Childrens Cognitive

Research Lab
CCRL
Childrens Cognitive
Research Lab
CCRL
Stability of Reasoning: Measuring Degree of Order in
Adults Predictions in Sinking Objects
Ramon Castillo, Samantha Hinds, Ashlee Kromski and Faculty Mentor, Heidi Kloos

OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
METHOD
Participants
104undergraduatePsychology students at U.C.
25participants in each condition

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
REFERENCES
DISCUSSION
Materials
12uniquetransparent jars (large, medium, small)
Aluminumdisks (1cmhigh, 4cmin diameter, 43g
each)

Procedure
DirectRT Precision Timing Software (Version 2012) was used to administer 90 trials during the pre-test, 180- trials during
training, and90trials duringthepost-test yielding 360trials total.

Participants wereaskedto choosewhich of thetwo jars wouldsink faster in thesink-faster condition. Andin thesink-slower
condition, thetask was to choosewhich of thetwo objects wouldsink slower. Both phases consistedof aseries of prediction
trials, thedifferencebeingthat theparticipant was given feedback duringtraining, but not duringactual testing(pre& post-test).










Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, England.
Castillo, R. D. & Kloos, H. (2013). Can aFlow
Network Approach Shed Light on Childrens
ProblemSolving? Ecological Psychology, 25(3)
281-292.
Kohn, A. S. (1993). Preschoolers reasoning about
density: will it float? Child Development 64,
16371650.







RESULTS
Accuracy: Amount of Explained Variance:

Degree of Order:
Robustness:

Theexperimental phaseconsistedof eight segmentsof 90
trialseach, themiddlefour segmentsconsistingof feedback
trials. Ina2by 2between-groupdesign, wevariedthetask
instructionsandthedistributionof trialsto explore
variability inperformance. Specifically, participantshadto
determineeither thefaster sinkingobject (sink-faster
instruction) or theslower one(sink-slower instruction). And
thedifferent typesof trialswereeither evenly distributed
withinasegment (even-distributioncondition) or therewasa
higher number of critical versusnon-critical trials(uneven-
distributioncondition).

Stability isessential for usto understandour
surroundings. Wehavetheability to searchour mindsfor
past patternsof stability, whichcanhelpuspredict events
incurrent situations. Thesepredictivereasoningsare
knownasrepresentations, beliefs, schemas, strategiesor
goals. Theexistenceof theseentitiesconfirmedin
numerousstudies, rangingback to theearliest researchin
cognition(e.g., Bartlett, 1932).

Mental structuresthat giveriseto stablepredictionsina
reasoningtask aredifferent inmany waysfromthe
processesthat giveriseto stableeco-systems. However,
therearealso important similaritiesbetweenthetwo
systems(Castillo & Kloos2013). Thestability of eco-
systemsdependsontheflow of energy amongmultiple
species, noneof whichmakesupthestability of thesystem
alone. Stability comesfromtheholistic configurationof
interdependent components. Similarly, stablemental
structuresarelikely to beholistic configurationsthat
dependoninteractingelementsof knowledgethat change
their natureasaresult of alarger whole.

Giventhesimilaritiesbetweeneco-systemsandmental
structures, weproposeto apply eco-dynamic maturesof
network stability to describestability inmental structures.

Thegoal of thecurrent study wasto apply these
macroscopic measuresof stability andchangeto observe
thestability of adults predictionsinasimplereasoning
task.

Thespecific task involvedadults speculationsabout how
different objectsbehavewhensubmergedinwater.
Reasoninginregardto sinkingobjectshasbeenstudied
numeroustimes(e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Smithet
al., 1985; Kloos& Somerville, 2001; Kohn, 1993), and
performanceistypically attributedto incorrect beliefs. This
leadsto thestudyingof stability of performance, especially
inthecontext of correctivefeedback.

Theideaoutlinedby theseexperimentsisquitesimple. When
thepercentageof varianceexplainedwashighduringthe
pretest segments, thispercentagewasattributableto acommon
patternof response, clearly identifiableandstableinthegroup
of participants. Under theeffect of feedback, thiscommon
structurewasdilutedandthischangewasperceivedasa
reductionof theexplainedvariance. Finally, whenanew
configurationof responsesemerged, theexplainedvariance
increasedagain. Under feedback trainingparticipantsgenerated
different dimensional organizationdependingonif they were
predictingwhether theobject wouldsink faster or slower.

Our study isthefirst to investigatethedegreeto whichthis
moretraditional measureof amount of explainedvariance
coincideswitheco-dynamic measuresof degreeof order and
robustness. Wefoundthat thesemeasurescouldtrack the
fluctuationobservedinthefirst dimensionextractedby
CATPCA: Thedegreeof order androbustnesshadapositive
correlationwiththeEigenvalueof thefirst dimension. This
meansthat every timeastructureemerges, levelsof order and
systemrobustnessarehightoo.

Themeasuresof degreeof order androbustnesscomewithfar
lessconceptual baggagethantraditional conceptsof beliefs,
representations, or thelike. Thisisbecausethey capture
stability without dependingonauxiliary hypothesesand
constructsto explainasystemsmemory or itsdriveto survive.
Theanalogy witheco-systemsforcesusto think of adifferent
kindof explanationfor systemrobustness, onethat movesaway
fromthetrapof computer metaphors, pointingtowardsatheory
that couldcapturetheessenceof biological systems.

Theeco-dynamic measuresallow usto leavebehindquestions
about theexact content of stablestructure. They incorporate
informational measuresof uncertainty andaveragemutual
informationthat focusonthenatureof thesystemnetwork, not
thedetailsof thecomponentsthat makeupthenetwork. Thus,
eco-dynamical measuresallow usto incorporateheterogeneity
of mental structuresinto explanationsof cognitivephenomena,
without trappingthediscussioninwhat exactly it isthat adult
know or not know.


Wewould also liketo thank Michael Richardson,
CatherineSchneider as well as all participants who took
part in this study.