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21st Century Dam Design
Advances and Adaptations
31st Annual USSD Conference
San Diego, California, April 11-15, 2011
On the Cover
Artist's rendition of San Vicente Dam after completion of the dam raise project to increase local storage and provide
a more flexible conveyance system for use during emergencies such as earthquakes that could curtail the regions
imported water supplies. The existing 220-foot-high dam, owned by the City of San Diego, will be raised by 117
feet to increase reservoir storage capacity by 152,000 acre-feet. The project will be the tallest dam raise in the
United States and tallest roller compacted concrete dam raise in the world.
The information contained in this publication regarding commercial projects or firms may not be used for
advertising or promotional purposes and may not be construed as an endorsement of any product or
from by the United States Society on Dams. USSD accepts no responsibility for the statements made
or the opinions expressed in this publication.
Copyright 2011 U.S. Society on Dams
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Control Number: 2011924673
ISBN 978-1-884575-52-5
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Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-628-5430
Fax: 303-628-5431
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Internet: www.ussdams.org
U.S. Society on Dams
Vision
To be the nation's leading organization of professionals dedicated to advancing the role of dams
for the benefit of society.
Mission USSD is dedicated to:
Advancing the knowledge of dam engineering, construction, planning, operation,
performance, rehabilitation, decommissioning, maintenance, security and safety;
Fostering dam technology for socially, environmentally and financially sustainable water
resources systems;
Providing public awareness of the role of dams in the management of the nation's water
resources;
Enhancing practices to meet current and future challenges on dams; and
Representing the United States as an active member of the International Commission on
Large Dams (ICOLD).
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 173
THREE PREDOMINATE FAILURE MODES OF THIN ARCH DAMS
Chad Gillan
1

Guy Lund
2

James Weldon
3

ABSTRACT
Strontia Springs Dam is a double-curvature thin-arch dam located on the South Platte
River in Colorado, and is owned and operated by Denver Water. The project was
completed in 1986. Based on current practice, the probable maximum flood and
maximum design earthquake loads are greater than those used for the design of the
project. Therefore, an updated structural stability evaluation was recommended for the
project.
URS performed a comprehensive structural stability analysis of the dam, and evaluated
the safety of the structure against three potential failure modes that are typical for many
concrete arch dams. The study used the three-dimensional finite element method of
analysis to evaluate the behavior of the dam for the usual, unusual, extreme, and post-
earthquake loading conditions. This paper presents an overview of the structural stability
analysis, and how results were used to assess dam safety with regard to the potential
failure modes, which consisted of concrete overstressing, abutment stability, and rock
erosion.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Strontia Springs Dam is located on the South Platte River, approximately 11 miles south-
southwest of Denver metropolitan area, and on the boundary between Jefferson and
Douglas Counties. The drainage basin for the project encompasses 2,596 square miles of
land on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains. The dam impounds a reservoir 1.7
miles long at normal reservoir water surface.
Strontia Springs Dam is a double-curvature, thin-arch, concrete dam with a maximum
structural height of 292 feet. The crest of the dam is approximately 550 feet long (not
including the thrust block and auxiliary spillway), and is at El. 6029 feet. The thickness
of the dam varies from 30 feet at the base of the dam to 10 feet at the crest. The dam
consists of 13 monoliths (blocks) that have a maximum length (along the axis of the dam)
of 50 feet. The mass concrete for the monoliths was placed in 7.5-foot-high lifts. There
are vertical contraction joints between the monoliths that contain shear keys. The
contraction joints were grouted to assure monolithic behavior of the dam after the
concrete was cooled by cooling pipes. The construction of the dam was completed in
1982, and a hydropower unit was put into service in 1986.

1
P.E., Project Manager, URS Corporation, Chad_Gillan@URSCorp.com
2
P.E., Senior Principal, URS Corporation.
3
P.E., Engineering Manager/Dam Safety, Denver Water
174 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations

Figure 1. Profile and Section of Strontia Spring Dam

The Strontia Springs Dam site is in a steep V-shaped canyon approximately 1,500-feet-
deep. The riverbed is approximately 50-feet-wide near the base of the dam and occupies
the entire canyon bottom. The slope of the right abutment averages 50 degrees, and
averages 45 degrees for the left abutment.
The bedrock at the dam site consists mainly of interlayered rocks including biotite gneiss,
biotite schist, granitic gneiss, sillimanite gneiss, and small inclusions of amphibolite
gneiss. Small tabular bodies and large veins of coarse crystalline pegmatite are also
observed.
THE THREE PREDOMINATE FAILURE MODES
The three potential failure modes used for the structural assessment of Strontia Springs
Dam include overstressing, abutment stability, and erosion. The potential for each failure
mode was evaluated with the results from the three-dimensional finite element analysis.
The analyses presented in this paper used linear elastic material property assumptions.
Numerous parametric studies were performed to validate the finite element model,
including the comparison of the model results to instrumentation data taken from the dam
over the last 28 years.
Concrete Overstressing
The potential for failure due to overstressing is evaluated by comparing the computed
stresses from the finite element analysis with the estimated allowable strength of the
concrete. If the computed stresses from the analysis are greater than the allowable limit
of the concrete, then the results indicate that crushing or cracking of the concrete would
develop in the structure. The allowable strength of the concrete is estimated based on the
tested strength for the material, and the assumed load (i.e. usual (normal), unusual
(flood), and extreme (seismic) loads).
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 175
Allowable Strength of Concrete
As previously noted, the evaluation of
Strontia Springs Dam was based on linear
elastic assumptions. However, concrete is
not a linear material, as shown by the
idealized stress-strain curve for concrete in
tension on Figure 2. Point B on Figure 1
represents the ultimate tensile strength of
the concrete.
In general the stress-strain behavior of
concrete can be characterized in the
following four stages:
The stress-strain curve in the first stage
is considered to be linear elastic, that
is, when the load is removed the
material rebounds to the initial
unstrained state. Studies on mass
concrete have shown that the material
behaves linearly up to approximately
35 percent of the ultimate strength 1.
The stress-strain curve in the second
stage consists of some inelastic
behavior. The load results in
permanent deformations and strains in
the material. When the load is
removed the material does not rebound to the initial unstrained state (this is called
hysteresis). Studies have also shown that growth of internal microcracks commences
in the concrete at loads equal to approximately 35 to 50 percent of the ultimate
strength 1.
The third stage consists of large inelastic strains, so that there is a noticeable change
in deformation. In this stage there is stable crack grow in the concrete, meaning that
cracks will form but not initiate failure.
The fourth stage is also called the fracture stage. The deformations are great enough
to produce unstable crack grow and eventual failure of the concrete.
Traditionally, the design and analysis of mass concrete dams has limited the material
behavior to the first stage for usual loads, the second stage for unusual loads, and the
third stage for extreme loads. Similar assumptions were used for the evaluation of
Strontia Springs Dam, and are summarized in the following bullets:
Figure 2. Idealized stress-strain curve for
concrete in tension
176 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations
For the usual (normal) loads the concrete behavior is limited to the linear elastic
stage, or the first stage. Therefore, the maximum allowable stress for the linear
behavior of concrete is typically the static strength divided by three (3).
For unusual (flood) loads the concrete behavior is limited to the second stage, which
can result in permanent deformations and strains in the concrete. Therefore, for the
unusual loads the limit of the maximum allowable stress is the static strength divided
by two (2).
For extreme (seismic) loads the concrete behavior is limited to the third stage. This
assumes that the concrete may experience permanent deformations and damage due
to the load, but not enough to cause failure. The maximum allowable stress for the
concrete is the dynamic strength divided by 1.1 for compression and unity for tension
2.
Evaluation of Concrete Stress
For this paper the results from the usual loading condition are presented to illustrate how
the stresses in the dam due to the load are evaluated against overstressing. The usual
loading condition, USLC-1, evaluated the dam for static loads due to gravity, normal
water surface (NWS), spring/fall temperatures, tailwater, and sedimentation. The
spring/fall condition assumes that the dam is in a stress-free temperature state, and
simulates the transition from warmer to colder temperatures.

Figure 3. Arch stresses on the upstream and downstream faces of the dam. Negative
values indicate compressive stress.
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 177
The stresses from the finite element model (FEM) are transformed in to arch stresses,
which are horizontal and tangent to the circumference of the arch, and cantilever
stresses, which are vertical and parallel to the slope of the dam face. Negative and
positive values correspond to compressive and tensile stresses, respectively. Figure 3
shows a contour plot of the arch stress results from the finite element analysis on the
upstream (extrados) and downstream (intrados) faces of the dam. The allowable
compressive and tensile strength of the concrete was assumed to be 1,333 pounds per
square inch (lb/in
2
) and 143 lb/in
2
, respectively.
The results from the analysis show that the computed stresses on the upstream and
downstream faces of the dam are less than the allowable strength of the concrete, except
at the pinnacle of the ogee spillway crest where there is an isolated area of tensile stress
that is greater than the allowable limit of the concrete. This area of high tensile stress can
be shown more effectively in a sectional view of the crown cantilever of the dam, as
shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Crown Cantilever of the dam showing arch stresses.

The plot of arch stress in Figure 3 clearly shows that the area of high tensile stress is
isolated to the downstream end of the spillway crest. Strontia Springs Dam contains
vertical contraction joints between the monoliths, and there is a vertical contraction joint
at the centerline of the service spillway. The contraction joint will open slightly under
the assumed load, which will significantly reduce, or eliminate, the development of
tensile stresses computed by the model. Therefore, the area of high tensile stresses on the
downstream edge of the service spillway is not a concern regarding the safety of the dam.
178 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations

Figure 5. Cantilever stresses on the upstream and downstream faces of the dam.

A contour plot of the cantilever stresses from the finite element analysis is shown in
Figure 5. The results show that the maximum computed cantilever stresses are less than
the allowable compressive and tensile strength of the concrete. Note, the results also
indicate that large area of cantilever tensile stresses will develop on the downstream face.
Further evaluation of the results shows that this area of cantilever tensile stress is due to
the structural response to the load on the arches.
The horizontal arches near the top of the dam are above the reservoir level, and thus there
is no hydrostatic load. Whereas, the lower arches in middle of the dam have significant
hydrostatic load due to the reservoir. The greater load on the middle arches results in
arch deflection in the downstream direction. The upper arches, however, have no
potential for deflection without any hydrostatic load. The arches cannot behave as
independent systems, because monolithic continuity causes the middle (more heavily
loaded) arches to pull the upper (less loaded) arches downstream. This behavior results
in the development of the cantilever tensile stresses on the downstream face. The
maximum tensile stress is less than 100 lb/in
2
and significantly less than the estimated
allowable tensile capacity of the concrete. Therefore, the vertical tensile stresses on the
downstream face are not a concern regarding the safety of the dam.
The results also show isolated areas of vertical tensile stress on the upstream face of the
dam near the dam/foundation interface. The interface between the dam and foundation
cannot actually develop tension. Thus the results could be an indication of potential
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 179
separation between the dam and foundation at these areas. Further evaluation of the
results in these areas show that the tensile stresses are isolated to the face of the dam, thus
any potential separation at the interface will be small and will not have any significant
change on the behavior of the structure.
The results from the finite element analysis due to the usual load combination indicate
that the computed stresses in the dam will be less than allowable strength of the concrete.
Based on these results, the dam is considered to have adequate safety against overstresses
for the assumed load.
Abutment Stability
The abutment stability analysis evaluated the potential for rock block wedges in the
foundation to become unstable due to loads from the dam. Potential rock blocks are
formed by intersecting discontinuities (i.e. joints, faults, bedding planes) in the rock
mass. The analysis uses the results from the finite element analyses to estimate the thrust
from the dam onto the foundation due to the usual, unusual, and extreme loading
condition. The estimated thrust from the dam is applied to potential rock blocks and a
factor of safety against the sliding is computed.
Minimum Allowable Factors of Safety
The minimum allowable factors of safety against sliding are 1.5 for the usual and unusual
loading conditions 2. Note, the minimum required factors of safety are for sliding
stability calculations that neglect the effect of apparent cohesion.
Evaluation of Abutment Stability
For this paper the results from the usual loading condition are presented. Field
investigations were performed at the dam site to identify discontinuities in the rock
foundation. The field investigation categorized the discontinuities regarding the potential
for form moveable rock blocks.
Note, that the field investigations were performed primarily using surface mapping
techniques. Therefore, there are many unknowns about the discontinuities below the
surface. It is important to document the assumptions that must be true, in order for
potential rock blocks to become a hazard regarding the safety of the dam. For Strontia
Springs Dam, the following conditions must be true for rock block movement to occur.
1. The discontinuities must be continuous.
2. Discontinuities must intersect to form a discrete block.
3. The sliding surface(s) of the discrete block must daylight for the block to be
kinematically moveable.
4. The driving force must be greater than the shear resistance of the sliding plane.
Only when these four conditions are met, can slope instability occur.
180 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations
An example of a potential rock block in the foundation on the right abutment of Strontia
Springs dam is show on Figure 6.
The results show that the
typical thrust from the dam
will actually drive the block
into the abutment, and
opposite the direction of
sliding.
However not all sliding
planes were this obvious,
therefore, further evaluation
was necessary to determine
the potential safety issues
due to rock block stability.
The stereographic analysis
of the discontinuities
identified three kinematic
rock wedges in the
foundation of Strontia
Springs Dam. The
stability of these rock
blocks were evaluated
using the program
SWEDGE
4
. The results
from the analysis are shown
in Table 2.



4
SWEDGE, v. 2.0, Rock Engineering Group, Univ. Toronto, Rocscience Inc., 1997
Figure 6. Plan view of foundation rock, showing
orientation of typical arch thrust and rock block movement.
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 181
Table 2. Stability results for potential sliding planes
Slope Orientation
Friction
Angle/Cohesion
Factor of Safety
(DDR / dip)
(degree / lb/in
2
)

Left Abutment
140 / 50 45
o
/ 5 18.9
Block Wt = 7 tons 35
o
/ 20 69.1
181 / 56, 45
o
/ 5 4.2
Block Wt = 562 tons 35
o
/ 20 10.3
Right Abutment
333 / 50 45
o
/ 5 11.2
Block Wt = 16 tons 35
o
/ 20 39.3
333 / 75 45
o
/ 5 3.0
Block Wt = 1027 tons 35
o
/ 20 6.4
Minimum Require Factor of Safety 1.5

The results show that the computed sliding factors of safety for the potential rock blocks
on both the right and left abutments are greater than the minimum required factors of
safety. Based on these results, there are no anticipated wedge failures that are a safety
concern to the stability of the abutments, of dam, for the usual loading condition.
Erosion
Historical observations at other dam sites have noted rock scour during significant
discharging events, such as floods. Rock scour at concrete dams, such as Strontia
Springs Dam, which rely on the rock abutments for the stability of the structure, can
present a significant hazard to dam safety. Current FERC guidelines require an
assessment of rock scour when the dam under consideration is expected to overtop during
high flow conditions 2.
The erosion analysis evaluated the potential for rock scour due to overtopping during the
unusual flood loading condition, and the effect that potential scour would have on the
overall stability of the dam. This was especially important at Strontia Springs because
the probable maximum flood (PMF) is estimated to results in approximately 25 feet of
flow overtopping the crest of the dam.
The erodibility of the rock mass at the abutments was evaluated using the Erodibility
Index method, as described in the FERC guidelines 2. The Erodibility Index method
compares the computed stream power of the overtopping jet with the Erodibility Index to
determine if the foundation material supporting the dam has the potential to scour.
182 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations
Erodibility Index Method
Water jets that impact the downstream area of a dam with high velocity will usually
produce erosion unless the rock is extremely hard and quite sound. The Erodibility
Index, which is used to determine the likelihood of erosion, is computed using Equation
1.
(1)

where: K = Erodibility Index
Ms = mass strength number
Kb = block size number
Kd = inter-block bond shear strength number
Js = ground structure number

The estimated range of values for the mass strength, block size, inter-block bond shear
strength, and ground structure parameters were used to compute a range of the Erodibility
Index for the foundation rock. The estimated Erodibility Index at Strontia Springs ranged
from 1,100 for weathered rock, to 16,325 for un-weathered rock. Figure 4 shows the
threshold which relates the relative ability of rock and other earth materials to resist scour
to the relative magnitude of the erosive capacity of the water (stream power). The
corresponding stream power that could potentially erode the rock will then range between
190 and 1450 kW/m
2
, based on Figure 7.
Figure 7. Erosion threshold for rock and other earth materials (Annandale 1995)
The computed stream power for the overtopping discharge is computed using Equation 2
2.
S d b S
J K K M K =
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 183
(2)
where: E = rate of energy dissipation due to overtopping
q = unit discharge
E = elevation difference (i.e., reservoir and foundation)
= unit weight of water
A = area of jet at impact

The potential for erosion of the
foundation rock was evaluated by
comparing the Erodibility Index of
the rock mass to the computed
stream power due to the
overtopping jet. If the Erodibility
Index is greater than the computed
stream power, then rock scour is
not likely. If the computed stream
power is greater than the
Erodibility Index stream power,
then rock scour is likely. The
computed stream power due to the
overtopping jet at Strontia Springs
Dam was computed for different
depth of overtopping and various
heights of fall. The results are
shown in Table 3. The
overtopping jet profile is shown on
Figure 8.

Table 3. Stream power due to the overtopping jet
Depth of Overtopping
Foundation
Elevation
5 feet 10 feet 12.5 feet 15 feet 25 feet
(kW/m
2
) (kW/m
2
) (kW/m
2
) (kW/m
2
) (kW/m
2
)
El. 6000 168 380 495 606 1081
El. 5950 286 666 883 1088 1913
El. 5900 374 879 1159 1435 2561
El. 5885 392 933 1236 1530 2747
El. 5750 100 288 378 467 800

A
E q
E

=
Figure 8. Profile of overtopping jet.
184 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations
The results indicated that there is a likelihood that a scour hole could develop. Based on
the foundation rock data, the scour hole would be approximately 20 to 30 feet deep of
rock material that would have to be scoured away before the overtopping jet reached the
dam/foundation contact, because the dam is keyed into the foundation rock. Figure 9
shows the impacted zone from the overtopping jet.
The Effect of Scour at Strontia Springs Dam
Rock scour was simulated using the FEM to depths of approximately 26, 53, and 80 feet
below the dam/foundation contact. The dam/foundation contact is below the current
surface of the rock because the dam was keyed into the foundation and the FEM does not
model the material above the dam/foundation contact. Therefore, the depth of scour
modeled would actually be approximately 56, 83, and 110 feet for the left abutment and
45, 72, and 99 feet for the right abutment. Figure 10 shows the FEM.
Figure 9. Plan view showing area of impact from overtopping jet.
Figure 10. View shows the foundation elements that are eliminated to simulate the
effects of rock scour.
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 185

The behavior of the dam was evaluated from plots of stress and displacement versus
scour depth. The results were normalized for comparison. Three different locations on
the FEM of the dam were selected to evaluate the results of the different scour depths, as
shown in Figure 11. The normalized radial deformations versus scour depth for the three
different locations are shown on Figure 12. The normalized arch stress and normalized
cantilever stress versus scour depth are shown on Figures 13 and 14 respectively.
Figure 11. Location of evaluation points
Figure 12. Normalized radial deformations versus scour depth
186 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations


The results indicate that the response of the dam is nearly linear between the zero (0) and
26 feet of scour depth. The response shows minor non-linear behavior between 26 and
53 feet of scour depth. The results show a significant change in the behavior between 53
Figure 13. Normalized arch stresses versus scour depth.
Figure 14. Normalized cantilever stresses versus scour depth
Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 187
and 80 feet of scour depth. Based on these results it appears that the behavior of the dam
is adequate for scour depth up to 53 feet. As discussed previously, the actual rock depth
is greater than assumed in the model because the assumed dam/foundation level is below
the actual rock surface. Based on the results from this analysis, the dam is considered to
have adequate safety for left and right abutment scour depths up to approximately 80 and
70 feet, respectively.
REFERENCES
1. American Concrete Institute, "Mass Concrete (ACI 207.1R-96), 1996.
2. FERC Guidelines. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of
Hydropower Licensing, "Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower
Projects", Washington, D.C., October 1999, Chapter 11-Arch Dams.

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