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The existing 220-foot-high dam, owned by the city of san diego, will be raised by 117 feet to increase reservoir storage capacity by 152,000 acre-feet. The project will be the tallest roller compacted concrete dam raise in the world. The 31st annual USSD conference will be held in San Diego, california.
The existing 220-foot-high dam, owned by the city of san diego, will be raised by 117 feet to increase reservoir storage capacity by 152,000 acre-feet. The project will be the tallest roller compacted concrete dam raise in the world. The 31st annual USSD conference will be held in San Diego, california.
The existing 220-foot-high dam, owned by the city of san diego, will be raised by 117 feet to increase reservoir storage capacity by 152,000 acre-feet. The project will be the tallest roller compacted concrete dam raise in the world. The 31st annual USSD conference will be held in San Diego, california.
GEI Consultants, Inc. Kleinfelder, Inc. MWH Americas, Inc. Parsons Water and Infrastructure Inc. URS Corporation 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations 31st Annual USSD Conference San Diego, California, April 11-15, 2011 On the Cover Artist's rendition of San Vicente Dam after completion of the dam raise project to increase local storage and provide a more flexible conveyance system for use during emergencies such as earthquakes that could curtail the regions imported water supplies. The existing 220-foot-high dam, owned by the City of San Diego, will be raised by 117 feet to increase reservoir storage capacity by 152,000 acre-feet. The project will be the tallest dam raise in the United States and tallest roller compacted concrete dam raise in the world. The information contained in this publication regarding commercial projects or firms may not be used for advertising or promotional purposes and may not be construed as an endorsement of any product or from by the United States Society on Dams. USSD accepts no responsibility for the statements made or the opinions expressed in this publication. Copyright 2011 U.S. Society on Dams Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Control Number: 2011924673 ISBN 978-1-884575-52-5 U.S. Society on Dams 1616 Seventeenth Street, #483 Denver, CO 80202 Telephone: 303-628-5430 Fax: 303-628-5431 E-mail: stephens@ussdams.org Internet: www.ussdams.org U.S. Society on Dams Vision To be the nation's leading organization of professionals dedicated to advancing the role of dams for the benefit of society. Mission USSD is dedicated to: Advancing the knowledge of dam engineering, construction, planning, operation, performance, rehabilitation, decommissioning, maintenance, security and safety; Fostering dam technology for socially, environmentally and financially sustainable water resources systems; Providing public awareness of the role of dams in the management of the nation's water resources; Enhancing practices to meet current and future challenges on dams; and Representing the United States as an active member of the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD). Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 173 THREE PREDOMINATE FAILURE MODES OF THIN ARCH DAMS Chad Gillan 1
Guy Lund 2
James Weldon 3
ABSTRACT Strontia Springs Dam is a double-curvature thin-arch dam located on the South Platte River in Colorado, and is owned and operated by Denver Water. The project was completed in 1986. Based on current practice, the probable maximum flood and maximum design earthquake loads are greater than those used for the design of the project. Therefore, an updated structural stability evaluation was recommended for the project. URS performed a comprehensive structural stability analysis of the dam, and evaluated the safety of the structure against three potential failure modes that are typical for many concrete arch dams. The study used the three-dimensional finite element method of analysis to evaluate the behavior of the dam for the usual, unusual, extreme, and post- earthquake loading conditions. This paper presents an overview of the structural stability analysis, and how results were used to assess dam safety with regard to the potential failure modes, which consisted of concrete overstressing, abutment stability, and rock erosion. PROJECT DESCRIPTION Strontia Springs Dam is located on the South Platte River, approximately 11 miles south- southwest of Denver metropolitan area, and on the boundary between Jefferson and Douglas Counties. The drainage basin for the project encompasses 2,596 square miles of land on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains. The dam impounds a reservoir 1.7 miles long at normal reservoir water surface. Strontia Springs Dam is a double-curvature, thin-arch, concrete dam with a maximum structural height of 292 feet. The crest of the dam is approximately 550 feet long (not including the thrust block and auxiliary spillway), and is at El. 6029 feet. The thickness of the dam varies from 30 feet at the base of the dam to 10 feet at the crest. The dam consists of 13 monoliths (blocks) that have a maximum length (along the axis of the dam) of 50 feet. The mass concrete for the monoliths was placed in 7.5-foot-high lifts. There are vertical contraction joints between the monoliths that contain shear keys. The contraction joints were grouted to assure monolithic behavior of the dam after the concrete was cooled by cooling pipes. The construction of the dam was completed in 1982, and a hydropower unit was put into service in 1986.
1 P.E., Project Manager, URS Corporation, Chad_Gillan@URSCorp.com 2 P.E., Senior Principal, URS Corporation. 3 P.E., Engineering Manager/Dam Safety, Denver Water 174 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations
Figure 1. Profile and Section of Strontia Spring Dam
The Strontia Springs Dam site is in a steep V-shaped canyon approximately 1,500-feet- deep. The riverbed is approximately 50-feet-wide near the base of the dam and occupies the entire canyon bottom. The slope of the right abutment averages 50 degrees, and averages 45 degrees for the left abutment. The bedrock at the dam site consists mainly of interlayered rocks including biotite gneiss, biotite schist, granitic gneiss, sillimanite gneiss, and small inclusions of amphibolite gneiss. Small tabular bodies and large veins of coarse crystalline pegmatite are also observed. THE THREE PREDOMINATE FAILURE MODES The three potential failure modes used for the structural assessment of Strontia Springs Dam include overstressing, abutment stability, and erosion. The potential for each failure mode was evaluated with the results from the three-dimensional finite element analysis. The analyses presented in this paper used linear elastic material property assumptions. Numerous parametric studies were performed to validate the finite element model, including the comparison of the model results to instrumentation data taken from the dam over the last 28 years. Concrete Overstressing The potential for failure due to overstressing is evaluated by comparing the computed stresses from the finite element analysis with the estimated allowable strength of the concrete. If the computed stresses from the analysis are greater than the allowable limit of the concrete, then the results indicate that crushing or cracking of the concrete would develop in the structure. The allowable strength of the concrete is estimated based on the tested strength for the material, and the assumed load (i.e. usual (normal), unusual (flood), and extreme (seismic) loads). Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 175 Allowable Strength of Concrete As previously noted, the evaluation of Strontia Springs Dam was based on linear elastic assumptions. However, concrete is not a linear material, as shown by the idealized stress-strain curve for concrete in tension on Figure 2. Point B on Figure 1 represents the ultimate tensile strength of the concrete. In general the stress-strain behavior of concrete can be characterized in the following four stages: The stress-strain curve in the first stage is considered to be linear elastic, that is, when the load is removed the material rebounds to the initial unstrained state. Studies on mass concrete have shown that the material behaves linearly up to approximately 35 percent of the ultimate strength 1. The stress-strain curve in the second stage consists of some inelastic behavior. The load results in permanent deformations and strains in the material. When the load is removed the material does not rebound to the initial unstrained state (this is called hysteresis). Studies have also shown that growth of internal microcracks commences in the concrete at loads equal to approximately 35 to 50 percent of the ultimate strength 1. The third stage consists of large inelastic strains, so that there is a noticeable change in deformation. In this stage there is stable crack grow in the concrete, meaning that cracks will form but not initiate failure. The fourth stage is also called the fracture stage. The deformations are great enough to produce unstable crack grow and eventual failure of the concrete. Traditionally, the design and analysis of mass concrete dams has limited the material behavior to the first stage for usual loads, the second stage for unusual loads, and the third stage for extreme loads. Similar assumptions were used for the evaluation of Strontia Springs Dam, and are summarized in the following bullets: Figure 2. Idealized stress-strain curve for concrete in tension 176 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations For the usual (normal) loads the concrete behavior is limited to the linear elastic stage, or the first stage. Therefore, the maximum allowable stress for the linear behavior of concrete is typically the static strength divided by three (3). For unusual (flood) loads the concrete behavior is limited to the second stage, which can result in permanent deformations and strains in the concrete. Therefore, for the unusual loads the limit of the maximum allowable stress is the static strength divided by two (2). For extreme (seismic) loads the concrete behavior is limited to the third stage. This assumes that the concrete may experience permanent deformations and damage due to the load, but not enough to cause failure. The maximum allowable stress for the concrete is the dynamic strength divided by 1.1 for compression and unity for tension 2. Evaluation of Concrete Stress For this paper the results from the usual loading condition are presented to illustrate how the stresses in the dam due to the load are evaluated against overstressing. The usual loading condition, USLC-1, evaluated the dam for static loads due to gravity, normal water surface (NWS), spring/fall temperatures, tailwater, and sedimentation. The spring/fall condition assumes that the dam is in a stress-free temperature state, and simulates the transition from warmer to colder temperatures.
Figure 3. Arch stresses on the upstream and downstream faces of the dam. Negative values indicate compressive stress. Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 177 The stresses from the finite element model (FEM) are transformed in to arch stresses, which are horizontal and tangent to the circumference of the arch, and cantilever stresses, which are vertical and parallel to the slope of the dam face. Negative and positive values correspond to compressive and tensile stresses, respectively. Figure 3 shows a contour plot of the arch stress results from the finite element analysis on the upstream (extrados) and downstream (intrados) faces of the dam. The allowable compressive and tensile strength of the concrete was assumed to be 1,333 pounds per square inch (lb/in 2 ) and 143 lb/in 2 , respectively. The results from the analysis show that the computed stresses on the upstream and downstream faces of the dam are less than the allowable strength of the concrete, except at the pinnacle of the ogee spillway crest where there is an isolated area of tensile stress that is greater than the allowable limit of the concrete. This area of high tensile stress can be shown more effectively in a sectional view of the crown cantilever of the dam, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Crown Cantilever of the dam showing arch stresses.
The plot of arch stress in Figure 3 clearly shows that the area of high tensile stress is isolated to the downstream end of the spillway crest. Strontia Springs Dam contains vertical contraction joints between the monoliths, and there is a vertical contraction joint at the centerline of the service spillway. The contraction joint will open slightly under the assumed load, which will significantly reduce, or eliminate, the development of tensile stresses computed by the model. Therefore, the area of high tensile stresses on the downstream edge of the service spillway is not a concern regarding the safety of the dam. 178 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations
Figure 5. Cantilever stresses on the upstream and downstream faces of the dam.
A contour plot of the cantilever stresses from the finite element analysis is shown in Figure 5. The results show that the maximum computed cantilever stresses are less than the allowable compressive and tensile strength of the concrete. Note, the results also indicate that large area of cantilever tensile stresses will develop on the downstream face. Further evaluation of the results shows that this area of cantilever tensile stress is due to the structural response to the load on the arches. The horizontal arches near the top of the dam are above the reservoir level, and thus there is no hydrostatic load. Whereas, the lower arches in middle of the dam have significant hydrostatic load due to the reservoir. The greater load on the middle arches results in arch deflection in the downstream direction. The upper arches, however, have no potential for deflection without any hydrostatic load. The arches cannot behave as independent systems, because monolithic continuity causes the middle (more heavily loaded) arches to pull the upper (less loaded) arches downstream. This behavior results in the development of the cantilever tensile stresses on the downstream face. The maximum tensile stress is less than 100 lb/in 2 and significantly less than the estimated allowable tensile capacity of the concrete. Therefore, the vertical tensile stresses on the downstream face are not a concern regarding the safety of the dam. The results also show isolated areas of vertical tensile stress on the upstream face of the dam near the dam/foundation interface. The interface between the dam and foundation cannot actually develop tension. Thus the results could be an indication of potential Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 179 separation between the dam and foundation at these areas. Further evaluation of the results in these areas show that the tensile stresses are isolated to the face of the dam, thus any potential separation at the interface will be small and will not have any significant change on the behavior of the structure. The results from the finite element analysis due to the usual load combination indicate that the computed stresses in the dam will be less than allowable strength of the concrete. Based on these results, the dam is considered to have adequate safety against overstresses for the assumed load. Abutment Stability The abutment stability analysis evaluated the potential for rock block wedges in the foundation to become unstable due to loads from the dam. Potential rock blocks are formed by intersecting discontinuities (i.e. joints, faults, bedding planes) in the rock mass. The analysis uses the results from the finite element analyses to estimate the thrust from the dam onto the foundation due to the usual, unusual, and extreme loading condition. The estimated thrust from the dam is applied to potential rock blocks and a factor of safety against the sliding is computed. Minimum Allowable Factors of Safety The minimum allowable factors of safety against sliding are 1.5 for the usual and unusual loading conditions 2. Note, the minimum required factors of safety are for sliding stability calculations that neglect the effect of apparent cohesion. Evaluation of Abutment Stability For this paper the results from the usual loading condition are presented. Field investigations were performed at the dam site to identify discontinuities in the rock foundation. The field investigation categorized the discontinuities regarding the potential for form moveable rock blocks. Note, that the field investigations were performed primarily using surface mapping techniques. Therefore, there are many unknowns about the discontinuities below the surface. It is important to document the assumptions that must be true, in order for potential rock blocks to become a hazard regarding the safety of the dam. For Strontia Springs Dam, the following conditions must be true for rock block movement to occur. 1. The discontinuities must be continuous. 2. Discontinuities must intersect to form a discrete block. 3. The sliding surface(s) of the discrete block must daylight for the block to be kinematically moveable. 4. The driving force must be greater than the shear resistance of the sliding plane. Only when these four conditions are met, can slope instability occur. 180 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations An example of a potential rock block in the foundation on the right abutment of Strontia Springs dam is show on Figure 6. The results show that the typical thrust from the dam will actually drive the block into the abutment, and opposite the direction of sliding. However not all sliding planes were this obvious, therefore, further evaluation was necessary to determine the potential safety issues due to rock block stability. The stereographic analysis of the discontinuities identified three kinematic rock wedges in the foundation of Strontia Springs Dam. The stability of these rock blocks were evaluated using the program SWEDGE 4 . The results from the analysis are shown in Table 2.
4 SWEDGE, v. 2.0, Rock Engineering Group, Univ. Toronto, Rocscience Inc., 1997 Figure 6. Plan view of foundation rock, showing orientation of typical arch thrust and rock block movement. Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 181 Table 2. Stability results for potential sliding planes Slope Orientation Friction Angle/Cohesion Factor of Safety (DDR / dip) (degree / lb/in 2 )
Left Abutment 140 / 50 45 o / 5 18.9 Block Wt = 7 tons 35 o / 20 69.1 181 / 56, 45 o / 5 4.2 Block Wt = 562 tons 35 o / 20 10.3 Right Abutment 333 / 50 45 o / 5 11.2 Block Wt = 16 tons 35 o / 20 39.3 333 / 75 45 o / 5 3.0 Block Wt = 1027 tons 35 o / 20 6.4 Minimum Require Factor of Safety 1.5
The results show that the computed sliding factors of safety for the potential rock blocks on both the right and left abutments are greater than the minimum required factors of safety. Based on these results, there are no anticipated wedge failures that are a safety concern to the stability of the abutments, of dam, for the usual loading condition. Erosion Historical observations at other dam sites have noted rock scour during significant discharging events, such as floods. Rock scour at concrete dams, such as Strontia Springs Dam, which rely on the rock abutments for the stability of the structure, can present a significant hazard to dam safety. Current FERC guidelines require an assessment of rock scour when the dam under consideration is expected to overtop during high flow conditions 2. The erosion analysis evaluated the potential for rock scour due to overtopping during the unusual flood loading condition, and the effect that potential scour would have on the overall stability of the dam. This was especially important at Strontia Springs because the probable maximum flood (PMF) is estimated to results in approximately 25 feet of flow overtopping the crest of the dam. The erodibility of the rock mass at the abutments was evaluated using the Erodibility Index method, as described in the FERC guidelines 2. The Erodibility Index method compares the computed stream power of the overtopping jet with the Erodibility Index to determine if the foundation material supporting the dam has the potential to scour. 182 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations Erodibility Index Method Water jets that impact the downstream area of a dam with high velocity will usually produce erosion unless the rock is extremely hard and quite sound. The Erodibility Index, which is used to determine the likelihood of erosion, is computed using Equation 1. (1)
where: K = Erodibility Index Ms = mass strength number Kb = block size number Kd = inter-block bond shear strength number Js = ground structure number
The estimated range of values for the mass strength, block size, inter-block bond shear strength, and ground structure parameters were used to compute a range of the Erodibility Index for the foundation rock. The estimated Erodibility Index at Strontia Springs ranged from 1,100 for weathered rock, to 16,325 for un-weathered rock. Figure 4 shows the threshold which relates the relative ability of rock and other earth materials to resist scour to the relative magnitude of the erosive capacity of the water (stream power). The corresponding stream power that could potentially erode the rock will then range between 190 and 1450 kW/m 2 , based on Figure 7. Figure 7. Erosion threshold for rock and other earth materials (Annandale 1995) The computed stream power for the overtopping discharge is computed using Equation 2 2. S d b S J K K M K = Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 183 (2) where: E = rate of energy dissipation due to overtopping q = unit discharge E = elevation difference (i.e., reservoir and foundation) = unit weight of water A = area of jet at impact
The potential for erosion of the foundation rock was evaluated by comparing the Erodibility Index of the rock mass to the computed stream power due to the overtopping jet. If the Erodibility Index is greater than the computed stream power, then rock scour is not likely. If the computed stream power is greater than the Erodibility Index stream power, then rock scour is likely. The computed stream power due to the overtopping jet at Strontia Springs Dam was computed for different depth of overtopping and various heights of fall. The results are shown in Table 3. The overtopping jet profile is shown on Figure 8.
Table 3. Stream power due to the overtopping jet Depth of Overtopping Foundation Elevation 5 feet 10 feet 12.5 feet 15 feet 25 feet (kW/m 2 ) (kW/m 2 ) (kW/m 2 ) (kW/m 2 ) (kW/m 2 ) El. 6000 168 380 495 606 1081 El. 5950 286 666 883 1088 1913 El. 5900 374 879 1159 1435 2561 El. 5885 392 933 1236 1530 2747 El. 5750 100 288 378 467 800
A E q E
= Figure 8. Profile of overtopping jet. 184 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations The results indicated that there is a likelihood that a scour hole could develop. Based on the foundation rock data, the scour hole would be approximately 20 to 30 feet deep of rock material that would have to be scoured away before the overtopping jet reached the dam/foundation contact, because the dam is keyed into the foundation rock. Figure 9 shows the impacted zone from the overtopping jet. The Effect of Scour at Strontia Springs Dam Rock scour was simulated using the FEM to depths of approximately 26, 53, and 80 feet below the dam/foundation contact. The dam/foundation contact is below the current surface of the rock because the dam was keyed into the foundation and the FEM does not model the material above the dam/foundation contact. Therefore, the depth of scour modeled would actually be approximately 56, 83, and 110 feet for the left abutment and 45, 72, and 99 feet for the right abutment. Figure 10 shows the FEM. Figure 9. Plan view showing area of impact from overtopping jet. Figure 10. View shows the foundation elements that are eliminated to simulate the effects of rock scour. Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 185
The behavior of the dam was evaluated from plots of stress and displacement versus scour depth. The results were normalized for comparison. Three different locations on the FEM of the dam were selected to evaluate the results of the different scour depths, as shown in Figure 11. The normalized radial deformations versus scour depth for the three different locations are shown on Figure 12. The normalized arch stress and normalized cantilever stress versus scour depth are shown on Figures 13 and 14 respectively. Figure 11. Location of evaluation points Figure 12. Normalized radial deformations versus scour depth 186 21st Century Dam Design Advances and Adaptations
The results indicate that the response of the dam is nearly linear between the zero (0) and 26 feet of scour depth. The response shows minor non-linear behavior between 26 and 53 feet of scour depth. The results show a significant change in the behavior between 53 Figure 13. Normalized arch stresses versus scour depth. Figure 14. Normalized cantilever stresses versus scour depth Failure Modes of Thin Arch Dams 187 and 80 feet of scour depth. Based on these results it appears that the behavior of the dam is adequate for scour depth up to 53 feet. As discussed previously, the actual rock depth is greater than assumed in the model because the assumed dam/foundation level is below the actual rock surface. Based on the results from this analysis, the dam is considered to have adequate safety for left and right abutment scour depths up to approximately 80 and 70 feet, respectively. REFERENCES 1. American Concrete Institute, "Mass Concrete (ACI 207.1R-96), 1996. 2. FERC Guidelines. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Hydropower Licensing, "Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower Projects", Washington, D.C., October 1999, Chapter 11-Arch Dams.