambansa must be decided by the
Commission on Elections en banc under Secs. 2 and 3
of Art. XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These sections
do not distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and
"post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and
"contests".
g. AZUL VS. CASTRO, 133 SCRA 271
h. PADERANGA VS. AZURA, 136 SCRA 266
i. DAVID VS. AQUILIZAN, 94 SCRA 707

20

j. LORENZANA VS. CAYETANO, 78 SCRA 485


(respondent was not a party to the ejectment case) so to
enforce the decision on her violates her right to due
process of law
k. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS. CA, 94
SCRA 261
l. ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353
m.SINGSON VS. NLRC, 273 SCRA 258
n. ANZALDO VS. CLAVE, 119 SCRA 353
o. MAYOR ALONTE VS. JUDGE SAVELLANO, 287
SCRA 245
MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS.
JUDGE SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245
Vitug, J.
Mayor Alonte of Binan, Laguna was charged of
rape before Branch 25, RTC of Laguna. However, as a
result of a petition for a transfer of venue filed by the
prosecution and granted by the SC, his case was
transferred to RTC Branch 53, Manila, presided over by
the respondent judge.
After the petitioners arraignment, the prosecution
submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE signed by
the
private
complainant
JUVIE-LYN
PUNONGBAYAN where she prayed for the withdrawal
of the case because she is no longer interested in
pursuing the same with no intention of re-filing the said
case in the future.
Pending resolution of the said motion to
withdraw, the petitioner filed a motion for bail. The
same was not resolved despite several motions filed by
the petitioner to resolve the same.
On December 17, 1997, counsel for the petitioner,
ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN, received a notice
from the respondent judge notifying him of the
promulgation of the decision in this case despite the

21

fact that the prosecution and the defense have not


presented their evidence in court.
On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge
issued a Decision convicting the petitioner of rape and
sentenced to suffer a penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right
to due process of law.
Held:
In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings
is deemed to have been given the right to due process of
law, the following requisites must be complied with
before a decision is rendered:
1. the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed
with jurisdiction to hear and determine the
matter before it;
2. that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it
over the person of the accused;
3. that the accused is given the opportunity to be
heard; and
4. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing (PEOPLE VS. DAPITAN, 197 SCRA
378)
The act of the respondent judge in rendering a
decision without even giving the petitioner the right to
adduce evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his
right to due process of law. The Decision rendered is
NULL AND VOID for want of due process.
p. DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999
2. Procedural due process before administrative bodies
a. TIBAY VS. CIR, 69 Phil. 635

22

Requisites:
a. the right to a hearing which includes the right to
present evidence;
b. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
c. the decision must have something to support itself;
d. the evidence must be substantial;
e. the decision must be based on the evidence presented
during the hearing;
f. the tribunal or body must act on its own independent
consideration of the law or facts;
g. the board or body shall in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceedings can know the various issues involved.
b. AMERICAN TOBACCO VS. DIRECTOR, 67 SCRA
287
c. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NLRC, 263 SCRA
531
d. DELGADO VS. CA, November 10, 1986
If an accused was represented by a non-lawyer
during the trial (though he thought that he was a lawyer),
his right to due process was violated and therefore
entitled to a new trial.
3. Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against
students
Academic freedom; due process
in disciplinary actions involving
students
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE
COMMISSION
ON
HIGHER
EDUCATION,
THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS,
ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD
REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., G.R. No.
127980, December 19, 2007

23

REYES, R.T., J.:


THE FACTS:
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the
De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde
(CSB)2[1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an
offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three
other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.
On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone
in Manangs Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men
bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored
the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house,
he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching
television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner
at Manangs. Then, the three, together with four other persons went
back to Manangs and confronted the two who were still in the
restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his
testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two
heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student
Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an
apology. Kailangan ng apology in the words of respondent
Aguilar. But no apology was made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00
p.m., James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering
Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to recross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to
ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not
know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in
the head with something heavy in his hands parang knuckles.
Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him.
Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him,
were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent
Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group
of attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the
2[1]

College of Saint Benilde is an educational institution which is part of the De La Salle System.

24

group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr.


Yap said hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita
sumuntok siya. What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also
running with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The
victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson
Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux
Fraternity, while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin
Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto
Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival
fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a
complaint3[7] with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with direct assault. Similar complaints 4[8] were also
filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and
private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled
De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar
(AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403),
Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and
Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227) were docketed as Discipline
Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate
notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr.
and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring
them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers. 5
[9]

Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board


uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded
Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and
deliberate the charge against you for violation of
CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints
of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

3[7]
4[8]
5[9]

Id. at 127.
Id. at 128-129.
Id. at 130-133.

25

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the


Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the
Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give
testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You
may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your
testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further
directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline
Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn
statement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or
your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the
sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be
considered a waiver on your part to present evidence
and as an admission of the principal act complained of.
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28,
1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.
No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
issued a Resolution6[18] finding private respondents guilty. They
were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,7[19]
pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.8[20] The dispositive part of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the
Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (ABBSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (ABPSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837)
6[18]

Id. at 139-150.
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that expulsion is an extreme
penalty of an erring pupil or student consisting of his exclusion from admission to any public or private
school in the Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary. The penalty may be
imposed for acts or offenses constituting gross misconduct, dishonesty, hazing, carrying deadly weapons,
immorality, selling and/or possession of prohibited drugs such as marijuana, drug dependency,
drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and other serious school offenses such as assaulting a pupil or
student or school personnel, instigating or leading illegal strikes or similar concerned activities resulting in
the stoppage of classes, preventing or threatening any pupil or student or school personnel from entering
the school premises or attending classes or discharging their duties, forging or tampering with school
records or school forms, and securing or using forged school records, forms and documents.
8[20]
Rollo, pp. 151-153.
7[19]

26

guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and


thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO
(AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the
charge.
I SSUE
Were private respondents accorded due process of law
because there was no full-blown hearing nor were
they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against
them?
H E L D:
Private respondents right to
due process of law was not
violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students
found violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum
standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired;
(3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case.9[66]
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process.10[67] Notice and hearing is the bulwark
of administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings.11[68] The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
9[66]

Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. L-68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, 706-707.
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 353.
11[68]
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 143964, July 26, 2004,
435 SCRA 110.
10[67]

27

proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity


to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 12[69]
So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause
or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was
denial of due process.13[70]
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all
instances, essential to due process it is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based.14[71] To be heard does not
only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may
also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be
heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.15[72]
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges
against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the
charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective
answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented
against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board.
Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the
parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 94953-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due
process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in
Guzman v. National University16[73] where this Court held that x x
x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student
discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x
x x an essential part thereof.
12[69]

Valiao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146621, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 543.
Barza v. Dinglasan, Jr., G.R. No. 136350, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 277.
14[71]
Seastar Marine Services, Inc. v. Bul-an, Jr., G.R. No. 142609, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 140.
15[72]
Batul v. Bayron, G.R. Nos. 157687 & 158959, February 26, 2004, 424 SCRA 26.
16[73]
Supra note 66, at 706.
13[70]

28

GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706


GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-68288, July 11, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners who are students of the National
University were barred from enrolment. The school
claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that
they have been involved in activities that have disrupted
classes and had conducted mass actions without the
required permits.
HELD:
a. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged
violations hurled by the school against the petitioners,
the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of
any sort to determine whether or not petitionersstudents had indeed led or participated "in activities
within the university premises, conducted without prior
permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein".
Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite
any duly published rule of theirs by which students may
be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
standing.
b. Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the
right "to freely choose their field of study subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein
up to graduation, EXCEPT in case of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."
The petitioner were denied of this right, and were
being disciplined without due process, in violation of
the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools that "no penalty shall be imposed upon any
student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel

29

and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly


promulgated and only after due investigation shall
have been conducted. It has already been held in
Berina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute, 117 SCRA
581, that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on
students without conducting due investigation.
c. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and
enforce its rules. In fact the maintenance of good school
discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every
private school. The Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools provides that:
"* * The school rules governing discipline and
the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly
specified and defined in writing and made known to the
students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall
have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such
rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from
time to time effective as of the date of their
promulgation unless otherwise specified."
d. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process. Due process in
disciplinary cases involving students :
a. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court of
justice;
b. the proceedings may be summary;
c. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.
But the S.C. said that the following minimum standards
must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process:

30

1. the students must be informed in writing of


the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence
against them;
4.
they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf;
5. the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
a. BERINA VS. PMI, September 30, 1982
Due process in the dismissal of employees
Requisites of Due Process before the NLRC
1. Notice; and
2. Hearing
a.
b.
c.
d.

MGG Marine Services vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664


Philippine Savings Bank vs. NLRC, 261 SCRA 409
RAYCOR AIR CONTROL VS. NLRC, 261 SCRA 589
WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES VS. NLRC, 263
SCRA 174
e. SAMILLANO VS. NLRC, 265 SCRA 788
f. STOLT-NIELSEN VS. NLRC, 264 SCRA 307
g. GARCIA VS. NLRC, 264 SCRA 261
4. Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration to violation of the
right to due process
a. CASUELA VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 276
SCRA 635
b. CORDENILLO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 276
SCRA 652

31

5.

In administrative proceedings, does due process require that a


party be assisted by counsel and be able to cross-examine the
witnesses?
LUMIQUED VS. EXENEA, 282 SCRA 125
There is no law, whether the Civil Service Act or the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that a
respondent in an administrative case should be assisted by
counsel in order that the proceedings therein is considered
valid. Not only, that, petitioner herein was given the
opportunity several times to engage the services of a lawyer
to assist him but he confidently informed the investigators
that he could protect himself.

Administrative Due Process


ATTY. ROMEO ERECE VS. LYN
MACALINGAY, ET AL., G.R. No.
166809, April 22, 2008
THE FACTS:
Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) Region I, whose office is located in San
Fernando City, La Union. Respondent employees of the CHR
Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated October 2, 1998
against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office
vehicle assigned to petitioner, that petitioner still claimed
transportation allowance even if he was using the said vehicle, and
that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle, when
in fact he did, in order to collect transportation allowance.
Respondent filed his answer denying the allegations
against him.
After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC Proper in CSC
Resolution No. 99-1360 dated July 1, 1999 charged petitioner with
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle
in spite of his receipt of the monthly transportation allowance and
for certifying that he did not use any government vehicle, when in
fact, he did, in order to receive the transportation allowance.

32

Pertinent portions of the formal charge read:


1.
That despite the regular receipt of Erece of
his monthly Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) in the amount of P4,000.00, he still
prioritizes himself in the use of the office vehicle
(Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive from the Central
Office that he cannot use the service vehicle for official
purposes and at the same time receive his transportation
allowance;
2.
That Erece did not comply with the directive
of the Central Office addressed to all Regional Human
Rights Directors, as follows: to regularize your receipt
of the transportation allowance component of the RATA
to which you are entitled monthly, you are hereby
directed to immediately transfer to any of your staff,
preferably one of your lawyers, the memorandum
receipt of the vehicle(s) now still in your name;
3.
That he certified in his monthly liquidation
of his RATA that he did not use any government vehicle
for the corresponding month, which is not true because
he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued
to CHR-Region I.
The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate
that government service has been prejudiced by the acts
of Erece.
WHEREFORE, Romeo L. Erece is hereby
formally charged with Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days
from receipt hereof to submit his Answer under oath
and affidavits of his witnesses, if any, to the Civil
Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region
(CSC-CAR). On his Answer, he should indicate
whether he elects a formal investigation or waives his
right thereto. Any Motion to Dismiss, request for
clarification or Bills of Particulars shall not be
entertained by the Commission. Any of these pleadings
interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an

33

Answer and shall be evaluated as such. Likewise, he is


advised of his right to the assistance of counsel of his
choice.17[4]
After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 020124, dated January 24. 2002, finding petitioner
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution
with the CA.
In the Decision promulgated on January 7, 2005, the CA
upheld the CSC Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.18[5]
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
Petitioner raised the issue of violation of his right to due
process because he was denied the right to cross-examine the
respondents on their affidavit-complaint.
H E L D:
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was
not afforded the right to cross-examine his accusers and their
witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay
in the disposition of the case, he was allowed to present evidence
first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he
rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but
moved to submit their position paper and formal offer of evidence,
which motion was granted by the CSC over his (petitioners)
objection. Respondents then submitted their Position Paper and
Formal Offer of Exhibits.
17[4]
18[5]

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 34.

34

Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present


evidence first, it should not be construed as a waiver of his right to
cross-examine the complainants.
Although the order of
presentation of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure,
still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his right to crossexamine his accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed
only if he expressly waived said right.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied
due process when he failed to cross-examine the complainants and
their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and
present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.19[6]
Velez v. De Vera20[7] held:
Due process of law in administrative cases is not
identical with judicial process for a trial in court is
not always essential to due process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is
otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest
upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its
requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain
proceedings of administrative character, the right to a
notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law.
The constitutional requirement of due process is met by
a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that
hearings be had before the making of a determination if
thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before
which all objections and defenses to the making of such
determination may be raised and considered. One
adequate hearing is all that due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual
hearing always essential. . . . 21[8]
The dismissal of the petitioner from the government is valid.
19[6]
20[7]
21[8]

Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 345.
Id. at 387-388.
Emphasis supplied.

35

CHAPTER III - THE EQUAL


PROTECTION CLAUSE
nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
1. The scope of the equal protection clause, 95 SCRA

420

2. Equal protection of the law, 13 SCRA 266


3. Requisites for a valid classificationRead:
1. People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
a.
b.
c.
d.

There must be real and substantial distinctions;


It must be germane tot he purposes of the law;
It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
It must apply equally to all members of the same class.

2. Read again, Association of Small Landowners vs. Sec. of


Agrarian reform, July 14, 1989
4. Equal protection in generalRead:
1. P. vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
2. TIU VS. CA, 301 SCRA 278 (There is real and substantial
distinction between business inside the Subic Special
Economic Zone and outside wherein those inside are exempt
from other taxes as a result of the policy of the government to
accelerate the development of the portion of Subic left by the
Americans)
3. MELDA MARCOS VS. CA, 278 SCRA 843
4. HIMAGAN VS. PEOPLE, October 7, 1994
The fact that policemen charged with a criminal offense
punishable by more than 6 years are to be suspended during
the entire duration of the case unlike other government
employees is valid since it rests on valid classification
because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law

36

which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against


them.
2-A Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
2-b. PANFILO LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20,
1999
2-b-1. BASCO VS. PAGCOR, May 14, 1991
No violation of the equal protection clause if Congress
would legalize cock-fighting and horse racing since police
power could regulate gambling.
3. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO,
November 11, 1993
There is no valid distinction for a law removing the franking
privilege of the judiciary while leaving the same to the
Executive and Legislative despite the fact that there is
considerable volume of mails from the courts. Loss of revenue is
not a valid ground unless it would be withdrawn to all
government offices.
FRANCISCO TATAD vs.
THE
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, G. R. No. 124360, November 5,
1997
EDCEL LAGMAN, JOKER ARROYO,
ENRIQUE
GARCIA,
WIGBERTO
TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION vs. HON. RUBEN
TORRES, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY,
PETRON, FILIPINAS SHELL and
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
127867, November 5, 1997.
PUNO, J.
These petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and for Other Purposes. RA 8180 seeks to end

37

26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil


industry.
The facts:
1. Prior to 1971, no government agency was regulating
the oil industry. New players were free to enter the
oil market without any government interference.
There were four (4) refining companies at that time.
SHELL,
CALTEX,
BATAAN
REFINING
COMPANY and FILOIL MARKETING and six (6)
petroleum marketing companies: ESSO, FILOIL,
CALTEX, GETTY, MOBIL and SHELL;
2. In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by the
crippling oil crisis and in order to remedy the same,
the OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION ACT was
enacted REGULATING the oil industry ;
3. On November 9, 1973, then President Marcos
created the Philippine national Oil Corporation
(PNOC) t break the control of the foreigners to the
oil industry. It
acquired ownership of ESSO
Philippines and Filoil and likewise bought
controlling shares of the Bataan Refining
Corporation. PNOC then operated under the business
name PETRON CORPORATION and for the first
time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine
oil market;
4. In 1984, Pres. Marcos through section 8 of PD 1956
created the OIL PRICE STABILIZATION FUND
(OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in
the price of oil caused by the exchange rate
adjustments or increase of the world market prices
crude oil and imported petroleum products;
5. By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were left
operating in the country. These are: CALTEX,
FILIPINAS SHELL and PNOC;
6. In May, 1987, Pres. Corazon Aquino signed
Executive Order No. 172 creating the ENERGY
REULATORY BOARD to regulate the business of
importing, exporting, shipping, transporting,
processing, refining, marketing and distributing
energy resources WHEN WARRANTED AND
ONLY WHEN PUBLIC NECESSITY REQUIRES.

38

The Board was empowered to fix and regulate the


prices of petroleum products and other related
merchandise;
7. In March, 1996, Congress enacted RA 8180
deregulating the Oil Industry not later than March,
1997. The law requires that the implementation of
the regulation, shall as far as practicable be made at a
time WHEN THE PRICES OF CRUDE OIL AND
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE WORLD ARE
DECLINING AND WHEN THE EXCHANGE
RATE OF THE PESO IN RELATION TO THE US
DOLLAR; IS STABLE;
8. On February 8, 1997, Executive Order No. 372 was
issued by President Fidel Ramos implementing full
deregulation ON THE GROUND THAT THE OPSF
FUND HAS BEEN DEPLETED;
9. The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of
RA 8180 on the following grounds:
a. Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution;
b. The imposition of different tariff rates
does not deregulate the oil industry and
even bars the entry of other players in the
oil industry but instead effectively
protects the interest of the oil companies
with existing refineries. Thus, it runs
counter to the objective of the law to
foster a truly competitive market; The
inclusion of Sec. 5 [b] providing for
tariff differential violates Section 26 [1]
of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which
requires every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in the
title thereof;
c. Section 15 of RA 8180 and EO No. 392
are unconstitutional for undue delegation
of legislative power to the President and
the Secretary of Energy;
d. EO 392 implementing the full
deregulation of the oil industry is
unconstitutional since it is arbitrary and
unreasonable since it was enacted due to

39

the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund, a


condition which is not found in RA No.
8180;
e. Section 15
of RA 8180
is
unconstitutional for it allows the
formation of a de facto cartel among three
existing oil companies in violation of the
Constitution
prohibiting
against
monopolies, combination in restraint of
trade and unfair competition.
The provisions of the law being questioned as
unconstitutional are Section 5 [b] and Section 15
which provide:
Section 5 [b] Any law to the contrary
notwithstanding and starting with the
effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be
imposed and collected on imported crude oil
at the rate of 3% and imported refined
petroleum products at the rate of seven (7%)
percent, except fuel oil and LPG, the rate
for which shall be the same; Provided, that
beginning on January 1, 2004, the tariff rate
on imported crude oil and refined petroleum
products shall be the same; Provided,
further, that this provision may be amended
only by an Act of Congress.
xxx
Section 15. Implementation of
full
deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5 [e] of
RA 7638, the DOE, upon approval of the
President, implement full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry not later than
March, 1997. As far as practicable, the
DOE shall time the full deregulation when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining
and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable.

40

The issues are:


Procedural Issues:
a. Whether or not the petitions raise justiciable
controversy; and
b. Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to
question the validity of the subject law and executive
order.
Substantive Issues:
a. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the
one titleone subject requirement of the
Constitution;
b. Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution;
c. Whether section 15 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of legislative power;
d. Whether or not EO 392 is arbitrary and
unreasonable; and
e. Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.
HELD:
1. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the
courts to settle controversies involving rights but
also the duty to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any agency or
branch of the government. The courts, as guardians
of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law. When the statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right of the judiciary
to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.
2. The question of locus standi must likewise fall . As
held in KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD
SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC. VS.
TAN, it was held that:

41

Objections to taxpayers suit for lack


of sufficient personality, standing, or
interest are , however, in the main
procedural matters. CONSIDERING
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASES
TO THE PUBLIC, AND IN KEEPING
WITH THE COURTS DUTY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT
THE OTHER BRANCHEDS OF
GOVERNMENT
HAVE
KEPT
THEMSELVES
WITHIN
THE
LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE LAWS AND THAT THEY
HAVE
NOT
ABUSE
THE
DISCRETION GIVEN TO THEM,
THE COURT HAS BRUSHED
ASIDE
TECHNICALITIES
OF
PROCEDURE AND HAS TAKEN
COGNIZANCE
OF
THESE
PETITIONS.
There is no disagreement on the part of the parties as to
the far-reaching importance of the validity of RA 8180.
Thus, there is no good sense in being hyper-technical
on the standing of the petitioners for they pose issues
which are significant to our people and which deserve
our forthright resolution.
3. It is contended that Section 5[b[ of RA 8180 on tariff
differentials violates the Constitutional prohibition
requiring every law to have only one subject which
should be expressed in its title. We do not concur
with this contention. As a policy, the Court has
adopted a liberal construction of the one title---one
subject rule. We have consistently ruled that the title
need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents
and minute details of a law. A law having a single
general subject indicated in the title may contain a
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the

42

method and means of carrying out the general


subject. We hold that Section 5 providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180
which is the deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.
4. The contention that there is undue delegation of
legislative power when it authorized the President to
determine when deregulation starts is without merit.
The petitioners claim that the phrases as far as
practicable, decline of crude oil prices in the world
market and stability of the peso exchange rate to
the US dollar are ambivalent, unclear and
inconcrete in meaning and could not therefore
provide the determinate or determinable standards
which can guide the President in his decision to fully
deregulate the oil industry. The power of Congress to
delegate the execution of laws has long been settled
by this Court in 1916 in the case of COMPANIA
GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINA VS. THE
BOARD
OF
PUBLIC
UTILITY
COMMISSIONERS WHERE IT WAS HELD
THAT:
The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law , which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made.
Two tests have been developed to determine whether
the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve
the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated
the metes and bounds of these tests in EASTERM SHIPPING
LINES VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power , viz: the completeness test
and the sufficiency of standard test. Under

43

the first test, the law must be complete in all


its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will do is enforce
it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. BOTH TESTS
ARE INTENDED TO PREVENT A TOTAL
TRANSFERENCE OF LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATE, WHO
IS NOT ALLOWED TO STEP INTO THE
SHOES OF THE LEGISLATURE AND
EXERCISE A POWER ESSENTIALLY
LEGISLATIVE.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a
quiet area in our constitutional landscape because such
has become an inevitability in light of the increasing
complexity of the task of government. In fact, in
HIRABAYASHI VS. UNITED STATES, the Supreme
Court through Justice ISAGANI CRUZ held that even
if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard,
THE COURTS WILL BEND BACKWARD TO
LOCATE THE SAME ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO
SPARE THE STATUTE; IF IT CAN, FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY.
5. EO No. 392 failed to follow faithfully the standards
set by RA 8180 when it considered the extraneous
factor of depletion of the OPSF Fund. The
misapplication of this extra factor cannot be
justified. The executive is bereft of any right to alter
either by addition or subtraction the standards set by
RA 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede
to the executive the power to make laws would invite
tyranny and to transgress the separation of powers.
The exercise of delegated power is given a strict
scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent
whose action cannot infringe the terms of the agency.

44

6. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution


provides:
The state shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interests so
requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in
one or more persons or companies, consisting of the
exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or
trade, manufacture a particular article or control the sale or
the whole market structure in which one or only a few firms
dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other
hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or
understanding between two or more persons, in the form of
contract, trust, pool, holding company, for the purpose of
unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and
commerce in
a certain commodity, controlling its
production, distribution and price or otherwise interfering
with freedom of trade without statutory authority.
Combination in restraint of trade refers to means while
monopoly refers to the end.
Respondents aver that the 4% tariff differential is designed
to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress
that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty
continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage
fly-by-night operators. They also claim that the prohibition
against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective
entrants.
The validity of the assailed provisions of RA 8180 has to be
decided in the light of the letter and spirit of Section 19, Art.
XII of the Constitution. While the Constitution embraced free
enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the
operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in
the public interest. This distinct free enterprise system is
dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national
economy as defined under Section 1, Art. XII of the
Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the

45

amount of goods and services produced by the nation for all,


especially the underprivileged . It also calls for the State to
protect Filipino enterprises against unfair and trades
practices.
The provisions on 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing
and inventory requirement blocks the entry of other players
and give undue advantage to the 3 oil companies resulting to
monopolies or unfair competition. This is so because it would
take billions for new players to construct refineries, and to
have big inventories. This would effectively prevent new
players.
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that our oil industry is
operated and controlled by an oligopoly (dominated by a
handful of players) and a foreign oligopoly at that. As the
dominant players, SHELL, CALTEX & PETRON boast of
existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential
of 4% works to their immense advantage. Yet, this is only
one edge on tariff differential. THE OTHER EDGE CUTS
AND CUTS DEEP IN THE HEART OF THEIR
COMPETITORS. IT ERECTS HIGH BARRIERS TO NE
PLAYERS. New players in order to equalize must build their
refineries worth billions of pesos. Those without refineries
had to compete with a higher cost of 4%.They will be
competing on an uneven field.
The provision on inventory widens the advantage of
PETRON, SHELL AND CALTEX against prospective new
players. The three (3) could easily comply with the inventory
requirement in view of their numerous storage facilities.
Prospective competitors again find compliance oft his
requirement
difficult because of prohibitive cost in
constructing new storage facilities. The net effect would be
to effectively prohibit the entrance of new players.
Now comes the prohibition on predatory pricing or selling
or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below
the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the
detriment of the competitors. According to HOVENKAMP:
The rationale for predatory pricing
is the sustaining of losses today that

46

will give a firm monopoly profits in


the future. The monopoly profits will
never materialize, however, if the
market is flooded with new entrants
as soon as the successful predator
attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the
market contains significant barriers
to new entry.
Coupled with the 4% tariff differential and the inventory
requirement, the predatory pricing is a significant barrier
which discourage new players to enter the oil market thereby
promoting unfair competition, monopoly and restraint of
trade which are prohibited by the Constitution.
2-d.LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999
3. Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30,l982
4. Bautista vs. Juinio,127 SCRA 329
5. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
6. Villegas vs. Hiu, 86 SCRA 270
7. Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
8. UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 38
9. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433(Read also the
dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar
10. Sison vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
11. Citizens Surety vs. Puno, 119 SCRA 216
12. Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30
13. Hawaiian-Phil. Co. vs. Asociacion, 151 SCRA 306
14. Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603
15. Flores vs. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484
CHAPTER IV - THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE PROVISION
Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

47

except upon probable cause to be


determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human
Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic
Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6, 2007
and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law
shall be automatically suspended one (1)
month before and two (2) months after the
holding of any election)
Sec. 18. Period of detention without judicial warrant of
arrest.- The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, notwithstanding, any police or law
enforcement personnel, who, having been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council
has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected
of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall, WITHOUT INCURRING ANY
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THE
DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE
PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, DELIVER
SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON TO
THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A
PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from the
moment said charged or suspected person has been
apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into
custody by the said police, or law enforcement
personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected
of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism must result from the surveillance under
Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under
Section 27 pf this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel
concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected
of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any
judge at the latters residence or office nearest the place

48

where the arrest took place at any time of the day or


night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other
things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law
enforcement personnel and the person or persons they
have arrested and presented before him or her, to
inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the
person and determine by questioning and personal
observation whether or not the subject has been
subjected to any physical, moral or psychological
torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit
a written report of what he/she had observed when the
subject was brought before him to the proper court that
has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus
arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit his report within
3 calendar days from the time the suspect was brought
to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law
enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge
of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest;
provided, That where the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the
written notice shall be served at the residence of the
judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law
enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as
provided in the preceding paragraph.
Section 19. Period of Detention in the event of an
actual or imminent terrorist attack.- In the vent of an
actual or imminent terrorist attack,, suspects may not be
detained for more than three days without the written
approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional
official of a Human Rights Commission, or judge of the
municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a
justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of
arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays
or holidays, or after office hours, the arresting police of

49

law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus


arrested to the residence of any of the officials
mentioned above that is nearest the place where the
accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of
the said officials shall be secured by the police or law
enforcement personnel concerned within five days after
the date of the detention of the persons concerned;
Provided, however, That within three days after the
detention the suspects whose connection with the terror
attack or threat is not established, shall be released
immediately.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been
charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because
evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Detained under house arrest;
Restricted from traveling; and/or
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers,
or other means of communications with people outside
their residence.
Section 39. Seizure and Sequestration.- The deposits and
their outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys,
businesses, transportation and communication equipment,
supplies and other implements, and property of whatever
kind and nature belonging:
To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
to a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
to a member of such judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association or group of persons,
-shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to
prevent their use, transfer or conveyance for purposes that
are inimical to the safety and security of the people or
injurious to the interest of the State.

50

The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are


reasonably needed by his family including the services of
his counsel and his familys medical needs upon approval
of the court. He or she may also use any of his property
that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of
his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the
court for any legitimate reason.
Section 40. The seized, sequestered and frozen bank
depositsshall be deemed property held in trust by the
bank or financial institution and that their use or
disposition while the case is pending shall be subject to the
approval of the court before which the case or cases are
pending.
Section 41. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted
after arraignment or his case dismissed before his
arraignment by a competent court, the seizureshall be
lifted by the investigating body or the competent court and
restored to him without delay. The filing of an appeal or
motion for reconsideration shall not stay the release of
said funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.
If convicted, said seized, sequestered and frozen assets
shall automatically forfeited in favor of the government.
Requisites of a valid search warrant
Read:
a. Essentials of a valid search warrant,145 SCRA

739

b. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of


evidence obtained in
violation thereof.
c. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is
controlling
PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400
Narvasa, CJ

51

In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had


in their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the
rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be
the subject of their search. The same was not, however, what
the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS
NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE
SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any evidence obtained from
the place searched which is different from that indicated in
the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose and in any proceeding.
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow
police officers to search a place different from that stated in
the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched--although not that specified in the search warrant---is exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and
had demarcated in their supporting evidence. WHAT IS
MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A
SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT
ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR
THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS
THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE
WARRANT. As such, it was not just a case of obvious
typographical error, but a clear case of a search of a place
different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in
the search warrant.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is
issued by one court and the criminal action base don the
results of the search is afterwards commenced in another
court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO
QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized)
MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURT---SUCH
A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH
THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING.
d. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an
informers tip. Note the two (2) conflicting decisions of the
Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626

52

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello of the


Olongapo PNP was tipped off by an informer that Aling
Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City
the
following day with a large volume of marijuana. As a
result of the tip, the policemen waited for a Victory
Bus from Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo, near
Rizal Ave. When the accused got off, she was pointed to
by the informer. She was carrying a traveling bag at that
time. She was not acting suspiciously. She was arrested
without a warrant.
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of
marijuana. After trial, she was convicted and imposed a
penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken
from the accused is admissible in evidence.
Held:
Warrantless search is allowed in the following
instances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

customs searches;
searches of moving vehicle;
seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches;
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
stop and frisk measures.

The above exceptions to the requirement of a


search warrant, however, should not become unbridled
licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon
the conditionally guaranteed and more fundamental
right of persons against unreasonable search and
seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must
still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted. In order that the information
received by the police officers may be sufficient to be
the basis of probable cause, it must be based on

53

reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime has


been committed or is about to be committed.
The marijuana obtained
as a result of a
warrantless search is inadmissible as evidence for the
following reasons:
a. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a
search warrant but they failed to do so;
b. the accused was not acting suspiciously;
c. the accuseds identity was previously
ascertained so applying for a warrant should
have been easy;
d. the accused in this case was searched while
innocently crossing a street
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the
police to effect a warrantless search of the accuseds
bag, there being no probable cause and the accuseds
not having been legally arrested. The arrest was made
only after the accused was pointed to by the informant
at a time when she was not doing anything suspicious.
The arresting officers do not have personal knowledge
that the accused was committing a crime at that time.
Since there was no valid warrantless arrest, it
logically follows that the subsequent search is similarly
illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. This is
so because if a search is first undertaken, and an arrest
effected based on the evidence produced by the search,
both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for
being contrary to law.
This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE VS.
AMINNUDIN, and PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA.
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA
703
On June 19, 1994, at about 2 p.m., SPO1 Talingting and
SPO1 Clarin of the Dasmarinas, Cavite PNP were informed
by an INFORMER that a drug courier would be arriving in
Barangay Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, from Baguio City,

54

with an undetermined amount of marijuana. The informer


likewise informed them that he could recognize said person.
At about 4 in the morning of June 20, 1994, the
appellant was arrested by the above-named police officers
while alighting from a passenger jeepney near a waiting shed
in Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, upon being pointed to by the
informer. The policemen recovered 28 kilos of dried
marijuana leaves. The arrest was without warrant.
The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting
marijuana based on the testimonies of the Above-named
police officers without presenting the alleged informer.
Issue:
Was the warrantless arrest valid?
Held:
The accused claims that the warrantless search and
seizure is illegal because the alleged information was
received by the police on June 19, 1994 and therefore, they
could have applied for a search warrant. The said contention
is without merit considering that the information given by the
informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant.
While there is indication that the informer knows the courier,
the records do not show that he knew his name. On bare
information, the police could not have secured a warrant
from a judge.
Furthermore, warrantless search is allowed in the
following instances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

customs searches;
searches of moving vehicle;
seizure of evidence in plain view;
consented searches;
search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
stop and frisk measures.

55

Since the accused was arrested for transporting


marijuana, the subsequent search on his person is justified.
An arresting officer has the right to validly search and seize
from the offender (1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those that
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to by the informer
as the drug courier, the policemen requested the accused to
open and show them the contents of his bag and the cartoon
he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the same and upon
cursory inspection, it was found out that it contains
marijuana. Hence the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a person
traveling with a bag and cartoon which should not elicit the
slightest suspicion that he was committing a crime. In short,
there was no probable cause for this policemen to think that
he was committing a crime.
The said contention was considered without merit by
the Supreme Court considering the fact that he consented to
the search as well as the fact that the informer was a reliable
one who had supplied similar information to the police in the
past which proved positive.
(NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the
informer does not affect the case for the prosecution because
he is not even the best witness. He is merely a corroborative
witness to the arresting officers. )
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To say that reliable tips from informers constitute
probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search IS A
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT AND PLACES IN GREAT
JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY
DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT. (PEOPLE VS.
BURGOS, 144 SCRA 1; PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, 163
SCRA 402; PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA, October 2, 1997;
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, 220 SCRA).
The case is similar to the case of People vs. Encimada
where the appellant was searched without a warrant while

56

disembarking from a ship on the strength of a tip from an


informer received by the police the previous afternoon that
the appellant would be transporting prohibited drugs. The
search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. On
Appeal, the SC reversed the decision of conviction and held
that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious behavior that
would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the
police.
ELI LUI, ET AL. VS.
MATILLANO, May 27, 2004
Right
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures; Mission
Order does not authorize an
illegal search. Waiver of the right
against an unreasonable search
and seizure.
In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00
owned by the employer, the residence of a relative of the suspect
was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to
gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different
personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those
stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission
order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his
consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in
evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said
warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. BUT
A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED.
There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention
to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following:
a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had knowledge, either
constructive or actual, of the existence of said right;
c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.

57

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and


intelligently in order that the said is to be valid.
The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the
searching party held liable for damages in accordance with the
doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments
vs. CA.
e. General or roving warrants
Read:
1. Stonehill vs. Diokno,June 19,1967
Concepcion, C.J.
The petitioners are questioning the validity of a
total of 42 search warrants issued on different dates
against them and the corporations in which they are
officers, directing the peace officer to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial
records,
vouchers,
correspondence,
receipts,
ledgers, journals, typewriters and
other documents or papers
showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss
statements"
since they are the subject of the offense of
violating the CENTRAL BANK LAWS, TARIFF AND
CUSTOMS LAWS, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
AND THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The petitioners claim that the search warrants are
void being violative of the Constitutional provision on
search and seizure on the ground that:

58

a. The search warrants did not particularly


describe the documents, books and things to be
seized;
b. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were
actually seized;
c. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the
deportation cases against them;
d. the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner;
e. the things seized were not delivered to the court
to be disposed of in a manner provided for by law.
Issue:
Were the searches and seizures made in the offices
and residences of the petitioners valid?
a. As to the searches made on their offices, they
could not question the same in their personal capacities
because the corporations have a personality separate
and distinct with its officers. An objection to an
unlawful search and seizure IS PURELY PERSONAL
AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD
PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE PETITIONERS
MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT TO THE USE IN
EVIDENCE
AGAINST
THEM
OF
THE
DOCUMENTS, PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED
FROM THE OFFICES AND PREMISES OF THE
CORPORATIONS, TO WHOM THE SEIZED
EFFECTS BELONG, AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED
BY
THE
CORPORATE
OFFICERS
IN
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.
b. As to the documents seized in the residences of
the petitioners, the same may not be used in evidence
against them because the warrants issued were in the

59

nature of a general warrant for failure to comply with


the constitutional requirement that:
1. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and
2. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. They were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical
persons therein named had committed a violation of
Central bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
revenue Code and Revised Penal Code. IN OTHER
WORDS, NO SPECIFIC OFFENSE HAD BEEN
ALLEGED IN SAID APPLICATIONS. THE
AVERMENTS THEREOF WITH RESPECT TO THE
OFFENSE COMMITTED WERE ABSTRACT. AS A
CONSEQUENCE, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR
THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE WARRANTS TO
HAVE FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE, FOR THE SAME PRESUPPOSES THE
INTRODUCTION OF COMPETENT PROOF
THAT THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM IT IS
SOUGHT HAS PERFORMED PARTICULAR
ACTS,
OR
COMMITTED
SPECIFIC
OMISSIONS, VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION
OF OUR CRIMINAL LAWS.
2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
3. Secretary vs. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301
4. Castro vs. Pabalan, April 30,l976
5. Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant
for estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud is a general
warrant and therefore not valid)
6. Collector vs. Villaluz, June 18,1976
7. Viduya vs. Verdiago, 73 SCRA 553
8. Dizon vs. Castro, April 12, 1985
9. People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169

60

10. TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July 14, 1995; PEOPLE


VS. CA, 216 SCRA 101. A SCATTER-SHOT
WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more than one
specific offense like one for estafa, robbery, theft and
qualified theft)
f. Define probable cause. Who determines probable cause?
a. ROBERTS VS. CA, 254 SCRA 307
b. DE LOS SANTOS VS. MONTESA, 247 SCRA 85
VICENTE LIM,SR. AND MAYOR SUSANA
LIM
VS.HON. N. FELIX (G.R. NO. 99054-57)
EN BANC
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.
Facts:
-------Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of congressman
Moises Espinosa, Sr. and three of his security escorts and the
wounding of another. They were initially charged, with three
others, with the crime of multiple murder with frustrated
murder. After conducting a preliminary investigation, a
warrant of arrest was issued on July 31, 1989. Bail was fixed
at P200,000.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane, designated to
review the case, issued a Resolution affirming the finding of
a prima facie case against the petitioners but ruled that a case
of Murder for each of the killing of the four victims and a
physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the
survivor be filled instead against the suspects. Thereafter,
four separate informations to that effect were filed with the
RTC of Masbate with no bail recommended.
On November 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue,
filed by the petitioners was granted by the SC. It ordered that
the case may be transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the
RTC of Makati.

61

Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba


conducted to determine if there really exists a prima facie
case against them in the light of documents showing
recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary
investigation. They likewise filed a motion to order the
transmittal of initial records of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of Masbate.
These motions were however denied by the court because the
prosecution had declared the existence of probable cause,
informations were complete in form in substance , and there
was no defect on its face. Hence it found it just and proper to
rely on the prosecutors certification in each information.
ISSUE:
---------Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions
certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists?
Held:
----1. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a
judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence
of a probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge
to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision
interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973
Constitution. Under this provision, the judge must satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of order of arrest. If on the face of information, the
judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since
U.S vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.

62

2. In the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under


the 1987 Constitution, the Court noted that the addition of the
word personally after the word determined and the deletion
of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to other respondent officers as to may be authorized
by law does not require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witness in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.What the
Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. Following established doctrine
and procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the reports and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3. The case of People vs. Honorable Enrique B. Inting
reiterates the following doctrines:
(1) The determination of probable cause is a
function of the judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only
the judge alone makes this detemination.
(2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor
does not bind the judge. It merely assist him to make the
determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to
follow what the prosecutor's present to him. By itself, the
prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is
the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic
notes, and all other supporting documents behind the
prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the
judge to make his determination.
(3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished
from the preliminary investigation proper. While the former

63

seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant


of arrest, the latter ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or be released.
4.
4. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, the court
ruled that judges of RTC no longer have authority to conduct
preliminary investigations: This authority was removed from
them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on
January 1, 1985.
5.
In the present case, the respondent judge relies
solely on the certification of the prosecutor. Considering that
all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The
determination was made by the provincial prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement had not been satisfied.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent
Fiscal issued the warrant of arrest against the petitioners.
There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his
personal determination regarding the existence of probable
cause from the issuance of warrant of arrest as mandated by
the Constitution. He could not have possibly known what has
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Although the judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can
perform the same functions as commissioner for taking of
evidence) there should be a report and necessary documents
supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should
be before the judge.
1. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739
1-a. 20th Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655
1-b. Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467
1-c. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA,
GR No. 83578, March 16, 1989
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, 167 SCRA
393

64

The word personally after the word determined does not


necessarily mean that the judge should examine the complainant
and his witnesses personally before issuing the search warrant or
warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on the part of said
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. As
such, there is no need to examine the complainant and his
witnesses face to face. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of
the existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or
deposition of the complainant and his witnesses.
1-e. Pendon vs. CA, Nov. 16, 1990
1-f. P. vs. Inting, July 25, 1990
1-g. Umil vs. Ramos, et al., July 9, 1990 with the
Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in November, 1991
1-h. Paderanga vs. Drilon, April 19, 1991
2. Department of Health vs. Sy Chi Siong,
Inc., GR
No. 85289, February 20, 1989
2-a. P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465
2-b. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has
the power to determine probable insofar as the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is concerned)
3. Tolentino vs. Villaluz,July 27,1987
4. Cruz vs. Gatan, 74 SCRA 226
5. Olaes vs. P., 155 SCRA 486
7. Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435
7.JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE
JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO.
92163, June 5, 1990
Due process; right to bail; warrant of arrest
(Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law)
Narvasa, J.
On February 27, 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
was arrested by law enforcement officers led by NBI
Director Alfredo Lim on the strength of a warrant of
arrest issued by the respondent judge, HON. JAIME
SALAZAR, Regional trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. 90-10941. The warrant was
issued on an information signed and filed earlier in the
day by Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE

65

charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and


Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the
NBI Headquarters on Taft Ave., Manila, WITHOUT
BAIL, NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN
THE INFORMATION AND NONE FIXED IN THE
WARRANT OF ARREST.
On February 28, 1990, petitioner through counsel
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having
been:
a. held to answer for a criminal offense which
does not exist in the statute books;
b. charged with a criminal offense in an
information for which no complaint was initially filed
or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence, he
was denied due process;
c. denied the right to bail; and
d. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant
issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause.
HELD:
The parties' oral and written arguments presented the
following options:
1. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the
dissenting opinion of Justice Montemayor
that
"rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes";
2. Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable only to
offenses committed in furtherance, or as necessary
means for the commission, of rebellion, BUT NOT TO
ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A

66

REBELLION
WHICH
ALSO
CONSTITUTE
COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE
CHARACTER;
3. Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as applying to make
rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its
course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
1. On the first option, 11 justices voted AGAINST
abandoning Hernandez. Two members felt that the
doctrine should be re-examined. In view of the
majority, THE RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW, ITS
SUBSTANTIVE AND LEGAL BASES HAVE
WITHSTOOD ALL SUBSEQUENT CHALLENGES
AND NO NEW ONES ARE PRESENTED HERE
PERSUASIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A
COMPLETE REVERSAL. This is so because of the
fact that the incumbent President (exercising legislative
powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution) repealed
PD No. 942 which added a new provision of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Art. 142-A which
sought to nullify if not repealed the Hernandez
Doctrine. In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative fiat reinstated the Hernandez as a binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
than accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
2. On the second option, the Supreme Court was
unanimous in voting to reject the same though four
justices believe that the arguments in support thereof is
not entirely devoid of merit.
3. With the rejection of the first two options, the
Hernandez Doctrine remains a binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion.
On the issues raised by the petitioner:

67

a. By a vote of 11-3, the Court ruled that the


information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing
that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging SIMPLE REBELLION. The petitioner's
contention that he was charged with a crime that does
not exist in the statute books, WHILE TECHNICALLY
CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED THAT
REBELLION MAY NOT BE COMPLEXED WITH
OTHER OFFENSES COMMITTED ON THE
OCCASION THEREOF, MUST THEREFORE BE
DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE
REBELLION.
b. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint
having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows that a
complaint for simple rebellion against petitioner was
filed by the NBI Director and that based on the strength
of said complaint a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in
the filing of the questioned information. THERE IS
NOTHING
INHERENTLY IRREGULAR
OR
CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A
RESPONDENT AN INDUCTMENT FOR AN
OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CHARGED
IN
THE
INITIATORY
COMPLAINT,
IF
WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED
DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
c. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void
because it was issued barely one hour and twenty
minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent
judge which could hardly gave him sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. Also, the petitioner claims
that the respondent judge issued the warrant for his
arrest without first personally determining the existence

68

of probable cause by examining under oath or


affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in
violation of Art. III, Section 2, of the Constitution. This
Court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty
of the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure
by PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT
AND
THE
SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT
SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR. MEREBY
BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD
WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY A
RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO
COMPLY WITH THAT DUTY , GIVES NO REASON
TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT, OR COULD NOT
HAVE, SO COMPLIED; NOR DOES THAT SINGLE
CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE
LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY
HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.
d. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his
constitutional right to bail. In the light of the Court's
affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's
case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion which is
bailable before conviction, THAT MUST NOW BE
ACCEPTED AS A CORRECT PROPOSITION.
NOTES:
This might be useful also in your Remedial Law.
Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the
Supreme Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The Supreme Court held that the criminal case
before the respondent judge is the normal venue for
invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional
liberty pending trial and judgment. The correct course
was for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right
to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the

69

evidence against him. ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY


WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT BE INVOKED, AND EVEN THEN, NOT
WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS IF APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO
AVAILABLE THERE.
Even assuming that the petitioner's premise that the
information charges a non-existent crime would not
excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies.
Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent judge.
g. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid
or not. Is "Operation Kapkap" valid?
Read:
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No.
87059, June, 1992, 210 SCRA 174
Warrantless search and
seizure
Cruz, J.
Facts|
-----1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District
received a telephone call from an informer that there
were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw
the accused "looking from side to side" and "holding
his abdomen". They approched these persons and
identified themselves as policement that is why they
tried to ran away because of the other lawmen, they
were unable to escape;

70

3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor


revolver was confiscated from the accused and several
days later, an information for violation of PD 1866 was
filed against him;
4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated
PD 1866 and was sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal
evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Issue:
-----Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
----There is no question that evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in
any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute
prohibition of Article III, Section 3 [2], of the
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule
based on the justification given by Justice Learned
Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit
by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."
Section 5, Article 113 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A
peace officer or private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

71

(c) When the person to be arrested is a


prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
x x x
We have carefully examined the wording of this
Rule and cannot see how we we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as
Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution
when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves
to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this Section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1)
after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to
side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the
arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in thie presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual
existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote's acts created a reasonable suspicion on the
part of the arresting officers and induced in them the
belief that an offense had been committed and that
accused-appellant had committed it". The question is,
What offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and

72

"holding his abdomen" and in


forsaken.

aplace not exactly

These are certainly not sinister acts. And the


setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It
might have been different if Mengote had been
apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place where he
had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock
in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the
morning and in a crowded street shortly after
alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion.He
was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the
clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of
the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a
number of reasons, all of them innoent, why hiseyes
were darting from side to sideand he was holding his
abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was
all about.
xxx
The case before us is different because there was
nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion
other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his
abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in their presence.
This is similar to PEOPLE vs. AMMINUIDIN,
163 SCRA 402 where the Court held that a warrantless
arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
effected while he was coming down the vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor
was actually committing or attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was
not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no

73

probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly


suggested, dispensed with the constitutional
requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been satisfied.
Theprosecution has not shown that at the time of
Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact been committed
and that the arresting officers had personal knowldge
of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All
they had was hearsay information from the telephone
caller, and about a crime that had yet to
bem
committed.
xxx
In the landmark case of People vs. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1, this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personalknowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. (SAYO
vs. CHIEF OF POLICE, 80 Phil. 859).
xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b),
however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator..
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. Castro,
151 SCRA 279, thus:

74

If the arrest was made under Rule 113,


Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection
with a crime about to be committed, being
committed, or just committed, what was that
crime? There is no allegation in the record of such
a
falsification. Parenthetically, it
may be
observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of the ground therefor
as stressed in the recent case of People vs.
Burgos.
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could
be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of
a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion
that he may have committed a criminal act is actually
committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where
order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice
on the part ofthe arresting officer may be justified in
the name of security.
xxx
The court feels that if the peace officers had been
more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the
prosecution of the accused-appellant might have
succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over
zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their
disregard
of the requirements of a valid search and
seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they
had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers.
Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the
acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted,
escaping the clutches of the law, because, ironically
enough, it has not been observed by those who are
supposed to enforce it.
When illegal arrest is deemed waived.

75

Warrantless arrest; no personal


knowledge of the arresting
officer
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.
The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis
solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he
saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him.
Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of
arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken
into custody. Considering that the accused-appellant was not
committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the
arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating
that accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a
warrant cannot be justified.
However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the
arraignment, the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the
issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT
OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE
PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED
MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA,
OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. THE
FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT
RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND
DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE
GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE
CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.
g-1. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person.
(Valid since the constitutional provision is not applicable to him;
when it is not valid)
Read:
1. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66

76

Warrantless searches and seizures by


private individuals
2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL,
INC. VS. ROGELIO SOLUTA, ET AL.,
482 SCRA 660
Carpio-Morales, J.
The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers
of the Silahis International Hotel Union were using the Union
Office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana,
dollar smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived at the said
conclusion through surveillance.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent
union officer was opening the Union Office, security officers of the
plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by
forcibly opening the same. Once inside the union office they
started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of a
plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the
dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the
RTC of Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search
conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without consent
by the respondents.
After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for
Malicious Prosecution against the petitioner for violation of Art. 32
of the Civil Code. After trial, the Regional Trial Court held that
petitioners are liable for damages as a result of an illegal search.
The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners
(private individual and corporation) on the union office of the
private respondents is valid.
Held:
The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art.
32 of the Civil Code. The fact that the union office is part of the
hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless

77

search. The alleged reports that the said union office is being used
by the union officers for illegal activities does not justify their acts
of barging into the said office without the consent of the union
officers and without a search warrant. If indeed there was
surveillance made, then they should have applied for a search
warrant.
The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not
applicable here because in Marti, a criminal case, the
issue was whether an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of ones constitutional rights may
be invoked against the State. In other words, the issue
in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private
person acting in his private capacity without the
participation of the State, is admissible.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE
MARTI
G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991
Warrantless Search and seizure
by a private person
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send four (4) packages to Zurich,
Switzerland. Anita Reyes, owner of the place (no
relation to Shirley), received said goods and asked if
she could examine and inspect it. Marti refused.
However later, following standard operating procedure,
Job Reyes, co-owner and husband of Anita opened the
boxes for final inspection, before delivering it to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts.
Upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the
box that was supposed to contain gloves. Upon further
perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the box.
Job Reyes then brought samples to the NBI, he told
them that the boxes to be shipped were still in his

78

office. In the presence of the NBI agents, Reyes opened


the box and discovered that the odor came from the fact
that the dried leaves were actually those of the
marijuana flowering tops.
Two other boxes,marked as containing books and
tabacalera cigars; also revealed bricks or case-like
marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves
respectively.
Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on
the attempted shipment of the dried leaves. Thereafter
an information was filed against the appellant for
violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The
Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted accused
Marti of violating sec.21(b) of said RA.
ISSUES:
-----------1. Did the search conducted by a private person,
violate accused's right against unreasonable searches
seizures and invocable against the state?
2. Was the evidence procured from the search
admissible?
Held:
-------1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is
imposable only against the state and not to private
persons.
Since Art. III,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost
verbatim from the United States constitution, the SC
may consider US Fed. SC cases as likewise doctrinal in
this jurisdiction. Hence, in US cases, the constitutional
provision against unreasomable searches and seizure
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of the
sovereign authority and NOT intended against private
persons. If a search was initiated by a private person the

79

provision does not apply since it only proscribes


government action. This view is supported by the
deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
In short, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes`
initiative that perpetrated the search. He opened the
packages and took the samples to NBI. All the NBI
agents did was to observe and look in plain sight. This
did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the
constitution.
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from
therein is admissible evidence.
Art.III [2], on the admissibility of evidence in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, likewise applies only to the government and
its agencies and not to private persons.
(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau v. McDowell (256 us
465 [1921], state v. Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968], Walker
v. state (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), Barnes v. us (373 F 2d
517 [1967]), Chadwick v. state (329 sw 2d 135).
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439


PEOPLE VS. ANG CHUN KIT, 251 SCRA 660
PEOPLE VS. LUA, 256 SCRA 539
PEOPLE VS. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679
NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (A search
incidental to a valid arrest must be done at the place
where the accused is arrested. As such, if accused
was arrested while inside a jeepney, there is no valid
search incidental to a valid arrest if she will be

80

brought to her residence and thereafter search the


said place)
f. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused
was arrested in the street during a buy-bust
operation, the search of his house nearby is not a
valid search incidental to a valid arrest)
PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA
338
Where the gun tucked in a persons waist is plainly visible to
the police, no search warrant is necessary and in the absence of any
license for said firearm, he may be arrested at once as he is in
effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No
warrant is necessary in such a situation, it being one of the
recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of the accuseds valid warrantless arrest
inside the nightclub, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 126. This is a valid search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
In fact, the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked
in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was
committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the
Police Station after his warrantless arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia
and shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE
DURING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall
under the exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug
paraphernalia and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the
accused.
2. Search of moving vehicles
a. Carrol vs. US, 267 US 132
b. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, et al.
(G. R. No. 88017) January 21, 1991
c. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430
d. PEOPLE VS. CFI, 101 SCRA 86
e. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT198 SCRA 401

81

f. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122


FACTS:
----------In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the
CIS received a tip from one of its informers about an
organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs
and smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate the
crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and
"deep penetration agents" under OPLAN SHARON
887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia
(the
dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted regular
reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates.
CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan sharon 887, in
turned informed the Dan
gerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng
Huat by another agent named George. Lim wanted a
male travelling companion for his business trips abroad.
Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim. Later,
Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of
accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later turning out to
be Tia's intended companion.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong
on October 4, 1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera that
they would return to the Philippines on October 6. From
Hongkong, the two proceeded to Guangzhou in
mainland China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought
six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were
opened for examination. That evening, they went to Lo
Ho Wing's room and he saw two other men with him.
One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was
burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a
lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man
and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning
substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo
they would bring to Manila, the latter replied that they
would be bringing Chinese drugs.

82

The next day en route to Manila, customs


examiners inspected the bags containing the tin cans of
tea. Since the bags were not closely examined,
appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila,
They were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho
Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and
loaded their luggage in the taxi's compartment. Lim
Cheng Huat followed them in another taxi.
Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera
positioned themselves in strategic areas around the
airport. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia
followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS car
overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia ,
forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team
asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment.
The CIS team asked permission to search their luggage.
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment.
Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open and
pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents.
Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came
out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a
dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags opened
for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin
cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS
headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the second
taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to
escape. However, they were later captured.
Samples from the bag tested positive for
metamphetamine. The three suspects were indicted for
violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a
state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the
testimonies of government agents since the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties were
in their favor.
ISSUES:

83

---------1. Was the warrantless search valid?


2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
HELD:
----1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle
which is one of the well-known exceptions to the valid
warrantless search and seizure. To stilol get a search
warrant from a judge would allow the accused go scotfree.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the
evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in any
proceeding.
3. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857


Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517
PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

4. Seize of evidence in plain view


a.
b.
c.
d.

Harris vs. US, 390 US 234


PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547
PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA 135
PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252 SCRA 213

5. When there is waiver of right or gives his consent;


a. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689
b. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336
c. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there
is a valid waiver to a warrantless search, the waiver or
consent should be given by the person affected, not just
anybody. Example: The landlady could not give a valid
consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. Said
tenant himself should give the consent in order to be valid.
The doctrine in Lopez vs. Commissioner to the effect that

84

it could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being


rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of
the house allowed the policemen to enter his house because
they are searching for rebel soldiers but when inside the
house, they instead seized an unlicensed firearm, there is
no consent to a warrantless search)
6. STOP AND FRISK.
a. People vs. Mengote, June, 1992
b. PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288
c. MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. (The
policemen saw several suspicious looking men at
dawn who ran when they went near them. As the
policemen ran after them, an unlicensed firearm was
confiscated. The search is valid)
d. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159. (Mere
suspicions not sufficient to validate warrantless
arrest)
6. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL., GR
NO. 80508, January 30, 1990
Warrantless searches;
"zonings" and "saturation drives"
Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary
injunction to prohibit military and police officers from
conducting "Areal target zonings" or "saturation drive"
in Metro Manila particularly in places where they
suspect that the subversives are hiding. The 41
petitioners claim that the saturation drives conducted by
the military is in violation of their human rights because
with no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the
night or early morning hours, police and military
officers without any search warrant cordon an area of
more than one residence and sometimes the whole

85

barangay. Most of them are in civilian clothes and w/o


nameplates or identification cards; that the raiders
rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on
the walls and windows of their homes, shouting,
kicking their doors open (destroying some) and
ordering the residents to come out; the residents are
herded like cows at the point of high powered guns,
ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for
tattoo marks; that while examination of the bodies of
the men are being conducted, the other military men
conduct search and seizures to each and every house
without civilian witnesses from the neighbors; some
victims complained that their money and other
valuables were lost as a result of these illegal
operations.
The respondents claim that they have legal authority
to conduct saturation drives under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of
the Constitution which provides:
The respondents would want to justify said military
operation on the following constitutional provisions:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all the armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion x x x
xxxx
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed.
Held:
There can be no question that under ordinary
circumstances, the police action of the nature described
by the petitioners would be illegal and blatantly
violative of the Bill of Rights. If the military wants to
flush out subversive and criminal elements, the same
must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory
rights of the people. However, nowhere in the

86

Constitution can we see a provision which prohibits the


Chief Executive from ordering the military to stop
unabated criminality, rising lawlessness and alarming
communist activities. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The
government cannot adopt the same reprehensible
methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and
of the left. This is so because Art. III, Section 3 of the
Constitution is very clear as explained in Roan vs.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. Court of
Appeals, 164 SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed out
that police actions should not be characterized by
methods that offend one's sense of justice (Rochin vs.
California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable that some
violations were actually committed. But the remedy is
not to stop all police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones. A show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of people are protected
and not violated. However, the remedy of the
petitioners is not an original action for prohibition since
not one victim complains and not one violator is
properly charged. It is basically for the executive
department and the trial courts. The problem is
appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional
Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon and Pasay City where
the petitioners may present evidence supporting their
allegations so that the erring parties may be pinpointed
and prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts violative of
human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed
during the police actions are ENJOINED until such
time as permanent rules to govern such actions are
promulgated.
********************
Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ. , Dissenting
The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not
proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction. We

87

have held that technical objections may be brushed


aside where there are constitutional questions that must
be met (RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 PHIL. 603;
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702;
PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479; EDU VS.
ERICTA, 35 SCRA 481; GONZALES VS. COMELEC,
27 SCRA 835; LAGUNZAD VS. CA, 154 SCRA 199;
DEMETRIA VS. ALBA,148 SCRA 208). Lozada was
in fact an aberration.
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper
party even if he may not be directly injured. Each of us
has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a
proper party. It is not only the owner of a burning house
who has the right to call the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear:
Unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for whatever purpose is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE
ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A SEARCH OR AN
ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT.
THEY COME UNDER THE CONCEPT OF THE
FISHING EXPEDITIONS STIGMATIZED BY LAW
AND DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court
should instead categorically and emphatically that these
saturation drives are violative of human rights and
individual liberty and should be stopped immediately.
While they may be allowed in the actual theater of
military operations against the insurgents, the Court
should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such
a battleground.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR
DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS. FIDEL RAMOS, ET AL. and
companion cases, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990 (An NPA may be
arrested without warrant while sleeping or being treated in a
hospital because his being a communist rebel is a continuing
crime)

88

h. If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a


warrant of arrest
as a matter of course? See the
distinctions.
Read:
1. SAMULDE VS. SALVANI, SEPTEMBER 26, 1988
(No because a warrant is issued in order to have
jurisdiction of the court over the person of an accused
and to assure the court of his presence whenever his
case is called in court. As such, if the court believes that
the presence of the accused could be had even without a
warrant of arrest, then he may not issue said warrant.
Note: This case involves a minor offense)
2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense
committed is a serious one like that obtaining in this
case for murder, the Judge must issue a warrant of
arrest after determining the existence of probable cause)
i. Searching questions
Read:
DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE
HON.
EXECUTIVE
JUDGE
ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC 33,
Manila & People of the Philippines, GR
No. 82870, December 14, 1989 (En Banc)
Search and seizure; requirements/requisites of a valid
search warrant; searching questions
Padilla, J.
This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of
respondent Judge DENYING the motion of the
petitioner to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14 as well as
its Order denying the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Facts:

89

1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw,


Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division
(ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, presided
by the respondent Judge, an application for the issuance
of a Search Warrant for violation of PD 1866 against
the petitioner;
2. In his application for search warrant, P/Major
Dimagmaliw alleged that:
"1. That he has been informed and has good and
sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO
PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines x x x has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives, hand grenades and
ammunition intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense x x x;
"2. That the undersigned has verified the report and
found it to be a fact x x x ".
In support of said application, P/Lt. Florencio
Angeles executed a "Deposition of Witness dated
October 31, 1987 .
3. On November 1, 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day,
the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD
operatives led by Col. Edgar Dula Torre and Major
Maganto;
4. On November 2, 1987, Ricardo Abando, a member
of the searching team executed an affidavit alleging that
he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash
room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope
with three live fragmentation hand grenades separately
with old newspapers;
5. On November 6, 1987, the petitioner moved to quash
the search warrant on the grounds that:

90

a. the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Angeles had no


personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis
for the issuance of the search warrant;
b. the examination of said witness was not in the form
of searching questions and answers;
c. the search warrant was a general warrant, for the
reason that it did not particularly describe the place to
be searched and that it failed to charge one specific
offense; and
d. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19
of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege that the issuance of the search warrant on a
Saturday was urgent.
6. On March 9, 1986, the respondent judge denied the
motion to quash and on April 20, 1988, the same judge
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent
judge valid? Was there probable cause?
Held:
a. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be
probable cause, which is to be determined by the judge,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must
be in connection with one specific offense and the
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.

91

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has


been defined "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched". (Quintero vs. NBI, June
23, 1988). This probable cause must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or
the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay. (P. VS. SY JUCO, 64 PHIL. 667; ALVAREZ
VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33; US VS. ADDISON, 28 PHIL.
566).
In his affidavit, Major Dimagmaliw declared that
"he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in
his control and possession" the firearms and
explosivees described therein, and that he "has verified
the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand,
Lt. Angeles declared that as a result of continuous
surveillance for several days, they "gathered
informations from verified sources" that the holders of
said firearms and explosives are not licensed t possess
them. It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant
and his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES which
became the basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons.
Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his
affidavit that "he verified the information he had earlier
received and found it to be a fact, YET THERE IS
NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR
INDICATE HOW AND WHEN SAID APPLICANT
VERIFIED
THE
EARLIER
INFORMATION
ACQUIRED BY HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS
CONCLUSION. He might have clarified this point if
there had been searching questions and answers, but
there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions
and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the
said applicant.

92

In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was held that


the following test must be complied with in an
application for search warrant or in a supporting
deposition based on personal knowledge or not"The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for
damage caused. The oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not
of the facts merely reported by a person whom one
considers to be reliable."
Tested by the above standards, the allegation of the
witness, Lt. Angeles, do not come up to the level of
facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that
he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations
in causing the issuance of the questioned search
warrant.
Besides, respondent judge did not take the
deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of
Court. As held in Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 694,
"mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus insufficient. The examining judge has to take
the depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record."
b. There was also no searching questions asked by the
respondent judge because as shown by the record, his
questions were too brief and short and did not examine
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers. On the contrary, the
questions asked were leading as they called for a simple
"yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, June
23, 1988, "the questions propounded are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search
warrant and conducting of examination in a general

93

manner would not satisfy the requirements for the


issuance of a valid search warrant."
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the
strict requirements for determination of probable cause
in the valid issuance of a search warrant as enunciated
in earlier cases. True, this requirements are stringent but
the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of
the individual against unreasonable search and seizure
shall remain both meaningful and effective.
c. The rule is, that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place
intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48 PHIL. 180). In the case
at bar, the warrant described the place to be searched as
the premises of the PUP, more particularly the offices of
the Department of Science and Tactics as well as the
Office of the President, Nemesio Prudente.
There is also no violation of the "one specific
offense" requirement considering that the application
for a search warrant explicitly described the offense:
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under
PD 1866.
d. CIRCULAR NO. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT
merely provides for a guideline, departure from which
would not necessarily affect the validity of the search
warrant provided the constitutional requirements are
complied with.
a. HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 650
Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (When the applicant is basing
his knowledge from an informant, the same is not valid)
2. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313
3. De Mulata vs. Irizari, 62 SCRA 210
4. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687

94

6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the


applicants and witnesses should be attached to the record of the
case)
7. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
8. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509
9. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
10. P. vs. Burgos, September 14,1986
11. P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July 6,1988
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July 31,1987 (When the statements
in the affidavits of witnesses are mere generalities, mere
conclusions of law, and not positive statements of particular acts,
the warrant is not valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988
2. Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 SCRA 599
3. PENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990. (When the questions
asked to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed, the
same is not valid since there could have been no searching
questions)
j. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid
or not.
Read:
1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN
RENATO DE VILLA,
GR No.
83988, September 29, 1989
Warrantless searches and seizures;
validity of checkpoints
Padilla, J.
Facts:
1. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) was activated with the
mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining
peace and order. As part of its duty to maintain peace
and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

95

Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints, the


residents of Valenzuela, MM are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military authorities manning the checkpoints
considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially
at night or dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant
and/or court order.
2. On July 9, 1988 at dawn, the apprehensions of the
residents of Valenzuela increased because Benjamin
Parpon, the supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela was gunned down in cold blood by the
military men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspite of several warning shots
fired in the air.
Issue:
Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as
well as the periodic searches and seizures made by the
military authorities without search warrant valid?
Held:
Petitioners' concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military manning
the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on a
public fair grounds (People vs. Case, 190 MW 289), or
simply looks into a vehicle (State vs. Gaina, 97 SE 62),
or flashes a light therein (Rowland vs. Commonwealth,

96

259 SW 33), these do not constitute unreasonable


search.
The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila may be considered as security measure to
effectively maintain peace and order and to thwart plots
to destabilize the government. In this connection, the
Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement,
so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of
police and military men by NPA's "sparrow units," not
to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms.
BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE
STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE AND
PROMOTE
PUBLIC
WELFARE AND AN
INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT
AGAINST
A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER
REASONABLY CONDUCTED, THE FORMER
SHALL PREVAIL.
True, the manning of these checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible to abuse. BUT , AT THE COST OF
OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE, DISCOMFORT
AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE CITIZEN, THE
CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL
TIMES ARE PART OF THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN
ORDERLY
SOCIETY
AND
PEACEFUL
COMMUNITY.
Finally, it must be emphasized that on July 17, 1988,
the military checkpoints in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the
rules in the conduct of the police and military manning
the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC Chief.
Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting:
The bland declaration by the majority that individual
rights must yield to the demands of national security
ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended

97

precisely to limit the authority of the State even if


asserted on the ground of national security.
RESOLUTION
ON
THE MOTION
RECONSIDERATION, JUNE 15, 1990

FOR

Very Important:
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion
for Reconsideration dated 15 June, 1990, held that
military and police checkpoints are not illegal as these
measures to protect the government and safeguards the
lives of the people. The checkpoints are legal as where
the survival of the organized government is on the
balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are
in grave peril. However, the Supreme Court held further
that the military officers manning the checkpoints may
conduct VISUAL SEARCH ONLY, NOT BODILY
SEARCH.
Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION dated JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665
Read also:
1-a. Rizal Alih vs. Gen. Castro, June 23,1987
1-b. P s. Cendana, October 17, 1990
1-c. P. vs. Castiller, August 6, 1990
1-d. P. vs. Olaes, July 30, 1990
2. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
3. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336
4. P. vs. CFI, 101 SCRA 86
5. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
6. Lopez vs. Commisioner, 65 SCRA 336
7. P vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135
8. Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA
152
9. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless
search if a NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag
which contains marijuana which he found out when he smelled the
same. Here , there is a probable cause since he was personal
knowledge due to his expertise on drugs)

98

11. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994. (After


the informant was given by the police the amount of
P100.00, he went to buy marijuana from the accused then
return to the police headquarters with said article.
Thereafter, the policemen went to arrest the accused
without warrant. The arrest is not valid since it does not
fall under Section 5 Rule 113)
Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing
the seizure of shabu and its paraphernalia and instead, an
unlicensed firearm was seized instead, said gun is
inadmissible in evidence.
k. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (NO)
Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, June 26,1988


Moreno vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299
HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. HON TOMAS
ACHACOSO, G.R. NO. 81510, March 14, 1990 (En
banc)
5. Presidential Anti_Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA,
March 16, 1989
l. Properties subject to seizure
Read:

1. Sec. 2, Rule 126,1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure, as


amended
2. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 558

m. Warrantless searches and arrests


Read:
1. P. vs. Bati, August 27, 1990
1-a. Manuel et al., vs. Judge Tirso Velasco, GR No. 84666,
February 9, 1989
1-b. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,121 SCRA 47 &
137
SCRA 647

99

1-c. P. vs. Maspil, Jr., August 20, 1990 (Compare with P. vs.
Aminnudin, July 6, 1988, supra)
1-d. Posadas vs. CA, Aug. 2, 1990
1-e. P. vs. De la Cruz
1-f. P. vs. ortiz, Dec. 3, 1990
1-g. Rolito Go vs. CA, Feb. 11, 1992
1-h. People vs. Mati, January 18, 1991
2. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538
2-a. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
2-b. People vs. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416
2-c. Gatchalian vs. Board, May 31, 1991
2-d. People vs. Sucro, March 18, 1991
2-e. PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO, 262 SCRA 255
2-f. PEOPLE VS. CUISON, 256 SCRA 325
2-g. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547
2-h. OPOSADAS VS. CA, 258 SCRA 188
2-i. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN, 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust
operation)
3. Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended
n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment, if
the arrest was illegal. (The alleged illegality of the arrest is
deemed waived upon posting of the bond by the accused)
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355
SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.
The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis
solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he
saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him.
Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of
arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken
into custody. Considering that the accused-appellant was not
committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the
arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating
that accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a
warrant cannot be justified.

100

However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the


arraignment, the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the
issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT
OBJECTION TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE
PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED
MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA,
OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. THE
FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT
RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS VOID AND
DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE
GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE
CULPABILITY OF THE ACCUSED.
Read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377


PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256
FILOTEO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 263 SCRA 222
PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256
PEOPLE VS. LAPURA, 255 SCRA 85
PEOPLE VS. SILAN, 254 SCRA 491

o . Penalty for illegal arrest


Read:
Palon vs. NAPOLCOM, May 28, 1989
p. Judicial pronouncements on illegally seized
SCRA 336

evidence, 106

q. The exclusionary rule,155 SCRA 494


n. What is the status of a document obtained through
subpoena?
Read:
Dianalan vs. Pros., Office of the Tanodbayan, Nov. 27, 1990
r. Search warrant for pirated video tapes

101

1. Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (The master copy of
the allegedly pirated tape should be presented before the
judge in order to convince him of the existence of
probable cause)
2. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261 SCRA 144
LATEST CASES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURES
UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36
The following are the requisites of a valid search warrant:
1. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
2. The probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by applicant or any other person;
3. In determining probable cause, the judge must examine
under oath and affirmation the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the person or things to be seized.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
the community. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or
doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. In this case,
most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of
particularity, especially since the witness had furnished the judge
photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. THE SEARCH
WARRANT IS SEPARABLE, AND THOSE ITEMS NOT
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED MAY BE CUT OFF
WITHOUT DESTROYING THE WHOLE WARRANT.
PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ, 341 SCRA 25
The protection against unreasonable
search and seizure covers both innocent and
guilty alike against any form of
highhandedness of law enforces.
The plain view doctrine, which
may justify a search without warrant,
APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE POLICE

102

OFFICER IS NOT SEARCHING FOR


EVIDENCE AGAINS THE ACCUSED,
BUT
INADVERTENTLY
COMES
ACROSS
AN
INCRIMINATING
OBJECT.
Just because the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot does nor prevent
the appellant from invoking the protection
afforded by the Constitution. The right
against unreasonable search and seizure is
the immunity of ones person, which
includes his residence, papers and other
possessions. For a person to be immune
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
he need not be in his home or office, within
a fenced yard or private place.
PEOPLE VS. BAULA, 344 SCRA 663
In case of consented searches or
waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against
obtrusive
searches,
it
is
fundamental that to constitute waiver, IT
MUST APPEAR THAT THE RIGHT
EXISTS; THE PERSONS INVOLVED
HAD
KNOWLEDGE,
EITHER
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE, of the
existence of such right. The third condition
did not exist in the instant case. Neither was
the search incidental to a valid warrantless
arrest. (PEOPLE VS. FIFUEROA, July 6,
2000) An alleged consent to a warrantless
search and seizure cannot be based merely
on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. THE
PRESUMPTION BY ITSELF, CANNOT
PREVAIL
AGAINST
THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED
RIGHTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL, AND
ZEAL IN THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINALS
CANNOT ENNOBLE THE USE OF

103

ARBITRARY METHODS THAT THE


CONSTITUTION ITSELF ABHORS.

CHAPTER IV
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Section 3. The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Read:
Read:
NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human
Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic
Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6, 2007
and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law
shall be automatically suspended one (1)
month before and two (2) months after the
holding of any election)
Please observe the procedure in obtaining the The Warrant [or
Order] of Surveillance, not found in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
SURVEILLANCE OF SUSPECTS AND
INTERCEPTION AND RECORDING OF
COMMUNICATIONS OF SUSPECTS OR
CHARGED OF TERRORISM
Section 7. Surveillance of suspects and
interception and recording of communications. The
provisions of RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Law) to the
contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement
official and the members of his team may, upon a

104

written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to,


intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form or
kind or type of electronic or other surveillance
equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with
the use of any other suitable ways or means for that
purpose, any communication, message, conversation,
discussion, or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or of any
person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and
recording of communications between lawyers and
clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business correspondence shall
not be authorized.
Section 8. Formal Application for Judicial
Authorization.- The written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap,
listen, intercept, and record communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words
of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism, shall only be
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals UPON AN EX-PARTE written application of a
police or law enforcement official who has been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council
created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex-parte
application, and upon examination under oath and
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses who may
produce to establish:
That there is probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the said crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about
to be committed;
That there is probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that evidence which is essential

105

to the conviction of any charged or suspected


person for, or to the solution or prevention of
any such crimes, will be obtained; and
That there is no other effective means readily
available for acquiring such evidence.
Sec. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of
the Court. The written order granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if
any, to extend or renew the same, the original
application of the applicant, including his application to
extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations
of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are
hereby declared as classified information: Provided,
That the person being surveilled or whose
communications,
letters,
papers,
messages,
conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and
effects have been monitored, listened to, bugged or
recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to
be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement
authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she
intends to do so, the legality of the interference before
the Court of Appeals which issued said written order.
The written order of the authorizing division of the
court of Appeals shall specify the following:
The identity, such as name and address, if
known, of the charged of suspected persons
whose
communications,
messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or
written words are to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted or recorded
and, in case of radio, electronic, or telephone
(whether
wireless
or
otherwise)
communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words, the
electronic transmission systems or the
telephone numbers to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded
and their locations if the person suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism is not fully known, such
person shall be subject to continuous

106

surveillance provided there is reasonable


ground to do so;
The identity (name and address, and the
police or law enforcement organization) of
the members of his team judicially
authorized to track down, tap, listen to,
intercept, and record the communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words;
The offense or offenses committed, or being
committed, or sought to be prevented; and
The length of time which the authorization
shall be used or carried out.
Section. 10. Effective Period of Judicial
Authorization. Any authorization granted by the
authorizing division of the court of Appealsshall only
be effective for the length of time specified in the
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, which shall not exceed 30 days from the date
of receipt of the written order of the authorizing
division of the court of Appeals by the applicant police
or law enforcement official.
The CA may extend or renew the said
authorization for another non-extendible period, which
shall not exceed 30 days from the expiration of the
original periodThe ex-parte application for renewal
has been duly authorized by the Anti-terrorism Council
in writing.
If no case is filed within the 30-day period, the
applicant police or law enforcement official shall
immediately notify the person subject
of the
surveillance, interception, and recording of the
termination of the said surveillance, interception and
recording. [Penalty to be imposed on the police official
who fails to inform the person subject of surveillance of
the termination of the surveillance, monitoring,
interception and recording shall be penalized to 10
years and 1 day to 12 years.

107

Section 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited


Materials. Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversationsWHICH
HAVE BEEN SECURED IN VIOLATION OF THE
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT, SHALL
ABSOLUTELY NOT BE ADMISSIBLE AND
USABLE AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ANYBODY IN
ANY JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE,
OR
ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATION,
INQUIRY, PROCEEDING, OR HEARING.
JUDICIAL
AUTHORIZATION
TO
EXAMINE
BANK
DEPOSITS,
ACCOUNTS,
AND RECORDS OF
SUSPECTED
OR
CHARGED
TERRORISTS
Section 27. judicial authorization required to examine bank
deposits, accounts and records.
The justices of CA designated as special court to handle antiterrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of
probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that:
A person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association or group of persons, may
authorize in writing any police or law enforcement
officer and the members of his team duly authorized in
writing by the anti-terrorism council to:
1. examine or cause the examination of, the deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in a
bank or financial institution; and
2. gather or cause the gathering of any relevant
information about such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records from a bank or
financial institution. The bank or financial
institution shall not refuse to allow such
examination or to provide the desired information,

108

when so ordered by and served with the written


order of the Court of Appeals.
Sec. 28. Application to examine deposits, accounts and
records.
The written order of the CA authorizing the examination of
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records:
A person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association or group of persons, in a bank
or financial institution-SHALL ONLY BE GRANTED BY THE AUTHORIZING
DIVISION OF THE CA UPON AN EX-PARTE APPLICATION
TO THAT EFFECT OF A POLICE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICIAL who has been duly authorized by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file such ex-parte application and upon examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses he may
produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency
of examining and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records:
Of A person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association or group of persons.
Section 35. Evidentiary value of deposited bank materials.Any information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda,
work sheets, reports or documents acquired from the examination
of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records
of:

109

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of


terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association or group of persons,
-which have been secured in violation of the provisions of
this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence
against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding or hearing.
1. PEOPLE VS. CABALQUINTO, September 19, 2006, 502
SCRA 419
2. ZULUETA VS. CA, February 10, 1996
The wife forcibly opened the drawers at the clinic of her
doctor-husband and took diaries, checks and greeting cards of his
alleged paramours. Thereafter, she used the same in their legal
separation case. Said documents are inadmissible in evidence. This
is so because the intimacies of husband and wife does not justify
the breaking of cabinets to determine marital infidelity.
3. OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998
Puno, J.
Facts:
On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V.
RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM.
The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and
foreign residents to have a Population Reference
Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics
Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY .

110

The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the


following grounds:
1. The establishment of the PRN without any law
is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
legislative powers of the Congress of the
Philippines;
2. The appropriation of public funds for the
implementation of the said AO is
unconstitutional since Congress has the
exclusive authority to appropriate funds for
such expenditure; and
3. The AO violates the citizens right to privacy
protected by the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution.
Held:
1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is
all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty
of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and
therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by
Congress that implements it, not by an
Administrative Order issued by the President.
Administrative Power, which is supposed to be
exercised by the President, is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the
foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative
Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued
by the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of the government. It
must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO
308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to
issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.

111

2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since


its main purpose is to provide a common reference
number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the
application of statistical methods to biological facts;
a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the
confirmation of an individuals identity through a
fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial
features. Through the PRN, the government offices
has the chance of building a huge and formidable
information base through the electronic linkage of
the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be
gathered for gainful and useful government
purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert invitation
to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for
some of our authorities to resist.
Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and
unequivocal terms how these informations gathered
shall be handled. It does not provide who shall
control and access the data and under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors
are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty
the integrity of the information. The computer
linkage gives other government agencies access to
the information. YET, THERE ARE NO
CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE
OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS
CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE
PARTICULAR
COMPUTER
SYSTEM
IS
BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF
SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF
THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR
WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED
WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls
short of assuring that personal information
gathered about our people will be used only for
specified purposes thereby violating the citizens
right to privacy.

112

KILUSANG
MAYO
UNO
VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, ET AL., April 19, 2006 &
June 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET
AL., April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006
Carpio, J.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 420 that mandates the Adoption of a Unified,
Multi-purpose Identification System by all Government Agencies
in the Executive Department. This is so despite the fact that the
Supreme Court held in an En Banc decision in 1998 OPLE VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES Administrative
Order No. 308[National computerized Identification Reference
System] issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos that the same is
unconstitutional because a national ID card system requires
legislation because it creates a new national data collection and
card issuance system, where none existed before. The Supreme
Court likewise held that EO 308 as unconstitutional for it violates
the citizens right to privacy.
Based on the Ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that
Proclamation No. 420 is unconstitutional on two (2) grounds:
a. usurpation of legislative powers; and
b. it infringes on the citizens right to privacy
Held:
The said Executive Order No. 420 does not violate the
citizens right to privacy since it does not require all the
citizens to be issued a national ID as what happened in AO
308. Only those dealing or employed with the said
government entities who are required to provide the
required information for the issuance of the said ID.

113

CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R.


No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA
704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago
introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No.
455),22[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC),
Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the
authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to
be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No.
455.23[6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the
PCGG declined the invitation because of prior commitment. 24[7] At
the same time, they invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1
earlier quoted.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General
Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building,
No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate
premises where he was detained.

22[4]
23[6]
24[7]

Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.


Annex F of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
Annex G of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

114

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a


petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee
on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and
Joker P. Arroyo and Members.
I S S U E S:
Is the investigation conducted on the petitioners violative of
their right to privacy?
H E L D:
The claim of immunity is without merit.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. 25
[46]
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not
only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
constitutional right and the right most valued by civilized
men,26[47] but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which mandates that, no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.27[48]
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the
Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that explicitly create
zones of privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or
the right to determine what, how much, to whom and when
information about himself shall be disclosed.28[49]
Section 2
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
25[46]

Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA 772.

26[47]

See Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.

27

[48]

28

[49]

Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also Article 17 (1) and (2)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries, Sison, Academy of ASEAN Law
and Jurisprudence, 1990, at 221, citing I.R. Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, 7
(1970).

115

searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.


Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy of communication
and correspondence and further cautions that any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 29[50] Applying this
determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did
the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation
exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy?; and second, did the
government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in
the Senates public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455,
particularly
on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippine
Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by
their respective board of directors. Obviously, the inquiry
focus on petitioners acts committed in the discharge of their duties
as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their
offices in a corporation where the government has interest.
Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which
the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe
v. Mutuc,30[51] the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,31[52] employed
the rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no
infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement
29

[50]

30[51]

Supra.

31[52]

429 U.S. 589 (1977).

Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P 2d 590
(1974). See Katz v. United states (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 350-352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576;
People v. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 357, 364, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P. 2d 1262; 8 Cal. 3d 623624,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P. 2d 457. INSERT Herreras Handbook on Arrest, Search and
Seizure.

116

to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and


minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a
standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in
public administration.32[53] In Valmonte v. Belmonte,33[54] the Court
remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former
Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to
closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that
the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the
PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and
the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are
compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from
the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as
well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in
crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and
formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding
PCGGs efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject
covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to
privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners,
will be respected by respondent Senate
Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to
obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae,
to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation.
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners
Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier;
and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and
officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum
issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to
32[53]

Justice Puno, Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to Privacy, p. 60.

33[54]

170 SCRA 256 (1989)

117

appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate


Resolution No. 455.
CHAPTER V - FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
PRESS, EXPRESSION, etc.
Section 4. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for the redress of
their grievances.
NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human
Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic
Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6, 2007
and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law
shall be automatically suspended one (1)
month before and two (2) months after the
holding of any election)
Section 26 provides that persons who have been
charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because
evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Detained under house arrest;
Restricted from traveling; and/or
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers,
or other means of communications with people outside
their residence.
1. Rule on criticisms against acts of public officers
Read:
1. Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil. 524
2. US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (A public official should not be
onion-skinned with reference to comments upon his official
acts. The interest of the government and the society demands
full discussion of public affairs)

118

3. P. vs. Perez, 45 Phil. 599


4. Mercado vs. CFI, 116 SCRA 93
2. Freedom of the press, in general
Read:
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER &
CECILLE AFABLE VS. COURT OF
APPEALS & RAMON LABO, JR., 444
SCRA 28 [November 25, 2004]
Freedom of Expression; the
public has the right to be
informed on the mental, moral
and physical fitness of candidates
for public office.
FACTS:
1. In the January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier
(BMC), Cecille Afable, the Editor-in-Chief, in her column
In and Out of Baguio made the following comments:
Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City),
Labo has the most imponderables about him. People
would ask: can he read and write? Why is he always
talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a
Japanes Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he
will send P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to
put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier
but was refused because he has not yet paid his account
of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We
will accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old
account first.
2. In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the following
comments in her January 10, 1988 column at the Courier:
I heard that the Dumpty in the Egg is
campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some real doctors are
also busy campaigning against Labo because he has not
also paid their medical services with them. Since he is

119

donating millions he should also settle his small debts


like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000
only. If he wins, several teachers were signifying to
resign and leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be
the franca-liqua of Baguio.
3. As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a
complaint for Damages before the regional trial Court of
Baguio City as he claimed said articles were libelous. He
likewise filed a separate criminal complaint before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed;
4. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice
because he was allegedly described as Dumpty in the Egg
or one who is a failure in his business which is false
because he is a very successful businessman or to mean zero
or a big lie; that he is a balasubas due to his alleged
failure to pay his medical expenses;
5. The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo has an
unpaid obligation to the Courier in the amount of P27,415.00
for the ads placed by his campaigners for the 1984 Batasang
Pambansa elections;
6. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, in its
Decision dated June 14, 1990 dismissed Labos complaint for
damages on the ground that the article of petitioner Afable
was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of
public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation and
honesty of private respondent Labo who was a candidate for
Mayor of Baguio City;
7. On January 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
Decision and ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon Labo, Jr.
damages in the total amount of P350,000.00 after concluding
that the Dumpty in the Egg refers to no one but Labo
himself.
Hence, the Petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

120

2. Was Labo the Dumpty in the Egg described in the


questioned article/
3. Were the articles subject of the case libelous or privileged/
HELD:
1. The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the
Dumpty in the Egg in the questioned article. This is so
because the article stated that The Dumpty in the Egg is
campaigning for Cortes, another candidate for mayor and
opponent of Labo himself. It is unbelievable that Labo
campaigned for his opponent and against himself. Although
such gracious attitude on the part of Labo would have been
commendable, it is contrary to common human experience.
As pointed out by the petitioners, had he done that, it is
doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor of
Baguio in the 1988 elections, which he actually did. In line
with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. CA, 310 SCRA 1, that it
is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be
shown that at least a 3rd person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication, the case should be
dismissed since Labo utterly failed to dispose of this
responsibility.
2. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke public
interest to justify the publication since he was not yet a
public official at that time. This argument is without merit
since he was already a candidate for City mayor of Baguio.
As such, the article is still within the mantle of protection
guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in the
Constitution since it is the publics right to be informed of the
mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates for public
office. This was recognized as early as the case of US VS.
SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK
TIMES VS. SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 where the US
Supreme Court held:
it
is
of
the
utmost
consequence that the people should
discuss the character and qualifications
of candidates for their suffrages. The
importance to the State and to society
of such discussions is so vast, and the

121

advantages derived so great, that they


more
than
counterbalance
the
inconvenience of private persons
whose conduct may be involved, and
occasional injury to the reputations of
individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury
may be great. The public benefit from
publicity is so great and the chance of
injury to private character so small,
that such discussion must be
privileged.
Clearly, the questioned articles constitute
fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt
with the character of the private respondent who was
running for the top elective post in Baguio City at that
time.
2. PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC,
G.R. NO. 90878, January 29, 1990
Freedom of expression and of the press
(Note: Unanimous en banc decision)
Medialdea, J.
Facts:
1. On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE
CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was
enacted into law;
2. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and
Provinces of Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and
Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the autonomous region
shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for
December 27, 1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990
specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said
act;

122

3. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus


Election Code (BP 881), the Comelec issued Comelec
Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which provides:
"Section 19. Prohibition on columnist,
commentators or announcers.- During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer
or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite
issues."
4. On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V.
SANIDAD who is a columnist ("OVERVIEW") for the
Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper
circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Comelec to enjoin
the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No.
2167. Petitioner claims that the said provision is
violative of his constitutional freedom of expression
and of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint
because it imposes subsequent punishment for those
who violate the same;
5. On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent
from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167;
6. On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor
General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal
of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of
Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the
petitioner from expressing his views because under
Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he may still express his
views or campaign for or against the act through the
Comelec space and airtime.
Held:
What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to
the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the

123

use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants


issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are insured. The evil
sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising
time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist,
commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of
absence from his work during the campaign period if he
is a candidate.
HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE
CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR.
OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN
THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN
GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND
REGULATE THE
EXERCISE
BY MEDIA
PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT
TO
EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE
PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising their freedom
of expression during the plebiscite periods are neither
the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there
are no candidates in a plebiscite.
While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely
barred from campaigning for or against the Organic
Act, said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity
of Section 19, Comelec Resolution No. 2167. This is so
because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS
CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY
EXPRESS HIS VIEW.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and
importance. The people's right to be informed and to be
able to freely and intelligently make a decision would
be better served by access to an unabridged discussion
of the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people
affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum
where the right to expression may be exercised.

124

ACCORDINGLY, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution


No. 2167 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Read also:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

In re: Ramon Tulfo,March 19, 199


In re: Atty. Emil Jurado, July 12, 1990
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 448
Babst vs. NIB, 132 SCRA 316
6. Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448 (In order that any news
item relating to a judicial proceeding will not be actionable,
the same must be [a] a true and fair report of the actual
proceedings; [b] must be done in good faith; and [c] no
comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer}
7. Policarpio vs. Manila Times, 5 SCRA 148
8. Lopez vs. CA, 34 SCRA 116
9. New York Times vs. Sullivan,376 U.S.254
10. Liwayway Publishing vs. PCGG, April 15,l988
3. Freedom of expression in general
Read:
1. RANDY DAVID VS. ARROYO, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 160;
2. Adiong vs. Comelec, March 31, 1992 (putting of
decals and stickers in ones car is within the
protected freedom of expression)
3. National Press Club vs. Comelec, March 5, 1992. Real
also the dissenting and separate opinions of the justices.
(Preventing campaigns through radio, TV and
newspapers is valid in order to even the playing field
between rich and poor candidates)
4. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 7960-707 &
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, GR No. 80578, February
1,
1989
5. Eastern Broadcasting vs. Dans,137 SCRA 628
6. Newsweek vs. IAC, 142 SCRA 171
7. Kapisanan vs. Camara Shoes, 11 SCRA 477
8. IN RE: Atty. Tipon, 79 SCRA 372
9. Lacsa vs. IAC, May 23,1988
10.
Kapunan vs. De Villa, December 6, 1988

125

4. Not within the protection of the freedom of


of the Constitution

expression clause

1. Obscenity; test of
Read:
a. P. vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352
b. P vs. GO PIN, August 8, 1955
Tests:
a. Whether the average person applying to contemporary
community standards would find the work appeals to
prurient interest;
b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently
offensive sexual conduct;
c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary ,
artistic, political or scientific value.
c. Miller vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419
d. Ginsberg vs. New York,390 U.S. 629
e. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (A City Mayor may not order
the warrantless seizure of magazines which he believes to be
obscene; otherwise, he will become the complainant, prosecutor
and judge at the same time. He should obtain a search warrant
from a judge)
2. Libel or slander; test ofRead:
a. Lopez and Manila Times cases, supra
b. Quisumbing vs. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510
3. Cases undersub-judice
Read:
a. P. vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265
5. Freedom of assembly and to petition the government
redress of grievances

for

126

GESITE et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,


444 SCRA 51
Freedom of public school
teachers to peaceably assemble
and petition the government for
redress of grievances; right of
public school teachers to form
union.
The petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted
mass actions in Metro Manila from September to the first half of
October, 1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in Metro
Manila but they claimed that they were not on strike. They claimed
that they were merely exercising their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
their grievances. Thus, they may not be penalized administratively.
HELD:
The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the
public school teachers during the period from September up to the
1st half of October, 1990 was a strike or not has been decided in the
case
of
MANILA
PUBLIC
SCHOOL
TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION VS. LAGUIO, 200 SCRA 323 where it was held
that these mass actions were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
It is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that
petitioners purpose was to realize their demands by withholding
their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not
used by the striking employees to describe their common course of
action is inconsequential, SINCE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
SITUATION, AND NOT ITS APPEARANCE, WILL BE
DEEMED CONTROLLING.
Despite the constitutional right to form associations under the
Constitution, employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass actions that
will lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The

127

right of government employees to organize IS LIMITED TO THE


FORMATIONS OF UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS ONLY,
WITHOUT INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. (Bangalisan
vs. CA, 276 SCRA 619)
The petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries
during their suspension because the general proposition is that a
public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not
rendered any service.

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG


MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
and
GABRIELA
vs.
EDUARDO
ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO
ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine National
Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO,
NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL
QUEROL, and Western Police District
Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, G.R. No.
169848, May, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
The Facts:
Petitioners come in three groups.
The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,
allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and
that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 880.
The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess
del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who allege that they were
injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they
held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5,
2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to
protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country

128

under an undeclared martial rule, and the protest was likewise


dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and
suffered injuries.
The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al.,
petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, allege that they conduct peaceful
mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of
their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to
peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and
the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being
followed to implement it.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU cosponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police
blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly
dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They
further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which
KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along Espaa
Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going
towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along
Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They
were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
Three other rallyists were arrested.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as
well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of
rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.
B.P. No. 880, The Public Assembly Act of 1985, provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise
By The People Of Their Right
Peaceably To Assemble And Petition
The Government [And] For Other
Purposes
Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session
assembled:

129

SECTION 1. Title . This Act shall be known as


The Public Assembly Act of 1985.
SEC. 2.
Declaration of policy. The
constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances is
essential and vital to the strength and stability of the
State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of
others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.
SEC. 3. Definition of terms. For purposes of
this Act:
(b) Public place shall include any highway,
boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other
thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space
of public ownership where the people are allowed
access.
(c) Maximum tolerance means the highest
degree of restraint that the military, police and other
peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public
assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not
required.-- A written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall
be required if the public assembly shall be done or
made in a freedom park duly established by law or
ordinance or in private property, in which case only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in the campus of a
government-owned and operated educational institution
which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of
said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies
held during any election campaign period as provided
for by law are not covered by this Act.
SEC. 5.
Application requirements.-All
applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:

130

1.
The applications shall be in writing and shall
include the names of the leaders or organizers; the
purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and
duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the probable number of persons
participating, the transport and the public address
systems to be used.
2.
The application shall incorporate the duty
and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
3.
The application shall be filed with the office
of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose
jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least
five (5) working days before the scheduled public
assembly.
4.
Upon receipt of the application, which must
be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city
or municipal mayor shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the
city or municipal building.
SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
1.
It shall be the duty of the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
public assembly will create a clear and present danger
to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.
2.
The mayor or any official acting in his
behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed,
failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted.
Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a
permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant
on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.

131

3.
If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he
shall immediately inform the applicant who must be
heard on the matter.
4.
The action on the permit shall be in writing
and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
5.
If the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of law.
6.
In case suit is brought before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court,
or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may
be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight
(48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying if in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately
executory.
7.
All cases filed in court under this section
shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from
date of filing.
Cases filed hereunder shall be
immediately endorsed to the executive judge for
disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
8.
In all cases, any decision may be appealed to
the Supreme Court.
CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release
by Malacaang dated September 21, 2005, shown in Annex A to
the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:
Malacaang
Manila, Philippines
Release No. 2
2005

Official
NEWS
September

21,

132

STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


EDUARDO ERMITA
On Unlawful Mass Actions
In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible
plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political
situation, sow disorder and incite people against the
duty constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP
as well as the local government units to strictly enforce
a no permit, no rally policy, disperse groups that run
afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the
laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper
conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
The rule of calibrated preemptive response is
now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill
intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of
people and inciting them into actions that are
inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of
the national community.
Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The
majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be
protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the government to
engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a
democratic society.
The Presidents call for unity and reconciliation
stands, based on the rule of law.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No.
880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a

133

clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is
thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it
does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The
words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that
the law applies to assemblies against the government because they
are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass
the strict scrutiny test.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without
providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the laws
(clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires
act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P.
No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of
publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution
sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even
assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits
provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the
permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present
danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to
apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant
public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly
wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that
the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform
their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the
policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy
of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling
effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
I s s u e s:

134

4.

On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No.


880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and
14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

5.

Are these content-neutral or content-based


regulations?
Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness?
Do they constitute prior restraint?
Are they undue delegations of powers to
Mayors?
Do they violate international human rights
treaties and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?

On the constitutionality and legality of the policy


of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):
1.
2.
3.

Is the policy void on its face or due to


vagueness?
Is it void for lack of publication?
Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the
rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and
6, 2005?

H e l d:
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their
right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the
right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly
affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would
publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in
fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required
permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly
required without violating the Constitutional guarantee.
Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as
contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without
the permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the

135

right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition


the government for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy
in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute
the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all
the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated
in Jacinto v. CA, the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in
U.S. v. Apurado already upheld the right to assembly and petition,
as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to
peaceful assembly to petition the government for a
redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or
form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as
well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities.
These rights are guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of
Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of
Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples
exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this
century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld
the right to assembly and petition and even went as far
as to acknowledge:
It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to
a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance
of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a
seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities,
then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of
grievances would expose all those who took part therein
to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the

136

purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to


be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances
of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the
guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in
drawing the line between disorderly and seditious
conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly
and a tumultuous uprising.
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court likewise sustained
the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition
over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies
that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it
may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This
sovereign police power is exercised by the government
through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws
regulating those and other constitutional and civil
rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions,
such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing
their legislative bodies called municipal and city
councils enact ordinances for purpose
Reyes v. Bagatsing further expounded on the right and its
limits, as follows:

137

1.
It is thus clear that the Court is called upon
to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial
of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. Free speech, like free press, may be
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. There is to be then no
previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution
for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to
prevent. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of
the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to
be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not
to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as
is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution,
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican institutions
and complements the right of free speech.
To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for
the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas
v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the
rights to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these rights,
while not identical, are inseparable. In every case,
therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the
exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to
examine the effects of the challenged governmental
actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of
a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil

138

to public safety, public morals, public health, or any


other legitimate public interest.
2.
Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the
freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better
expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of
Justice Frankfurter: It must never be forgotten,
however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the
Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay
faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the
peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was
in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions
upon rational modes of communication that the
guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope.
But utterance in a context of violence can lose its
significance as an appeal to reason and become part of
an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant
to be sheltered by the Constitution. What was
rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the
utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context
of violence. It must always be remembered that this
right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing
parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even
if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if
the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed
of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the
expression of dissent. It means more than just the right
to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is
dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in
the fact that there may be something worth hearing
from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of
ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What
is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less
preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and
outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm
though is not required. As pointed out in an early
Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United
States v. Apurado: It is rather to be expected that more
or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the

139

people to protest against grievances whether real or


imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater
the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers. It bears
repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked,
riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of
vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones
destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to
make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed
to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939
vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO:
Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a
citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks
for communication of views on national questions may
be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance
with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of
respondents, be abridged or denied. The above
excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v.
Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where
this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks
and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus
nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of
plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such
plaza being a promenade for public use, which
certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To

140

repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit


should not be granted for the proposed march and rally
starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
4.
Neither can there be any valid objection to
the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy,
hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard.
Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on
the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of
the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court
categorically declared: Our conclusion finds support
in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of
New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing
that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting
thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license
therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of
the town or from licensing committee, was construed
by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not
conferring upon the licensing board unfettered
discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid.
And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its
decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes
affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court,
held that a statute requiring persons using the public
streets for a parade or procession to procure a special
license therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or
of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is
construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities
are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the
parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *.
Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in
a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: Civil
liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public
order without which liberty itself would be lost in the
excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a

141

municipality to impose regulations in order to assure


the safety and convenience of the people in the use of
public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the
means of safeguarding the good order upon which they
ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets
of cities is the most familiar illustration of this
recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the
use of highways in that relation is designed to promote
the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be
disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil
right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection.
xxx
6.
x x x The principle under American
doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes
in these words: The question, if the rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is
not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held
but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the
speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution
protects. There could be danger to public peace and
safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence.
That would deprive it of its peaceful character. It is true
that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not
devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of
what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption especially so
where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public
place is that the permit must be for the assembly
being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American
Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place.
xxx

142

8.
By way of a summary. The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the
time when it will take place. If it were a private place,
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If
he is of the view that there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must
be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded,
they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the
other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so
than on the other departments rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and
deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula,
no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes
as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.
Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the
weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its
decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling
in Reyes:
Reyes v. Bagatsing
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9,
1983,

B.P. No. 880

143

125 SCRA 553, 569)


SEC. 4.
Permit when
required and when not
required.-- A written permit
shall be required for any
person or persons to organize
and hold a public assembly in
a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done
or made in a freedom park
duly established by law or
ordinance or in private
property, in which case only
the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal
possession is required, or in
the campus of a governmentowned
and
operated
educational institution which
shall be subject to the rules
and regulations of said
educational
institution.
Political meetings or rallies
held during any election
campaign period as provided
for by law are not covered by
this Act.

8. By way of a summary. The


applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the
public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were
a private place, only the consent
of the owner or the one entitled to
its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that
there is such an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on
the matter.
Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. SEC. 5.
Application
Thus if so minded, they can have requirements.-All
recourse to the proper judicial applications for a permit shall
authority.
comply with the following
guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be
in writing and shall include the
names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such
public assembly; the date, time
and duration thereof, and place
or streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the
probable number of persons

144

participating, the transport and


the public address systems to
be used.
(b) The application shall
incorporate the duty and
responsibility of applicant
under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be
filed with the office of the
mayor of the city or
municipality
in
whose
jurisdiction
the
intended
activity is to be held, at least
five (5) working days before
the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the
application, which must be
duly acknowledged in writing,
the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause
the same to immediately be
posted at a conspicuous place
in the city or municipal
building.
SEC. 6. Action to be taken
on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the
mayor or any official acting in
his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the
public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to
public order, public safety,
public convenience, public
morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official
acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2)
working days from the date the
application was filed, failing
which, the permit shall be

145

deemed granted. Should for


any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application
for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of
the office of the mayor and
shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the
view that there is imminent
and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the
permit, he shall immediately
inform the applicant who must
be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit
shall be in writing and served
on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf
denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in
his permit, the applicant may
contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought
before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the Regional Trial
Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate Court, its decisions
may be appealed to the
appropriate court within fortyeight (48) hours after receipt
of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting
such permit or modifying it in

146

terms satisfactory to the


applicant shall be immediately
executory.
(g) All cases filed in court
under this section shall be
decided within twenty-four
(24) hours from date of filing.
Cases filed hereunder shall be
immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition
or, in his absence, to the next
in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision
may be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be
followed by formal appeals are
hereby allowed.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an


absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This
was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,34 where the Court referred
to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and
manner of holding public assemblies.35
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies36 that would
use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make
it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and
influencing in the definition of public assembly content based,
since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the
government for redress of grievances come from the wording of
the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
34
35
36

G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, 288 SCRA 447.


Ibid, p. 478.
Except picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute, which are governed by the Labor Code and
other labor laws; political meeting or rallies held during any election campaign period,
which are governed by the Election Code and other election related laws; and public
assemblies in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational
institution, which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
institution. (Sec. 3[a] and Sec. 4 of B.P. No. 880).

147

tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is


independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent
needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils
Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of
the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law
provides a precise and sufficient standard the clear and present
danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means
the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether
respondent Mayor has the same power independently under
Republic Act No. 716037 is thus not necessary to resolve in these
proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law
provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom
parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and
petition at any time:
SEC. 15. Freedom parks. Every city and
municipality in the country shall within six months after
the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least
37

The Local Government Code. Specifically, Section 16 stating the general


welfare clause, thus:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

148

one suitable freedom park or mall in their respective


jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be
centrally located within the poblacion where
demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan
Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the
freedom parks within the period of six months from the
effectivity this Act.
2
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated
earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term
should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other
than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This
is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
The truth of the matter is the policy of calibrated
preemptive response is in consonance with the legal
definition of maximum tolerance under Section 3 (c)
of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the highest degree of
restraint that the military, police and other peacekeeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in
the dispersal of the same. Unfortunately, however, the
phrase maximum tolerance has acquired a different
meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean
inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of
mayhem and serious threats to public order. More so,
other felt that they need not bother secure a permit
when holding rallies thinking this would be tolerated.
Clearly, the popular connotation of maximum
tolerance has departed from its real essence under B.P.
Blg. 880.
It should be emphasized that the policy of
maximum tolerance is provided under the same law
which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit,
which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit,
and which recognizes certain instances when water
cannons may be used. This could only mean that

149

maximum tolerance is not in conflict with a no


permit, no rally policy or with the dispersal and use of
water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed,
the maximum amount of tolerance required is
dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is.
Our law enforcers should calibrate their response based
on the circumstances on the ground with the view to
preempting the outbreak of violence.
Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive
response is being enforced in lieu of maximum
tolerance I clearly was not referring to its legal
definition but to the distorted and much abused
definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to
disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that
law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of
keeping the peace even when confronted with
dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to send a
message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing
the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter.
Thus I said, we have instructed the PNP as well as the
local government units to strictly enforce a no permit,
no rally policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws
of the land . . . unlawful mass actions will be
dispersed. None of these is at loggerheads with the
letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880. It is thus
absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my
co-respondents to violate any law.
In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the
fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly. For this reason, the socalled calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness
that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other
hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional;
it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, maximum
tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government.
The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally

150

permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound clear and present danger standard.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would
purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is
NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN
from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of
maximum tolerance.
Read:
1. Right of assembly..31 SCRA 734 and 742
2. Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255
3. Primicias vs. Fuguso, 80 Phil. 71
4. De la Cruz vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346
5. Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 SCRA 731
6. Philippine Blooming Mills Case,51 SCRA 189
7. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553;see
guidelines
8. Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233
9. Villar vs. TIP, 135 SCRA 705
10. Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359
11. Carpio vs. Guevara, 106 SCRA 685
12. Nestle' Phils. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542
13. Arreza vs. Araneta University Foundation, 137
SCRA
94
6. Freedom from prior restraint
Read:
1. Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717
2. New York Times vs. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its validity)
3. Near vs. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
4. Times Film vs. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43
5. Freedman vs. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
8. Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule
(whether the words used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that

151

they will bring about the substantive evils that the State
has the right to prevent)
7-a. Dangerous tendency rule (If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the State has the right to prevent,
then such words are punishable)
Read:
1. Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152
2. Read again the Reyes and Ruiz cases, supra
3. Read again Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
7960707& Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, GR No.
80578, February 1,
1989
8. The balancing-of-interest test (When a particular conduct is
regulated in the interest of the public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of
speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2
conflicting interests demand greater protection under the
circumstances presented.)
Read:
AYER PRODUCTION VS. JUDGE CAPULONG, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, ET AL., 160 SCRA 861
Read also:
1. Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476
2. Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652, including
criticism on this test by Justice Holmes
3. See also Zaldivar case above
CHAPTER VI - THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT
OF RELIGION CLAUSE
Section 5.
No law shall be made
respecting the establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference shall forever

the

152

be allowed. No religious test shall be


required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
ESTRADA VS. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR,
492 SCRA 1 (Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration), 408 SCRA 1
Puno, J.
Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253, Las
Pinas City. Complainant requested for an investigation of
respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was
still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary,
thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it
might appear that the court condones her act.
Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having
a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly
immoral conduct because:
She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch
Tower Society;
That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with
their religious beliefs;
That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the
approval of her congregation.
Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a
DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS in
accordance with her religion which allows members of the
Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by their
spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and binding within the
congregation all over the world except in countries where
divorce is allowed.
HELD:

153

Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as


she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on
her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms--including religious freedom---may be enjoyed. IN THE
AREA OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AS A PREFERRED
FREEDOM, HOWEVER, MAN STANDS ACCOUNTABLE
TO AN AUTHORITY HIGHER THAN THE STATE, and so
the stateinterest sought to be upheld must be so compelling
that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that
will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing
that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable
for grossly immoral conduct.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
- any specific system of belief, worship or conduct, often
involving a code of ethics and philosophy.
- A profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator.
The existence of a Divine being is not necessarily inherent
in religion; the Buddhists espouses a way of life without
reference to an omnipotent God.
Strong fences make good neighbors. The idea is to
delineate the boundaries between two institutions and prevent
encroachments by one against the other.
The doctrine cuts both ways. It is not
only the State that is prohibited from
interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs;
the Church is likewise barred from meddling
in purely secular matters.
NON-STABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
It simply means that the State cannot
set up a church; nor pass laws which aids
one religion; aid all religion, or prefer one

154

religion over another nor force nor influence


a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will; or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief; that the State
cannot openly or secretly participate in the
affairs of any religious organization or group
and vice versa (EVERSON VS. BOARD
OF EDUCATION, 330 US 1)
This clause seeks to protect:
Voluntarism---must come into existence
through the voluntary support of its
members;
Insulation from political processgrowth
through voluntary support of its members
will not take place if there is intervention
from the State.
There will be no violation of the nonestablishment clause if:
the statute has a secular legislative purpose;
its principal or primary effect is one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
it does not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. (LEMON VS.
KURTZMAN, 403 US 602)
The government is neutral
and while
protecting all, it prefers none and disparages
none. All here applies both to the believer
and the non-believer. FREEDOM OF
RELIGION
INCLUDES
FREEDOM
FROM RELIGION; THE RIGHT TO
WORHIP INCLUDES THE RIGHT NOT
TO WORSHIP.
SCHOOL PRAYER CASE (ENGEL VS.
VITALE, 370 US 421)
It is unconstitutional for a school to
require the students to recite a prayer

155

composed by the Board of Regents at the


starts of the days class. It is no part of the
business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American
People.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON
VS. SCHEMPP, 374 US 203
It is unconstitutional for a law to
require that at least 10 verses from the Holy
Bible be read daily without comment
because the same constitute a religious
exercise
which
violates
the
nonestablishment clause.
BOARD OF EDUCATION VS.
ALLEN, 392 US 236
A law requiring the Board of Education to lend textbooks
free of charge to all students from grades 7-12 of parochial school.
This is constitutional since it is not the parochial school which gets
the benefits but the parents.
EVERSON VS. BOARD OF
EDUCATION, 330 US 1
The law authorizing reimbursement of transportation
expenses of school children going to and from parochial schools is
not violative of the non-establishment clause because it will be the
parents who get benefits, not the parochial school.
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP
HAS TWO ASPECTS:
a. Freedom to believe; and
b. Freedom to act.
IN the first, such freedom is absolute. He may indulge in his
own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or
none at all. He may not be punished even if he cannot prove what
he believes.

156

In the second, if the individual externalizes what he believes,


his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State.
This is so because religious freedom can be exercised only with
due regard to the rights of others. Example: Go forth and
multiply---cannot marry several times just to comply.
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN & ZOSA, 38 O.G.
1676
Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not
allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4, Article IIThe
state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the
people to defend the State and in the fulfillment of this duty, the
State may call all citizens to render military or civil service.
IN RE SUMMERS, 325 US 561
The act of the Illinois Supreme Court denying admission to
the bar because of his refusal to take in good faith an oath to
support the Constitution of the State of Illinois which requires
mandatory service in the military in times of war was reversed by
the US Supreme Court stating that this constitutes a violation of
the 1st Amendment which guarantees religious freedom.
1.
Religious
freedom in relation to impairment of
contracts and the right to join associations,36
SCRA 445
2. Read:
1. Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201
2. Garces vs. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510
3. INK vs. Gironella, 106 SCRA 1
4. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101
398
5. Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 11
6. Pamil vs. Teleron, November 20, 1978
7. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope, 59 SCRA 54
7. German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514
ROEL EBRALINAG, ET AL VS. THE
DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS OF CEBU, March 1, 1993

Phil.

157

Grino--Aquino, J.
Facts:
-----1. The petitioners are high school and grade schools
students enrolled in the different public schools of the
Province of Cebu and who belong to the religious group
known as the Jehovah's Witnesses;
2. That they rrefused to take part in the flag ceremony
which includes playing by a band or singing the
Philippine National Anthem, saluting the Philippine
Flag and reciting the patriotic pledge because they
considered the flag as an image and they should not
worship it except GOD;
3. That because of their refusal to perform the foregoing
acts as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955 and by
Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the
DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions, they were expelled by the
respondent school authorities.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
-----May the petitioners be expelled for refusing to
salute the flag, recite the patriotic pledge or sing the
national anthem in order to follow their religious
beliefs?
Held:
The same issue was raised in Gerona vs.
Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna
vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960) where
the SC held that:

158

The flag is not an image but a symbol of the


Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution
guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete
separation of church and state in the government, the
flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance.
The law, RA 1265 was likewise incorporated in
Executive Order No. 297, September 21, 1988.
Our task is extremely difficult for the 30-year old
decision of this Court in GERONA upholding the salute
law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse
to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic
pledge, during flag ceremony on pain of being
dismissed from one's job or be expelled in school, IS
ALIEN TO THE CONSCIENCE OF THE PRESENT
GENERATION OF FILIPINOS WHO CUT THEIR
TEETH ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS WHICH
GUARANTEES THEIR RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH
AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS
PROFESSION AND WORSHIP (Section 5, Art. III,
1987 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is
entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man and his Creator (Chief Justice
Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan,
135 SCRA 530).
The right to religious profession has a two-fold
aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of the thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of religious freedom

159

(according the Former Chief justice Teehankee in his


dissenting opinion in German vs. Baranagan) is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has the right
and duty to presvent. Absent such a threat to public
safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools
is not justified since they are not doing anything that
could warrant their expulsion since during flag
ceremonies, they just quietly stand at attention to show
their respect for the rights of others who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings.
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,
59 SCRA 54, we upheld the exemption of the members
of the Iglesia ni Kristo from the coverage of the closedshop agreement between the labor union and the
company because it would violate the teaching of their
church not to join any labor group.
We hold that a similar exemption may be
accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect to their
religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
seem to others
CHAPTER VII - THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
NOTE: THE APPLICABLE PROVISION
OF THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT ON
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

160

Section 26 provides that persons who have been


charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because
evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Detained under house arrest;
Restricted from traveling; and/or
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers,
or other means of communications with people outside
their residence.
Upon application of the prosecutor, the suspects right to
travel shall be limited to the municipality or city where he
resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of
national security and public safety. Travel outside of said
municipality or city, without the authorization of the court,
shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of
the bail which shall then be forfeited as provided in the
Rules of Court.
These restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of
the accused; or the dismissal of the case filed against him;
or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion
of the prosecutor.
1. The constitutional as well as human right to travel,

129 SCRA

2. Read:
FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS.
HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 88211, September 15, 1989 and
the Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 27, 1989
right to travel; liberty of abode
and "right to return"
En banc
Cortes, J.

161

This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition


asking the Supreme Court to Order the respondents to
issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.
The case for the petitioners is founded on the
assertion that their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed by the following provisions of the
Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be provided by
law.
The petitioners contend that the President has no
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only the Courts may do so "within the limits
prescribed by law". Nor may the President impair the
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do
so.
Also, the petitioners claim that under international
law, particularly the Universal Declaration of Humjan
Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to
the Philippines. Thus:
Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, AND TO RETURN TO HIS
COUNTRY.

162

Likewise, under the International Covenant on Civil


and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:
Art. 12
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.
The respondents argue that the issue in this case
involves a political question which is therefore beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, they argue
that the right of the state to national security prevails
over individual rights, citing Section 4, Art. II of the
1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted in
the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
The sub-issues, which could help in the
determination of the main issue, are:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power
to bar former Pres. Marcos and his family
from returning to the Philippines, in the
interest of national security, public safety or
public health, has the President made a
finding that the return of the petitioners to
the Philippines is a clear and present danger
to national security, public welfare or public
health. And if she has made that finding,
have the requirements of due process been
complied with in making such finding? Has
there been prior notice to the petitioners?

163

Held:
It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved in this case is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel connote. Essentially,
the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct
right under international law, independent from, though
related to the right to travel. Thus, even the Universal
declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within the territory of
the state, the right to leave a country and the right to
enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY
IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY
GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH
TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELLCONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO
RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A
GENERALLY
ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLE
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
UNDER
OUR
CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE
LAND.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing
the general welfare and the common good against
the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President's RESIDUAL
POWER to protect the general welfare of the people.
The court cannot close its eyes to present realities
and pretend that the country is not besieged by the
insurgency, separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, etc. With these before her,
the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily,
capriciously and whimsically.
Lastly, the issue involved in the case at bar is not
political in nature since under Section 1, Art. VIII of the
Constitution, judicial power now includes the duty to

164

"determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse


of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government."
NOTE:
The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices (CJ
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, GrinoAquino, Medialdea and Regalado) or a total of 8
justices in voting in favor of DISMISSING the petition.
Seven justices filed separate dissenting opinions
(Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin
and Sarmiento).
***********************
Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting.
With all due respect for the majority in the Court
that the main issue in this case is not one of power but
one on RIGHTS. If he comes home, the government
has the power to arrest and punish him but does it have
the power to deny him his right to come home and die
among familiar surroundings? x x x The government
has more than ample powers under existing laws to deal
with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils
public safety. BUT THE DENIAL OF TRAVEL
PAPERS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE POWERS
BECAUSE THE BILL OF RIGHTS SAY SO. THERE
IS NO LAW PRESCRIBING EXILE IN FOREIGN
LAND AS THE PENALTY FOR HURTING THE
NATION.
. The fears expressed by its representatives were based
on mere conjectures of political and economic
destabilization without any single piece of concrete
evidence to back up their apprehensions.
Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the
conclusion that there exist "factual bases for the
President's decision" to bar Marcos's return. That is not

165

my recollection of the impressions of the Court after the


hearing.
2. Silverio vs. CA, April 8, 1991
Read also:
1. Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851
2. Kwong vs. PCGG, December 7,l987
3. Manotoc vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149
1. Petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. has 6 criminal cases
for estafa pending against him. In said cases he was
admitted to bail with the FGU Insurance Corporation as
surety.
He is also involved in a case pending before the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
2.
The SEC requested the Commissioner on
Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure
pending disposition of the case involving him. The
same was granted by the Commissioner.
3. Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a
motion entitled "motion for permission to leave the
country" stating as ground therefor his desire to go to
the United States, "relative to his business transactions
and opportunities".
4. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the
matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which also
denied the same. Petitioner brings the matter to the S.C.
claiming his constitutional right to travel and also
contending that having been admitted to bail as a matter
of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor
the SEC would have jurisdiction over his liberty.
HELD:
Petition denied.
a. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary

166

consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.


The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel.
b. "x x x the result of the obligation assumed by
appellee to hold the accused amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit
the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and
processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does
not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
have
no
binding
force
outside
of
said
jurisdiction."(People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404
(l935)
c. To allow the petitioner to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason would place him beyond the
reach of the courts.
d. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People
vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, Feb. 13, 1980)
as authority for his claim that he could travel. The S.C.
held however that said case is not squarely on all fours
with the case at bar. Unlike the Shepherd case,
petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent
of his surety to the proposed travel.
e. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal
case is pending against an accused does not
automatically bar him from travelling abroad. He must
however convince the courts of the urgency of his
travel, the duration thereof, and that his sureties are
willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing
him to travel.
4. Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, supra.
6. Salonga vs. Hermoso, 97 SCRA 121

167

7. Read also the Ferdinand Marcos Cases of August


October, 1989

&

CHAPTER VIII - THE


CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Section 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
recordsshall be afforded the citizen
subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
1. Read:
Right to Privacy;
right to
information on matters of public
concern;
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R.
No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA
704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago
introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No.
455),38[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation
(POTC),
Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors. The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the
representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
38[4]

Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

168

skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the


previous years mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established
wholly
owned
PHC
subsidiary
called
Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC
funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73
million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without
any accountability report given to PHC and
PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12
February 2002 issue reported that the executive
committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released
P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a
relative of an executive committee member; to date
there have been no payments given, subjecting the
company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25
million in 2004;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper
Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippine
Overseas
Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in the operations by their
respective board of directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the
authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to
be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No.
455.39[6]

39[6]

Annex F of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

169

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because


of prior commitment.40[7] At the same time, he invoked Section
4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General
Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building,
No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate
premises where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee
on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and
Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
174340.
I S S U E S:
Is the refusal of the petitioners to testify in Congress by
virtue of EO No. 1, Section 4 [b] violates the constitutional
provision on information on matters of public concern?
H E L D:
Yes.
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 which was invoked by the
petitioners in support of their refusal to testify in the Senate limits
the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members
or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding
40[7]

Annex G of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

170

concerning matters within its official


cognizance.
Such provision of EO No. 1 is unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional provision ensuring the peoples access to
information on matters of public
1-A. BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT VS. COMELEC, MAY 4 ,
2007, 523 SCRA 1
The petitioner requested the COMELEC to publish
the individual nominees of all the party-list groups in order
that they will be guided on what party-list group shall be
supported by them. The COMELEC held that under the
Party-list Act, such list of nominees is confidential and
should not be published.
Held:
The COMELEC should publish the list of nominees
of all the party-list groups. This is in accordance with the
right to information on matters of public concern which
shall be accorded to every citizen.
2. Valmonte vs. Belmonte, GR No. 74930, February 13, 1989
in relation to the Right to Privacy
Cortes, J.
Facts:
1. On June 4, 1986, petitioner Valmonte wrote the
respondent asking the latter to furnish him copies of
former members of the Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a "clean loan" from the GSIS prior to the
February 7, 1986 elections;
2. On June 17, 1986, respondent through counsel
refused to give the petitioner a list of said lawmakers
who obtained "clean loans" from the GSIS on the
ground that there is a confidential relationship between

171

the GSIS and its borrowers and it would be proper for


them to preserve the same;
3. On July 19, 1986, the petitioners filed this instant
petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case should be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies?
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the
documents sought in accordance with their
constitutional right to information?
Held:
1. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that before a party
can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to
have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law.
In the case at bar, the decision of the General Manager
of the GSIS is appealable/reviewable by the GSIS
Board of Trustees. Petitioners did not ask the Board of
Trustees to review the decision of the respondent.
However, the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable when only questions of law
is involved. (Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil.
466; Aguilar vs. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan
vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359.
This is not the first time that the court is confronted
with a case involving the right to information. In
Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, we upheld the
citizen's right to information as well as in Legaspi vs.
CSC, 150 SCRA 530 and ordered the government
officers involved to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 7,
Art. III which provides:

172

The right of the people to information on matters of


public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions x x x shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
for by law.
The postulate of public office is a public trust as
institutionalized in the Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. XI) to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power,
would certainly be empty words if access to
information of public concern is denied except under
limitations prescribed by law.
Petitioners are members of the media. As such, they
have both the right to gather and the obligation to check
the accuracy of the information they disseminate x x x
The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is
not to say that the right to information is merely an
adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the
exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. Far
from it. The right to information goes hand in hand with
the constitutional policies of "full public disclosure"
and "honesty in the public service".
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. It is subject to limitations
provided for by law and the people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern".
Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited
to "transactions involving public interest" and subject to
"reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
The information sought to be obtained by the
petitioners affect public interest since the GSIS is the
trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees. The funds of the GSIS assume a public
character and that its obligations are guaranteed by the
government.

173

The petitioners are entitled to access to documents


sought subject to reasonable regulations that the
respondent may impose relating to manner and hours of
examination, to the end that damage or loss of the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with
the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to
inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi vs. CSC,
supra; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383]
he petitioners, however, are not entitled to be
furnished copies of list of alleged members of the
Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure clean
loans through the intercessions of Pres. Marcos and the
First Lady. This is so because access to public records
does not include the right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
The respondent is therefore ordered to allow
petitioners access to documents and records evidencing
loans granted to members of the Batasang Pambansa, as
petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable rules and
regulations as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS.
EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET
AL., G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed

174

Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police


(PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as
a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery
and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines
issued E.O. 464, ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO
THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, which,
pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient
provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments
Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all
heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive
session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality
based on executive privilege is fundamental to the

175

operation of government and rooted in the separation of


powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez,
G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act
No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge
confidential or classified information officially known
to them by reason of their office and not made available
to the public to prejudice the public interest.
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by
this executive order:
1. Senior officials of executive departments
who in the judgment of the department
heads are covered by the executive
privilege;
2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
3. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
with rank of chief superintendent or higher
and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege;
4. Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser
are covered by the executive privilege; and
5. Such other officers as may be determined by
the President.
I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern; and
H E L D:
E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the
right to information on matters of public concern. There are clear
distinctions between the right of Congress to information which

176

underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to


information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of
a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and
not to an individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are
generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance
tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations necessarily deprives the people of information
which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to
be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied
access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can
then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom
of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels
for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive
to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.41
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a
consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained
above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of
inquiry.
1-a. Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530
1-b. Brilliantes vs. Chang, Aug. 14, 1990
1-c. Canlas vs. Vazquez, July 3, 1990
1-d. Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Manuel Morato, November 13,
1991
41

G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.

177

2. Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 44


3. Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14
4. Lantaco vs. Lllamas, 108 SCRA 502
5. Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383
CHAPTER IX - THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN
ASSOCIATIONS
Section 8. The right of the people,
including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
1. Freedom of Association, 100 SCRA 100
2. The fundamental right of self-organization,108 SCRA 390
3. The right of self-organization of managerial
SCRA 434

employees,47

4. Read:
1. In re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554
2. Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93
3. Samahan ng Manggagawa vs. Noriel, 108 SCRA 381
4. Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983
5. P. vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
6. P. vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting
opinion
of Justice FERNANDO in both cases)
CHAPTER X - THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Section 9. Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just
compensation
1. The inherent power of eminent domain,93 SCRA 663

178

2. Who may exercise it? How about a barangay? Yes provided


there is an approval of the President.
Read:
1. Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83
2. Procedure for the exercise
of said power; Extent of
payment to be made before
writ of possession shall be
issued in favor of the
government.
Value of property
expropriated
for
national
projects; Writ of possession when
it shall be issued by the court;
when Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court and when RA 8974 shall
apply; full payment of just
compensation before government
takes over.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474
Tinga, J.
Facts:
In 2003, the Supreme Court held in AGAN VS. PIATCO,
402 SCRA 612 that the CONCESSION AGREEMENT FOR THE
BUILD OPERATE TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT OF THE
NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT PASSENGER
TERMINAL II between the Philippine Government and the
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) as well
as the amendments thereto is void for being contrary to law and
public policy. On Motion for Reconsideration (420 SCRA 420),
the Supreme Court held that:
This Court, however, is not
unmindful of the reality that the structures

179

comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are


almost complete and that funds have been
spent by PIATCO in their construction. For
the government to take over the said facility,
IT
HAS
TO
COMPENSATE
RESPONDENT PIATCO AS BUILDER
OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. THE
COMPENSATION MUST BE JUST
AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
AND
EQUITY
FOR
THE
GOVERNMENT CAN NOT UNJUSTLY
ENRICH ITSELF AT THE EXPENSE
OF PIATCO AND ITS INVESTORS.
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for
expropriation with the RTC of Pasay City seeking a writ of
possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control
over NAIA 3 facilities and deposited the amount of P3.0B in cash
with Land Bank of the Philippines representing the assessed value
of the terminals assessed value for taxation purposes.
On the same day, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order directing
the issuance of a writ of possession to the government to take or
enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. It held that it is
the ministerial duty of the government to issue writ of possession
upon deposit of the assessed value of the property subject of
expropriation.
However, on January 4, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued
another Order supplementing the December 21, 2004 Order. It
pointed out that the earlier orderas to the amount to be deposited
by the government was based on Section 2, Rule 67 when what
should be applicable is RA 8974 and therefore ordered that the
amount of US$62,343,175.77 be released to PIATCO instead of the
amount in the December 21, 2004 Order.
On January 7, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued another Order
directing the appointment of three (3) Commissioners to determine
just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.
Both Orders were questioned by the government as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

180

ISSUES:
1. What law is applicable in this expropriation
case: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or RA 8974?
2. If RA 8974 will be used, may the court used the
provision of Rule 67 on the 3 commissioners to
determine just compensation.
HELD:
1.
Application of Rule 67 would violate the AGAN Doctrine
which provides that for the government to take over the said
NAIA 3 facility, IT HAS TO COMPENSATE RESPONDENT
PIATCO AS BUILDER OF THE SAID STRUCTURES. If
Section 2, Rule 67 will be applied, PIATCO would be enjoined
from receiving the just compensation even if the government takes
over the NAIA 3 facility. It is sufficient that the government
deposits the amount equal to the assessed value of the facilities. It
would violate the proscription in the AGAN Decision that the
government must pay first the just compensation before taking
over the facilities.
So when shall Rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when
shall RA 8974 be used?
In all National government projects or national
infrastructure projects, like those covered by the BuildOperate-Transfer, RA 8974 shall be followed. The rest, Rule 67
shall apply.
Differences between the two laws on expropriation:
a. Under Rule 67, the government merely deposits the
assessed value of the property subject of expropriation and
can have a writ of possession over the same while under RA
8974, the scheme of immediate payment (100%) shall be
followed.
b. Under Rule 67, there can be writ of possession even if the
owner of the property has not received a single centavo while
under RA 8974, as in this case, Writ of Possession may not
be issued in favor of the government UNTIL ACTUAL

181

RECEIPT by PIATCO of the proferred value of just


compensation.
Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government, however,
it could already exercise acts of ownership over the NAIA 3
facilities.
The just compensation to be paid by the government shall be
determined within 60 days from the finality of the decision based
on Section 4, RA 8974.
2
Rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to
determine just compensation may be used since RA 8974 does not
provide for such procedure.

Just Compensation; Amount to


be deposited in court before a
Writ of Possession may be issued
by the court in favor of the
government; When to apply Rule
67 and when to apply RA No.
8974; Who owns the interest of
the initial amount deposited for
the purpose of issuing writ of
possession
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
HOLY
TRINITY
REALTY
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008
THE FACTS:
On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed
with the RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against
landowners whose properties would be affected by the
construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon
Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000

182

and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Holy


Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of
the affected landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a
sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value
of the affected properties, in the total amount of P28,406,700.00,
with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South Harbor Branch
(LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government depository. TRB
maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions
of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 42[5] in relation to Section 2
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC.
The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to
Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent or its duly
authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of
P22,968,000.00, out of TRBs advance deposit of P28,406,700.00
with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which accrued
thereon.
Thereafter, the RTC allowed the release of the principal
amount together with the interest to the respondent but on Motion
for Reconsideration of the TRB, it disallowed the withdrawal of
the interest reasoning out that the said issue will be included in the
second stage of expropriation, that is, the determination of just
compensation.
The private respondent elevated the issue to the Court of
Appeals which ruled that the respondent is entitled to the interest
by way of accession.
Hence, this petition of the government before the Supreme
Court.
I S S U E:

42

183

Who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited
representing the zonal value of the property sought to be
expropriated? The expropriator or the landowner?
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
The TRB claims that there are two stages 43[11] in expropriation
proceedings, the determination of the authority to exercise eminent
domain and the determination of just compensation. The TRB
argues that it is only during the second stage when the court will
appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlement to
interest, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco44[12] and
National Power Corporation v. Angas.45[13]
The TRB further points out that the expropriation account
with LBP-South Harbor is not in the name of HTRDC, but of
DPWH. Thus, the said expropriation account includes the
compensation for the other landowners named defendants in Civil
Case No. 869-M-2000, and does not exclusively belong to
respondent.
The said argument is without merit because it failed to
distinguish between the expropriation procedures under Republic
Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No.
8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different
procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation
proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus,
in Republic v. Gingoyon,46[14] we held:
There are at least two crucial differences between
the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is
required to make immediate payment to the
property owner upon the filing of the complaint to
be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule
67, the Government is required only to make an
initial deposit with an authorized government
depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the
43
44
45
46

184

initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the


property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No.
8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant
zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement
cost method.
xxxx
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which
eminent domain may be exercised by the Government.
Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary
guideline through which the State may expropriate
private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local
Government Code governs as to the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain
through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep.
Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure
projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a
procedure eminently more favorable to the property
owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances
when the national government expropriates property
for national government infrastructure projects. Thus,
if expropriation is engaged in by the national
government for purposes other than national
infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and
the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to
apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal
with the expropriation of properties intended for a national
government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly
applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. 8974, by
requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the
zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic.

185

The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the


deposit, but as to the ownership of the interest that had since
accrued on the deposited amount.
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the
interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation
account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on
the determination of who actually owns the deposited amount,
since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is
conferred by ownership of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right
by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or
which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar is part of the
deposited amount in the expropriation account of DPWH which
pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such amount, determined to be
P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already
ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized
representative. The Court of Appeals further recognized that the
deposit of the amount was already deemed a constructive delivery
thereof to HTRDC:
When the [herein petitioner] TRB deposited the
money as advance payment for the expropriated
property with an authorized government depositary
bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession, it is
deemed to be a constructive delivery of the amount
corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the
expropriated property. Since [HTRDC] is entitled
thereto and undisputably the owner of the principal
amount deposited by [herein petitioner] TRB,
conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank
deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the
money deposited.47[15]

47

186

Since the Court of Appeals found that the HTRDC is the


owner of the deposited amount, then the latter should also be
entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.
The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8974, which requires nothing less than the
immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property, based on
the current zonal valuation of the BIR, to the property owner.
Thus, going back to our ruling in Republic v. Gingoyon48[16]:
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No.
8974 to supersede the system of deposit
under Rule 67 with the scheme of
immediate payment in cases involving
national government infrastructure projects.
The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery
which gives legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver
on the part of the party making such delivery.49[17] The intention of
the TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to
comply with the requirement of immediate payment in Republic
Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession
over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence
implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to
HTRDCs Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as long
as HTRDC shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner
thereof.50[18]
A close scrutiny of TRBs arguments would further reveal
that it does not directly challenge the Court of Appeals
determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the
amount deposited in the expropriation account accrues to HTRDC
by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that HTRDC is entitled
only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated
property, nothing more and nothing less.
We agree in TRBs statement since it is exactly how the
amount of the immediate payment shall be determined in
accordance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, i.e., an
amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated
48
49
50

187

properties.
However, TRB already complied therewith by
depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of
DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said amount,
TRB is already considered to have paid the same to HTRDC, and
HTRDC became the owner thereof. The amount earned interest
after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of
the principal who is already determined as HTRDC. The interest is
paid by LBP-South Harbor on the deposit, and the TRB cannot
claim that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so
by law.
Since the respondent is the owner of P22,968,000.00, it is
entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the
said amount only.
We are not persuaded by TRBs citation of National Power
Corporation v. Angas and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,
in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part
and parcel of the determination of just compensation which should
be determined in the second stage of the proceedings only. We
find that neither case is applicable herein.
The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of
the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated
lands, the applicable law is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which
prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or Central Bank Circular No.
416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We ruled in
Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by
way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as
earnings from loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the
Civil Code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on
the other hand, we clarified that interests in the form of damages
cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just
compensation.
The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as
damages for delay in payment of just compensation. It concerns
interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation
account.
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing
agency of the government pays just compensation twice: (1)
immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to

188

be paid is 100% of the value of the property based on the current


relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial payment); and (2) when
the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation
becomes final and executory, where the implementing agency shall
pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and
the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).51
[19]

As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDCs withdrawal


of the amount of P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account,
provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from
any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner
thereof.52[21] The said conditions do not put in abeyance the
constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the
latters compliance therewith. Article 118753[22] of the Civil Code
provides that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once
the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the
constitution of the obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied
with the given conditions, as determined by the RTC in its
Order54[23] dated 21 April 2003, the effects of the constructive
delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount
in the expropriation account of DPWH.

BIGLANG-AWA VS. JUDGE


BACALLA, 354 SCRA 562
PURSUANT TO SECTION 2, RULE 67 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE DOCTRINE
LAID DOWN IN THE ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CASE,
THE ONLY REQUISITES FOR THE IMMEDIATE ENTRY
BY THE GOVERNMENT IN EXPROPRIATION CASES
ARE:
a. the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance; and

51
52
53
54

189

b. the making of a deposit equivalent to the ASSESSED


VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO
EXPROPRIATION.
The owners of the expropriated land are entitled to legal
interest on the compensation eventually adjudged from the
date the condemnor takes possession of the land until the full
compensation is paid to them or deposited in court.
New Requisites before immediate possession or writ of
possession may be issued in expropriation cases:
1. Complaint sufficient in form and substance; and
2. Payment of 15% of the Market value as appearing in the
latest Tax Declaration.
THE CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE
LEGASPI, RTC 22, ILOILO CITY, 444
SCRA 269
Requisites
before
the
expropriator
is
allowed
immediate entry on the property
subject of expropriation if the
expropriator
is
a
local
government unit.
The expropriator may immediately enter the property subject
of expropriation proceedings if the following requisites are
present:
1. the complaint for expropriation filed in court is
sufficient in form and substance; and
2. the expropriator must deposit the amount
equivalent to 15% of the fair market value
of the property to be expropriated based on
its current tax declaration.
GABATIN VS. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 444 SCRA 176

190

What is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation


proceedings in connection with the agrarian reform program of the
government.
Held:
The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform
program of the government partakes of the nature of an
expropriation proceedings. As such, in computing the just
compensation, it is the value of the land at the time of the
taking, not at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which
should be taken into consideration.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 441 SCRA
637
Just compensation in
expropriation cases; value of
the property when?
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure
is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. Market value is that
sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy,
and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as
a price to be given and received therefore.
The just compensation is determined as of the date of taking
of the property or the filing of the complaint for expropriation,
WHICHEVER COMES FIRST.
4. Basis of just compensation
Read:
a. NPC vs. Jocson, February 25, 1992
a-1. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Aug. 3, 1990
b. Mun. of Makati vs. CA, Oct. 1, 1990
c. Reublic vs. IAC, 185 SCRA 572
d. Mun. of Talisay vs. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528
e. NPC vs. CA, 129 SCRA 665
f. Maddumba vs. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281

191

Read also:
1. Meaning of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings, 29 SCRA 868
Basis of just compensation (Exceptional case)
BERKENKOTTER, INC. VS. COURT
OF APPEALS
AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
December 14, 1992
Cruz, J.
Facts:
-----1. On June 18, 1982, Vicente Viray, then President of
Apolinario Apacible School of Fisheries, a government
institution in Nasugbu, Batangas, sent the petitioner a
written offer to buy the property of the latter with an
area of 10,640 square meters for its 5-year expansion
program;
2. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at
P50.00 per square meter in its reply;
3. Viray then requested the Office of the Provincial
Assessor of the Province of Batangas to appraise the
land and the latter fixed its market value at P32.00 per
square meter;
4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed
willingness to buy the latter's property at P32.00 per
square meter. The petitioner, however, stuck to its
original valuation. Later on, it said that its property had
in fact appreciated to as much as P100.00 per square
meter;
5. On October 28, 1983, the Republic of the Philippines
filed a complaint for the expropriation of the
petitioner's property and invoked the assessment made

192

by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the


Provincial Assessor of Batangas in the amount of
P32.00. The government likewise sought immediate
possession of the property upon deposit of 10% of the
total assessment in accordance with PD 48;
6. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the
expropriation but later abandoned this objection and
concentrated only on what it
called the
"underappraisal" of the subject land;
7. The RTC then appointed a panel of commissioners in
accordance with Rule 67, ection 5, of the Rules of
Court, to determine the just compensation to be paid for
the land;
8. On September 23, 1985, the panel of commissioners
submitted its report to the trial court and pegged the
market value at P85.00 per square meter;
9. The Republic of the Philippines objected and
pointed to three (3) contracts of sale executed by the
petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of
land similar in topography and adjacent to the property
in question for the unit price of only P19.18 per square
meter;
10. The court directed the commissioners to convene
anew and to receive additional evidence. However, in
its second report dated April 1, 1987, the panel
reiterated its original recommendation of P85.00/sq.
m. or a total of P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to
be expropriated. The trial court acting on this
recommendation rendered judgment requiring the
Republic to pay the petitioner the amount of
P904,400.00 for the entire area sought to be
expropriated;
11. The government appealed the trial court's decision
to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision
REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION
and declaring that the fair market value which should
be the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the

193

government to the petitioner shall be P19.18, the


market value according set by the petitioner if we
follow the three (3) deeds of sale it executed in favor of
three (3) different individuals;
12. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this
instant petition claiming that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that P19.18 per square meter should be the
basis of the computation for the just compensation of
its property because:
a. Viray even offered the amount of P32.00 per
squaremeter as the fair market value;
b. that P32.00 per square meter was the
appraised value made by the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Batangas; and
c. the complaint itself prays that the market value
be pegged at P32.00 per square meter.
Issue:
-----WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS IN THE
COMPUTATION OF THE JUST COMPENSATION:
P32.00/SQ. M. IN
ACCORANCE WITH THE
APPRAISAL OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR;
P100.00/SQ.M. AS CLAIMED BY THE OWNER;
P85.00/SQ. M. AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY
THE COURT TO EVALUATE THE SAME, OR
P19.18 PER SQUARE METER WHICH WAS THE
SELLING PRICE IN AN ADJACENT LOT SOLD
BY THE PETITIONER TO THREE PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS.
Held.
----The basis
in the computation
of just
compensation shall be P19.18 per square meter or the

194

price which the petitioner sold its other lots to other


individuals.
This is so because there is no showing that the
petitioner had any special reason for granting each of
the individual vendees the extraordinary discount
amounting to as much as 75% of its claimed real
value of the land. To all appearances, they were
ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own
private purposes only and not for the public purpose
invoked by the government.
The petitioner's claim that the value as
appearing in the deeds of sale in the three other
parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation
"because owners usually undervalue the selling price of
the property to lower the expenses they would have to
pay for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax"
is practically an admission that it did not indicate the
actual consideration in the three transactions where it
was made to appear that the price per square meter was
only P19.18. If this was the purpose of the petitioner
when it executed the 3 deeds of sale, then IT IS
SURELY HOIST NOW BY ITS OWN PETARD. AND
RIGHTLY SO, FOR IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM ITS OWN DECEPTION AND
CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SHOULD
BE ASSESSED AT THE HIGHER RATE
IT
CLANDESTINELY AGREED UPON WITH THE
BUYERS.
The Court is disappointed that the petitioner
should demand a higher price from the republic, which
needs the land for a public purpose, when it was willing
to accept less from the three individual buyers who had
only their private interests to serve.
The fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels
of land at P19.18 per square meter which are
admittedly of the same topography as that subject of
this case, it impliedly admitted that the price for the
latter should be the same as the former. This rule of
consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying,

195

surely not unknown to the petitioner, THAT WHAT IS


SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS ALSO SAUCE FOR
THE GANDER.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the proerty sought to be expropriated
(Association of Small Landowners vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 378). The measure is not
the taker's gain but the owner's loss. he compensation,
to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to
the taker.
To determine just compensation, the trial court
should first ascertain the market value of the property,
to which should be added the consequential benefits
which may arise from the expropriation.
The market value of the property is the price
that may be agreed upon by the parties willing but
not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at
the fair market value are:
1. cost of acquisition;
2. the current value of like proerties;
3. its actual or potential uses;
4. particular case of lands;
5. their size, shape, location; and
6. the tax declarations thereon.
Finally, note that as held in the case of Republic
vs. Santos, 141 SCRA 30, the market value as
recommended by
the board of commissioners
appointed by the court were at best only ADVISORY
AND PERSUASIVE AND BY NO MEANS FINAL
OR BINDING.
2. NHA vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245
3. Manotok vs. CA, May 21,1987
4. EPZA vs. Dulay, April 29,l987
5. Lagunzad vs. CA, 154 SCRA 199

196

When it is considered for "public use":


6. Sumulong vs. Guererro, 154 SCRA 461
7. Republic vs. CA, 154 SCRA 428
8.Cosculluela vs. CA, 164 SCRA 393
5. Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain cases
Read:
1. Rep. vs. Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336
Requisites of taking:
a. the expropriator must enter the property;
b. the entrance must not be for just a momentary period;
c. the entry must be under warrant of color or title;
d. the property must be devoted for public use; and
e. the owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land.
2. Ignacio vs. Guererro, 150 SCRA 369
3. Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 597
6. Not a valid exercise of eminent domain
Read:
1. City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40
Phil. 349
( A private property which is devoted to public use may not be
expropriated for another public purpose.)
2. De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
87335, February 12, 1989
Expropriation
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
1. On February 20, 1979, the Rep. of the Philippines initiated an
expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses

197

standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets, among them


Cristina de Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some
other fifteen defendants in Civil Case No. 7001-P;
2. In June, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines prayed for the
issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated
on the ground that it had already deposited with the PNB 10% of
the amount of compensation stated in the complaint; that on June
14, 1979, the Lower Court issued a writ of possession authorizing
the Republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a
committee to determine just compensation;
3. On July 16, 1979, De Knecht went to the Supreme Court on a
petition for certiorari and prohibition directed against the June 14,
1979 order of the lower court;
4. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme Court rendered its decision
granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition and directing
that the Order of the respondent Judge dated June 14, 1979 be SET
ASIDE and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from
taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P;
5. On August 8, 1981, the defendants in Civil Case No. 7001moved for the dismissal of said case since the decision of the
Supreme Court is already final;
6. On September 2, 1983, the Republic moved for the dismissal of
the case due to the encatment of BP 340 expropriating the same
properties for the same purpose. On the same date, the Court
dismissed the case. The defendants moved for a reconsideration
which the Court denied;
7. De Knecht appealed the Order dismissing the case to the Court
of Appeals who on December 28, 1988 issued its decision setting
aside the Order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation
proceedings before the lower court on the ground that the choice of
the above-mentioned streets as the line through which the EDSA
should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval;
8. The Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Review with
the Supreme Court.

198

Issue:
Whether or not the legislature could still pass a law
expropriating the lots of the private respondents despite the
existence of a final decision of the Supreme Court which held that
choice of their lot to be used as an extension of EDSA is arbitrary?
Held:
It is true that there is already a final decision of the Supreme
Court to the effect that the choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan
Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
However, it is equally true that the Constitution and our laws may
expropriate private properties after the payment of just
compensation. When on February 17, 1983, the Batasang
Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the
same purpose, IT APPEARS THAT THE SAME WAS BASED
ON SUPERVENING EVENTS THAT OCCURRED after the
decision of the SC in De Knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social
impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension
has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of the area
have been relocated and duly compensated and only DE KNECHT
now is left while her property is only about 5% of the area to be
expropriated. The Republic could continue it expropriation
proceedings considering the supervening events after the decision
was rendered.
BP Bilang 340 THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDED
THE AFORESAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF
THE SUPREME COURT. X x x THE COURT AGREES IN THE
WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF ENACTING BP 340. THUS
THE ANTERIOR DECISION OF THIS COURT MUST YIELD
TO THIS SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
************************
Cruz, J., concurring
Supervening events have changed the factual basis of the SC's
decision to justify the subsequent enactment of the statute. If we
are sustaining the legislation, it is not because we concede that the
lawmakers can nullify the findings of the Court in the exercise of
its discretion. It is simply because we ourselves have found that

199

under the changed situation, the present expropriation is no longer


arbitrary.
I MUST ADD THAT THIS DECISION IS NOT A REVERSAL
OF THE ORIGINAL DE KNECHT CASE, WHICH WAS
DECIDED UNDER A DIFFERENT SET OF FACTS.
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CRISTINA DE
KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 87335,
February 12, 1989
3-a. Limitations of the power of expropriation, 3

SCRA

706
7. When shall we base the computation of the value of the property
expropriated: at the time of taking or at the time of the institution
of the expropriation proceedings?
8. Eminent domain cases, in general
Read:
1. City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, 106 Phil. 144
2. Garcia vs. CA, 102 SCRA 620
3. Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503
4. Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734
5. Arce vs. Genito, Feb. 27, 1976
6. Guido vs. RPA, 84 Phil. 847
7. Rep. vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461
8. Mataas na Lupa vs. Dimayuga, 130 SCRA 30
9. San Diego vs. Valdellon, 80 SCRA 305
10. Haguisan vs. Emilia, 131 SCRA 517
11. Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220
12. Commissioner vs. Burgos, March 31,1980
13. Republic vs. Juan, 92 SCRA 29
CHAPTER XI - THE NONIMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Section 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1. Read:

200

1. Kabiling, et al., vs. NHA, December 18,l987


2. Clements vs. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702
3. Co vs. PNB, 114 SCRA 842
4. Lozano vs. Martinez,146 SCRA 323
5. Rutter vs. Esteban,93 Phil. 68
6. Ilusorio vs. CAR, 17 SCRA 25
7. Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533
8. Ganzon vs. Insierto, 123 SCRA 713
9. Del Rosario vs. De los Santos, March 21, 1968
10. Abella vs. NLRC, 152 SCRA 140
11. PVBEU vs. PVB, 189 SCRA 14
CHAPTER XII - RIGHTS DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Rights of a person under custodial detention for one
suspected or arrested as a terrorist.
NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human
Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic
Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6, 2007
and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law
shall be automatically suspended one (1)
month before and two (2) months after the
holding of any election)
Section 21. Rights of a person under custodial
detention.- The moment a person charged with or suspected
of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he
shall forthwith be informed by the arresting police or law
enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned
is brought, of his or her right:
1. to be informed of the nature and cause of his
arrest, to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel
of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement
officers concerned shall immediately contact the
free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the Public
attorneys office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the

201

2.
3.
4.

5.

free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAOs


thus contacted to immediately visit the person
detained and provide him with legal assistance.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of the counsel of choice;
informed of the cause or causes of his detention in
the presence of his legal counsel;
allowed to communicate freely with his legal
counsel and to confer with them at any time
without restriction;
allowed to communicate freely and privately
without restrictions with the members of his
family or with his nearest relatives and be visited
by them; and
allowed freely to avail of the services of a
physician or physicians of choice.

Section 23. Requirement for an official custodial


logbook and its contents.- The police or other law
enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terroriam or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed
under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely and
orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby declared
as public document and opened and made available for
inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person
under custody or any member of his family or relative by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or his physician
at any time of the day without any form of restriction. The
logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of:
1. name, description, and address of the detained
person;
2. date and exact time of his initial admission for
custodial arrest and detention;
3. the name and address of the physician/s who
examined him physically and medically;
4. the state of his health and his physical condition a
the time of his initial admission for custodial
detention;
5. the date and time of each removal of the detained
person from his cell for interrogation or for any
purpose;

202

6. the date and time of his return to his cell;


7. name and address of the physician who examined
him physically and medically;
8. summary of the physical and medical findings
after each interrogation;
9. names and addresses of the members of his family
and relatives;
10.
names and addresses of the persons who
visited him;
11.
date and time of such visits;
12.
date and time when the detained person
requested to communicate or confer with his
lawyer;
13.
the date and time of visits by his legal
counsel and the date and time of departure; and
14.
all other important events bearing on all
relevant details regarding the treatment of the
detained person while under custodial arrest or
detention.
Section 24. No torture or coercion in Investigation
and interrogation. No threat, intimidation, or coercion, and
no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or
torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure on the
detained person which shall vitiate his free will shall be
employed in his investigation and interrogation; otherwise,
the evidence obtained from said detained person shall be in
its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding or hearing.
1. The summary of the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation (from the time of arrest)
PEOPLE VS. MAHINAY, February 1, 1999
Rights of the accused during custodial investigation;
obligations of the arresting officers and investigators during
and after arrest; effect of non-compliance by the investigators
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. MAHINAY, G.R. No. 122485,
February 1, 1999

203

En Banc
Per Curiam:
Considering the heavy penalty of death and in
order to ensure that evidence against an accused were
obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian
of the rights of the people, lays down the
PROCEDURE, GUIDELINES, AND DUTIES WHICH
THE ARRESTING, DETAINING, INVITING OR
INVESTIGATING OFFICER OR HIS COMPANIONS
MUST OBSERVE AT THE TIME OF MAKING THE
ARREST AND AGAIN AT AND DURING THE TIME
OF THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION OR
INTERROGATION IN ACCORDANCE with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438.
It is high time to educate our law enforcement agencies
who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the socalled Miranda rights which had become insufficient
and which the court must update in the light of new
legal developments.
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under
custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown a copy of
the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has the right to remain
silent and that any statement he makes may be used
as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be
assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his
own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or
cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be

204

engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be


appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer,
, he must be informed that no custodial investigation
in any form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has
been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any
time, he has the right to communicate or confer by
the most expedient means---telephone, radio, letter
or messenger---with his lawyer (either retained or
appointed), any member of his immediate family; or
any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him
or by any one from his immediate family or by his
counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national
or
international
non-governmental
organization.
IT
SHALL
BE
THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICER TO
ENSURE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive
any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he
understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to
a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in
writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise,
he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he
insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he
may indicate in any manner at any time or state of
the process that he does not wish to be questioned
with the warning that once he makes such indication,
the police may not interrogate him if the same had
not yet commenced, or the interrogation has begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his
initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to

205

counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from


invoking it at any other time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some information or
statements;
11. He must be informed that any statement OR
EVIDENCE, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part,
SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
(NOTE: Any violation of the foregoing rights of the accused
shall entitle him to sue for damages against the arresting or
investigating officers in accordance with RA7438, not to
mention the possible criminal liability of said persons under
existing laws).
LATEST CASES ON THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON DURING
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Rights
during
custodial
investigation; when custodial
investigation is deemed to have
started; right to be informed of
the nature and cause of
accusation against him.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR., et al., 475
SCRA 248
Ynares-Santiago, J.
Facts:
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National
Power Corporation intended for the purchase of US Dollars from
the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), the accused-appellants
were charged of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial
Documents as defined and penalized under Arts. 217 and 171 [8]

206

in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial, all


accused were convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
While the Information charged the accused of willful and
intentional commission of the acts complained of while the
Decision found the accused guilty of inexcusable negligence.
Accused Ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his
conviction was based on his alleged sworn statement and the
transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with an
NPC personnel and the report of the NBI. He maintains that he
signed the sworn statement while confined a the Philippine heart
center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him.
He was not assisted by counsel nor he was apprised of his
constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. He likewise
claimed that his constitutional rights to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against and due process were violated.
Held:
1. Even if the information charges willful malversation,
conviction for malversation through negligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of
commission of the offense. (Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302
SCRA 118). This was the doctrine laid down in the case of
Samson vs. Court of appeals, 103 Phil. 277.
2. The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in
accordance with section 12 [1] of the Bill of Rights is not
tenable. The investigation under said provision refers to
custodial investigation where a suspect has already been
taken into police custody and that the investigating officers
begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions
or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial
investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has began to focus on a particular person as a
suspect (People vs. Duenas, Jr., 426 SCRA 666). Clearly,
therefore, the rights enumerated by the accused are not
available BEFORE GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATORS
ENTER THE PICTURE. The protective mantle of section
12, article III does not apply to administrative investigations
(People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216); confession to a

207

private individual (Kimpo vs. CA, 232 SCRA 53); verbal


admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of
the investigation (People vs. Ordono, 334 SCRA 673); or
even to a Mayor approached as a personal confidante and not
in his official capacity (People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589). In
fact, even a videotaped interview where the accused
willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is not
covered by the said provision though the trial courts were
warned by the supreme Court to take extreme caution in
admitting similar confessions because of the distinct
possibility that the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television (People vs. Endino, 353 SCRA 307).
Clearly, the confession of the accused was obtained during
an administrative investigation by NPC and therefore, the same
was not covered by Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution.
PEOPLE VS. FIGUEROA, 335 SCRA 349
Under Art. III, Section 12 [1] of the Constitution, a
suspect in custodial investigation must be:
1. informed of his right to remain silent;
2. warned that anything he says can be and will be
used against him;
3. told that he has the right to counsel, and that if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him.
In this case, accused-appellant was given no more than
a perfunctory recitation of his rights, signifying nothing
more than a feigned compliance with the constitutional
requirements. (People vs. Samolde, July 31, 2000)
It is always incumbent on the prosecution to prove
at the trial that, prior to in-custody questioning, the
confessant was informed of his constitutional rights.
The presumption of regularity of official acts does not
prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the

208

arresting officers complied with the


above
constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during the
custodial investigation, are inadmissible not only
against the DECLARANT but with more so against 3rd
persons. THIS IS SO EVEN IF SUCH STATEMENTS
ARE GOSPEL TRUTH AND VOLUNTARILY
GIVEN.
Such statements are useless EXCEPT AS
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE VERY POLICE
AUTHORITIES WHO VIOLATED THE SUSPECTS
RIGHTS.
PEOPLE VS. BARIQUIT, 341 SCRA 600
When custodial investigation is deemed to have started.
The protection under Section 12 , Art. III of the
Constitution begins when a person is taken into custody
for investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime, or from the time he is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of the crime,
although not yet in custody.
Custodial investigation begins when it is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts i9nterrogating or
exacting confession from the suspect in connection with
an alleged offense.
THE PLACE OF INTERROGATION IS NOT
DETERMINATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OR
ABSENCE OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BUT
THE TONE AND MANNER OF QUESTIONING BY
THE POLICE AUTHORITIES. Thus, there was
custodial investigation when the police authorities,
upon their arrest of some of the accused, immediately
asked them regarding their participation in the
commission of the crime , even while they were still
walking along the highway on their way to the police
station. This is line with the provisions of RA 7438

209

which makes it applicable even when a person is


merely invited for questioning.
PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA
515, SEPT. 1, 2000; PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, G.R.
NO. 135405, 346 SCRA 458, NOVEMBER 29, 2000.
However, spontaneous statements voluntarily
given, as where appellant orally admitted killing the
victim before the barangay captain (who is neither a
police officer nor a law enforcement agent), do not fall
under custodial investigation. Such admission, even
without the assistance of a lawyer, does not violate
appellants constitutional rights AND THEREFORE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
PEOPLE VS. DANO, G.R. NO. 117690, 339 SCRA
515, SEPT. 1, 2000; PEOPLE VS. SAMOLDE, G.R.
NO. 128551, 336 SCRA 632, JUL. 31, 2000.
To be admissible in evidence, an extrajudicial
confession must be: (i) voluntary; (ii) made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (iii)
express; and (iv) in writing.
A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal,
when taken without the assistance of counsel, without a
valid waiver of such assistance, regardless of the
absence of coercion or the fact that it had been
voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if
appellants confession were gospel truth.
2. Guidelines for police investigation
Read:
1.Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 US 478
2. Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436
3. P. vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379
2-a. Duties of the Police or Arresting Officers

210

Read:
1. P. vs. Matos-Viduya, Sept. 11, 1990
1-a. P vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289
2. P vs. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100
3. P vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2
4. P vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312
3. To be informed of the Right to remain silent; cases
particular

in

Read:
1. Constitutional right to remain silent,104 SCRA
1-a. People vs. Marcos Jimenez, Dec. 10, 1991

391

Extrajudicial confession; counsel of choice


Right to counsel during custodial
investigation; while making an
extrajudicial confession
PEOPLE VS. PATUNGAN, 354 SCRA
413
The accused was under coercive and uncounselled custodial
investigation by the police without a lawyer for 2 and a half days .
Then, he was brought to the IBP Office where a lawyer would
assist him in his extrajudicial confession.
We are inclined to believe that when he was brought to the
IBP Office, his body and his will were in no position to raise any
objection much less to complaint to the IBP lawyer about what he
has gone through. In fact, the IBP lawyer was working on an
appeal in another case while the extrajudicial confession was being
taken.
The mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement of assistance of counsel.
Assistance of counsel must be effective, vigilant and independent.
A lawyer who could just hear the investigation going on while
working on another case hardly satisfies the minimum

211

requirements of effective assistance of counsel. Not only was the


accused subjected to custodial investigation without counsel, he
was likewise denied effective assistance of counsel during the
taking of his extra-judicial confession.
PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ
G.R.No. 82604. December 10, 1991
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
----------On August 13, 1985, police authorities, acting upon a report,
came upon the corpse of Pelagio Jimenez below a cliff near a balite
tree. The police investigators learned that Marcos, the son of the
deceased Pelagio Jimenez told his mother that his father had not
come home the previous night: that the search for the deceased,
who was living separately from them, commmenced a day earlier
but it was not until the morning of the following day, August 13,
1985, that deceased Pelagio was finally found dead. They also
learned from the persons they interviewed of circumstances that
drew their suspicion to the son, Marcos and Robert, such as; the
bathing at the artisian well "as if washing away stains of blood";the
deceased's violent quarrels with his children and occasions that he
had been boxed and hit by his children. The police had invited the
deceased's widow and her sons for questioning about the killing.
Adraft of the confession was prepared by the investigating officer
but Marcos was not able to sign the same due to the absence of the
judge before whom it is suppoed to be sworn and signed. Marcos
agreed to come back and sign his statement, but upon his return,
he, assisted by a former judge whose presence was requested by
the police authorities, refused to sign his statement. Subsequently,
an information for parricide was filed against the widow and her
sons, Marcos, Robert, and Wilkins. In an order dated July 21,
1986, the trial court absolved the widow and Wilkins of any
participation in the filling for lack of proof. On December 12.
1986, the trial court found Marcos and Robert guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, noting that the unsigned
confession is admissible in evidence inasmuch as evidence aliunde
corroborated such confession. Both accused contest such ruling.
Hence this appeal.

212

ISSUE:
---------Is the extrajudicial confession of Marcos admissible in
evidence?
HELD:
--------No. Decision reversed.
Section 12 (1), Article III OF THE 1987 Constitution
declares that a person being investigated by the police as a suspect
in an offense has the right, among others, (1) to have a competent
and independent counsel of his own choice and if he cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one; and that (2)
said right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial
interrogation should be of the latter's own choice, not one foisted
on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case, the
former judge whose assistance was requested by the police was
evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own choice; she was the police
officers' own choice; she did not ask Marcos if was is willing to
have her represent him. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal
assistance contemplated by the constitution.
Furthermore, the former judge was not present when Marcos
was being interrogated by the police. While she asked him if he
had voluntarily given the statements contained in the typewritten
document, this is far from being substantial compliance with the
constitutional duty of police investigators during custodial
interrogation.
The typewritten confession is unsigned and was in fact
expressly rejected by Marcos. Hence, the supposed waiver made
therein of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice.
Neither can the confession prejudice his co-accused, his
brother Robert, not only because it was obtained in violation of the
constitution but also because of the principle of res inter alios acta.

213

The interrogation of Marcos Jimenez having been conducted


without the assistance of counsel, and no valid waiver of such right
to counsel have been made, not only the confession but also any
admissible obtained in the course therof are inadmissible against
him or his co accused. In view of the inadmissibility in evidence of
the confession, the rest of the evidence of the prosecution is
inadequate to overcome the presumption of innocence raised by
the fundamental law in favor of both the accused.
Extrajudicial confession without
the assistance of counsel,
inadmissible
as
evidence;
exception
PEOPLE VS. PANFILO CABILES, 284
SCRA 199; PEOPLE VS. TAN, 286
SCRA 207
Melo, J.
Even if the confession of the accused speaks the truth, if it
was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it was
voluntarily given.
In order that a confession is admissible, the following
requisites must be present:
a. the confession must be voluntary;
b. the confession must be made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel;
c. the confession must be express; and
d. the confession must be in writing.
The above requirements, however, are not applicable when
the suspect makes an spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, BUT GIVEN IN AN ORDINARY
MANNER WHEREBY THE ACCUSED ORALLY ADMITTED
HAVING COMMITTED THE CRIME. This was the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE VS. ANDAN, March 3,
1997 when the accused made a voluntary and verbal confession to

214

the Municipal Mayor that he committed the crime imputed to him.


As such, his uncounselled confession is admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE VS. OBRERO, 332 SCRA 190
Mendoza, J.
There are two (2) kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions
under Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution. These are:
a. confession which are the product of third degree methods
such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation; and
b. those which are given without the benefit of Miranda
Warnings.
There is no compliance of the constitutional requirement of
competent and independent counsel to assist an accused during
custodial investigation when the accused was assisted by the
Station Commander of the WPD, Atty. De los Reyes, while being
investigated by other policemen of the same police station because
the interest of the police is naturally adverse to the accused. In fact,
the SC in the case of PEOPLE VS. JANUARIO, 267 SCRA 608
held that a lawyer applying for a position in the NBI could not
validly assist an accused being investigated then by the NBI.
1-b. P. vs. Aspili, November 21, 1990
1-c. People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216
1-d. P. vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 675
1-e. People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47
1-f. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 675
2. P. vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465
3. P vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109
4. Draculan vs. Donato, 85 SCRA 266
5. P. vs. Borromeo, June 29,l983
6. P vs. Camalog, GR No. 77116, January 31, 1989
(Including the duty of Police Officers in
connection with
said right)
7. P vs. Cui, Jr., 162 SCRA 220
3-a. How about if the accused gives an spontaneous statement
before he could be advised of his right to remain silent?
Read:

215

Aballe vs. People, 183 SCRA 196


3-b. When shall the constitutional rights of the
accused as
mentioned above demandable? During police line-up?
Read:
1. P vs. Usman Hassan, 157 SCRA 261
2. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 642
3. DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196
4. PEOPLE VS. HATTON
4. The right to counsel; Waiver of the right to
counsel/exceptions/requisites
PEOPLE VS. JEREZ, 285 SCRA 393
A lawyer provided by the investigators to the accused during
the custodial investigation is deemed engaged by the accused
where he never raised any objection against the formers
appointment during the course of the investigation AND THE
ACCUSED THEREAFTER SUBSCRIBES TO THE VERACITY
OF HIS STATEMENT BEFORE THE SWEARING OFFICER.
(NOTE: In the case of PEOPLE VS. JUANERIO,
February 7, 1997, the SC held that a lawyer who was at the NBI
Office applying for a position therein and who was appointed as
counsel for a suspect being then investigated by the NBI could not
be considered as the competent and independent counsel referred
to in the Constitution especially so that later on, said lawyer was
appointed by the NBI as one of its agents.)
Read also:
1. The right to counsel, 57 SCRA 481
1-a. P vs. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623
1-b. P vs. Hernandez, 162 SCRA 422
1-c. P. vs. Ampo-an, July 4, 1990
1-d. P. vs. Saludar, July 31, 1990
1-e. P. vs. Kidagan, August 20, 1990
1-f. Estacio vs. Sandiganbayan, 183 SCRA 12
1-g. P. vs. Buenaflor, 181 SCRA 225

216

2. P vs. Tampus, 96 SCRA 624


3. P vs. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373
4. P vs. Tawat, 129 SCRA 431
5. P vs. Marcos, 147 SCRA 204 (Note that this
widely criticized by
constitutionalists)
6. P vs. Ladrera, 150 SCRA 113
7. P. Nulla, 153 SCRA 471
8. P vs. Marquez, 153 SCRA 700
9. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
10. P vs. Caguioa, January 17, 1980
ll. P vs. Pecardal, 145 SCRA 624
12. P vs. Lasac, 148 SCRA 624
13. P vs. Pena, 80 SCRA 589
14. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516

decision is

How about if the lawyer who assisted him during custodial


investigation is a public attorney who was not chosen by the
accused himself but given to him free of charge?
Read:
P. vs. Alegria, September 28, 1990
Could the Fiscal also represent the accused during custodial
investigation to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that the
accused is assisted by counsel?
Read:
P. vs. Matos-Viduaya, September 11, 1990
5. Right to remain silent and to counsel and the right
to be
informed of such rights; cases in general/when does these rights
demandable? Effect of its non-observance by the investigator
Read:
1. P vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123
1-a. P vs. Lasanas, 152 SCRA 27
1-b. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
1-c. P vs. Capitin, 165 SCRA 47
1-a. Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642
1-b. P vs. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760

217

1-c. P vs. Velasco, 110 SCRA 319


2. Diokno vs. Enrile, 110 SCRA 140
3. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538
4. P vs. Rojas, January 8, l987
5. P vs. Santiago, January 7,1987
6. P vs. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496
5-a. Is the right to counsel indispensable in non-criminal
proceedings?
Read:
1. Nera vs. Auditor Genral, 164 SCRA 1
6. Presumptions on extrajudicial confessions(that official acts were
regularly performed as against the presumption against waiver of
constitutional rights)
Read:
1. P vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379
2. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516
3. P vs. Abano, 145 SCRA 555
4. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
5. P vs. Salig, 133 SCRA 59
6. P vs. Cruz, 133 SCRA 426
7. P vs. Prudente,, 133 SCRA 651
8 P vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714, when the
regularity does not apply
7. Who can object to the admissibility of an
confession?

presumption of
extrajudicial

Read:
1. Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra
2. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 576
3. P. vs. loveria, July 2, 1990
8. Inadmissible as evidence
a. The doctrine of the "fruit of the poisoned

tree"

218

PEOPLE VS. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y


CAMACHO
GR No. 125333, March 20, 2002
En Banc
Facts:
1. In the morning of September 19, 1995, accused-appellant
and his cousin, RONNIE GARCIA were drinking gin in a
canteen in Urdaneta, Pangasinan;
2. At around 10 a.m. of the same day, Rosita Mangunay saw
both persons walking along Ambrosio St., in the poblacion
and noticed that they smelled liquor when they greeted
her;
3. In the early afternoon of the same day, accused-appellant
and his cousin went to look for 6-year old Maria Lourdes
Galinato, also known as Tisay and found her playing
inside a jeepney and took her;
4. At around 2:45 p.m. of the same day, Mangunay again saw
the accused-appellant walking along Ambrosio St.,
carrying Tisay who was crying and struggling. She
claimed that she clearly saw the accused-appellant since
they were walking towards each other coming from
opposite directions;
5. Before 3 to 4 p.m., prosecution witness Natividad
Bernardo, saw accused-appellant pass their house carrying
a child who looked about 5-6 years old.
6. At about the same time, witness Leah Magno saw the
accused-appellant carrying a child was seen heading
towards the wooded area in the Macalong River;
7. By 5 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. of that same day, Magno saw
accused-appellant walking alone to town coming from the
direction of the Macalong River;
8. Meanwhile, the parents of Tisay were frantically searching
for their child and when their search proved futile, they

219

reported the matter to the Barangay Captain and to the


Police;
9. Upon receipt of the information that the child was last
seen with the accused-appellant, the police together with
the Barangay Captains of Camantiles and Bayaoas,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, proceeded to the house of the
accused-appellant;
10. As they approached the house, the accused-appellant
jumped out of the window carrying a black bag. The
police authorities gave chase and finally caught him after
twenty (20) exhausting hours;
11. After his arrest, accused-appellant was brought to the
Urdaneta Police Station where he admitted that he raped,
killed and buried Maria Lourdes near the Macalong River
in Barangay San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, while
UNDER
INVESTIGATION
WITHOUT
THE
ASSISTANCE OF A LAWYER. INDEED, THE BODY
OF TISAY WAS FOUND IN THE PLACE WHICH HE
DESCRIBED
DURING
HIS
CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
12. After trial, the trial court (RTC 45 presided over by
JUDGE JOVEN COSTALES) rendered a judgment of
conviction and imposing the penalty of death to the
accused-appellant. The court admitted as evidence the
extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant and used
the same as one of the grounds in support of the judgment
of conviction.
1. I S S U E S
1. Is the extrajudicial confession of the accused appellant
admissible in evidence?
2. Whether the lower court erred in convicting in convicting the
accused-appellant?
Held:
1

220

The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused while


under custodial investigation and without the assistance of counsel
is inadmissible in evidence despite the fact that he was allegedly
appraised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel.
This is so because under the 1987 Constitution, the said
rights could not be waived except in the presence of counsel. As
such, in accordance with the doctrine of the fruit of the poisoned
tree, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
Any information or admission given by a person while in
custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time
without the competent assistance or an independent counsel should
be struck down as inadmissible.
2
Though the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant
is inadmissible as evidence, his conviction by the trial court is
correct. This is so because [1] the compromising circumstances
were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which
lead with moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the
crime charged; and [2] the totality of such circumstances
eliminated beyond doubt the possibility of his innocence. In People
vs. Mahinay, it was held that conviction may be had on
circumstantial evidence provided the following requisites are
present: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence in this case are more than sufficient to prove
the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence is not a weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence
and cases have recognized that circumstantial evidence in its
weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its
effect upon the Supreme Court.
(NOTE: The indemnification for the death of a person in a
rape with Homicide cases was increased from P50,000.00 to
P125,000.00. The said indemnity shall also be applicable

221

where the death penalty is authorized by applicable


amendatory laws))
b. The exclusionary rule, 145 SCRA 700
Read:
1. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 516
2. P vs. Alcaraz,136 SCRA 74
3. Does it also include the confession of a
accused?

witness, not the

Read:
1. P vs. Bombesa, 162 SCRA 402
2. p. vs. Yutuc, July 26, 1990
9. Sec. 12(2)
Read:
1. Dizon vs. Gen. Eduardo, May 3,1988
2. P vs. Eligino, August 11,1988
3. Contado vs. Tan, April 15, 1988
10. Extrajudicial confession; when admissible or

inadmissible

Read:
1. The admissibility of an extrajudicial
criminal prosecution,142 SCRA 110

confession in a

2. Admissibility of an extrajudicial
SCRA 419 and 10 SCRA 520

confession,135

3. Inadmissibility of an admission obtained by


114 SCRA 234

force,

4. Confession as evidence against the accused, 96


SCRA 637
Read:

222

5. P vs. Camalog, January 31, 1989


5-a. P vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533
5-b. P vs. Lagahan, December 8, 1988
5-c. P vs. Dino, 160 SCRA 197
5-d. P vs. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150
5-e. P vs. Enciso, 160 SCRA 728
5-d. P vs. Abano, 145 SCRA 565
5-e. P vs. Quizon, 142 SCRA 362
5-f. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
5-g. P vs. Robles, 104 SCRA 450
5-h. P vs. Eligino, 164 SCRA 260
5-i. P vs. Abejero, May 17,l980
5-j. P. vs. Bagano, 181 SCRA 34
5-k. P. vs. Estevan, 186 SCRA 184
5-l. P. vs. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184
5-m. P. vs. Flores, 186 SCRA 303
5-n. P. vs. Jungco, 186 SCRA 714
5-o. P. vs. Arsenio, 184 SCRA 205
6. P vs. Villanueva, 128 SCRA 488
7. P vs. Dejaresco, 129 SCRA 576
8. P vs. Tuvera, 130 SCRA 169
9. P vs. Maternal, 130 SCRA 625
10. P vs. Nilos, 127 SCRA 207
11. P vs. Sanchez, 132 SCRA 103
12. P vs. Pizarro, 131 SCRA 418
13. P vs. Sabilano, 132 SCRA 83
14. P vs. Veloso, 148 SCRA 60
15. Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4
16. P vs. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178
17. P vs. Palo, 147 SCRA 178
18. P. vs. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521
19. P vs. Pia, 145 SCRA 581
20. P vs. Encipiado, 146 SCRA 478
21. P vs. Canumay, 130 SCRA 301
22. P vs. Marino, 130 SCRA 595
23. P vs. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483
24. P vs. Cruz, 133 SCRa 426--when confession is
valid
25. P. vs. De La Cruz, 183 SCRA 763---when confession is
inadmissible but accused is still liable
11. Evidence of lack of cvoluntariness
Read:

223

1. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516


2. P vs. Abayon, 114 SCRA 197
12. Is the testimony of the arresting officer on the
confession of the accused admissible?

alleged oral

Read:
1. P vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111
******************************************************
*
CHAPTER XIII - THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BAIL
******************************************************
*
1. The right to bail, 104 SCRA 372
2. Bail, 81 SCRA 188
Kinds of bail; when not applicable.
Recognizance/bail for a convict
ATTY. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE VS.
JUDGE ARNULFO BUGTAS, RTC 2
BORONGAN, SAMAR, 475 SCRA 175
Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
Manuel Bagaporo, Jr. was convicted of frustrated
murder and was sentenced four years and two months to
eight years and one day of imprisonment. He started serving
his sentence and subsequently, he filed an application for
release on recognizance. In support of his application, the
Provincial Jail Warden issued a certification that Bagaoporo

224

has been confined at the Provincial Jail since February 9,


1996 and is already entitled to parole. Another certification
was issued by the Supervising Parole and Probation Officer
showing that Bagaporo applied for parole in lieu of the
DOJs Maagang Paglaya Program.
By virtue of the above certifications, respondent judge
ordered the release of Bagaporo upon recognizance of the
Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He likewise
justified the same based on the rule that bail is discretionary
upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Held:
Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for ordering the release of Bagaporo pending the
approval of his application for parole and before the
completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed
upon him.
It is patently erroneous to release a convict on
recognizance. Section 24, Rule 114 provides that there shall
no bail for a convict after final judgment. The only exception
is when the convict applies for Probation before he
commences to serve his sentence and that the offense and the
penalty for the offense is within the purview of the
Probation Law.
Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on
the different kinds of bail) APPLIES ONLY TO AN
ACCUSED
UNDERGOING
PREVENTIVE
IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL.
THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED
BY FINAL JUSGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING
SENTENCE.
Judge Bugtas was therefore fined P40,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law and sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
3. Read:

225

******************************************************
Excessive bail:
1. De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1
*****************************************************
1-a. Pestano vs. Judge Velasco, July 3, 1990
******************************************************
Waiver of the right to bail:
1-b. P. vs. Donato, June 5, 1991
*****************************************************
2. Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38
3. Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 and 70 Phil.
4. Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312
5. P vs. IAC, January 10,1987, 147 SCRA 219
6. Manotoc vs. CA, May 30,1986
7. Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
8. P vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522
4. See Section 10, Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure

a. Procedure when prosecutor does not object to the petition


for bail in capital offenses:
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI, 284 SCRA 315
Bail in Extradition cases.
UNITED STATES VS. JUDGE
PURUGGANAN & MARK JUMENEZ
November, 2002
A person facing extradition proceedings is not entitled to bail
even if the crime he was charged of in a foreign country is bailable.
This is so because the constitutional provision on the right to bail
under Art. III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to criminal
cases, not in extradition proceedings.
*********************************

226

Right to notice and hearing


before the issuance of a warrant
of arrest in extradition case
EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ VS. THE
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC 17, MANILA,
483 SCRA 290
Quisumbing, J.
In SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. JUDGE LANTION,
322 SCRA 160 (The Mark Jimenez Case) , the Supreme Court on
a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing
even when a request for extradition by another country is still
being evaluated. However, on Motion for Reconsideration in the
same case, in a 9-6 decision, the Supreme Court held that the
prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing while
his case is still under evaluation because this would defeat the
purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that
respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee but
entitled to notice and hearing if the case is already filed in court.
It is a different matter if at first, the extraditee was allowed
bail. The cancellation of his bail bond may be made only after
notice and hearing. Otherwise, his right to due process of law will
be violated.
(NOTE: In the case of US vs. Judge Purugganan, 389 SCRA
623), the Supreme Court held that the extraditee is not entitled to
post a bond even if the crime he was charged of abroad is a
bailable offense. This is so because of the possibility of flight.)
***************************************************
CHAPTER XIV - DUE PROCESS
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
**************************************************
1. In general:
1. P vs. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321

227

3. Presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption of


regularity in the performance of official duties of the police
authorities and Presumption of innocence resulting in
acquittal as a result on conflicting and inconsistent
testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses:
JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ,
VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 172953 ,
April 30, 2008
THE FACTS:
On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by
the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police
officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos,
Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by
P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2
Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted
in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as
petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma
allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5)
empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
That on or about the 4th day of February 2003,
at about 8:45 in the morning in Barangay Tugos,
Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic
sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or]
shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram,
and four empty sachets containing shabu residue,
without having been previously authorized by law to
possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

228

Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the


prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding
team, testified on the circumstances surrounding the search as
follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by
petitioner after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon
entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and barangay kagawad
Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in
executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the
police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure
that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search
from about a meter away; that the search conducted inside the
bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with
suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one
of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell
off from one of the pillows searched by Esternona discovery that
was made in the presence of petitioner.55[10] On cross examination,
Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its
progress to petitioners mother, Norma, but that at the same time
his eyes were fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon.
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty
plastic sachets was found behind the door of the bedroom and
not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets
under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have
the items recorded and marked.56[12] On cross, he admitted that it
was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was
standing behind him in the living room portion of the house and
that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which
included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept;57
[13]
that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station for
a true inventory, then to the trial court58[14] and thereafter to the
laboratory.59[15]

55
[10]

TSN, 22 April 2003, pp. 6-9.

[12]

TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 6-7, 10.

56

57[13]

Id. at 16-17.

58[14]

TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 13-15.

59[15]

Id. at 9.

229

Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who


administered the examination on the seized items, was presented as
an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory.
She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and
that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of containing
residue of the same substance.60[16] She further admitted that all
seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the
afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except
that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who
received the items from Esternon at the laboratory .]
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of
the search and seizure conducted by the police operatives.
Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom
with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it was
momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared
to Bolanos that petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something
inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct
the search of Sheilas body inside the same bedroom. At that point,
everyone except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So,
it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady
officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand,
he was told that nothing was found on Sheilas body.61[18] Sheila
was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her
children.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was
summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer
closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And
as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to
lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed
him sachet of shabu which according to him came from a pillow
on the bed.62[20]
Petitioners account in its entirety was
corroborated in its material respects by Norma, barangay kagawad
Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively
declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration
60
[16]

TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The results of the chemical analysis are embodied in Chemistry
Report No. D-037-03. See records, p. 18.
61
[18]

TSN, 2 December 2003, pp. 6-10.

62[20]

Id. at 11-12.

230

of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the


store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady
officer.
Licup for his part testified on the circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that
after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of the
bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes,
Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had
just found two filled sachets.]
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision
declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12)
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00. The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was
found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of
petitioners animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the
charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which
he exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It
also noted petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives to the police
officers to fabricate charges against him.
Hence, this Appeal.
HELD:
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
necessitates that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited
substance be established with moral certainty, together with the
fact that the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential
therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt . Be that as it may, the mere fact of
unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable
mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt.
More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered
in court as exhibit must also be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.

231

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody


rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one
that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in
form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. 63[41]
Graham vs. State64[42] positively acknowledged this danger. In that
case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by
two police officers prior to examination who however did not
testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at
the time it was in their possessionwas excluded from the
prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder
seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar
or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by
records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at
least between the time it came into the possession of police officers
until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is
inadmissible.65[43]
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are
not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific
analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court
cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the
possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the
same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which
63[41]

Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.

64[42]

Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652.

65
[43]

Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.

232

similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was


submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same,
a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving
objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with
sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant
doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized
from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with
the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the
specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence.
Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the
confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia,
the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items
for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in
court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the
subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question:
Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very
same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an
affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded
and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to
affirm whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to
him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who
could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances
under which she received the items from Esternon, what she did
with them during the time they were in her possession until before
she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon
from the standard and normal procedure in the implementation of
the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the
blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just
thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which
when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding

233

truth.66[52]
Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.67[53] In the present
case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in
the manner by which the same were placed under police custody
before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the
presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused
lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is
invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the
law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is
shown.68[54] In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to
culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt
inevitably becomes a matter of right.
Presumption of innocence leads
to the accuseds acquittal due to
inconsistent
testimonies
of
prosecutions witnesses
ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158788, April 30,
2008
FACTS:
On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the
house of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os,
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables,
including cash amounting to P600,000.00.69[3] Forthwith, the spouses
reported the matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a
search warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur.70[4] The MTC issued Search Warrant No. 5-95,71[5] directing a
66[52]

People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v.
Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
67[53]

People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v.
Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
68
[54]

69
70
71

People v. Laxa, id.

234

search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used
by the perpetrators. One of the target premises was the residence of
petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime.
On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the
premises of petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os,
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm
and ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such
weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal
Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before the RTC.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented eight
witnesses namely: (1) P/Insp. Anselmo Baldovino72[7] (P/Insp.
Baldovino), a police investigator and the applicant for the search
warrant; (2) Rosemarie Gante (Gante), the victim of the robbery and
private complainant; (3) Ignacio Yabes (Yabes), a Municipal Local
Government Operations Officer of the Department of Interior and Local
Government who was the civilian witness to the search; (4) P/Supt.
Bonifacio Abian73[8] (P/Supt. Abian), Deputy Provincial Director of the
Philippine National Police and part of the search team; (5) SPO4 Marino
Peneyra (SPO4 Peneyra); (6) SPO1 Franklin Cabaya (SPO1 Cabaya);
(7) SPO1 James Jara (SPO1 Jara); and (8) SPO2 Florentino Renon
(SPO2 Renon).
The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during
the enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber
revolver firearm was found in the latter's house.74[9] In particular, SPO1
Cabaya testified that while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the
door, he saw a firearm on the lower shelf. 75[10] The gun is a .38 caliber
revolver76[11] with five live ammunitions,77[12] which he immediately
turned over to his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.78[13]
Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The
petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun. 79
[14]
Lorna testified that she saw a military man planting the gun.80[15]
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

235

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision 81[16] dated July 7, 1999,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which rendered the
assailed Decision82[18] dated January 22, 2003, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, except for the MODIFICATION
reducing and changing the maximum of the prison term
imposed to Five (5) Years Four (4) Months and Twenty (20)
Days, the appealed Decision is otherwise AFFIRMED.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review, on the principal ground that
the CA gravely erred in finding that the guilt of petitioner has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt; and more specifically, in giving weight
and credence to the testimonies of the police officers who searched the
house of the petitioner which are replete with material and irreconcilable
contradictions and in giving SPO1 Cabaya the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty despite the claim of Lorna that the .38 caliber
revolver was planted.
Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed
reversible error in giving little credence to his defense that the firearm
found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the policemen as witnesses
for the prosecution, which amounted to failure by the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The petition has merit.
The paramount issue in the present case is whether the prosecution
established the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt; and in the
determination thereof, a factual issue, that is, whether a gun was found in
the house of petitioner, must necessarily be resolved.
It is a well-entrenched rule that appeal in criminal cases opens the
whole case wide open for review.83[20]
81
82
83

236

In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony


of SPO1 Cabaya, who testified that he discovered the subject firearm in
a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside
petitioner's defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC
justified giving full credence to Cabaya's testimony on the principles that
the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties regularly; that
he had no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and that his affirmative
testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative testimony.84[21]
Weighing these findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's
claim that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of its
witnesses, the Court finds, after a meticulous examination of the records
that the lower courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged
with.
The RTC and the CA have overlooked certain facts and
circumstances that would have interjected serious apprehensions
absolutely impairing the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who
actually entered the house and conducted the search, who discovered
the gun, and who witnessed the discovery are material matters because
they relate directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun
has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the
process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue.85[24] As held in United States v. Estraa,86[25] a
material matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any fact or
circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the
testimony relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately
affects the credit of any witness who testifies.
The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several
contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses. Especially damaged is
the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on material
points jibes with those of the other prosecution witnesses. In the face of
the vehement and consistent protestations of frame-up by petitioner and
his wife, the trial court and the CA erred in overlooking or
misappreciating these inconsistencies. The inconsistencies are material
as they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not
SPO1 Cabaya really found a firearm in the house of petitioner.
84
85
86

237

SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other
policemen, among whom were SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3
Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he does not
remember.87[26] While searching, he discovered the firearm in the
kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the door.88[27] He said that SPO1
Jara was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when
he (Cabaya) saw the firearm;89[28] and that he picked up the gun, held it
and showed it to SPO1 Jara.90[29] He asserted that SPO2 Renon was not
one of those who went inside the house.91[30]
However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have
corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony, related a different story as to the
circumstances of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he
merely conducted perimeter security during the search and did not enter
or participate in searching the house.92[32] SPO1 Jara testified that he
remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SPO1
Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was seven to eight meters away
from him.93[33] He could not see the inside of the house and could see
Cabaya only from his chest up.94[34] He did not see the firearm at the
place where it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to
show the gun, which was a revolver.95[35] He is certain that he was not
with Cabaya at the time the latter discovered the firearm.96[36] He
further testified that SPO3 Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was
one of those near him when he (Cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed
outside and did not enter or search the house.97[37]
P/Insp. Baldovino testified that only SPO2 Renon conducted the
search and entered the house together with SPO1 Cabaya, 98[38] directly
contradicting SPO1 Cabaya's testimony that he, together with SPO1
Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Ocado, and another one whose name he
cannot recall, were inside the house when he discovered the gun99[39] and
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

238

that SPO2 Renon did not enter the house of petitioner.100[40]


The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further
muddled the prosecution evidence with more inconsistencies as to
matters material to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been
found in the house of petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified that Yabes
stayed outside of the during the search;101[59] whereas SPO1 Jara testified
that Yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when
SPO1 Cabaya raised it.102[60]
Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the
weakest defenses,103[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult to prove, 104[62] in the present
case, the lower courts seriously erred in ignoring the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure
to prove the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be
supported by clear and convincing evidence105[63] was never intended to shift
to the accused the burden of
proof in a criminal case.
As the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Ambih:106[64]
[W]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the
victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated, this claim assumes
importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the
prosecution evidence. It is well to remember that the
prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense
evidence, but rather on its own proof which must be strong
enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock
deserves to be punished. The constitutional presumption
is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is weak
as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict
him.107[65] (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales,108[66] the Court held that
where there was material and unexplained inconsistency between the
testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to
inconsequential details but to the alleged transaction itself which is
subject of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony
given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

239

vitiating the testimony given by the other principal prosecution


witness.109[67] The Court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable
testimony of one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is more
plausible.110[68] In such a situation, both testimonies lose their probative
value. The Court further held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2)
contradictory descriptions of the same sale transaction,
which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the
same physical location and on the same occasion? We must
conclude that a reasonable doubt was generated as to
whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever took place.111[69]
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses generate serious doubt as to whether a
firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution
utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of
illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt.
The
constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been
demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he
was with.
Read also:
P. vs. Bernardino, January 28, 1991
1-a. P vs. Flores, 165 SCRA 71
1-b. Aguirre vs. P., 155 SCRA 337
1-c. P. vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287
1-d. P. vs. Solis, 182 SCRA 182
1-e. P. vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313
2. Alonso vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 552
3. P vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205
4. P vs. Quiason, 78 SCRA 513
5. P vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450
6. P vs. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634
7. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392
3. Presumption of innocence in general and in the order of trial

109
110
111

240

PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355


SCRA 415
PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578
What is the EQUIPOISE RULE?
A. If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced,
the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the
scale of justice in favor of the accused and he should
be acquitted from the crime charged.
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more interpretations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient
to support a conviction.
Read:
1. Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322
4. Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, July 10,l986
SACAY VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-66497-98,July 10, 1986
FACTS:
1.
At the initial hearing, the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses was interrupted when the accused, through counsel,
admitted that he shot the deceased but claimed that it was done in
self-defense and fulfillment of duty. The prosecution then moved
that the reverse procedure be adopted in view of the admission that
the accused shot the deceased. No objection was interposed by the
accused or his counsel.
2. On appeal with the S.C. after he was convicted the accused
later claims that there was a violation of the order of trial provided
for in Sec. 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. He also cites the case
of Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322, wherein the S.C. ruled
that : "It behooved the respondent Judge to have followed the
sequence of trial set forth x x x the form of a trial is also a matter

241

of public order and interest; the orderly course of procedure


requires that the prosecution should go forward and present all of
its proof in the first instance."
HELD:
The case of Alejandro vs. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as
the accused in the case at bar did not object to the procedure
followed. In fact in the said Alejandro case, the Court also stated:
"It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404
(l910), relied upon by the prosecution and the trial Court, the
defense has produced its proofs before the prosecution presented
its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the accused
were prejudiced. There is one radical difference, however, since in
that case no objection was entered in the Court below to the
procedure followed in the presentation of proof. In this case, the
change in the order of trial made by respondent Judge was
promptly and timely objected to by the defense."
In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 3e), Rule 119)the said
procedure is now expressly sanctioned. Thus:
"However, when the accused admits the act or omission
charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."
3.Sec. 3(3), Rule 119 , 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure , as amended.
4. Other cases Read:
1. P vs. Opida, June 13,1986
2. P vs. Tempongko, October 2,1986
3. P vs. Drammayo, 42 SCRA 59
4. P vs. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151
5. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
6. Castillo vs. Filtex, September 30,1983
7. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, supra

242

5. Right to counsel-during trial


1. Reason behind the requirement
2. Obligation of the judge to an accused who
court without a lawyer to assist him

appears in

Read:
1. P vs. Holgado,85 Phil. 752
2. Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357
3. P vs. Cuison, 193 Phil. 296
5-a. The right to be heard by himself and counsel during trial
JOHN HILARIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161070, April 14,
2008
THE FACTS:
Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged
with two counts112[3] of Murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty.
During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over representing petitioner in view of the
death of the latter's counsel.
On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision113[4] finding
petitioner and his co-accused Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each count.
On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed
with the RTC a Petition for Relief114[5] from the Decision dated
December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. In his petition,
petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment, he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed
to be committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa; that he had
112

[3]

113

[4]

114

[5]

Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91647-48.


Penned by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa, rollo, pp. 36-52.
Id. at 53-60.

243

no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed his


lawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose his full
trust and confidence to his lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to
file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on
May 2, 2002, he was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City and learned from the grapevine of his impending
transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan; that believing that the
notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated
December 5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he
instructed his representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from
the RTC; that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of
his clear instructions; and that the RTC Decision showed that it was
received by his counsel on February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did not
inform him of any action taken thereon.
I S S U E:
Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case
due to the defiance or failure of the petitioner's counsel de
oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes
excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention
prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?
Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of
justice warrants the review of a final and executory
judgment?
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio
cannot be binding on him for the latter's defiance of his instruction to
appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between counselclient and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced; that this
breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation considering
that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO, who broke the
fiduciary relationship; that the assailed CA Resolutions both harped on
technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for
relief; that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is
serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an
affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will result to
unfairness; and that it would have been for the best interest of justice for
the CA to have directed the petitioner to complete the records instead of

244

dismissing the petition outright.


In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of
justice does not warrant the review of an appeal from a final and
executory judgment; that perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment
sought to be reviewed final and not appealable; and that petitioner's
appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in
futility, thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief
from judgment. The OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice
to clients and failure of counsel to notify his client of an adverse
judgment would not constitute excusable negligence and therefore
binding on the client.
We grant the petition.
A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the
rules of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get
tangled in the web of procedure.115[12] We have held in a civil case that to
demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is
their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating
monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights
not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know
how to establish such right.116[13] This finds application specially if the
liberty of a person is at stake. As we held in Telan v. Court of Appeals:
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as
forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a
consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint
or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to
be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process.
Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.
xxxx
115

[12]

116

[13]

See Telan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95026, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 534, 541.
Id.

245

Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the


web of procedure. The demand as much from ordinary
citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right
would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity
where an individual may be stripped of his property rights
not because he has no right to the property but because he
does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at
all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is
a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with
the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be
as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists
only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right
ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.117[14] (Emphasis
supplied)
To repeat the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of
law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists
only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit
of the appeal.118[15] It is even more important to note that petitioner was
not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief from
judgment with the RTC.
It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held
in Telan, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of
the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due
process.
Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to
all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
justice would be served better.119[16]
While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion
for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law
rendered the resolution final and executory, we have on some occasions
relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla120[17] we held:
117[14]
118

[15]

119

[16]

120

[17]

Id. at 540-541.
Id. at 541.
Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 11, at 781.
G.R. No. 160753, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675.

246

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to


serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the
Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend
or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling
as to alter even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking
through the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, had occasion to
state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain
the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts
will be mere slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts in rendering justice have
always been, as they ought to be guided by the
norm that when on the balance, technicalities
take a backseat against substantive rights, and
not the other way around. Truly then,
technicalities, in the appropriate language of
Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the
realities of the situation.
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court
is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the

247

constraints of technicalities.121[18]
Moreover, in Basco v. Court of Appeals,122[19] we also held:
Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid
the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the
rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of
substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.
Recognizing this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that:
SECTION 2.
Construction. These rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.123[20]
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A
strict and rigid application of rules that would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be
avoided.124[21]
Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still
be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by
himself and counsel.125[22] However, instead of remanding the case to
the CA for a decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as not
to further delay the final disposition of this case.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right
to appeal in the manner prescribed by law. The importance and real
purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court
of Appeals126[27] where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our
judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every
party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law,
121

[18]

122

[19]

123[20]
124
125

126

Id. at 686-687.
392 Phil. 251 (2000).
Id. at 266.
[21]
Cusi-Hernandez v. Spouses Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).
[22]
Telan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 540-541; People of the Philippines v.
Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950); Flores v. Judge Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355 (1979); Delgado
v. Court of Appeals, 229 Phil. 362, 366 (1986).

248

however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, a right


guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out
whether petitioner's loss of the right to appeal was due to the PAO
lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner.
PEOPLE VS. NADERA, JR.,
324 SCRA 490
Mendoza, J.
The cavalier attitude of Atty. Manolo Brotonel of the PAO
cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in [a] his refusal to crossexamine Oleby Nadera (the complainant for RAPE); [b] the
manner in which he conducted Maricris Naderas crossexamination; and [c] his failure not only to present evidence for the
accused but to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he
desires. Only the faithful performance by counsel of his duty
towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accuseds
right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. Hence, a lawyers duty, especially that of a defense
counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all
the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the
accuseds fundamental rights.
It may be so that the defense counsel really found Olebys
testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty
to scrutinize private complainants testimony to ensure that the
accuseds constitutional right to confront and examine the
witnesses against him was not rendered for naught. It bears
pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the words of the
complainant against the accused, the two being the only persons
present during the commission of the crime. This is so because the
complainants testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate
credulity without denying the accuseds constitutional right to be
presumed innocent. This is where cross-examination becomes
essential to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods
or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct
examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and
demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give
substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the

249

witnesses against him. For unless proven otherwise to be guilty


beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed innocent.
(NOTE: For your Legal & Judicial Ethics)
Atty. Brotonel as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend
his client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he
perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty
was all the more imperative because the life of the accusedappellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because he
was counsel de oficio.
The Decision of the RTC convicting the accused is SET
ASIDE and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
Read:
1. P vs. Dischoso, 96 SCRA 957
2. Read also:
PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT, G.R. NO. 120350, 343
SCRA 20, OCT. 30, 2000; PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT,
G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000.
Right to be Heard by himself and counsel and to present
evidence for his defense.
In this case, the non-appearance of counsel for the
accused on the scheduled hearing was not construed as
waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence
for his defense. Denial of due process can be
successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights
had been made as in this case.
In another case, the accused-appellant validly waived
his right to present evidence. This is in consonance with
the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit
and protection of the individual in his private capacity,
if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to
the community at large.

250

6. The right to be present during trial


Read:
1. Aquino vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546
2. P vs. Judge, 125 SCRA 269
3. Waiver of the defendant's presence in a
prosecution,77 SCRA 430

criminal

7. The right to a speedy trial


JAIME BERNAT VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20, 2004
Right to speedy disposition of case.
Facts:
1. On August 14, 1991, the petitioner and several others were
charged of violation of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act;
2. On August 23, 1994 after the presentation of the parties
evidence, the case was deemed submitted for decision
before the 2nd Division;
3. Thereafter, the case was unloaded to the newly created 5 th
Division, particularly to Justice Godofredo Legaspi and
later re-assigned to Justice Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada
upon her assumption of office on November 3, 1998.
4. In the early part of 2002 while Justice Estrada was writing
the decision of the case, she found out that the November
26, 1993 transcript of stenographic notes, which was the
cross-examination of the petitioner, was missing so she
called the parties for a conference on April 19, 2002 to
discuss the matter.
5. Instead of attending the conference, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the case based on the alleged violation
of his right to speedy trial. The Court denied the same as
well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.

251

Issue:
Was there violation of the petitioners right to a speedy
disposition of his case when the same was not decided for almost 8
years from the time it was deemed submitted for decision?
Held:
No. The right is violated only if the proceedings were
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative
and cannot be based on mere mathematical reckoning of time.
Particular regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. As held
in the case of DE LA PENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, certain
factors shall be considered and balanced to determine if there is
delay, as follows:
1. Length of the delay;
2. Reasons for the delay;
3. Assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and
4. Prejudiced caused by the delay.
There is no violation of the right to speedy disposition of his case
because petitioner failed to assert his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year period prior to
April 19, 2002, petitioner did not complain about the long delay in
deciding his case.
a. Read Admin. Circular No. 4 of the Supreme
dated September 22, 1988
b. Department of Justice Circular No. 27, dated
16, 1988
c. When shall this right starts
Read:
1. P vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226
d. To what proceedings is this right available
Read:

Court
September

252

1. Caballero vs. Alfonso, 153 SCRA 153


e. In general
Read:
1. The right to speedy trial, 28 SCRA 601
2. Conde vs. Rivera, 59 Phil. 650
3. Ventura vs. People, Nov. 6,1976
4. Martin vs. Ver, July 25, 1983
5. Bermisa vs. CA, 92 SCRa
6. Luneta vs. Mil. Com., 102 SCRA 56
7. P vs. Baladjay, 113 SCRA 284
8. P vs. Araula, 111 SCRA 598
9. Regaspi vs. Castillo, 69 SCRA 160
10. Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247
11. Nepumuceno vs. Secretary,108 SCRA 658
12. Tatad vs. SB, 159 SCRA 70
13. P vs. CFI of Rizal, 161 SCRA 249
14. P vs. Laya, 161 SCRA 327
15. Salcedovs. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811
16. DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 289 SCRA 721
18. ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN, 269 SCRA 301
SUMBANG VS. GEN. COURT MARTIAL, G.R.
NO. 140188, 337 SCRA 227, AUG. 3, 2000;
BLANCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS.
136757 58, 346 SCRA 108, NOV. 27, 2000; SOLAR
TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. HON. HOW,
G.R. NO. 140863, 338 SCRA 51, AUG. 22, 2000.
Speedy Disposition of Cases.
(i) The determination of whether an accused had been
denied the right to speedy trial depends on the
surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it
took about 8 years before the trial of this case was
resumed, such delay did not amount to violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial considering that such
delay was not by attributable to the prosecution.

253

Factors to consider in determining whether or not


such right has been violated:
1. length of delay,
2. reasons for such delay, and
3. assertion or failure to assert such rights by the
accused and the prejudice caused by the delay.
(ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates even after an information has already been
filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict
with the 30-day period prescribed in Sec. 7 of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998.
8. The right to an impartial trial
Read:
1. P vs. Opida, June 13,1986
1-a. P vs. Tuazon, 159 SCRA 317
2. Olaguer vs. Chief of Staff, May 22, 1987
3. Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz,90 SCRA 16
4. P vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120
5. Dimacuha vs. Concepcion, 117 SCRA 630
9. Right to a public trial
Read:
1. Garcia vs. Domingo, July 25,1973
2. P vs. Tampus, March 28,1980
9. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. JERRY NAZARENO, G.R. No.
167756, April 8, 2008
THE FACTS:

254

On March 17, 1999, appellant Jerry Nazareno was indicted


for violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case No. 2638 for the alleged rape of BBB, his daughter.
The information reads:
That sometime and between January 1992 up to
December 06, 1998, in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of
Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force, violence and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and repeatedly
made sexual intercourse with his daughter BBB at the
age of 7 through 14 years old against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.127[17]
On May 3, 1999, another Information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2650, for the rape of AAA, another daughter, was
levelled against appellant. The Information is worded thus:
That from sometime in January 1990 up to
December 1998 in Barangay Codon, municipality of
San Andres, Catanduanes, and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father
of the complainant, did then and there willfully,
feloniously and criminally repeatedly had sexual
intercourse with her daughter AAA, then five years old
up to the time when she was 15-years-old against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.128[18]
After trial , the accused was found guilty of qualified rape in
both cases. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the People vs. Mateo Doctrine but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence, this Petition before the
Supreme Court.
I S S U E:

127[17]
128[18]

Rollo, p. 21.
Records, Vol. II, p. 18.

255

Is the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of


the nature and cause of accusation against him violated since the
information failed to specify with certainty the approximate date
of the commission of the offenses for rape which is a fatal defect.
H E L D:
The argument is specious. An information is intended to
inform an accused of the accusations against him in order that he
could adequately prepare his defense. Verily, an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint
or information. Thus, to ensure that the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him is not violated, the information should state the name
of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute;
a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense has been committed. 129[27] Further, it
must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by
setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the
culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense.130[28]
However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the
date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude
unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense. 131[29] In People
v. Bugayong,132[30] the Court held that when the time given in the
information is not the essence of the offense, the time need not be
proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if the
proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the
period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement
of the action.
In People v. Gianan,133[31] the Court ruled that the time of the
commission of rape is not an element of the said crime as it is
129[27]

People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372, 388 (1998), citing Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110,
Secs. 6 and 8.
130[28]
Id.
131[29]
People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161 (2000); Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11
reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission.
132[30]
G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998, 299 SCRA 528.
133[31]
G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 477.

256

defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen


of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the
circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section
11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as it alleges
that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed, an information is
sufficient.
The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v.
Salalima134[32] and in People v. Lizada.135[33]
In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case
No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB transpired sometime and
between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay
Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes. In
Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred that from
sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay
Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes,
AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the
recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the
constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In People v. Garcia,136[34] the Court upheld a conviction for
ten counts of rape based on an Information which alleged that the
accused committed multiple rapes from November 1990 up to
July 21, 1994. In People v. Espejon,137[35] the Court found the
appellant liable for rape under an information charging that he
perpetrated the offense sometime in the year 1982 and dates
subsequent thereto and sometime in the year 1995 and
subsequent thereto.
In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case
No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB transpired sometime and
between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay
Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes. In
Criminal Case No. 2650, the information averred that from
134[32]

G.R. Nos. 137969-71, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 192.


G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62.
136[34]
G.R. No. 120093, November 6, 1997, 281 SCRA 463.
137[35]
G.R. No. 134767, February 20, 2002, 377 SCRA 412.
135[33]

257

sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay


Codon, Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes,
AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the
recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the
constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Indeed, this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were
committed before and until October 15, 1994, 138[36] sometime in
the year 1991 and the days thereafter,139[37] and on or about and
sometime in the year 1988140[38] constitute sufficient compliance
with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
More than that, the Court notes that the matter of particularity
of the dates in the information is being raised for the first time on
appeal. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that
objections as to matter of form or substance in the information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 141[39] Appellant failed
to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court.
He could have moved to quash the informations or at least for a
bill of particulars. He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights
and awakened too late.
Too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the
evidence for the People contending that the offenses were
committed sometime and between January 1992 up to December
6, 1998 for Criminal Case No. 2632 and sometime in January
1990, up to December 1998 in Criminal Case No. 2650. On the
contrary, appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial
and alibi as his defenses. Simply put, he cannot now be heard to
complain that he was unable to defend himself in view of the
vagueness of the recitals in the informations.
Read:
1. Sales vs. CA, 164 SCRA 717
1-a. P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653
1-b. P vs. Corral, 157 SCRA 678
1-c. P vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426
138[36]

People v. Bugayong, supra note 30.


People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999, 319 SCRA 719.
140[38]
People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103 & 143472, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 655.
141[39]
People v. Razonable, 386 Phil. 771, 780 (2000).
139[37]

258

1-d. Formilleza vs. SB, 159 SCRA


2. P vs. Labado, 98 SCRA 730
3. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573
4. P. vs. Cabale, 185 SCRA 140
5. People vs. Regala, April 27, 1982
11. The right to meet witnesses face to face or the
confrontation

right of

Read:
1. P. vs. Talingdan, Nov. 9, 1990
1-a. P vs. Villaluz, October 20, 1983
2. P vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661
3. P vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718
4. Talino vs. Sandiganbayan, March 16,1987
5. P vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92
6. Ortigas, JR. vs. Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610
7. Toledo vs. People, 20 SCRA 54
8. P vs. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388
9. P vs. Santos, 139 SCRA 383
10. Soliman vs. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 640
11. P vs. Lacuna, 87 SCRA 364
12. P vs. Clores, 100 SCRA 227
13. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273
14. Fulgado vs. CA, 182 SCRA 81
12. Trial in absentia
Read:
1. Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420
2. Nolasco vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 502
3. P vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163; Note the purpose
of this provision)
4. P vs. Judge Prieto, July 21,1978
5. Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1
6. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273
13. Right to secure witnesses and production of
Read:

evidence.

259

1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA 610


2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514
14. Duty of the judge to the accused before trial
PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI, 284 SCRA 315
******************************************************
CHAPTER XV - HABEAS CORPUS
******************************************************
*
Read:
1In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Ferdinand Marcos, etc, GR No. 88079, May 18,
1989 and
August & October, 1989.
1-a. Harvey vs. Santiago, supra
2. Cruz vs. Juan Ponce Enrile, April 15,1988
3. Abadilla vs. Fidel Ramos, December 1,1987
******************************************************
**
CHAPTER XVI - THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
******************************************************
**
1. Self-incrimination, 24 SCRA 692
2. Read
1. Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663
2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294, read
the concurring and dissenting opinions
3. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
4. Beltran vs. Samson, 50 Phil. 570
5. Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906

including

260

6. BASECO vs. PCGG, supra


7. Isabela Sugar vs. Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 995
8. Fernando vs. Maglanoc, 95 Phil. 431
9. US vs. Tang Teng, 23 Phil. 145
10. P vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
11. P vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513
12. P vs. Boholst-Amadore, 152 SCRA 263
13. P vs. Rosas, 148 SCRA 464
14. P vs. Ruallo, 152 SCRA 635
15. P vs. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85( Compare with
Rosas & Boholst cases)
16. P vs. Lumayok, 139 SCRA 1
17. Cabal vs. Kapunan, Jr. December 29, 1962

the

PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT, G.R. NO. 132045, 339


SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000; PEOPLE VS.
CONTINENTE, G.R. NOS. 100801- 02, 339 SCRA
1, AUG. 25, 2000.
The essence of this right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion or the giving of evidence
against oneself through a testimonial act. Hence, an
accused may be compelled to submit to physical
examination and have a substance taken from his body
for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from a disease that was contracted by his
victim without violating this right.
******************************************************
**
CHAPTER XVII - THE RIGHT AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
******************************************************
**
1. Read:
1. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 SCRA 131
2. Caunca vs. Salazar, supra
******************************************************
**

261

CHAPTER XVIII - RIGHT AGAINST


CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
******************************************************
**
a. Is the Death Penalty already abolished by the
Constitution?

1987

Read:
1. P vs. Gavarra, 155 SCRa 327
2. P vs. Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113
3. P vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242
4. P vs. Intino, September 26, 1988
5. People vs. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107
b. Is death as a penalty a cruel or unuasual

punishment?

Read:
1. P vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647
2. P vs. Villanueva,, 128 SCRA 488
3. Veniegas vs. People, 115 SCRA 79
4. P vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688
2. On the death penalty whether it was abolished or not
Read:
a. P vs. Idnay, 164 SCRA 358
******************************************************
**
CHAPTER XIX - RIGHT AGAINST
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
******************************************************
**
1. Read:

262

1. Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323


2. Ajeno vs. Incierto, 71 SCRA 166
******************************************************
***
CHAPTER XX - THE RIGHT
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
******************************************************
**
1. Requisites present before this right can be invoked
PEOPLE VS. ALMARIO, 355
SCRA 1
There is double jeopardy when there is:
[1] valid indictment;
[2] before a competent court;
[3] after arraignment;
[4] when a valid plea has been entered; and
[5] when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
If the dismissal is through the instance of the
accused or with his express consent, there is no double
jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two (2)
exceptions:
1) the motion to dismiss is based on insufficiency
of evidence; and
2) the motion to dismiss is based on the denial of
the accuseds right to speedy trial.
It must be pointed out, however, that in PEOPLE VS.
TAMPAL, 244 SCRA 202 and PEOPLE VS. LEVISTE, 255
SCRA 238, the SC reversed the dismissal of the criminal case by
the trial court based on speedy trial since the same was not
predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. It is

263

only when there is a clear violation of the accuseds right to speedy


trial that the dismissal results in double jeopardy.
3. Double jeopardy, 102 SCRA 44 and 12 SCRA 561
4. When the act is punished by both a law and an ordinance:
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292
If the accused was charged of theft of electricity based on
the City Ordinance of Batangas and not based on the Revised
Penal Code and later on the case is dismissed by the judge due to
the fact that the crime has prescribed, the government can no
longer charge the accused of the same crime under the Revised
Penal Code since double jeopardy has set in.
Read:
1. P vs. Duero, 104 SCRA 379
2. CUDIA VS. CA, 284 SCRA 173
3. CUISON VS. CA, 289 SCRA 159
2. P vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516
3. P vs. Abano, 145 SCRA 555
4. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
5. P vs. Salig, 133 SCRA 59
6. P vs. Cruz, 133 SCRA 426
7. P vs. Prudente,, 133 SCRA 651
8 P vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714, when the
regularity does7, 1966
2. P vs. City Court,154 SCRA 175
3. Galman vs. Pamaran, 144 SCRA 43
4. P vs. Molero, 144 SCRA 397
5. P vs. Quibate, 131 SCRA 81
6. P vs. Obania, June 29,1968
7. Dionaldo vs. Dacuycuy, 108 SCRA 736
8. P vs. Judge Hernando, 108 SCRA 121
9. Esmena vs. Judge Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861
10. Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 SCRA 217
11. Andres vs. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 217
12. Buerano vs. CA, 115 SCRA 82
13. P vs. Militante, 117 SCRA 910
14. P vs. Fuentebella, 100 SCRA 672
15. Lazaro vs. P, 112 SCRA 430
16. Flores vs. Enrile, 115 SCRA 236
17. Bernarte vs. Sec. ,116 SCRA 43

presumption of

264

18. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573


19. P vs. Duran, 1075 SCRA 979
20. P vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312
21. Jimenez vs. Military Commission, 102 SCRA 39
22. P vs. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473
23. P vs. Araula, January 30, 1982
24. P vs. Baladjay, March 30, 1982
25. P vs. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA 247
28. P vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81
29. P vs. Gloria, December 29, 1977
30. P vs. Galano, 75 SCRA 193
31. Tacas vs. Cariasco, 72 SCRA 527
32. P vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77
33. P vs. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277
34. P vs. Inting, 70 SCRA 289
35. De Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619
36. P vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289
37. Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700
38. Tangan vs. P, 155 SCRA 435
39. P vs. Quezada, 160 SCRA 516
40. Canizano vs. P, 159 SCRA 599
41. Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 144
There is no double jeopardy in this case:
PEOPLE VS. MOLERO
G.R No. L-67842, September 24,
1986
FACTS:
1. Molero was charged for having raped his daughter.
The original complaint was dated March 22, 1977, the
complainant charged Molero of having raped her on the
"13th day of February 1976".
2. Molero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty";
3. During the trial, the complainant testified that she
was raped by her father on February 5, 1976 and not
February 13, 1976 as alleged in the complaint;

265

4. The Fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the


complaint. The motion was granted but was
subsequently reconsidered. The lower court in its order
dismissed the original complaint, but ordered the Fiscal
to cause the filing of a new complaint charging the
proper offense of rape committed on or before February
5, 1976;
5. A new complaint was therefore filed dated March
30, 1978
6. Molero claims that the new complaint places him in
double jeopardy.
HELD:
There is no double jeopardy.
a. Dismissal of the first case contemplated by the rule
against double jeopardy presupposes a definite and
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.
(Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452; People vs. Manlapas,
5 SCRA 883; People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 296) And
"for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause
of the Constitution, it must have the effect of
acquittal.(People vs. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579);
b. It is quite clear that the order of the trial court
dismissal the original complaint was without prejudice
to the filing of a new complaint and/or information
charging Molero with the proper offense. The said
dismissal did not therefore amount to an acquittal.
c. In fact there was no need for the trial court to have
adopted such a cumbersome procedure. It could have
merely ordered an amendment of the complaint. Sec.
12, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court applies
when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense,
but not when an honest error of a few days is sought to
be corrected and the change does not affect the rights of
the accused.

266

d. The precise time of the commission of the crime is


not an essential element of the offense of rape. The
amendment of the complaint changing the date of the
commission of the crime of rape from February 13,
1976 to February 5, 1976 , a difference of 8 days was
only a matter of form under the facts of this case and
did not prejudice the rights of the accused.
e. The reliance of the accused on the case of People
vs. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 is not well-taken. In the said
case the proposed amendment was the changing of
the date of the commission of the crime from June
18, 1952 to July 1947, or a difference of 5 years. The
S.C. held that the amendment that would change the
date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to
1952 is certainly not a matter of form.
f. The dismissal of the first complaint did not amount
to the appellant's acquittal. In effect, the order of
dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim
of double jeopardy. (People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166)

5. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or


increase of the penalty imposed?

for the

PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444,


340 SCRA 207, SEPT. 13, 2000.
Double Jeopardy. Evolution of doctrine. Appeal by the
Government from verdicts of acquittal.
As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate
jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on
the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at
the trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before
the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless
there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman vs.
Sandiganbayan.
Read:

267

1. Central Bank of the Philippines vs. CA, GR No.


March 8, 1989
1-a. P vs. Montemayor, January 30, 1969, 26 SCRA
2. P vs. Ruiz,81 SCRA 455
3. US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67
4. P vs. Ang ho Kio, 95 Phil. 475

41859,
687

6. The "Supervening Fact Doctrine."


Read:
1. 76 SCRA 469
2. P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260
3. P vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268
4. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766
5. P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712
5-a. P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462
5-b. P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601
6. P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637
7. Read also Sec. 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on
Procedure

Criminal

******************************************************
*
CHAPTER XXI
RIGHT AGAINST EX-POST FACTO LAW,
BILL OF ATTAINER, ETC.
******************************************************
*
Read:
1. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433
2-LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON VS. THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
ROMEO ACOP & FRANCISCO ZUBIA,
JR., Petitioners-Intervenors
G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

268

The petitioner seeks to stop the Sandiganbayan from trying


the multiple murder case against him and 26 other police officers
for the death of 11 Kuratong Baleleng members in the early
morning of May 18, 1995 at Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
The police officers claimed that it was a shoot-out between them
and the Kuratong Baleleng Members while SPO2 Eduardo de los
Reyes claimed it was a summary execution or rub-out.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs resulted in the dismissal of the
cases after finding that the incident was a legitimate police
operation. However, the Review Board led by Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco Villa resulted in the filing of multiple
murder cases against the petitioner and his companion where he
was indicted as a principal.
Upon motion by the petitioner and his co-police officers with
leave from the Sandiganbayan, a Motion for Reconsideration was
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman who AMENDED the 11
informations on March 1, 1996 charging the petitioner , ROMEO
ACOP and FRANCISCO ZUBIA, JR., as mere accessories.
On March 5-6,1996, the accused questioned the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over the 11 criminal cases since under
Republic Act No. 7975, particularly Section 2, paragraphs [a] and
[c], the said court has jurisdiction only if one or more of the
principal accused has a rank of Brigadier General
(Chief
Superintendent) or higher and since the highest PNP officer
charged as a principal accused is merely Chief Inspector, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction to try and
decide the same.
On May 8, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
transferring the case to the RTC of Quezon City which has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the cases under RA 7975. On May
17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
Reconsideration and insisted that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan which was opposed by the petitioner and his coaccused.
While the Motions for Reconsideration were pending before
the Sandiganbayan, Congress passed into law Republic Act No.

269

8249 which was approved by the President on February 5, 1997


entitled AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION
OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE PD 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR which deleted the word PRINCIPAL in Section 2,
paragraphs [a] and [c] of RA 7975 thereby giving jurisdiction to
the Sandiganbayan criminal cases involving police generals like
the petitioners even though they are not charged as principals but
merely accessories or accomplices. The new law further provides
that it shall be applicable to all cases which are pending in court
before the passage of the same provided trial has not begun at the
time of its approval.
On March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor and ruled that it stands pat in its Resolution
dated May 8, 1996 ordering the transfer of the 11 criminal cases
to the RTC of Quezon City. On the same day, however, the
Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
Resolution where it that with the passage of RA 8249, the court
admitted the amended informations in these cases and by the
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting,
retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.
The petitioner questioned the said Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court on the following grounds:
1. their right to due process of law and equal protection of
the law was violated as a result of the application of the
new law by
which restored to the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction over their cases especially so that the
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for 9 months the
resolution of the pending incident involving the transfer of
these cases to the RTC of Quezon City and waited for the
passage of the law to overtake such resolution and thereby
rendering their vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan
law moot;
2. the retroactive application of the new law violates their
constitutional right against ex-post facto law;
3. the title of the law is misleading in that it contains the
aforesaid innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which

270

actually expands rather than defines the old


Sandiganbayan law thereby violating the one title one
subject requirement of Section 26 [1] Article VI of the
Constitution.
The petitioners-intervenors claimed that while the law
(Sections 4 and 7) innocuously appears to have merely expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it is in fact a class legislation
and an ex-post facto law statute intended specifically to apply to all
the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Finally, if their case will be tried by the
Sandiganbayan, they will be deprived of their two-tiered appeal
to the Sandiganbayan which they acquire under RA 7975 before
recourse to the Supreme Court could be made.
Held:
1. The contention that the law violates petitioners right to due
process and equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve
merit. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification
is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
a.
b.
c.
d.

it must rest on real and substantial distinctions;


it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
must apply equally to all members of the same class-

all of which are present in this case.


The classification between those pending cases involving
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and
whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under RA 8249, as against those whose
cases where trial has already started as of the approval of the law
rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the 1st
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in
the latter the parties have already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within
the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of the courts, it
can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction

271

necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for


a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. The transitory
provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the
Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law.
Moreover, those cases where trial has already begun are not
affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law
(RA 8249).
2. The petitioners argument that the retroactive application of the
new law to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post
facto law for they are deprived of their right to due process as
they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had
allegedly acquired under RA 7975 is without merit.
In order that a law is an ex post facto law, the same must be
one
a. which makes an act done criminal before the passing
of the law and which was innocent when committed,
and punishes such action;
b. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than
when it was committed;
c. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
it was committed;
d. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony than the law required a the
time of the commission of the offense in order to
convict the defendant;
e. every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage;
f. that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
g. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or
a proclamation of amnesty (KAY VILLEGAS
KAMI, 35 SCRA 429; MEJIA VS. PAMARAN,
160 SCRA 457; TAN VS. BARRIOS, 190 SCRA

272

686; PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 211


SCRA 241).
Ex post facto law prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
RA 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character.
The other contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal
which they acquired under RA 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of RA 8249 is incorrect. The same contention had been
rejected by the court several times in the cases of RODRIGUEZ
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 205 Phil. 567; ALVIAR VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN,
137
SCRA
63;
NUNEZ
VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433; DE GUZMAN VS.
PEOPLE, December 15, 1982 considering that the right to appeal
is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Moreover, the new law did not alter the rules of evidence or the
mode of trial.
3. The contention that the new Sandiganbayan law violates the one
title-one subject provision of the Constitution is without merit.
The petitioners claim that the new does not define the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but expands the same. But
even assuming that that is true, the expansion of the jurisdiction,
does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law
because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.
The requirement that every bill must only have one subject
expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The Congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within
its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
(NOTE: Though the Supreme Court rejected all the above
arguments raised by the petitioner and the intervenors who
are against the trial of their cases with the Sandiganbayan and
prefer to have their cases be tried and decided by the RTC of
Quezon City, they got what they want in the end because it
was held that the 11 criminal informations failed to alleged

273

that they committed the crimes in relation to their public


office which is a jurisdictional requirement in order that the
same be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, sometime in May, 1999, the Quezon City RTC
to whom the said cases were raffled DISMISSED the 11
murder cases as a result of the retraction made by the
eyewitnesses. The same was revived by the DOJ in April,
2001. The same was returned to the QC RTC to determine if
the 2-year provisional rule under the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure is applicable)
2.a. Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429
3. Sevilleja vs. COMELEC, 107 SCRA 141
4. P vs. Ferrer, 46 & 56 SCRA
5. Tan vs. Barrios, October 18, 1990
******************************************************
CHAPTER XXII-CITIZENSHIP
******************************************************
1. Effect of naturalization in another country
Read:
a. Ramon Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, July 3, 1992
a.-1 RAMON LABO JR. VS. COMELEC, GR No. 86564,
August 1, 1989
RAMON LABO, JR. VS. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
LUIS LARDIZABAL, G.R. NO. 86564,
August 1, 1989
Citizenship; renunciation of; who takes the place of a disqualified
winner in an election; res judicata
Unanimous en banc decision
(NOTE: This is also important in your Remedial Law)

274

Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. The petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of the City of Baguio
on January 20, 1988;
2. On January 26, 1988, the private respondent filed a quo
warranto case against the petitioner but no filing fee was paid;
3. On February 10, 1988 or 21 days after the petitioner was
proclaimed, the private respondent paid the filing fee of P300.00;
4. Since the filing fee was paid beyond the reglementary period,
the petitioner claims that the petition was late because the payment
of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of an appeal, citing
Manchester vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562;
5. The private respondent claimed he filed the petition on time
because when he first filed the same, it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation controversy which needs no
filing fee. When the COMELEC treated it as a quo warranto case
on February 8, 1988, he immediately paid the filing fee on said
date. Hence, the filing fee was paid on time.
Issues:
1. Was the petition for quo warranto filed on time?
2. Since the case was merely for determination on whether or not
the petition was filed on time or not, may the Supreme Court
determine whether petitioner Ramon Labor, Jr. is qualified for the
office of the City Mayor of Baguio or not?
3. Since the petitioner won in the election and turned out to be not
qualified for said position, who shall take his place as the City
Mayor?
Held:
1. The petition was filed on time since the filing fee was paid
immediately when the COMELEC treated the same as a quo
warranto and not a pre-proclamation controversy. However, even

275

assuming that the filing fee was paid late, the same was not
traceable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. What is
important is that the filing fee was paid.
2. Normally, the case should end here as the sole issue raised by
the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings
against him. HOWEVER, AS HIS CITIZENSHIP IS THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDING, AND
CONSIDERING THE NECESSITY FOR AN EARLY
RESOLUTION OF THAT MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION
CLEARLY AND URGENTLY AFFECTING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, WE SHALL DIRECTLY ADDRESS IT NOW IN
THIS SAME ACTION AGAINST HIM. (DEL CASTILLO VS.
JAYMALIN, 112 SCRA 629; ALGER ELECTRIC VS. CA, 135
SCRA 37; BEAUTIFONT VS. CA, January 29, 1988; SOTTO VS.
SAMSON, 5 SCRA 733; REPUBLIC VS. PAREDES, 108 PHIL.
57; LIANGA LUMBER CO. VS. LIANGA TIMBER CO. , 76
SCRA 197; ERICO VS. HEIRS OF CHIGAS, 98 SCRA 575;
FRANCISCO VS. CITY OF DAVAO, 12 SCRA 628; VALENCIA
VS. MABILANGAN, 105 PHIL. 162; FERNANDEZ VS.
GARCIA, 92 PHIL. 592; LI SHIU LIAT VS. REPUBLIC, 21
SCRA 1039; SAMAL VS. CA, 99 PHIL. 30; US VS. GIMINEZ,
34 PHIL. 74; TEJONES VS. GIRONELLA, 159 SCRA 100 and
LIANGA BAY LOGGING VS. CA, 157 SCRA 357).
In addition thereto, since the petitioner claims that the
respondent COMELEC has prejudged the case against him because
it adopted the private respondent's COMMENT which repeatedly
asserted that he is not a Filipino citizen, with more reason that the
Supreme Court shall now decide the case with finality instead of
returning the same to the COMELEC.
3. There are two administrative decisions involving the citizenship
of the petitioner. On May 12, 1982, the COMELEC held that he is
a Filipino citizen while on September 13, 1988, the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation held that he is not a citizen of the
Philippines.
In a statement by the Australian consul in the Philippines, it was
found out that RAMON LABO, JR. was granted Australian
citizenship by Sydney on July 28, 1976.

276

However, Labo claims that the petition to disqualify him


because of his citizenship is already barred by res judicata because
of the earlier ruling of the COMELEC that he is a Filipino citizen.
It must be pointed out that res judicata does not apply to questions
involving citizenship (SORIA VS. COMMISSIONER, 37 SCRA
213; LEE VS. COMMISSIONER, 42 SCRA 561; SIA REYES VS.
DEPORTATION BOARD, 122 SCRA 478).
Labo also claims that his naturalization in Australia was
annulled since it was found out that his marriage to an Australian
was bigamous. This is without merit since even assuming it to be
true, the same did not automatically vest him Philippine
Citizenship which could be reacquired only by: a) a direct act of
Congress; b) by naturalization; and c) by repatriation. Since none
of these is present to show that he was able to reacquire Philippine
citizenship, Labo is not considered a Filipino citizen. As such, he is
not even qualified to be a voter under the Constitution, much less
as a candidate for the position of Mayor in the City of Baguio.
Labo claims further that the "futile" technicality should not
frustrate the will of the electorate in Baguio City who elected him
by a "resonant and thunderous majority. Again, this is without
basis because to be more accurate, he won by just over 2,100
votes. But even assuming further that he was elected unanimously,
the same voters of Baguio City could not change the requirements
of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The electorate
had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia or at the least a stateless person to preside over
them as the City Mayor of Baguio. Only citizens of the Philippines
have that privilege. The probability that many of those who voted
for him may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the elections cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him.
3. Who shall take the place of the petitioner then as the City Mayor
of Baguio? Is the private respondent entitled to it? HE CANNOT
FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT HE OBTAINED ONLY THE
SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE ELECTION
AND THEREFORE, HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT THE CHOICE
OF THE PEOPLE OF BAGUIO CITY.
It is true that in SANTOS vs. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 740 , the
Supreme Court held that in cases like this, the second placer shall

277

take the place of the disqualified candidate since the latter was
considered as non-candidate and all that he received are considered
stray votes. The second placer, in effect, won by default. Said
decision was supported by 8 members of the Court, three
dissented, two reserved their votes and one on leave. Re-examining
said decision, the same shall be REVERSED in favor of the earlier
case of Geronimo vs. COMELEC, 136 SCRA 435, which is the
more logical and democratic rule first announced in the 1912 case
of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238, and was supported by ten (10)
members of the Court without any dissent. The Vice Mayor of the
City of Baguio shall be entitled to become the City Mayor instead
of the private respondent.
b. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, June 23, 1989
c. Board of Commissioners vs. De la Rosa and William
Gatchalian, May 31, 1991
d. Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703
1-a. Effect of naturalization of wife and minor

children

Read:
1. Burca vs. Republic,51 SCRA 248
2. Reyes vs. Deportation Board,May 30,1983
2. Effect on the citizenship of an alien woman married
Filipino citizen

to a

Read:
1. Moy Ya Lim vs. Comm. on Immigration, 41 SCRA
3. Effect on the citizenship of a Filipino woman on her
to an alien.
Read:
1. Rep. vs. Tandayag, 117 SCRA 637
4. Procedure for repatriation
Read:

292
marriage

278

1. P vs. Avengoza, 119 SCRA 1


5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization
Read:
1. Schneider vs. Rusk, 377 US 163
2. Republic vs. Cokeng, 23 SCRA 559
3. Republic vs. Cokeng, 34 SCRA 668
4. Chan Teck Lao vs. Republic, 55 SCRA 1
5. Rep. vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244
*****************************************************