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- Totality and infinity, p 36

- Does this mean that the identity of the I comes from its accommodation of the other?


- TI 36
- Only as I.


- The I is even an Other to itself; perhaps suggesting a stepping away from itself
But,

CLARIFY THIS ^^^ (TI 36-38)




-Perhaps the intention of stepping away is an act of the same?



TI 38, levinas speaks of heideggerian conception of reducing the other; the concept of sojourn and at home
reduces alterity.

At home- possession- egoism

Is it possible then to talk about the Other? The mere fact that we are dealing with it, is perhaps a mode if
reducing it. As levinas puts it: TI 38


Read page 38-39 paragraph, very important.
Page 39, language is cited.

^ part only.
So for Levinas, conversation takes the notion of accommodating the other, precisely because it is only trhough
conversation that the I can open up to the other. On the other hand, I can see that he is still not opening the
problem about language itself, which would be addressed by Derrida, and answered by Levinas on his
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence

Transcendence is not Negativity :

-TI page 41

-TI 41.
- Here Levinas discusses that the idea of perfection is the idea of infinity. He also took note of the relation to
the Other, that needs further research to describe its whole relation.


Metaphysics precedes Ontology
Im not able to digest everything that has been cited in here. What my judgment yields is Levinas
attack on Heideggerian ontology that is guilty in reducing the other. As Levinas states in page 42:

Ontology promotes freedom, but here he renounces the metaphysical Desire- we must allow ourselves
to be alienated by the other.

-Ask trina about this.




The word Ethics- which resembles the way the same is being criticized by the means of the Other- is
brought out for the first time. As Levinas continues in page 42,




When it comes to freedom, it seems to me that what levinas means in his TI about freedom is that it represents
the way we are not affected by the things outside us, through our use of reason, perhaps.

Thus, there is a refusal to accommodate the Other fully, for we are not moved by the other entirely; there is a
primacy of the same over the other. Freedom and Cognition are complementary- it negates alterity.
As Levinas continues, he also cites illumination. Perhaps it is a metaphor for cognition?



- Betrayal- when we thought that the Other surrendered itself already. When we settled, when we took
hold of the reduced idea of the Other that is in fact misleading.




Philosophy is an egology. So, is he against scorates?


Page 44, lapse (Berkeley, existents blabla). Ask trina.
Continuing, there comes the idea of justice, which is then contradictory to the idea of freedom. It seems to me
that justice here applies to how an I responds to an Other. Plus, in this section Levinas is attacking Heideggerian
Ontology, again.:


As he continues, I find the relation of this terms freedom-cognition-thematization-reducing of the other to the
same.

45




Now Levinas unveils the hidden idea of Power in Heideggerian Ontology- Possession. TI 46


46-47







Transcendence as the idea of infinity:
Ask trina about this. Di ko maintindihan. Review the relation with Descartes.

49
^ infinity, transcendence, separation, distance
Levinas describing the distance:
.49
Is he affirming cartesian notions?



What does this mean?

50


Whats disinterested-goodness?

50-51 Other, face discussion.
Also, conversation:


50-52
Other, history, infinity.

B. Separation and Discourse

I dont get this. positive movement? synoptic gaze. Anti thetica;. Nonintegrateable.
This seems important :


Psychism, a paradox. Way of cogito? Thinking? Intentional reflecting to breach totality?


Clarify 54-56
His conclusion: the ontological separation between the metaphysician and the metaphysical


Ti 56. Paradoxical. Detachment.

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