CONTENTS

PUBLIC OFFICERS CASES .................................................................................................. 3

In re: Gonzales.................................................................................................................... 3
Francisco v. House of Representatives .................................................................. 3
Gutierrez v. Committee on Justice ........................................................................... 4
Estrada v. Desierto ........................................................................................................... 4
Ombudsman v. Galicia .................................................................................................... 6
Ledesma v. CA .................................................................................................................... 7
Carabeo v. CA ................................................................................................................... 12
Lacson v. Executive Secretary ................................................................................. 14
Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan ....................................................................................... 15
Pleyto v. PNP-CIDG ....................................................................................................... 15
Rabe v. Flores .................................................................................................................. 15
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan ......................................................................................... 15
Ong v. Sandiganbayan ................................................................................................. 18
Dela Cruz v. Sandiganbayan ..................................................................................... 19
ELECTION LAW CASES .................................................................................................... 21
ROQUE V. COMELEC..................................................................................................... 21
CAPALLA V COMELEC ................................................................................................. 21
ANG LADLAD V. COMELEC ....................................................................................... 30
QUINTO V. COMELEC (2009) .................................................................................. 33
QUINTO V. COMELEC (2010) .................................................................................. 34
QUINTO digests from george (based on recit) ............................................... 35
PENERA V. COMELEC (NOV 2009)[MR] ............................................................ 37
BANAT V. COMELEC ..................................................................................................... 43
TECSON V. COMELEC .................................................................................................. 46
ABS-CBN V. COMELEC ................................................................................................. 50
DOMINGO V COMELEC (30 AUG 1999) .............................................................. 50
CAASI V. COMELEC ....................................................................................................... 54
CODILLA V. DE VENECIA ........................................................................................... 55
REPUBLIC V. DELA ROSA .......................................................................................... 55
TRINIDAD V. COMELEC .............................................................................................. 55
NOLASCO V. COMELEC ............................................................................................... 55





Must read Roque and Capalla. Also the laws. Francisco and Gutierrez and their
differences


PUBLIC OFFICERS CASES
IN RE: GONZALES

FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Francisco V HoR : Davide Impeachment : One year bar to filing impeachment
Facts:
1. Former President Estrada along with Suplico and Dilangalen fils an
impeachment case against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide and 7
Associate Justices citing culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of public trust and other high crimes.

Committee on Justice ruled that the complaint was sufficient in form
but four months later dismissed the complaint being insufficient in
substance

2. After the dismissal by the Committee on Justice of the previous
complaint, Gilbert Teodoro and William Fuentebella file another
impeachment complaint against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide
alone, for misuing the Judiciary Development Fund. This was endorsed
by 1/3 of the members of the House of Representatives.
Current petitions for certorari and prohibition questioning the
constitutionality of the 2
nd
impeachment complaint
Held: Petition granted. The 2
nd
impeachment case barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the constitution.
Ratio:
1. Is it a justiciable controversy? YES

- In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.

- Judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system
of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the
benefit of the people for which it serves.

a. Actual case or controversy
b. Locus standi
c. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity
d. Lis mota

2. When is it Deemed initiated
- is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do to begin,
to commence, or set going.

- Father Bernas to initiate- object in the first sentence is
impeachment case. The object in the second sentence is impeachment
proceeding.
An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by
the Senate. House has the exclusive power to initiate all the cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is
made to initate a case in the senate , a proceeding must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion

Initium- means to begin.

Proceeding is a progressive noun takes place in the House of Rep and
consists of several steps
1. filing
2. processing by the proper committee
3. resolution forwarded to the House
4. there is a processing which either affirms a favorable resolution or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of 1/3

If at least one third of all the members upholds the complaint, articles
of impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the senate. It is at
this point that the House initiates an impeachment case

To initiate filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with
congress taking initial action of said complaint. Having concluded that
the initation takes place y the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House committee on Justice, or
by the filing by at least one third once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
Rules clearly contravene- when they say that the complaint is deemed
initiated once there has been an adjudication by the committee of
justice if there is sufficient substance to proceed with trial in the
Senate.

GUTIERREZ V. COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
FACTS:
There were two impeachment complaints filed against Ombudsman,
Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez for culpable violation of the Constitution and
Betrayal of Public Trust.
The 1
st
one was filed on July 22, 2008 by the BARAQUEL group before
the 15
th
Session of the Congress was opened, JULY 26, 2008.
The 2
nd
one was filed on August 3, 2008 by the REYES group.
Both of the complaints were duly indorsed.
It was found to be both substantially the same in substance.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the
House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to
the COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation with ART11 sec 3 (5)
o No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year- SC:
NO violation as both of the complaints were simultaneously
referred to the Committee at the same time.
RATIO:
The SC defined how initiation takes place
the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action
on it.The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to
the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking
initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House
on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice.
to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.
1. initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral
or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or,
2. by the filing by at least one-third
[61]
of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment
complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle,
unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the
complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there
should only be ONECANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the
candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the
candle.


ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
Doctrine: A non-sitting President cannot claim absolute immunity from suit
regardless of non-conviction in an impeachment proceeding. Absolute
immunity covers only the tenure by which the President sits as an incumbent,
and cannot be invoked after he/she was unseated, either by resignation or
impeachment. Conviction in an impeachment proceeding is not a requirement
to subsequent prosecution of crimes committed during tenure of office, neither
does such conviction constitute double jeopardy by subsequent prosecution for
the same grounds found in impeachment.

Elements of resignation from office: a) intent to abandon office b) actual
relinquishment of office


This is a consolidated motion for reconsideration filed by then Pres. Estrada of
the decision of the Supreme Court adjudging him as deemed resigned from his
office as President of the Philippines on January 20, 2001.

Antecedent Facts:

- Chavit Singson accused Estrada (petitioner), his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
- Then Senator Guingona delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I
Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to
August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos
Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President
Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by
Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed
by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.
- The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of
Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson
Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move
to impeach the petitioner.
- Several cabinet members, as well as presidential advisers, resigned.
Event the AFP withdrew support to the petitioner.
- Impeachment trial started. On January 17, the public prosecutors
walked-out of Senate after the second envelope was not opened, upon
a majority vote of senator-judges against its opening. This happening
suspended the impeachment proceedings.
- Thereafter, negotiations between petitioners team and the Arroyo
team commenced for the transfer of power from petitioner to then VP
Arroyo.
- On January 20, petitioner left Malacanang while Arroyo was sworn into
office. This act by petitioner rendered the impeachment proceedings
functus officio.
- Allegedly, petitioner, on the same day, transmitted a letter to Congress
expressing his temporary inability to discharge functions of his office.
This letter was, however, received by Senate only after the assumption
of office by Arroyo.
- Petitioner then questions the legality of Arroyos assumption of office
and contends that he did not resign. He prays in his petition to be
deemed as President on leave.
- SC in its initial decision ruled that petitioner has resigned as President.
Thus this MR.


ISSUE pertinent in LOPO (as asked by Atty. Arriola):

WON Petitioner Estrada can claim absolute immunity from suit despite
resignation? WON he can be prosecuted for crimes committed during his
tenure as President notwithstanding his non-conviction in the impeachment
trial?

HELD: NO, he cannot claim absolute immunity from suit as a non-sitting
President. YES, he can be prosecuted despite his non-conviction.

RATIO:

- Petitioners contention was based from his interpretation of this provision:
Section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides:
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the
impeachment proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted. However,
the Court ruled that such interpretation is flawed and that conviction in the
impeachment proceeding is not a condition sine qua non in the prosecution of
offenses charged against him.
- There was also no failure to prosecute on the part of the public
prosecutors, which amounts to his acquittal. There was only a
suspension of the proceedings, which thereafter rendered functus
officio by his resignation. He cannot claim double jeopardy. There can
also be no double jeopardy when the cases filed were a criminal and an
administrative one.
- In sum, only a sitting President can claim absolute immunity. It can be
invoked during the tenure, and not necessarily the term.

OMBUDSMAN V. GALICIA
In the doctrine thing that maam gave us.
The clause illegal act or omission of any public official encompasses any crime
committed by a public officer or employee. Its reach is so vast that there is no
requirement that the act or omission be related to or be connected with the
performance of official duty.
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman
Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of MTCs. [As regards public school
teachers], by virtue of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, original
jurisdiction belongs to the school superintendent. The intention of the law which
is to impose a separate standard and procedural requirement for administrative
cases involving public school teachers, must yield to this committee of the Division
School Superintendent.
In the exercise of its duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative
disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving, processing
complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold
hearings, summon witnesses, and require production of evidence and place
respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public official or
employee.
FACTS:
Petition to review on certiorari the decision of the CA divesting the
Ombudsman of jurisdiction.
Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a public school teacher at M.B. Asistio,
Sr. High School (MBASHS). Included as part of the academic records that
he submitted was that he earned 18 units in education in school year
1985-1986 from Caloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC), evidenced by a
copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR).
The principal of MBASHS reviewed the files of his teaching staff. He
subsequently required Galicia and some others to secure authenticated
copies of the TOR that they submitted. All teachers complied except for
Galicia.
Principal inquired and received a reply from CCPC that Galicia had no
records in their office of having taken the 18 units.
He filed a complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct
against Galicia with the Ombudsman.
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE Galicia presented original TOR and
Certificate of Grades for comparison. Subpoena duces tecum on Registrar
of CCPC to verify/certify documents but the registrar couldnt since no
copies were on file in the school.
Ombudsman ruled against Galicia.
MR argued jurisdiction is not under Ombudsman but the department of
education, through the School Superintendent, that has jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers (Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers or RA 4670)
Ombudsman denied. CA REVERSED! Jurisdiction belonged to School
Superintendent AND mere fact of the schools lack of certification does not
establish that his TOR is fabricated or spurious.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the decision of the
Ombudsman regarding the jurisdiction being his. No they didnt! All is well!
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the finding of fact of the Ombudsman
that is based on substantial evidence. Right again! CA is on fiyah
HELD:
This Court has recently ruled in Ombudsman vs Estandarte that by virtue of the
Mana Carta for Public School Teachers, original jurisdiction belongs to the
school superintendent. The intention of the law, which is to impose a separate
standard and procedural requirement for administrative cases involving public
school teachers, must be given consideration. Hence, the Ombudsman must
yield to this committee of the Division School Superintendent.
They also say that exercise of jurisdiction of Ombudsman is ok in this case since
Galicia had a sufficient opportunity to be heard and submit his defenses. Hence,
investigation by Ombudsman was valid.
However, they still dont agree with the Ombudsman as to his decision based
on his investigation. They quote with approval the decision of the CA, Such
certification, however, does not necessarily mean that petitioner fabricated his
education records or that the one which he presented is spurious just so he
could gain employment at the M.B. Asistio Sr. High School. Verily, the failure of
the registrar to locate the transcript of records of petitioner should not be
taken against the latter.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in the complaint.

Absent substantial evidence to prove the falsity of
the TOR presented by Galicia duly signed by the College Registrar at that time,
We are constrained to uphold his innocence of the charges of falsification.
Petition DENIED and CA Decision AFFIRMED.
LEDESMA V. CA
CASE: Petition for review on certiorari reverse and set aside decision of CA,
which reduced the suspension of Ledesma to 9 Months to 6 Months and 1 day
without pay.

KEY OFFICES:
BSI Board of Special Inquiry
BID Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
FFIB Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau of the office of the Ombudsman
BOC Board of Commission of the BID

DOCTRINE:

- That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with
such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or
employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication
that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory
in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
- This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned.
- It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged.
- - that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a
stronger and more effective Ombudsman, independent and
beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers
that are not merely persuasive in character.

FACTS:
BACKGROUND: LEDESMA
- (Petitioner) Atty. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID).
- In a letter-complaint filed by Somalio with the Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an
investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the
extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign
nationals.
- The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV
extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

COMPLAINT
- The FFIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal
complaint against herein petitioner LEDESMA.
- Also charged administratively were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma.
Elena P. Ang, Board Member and Executive Assistant, respectively, in
petitioners division.
- With respect to petitioner, the complaint was treated as both a
criminal and an administrative charge and for the CRIMINAL aspect,
nine (9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and for falsification of public documents, and for the ADMINISTRATIVE
aspect, for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.

- The complaint against Ledesma, Caronongan and Ang alleged the
following illegal acts:
- (a) irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and
- (b) using recycled or photocopied applications for a TRV extension
without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to validate the
correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated
therein.
- Specifically, petitioner and Caronongan allegedly signed the
Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the
BID, forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens
whose papers were questionable.

JOINT RESOLUTION for the ADMINISTRATIVE CASE (only Ledesma is
liable)
- Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved the administrative cases
filed against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, as follows:
1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA be
SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service;
2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN
be DISMISSED, the same having been rendered moot
and academic; and
3. The instant case against respondent MA. ELENA P. ANG be
DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.

CRIMINAL CASE DISMISSED
- Respondent Ombudsman DESIERTO approved a Resolution of Graft
Investigation OfficerAncheta-Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges
against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.


ADMIN CASE (MR and Petition for Review DENIED)
- LEDEMSA filed a MR in the administrative case alleging that the BOC
which reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved the TRVs
in question, hence, LEDESMA argued that it effectively declared the
applications for extension regular and in order and waived any
infirmity thereon.
- MR DENIED but reduced the period of suspension from one (1) year to
nine (9) months without pay.

- Ledesma filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which
included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order
- The CA issued the TRO on April 19, 2000.
- BUT the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but reduced
the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day
without pay.

THUS this case is filed: (issue 2&3 important)
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the following grounds:
- I. IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED DECISION, RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FOLLOWING
RELEVANT FACTS AND MATTERS WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER:
- II. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE FINDING OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY
ADVISORY ON THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION (BI) IS CONTRARY TO
THE PERTINENT PROVISION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT.
- III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE OMBUDSMANS RESOLUTION FINDING
PETITIONER ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE CONSTITUTES AN
INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT INTO THE POWER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION OVER IMMIGRATION MATTERS.


COURT HELD: The petition lacks merit. CA did not commit any error

FIRST:
- LEDESMA insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned
applications for the extension of the TRVs.
- He denies that he misled or deceived the BOC into approving these
applications and argues that the BOC effectively ratified his actions and
sanctioned his conduct when it approved the subject applications.

COURT: We are not persuaded.
- In his attempt to escape liability, Ledesma undermines his position in
the BID and his role in the processing of the subject applications.
- But by his own admission, it appears that the BSI not only
transmits the applications for TRV extension and its supporting
documents, but more importantly, it interviews the applicants
and evaluates their papers before making a recommendation to
the BOC.
- The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in order, it
executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the
regularity and propriety of the applications.

JURISPRUDENCE:
- In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, we stated that all heads of offices have to rely
to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. Practicality and efficiency
in the conduct of government business dictate that the gritty details be
sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final approving authority.
THUS
- In the case at bar, it is not unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the
evaluation and recommendation of the BSI as it cannot be
expected to review every detail of each application transmitted
for its approval. Petitioner being the Chairman of the First
Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its proceedings.
- Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or good faith when the irregularities in
the TRV extension applications are so patently clear on its face. He is
principally accountable for certifying the regularity and propriety
of the applications which he knew were defective.

SINGLE OUT (not true, Coronongan and Ang)
- ALSO Ledesma could not validly claim that he was singled out for
prosecution.
- It is of record that administrative cases were also filed against
Caronongan and Ang, but extraneous circumstances rendered the case
against Caronongan moot while the case against Ang was dismissed
because it was proven that she merely implemented the approved
decision of the BOC.

BOC approval CURED his actions
- Equally untenable is the contention that the BOCs approval of the
defective applications for TRV extension cured any infirmities
therein and effectively absolved petitioners administrative
lapse.
- The instant administrative case pertains to the acts of petitioner as
Chairman of the First Division of the BSI in processing nine (9)
defective applications, independent of and without regard to the action
taken by the BOC.
- It does not impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to encroach
upon the authority of the BID on immigration matters.
- The main thrust of the case is to determine whether petitioner
committed any misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance
in the performance of his duties.

NOTE DIFFERENCE:
Misconduct - a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
Nonfeasance - A failure to act when under an obligation to do so; a refusal
(without sufficient excuse) to do that which it is your legal duty to do
Misfeasance - Doing a proper act in a wrongful or injurious manner
Malfeasance - Wrongful conduct by a public official

IMPORTANT ISSUES 2
nd
and 3rd
- Ledesma questions the Court of Appeals pronouncement that the
findings of the Ombudsman may not be said to be merely
recommendatory upon the Immigration Commissioner.
- He argues that to uphold the appellate courts ruling expands the
authority granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman
and runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.
- Ledesma submits that the Ombudsmans findings that the TRV
applications were illegal constitutes an indirect interference by
the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over immigration
matters.

COURT: We do not agree.
- The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the
1987 Constitution.
- The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are
mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
- Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees, thus:

- Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
- RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to
act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the
administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers
and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to
promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
- The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative
investigations as in the present case is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770
provides:
- SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all
complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of
an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an
arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers
but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid
of justification.

The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or
order that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman after it has
conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties: (3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

- LEDESMA insists that the word recommend be given its literal
meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans action is only advisory in
nature rather than one having any binding effect citing tapiador case,
ombudsmans finding is merely at best an OBITER DICTUM BUT IN
THIS CASE IT CANNOT BE CITED ASA A DOCTRINAL DECLARATION)
- The Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the
word recommend must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and
ensure compliance therewith.
- The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should
be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and
direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed.
- In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

COURT HELD: We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents.
- Regarding the Tapiador case, the statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it
is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it
cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe
from judicial examination.

- The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents theory.
- Section 15 is substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce
its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act:
Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause
to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act
or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer; (Emphasis
supplied)

- We note that the proviso above qualifies the order to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee
akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar.
- That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with
such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or
employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication
that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory
in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
- This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned.
- It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged.
- By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to
be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would
be the head of the BID.

- It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to
provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure
that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people
against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The
Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance
with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only
of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also,
it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an
investigation when the case so warrants.

- It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to
create a stronger and more effective Ombudsman, independent
and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with
powers that are not merely persuasive in character.
- The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA
6770 was enacted.
- In the case of Uy v. Sandiganbayan it was held:Clearly, the Philippine
Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose
function is merely to receive and process the peoples complaints against
corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman,
as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring
public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The
legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to
implement his own actions. ...

NOTES: OMBUDSMAN
Accountability of Public Officers (The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines)
Section 5: There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy,
and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.

Section 6: The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other
than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil
Service Law.

Section 7: The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of
the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office
of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.

- Under the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was
created. The Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
which continued to exercise powers except those belonging to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
- The Ombudsman, which is intended to be independent and
autonomous constitutional body, is armed with the power to prosecute
erring public officers and employees.
- The Ombudsman has an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-
graft and corrupt practices, as well as other offenses committed by
government officers and employees.

- The present Ombudsman, designated under the constitution as the
Protector of the People is charged with five major functions Public
Assistance, Graft Prevention, Investigation, Prosecution and
Administrative Adjudication.
- The framers of the Constitution defined the role of the Office of the
Ombudsman as a watchdog, to monitor the general and specific
performance of government officials and employees.
- In short, the Ombudsman, as an institution, is and should be the
PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE.

POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
- The Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of
investigating power, virtually free from legislative, executive and
judicial intrusion. (Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 141445,
May 27, 2004, 426 SCRA 357).
- The Ombudsman and his deputies are designated by the Constitution
as protectors of the people, who are thus required to act promptly on
complaints against public officers of the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof. (Sec. 12, Article XI,
Constitution).
- The general investigation on the Office of the Ombudsman is precisely
for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution as much as
securing the State from useless and expensive trials. (Almonte v.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995, 244 SCRA 286).
- Moreover, the reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority is to
insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able
to penetrate the judges and other fiscals offices, and others involved
in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of
official pressure and influence, quash, delay or dismiss investigations
into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.
(Deloso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA
545).

- To achieve the objectives of the Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered to administer oaths, issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or
inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank
accounts and records which may be delegated to the deputy or its
investigator to ensure the effective exercise or performance of the
power, functions, and duties therein as provided in the law. in any
investigation under the law, the Ombudsman may examine and access
any record, file, document or paper in any office, agency or commission
or tribunal.
- Delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the
Ombudsman or any of his deputies constitutes a ground for
administrative disciplinary action against the officers or employee
concerned. Indeed, non-performance of an act which ought to be
performed, omission to perform a required duty at all, or total neglect
of duty constitutes nonfeasance.


CARABEO V. CA
FACTS:
On 8 July 2005, the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection
Service (DOF-RIPS), filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
Carabeo, Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Office of the Treasurer of Paraaque
City. The complaint pertinently alleged:
4. CARABEO is currently designated by the BLGF as City Treasurer II x x x.
In September 1981, CARABEO first occupied the position of Revenue Collection
Clerk at the Office of the City Treasurer of Paraaque earning an annual gross
salary of P8,400.00. As the present City Treasurer (In-charge of Office) at the
City of Paraaque, CARABEO receives an annual gross salary of P291,036.00.
5. The net worth of CARABEO, based on his SALN from the time he
commenced employment at the Paraaque Treasurers Office in 1981 has
ballooned from P114,900.00 to approximately P7.5 Million in the year 2004.
6. Equally noticeable as the drastic increase in his net worth is the steady
accumulation of various expensive properties by CARABEO and his spouse
ranging from real properties to vehicles to club shares ownership.
7. In the last nine years, CARABEO and/or his spouse was able to purchase
numerous real properties, including 2 lots in Tagaytay, 3 parcels of land in
Laguna and Townhouse in Cavite.
8. Also, 7 expensive vehicles were found to be currently owned by CARABEO
and/or his spouse,
9. However, CARABEO did not declare most of the foregoing vehicles in his
SALNs. In his SALN for year 2003, CARABEO claimed that he owns only 3
vehicles. In the succeeding year, CARABEO only declared ownership of only
1vehicle.
10. The records of the LTO however belie this declaration of ownership of
only 3 vehicles and later (in year 2004), of only 1vehicle, with the LTO
certification that CARABEO and/or his spouse owns at least 7.
11. 1 tagaytay property acquired in year 2001 was also not reflcted in his
SALN.
12. Punctuating the expensive list of purchases CARABEO and/or his spouse
is his recent purchase of a share in the very exclusive The Palms Country Club
in Alabang, Muntinlupa. An individual share in this premiere country club is
currently priced at Seven Hundred Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P745,000.00)
and can only be purchased in cash.
13. It was also discovered in the course of our investigation that, in
addition to the foregoing purchases, during the period 1996 to 2004,
CARABEO went abroad at least fifteen times (or more than once a year) x
x x .[4]
14. CARABEOs failure to disclose his and his spouses ownership of the
foregoing Tagaytay property and vehicles in the pertinent SALNs amounts
to a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and Section 8(A) of RA 6713
requiring him to file under oath the true and detailed statement of his
assets as well as those of his spouse.
15. While CARABEO claims in his SALNs to have investments in various
businesses, the information we gathered on these alleged businesses
indicates that these purported investments could not possibly justify the
foregoing substantial purchases.
16. Any anticipated claim to the effect that CARABEOs wife has business
undertakings that should explain their acquired wealth cannot also be given
credence. CARABEOs spouse, Cynthia, had no tax payments reflected on the
Bureaus records, except for a one-time tax payment of approximately three
thousand pesos (representing capital gains tax for one transaction
The DOF-RIPS prayed that the Office of the Ombudsman issue an order:
(a) filing the appropriate criminal informations against Carabeo for
violation of Republic Act (RA) Nos. 3019, 6713, and 1379 and the Revised
Penal Code;
(b) instituting the appropriate administrative cases against Carabeo for
the same violations, for dishonesty and grave misconduct;
(c) commencing forfeiture proceedings against Carabeos unlawfully
acquired properties including those illegally obtained in the names of his
spouse, children, relatives and agents; and
(d) placing Carabeo under preventive suspension pursuant to Section 24
of RA 6770.

Ombudsman Ruling- Put Carabeo under preventive suspension for a
period not to exceed 6 month.
Aggrieved, Carabeo filed a petition for certiorari, alleging GADLEJ in the
approval of his preventive suspension.
Court of Appeals- issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) enjoining the enforcement of Carabeos preventive suspension.
ISSUE: W/N The preventive suspension against Carabeo was proper (YES)
Held: The preventive suspension was proper.
RATIO:
A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority
under Section 21 of RA 6770, in relation to Section 9 of Administrative Order
No. 7, is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and
impartial conduct of an investigation, which did not require prior notice and
hearing.
The order of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend him stemmed from the
Ombudsmans review of the factual findings reached by the investigating
prosecutor.
Carabeos contention: there must be prior notice and hearing before the
Ombudsman may issue a preventive suspension order.
The contention is bereft of merit. Settled is the rule that prior notice and
hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order,
such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step or
preventive measure in an administrative investigation
Moreover, there is nothing in the law, specifically Section 24 of RA 6770, or
The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which requires that notice and hearing
precede the preventive suspension of an erring public official. This
provision states:
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong,
and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.

While a preventive suspension order may originate from a complaint, the
Ombudsman is not required to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint prior to ordering a preventive suspension.
IMPORTANT: Under Section 24 of RA 6770, two requisites must concur to
render the preventive suspension order valid. First, there must be a prior
determination by the Ombudsman that the evidence of respondents guilt is
strong. Second, (a) the offense charged must involve dishonesty,
oppression, grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.
These requisites are present here. The Ombudsman justified the issuance
of the preventive suspension order in this wise:
First, the deliberate failure of respondent Carabeo to disclose all of his
supposed properties in his SALN, particularly the vehicles and the lot which are
registered in his name involves dishonesty which, if proven, warrant his
corresponding removal from the government service.
Second, being the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Treasurers
Office of Paraaque, respondent Carabeos continued stay thereat may
prejudice the outcome of the instant case, he being the head of that particular
office, albeit in an Officer-in-Charge capacity.
Third, the evidence of guilt against him is strong. It bears stressing that
as the current Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Treasurers Office of
Paraaque receiving only an annual gross salary of P291,036.00, it is highly
inconceivable how respondent Carabeo could have legally acquired all these
real and personal properties.
Fourth, respondents unauthorized foreign travels abroad numbering fifteen
(15) times between the years 1996 to 2004, indicates that he has financial
resources which could not be legally justified relying solely on his declared
income.
Whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, the court cannot substitute its own
judgment for that of the Ombudsman on the question of whether the evidence
of respondents guilt is strong warranting the issuance of the
preventive suspension order, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
Moreover, Carabeo cannot claim any right against, or damage or injury
that he is bound to suffer from the issuance of the preventive suspension order,
since there is no vested right to a public office, or even an absolute right to hold
it. Public office is not property but a public trust or agency. While their right
to due process may be relied upon by public officials to protect their security of
tenure which, in a limited sense, is analogous to property, such fundamental
right to security of tenure cannot be invoked against a preventive suspension
order which is a preventive measure, not imposed as a penalty. An order of
preventive suspension is not a demonstration of a public officials guilt, which
can be pronounced only after a trial on the merits.
LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
In 1995, 11 persons believed to be members of Kuratong Baleleng
gang, were slain along Commonwealth Ave. in QC by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
ABRITG was composed of police officers, one of which is petitioner
Lacson who was then Chief Superintendent.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Delos Reyes that what actually
transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out, Ombudsman
Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate. This panels
finding was that said incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board modified the panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against Lacson and
25 other respondents.
Lacson was among those charged as principal in 11 informations of
murder before Sandiganbayan. He filed a motion for reconsideration.
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended
informations wherein Lacson was charged ONLY as an accessory.
All the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan (RTC daw kasi dapat!). They contend that RA 7975
limited the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more
of the principal accused are government officials with SG 27 or
higher, and PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended
informations has the rank only of a Chief Inspector, and none has the
equivalent of at least SG 27.
Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to RTC. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration.
While these motions were pending, a House Bill and Senate Bill were
introduced in the Congress defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase
principal accused. These bills were consolidated and approved into law
by RA 8249.
Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its previous resolution,
stating that since, three of the accused are PNP Chief Superintendents
and that trial has not yet begun, Sandiganbayan has competence to
take cognizance of the case. Hence, it contends that it retained
jurisdiction.
Lacson now questions the constitutionality of RA 8249. Among his
arguments were that the law was violative of his right to procedural
due process and the equal protection clause, and that the statute was
an ex-post facto statute.
ISSUES:
1. WoN R.A. 8249 is constitutional. YES
a. Violative of right to due process and equal protection clause
NO!
b. Ex-post facto law? NO!
2. WoN the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong
Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls
within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction. NO!
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
said cases.

RATIO:
1. The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality, the burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies
with those who challenge it. That burden was NOT convincingly
discharged in this case.
a. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable when there is a concurrence of
four elements: 1) it must rest on substantial distinction; 2) it
must be germane to the purpose of law; 3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and 4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class, all of which are present in this
case.
b. RA 8249 is NOT a penal law it is a substantive law on
jurisdiction, and not being a penal law, its retroactive
application cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. With
regard to petitioners contention that their right to a two-
tiered appeal was diluted by such law: the right to appeal is
not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be
regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.

2. Under RA 8249, the requisites for a case to fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended
(the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-
gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
(2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is
a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated
in paragraph a of Section 4; and
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Under Sec. 4, par. B of RA 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. In this case, accused are Chief
Superintendents of PNP(included in RA 8249).

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute, and
the elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.
Hence, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information, and NOT by the evidence presented by
the parties at the trial.

The mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is NOT
sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual
averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense
charged and the discharge of the accuseds official duties. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that
would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to
public office.

Where there is failure to show in the informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged is plain
murder and, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.



FONACIER V. SANDIGANBAYAN

PLEYTO V. PNP-CIDG

RABE V. FLORES

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Estrada was charged with plunder (RA 7080). The plunder case consisted of
four separate charges: acceptance of 545 million pesos from proceeds
of jueteng, an illegal gambling game; misappropriation of 130 million pesos in
excise taxes from tobacco; receiving a 189.7-million-peso commission from the
sale of the shares of Belle Corporation, a real-estate firm; and owning some 3.2
billion pesos in a bank account under the name Jose Velarde.
He moved to quash the information regarding the plunder charge.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion hence the petition.

Issue:
The issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are:
(1) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (NO)
(2) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; (NO)
and,
(3) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. (MALA IN SE
CRIME)

Ratio:

Petitioner bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition
of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the
word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad
and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.


Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime
with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by
the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is
obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute
vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued.
Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners
reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited
by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or
construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case
since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases.

They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due
process?

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done
by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always
has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm
of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is
every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense. What would
be needed for a conviction for plunder would be proving at least 2 crimes out of
the many so alleged. (SC implied that at least two offenses would be enough to
form a combination or series of overt or criminal acts)
Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his
submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of
plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and
a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be
convicted of plunder.
We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements
of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation
to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of
procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. (What Maam asked
me during class)

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because
the constitutive crimes are mala in se, the element of mens rea must be proven
in a prosecution for plunder.

Any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed
to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to
include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

There are crimes in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-
political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder
the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

BONUS: Maam also said that the crime of plunder is mala in se because of the
aggregate amount of ill-gotten wealth (at least P50 Million) accumulated or
acquired. Such ill-gotten wealth is a huge amount that could substantially affect
the funds of the Government which should be for the benefit of the public. Thus,
in pursuing to acquire such ill-gotten wealth, criminal intent will be present.

ONG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit
claiming that Jose U. Ong, then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), has amassed properties worth disproportionately
more than his lawful income.
After the investigation of the Ombudsman, it was found out that:
o Ongs 1989 SALN stated his cash-on-hand to be worth
P750,000
o Then in a couple of 11 months, he was able to purchase
A house and lot in Alabang worth P5.5M
3 more lots in Alabang worth around P4-5M each
condo in Makati worth P850,000
that his annual income is P200,000
Ong explained his purchases were made because
o He had profits from various money market placements
o He obtained a loan from Allied Bank
o He got his retirement benefits from SGV (accounting firm)
o One of the properties was held in trust for his brother-in-law
in the US
The Ombudsman, then issued a subpoena duces tecum to Allied Bank
and SGV for the production of the relevant documents to Ongs claims
o Nothing was produced
So Ombudsman filed for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property
pursuant to RA 1379 against Jose and Nelly Ong
Ongs defenses:
o No preliminary investigation on his wife Nelly (conjugal
owner of properties) thus depriving her of due process
o RA 1379 is unconstitutional as it is vague and does not
sufficiently define ill-gotten wealth and insofar as it disregards
the presumption of innocence
o they were not notified of the Resolution directing the filing of
the case and were thereby prevented from filing a motion for
reconsideration
Sandiganbayan then issued a Resolution directing the Ombudsman to
furnish petitioners with a copy of the Resolution to file the forfeiture
case and giving them a period of five (5) days from receipt of the
Resolution within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The
Ombudsman was given a period of sixty (60) days to resolve the
motion for reconsideration
The Ongs, instead of waiting for Ombudsmans Resolution, filed a
petition for certiorari in the SC

ISSUES
1. WON RA 1379 is unconstitutional for being vague and disregarding
presumption of innocence? (IMPT)
NO
The law is not vague as it defines with sufficient particularity
unlawfully acquired property of a public officer or employee as that
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property. It also provides a definition of
what is legitimately acquired property. Based on these parameters,
the public is given fair notice of what acts are proscribed. The law,
therefore, does not offend the basic concept of fairness and the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Neither is the presumption of innocence clause violated by Sec. 2 of RA
1379 which states that property acquired by a public officer or
employee during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired. As elaborated by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of
presumption of innocence, it is merely required of the State to
establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof shifts to
the accused

2. WON there was denial of due process to Nelly Ong?
None
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that forfeiture proceedings
under RA 1379 are civil in nature and not penal or criminal in
character, as they do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but
merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of
the State. Moreover, the procedure outlined in the law is that provided
for in a civil action. Unlike in a criminal proceeding, there is to be no
reading of the information, arraignment, trial and reading of the
judgment in the presence of the accused

In the earlier case of Cabal v. Kapunan, however, we declared that
forfeiture to the State of property of a public official or employee
partakes of the nature of a penalty and proceedings for forfeiture of
property, although technically civil in form, are deemed criminal or
penal. We clarified therein that the doctrine laid down in Almeda v.
Perez that forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature applies purely to
the procedural aspect of such proceedings and has no bearing on the
substantial rights of the respondents therein. This ruling was
reiterated in Katigbak v. Solicitor General, where we held that the
forfeiture of property provided for in RA 1379 is in the nature of a
penalty.


3. WON Ombudsman erred in not serving the Ongs a copy of the
Resolution in filing a case against them?
Yes, however this was deemed cured when the Sandiganbayan
issued its Resolutiong directing the Ombudsman to furnish the
Ongs a copy of the Resolution.


DELA CRUZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN
ER:
W/N The preventive suspensions of the accused are proper?
The preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA No.
3019 is mandatory upon a finding that the information is valid.
RA No. 3019 provides:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits - Any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
It becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the
suspension order upon a proper determination of the validity of the
information.
o The court possesses no discretion to determine whether a
preventive suspension is necessary to forestall the possibility
that the accused may use his office to intimidate witnesses, or
frustrate his prosecution, or continue committing
malfeasance. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit
further acts of malfeasance or do both.


Facts
There was a construction and/or renovation project involving several
multi-purpose halls located in various barangays in the City of Tarlac.
Upon post audit, the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit
(COA) issued Notice of Disallowances on the ground that what were
actually constructed and/or renovated were barangay chapels in
violation of Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
335 of the Local Government Code prohibiting public expenditure for
religious purposes.
Complainants Jesus B. David and Ana Alamo Aguas filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman against several local government
officials of the City of Tarlac for violation "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act". namely:
o Gelacio R. Manalang- Mayor
o Alfredo D. Baquing- Engineer
o Nathaniel B. Lugtu- Accountant
o Lynn Paz T. Dela Cruz- Assistant Accountant
o Fernando L. Serrano- Budget Officer
o Janet S. Pineda- Planning & Development Officer
The Ombudsman issued an Order directing the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to file the necessary information with
the Sandiganbayan, viz:
o Accused Gelacio R. Manalang being the mayor of Tarlac City,
Tarlac, a high ranking officer pursuant to R.A. 8249 in relation
to Sec. 455(d) of R.A. 7160, and all the other accused then
occupying different positions in the government of Tarlac City
o That they conspired to commit the crime herein charged in
relation to their office, taking advantage of their official
position, and caused undue injury to the government to the
amount of P543,800.00 for the construction of the "multi-
purpose halls" despite the fact, as Accused knew fully well,
that these were chapels.
The accused then moved for reinvestigation on the ground that they
were not given an opportunity to be heard when the Ombudsman
reversed his earlier finding of lack of probable cause. Granted.
o The prosecution filed a Manifestation with
the Sandiganbayan that after conducting its reinvestigation, it
found probable cause to charge the accused with violation of
the anti-graft law and prayed that the case be set for
arraignment
Undeterred, the accused filed separate motions to quash the
information and/or to dismiss the case.
o Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution which denied all of the
aforesaid motions and upheld the validity of the subject
information.
Accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution subsequently filed a motion to suspend the
accused pendente lite.
The accused filed a consolidated petition for certiorari and prohibition
before this Court against public respondents Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman and the People of the Philippines.
o Ground of GADLEJ for filing the information and upholding the
validity of the same despite the violation of the right of the
accused to due process and the patent lack of probable cause.
o SC dismissed for lack of merit.
Sandiganbayans
Ordered the preventive suspension of the accused for a period of 90
days.
Validity of the information has been previously settled, and under
Section 13 of RA No. 3019, the preventive suspension of the accused
becomes mandatory.
Issues
1. W/N the subject criminal case was prematurely instituted considering the
pendency of petitioners appeals before the COA En Banc? NO
2. W/N The preventive suspensions of the accused are proper? YES!
SC:
W/N the subject criminal case was prematurely instituted considering the
pendency of petitioners appeals before the COA En Banc?
SC did not rule, but these are the Respondents Arguments which the SC did
not seem to refute
o COA is not vested with jurisdiction to determine the criminal
liability of petitioners.
Its power is limited to the determination of the violation of its
accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
Hence, the COA En Bancs exclusion of petitioners from
liability under the notices of disallowance only relates to the
administrative aspect of their accountability.
This, however, does not foreclose the Ombudsmans authority
to investigate and determine whether there is a crime to be
prosecuted.
For similar reasons, the exoneration of Baquing from
administrative liability by the Ombudsman, specifically, the
finding therein that what were constructed were multi-
purpose halls and not chapels is not binding on the subject
criminal case against petitioners and their co-accused.
The dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the
same or similar acts, which were the subject of the
administrative complaint.
W/N The preventive suspensions of the accused are proper?
The preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA No.
3019 is mandatory upon a finding that the information is valid.
RA No. 3019 provides:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits - Any public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
It becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the
suspension order upon a proper determination of the validity of the
information.
o The court possesses no discretion to determine whether a
preventive suspension is necessary to forestall the possibility
that the accused may use his office to intimidate witnesses, or
frustrate his prosecution, or continue committing
malfeasance. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit
further acts of malfeasance or do both.
In Luciano v. Mariano, we laid down the guidelines for the exercise of
the courts power to suspend the accused:
o Upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue
an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to
show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be
ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited
mandatory provisions of the Act.
o What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the
information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the
validity of the information or withholding such suspension in
the contrary case.
o No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a
fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against him,
e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery
provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would
warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of the Act; Or he may present a motion to
quash the information on any of the grounds provided
in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
The hearing should be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension
envisioned by the Act.
The issues proper for a pre-suspension hearing are, thus, limited to
ascertaining whether:
o (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of the information against him,
o (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of
the provisions of RA No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or
o (3) the information against him can be quashed under any of
the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
SC did not rule on whether the ruling of the Sandiganbayan was tainted
with GADLEJ as all of the above issues proper in a pre-suspension
hearing were previously passed upon. Futile attempt by the accused
for us to re-litigate the same issues.
As to validity of complaint (Side Issue)
Contains sufficient allegations to charge the accused with violation of
the anti-graft law; that there was no denial of due process during the
preliminary investigation stage; that there exists probable cause to
indict the accused;
Already passed upon.


ELECTI ON LAW CASES
ROQUE V. COMELEC

CAPALLA V COMELEC
Pursuant to its authority to use an Automated Election System (AES)
under Republic Act (RA) No. 8436, as amended by RA No. 9369, or the
Automation Law and in accordance with RA No. 9184, otherwise
known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) posted and published an invitation to apply
for eligibility and to bid for the 2010 Poll Automation Project (the
Project).
On March 18, 2009, the Comelec approved and issued a Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the Project consisting of the following components:
o Component 1: Paper-Based Automation Election System
(AES)
1-A. Election Management System (EMS)
1-B. Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) System
1-C. Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS)

o Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of
Election Results using Public Telecommunications
Network

o Component 3: Overall Project Management

On June 9, 2009, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 8608 awarding the
contract for the Project to respondent Smartmatic-TIM.
On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a
Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the
May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,

(AES
Contract, for brevity).
o The contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was
one of lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the
goods listed in the contract.
o In said contract, the Comelec was given until December 31,
2010 within which to exercise the option.

On September 23, 2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920
units of PCOS machines with corresponding canvassing/consolidation
system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces
of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan.
In a letter

dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its
Chairman Cesar Flores (Flores), proposed a temporary extension of
the option period on the remaining 81,280 PCOS machines until
March 31, 2011, waiving the storage costs and covering the
maintenance costs.
The Comelec did not exercise the option within the extended period.
Several extensions were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP
until its final extension on March 31, 2012.

On March 6, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9373

resolving to
seriously consider exercising the OTP subject to certain conditions.

On March 21, 2012, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9376 resolving
to exercise the OTP the PCOS and CCS hardware and software in
accordance with the AES contract between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections subject
to the following conditions:

o (1) the warranties agreed upon in the AES contract shall be in
full force and effect;
o (2) the original price for the hardware and software covered
by the OTP as specified in the AES contract shall be
maintained, excluding the cost of the 920 units of PCOS and
related peripherals previously purchased for use in the 2010
special elections; and
o (3) all other services related to the 2013 AES shall be subject
to public bidding. On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued
Resolution No. 9377
[10]
resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIMs
offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until March 31,
2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on
behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the
OTP Under the AES Contract

(Extension Agreement, for
brevity).
The aforesaid Extension Agreement was signed on March 30, 2012.
On even date, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9378 resolving to
approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM to
purchase the latters PCOS machines (hardware and software) to be
used in the upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman
Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the Comelec
The Deed of Sale

was forthwith executed.

Claiming that the foregoing issuances of the Comelec, as well as the
transactions entered pursuant thereto, are illegal and unconstitutional,
petitioners come before the Court in four separate Petitions for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the
assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement
and Deed.

The consolidated cases were later set for Oral Arguments on the
following issues:

I. Whether or not the Commission on Elections may validly accept
the extension of time unilaterally given by Smartmatic-TIM
Corporation within which to exercise the option to purchase
under Article 4 of the Contract for the Provision of an Automated
Election System for the May 2010 Synchronized National and Local
Elections; and
II. Whether or not the acceptance of the extension and the issuance of
Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 9376 violate Republic Act No.
9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act and its
Implementing Rules, and Republic Act No. 9369 or the Automated
Election Systems Act.


The petitions are without merit.


Simply stated, petitioners assail the validity and constitutionality
of
o the Comelec Resolutions for the purchase of the subject
PCOS machines
o as well as the Extension Agreement and the Deed of Sale
covering said goods mainly on three grounds:
(1) the option period provided for in the AES contract
between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM had
already lapsed and, thus, could no longer be
extended, such extension being prohibited by the
contract;
(2) the extension of the option period and the exercise
of the option without competitive public bidding
contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and,
(3) despite the palpable infirmities and defects of the
PCOS machines, the Comelec purchased the same in
contravention of the standards laid down in RA 9369.

For its part, the Comelec defends the validity and constitutionality of
its decision to purchase the subject PCOS machines, pursuant to the
OTP under the AES contract with Smartmatic-TIM, on the following
grounds:
o (1) Article 6.6 of the AES contract which states the option
period was amended by the extension agreement;
o (2) the exercise of the OTP is not covered by RA 9184, because
it is merely an implementation of a previously bidded
contract;
o (3) taking into account the funds available for the purpose,
exercising the OTP was the prudent choice for the Comelec
and is more advantageous to the government; and
o (4) the exercise of the OTP is consistent with the technical
requirements of RA 9369.

Stated in another way, Smartmatic-TIM insists on the validity of the
subject transaction based on the following grounds:
o (1) there is no prohibition either in the contract or provision
of law for it to extend the option period; rather, the contract
itself allows the parties to amend the same;
o (2) the OTP is not an independent contract in itself, but is a
provision contained in the valid and existing AES contract that
had already satisfied the public bidding requirements of
RA 9184; (3) exercising the option was the most
advantageous option of the Comelec; and
o (4) Smartmatic-TIM has an established track record in
providing effective and accurate electoral solutions and
its satisfactory performance has been proven during the
2010 elections. The alleged glitches in the May 2010
elections, if at all, are not attributable to the PCOS machines.

We agree with respondents


Ratio:

I
Procedural

At the outset, we brush aside the procedural barriers (i.e., locus
standi of petitioners and the non-observance of the hierarchy of
courts) that supposedly prevent the Court from entertaining the
consolidated petitions.
o As we held in Guingona, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May
2010 [in this case, May 2013] elections is a matter
of great public concern. On election day, the
country's registered voters will come out to exercise
the sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise
that ensures the preservation of our democracy, the
coming elections also embodies our people's last
ounce of hope for a better future. It is the final
opportunity, patiently awaited by our people, for the
peaceful transition of power to the next chosen
leaders of our country. If there is anything capable of
directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as
to come within the ambit of a public concern, it is the
coming elections, more so with the alarming turn of
events that continue to unfold. The wanton wastage
of public funds brought about by one bungled
contract after another, in staggering amounts, is
in itself a matter of grave public concern.

Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public

importance of the issues raised by petitioners, the technicalities
raised by respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way,
if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence
to the rules of procedure.


II
Substantive

In order to achieve the modernization program of the Philippine
Electoral System, which includes the automation of the counting,
transmission and canvassing of votes for the May 2010 national and
local elections with systems integration and over-all project
management in a comprehensive and well-managed manner,

the
Comelec entered into an AES contract with Smartmatic-TIM for
the lease of goods and purchase of services under the contract,
with option to purchase the goods.
The option contract between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM is
embodied in Article 4.3 of the AES contract to wit:

Article 4
Contract Fee and Payment

x x x x

4.3. OPTION TO PURCHASE

In the event the COMELEC exercises its option to purchase the Goods as
listed in Annex L, COMELEC shall pay the PROVIDER an additional amount
of Two Billion One Hundred Thirty Million Six Hundred Thirty- Five
Thousand Forty-Eight Pesos and Fifteen Centavos (Php2,130,635,048.15)
as contained in the Financial Proposal of the joint venture partners
Smartmatic and TIM.

In case COMELEC should exercise its option to purchase, a warranty shall be
required in order to assure that: (a) manufacturing defects shall be corrected;
and/or (b) replacements shall be made by the PROVIDER, for a minimum
period of three (3) months, in the case of supplies, and one (1) year, in the case
of equipment, after performance of this Contract. The obligation for the
warranty shall be covered by retention money of ten percent (10%) of every
option to purchase payment made.

The retention money will be returned within five (5) working days after the
expiration of the above warranty, provided, however, that the goods supplied
are in good operating condition free from patent and latent defects, all the
conditions imposed under the purchase contract have been fully met, and any
defective machines, except to those attributable to the COMELEC, have been
either repaired at no additional charge or replaced or deducted from the price
under the Option to Purchase.

Article 6.6 thereof, in turn provides for the period within which the
Comelec could exercise the option, thus:



Article 6
COMELECs Responsibilities

x x x x

6.6. COMELEC shall notify the PROVIDER on or before 31 December 2010 of
its option to purchase the Goods as listed in Annex L.
[33]


The Comelec did not exercise the option within the period stated in the
above provision.
Smartmatic, however, unilaterally extended the same until its final
extension on March 31, 2012.
The Comelec, thereafter, accepted the option and eventually executed a
Deed of Sale involving said goods.
Now, petitioners come before the Court assailing the validity of the
extension, the exercise of the option and the Deed of Sale.

In light of the AES contract,

o Can Smartmatic-TIM unilaterally extend the option
period?
o Can the Comelec accept the extension?
We answer in the affirmative.

It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that an instrument
must be construed so as to give effect to all the provisions of the
contract.
o In essence, the contract must be read and taken as a whole.
While the contract indeed specifically required the Comelec to notify
Smartmatic-TIM of its OTP the subject goods until December 31, 2010,
a reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show
that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which
may include the period within which to exercise the option.
There is, likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period,
provided that the contract is still effective.

Article 2 of the AES contract lays down the effectivity of the contract,
viz.:



Article 2
EFFECTIVITY

2.1. This Contract shall take effect upon the fulfillment of all of the following
conditions:

(a) Submission by the PROVIDER of the Performance Security;
(b) Signing of this Contract in seven (7) copies by the parties; and
(c) Receipt by the PROVIDER of the Notice to Proceed.

2.2. The Term of this Contract begins from the date of effectivity until the
release of the Performance Security, without prejudice to the surviving
provisions of this Contract, including the warranty provision as prescribed
in Article 8.3 and the period of the option to purchase (Emphasis supplied).

Obviously, the contract took effect even prior to the 2010 elections.
The only question now is whether its existence already ceased.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision, it is important to determine
whether or not the performance security had already been
released to Smartmatic-TIM.
In Article 8 of the AES contract, performance security was defined and
the rules in releasing said security were laid down, to wit:

Article 8
Performance Security and Warranty

8.1. Within three (3) days from receipt by the PROVIDER of the formal Notice of
Award from COMELEC, the PROVIDER shall furnish COMELEC with a
Performance Security in an amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the
Contract Amount; which Performance Security as of this date has been duly
received by COMELEC.

Within seven (7) days from delivery by the PROVIDER to COMELEC of the Over-
all Project Management Report after successful conduct of the May 10, 2010
elections, COMELEC shall release to the PROVIDER the above-mentioned
Performance Security without need of demand.

Smartmatic-TIM categorically stated in its Consolidated Comment to

the petitions that the Comelec still retains P50M of the amount due
Smartmatic-TIM as performance security.

In short, the performance security had not yet been released to
Smartmatic-TIM which indicates that the AES contract is still
effective and not yet terminated.
Consequently, pursuant to Article 19

of the contract,
o the provisions thereof may still be amended by mutual
agreement of the parties provided said
amendment is in writing and
signed by the parties.
In light of the provisions of the AES contract, there is, therefore,
nothing wrong with the execution of the Extension Agreement.


Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract
as it involves procurement by a government agency, the rights and
obligations of the parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but
also by RA 9184.
In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the established procedure in
the grant of government contracts.
The award of public contracts, through public bidding, is a matter of
public policy.
The parties are, therefore, not at full liberty to amend or modify
the provisions of the contract bidded upon.

The three principles of public bidding are:
(1) the offer to the public;
(2) an opportunity for competition; and
(3) a basis for the exact comparison of bids.
By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest by
giving the public the best possible advantages through open
competition.
Competition requires not only bidding upon a common standard, a
common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, and the
same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest and
not designed to injure or defraud the government.
The essence of competition in public bidding is that the bidders are
placed on equal footing which means that all qualified bidders
have an equal chance of winning the auction through their bids.
Another self-evident purpose of public bidding is to avoid or preclude
suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public
contracts.

A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain
provisions of the contract bidded upon.

o However, such changes must not constitute substantial or
material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of
the contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders
of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.
o The determination of whether or not a modification or
amendment of a contract bidded out constitutes a substantial
amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a
whole, would contain substantially different terms and
conditions that would have the effect of altering the technical
and/or financial proposals previously submitted by the other
bidders.
o The modifications in the contract executed between the
government and the winning bidder must be such as to render
the executed contract to be an entirely different contract from
the one bidded upon.

Public bidding aims to secure for the government the lowest possible
price under the most favorable terms and conditions, to curtail
favoritism in the award of government contracts and avoid suspicion
of anomalies, and it places all bidders in equal footing.
Any government action which permits any substantial variance
between the conditions under which the bids are invited and the
contract executed after the award thereof is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which
warrants proper judicial action.
If this flawed process would be allowed, public bidding will cease to be
competitive, and worse, government would not be favored with the
best bid. Bidders will no longer bid on the basis of the prescribed
terms and conditions in the bid documents but will formulate their bid
in anticipation of the execution of a future contract containing new and
better terms and conditions that were not previously available at the
time of the bidding.
Such a public bidding will not inure to the public good.

In Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation

(PSALM) v. Pozzolanic Philippines Incorporated,the Court nullified the
right of first refusal granted to respondent therein in the Batangas
Contract for being contrary to public policy. The Court explained that
the same violated the requirement of competitive public bidding in the
government contract, because the grant of the right of first refusal did
not only substantially amend the terms of the contract bidded upon so
that resultantly the other bidders thereto were deprived of the terms
and opportunities granted to respondent therein after it won the
public auction, but also altered the bid terms by effectively barring any
and all true bidding in the future.


Also in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,
(PIATCO),this Court declared as null and void, for being contrary to
public policy, the Concession Agreement entered into by the
government with PIATCO, because it contained provisions that
substantially departed from the Draft Concession Agreement included
in the bid documents. The Court considered the subject contracts a
mockery of the bidding process, because they were substantially
amended after their award to the successful bidder on terms more
beneficial to PIATCO and prejudicial to public interest.

The same conclusions cannot be applied in the present case.

o One. Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right
that was not previously available to the other bidders.
Admittedly, the AES contract was awarded to Smartmatic-TIM
after compliance with all the requirements of a competitive
public bidding. The RFP, Bid Bulletins and the AES contract
identified the contract as one of lease with option to purchase.
The AES contract is primarily a contract of lease of goods

listed
in the contract and purchase of services

also stated in the
contract. Section 4.3 thereof gives the Comelec the OTP the
goods agreed upon. The same provision states the conditions
in exercising the option, including the additional amount that
the Comelec is required to pay should it exercise such right.
It is, therefore, undisputed that this grant of option
is recognized by both parties and is already a part
of the principal contract of lease.
Having been included in the RFP and the bid bulletins,
this right given to the Comelec to exercise the option
was known to all the bidders and was considered in
preparing their bids.
The bidders were apprised that aside from the lease
of goods and purchase of services, their proposals
should include an OTP the subject goods.
Although the AES contract was amended after the
award of the contract to Smartmatic-TIM, the
amendment only pertains to the period within which
the Comelec could exercise the option because of its
failure to exercise the same prior to the deadline
originally agreed upon by the parties.
Unlike in PSALM, wherein the winning bidder was
given the right of first refusal which substantially
amended the terms of the contract bidded upon,
thereby depriving the other bidders of the terms and
opportunities granted to winning bidder after it won
the public auction; and in Agan, Jr., wherein the
Concession Agreement entered into by the
government with PIATCO contained provisions that
substantially departed from the draft Concession
Agreement included in the bid documents;
the option contract in this case was
already a part of the original contract and
not given only after Smartmatic-TIM
emerged as winner.
The OTP was actually a requirement by the
Comelec when the contract of lease was
bidded upon.
To be sure, the Extension Agreement does
not contain a provision favorable to
Smartmatic-TIM not previously made
available to the other bidders.

o Two. The amendment of the AES contract is not
substantial.
o The approved budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00
charged against the supplemental appropriations for election
modernization.
o Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they did not
exceed said amount.
o After the competitive public bidding, Smartmatic-TIM
emerged as winner and the AES contract was thereafter
executed.
o As repeatedly stated above, the AES contract is a contract of
lease with OTP giving the Comelec the right to purchase the
goods agreed upon if it decides to do so.
o The AES contract not only indicated the contract price for the
lease of goods and purchase of services which is
P7,191,484,739.48, but also stated the additional amount that
the Comelec has to pay if it decides to exercise the option
which is P2,130,635,048.15.
o Except for the period within which the Comelec could exercise
the OTP, the terms and conditions for such exercise are
maintained and respected.
o Admittedly, the additional amount the Comelec needed to
pay was maintained (less the amount already paid when it
purchased 920 units of PCOS machines with corresponding
CCS for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces
of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan) subject to the
warranties originally agreed upon in the AES contract.
The contract amount not only included that for the
contract of lease but also for the OTP.
o Hence, the competitive public bidding conducted for the
AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding would be a
superfluity.

o The Solicitor General himself clarified during the oral
arguments that the purchase price of the remaining PCOS
machines stated in the assailed Deed of Sale was the price
stated in Article 4.3 of the AES contract.

o Therefore, the said amount was already part of the original
amount bidded upon in 2009 for the AES contract which
negates the need for another competitive bidding.

o Third. More importantly, the amendment of the AES
contract is more advantageous to the Comelec and the
public.
The nature of an option contract was thoroughly
explained in Eulogio v. Apeles,

to wit:
An option is a contract by which the owner of
the property agrees with another person that
the latter shall have the right to buy the
former's property at a fixed price within a
certain time.
It is a condition offered or contract by which
the owner stipulates with another that the
latter shall have the right to buy the property
at a fixed price within a certain time, or
under, or in compliance with certain terms
and conditions; or which gives to the owner
of the property the right to sell or demand a
sale.
An option is not of itself a purchase, but
merely secures the privilege to buy. It is not a
sale of property but a sale of the right to
purchase. It is simply a contract by which the
owner of the property agrees with another
person that he shall have the right to buy his
property at a fixed price within a certain
time.
He does not sell his land; he does not then
agree to sell it; but he does sell something,
i.e., the right or privilege to buy at the
election or option of the other party.
Its distinguishing characteristic is that it
imposes no binding obligation on the person
holding the option, aside from the
consideration for the offer.
Also in Carceller v. Court of Appeals, the Court
described an option in this wise:
An option is a preparatory contract in which
one party grants to the other, for a fixed
period and under specified conditions, the
power to decide, whether or not to enter into
a principal contract.
It binds the party who has given the option,
not to enter into the principal contract with
any other person during the period
designated and, within that period, to enter
into such contract with the one to whom the
option was granted, if the latter should
decide to use the option.
It is a separate agreement distinct from the
contract which the parties may enter into
upon the consummation of the option.

In Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. CA,the Court described an
option as:
An option, as used in the law on sales, is a
continuing offer or contract by which the
owner stipulates with another that the latter
shall have the right to buy the property at a
fixed price within a certain time, or under, or
in compliance with, certain terms and
conditions, or which gives to the owner of the
property the right to sell or demand a sale. It
is sometimes called an unaccepted offer. x x
x

From the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements,
an option is only a preparatory contract and a
continuing offer to enter into a principal contract.
Under the set-up, the owner of the property, which is
Smartmatic-TIM, gives the optionee, which is the
Comelec, the right to accept the formers offer to
purchase the goods listed in the contract for a
specified amount, and within a specified period.
Thus, the Comelec is given the right to decide whether
or not it wants to purchase the subject goods.
It is, therefore, uncertain whether or not the principal
contract would be entered into.
The owner of the property would then have to wait
for the optionee to make a decision.
A longer option period would mean that more time
would be given to the optionee to consider
circumstances affecting its decision whether to
purchase the goods or not.
On the part of Smartmatic-TIM, it would have to wait
for a longer period to determine whether the
subject goods will be sold to the Comelec or not,
instead of freely selling or leasing them to other
persons or governments possibly at a higher price.
This is especially true in this case as the terms and
conditions for the exercise of the option including the
purchase price, had been included in the AES contract
previously bidded upon.
The parties are bound to observe the limitations
embodied therein, otherwise, a new public
bidding would be needed.

o We agree with respondents that the exercise of the option is
more advantageous to the Comelec, because the
P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of goods and
purchase of services under the AES contract was
considered part of the purchase price.
For the Comelec to own the subject goods, it was
required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15.
o If the Comelec did not exercise the option, the rentals
already paid would just be one of the government
expenses for the past election and would be of no use to
future elections.
o Assuming that the exercise of the option is nullified, the
Comelec would again conduct another public bidding for the
AES for the 2013 elections with its available budget of P7
billion.
o Considering that the said amount is the available fund for the
whole election process, the amount for the purchase or lease
of new AES will definitely be less than P7 billion.
o Moreover, it is possible that Smartmatic-TIM would again
participate in the public bidding and could win at a possibly
higher price. The Comelec might end up acquiring the same
PCOS machines but now at a higher price.

Another reason posed by petitioners for their objection to the exercise
of the option and the eventual execution of the March 30, 2012 Deed of
Sale is the existence of the alleged defects, glitches, and infirmities
of the subject goods.
The technology provided by Smartmatic-TIM was not perfect, because
of some technical problems that were experienced during the
2010 elections.
Petitioners herein doubt that the integrity and sanctity of the ballots
are protected because of these defects.
o We do not agree.

Prior to the execution of the Deed of Sale, the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM had agreed that the latter would undertake fixes
and enhancements to the hardware and software to make sure
that the subject goods are in working condition to ensure a free,
honest, and credible elections.
As former Commissioner Augusto C. Lagman admitted during the oral
arguments, there are possible software solutions to the alleged
problems on the PCOS machines and it is not inherently impossible to
remedy the technical problems that have been identified.
While there is skepticism that Smartmatic-TIM would be able to
correct the supposed defects prior to the 2013 elections because of its
inaction during the two years prior to the exercise of the option, we
agree with the opinion of Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. that it is
absurd to expect Smartmatic-TIM to invest time, money and resources
in fixing the PCOS machines to the specifications and requirements of
the Comelec when prior to the exercise of the OTP, they do not have
the assurance from the Comelec that the latter will exercise the option.


As the Comelec is confronted with time and budget constraints, and in
view of the Comelecs mandate to ensure free, honest, and credible
elections, the acceptance of the extension of the option period, the
exercise of the option, and the execution of the Deed of Sale, are the
more prudent choices available to the Comelec for a successful 2013
automated elections.
The alleged defects in the subject goods have been determined and
may be corrected as in fact fixes and enhancements had been
undertaken by Smartmatic-TIM.
Petitioners could not even give a plausible alternative to ensure the
conduct of a successful 2013 automated elections, in the event that the
Court nullifies the Deed of Sale.

Judgment: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 24, 2012 is
LIFTED.

ANG LADLAD V. COMELEC
ANG LADLAD V COMELEC 2010
DOCTRINES:
- The enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is
not exclusive.
PETITION: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Resolutions of the (COMELEC) for denying their petition for accreditation
based on the ground of no substantial membership and based on moral
grounds.
EMERGENCY FROM THE INTERNET:
Facts: On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates
sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only
for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated
or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang
Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld
the First Assailed Resolution.
Issue: can the comelec utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
Ang Ladlad?
Ruling: NO. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. WE
THUS FIND THAT IT WAS GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE NON-
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FOR THE COMELEC TO UTILIZE THE BIBLE AND
THE KORAN TO JUSTIFY THE EXCLUSION OF ANG LADLAD. Rather than
relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects.

DETAILED DIGEST:
FACTS:
- Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs).
- On august 17, 2009, LADLAD filed a petition for registration with Comelec
and argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.

Ang Ladlad laid out
its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
- However, Comelec dismissed the petition on Moral Grounds
a. Comelec reasoned out that Ang ladlad tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs (cited the Koran and the Bible).
b. Also, it advocates sexual immorality and violating the civil code as
against morals, good customs and public policy.
- Also, ang Ladlad should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it
said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections."
- Thus, Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration and 3 commissioners voted to
overturn the assailed resolution while another 3 commissioners voted to
deny the MR. Thus, tie break, the Chairman upheld the assailed resolution
and reasoned;
a. The spirit of RA 7941 it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual
orientation per se would benefit the nation as a whole The party-list
system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their
interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because
of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is
able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation
under the party-list system will remain just that.
b. No substantial differentiation Homosexuality is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right even if societys
understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there
can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
c. Public Morals as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more
than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into
society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
d. Legal Provisions morality and social norms have become part of the
law of the land violative of civil code and unlawful
- Thus, this petition is filed to annul said resolution and grant said
application. Also, to apply for preliminary injunction against comelec
because of the printing of the ballots.
- The comelec only filed its comment Feb 2, 2010 (printing of ballots
happened Jan 25)
- CHR intervened - the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds
violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

ARGUMENTS
Ang Ladlad
- The denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion.
- They also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

OSG
- The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the
COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since
there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality.
- It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns
which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification.
- However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of
speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained
that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

COMELEC
- Ang Ladlad does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds.
- It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the
sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field
personnel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec erred in denying the petition for
application of Ang Ladlad as a partylist? ERRED
HELD: Comelec has abused its discretion in denying the petition of Ang Ladlad,
thus petition is granted.
RATIO:
1. Compliance with the requirements of the constitution and RA
7941 (Party List Act)
- Comelec has mistakenly opined that only those sectors named in the Ang
Bagong Bayani case may be registered under the party-list system.
- However, jurisprudence has said that the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive.
- The crucial element is whether the organization complies with the
requirements of the constitution and RA 7941.
- Regarding the issue of misrepresentation, it does not exist in almost all
provinces in the country, it ruled that it is not a ground for denial of
application. Thus, no misrepresentation for it did not claim that it exist in
each province. But only estimated that it constitutes 670K and it is a LGBT
umbrella organization.
- Thus, ang Ladlad has complied with the legal requirements for
accreditation.

2. Religion as the Basis for Refusal to accept and ladlads petition for
registration
- Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls
for is "government neutrality in religious matters."
- The court ruled that, it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion
of Ang Ladlad.
- SECULAR MORALITY. The legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects.

3. Public Morals as a ground to deny ang Ladlads Petition for
registration
- Homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval. Nonetheless, There is no law
criminalizing homosexuality or conduct.
- Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not
been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law
- The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad.
- Also, the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings.

A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code,
on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of
public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

4. Equal protection
- The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population
considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
- Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has
expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior.
- From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-
list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly
situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
- The court also, disagrees with the OSGs position that homosexuality are a
class themselves.
-
5. Freedom of Expression and association
- The COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one.
- The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not
been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association.
- The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by
the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law.
- To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded,
because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a
political party and participating on an equal basis in the political
process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find
that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners
fundamental rights.

6. Non- Discrimination and International Law
- Article 26 - All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.
- The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation.
- Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be
construed to include "sexual orientation."

Courts final note: we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented
by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the
psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role
is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the
Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and
confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.

CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO
- The assailed resolutions of the comelec are violative of the constitutional
directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights

DISSENTING
CORONA
- The party list system is essentially a tool for the advancement of social
justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to
marginalized and under represented sectors to participate in the shaping
of public policy and the crafting of national laws.
- The SC stressed that the party list system is reserved only for those sectors
marginalized and under represented in the past

QUINTO V. COMELEC (2009)
Emergency RECIT: DECLARED RESOLUTION AND ENABLING LAW
UNCONSITTUTIONAL
Basically, the case has something to do with the resolution passed by the
Comelec saying that an appointive official is ipso facto resigned upon filing of
their certificate of candidacy. However, elective officials according to the same
resolution is only deemed resigned at the commencement of the campaign
period. Main issue: does it violate the equal protection clause? YES. REASONS:
1) it is not germane to the purpose of the law since the prohibition is NOT
REASONABLY NECESSARY to protect public interest 2) no valid classification.
The example given in the case is that an appointive official and the president
(elected official) can actually both use their powers for the furtherance of the
interest. WHY the distinction??? Why limit the appointed and not the elected?
3) it suffers for being overbroad. Why? Appointed officials are not classified
whether they are high appointive officials or not. Even a utility worker can also
be considered as an appointed official. Pati siya ba matatangal? Eh, wala naman
power to influence yan eh.
FACTS:
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person
holding a public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy
for the same or any other elective office or position.

- Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the
moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who
intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
- Quinto et al. aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is
intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order
to cope with time limitations
-They also alleged that they should be considered resigned from their
respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by
law, already considered as candidates
-Lastly and more importantly: the provision considering them as ipso facto
resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates
the equal protection clause in the Constitution
ISSUES: W/on the said provision violates the equal protection clause (main
issue)
HELD: YES
Ratio:
-1. Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class (appointive officers/positions). The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.
-Mancuso v. Taft, cited above, explains that the measure on automatic
resignation, which restricts the rights of civil servants to run for officea right
inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and association, is not
reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with,
namely: (GEES)
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from
the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it
should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in
the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in
government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be
considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections.
This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his
position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
- The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service
by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated
by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction
is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather
than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed
provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be
germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for
that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the
same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-
Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare
development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat
them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us
say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can
still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the
discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as
true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy
would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
QUINTO V. COMELEC (2010)
2010 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (taken from the internet): DECLARED
RESOLUTION AND ENABLING LAW CONSITTUTIONAL
On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court voting 8-6 declared as
unconstitutional the second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, for being violative of the equal protection
clause and for being overbroad. The ponente of the decision was Justice
Antonio B. Nachura.
On February 22, 2010, voting 10-5, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier
ruling, granted the motions for reconsideration of its December 1, 2009
decision and upheld the constitutionality of the three provisions in
election laws that deemed appointive officials automatically resigned
once they filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs). The ruling was
penned by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno with a dissent from Justice Nachura.
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Puno rationalized that the issue as to equal
protection has been addressed in the earlier case of case of Farinas v. Executive
Secretary, (G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003) where the Court stated that
the equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from the other. x x
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials:
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. x x
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that
under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take (SIC) part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in
political and electoral activities.
The Court goes on to state that By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these
two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in
the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than
those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass
upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. x x x Since the classification
justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, I.E., elected officials vis--vis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and
all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated,
the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
In view of these pronouncements, Justice Puno states that the case at bar is a
crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. And that the miracle is that the (our)
assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of
STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE. This doctrine, which is really
adherence to precedents, mandates that once a case has been decided one
way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be
decided in the same manner.
The Farinas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-
resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere OBITER DICTUM. It is trite
to state that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the
case cannot be considered as OBITER DICTUM. This rule applies to all
pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the regular course of the
consideration of the case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any
statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated.
The concern, voiced by Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis-
-vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate, is
indeed a matter worth exploring but not by the Court. The remedy lies with
the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our
constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make
policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within
the Legislatures power to make the deemed-resigned provisions applicable to
elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are
of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the
class. The Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to
ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs from a public policy
standpoint.
QUINTO DIGESTS FROM GEORGE (BASED ON RECIT)
FACTS:
QUINTO is an appointive official, who wanted to run for the May 2010
elections. However due to the Resolution of the COMELEC, she would be ipso
facto resigned from her position upon the filing of her COC.
ISSUE: WON Comelec Resolution is constitutional?- no violates equal protection
clause and overbroad
Ratio:
SC decided upon the constitutionality of the resolution by tracing the
laws that upon which the Resolution came into being. The SC provided for
several laws that contained similar provisions, going way back to laws during
the American Occupation. It was held that the Resolution is null and void for
violating the equal protection clause and that it is overbroad.
4 requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinction
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

Although there is substantial distinctions between an elective and an
appointive official; the distinction is not germane to the purpose of law, since
the evil sought to be prevented by the law which is the influence that an
appointive official will have upon the electorate, or that she/ he will be
neglectful of his or her duties since much of his or her energy will be focused on
campaigning, such reasons also exist on an elective official.
Category Elected candidate Appointed candidate
Occupies
position
By virtue of the mandate
of the electorate
Designation thereto by an
appointing authority
term Definite term and may be
removed upon stringent
conditions
Permanent capacity,
entitled to security of
tenure or at the pleasure
of the appointing
authority
Political and
electoral
activities
expressly allowed Strictly prohibited, except
to vote.
Moreover, the RESOLUTION and LAWS are overbroad as it covers ALL
appointive officials, even those holding positions which are not in anyway
connected with the evils that the law sought to eliminate. Example given by SC,
when a utility worker who wishes to run for election, he or she will lose his or
her job upon the filing of COC. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence
in the political world. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to
restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. BUT, laws
cannot be legislated for appointive officials holding high positions alone, or
with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is
universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards
prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws.

2010 case:
Motion for reconsideration:
Basically, SC just said that the MR is valid
RATIO:
1. Intent of the law is really to ban political activities to apolitical offices
2. Does not violate equal protection
3. cases that were used in the 2009 case were overturned.
a. US case not anymore controlling
b. The Faranias case is not merely an obiter but must be seen as
a judicial precedent.

Intent of the Law :
The Sc looked into the resolution as an enforcement of Section 2(4),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.

The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to
limit the participation of civil service officers and employees in
partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken. SC cited the
deliberation of FOZ and QUESADA during the Constitutional
Commission which shows that they really wanted to ban partisan
activities to apolitical offices.

Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding
apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not
cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
[21]


Hence subsequent laws were implemented to ensure that the
provision of the Constitution would be implemented.

Does not violate equal protection
The US case relied upon the 2009 decision has already been overturned by the
US court
Substantial distinction between elected and appointed offices
o This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of
their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all
year round, even outside of the campaign period.
[22]
Political
partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office,
elective positions included.
[23]


Equal Protection, it is not for the court to decide upon the wisdom of the law as
long as substantial distinction was made.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must
convincingly show that the law creates a classification that is palpably
arbitrary or capricious.
[45]
He must refute all possible rational bases
for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those
bases as reasons for the enactment,
[46]
such that the constitutionality of
the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the
classification is fairly debatable.
[47]
In the case at bar, the petitioners
failed and in fact did not even attempt to discharge this heavy
burden.
PENERA V. COMELEC (NOV 2009)[MR]
THIS CASE IS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE DECIDED BY SC ON 11 SEPT
2009. THIS CASE OVERTURNED THE 11SEPT2009 DECISION.
EMERGENCY (SCRIBD):
FACTS:
PENERA and ANDANAR were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of
Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed
her certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed campaign period.
When she went to the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her
partymates. Thereafter, they had a motorcade which consist of two trucks and
ten motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to
vote for her and the other candidates of their political party.
Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging
premature campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80
which says: Election or partisan political activity outside campaign period.--- It
shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the campaign period. She argued that she is not
guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the campaign period
has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted.
While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as
mayor and took her office thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in
favor of the complainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning.
Likewise, when she appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision
was affirmed.
Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against
her. It held that the conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign or
partisan political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus
Election Code which says: [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.]
Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate the position. Now, she comes
for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.
ISSUE: Is PENERA guilty of premature campaigning?
RULING: No, she is not.
Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is
enough that Congress stated that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. So, it is
lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This plain language of
the law need not be construed further.
Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate
for. As what was decided in the Lanot Case which says that prior to the
campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of
candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than
the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning
for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What she did was an
exercise of her freedom of expression.
JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT PENERA Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for
Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613
promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July
2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC
En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as
Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
Chico-Nazario, J:
It is obvious that the motorcade was planned to gain more votes
from their constituents. Even if she was not yet a candidate at that time,
she can he held guilty of premature campaigning as an ordinary citizen
committing the prohibited act.
Abad, J:
But the fact that Penera was not yet a candidate before she actually
handed in her certificate of candidacy to the designated COMELEC official does
not exempt her from the prohibition against engaging in premature election
campaign. Section 80 which imposes the ban ensnares any person, even
a non-candidate.

COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS: The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the
Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the
Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision
disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed
Penera.
1. In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following
arguments:
a. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under
Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
b. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and
substantial evidence against Penera for violation of Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
c. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for
disqualification and has consistently disputed the charge of
premature campaigning.
d. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the
same as admitting she engaged in premature election
campaigning.
2. Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a candidate as any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a
certificate of candidacy x x x. The second sentence, third paragraph,
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that
[a]ny person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period
for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. The
immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period. These two
provisions determine the resolution of this case.
3. COMELECS ASSAILED DECISION: states that [w]hen the campaign
period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy]
proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we
can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and
prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as
a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which
he/she may be disqualified.
a. a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning
after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the
start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the
Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a
certificate of candidacy as the promotion of his/her election as
a candidate. Thus, such person can be disqualified for
premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the
campaign period.
b. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a
certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the
start of the campaign period.

ISSUE: WON a person who files a certificate of candidacy is already a
candidate even before the start of the campaign period? WON PENERA is
guilty of premature campaigning? NO, the assailed Decision is contrary to the
clear intent and letter of the law.
HELD: WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for
Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613
promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July
2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC
En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as
Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
RATIO:
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who
files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code are:
(1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political
activity;
(2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates;
(3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
o The second element requires the existence of a candidate. Under
Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of
candidacy to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
certificate of candidacy, he is not a candidate. The third element
requires that the campaign period has not started when the
election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
o Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates
of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the
Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign
period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80
for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is
no particular candidate or candidates to campaign for or against.
On the day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign
period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80
covers only acts done outside the campaign period.
o Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last
day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day,
which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least
one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps
the reason why those running for elective public office usually file
their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last
day.
o There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigning or
partisan political activities were committed outside of the
campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed
his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a
candidate when he committed those acts before the start of the
campaign period on 24 March 2004.
o Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 (RA 8436) moved the
deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days
before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from
23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial
question is: did this change in the deadline for filing the certificate
of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before
2 January 2004 immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he
engaged in election campaign or partisan political activities prior
to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of
the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or
the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under
each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by
surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in the
election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the
elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity,
except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the
start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is
running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for
filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice-President,
Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions for
registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be
on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for
other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office
and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of
private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall
adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it
cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized
citizens arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and
distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the
Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be printed
in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall
be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification
marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are
provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each
city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with a
provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of
certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of
official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee:
o SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign
period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national
officials?...But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy,
hes already a candidate, and there are many prohibited acts
on the part of candidate.
o THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can
provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will
not result in that official vacating his position, we can also
provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or
his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because
here, the reason why we are doing an early filing is to
afford enough time to prepare this machine readable
ballots.
o SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against
campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediately
upon being a candidate?
o THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the
intention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec
enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not
intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or
rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.
o THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be
subject to the other prohibition.
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004
for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress,
however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy
before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become
immediately a candidate for purposes other than the
printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the
immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear
intention of Congress was to preserve the election periods
as x x x fixed by existing law prior to RA 8436 and that one
who files to meet the early deadline will still not be
considered as a candidate. (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal
framework for an automated election system. There was no express
provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly
incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that Lanot merely relied
on the deliberations of Congress in holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the election
periods as x x x fixed by existing law prior to RA 8436 and
that one who files to meet the early deadline will still not be
considered as a candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under
the early deadline required by the automated election system would be
disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of
the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote the
Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended
Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:
x x x
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in
the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting
it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section
15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole
ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot
without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would
mean repealing this second sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this
second sentence or any portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by
RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision considers the entire
Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory reversing
Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which
embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in
conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence, third
paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. The original provision in RA
8436 states
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word only so that the first proviso now
reads

x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to
a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its
mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate
only upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before
the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so
committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369,
are read together, these provisions of law do not consider Penera a candidate
for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign
period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on
12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007.
Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing
the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed
by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a candidate,
even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not
punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are
within the realm of a citizens protected freedom of expression. Acts
committed by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by Section
80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly
declared unlawful by law. This is specially true to expression or speech,
which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear,
present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not
declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no
need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369,
that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are
lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period. The only inescapable and logical result is that the same
acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an
election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The
law is clear as daylight any election offense that may be committed by a
candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for
partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision
ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses
only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore
the clear and express mandate of the law that any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered
a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the
express and clear language of the law that any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period.
NOTES:
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T.
Carpio:
x x x The definition of a candidate in Section 79(a)
of the Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A candidate refers to any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties.
However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of
candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because
any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
[the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Any person may thus file a
certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed
period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall
be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining ones
possible violations of election laws, only during the
campaign period. Indeed, there is no election campaign or
partisan political activity designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office
simply because there is no candidate to speak of prior to the
start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of
her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera
a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which
was conducted a day before the start of the campaign period.
x x x
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the
first proviso in the third paragraph, the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that
election offenses applicable to candidates take effect only upon the start
of the campaign period. The Decision states that:
x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436,
as amended, which provides that any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of the campaign period, does not mean that the acts
constituting premature campaigning can only be committed,
for which the offender may be disqualified, during the
campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the
dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is
lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same
with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior
to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign
period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity,
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the
beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said
person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period,
can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature
campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when
the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall
accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only
about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously
engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in
promoting his/her candidacy. (Emphasis supplied)
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature
campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the
campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is any
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the campaign period. The plain meaning of this provision
is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but
may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does
the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start
of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides,
such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and
curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial
measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but
to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence, and
its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section
15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
BANAT V. COMELEC
Facts:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the National Board
of Canvassers (NBC)
o Because Comelec is duty bound to apply the Veterans ruling
July 7, 2007 - Comelec issued a Resolution, proclaiming (13) parties as
winners in the party-list elections, namely:
o Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party
(Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),
Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak
Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
o Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act)
provides
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each
Provided, that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
COMELEC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, declaring allocation
of additional seats according to Veterans formula (First Party Rule)
o That the 13 party lists garnering at least 2% are guaranteed 1
seat
o BUHAY has the most number of votes (1,178,747, which is
7.2% of the total votes for the party-list system)
o Therefore, BUHAY is the first party according to Veterans
and CIBAC.
o With 7.2% votes, it is entitled to 2 additional seats according
to Veterans formula for allocating additional seats for the first
party
in determining the additional seats for the
first party, the correct formula as expressed
in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first
party Proportion of votes of first
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party
relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list
system party-list system

the proportion of votes received by the first party
(without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional
seats:
If the proportion of votes received by the first
party is at least 6%, party is entitled to 2
additional seats
If the proportion of votes received by the first
party is at least 4%, party is entitled to 1
additional seat
If the proportion of votes received by the first
party is less than 4%, party is entitled to no
additional seat
o Other parties entitled to additional seats follow a different
formula, based on number of additional
o seats allocated to first party
No. of votes of
concerned party No.
of additional
Additional seats for = -------------------
x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes
of first party
first party

o Bayan Muna, CIBAC, GABRIELA, and APEC was then entitled to
1 additional seat each
BANATs Petition asks for the ff reliefs:
o That full number (20%) of Party-List representatives shall be
proclaimed
o Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2%
threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list
representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their
initial/first ranking
o The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied
o All party-list groups shall initially be given seats
corresponding to every 2% vote received and any additional
seats will be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941 (in relation to total nationwide votes cast after deducting
corresponding votes allotted seats under 2% threshold rule
o In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating
seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of
RA 7941 shall be followed
Sec. 12 of RA 7941:
COMELEC will rank, tally, and allocate party-list
representatives according to percentage of votes
obtained against the total nationwide votes cast
Additional seats will be allocated in proportion to the
percentage of votes obtained by each group:
in relation to total nationwide votes
After deducting corresponding votes of those
allotted seats under 2% threshold rule
Comelec on ruling in BANATs petition:
o Petition of BANAT moot and academic
o total number of seats of each winning party, organization or
coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results.
BANAT filed petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing NBC
Resolution No. 07-88 ruling (NOT a motion for reconsideration)
COMELEC proclaimed three more party-list organizations entitled to
one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System

ISSUES:
Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a
ceiling? ceiling
Is Section 11 (b)s 3-seat limit constitutional? Yes.
Is Section 11 (b)s 2% threshold to qualify for 1 seat constitutional?
YES but only in the computation of additional seats
How will the party-list representatives be allocated? Sec. 11 of RA 7149
then second round of seat allocation
Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from
participating in party-list elections? Can they be barred from
participating there? Constitution does not bar but SC upheld ruling in
Veterans barring major political parties to participate.

HELD:

RATIO:
Veterans: 4 inviolable parameters of Philippine Party-list election
o 20% allocation: combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total House of
Representatives membership
o 2% threshold: only parties with a minimum of 2% total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have seat
o 3-seat limit: each party shall only have a maximum of 3 seats;
1 qualifying seat and 2 additional seats
o Proportional representation: additional seats will be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes
SC recognizes mathematical flaws in the Veterans formula thus, a
revisit of the formula for additional seats should be done
Section 5, Article VI of Constitution
o House of Representatives will not have more than 250
members unless otherwise fixed by law, elected
From legislative districts in accordance with
respective populations
From those elected through party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations
o Party-list representatives will constitute 20% of total number
of representatives
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states
the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-
list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this
point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats
available to legislative
districts

x .20 =
Number of seats available to
party-list representatives
.80

o This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of
seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative
district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines
has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-
list representatives
o the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to
party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
o BANAT gives interpretations for the allocation of additional seats
1. Fill the 20% portion with party-list representatives
All those garnering 2% will have one seat. Max of 3 seats
the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the
party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three
(3) seats under the 2% threshold rule
2. On the assumption that the 2% threshold is unconstitutional,
tally all the votes for the parties
rank them according to the number of votes received
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according
to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the party list system
o SC rules that the 2% threshold as found in Section 11 is
unconstitutional ONLY in computing the allocation of additional
seats
o It makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the
number exceeds 50
o It frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the House of Representatives members will be party-list
representatives
o It is an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
o In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:
o The parties, shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest \
o The parties receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
o Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
o Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
o 2
nd
round of seat allocation:
o get the proportion of votes of each party to the total votes cast
for party-list
o percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters
o whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats
o assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank
until all available seats are completely distributed.
o Apply 3-seat cap
o On the participation of major political parties
o Framers of the Constitution intended political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings
and can organize or affiliate with their chosen sector or
sectors
o RA 7941 also intended major political parties to participate in
party-list elections. To exclude major political parties would
be against the Constitution and RA 7941
o Sec. 9 of RA 7941 offers qualifications for party-list nominees
Sectoral party/org/coalition nominee must be a
member of the sector
Natural-born Philippine citizen, registered voter,
resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year, able to
read and write, at least 25 years old, and a bona fide
member of the party he seeks to represent for at least
90 days before the day of election
Youth sector nominees must not be more than 30 on
the day of the election
o RA 7941s 3-seat cap is valid; it prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections
o 20% allocation is a ceiling; neither RA 7941 nor the Constitution
mandates that all 55 seats be filled
o The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law
which will systematically prevent the constitutionally
allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled
o HOWEVER the Supreme Court has decided that the ruling in Veterans
be continued (8-7 vote)
o Disallowed major political parties from participating in party-
list elections, whether directly or indirectly


TECSON V. COMELEC
FACTS
Antecedent Case Settings
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe aka Fernando Poe Jr. vs.
Petitioner Victorino Fornier
12/31/03 respondent filed certificate of candidacy for the
position of President
o under Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, date of birth 8/20/39, place of birth
Manila.

Consolidated Cases
1
st
Case
Fornier filed a petition with the COMELEC to
o disqualify FPJ
o deny due course or
o cancel his certificate of candidacy
Reason material misrepresentation in FPJs certificate of
candidacy
o Fornier says FPJ is claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth FPJS parents were
foreigners
Mother Bessie Kelley Poe American,
Father Allan Poe Spanish national
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
o Granting that father (Allan) of FPJ was Filipino, Allan
could not have transmitted Filipino citizenship to FPJ
Reason: FPJ was an illegitimate child of an alien
mother.
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to the mother of
FPJ, Bessie Kelley
even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after birth of FPJ.
COMELEC 3
rd
Division hearing 1/19/04 (Dismissed for lack of
Merit)
Fornier filed Motion for Reconsideration. Denied by
COMELEC en banc
Fornier assailed decision with SC.
o TRO
o Writ of preliminary injunction
o Any other resolution that would stay the finality or
execution of the COMELEC Resolution

2
nd
Case
Tecson, Desiderio and Velez filed a case against the COMELEC
Challenging COMELECs jurisdiction.
Asserting that only the SC has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the citizenship of FPJ1.
ISSUES
1. Does SC have the power to review COMELEC en banc decisions? YES
2. Does COMELEC have jurisdiction over the case? YES
2. Is FPJ a natural born Filipino Citizen? YES.

RATIO
1. SC has the power to review the COMELECs decision to deny Forniers
petition to disqualify the candidacy of FPJ for alleged misrepresentation of
material fact 2

1 Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution
2 Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
Decisions of COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the SC in action for certiorari 3
Constitution4 also allows decisions of Commissions to be
brought to the SC by certiorari.
SC can also determine Whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion by any branch of the government. 5

2. COMELEC has jurisdiction, petitions of Tecson and Velez are dismissed. SCs
jurisdiction as the judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications relates to the PRESIDENT or VP. Not the Candidates.
SC en banc: sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President and VP 6,
Election contests7 consist of either
o election protest
only a registered candidate who would have
received second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest.
o quo warranto
action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office

may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
3 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution "Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
5 Section 1, Article VIII, - judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
6 Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution
7 Election contests consist of either
o an election protest or
o quo warranto
o two distinct remedies one objective in view to dislodge the winning
candidate from office.

o 2 distinct remedies but both have one objective in view
dislodge winning candidate from office.
BUT jurisdiction of Supreme Court, does not include cases questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
term contest refers to a post- election scenario.
3. FPJ is a natural born citizen. He is therefor a qualified candidate. 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ was born, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

In whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is
necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen
if in affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father.

Summary : Parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley. FPJ was
born to them on 20 August 1939; Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on 16 September, 1940; The father of Allan F. Poe
was Lorenzo Poe; and At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
FPJs GRANDPARENTS
o Lorenzo Pou
Death certificate identified him to be Filipino
Residence was Pangasinan
84 yrs old, Sept 11 1954
o Marta Reyes
FPJs FATHER Allan Poe
o certificate of birth
born on 17 May 1915
father : Lorenzo Pou Espanol (but death
certificate says he was Filipino)
mother: Marta Reyes mestiza Espaol
o uncertified copy of supposed certificate of alleged
marriage
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
05 July 1936.
o marriage certificate
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
Allan F. Poe twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen,
Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years
old, unmarried, and an American
citizen.
16 September 1940.
FPJ
o birth of FPJ (8/20/39) was during the regime of the
1935 Constitution.
o birth certificate of FPJ
20 August 1939 to
Father: Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four
years old,
Mother: Bessie Kelly, an American citizen,
twenty-one years old and married.
Lorenzo Poe was probably Filipino by en Masse Filipinization
Any conclusion on Filipino citizenship of Lolo Lorenzo Pou (dad of
Allan Poe) could only be drawn from the presumption that having died
in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
San Carlos, Pangasinan, place of residence upon his death in 1954, in
the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
Lolo Lorenzos Filipinization if acquired would have extended to his
son Allan Poe, which would make Allans son Filipino
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ was born, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
argument of Fornier since birth to unmarried parents would make
FPJ an illegitimate, he would then follow the citizenship of his mother
(illegitimate child of a Filipino father) WRONG
To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public
office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
Fornier failed to substantiate his case.
totality of evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in FPJs favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate






LEGAL HISTORY RE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
Initially No Philippine Citizens during the Spanish Regime
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."
natives were called 'indios',
Not all citizenship laws of Spain were applied, Only explicitly extended
by Royal Decrees.
Novisima Recopilacion, - Experts had differing views whether the law was
extended to the Philippines

Three Royal Decrees made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines
Order de la Regencia Aug 14 1841
Royal Decree of August 23 1868
o Defined the political status of children born in the Philippines
Ley extranjera de Ultramar July 4 1870
Spanish Constitution 1876 - never extended to Philippine Islands by express
mandate of Article 89 Philippines would be governed by special laws.

Civil Code of Spain Dec. 8 1889 - 1
st
categorical enumeration of Spanish
Citizens
Persons born in Spanish territory,
Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
of Spain,
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
Treaty of Paris December 10 1898 : Native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish Subjects
1898 Spain was forced to so cede Philippines to United States.
principle of international law - change in sovereignity would have no
effect on civil laws
Article IX of treaty - civil rights and political status of native
inhabitants would be determined by its Congress
Upon ratification of treaty, and pending legislation by United States
Congress, native inhabitants of Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects.
o did not become American citizens,
o ceased to be "aliens" under American laws
o issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
Philippine Bill of 1902 or Philippine Organic Act of 19022
citizen of the Philippines
o one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines,
o native-born inhabitant,
o inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
o inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April
1899


o and a Spanish subject on the 11
th
day of April 1899.
Controversy as status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July
o no citizenship law was extant
principle of jus soli governed
Amendment of the Philippine Bill of 1902
23 March 1912, Congress of United States amended Philippine Bill
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by natives of Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, natives of other
insular possession of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of United
States, under laws of the United States, if residing therein
1916 Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Laws
a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen
of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was
o 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899,
o 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and,
o 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
1935 Constitution8: Jus Sanguinis or Blood Relationship as basis of Filipino
Citizenship
Section 1, Article III The following are citizens of the Philippines
o (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, women
would automatically lose Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands
o resulted in discriminatory situations
o effectively incapacitated women from transmitting their
Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children
o required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
1973 Constitution Curative Change9

8 Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
o (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
o (2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
o (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
o (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
o (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
9 Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
o (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
o (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
o (3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
o (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
main change (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines
Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
o "A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien
retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her
citizenship."
1987 Constitution
generally adopted provisions of the 1973 Constitution
main change:
o (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
o (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
aimed to correct irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Four Modes of Aquiring Citizenship
naturalization
jus soli
res judicata
jus sanguinis
o Onlyjus soli and jus sanguinis, qualifies a person as natural
born.

Citizenship of Philippine President
Constitution10 provides that a President must be a natural born
citizen of the Philippines.
o "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship

10 Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution"No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."

ABS-CBN V. COMELEC

DOMINGO V COMELEC (30 AUG 1999)
ERNESTO BIBOT A. DOMINGO, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and BENJAMIN BENHUR D. ABALOS, JR., respondents.
EMERGENCY: Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc
Resolution of the COMELEC and the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division,
which dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for disqualification filed by
DOMINGO against BENHUR ABALOS, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong
City. In May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private
respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. (BENHUR) were both mayoralty
candidates of Mandaluyong City. After BENHURS proclamation, Domingo
filed the instant petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the
campaign period, BENHUR prodded his father, then incumbent Mandaluyong
City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr., to give substantial allowances to public
school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members of the Boards of
Election Inspector (BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.
DOMINGOs allegations obtain from the Pasyal-Aral outing for Mandaluyong
City public school teachers, then Mayor Abalos, Sr. announcing that the
teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given substantial allowances.
DOMINGO alleged that it was done so as to influence them into voting for him
(Benhur) and ensuring his victory. DOMINGO presented as evidence
photographs and of the said activity, affidavits of 3 public school teachers, and
videotapes showing Mayor Abalos Sr. announcing Benhur as the one
responsible for such release.
DOMINGO alleges that BENHURs act of prodding his father constitutes a
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent provisions
of which read:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or
found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; . . . shall be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. . . .

In dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and
lack of merit, the COMELEC 1st Division admonished DOMINGO and his counsel
for attempting to mislead the COMELEC by making false and untruthful
statements in his petition.
On reconsideration, the COMELEC, En Banc, affirmed the findings and
conclusions of its 1st Division.
ISSUES:
1. Did Mayor Abalos Jr. violate Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code? NO
VIOLATION
2. Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion in its act of dismissing
the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence, despite the
overwhelming pieces of evidence of DOMINGO, consisting of the video
cassette, pictures and affidavits, which were not denied by BENHUR and
presented no evidence to substantiate his defense? NO GADLEJ
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions
dismissing the petition and affirming the proclamation of BENHUR Benjamin
Abalos, Jr. as duly elected mayor of Mandaluyong City, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Nothing in the affidavits suggests knowledge on any degree of participation of
BENHUR in the grant of these allowances. The name of BENHUR was not even
mentioned or alluded to by any of the three affiants. The videotapes did not
prove his participation therein either. The burden of proving that BENHUR
indirectly influenced the public school teachers of Mandaluyong City, through
his father, Abalos, Sr., was a burden that DOMINGO failed to meet. Neither is
this burden overcome by the argument that BENHUR, for himself, had no
evidence to rebut DOMINGOs allegations, since the burden of proving factual
claims rests on the party raising them
Besides, it is not true that BENHUR gave only denials and did not present any
evidence to his defense. Benhur presented in evidence a certified true copy of
Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1998, issued by the DECS, DBM and DILG, which
authorized the payment of allowances of public school teachers chargeable to
local government funds. The Joint Circular provided the basis for BENHURs
argument that the disbursement of funds by then mayor Abalos, Sr. was valid as
having been made pursuant to administrative circular, and was not an unlawful
attempt made in conspiracy with BENHUR to secure the latters victory in the
elections.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs decision to
dismiss the petition for disqualification. The conclusion that DOMINGOs
evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of the
evidence at hand, especially of the videotapes of DOMINGO.
COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS: Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc
Resolution of the COMELEC, dated December 1, 1998, and the Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, dated July 2, 1998, in SPA No. 98-361, which
dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for disqualification filed against herein
BENHUR ABALOS, JR. , the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City.
1. 11 May 1998 elections: Ernesto Domingo, Jr. (DOMINGO) and BENHUR
ABALOS, JR. were both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City.
2. After BENHUR ABALOS, JR.s proclamation, DOMINGO filed the instant
petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the campaign
period, BENHUR ABALOS, JR. prodded his father, then incumbent
Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr., to give substantial
allowances to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and
members of the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) for
Mandaluyong City.
3. DOMINGOs allegations:
a. obtain from an incident on April 14, 1998, wherein, in a Pasyal-
Aral outing for Mandaluyong City public school teachers in
Sariaya, Quezon, then Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. announced
that the teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given a
i. hazard pay of P1,000.00 and
ii. food allowance of P500.00,
iii. in addition to the allowance of P1,500.00.
b. DOMINGO charged that BENHUR ABALOS, JR.s influence over his
father on this matter was evident from the following declaration of
father Abalos, Sr.:

Your President [referring to Mr. Alfredo de Vera, President of the
Federation of Mandaluyong Public School Teachers], together with
Benhur, walang tigil yan kakapunta sa akin at not because he is
my son siya ang nakikipag-usap sa kanila and came up with a
beautiful compromise. xxx
As alleged by DOMINGO, the foregoing statement was revealing of
how BENHUR ABALOS, JR. prodded his father, then Mayor
Abalos, Sr., to award substantial allowances to the public school
teachers who will assume seats in the BEIs in the May 11, 1998
elections, as to influence them into voting for him and
ensuring his victory.
4. Mayor Abalos, Sr.s speech, as well, as other activities in the aforesaid
Pasyal-Aral outing, were recorded on videotape per instructions of Mr.
Perfecto Doroja, an associate of DOMINGO. In addition to the videotape,
DOMINGO also submitted photographs of a streamer, hung at the
entrance of the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort, Sariaya, Quezon, declaring
Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. as co-sponsor of the Pasyal-Aral, as
well as affidavits of three public school teachers who participated in the
said activity.
5. DOMINGO alleges that BENHUR ABALOS, JR.s act of prodding his father,
to give substantial allowances to the Mandaluyong City public school
teachers constitutes a violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration
to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if
he has been elected, from holding the office. Xxx
6. COMELEC FIRST DIVISION RULING: In dismissing the petition for
disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the
COMELEC First Division admonished DOMINGO and his counsel for
attempting to mislead the COMELEC by making false and untruthful
statements in his petition.
7. COMELEC EN BANC: Affirmed the findings and conclusions of its First
Division, on reconsideration.
8. DOMINGOS CONTENTION: DOMINGO assails the Resolutions of public
respondent COMELEC for being violative of his right to due process, and
thus, issued with grave abuse of discretion.
a. It is DOMINGOs argument that the dismissal of his petition for
disqualification on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was
unfounded, considering that no hearing on the merits was
conducted by public respondent on the matter.
b. DOMINGO next contends that grave abuse of discretion was
likewise attendant in public respondents act of dismissing the
petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence, despite
the overwhelming pieces of evidence of DOMINGO,
consisting of the video cassette, pictures and affidavits, which
were not denied by BENHUR ABALOS, JR. DOMINGO further
decries the fact that BENHUR ABALOS, JR. presented no evidence
to substantiate his defense, while all the pieces of evidence that he
submitted in his petition for disqualification were strong enough
to prove violation by BENHUR ABALOS, JR. of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON DOMINGO COMMITTED FORUM SHOPPING?
NO

It is not disputed that, in addition to the petition for disqualification,
DOMINGO also filed a criminal complaint and an election protest ex
abundante cautelam with public respondent COMELEC. BENHUR
ABALOS, JR. contends that, inasmuch as the petition for disqualification
and the complaint for election offense involve the same issues and charges,
i.e., vote-buying, exerting undue influence on BEI members, DOMINGO
should be held liable for forum-shopping.
We rule to the contrary. Forum-shopping exists when the DOMINGO files
multiple petitions or complaints involving the same issues in two or more
tribunals or agencies. The issues in the two cases are different.
o The complaint for election offense is a criminal case which
involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused
candidate and, like any other criminal case, requires a conviction
on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
o A petition for disqualification, meanwhile, requires merely
the determination of whether the respondent committed acts
as to merit his disqualification from office, and is done
through an administrative proceeding which is summary in
character and requires only a clear preponderance of
evidence.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON THE PETITION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME? YES
Next, DOMINGO admits receiving a copy of the assailed COMELEC First
Division Resolution on July 13, 1998. He also admits filing a motion for
reconsideration of the said COMELEC First Division Resolution on July 20,
1998. A copy of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated
December 1, 1998 was received by DOMINGO on December 4, 1998. Under
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitions for certiorari
from orders or rulings of the COMELEC shall be filed within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of the said
judgment or final order or resolution xxx shall interrupt the period herein
fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days
in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
Section 4 of Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure likewise provides:
Effect of motion for reconsideration on period to appeal. A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro-forma, suspends
the running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Inasmuch as the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the 30-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari with this Court, DOMINGO
has effectively consumed seven days of the abovestated 30-day period when he
filed his motion for reconsideration. Thus, as correctly pointed out by BENHUR
ABALOS, JR., when DOMINGO received a copy of the assailed COMELEC En Banc
Resolution, he only had 23 days from December 4, 1998, the date when he
received the COMELEC En Banc Resolution, or until December 27, 1998, to file
the instant petition for certiorari. This petition was filed on January 4, 1999.
In any event, whether the petition was filed on time or not, an examination of
the records leaves us satisfied that public respondent COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification.
MERITS: WON DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED BECAUSE NO HEARING WAS
CONDUCTED? NO
First, on the issue of due process, we find no violation thereof when public
respondent COMELEC decided to dismiss the petition for disqualification
without hearing. Well-established is the rule that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard. In Zaldivar vs.
Sandiganbayan, cited in the recent case of Bautista vs. COMELEC, we held
that the right to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal
arguments in court. A party may also be heard through his pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard is accorded, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Furthermore, the filing by DOMINGO of a motion for reconsideration
accorded him ample opportunity to dispute the findings of the COMELEC
First Division, so that he was as fully heard as he might have been had oral
arguments actually taken place. Deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard in his
motion for reconsideration.
MERITS (IMPORTANT): WON THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT
BENHUR ABALOS VIOLATED SEC 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE? NO
DOMINGO re-asserts before us the sufficiency of his evidence to prove that
BENHUR ABALOS, JR. influenced the Mandaluyong City public school
teachers, through his father, Abalos, Sr., in the performance of their
functions as members of the BEIs.
DOMINGOs evidence fails to persuade.
First, the affidavits of the three teachers who participated in the
controversial Pasyal-Aral do not contain anything but the following bare
declarations: (1) that they heard Abalos, Sr. promise that he will give
hazard pay of P1,000.00 and food allowance of P500.00, in addition to
the regular living allowance of P1,500.00, and (2) that, before the May
11, 1998 elections they each received P1,500.00, or half of the total
allowances promised by Abalos, Sr. in his speech.
Nothing in these affidavits suggests, let alone sets out, knowledge on any
degree of participation of BENHUR ABALOS, JR. in the grant of these
allowances. The name of BENHUR ABALOS, JR. was not even mentioned or
alluded to by any of the three affiants.
DOMINGO also submitted photographs taken of the streamer at the
entrance of the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort, welcoming the participants to
the Pasyal-Aral and declaring the Mandaluyong City School Board and
then mayor Abalos, Sr. as co-sponsors of the affair. Since by law, the
mayor is a co-chairman of the City School Board, we find nothing
unusual in his having co-sponsored the said event. We fail to see the
connection between these pictures and the alleged influence wielded by
BENHUR ABALOS, JR. on the public school teachers of Mandaluyong City.
Yet it is upon the videotape recordings that DOMINGO lays much reliance
on, in proving his case for disqualification. The recordings are supposed
to document how former mayor Abalos, Sr. announced that his son,
BENHUR ABALOS, JR. herein, prodded his father to release substantial
allowances to teachers who will act as members of the BEIs.
o As found by the COMELEC First Division, the name uttered in
the announcement was not Benhur, BENHUR ABALOS, JR.s
nickname and what DOMINGO alleged was uttered, but Lito
Motivo, a name which truly sounded unlike Benhur.
o Also, when the COMELEC, through its First Division, viewed the
videotape submitted by DOMINGO, the speech of Mayor Abalos,
Sr. was cut and so (they) also did not see and hear that part of
Mayor Abalos, Sr.s speech allegedly uttered by him.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs finding that Abalos,
Sr.s controversial statement, effectively reduced to this:

Your President, together with Lito Motivo, walang tigil yan kakapunta sa
akin at not because he is my son siya ang nakikipag-usap sa kanila and
came up with a beautiful compromise. xxx

was seriously insufficient and vague to prove violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

The burden of proving that BENHUR ABALOS, JR. indirectly influenced
the public school teachers of Mandaluyong City, through his father,
Abalos, Sr., was a burden that DOMINGO failed to meet.
Neither is this burden overcome by the argument that BENHUR
ABALOS, JR., for himself, had no evidence to rebut DOMINGOs
allegations, since the burden of proving factual claims rests on the
party raising them.
Besides, it is not true that BENHUR ABALOS, JR. gave only denials and
did not present any evidence to his defense, or to offer an explanation
for his fathers actions, which were assailed as having been influenced by
him.
o BENHUR ABALOS, JR. presented in evidence a certified true
copy of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1998, issued by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Department of
Budget and Management and Department of Interior and Local
Government, which authorized the payment of allowances of
public school teachers chargeable to local government funds.
o The Joint Circular provided the basis for BENHUR ABALOS,
JR.s argument that the disbursement of funds by then mayor
Abalos, Sr. was valid as having been made pursuant to
administrative circular, and was not an unlawful attempt
made in conspiracy with BENHUR ABALOS, JR. to secure the
latters victory in the elections.
MERITS: WON COMELEC COMMITTED GADLEJ? NO
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs decision to
dismiss the petition for disqualification. The conclusion that DOMINGOs
evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of
the evidence at hand, especially of the videotapes of DOMINGO. This is
clearly evident from the discussion of the COMELEC First Division, in the
Resolution dated July 2, 1998, which quoted extensively from the pleadings
and evidence of DOMINGOs, and provided adequate explanation for why it
considered DOMINGOs evidence insufficient and unconvincing.
Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness,
fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, the Court may not
review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on
the sufficiency of evidence.
Finally, the foregoing conclusion is without prejudice to the election
protest and election offense cases involving the same parties pending with
public respondent COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions
dated July 2, 1998 and December 1, 1998, dismissing the petition for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, and affirming the proclamation of
BENHUR ABALOS, JR. Benjamin Abalos, Jr. as duly elected mayor of
Mandaluyong City, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
CAASI V. COMELEC
Facts:
Merito Miguel is the mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. There are two cases from
Caasi and Cascante which seek to disqualify him on account of him being a
green card holder.
Miguel admits that he holds a green card but he explained that the green card is
only for convenience when he goes to the US during his medical exams and
when he visits his children. He also alleged that he is a permanent resident of
Bolinao, and in fact, even voted in previous elections.
The COMELEC dismissed the petitions saying that the green card does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On
the contrary, Miguel has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously
reside in Bolinao by having voted in successive elections in said municipality.
Issue: W/no the Green Card disqualifies Miguel from running for the Mayoralty
position.
Held: Yes, it does.
In view of rumors that a good number of officials in the Aquino administration
are green cards holders, this is a question that excites much interest.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
However, the above is not applicable for he acquired the status of an
immigrant before he was elected not "during his tenure" as mayor.
The law applicable to him is the Omnibus Election Code which provides that:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
To be qualified to run for elective office the green card holder must first "waive
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Filing a
certificate of candidacy, does not of itself constitute a waiver. Waiver should be
manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any
elective office.
Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding citizens who
possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege of
being elected as public officials for its citizens who "without mental
reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are
resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties
here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents
thereof.
In the Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration which Miguel
filled up in his own handwriting, Miguel's answer to the question regarding his
"Length of intended stay" was "Permanently."
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in
the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should
be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made
an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to
the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao, our
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his
election thereto was null and void.

CODILLA V. DE VENECI A

REPUBLIC V. DELA ROSA

TRINIDAD V. COMELEC

NOLASCO V. COMELEC