#1. SPOUSES SILVESTRE 0. PLAZA AND ELENA Y.

PLAZA, Petitioners,
vs GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO,
Respondents.

Facts: When the CA ruled that Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano, and Barbara, Barbara was the owner
of the subject agricultural land and such decision became final and executory, Vidals son and daughter-
in-law, the petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the
respondents and the City Government of Butuan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City,
Branch 5. While Barbara's successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de Martinez and
Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have continued occupying the property.
They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally threatening to take
possession of the subject property. According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia
Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City
of Butuan on December 27, 1996.
In their answer, the respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the land taxes
and were in fact not aware that their property had been offered for public auction. Moreover, Tuazon,
being a government employee, was disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89 of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
As Tuazons participation in the sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the
petitioners. Equally important, the petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting
the name of the petitioners father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land. Armed with
the falsified tax declaration, the petitioners, as heirs of their father, fraudulently redeemed the land
from Tuazon. Nonetheless, there was nothing to redeem as the land was not sold. For these
irregularities, the petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for against them.
Issue: whether Tuazon being a government employees is disqualified to bid in the public aution?
Held: The court found that the auction sale was tainted with irregularity as the bidder was a government
employee disqualified in accordance with Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the contrary, they were in bad faith for having
falsified the tax declaration they redeemed the property with.
The petitioners maintain that they did not falsify the tax declaration in acquiring the auctioned property.
Moreover, assuming that Tuazon, the sole bidder, was indeed disqualified from participating in the
public auction, Section 18112 of the Local Government Code of 1991 finds application.
Applying the law, it is as if there was no bidder, for which the City Government of Butuan was to be
considered the purchaser of the land in auction. Therefore, when the petitioners bought the land, they
bought it directly from the purchaser - City Government of Butuan - and not from Tuazon, as redeemers.
The petitioners may not invoke Section 18118 of the Local Government Code of 1991 to validate their
alleged title. The law authorizes the local government unit to purchase the auctioned property only in
instances where there is no bidder or the highest bid is xxx insufficient.
The prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners denied, and ordered that the
possession and occupation of the land be returned to the respondents.

























#2. G.R. Nos. 159017-18, March 9, 2011
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159059

Facts: When Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and
156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work, Visitacion,
together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional Trial Court of San
Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case for damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto S. Angeles.
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman alleging that named accused, all public officers,
accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being
then the Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles being then the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, all of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official functions,
conspiring and confederating with each other, and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the demolition of
a public market stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi
without legal or justifiable ground therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the latter in the amount of
PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY (P437,900.00).
The Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case with Criminal Case
pending before the Third Division.
Issue: whether the sangguniang bayan resolution authorizing mayor. Comendador to demolish the store
without court order is proper?
Held: no, the sangguniang bayan resolution authorizing mayor. Comendador to demolish the store
without court order is not proper. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried out without a
court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The
demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions
which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiffs store.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will. [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or
self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith in performing
the demolition.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents structure is a public nuisance. The
abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se. Nuisance per se
is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and
surroundings. In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found
out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by
Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.
Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor
law, the present Local Government Code

does not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.

And
even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the accused public
officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look
at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful
detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means.
Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the
resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision.




















#3. STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner
vs CITY OF PASIG, Respondent

Facts: Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several
parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which
indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig (Pasig).
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that covered by TCT No. 518403,
which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The
two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and
599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued.
TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and 92870.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia
East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.
Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land
Registration Court ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No.
39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.
Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch
74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). While this case is still pending Pasig filed a Complaint against Sta.
Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT
Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements thereon.
Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like
what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax
Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial
jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots covered by the
above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.
Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to intervene on the ground
that its interest would be greatly affected by the outcome of the case. It averred that it had been
collecting the real property taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta
further asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the subject
properties are within its metes and bounds.
Issue: whether the Municipality of Pasig is entiled to collect real estate taxes?
Held: the Court held that the resolution of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not
necessitate the assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and bounds of their respective
territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of Appeals wherein we said that a certificate of title is
conclusive evidence of both its ownership and location. The Court of Appeals even referred to specific
provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act. No. 496 to support its ruling that Pasig had the
right to collect the realty taxes on the subject properties as the titles of the subject properties show on
their faces that they are situated in Pasig.
Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code, the authority to collect real
property taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated:
Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at
the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated.
Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of treasurers. The collection of the real property
tax and all penalties accruing thereto, and the enforcement of the remedies provided for in this Code or
any applicable laws, shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or
municipality where the property is situated.
This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the 1991 the Local Government
Code, to wit:
Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. All real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in the locality where the property is
situated. The Department of Finance shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the
classification, appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of this Code.
Section 233. Rates of Levy. A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area
shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax applicable to their respective localities as follows:
The only import of these provisions is that, while a local government unit is authorized under several
laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to
first show that these properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries.
Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial boundaries, this Court, in Mariano, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections said:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within
the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must
undoubtedly show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it
would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.







#4. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2040 : July 13, 2011]

JOSE T. ALBERTO
vs JUDGE JOSE P. MORALLOS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 70, PASIG CITY

Facts: Jose T. Alberto filed a complaints against respondent Judge Jose P. Morallos, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City and charged him with gross inefficiency or gross
ignorance of the law or both as well as with wanton and willful disregard of applicable laws and rules.
Judge Morallos explained that he incurred delay in deciding Alberto's case because he had been pre-
occupied with his new appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge. As for the mailing delay, he
already lost supervision over the work of the MeTC mailing personnel after he took his oath as RTC
judge on January 10, 2006. And, while he admits citing the wrong law (P.D. 1508) when he dismissed
Alberto's action, the reasoning behind it essentially remained the same even under the amendatory
provisions of R.A. 7160. Thus, his error cannot be considered gross.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) rejected as unmeritorious Judge Morallos explanation of
his delay in deciding Alberto's unlawful detainer action. It thus recommended that he be fined
P10,000.00 for it. The OCA thought that, although Judge Morallos erred in citing an already amended
law, it did not regard the lapse as amounting to gross ignorance of the law. It recommended admonition
with warning.

Issue: Whether Judge Morallos acted with gross ignorance of the law in citing an already repealed law to
substantiate his decision?
Held: the court ruled that while mitigating under certain circumstances, it cannot excuse them from
doing their mandated duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy
caseloads should request the Court to extend the time given them for deciding cases. Judge Morallos
neglected making such request. Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in
rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious offense and is punishable under Section 11 of
the same Rule by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month
nor more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Considering that this is his first infraction, a fine of P5,000.00 will suffice.
[25]

As for Judge Morallos' error in citing an amended law to support what appears to be essentially the
same principle he relied on in deciding Alberto's case, such error cannot be regarded as amounting to
gross ignorance of the law which connotes an error so flagrant as to produce an inference of bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.





#5.