Philosophy 430 Paper 1

Over the course of his discussion with Socrates, Meno provides Socrates with
three definitions for virtue. First, Meno tells Socrates that "[t]here is a virtue for every
action and every age, for every task of ours and every one of us..." (Meno 72a). To back
this up, Meno provides various examples so that, for instance, the virtue of a man is being
able to run public affairs, the virtue of a woman is being able to run a household and so
on (Meno 71e). The problem with this 'definition' is that it is in fact not a definition at all;
rather, it is merely a list of virtues, whereas Socrates is looking for that by virtue of which
the different virtues, despite not being one another, are nevertheless all virtues: "Even if
[the virtues] are many and various, all of them have one and the same form which makes
them virtues and it is right to look at this..." (Meno 72c). When Meno doubts this,
Socrates points out that having a virtue consists in being good and someone, no matter
who he is, cannot be good without justice and moderation; since everyone is good in the
same way, i.e. with justice and moderation, and having a virtue is what make a person
good, then virtue, if it is to have this universal feature, cannot be something that is
radically different for every individual or type of individual (Meno 73b-c).
Meno thus provides his second attempt to explain to Socrates what virtue is:
"What else [can virtue be] but to be able to rule over people, if you are seeking one
description to fit them all" (Meno 73d). The first problem with this definition is that it is
too narrow. Presumably, Meno still believes that there are different kinds of virtues for
every type of person so that it is possible for every type of person, including slaves and
children, to have a virtue. But if all virtues consist in being able to rule over people, then


it is not clear how a slave could exercise his virtue while remaining a slave (Meno 73d).
Furthermore, this definition seems to be lacking with regards to what we normally
understand virtue is, so Socrates suggests altering it to the ability to rule over people
justly (Meno 73d). However, justice itself is a virtue so, rather than having a definition
for virtue, we have instead arrived back at an example of virtue (Meno 73e-74b).
Following Socrates further explanation of what he is looking for, Meno finally
tells us that virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them
(Meno 77b). Socrates critiques the first half of this definition first by substituting, with
Menos consent, beautiful with good. Meno argues that there are also people who
desire things which are bad but which they believe are beneficial and people who desire
things that are bad and which they know are bad. However, for this first group of people,
Socrates notes that if such people desire bad things because they mistakenly believe these
things to be beneficial, then in truth, they too also actually desire what is good, i.e.
beneficial; their problem is not one of desire but rather knowledge. As for the second
group, a person who desires something which is bad and which he knows is bad is a
person who deliberately wants something that will harm him and thus make him
miserable and unhappy. But no one wants to be miserable and unhappy. Hence, no one
seems to fit into this second category (Meno 77c-78b).
The first half of Menos definition therefore picks out everyone rather than only
the virtuous. Menos definition thus boils down to [having] the power of securing good
things (Meno 78c). However, Meno agrees that virtue cannot simply lie in acquiring
good things because to acquire good things such as gold through unjust means cannot be
virtuous. Behaving virtuously must also mean refraining from acquiring good things


when the only means to do so is through unjust means and to instead acquire good things
through actions informed by virtues such as justice and piety. But if this is so, then
Menos definition for virtue really just boils down to exercising the virtues which is
circular and simply brings us back to a list of the virtues to be exercised, not an
understanding of them (Meno 78d-79b).
From all of this, it is clear that what Socrates is looking for is a definition that
explains that by virtue of which a virtue is a virtue, and that does this without making
reference to an example of virtue. In other words, to use more modern terminology,
Socrates wants a definition that provides the intension rather than the extension of a word
and which avoids circularity by not using one of the members of the extension of the
word in question. To provide the intension of a word is to explicate that essential feature
which the members of that words extension must have in order to be a part of that
extension, i.e. the explanation behind why a word has the extension that it does. And it is
clear that Socrates does not want a definition which must use members of the words
extension because such definitions merely break back down into the extension without
providing any explanation for why these members are in that extension in the first place.
Because the members of the extension of the word in question are themselves under
investigation, any explanatory framework which must rely upon them will not be able to
advance the general inquiry (Meno 79d).
With regards to the definitions which Socrates himself provided for shape and for
color, Socrates says that It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno, more than that
about shape (Meno 76e). I believe that the point Socrates is trying to make here is that,
whereas Socrates definition of shape is straightforward, timeless and makes sense of its


subject without having to rely upon a fancy and technical apparatus, the definition which
he provides for color relies upon Empedocles notions of effluvia and channels
through which these effluvia pass. The theatricality of this definition comes from its
reliance upon an impressive sounding naturalistic theory but that theatricality serves well
in hiding the vacuousness of the theory: just what exactly are effluvia? The term sounds
fancy and the talk of different effluvia having to fit through different channels sounds
vaguely like an explanation for the phenomenon of sight but there is no real explanation
here. Effluvia doesnt seem to really mean anything here other than as a catch-all term
for the causal force were interested in and the theory seems to work more by analogy
with keys fitting into locks then anything else. The theory is like a fad: beneath all of that
dazzle, there is no real explanatory force.
Because of Socrates insistence upon arriving at the definitions of concepts so that
we can have an objective means by which to understand those concepts and what
extension words really have, I believe Heraclitus would have approved of Socrates
approach. Repeatedly, Socrates undoes Menos uncritical belief that he has insight into
what virtue is, until Meno is left dumbly stating ...I have made many speeches about
virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very good speeches as I thought,
but now I cannot even say what it is (Meno 80b). The imagery here is poignant: Meno
wanted others to listen to him, even though he had no real idea as to what he was talking
about. This recalls Heraclitus quote Listening not to me, but to the logos, it is wise to
agree that all things are one where Listening to me refers to being asleep in ones own
private world rather than Listening to the Logos or being aware of the structure of the
objective, common world (Cohen, pg. 32). The more Meno wanted others to listen to


him, the more he fell asleep in his own superficial knowledge but Socrates woke him up
to the objective world by trying to get him to provide an objective account of virtue.
I do not believe Socrates quest for a satisfactory definition of virtue is in vain.
Thanks to the arguments of W.V.O Quine, may modern philosophers have abandoned the
notion of intensionality because in order for words to have meanings, we must
presuppose the notion of synonymy which, however, we cannot provide any non-circular
account of. If this account is correct, then Socrates quest for an adequate definition for
anything is hopeless. However, I believe that such accounts are wrong and that Plato here
has done a good job of showing the ridiculousness of this view. If words are to have an
extensional aspect, then they must be able to refer to some things. But this leads to a
quandary because if we reject intensionality, then we have no criteria to guide our usage
of terms in determining just what exactly belongs and what does not belong within the
extension of the word in question. If words have no intensional aspect to guide their
usage, how can we justify placing the objects that we do within the extension of the word
in question? If the only thing red refers to is the class of all objects which are red, then
to be red simply means to be in the extension of red. But it isnt because it is in the class
of all things red that something is red; rather, something is in the class of all red things
because it is red. Likewise, if the only thing that virtue means is justice, courage,
temperance, etc. then what right do we have for classifying these terms under a single
heading that excludes greed, gluttony. etc.? One of the points of this dialogue is the
ridiculousness and vacuousness of trying to understand a word simply by means of what
it refers to. But if words do have definitions which explain their extensions, then, I see no
reason for why we should not expect Socrates to arrive at the definition for virtue.


With regards to the final question, although I do not believe Plato provides any
real hints here to the answer for Menos original question, insofar as the entire text in
Meno 70-80c involves Socrates humbling Meno and making Meno more receptive to a
truly rigorous inquiry into the nature of virtue, and insofar as intellectual receptivity and
humbleness are virtues, I believe that we can read Plato here as saying that virtue is
teachable through a process of culling out our closely held myopias and realizing that we
alone do not have all of the answers but can work together to try to achieve them. In this
sense, the Meno itself serves as a sort of meta-level answer to the inquiry in question.

















Citations

S. Marc Cohen, editor, Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc. 2011).