People vs.

Dimalanta
440 SCRA 55

Facts: On November 10, 1999, appellant was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2
(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, as she defrauded and
deceived ELVIRA D. ABARCA and said accused purchased and received assorted jewelries
from herein complainant in the total amount of P408,826.00. The first check issued by appellant
was honored and paid by the drawee bank. However, the eleven checks, which are enumerated in
the Information, were all returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason that appellants
account was closed. In her defense, appellant denied that she purchased jewelry from
complainant, saying that she could not afford them. She alleged that it was complainant who
approached her asking for help in selling jewelry. In turn, appellant asked her friend, Levinia
Maranan, to look for buyers for the jewelry. Appellant and complainant agreed that Maranan will
sell the jewelry and, upon the latters confirmation that the items had been sold, appellant shall
deliver to complainant the postdated checks in payment therefor. They further agreed that the
unsold pieces of jewelry shall be returned to complainant.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable for estafa.

Held: No, Maranan failed to fund the second check. In order to cover its amount, appellant gave
complainant P25,000.00 out of her own money as partial satisfaction. Subsequently, Maranan,
who had apparently encountered financial problems, went into hiding. As a consequence, the rest
of appellants checks were dishonored. It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was
enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se.
The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of
freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the "criminal mind" behind the
"criminal act." Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be
accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed
if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. It appears that Levinia
Maranan, in whom resided the duty to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry or to
return the same if unsold, must be impleaded either as a co-defendant or a third-party defendant.
Since she was not a party in the case at bar, a separate action should be instituted for the full
determination of the civil liability.


Magno vs. CA


Facts:
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair
shop operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment
needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the
equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP
Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount.
Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and
the rest had no sufficient fund.
Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled
out the equipment.
Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found
guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
No, From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with
which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the
vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs.
Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the
parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by
L.S. Finance Management.

People vs. Delim

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding
the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of
Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto
is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged
into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel
Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used
denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself,
more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and
executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and
killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that
modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the
appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the
three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot
and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF
HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER
THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE

Rivera vs. People

Facts: Victim, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Accused Rivera was in the same
vicinity. When he saw Ruben, Rivera mocked Ruben for being jobless and dependent on his
wife. This caused an exchange of heated words between the two.
The next day when Ruben and his daughter were once again buying food, Rivera and two other
men attacked Ruben. The two men punched and mauled Ruben while Rivera, on the other hand,
got a hollowblock and hit Rubenss head with it three times. Rivera and his companions left only
when the policemen arrived.
Ruben was brought to the hospital and it was said that he suffered only slight and superficial
wounds but were it not for the arrival of the policemen, Ruben would have died.
TC- the three are guilty of frustrated murder.
CA- affirmed the decision of the trial court, with modifications.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was INTENT TO KILL.
HELD: Yes. There is intent to kill in the case at bar.
The pieces of evidence required to prove intent to kill are as follows:
1.means used by the malefactors
2.nature,location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
3. conduct of the malefactor before, during and after the commission of the crime,
4.circumstances under which the crime was committed
5. motive of the accused.
Applying the elements to the case at bar, the means or weapons used by RIVERA is a piece of
hollow block.
As to nature, location and number of wounds, Rivera inflicted injuries on the head of Ruben
three times.
Conduct before during and after the commission of the crime, Rivera was angry at Ruben
because of the circumstances that transpired between Ruben and him

RECUERDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of Estafa under
Article 315,paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving 18 worthless bank checks were simultaneously
filed by theOffice of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.Evidence adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish
that herein private respondent Yolanda G. Floro is engagedin the business of buying and selling of jewelry since
1985. Herein accused-appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a dentist by profession, who was
introduced to Floro by the latters cousin Aimee Aoro in the firstweek of December 1993, became her customer.
Sometime in the second week of December 1993, at around 7:30in the evening, Recuerdo went to the house of
Floro and purchased from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19carat diamond round stone in white gold setting
worthP220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.
For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and there ten post-
datedchecks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust Development Bank. For the 1.55 carat
marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to complainant then and there ten (10) postdated checks,
each in theamount of P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank, Makati. In yet another transaction that transpired in the
earlyevening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once again proceeded at Floros house and bought another set of
jewelry,this time a pair of diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven (7) postdated checks
one for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6) postdated checks drawn against Prudential Bank,
Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 representing the balance in the aggregate amount of
P600,000.00 pesos.Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association,
Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Uponpresentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the different drawee
banks on their respective maturitydates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks were all dishonored for having been
drawn against closed accounts

Issue: Whether or not Recuerdo is guilty of estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(d)

Ruling: The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the following basic
elements:- Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time
thecheck was issued;- The postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that
his fundsdeposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and- Damage to the payee
thereof The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established by the prosecution through
convincing evidence, warranting petitioners conviction of the offense of Estafa. The trial court found private
complainant Floros testimony that petitioner issued the subject checks as payment for the purchase of pieces
of jewelry simultaneous to their transactions to be categorical and credible. There was sufficient
evidence establishedby the prosecution that the checks were issued by the accused to the complainant in
exchange of the pieces of jewelry given to her on two separate occasions.

Loney vs. People

Facts: Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President
and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining
in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings
3
from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At
the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears
that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings
gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions
of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. In August 1996, the Department of
Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque
(MTC) with violation of Article 91(B),
4
sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067),
5
Section 8
6
of Presidential Decree No.
984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),
7
Section 108
8
of Republic Act
No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942),
9
and Article 365
10
of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
11

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were
duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the
incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations
which constitute legal excuse or justification.
Issue: Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand.
Held: No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case, Duplicity of charges simply means a single
complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110
20
of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense.

In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping
of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit
from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for
violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the
absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental
Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent
damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of
actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused
must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or
lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there
was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had
done everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It
does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution
Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate
is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not
required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings
without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or
neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the
offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the
Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.

Garcia vs. CA
Facts: On May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during in theMunicipality of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, Election Officer Arsenia Garcia, together withRomero, Viray and
other Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, conspiring together, wi l l f ul l y and
unl awf ul l y decr eas ed t he vot es r ecei ved by s enat or i al candi dat e Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. from 6,998 votes (as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in 159 precincts)
to 1,921 votes.During the trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed one
whoannounced the figure 1921 instead of 6998, which was subsequently entered
bythen accused Viray in his capacity as the secretary of the board. Petitioner
alsoadmitted that she was the one who prepare the COC, though it was not her task. The trial
court sentenced Garcia with indeterminate sentence and is to sufferdisqualification to hold
public office. She is also deprived of her right of suffrage. Petitioner appealed before the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification,increasing the minimum penalty of 6
months to one year.
Issue: Whet her or not t he a vi ol at i on of Sect i on 27( b) of Republ i c Act
No. 6646 is under mala in se or mala prohibita
HELD: Mal a i n s e f el oni es ar e def i ned an d penal i z ed i n t he Revi s ed
Penal Code, while Mala Prohibita are those deemed inherently immoral, even punished
byspecial law. Section 27(b) of RA No. 6646 provides that Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases or decreases thevotes received by
the candidate in any election or any member of the board whorefuses, after proper
verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deductsuch tampered votes. Clearly,
the acts prohibited in the said RA are mal a in se.Criminal intent is presumed to exist on
the part of the person who executes an actwhich the law punishes

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact


Facts:
The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley,
Rizal Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest
building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room
toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building
o This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
o The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his roommate
Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house
and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident,
and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that
the door and acquaint his companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection
because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression
that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite the defendant's warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
(mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
Holding:
No, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would
be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if
Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would
be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he
would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
o The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if
without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts

Garcia vs. People
Facts: On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador
Tacuboy not far from Chys apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest
they be told off again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, Talaga a napangas ni
Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy, meaning, This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let
him live long.
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of
Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on the
26
th
and 28
th
of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory, petitioner
blurted out Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita. (This Manny is really
arrogant, I will finish him off today.) Later that afternoon, the group headed to the store of Adela dela
Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that they move to Punta. On their way to Punta, the
group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chys sister, and there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming
out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner who
suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman
inaano? (Why did you box me? Im not doing anything to you.) But petitioner kept on
assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy
continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower
back portion of Chys head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife
Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in
breathing. Upon reaching Chys house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered.
Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious on the
kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy
confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
Issue: whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.
Held: Yes, Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit
graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts. a person committing a felony is
responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful
act performed is different from the one he intended; el que es causa de la causa es causa del
mal causado (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).

Urbano vs. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the
place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to
the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre
cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and
Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo.
On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the
medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he
had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin
which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged
with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who
stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The
motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident
or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding
Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to
the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
People vs. Villacorta

Facts: On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere,
Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a
sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.
Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was treated as
out-patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the
stabbing incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus. The
next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus
infection secondary to stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.
HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta
upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening cause which appeared between the time of the
stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.
In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the
kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or less. In
this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days
already lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the date of death of Cruz. Something else
caused the tetanus other than the stabbing in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less
before February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.

People vs. Noel Sales

Facts: That on or about the 20
th
day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the evening at
Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit several times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate
eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a piece of wood, measuring more or less one meter in
length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which
cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latters heirs in such amount as
may be proven in court. On the other hand that on or about the 20
th
day of September, 2002, at around or
past 8:00 oclock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused assaulted and hit with a piece of wood,
one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice
of the victims heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime of parricide.
Held: Yes, there is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the
deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria
testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by
appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this time,
the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately.
For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head.
Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness
and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.



Intod vs. CA
Facts: Intod, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig went to Mandayas house and asked the latter to comewith
them in killing Palangpangan or else he would also be killed. Intod wanted to kill Palangpangan
because of a land dispute between them, 10:00pm of that same day, Petitioner, together with his
accessories, commenced in performing their planned crime. Mandaya pointed to the room of
Palangpangan and petitioner andcompany fired at the said room. It turned out that Palangpangan
was in another city, no one was in the room when the accusedfired shots, and no one was hit by
the gun fire.

Issue: Whether or not the act committed by intod and his accomplices constitutes an impossible
crime.

Held: Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code States: Criminal Liability shall be incurred:
By a person committing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were itnot
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means.

The case at bar constitutes an inherent impossibility to perform the act due to factual or physical
impossibility, that is, extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor beyond his control prevent
the consummation of the intended crime.

Impossible Crimes constitutes a criminal liability, in order to, punish the criminal intent.

Jacinto vs. People
Facts:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check waspayment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc.,
and petitioner was then the collector of MegaFoam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the
Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister
of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.Later,
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee
of Land Bank,who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform
Capitle that the subject BDO checkdeposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca
then called and relayed the message through accusedAnita Valencia, a former employee/collector
of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but theycould be reached through
Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.Valencia then
told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquinoto replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash
and divide it equally intofour: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle.
Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam'saccountant, reported the matter to the owner of
Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was
able to confirm that the latter indeed handedpetitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment
for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino furthertestified that petitioner Jacinto also
called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. Verificationfrom company
records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However,
BabyAquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the
dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
and worked out an entrapmentoperation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided
by Dyhengco were marked and dusted withfluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills
were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that shewas going along with Valencia's
plan.

Issue: Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.
Held: As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,
the personal property subject of thetheft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to
gain
from the thing stolen
. This isfurther bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed
on the accused isdependent on the value of the thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully
took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparentlywithout value, as
it was subsequently dishonored.
Consolidated cases of (Villareal v. People), (People v. Court of Appeals), (Dizon v.
People), (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts: - In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity
(Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza,
Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy
Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of
the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of
Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during
the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and
that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three
days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City
for the commencement of their initiation.
- Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of
Aquilan initiation rites.
- On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize
and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer,
they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically.
The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the
first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
- After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members1[10] Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head
of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground.
- After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping
bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
4. Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries
Held: 1. Yes, The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less
than the Constitution itself. 2Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all




criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones
defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage
of the proceedings. The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to
present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On
the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since
counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not
scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five
hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order
strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons
testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes
a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
2. Yes, The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2)
and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free
from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable
motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be
weighed. Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or
non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
3. Yes, The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal
Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to
Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. The fundamental ingredient of criminal
intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven
was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
4. Yes, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. The absence of malicious
intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are
ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault


when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.