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Viajar v. CA

Fac t s : The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of Lot
7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan,
Pototan, Iloilo (154,267 sq. ms., TCT T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo). Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a
parcel of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pototan. On 6 September 1973, Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his
wife, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A
Torrens title was later issued in the latters names. Later, Angelica Viajar had
Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of
Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido
refused. The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan,
Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 sq.ms.; that at the time of the cadastral
survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River;
that the area of 11,819 sq.ms of what was Lot 7340 has been in the
possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly
the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been
in the possession of Ladrido; and that the Viajars have never been in actual
physical possession of Lot 7340.
On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action
for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido (Civil
Case 9660) with the CFI Iloilo. Summoned to plead, Ladrido filed his answer
with a counterclaim. The Viajars filed their reply to the answer.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo Te as
another defendant. The Viajars sought the annulment of the deed of sale and
the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event the possession
of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Te filed his answer to the amended
complaint and he counterclaimed for damages. The Viajars answered the
counterclaim. During the pendency of the case, Celso Viajar sold his rights
over Lot 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this
reason, Angelica F. Viajar appears to be the sole registered owner of the lot.
On 25 May 1978, Ricardo Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil
action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes
Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties
defendants. After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which
included damages was admitted. On 10 December 1981, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of
Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs against them, declaring Leonor P.
Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P.
Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in the
sketch plan situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan, Pototan,
Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 sq.ms., and pronouncing that as
owners of the land, the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof.
Not satisfied with the decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo on
29 December 1986 (CA-GR CV 69942). The Viajars filed a petition for
review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs.
1. Accretion belongs to riparian owners Article 457 of the New Civil
Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters."
2. Change in the course of the river gradual The presumption is that the
change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and
erosion (Martinez Caas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate
Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil.
133). In the present case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence
introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of the
Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear
and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many
years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took
place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial
deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to
Lot 7511 (Lot A: 14,036 sq.ms., Lot B, 11,819 sq.ms. and Lot C, which is
not in litigation, 4,057 sq.ms). The established facts indicate that the eastern
boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For
a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually
received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The
consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was
possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same
with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion
through the years. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the
ground of any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the
banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks.
(Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on 30
August 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to
Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.
3. Finding of facts by lower court conclusive upon Supreme Court The
trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was
gradual and this finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court found no valid reason to disturb the finding of fact.
4. Section 45 and 46 of Act 496, Land Registration Act Section 45 of Act
496 provides that the obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a
certificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land,
and binding upon the applicant and all successors in title that the land shall
be and always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this
Act and all Acts amendatory thereof." Section 46 of the same act provides
that No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."
5. Registration does not protect riparian owner against diminution of
the area of registered land; Interpretation of Article 366 of the Civil
Code with the Land Registration Act / Torrens System The rule that
registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual
changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. In Payatas Estate
Improvement Co. vs. Tuason (53 Phil. 55), it was ruled that Article 366 of
the Civil Code provides that any accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of the
estates bordering thereon. Accretions of that character are natural incidents
to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration
laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of
the adjoining stream. Similarly in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia (109 Phil. 133), it
was ruled that if the land in question has become part of ones estate as a
result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact
that the accretion to his land used to pertain to another's estate, which is
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude the former from
being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the
owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).
Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams
and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the
Registration Act.
6. No damages recoverable from Ladridos As the Ladridos are the
owners of the premises in question, no damages are recoverable from them.


Agustin v. IAC

Fac t s : The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and
Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. In 1919 the lands east of
the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, OCT 5472 was
issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by Eulogio Agustin. As the
years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt
on the western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued
until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana
Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre
were Pablo Binayug and Maria Melad. Binayug was in possession since 1947
of Lots 3349, 7875 to 7879, 7881 to 7885, 7891 and 7892. It is has an area of
8 hectares planted to tobacco and corn and another 12 hectares overgrown
with talahib. Binayug's Homestead Application W-79055 over this land was
approved in 1959 and his possession recognized in the decision in Civil Case
101. On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case 343-T, Macario Melad, the
predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued OCT
P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on 1 June 1956. Through the years, the
Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank
among which was Agustin's Lot 8457, depositing the alluvium as accretion
on the land possessed by Binayug on the western bank. However, in 1968,
after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919
bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo
Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands
were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate
those lots they had to cross the river. In April 1969, while the Melads,
Binayug, Urbina and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on
the eastern side of the Cagayan River, Agustin, the Heirs of Baldomero
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Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi, accompanied by the mayor and
some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and
drove away the Melads, Binayug and Urbina from the premises.
On 21 April 1970, Maria and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case
343-T) to recover Lot 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare
accretion. On 24 April 1970, Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil
Case 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions. On 16 June 1975, the
trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case 343-T, ordering Eulogio Agustin,
Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud, their representatives
or agents to vacate Lot 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its accretion
consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre
and to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who
are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad. The trial court likewise
ordered, in Civil Case 344-T, Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay,
Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang,
Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose
Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan
Langoay, their representatives or agents to vacate Lots 3349, 7875 to 7879,
7881 to 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore
possession to Pablo Binayug and Geronimo Urbina. Without
pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.
Eulogio Agustin appealed the decision in Civil Case 343-T, while Eulogio
Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and
Juan Langcay appealed the decision in Civil Case 344-T. But upon motion of
the Melads, Binayug and Urbina, the trial court ordered on 15 August 1975
the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case 344-T against
Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory
as they had not presented evidence at the trial. On 29 November 1983, the
Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
judgment of the trial court, with costs against the Agustin, Cagurangan,
Balisi and Langcay. Hence, the petition for review.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, and affirmed the
decision of the IAC, now CA; with costs against Agustin, et.al.
1. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeal conclusive with the Supreme
Court The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to
the lots of the Melads, Binauyg and Urbina who did not lose the ownership
of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by
the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is
conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters. (366)"
2. Conditions for accretion to benefit a riparian owner Accretion
benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place
is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514). In the
present case, the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had
been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was
gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot 3351, with an original area of 5
hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in
June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares
had been added to it. Lot 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in
June 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an
additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually
moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose
lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408;
Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806).
3. Reason for the principle of accretion benefiting a riparian owner The
reason for the principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed
to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if
by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of
easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the
owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of
accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).
4. Ownership of accretion not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of
the river The' ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of the river (Cagayan River in 1968
or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed), and separated or transferred
said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459
and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. Article 459 provides
that whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an
estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate,
the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the
ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years."
Article 463 provides that whenever the current of a river divides itself into
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the
land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated
from the estate by the current.


Binalay v. Manalo

Fac t s : The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in
Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated area of 20 hectares. The western
portion of this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower
than that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road.
Through the years, the western portion would periodically go under the
waters of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the coming of the
rains. The submerged portion, however, would re-appear during the dry
season from January to August. It would remain under water for the rest of
the year. On 9 May 1959, Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof
from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan Taccad (N: Francisco Forto,
E: National Road, S: Julian Tumolva, W: Cagayan River). In 1964, Manalo
purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio Taguba who had earlier
acquired the same from Judge Taccad (N: Balug Creek, S: Faustina Taccad
[now Manalo], E: Provincial Road, W: Cagayan river). On 21 October 1969,
during the rainy season, the two parcels of land were consolidated as one lot
during the cadastral survey at Balug, Tamauini, Isabela (Lot 307, 1.8 hectares
+ 2.9489 hectares of 8.65 hectares purchased; the other portion under water
was left unsurveyed).
The Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to
form two (2) branches the western and the eastern branches and then
unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The
eastern branch of the river cuts through the land of and is inundated with
water only during the rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the
submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the land belonging to Manalo. For
about 8 months of the year when the level of water at the point where the
Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not flow into
the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is
susceptible to cultivation. The elongated strip of land formed by the western
and the eastern branches of the Cagayan River looked very much like an
island. This strip of land was surveyed on 12 December 1969. It was found
to have a total area of 22.7209 hectares and was designated as Lot 821
(10.8122 hectares) and Lot 822 (11.9087).. Lot 821 is located directly
opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the latter only by the eastern branch
of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the dry season, by
the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina
Taccad. Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion
to the submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent.
Binalay, et.al., other hand, who are in possession of Lot 821 insist that they
own Lot 821. They occupy the outer edges of Lot 821 along the river banks,
i.e., the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural
products. They also cultivate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion
during summer. This situation compelled Manalo to file a case for forcible
entry against petitioners on 20 May 1969. The case was dismissed by the
Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela for failure of both parties to appear.
On 15 December 1972, Manalo again filed a case for forcible entry against
petitioners. The latter case was similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
the Municipal Court of Tumauini, Isabela.
On 24 July 1974, Manalo filed a complaint before the then CFI Isabela,
Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners. He
prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners to vacate the western
strip of the unsurveyed portion, and prayed that judgment be entered
declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the
survey. On 10 November 1982, the trial court rendered a decision declaring
Manalo as the lawful owner of Lot 821 and ordering Binalay, et.al. to vacate
the premises of Lot 821 and restraining them further from entering said
premises; without pronouncement as to costs. Binalay, et.al. appealed to the
Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.
They filed a motion for reconsideration, without success. In effect, both
courts rejected the assertion that the depression on the earth's surface which
separates Lot 307 and Lot 821 is, during part of the year, the bed of the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV 04892, declared Manalo as the owner of Lot 307, and declared that the
regularly submerged portion or the eastern bed of the Cagayan River to be
property of public dominion. The Court also declared that the ownership of
Lot 821 shall be determined in an appropriate action that may be instituted
by the interested parties inter se; without pronouncement as to costs.
1. Finding of facts by lower courts entitled to great respect; Whether
the conclusion reached thereafter is correct is a question of law It is a
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familiar rule that the findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great
respect, and that they carry even more weight when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. This is in recognition of the peculiar advantage on the part of the
trial court of being able to observe first-hand the deportment of the
witnesses while testifying. Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of
Appeals is the final arbiter of questions of fact. But whether a conclusion
drawn from such findings of facts is correct, is a question of law cognizable
by the Supreme Court. In the present case, the conclusion reached by both
courts below apparently collides with their findings that periodically at the
onset of and during the rainy season, river water flows through the eastern
bed of the Cagayan River.
2. Government of the Philippine Islands v. Colegio de San Jose not
applicable to present case Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Colegio de San Jose is not applicable to the present case. That case involved
Laguna de Bay; since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the Court applied the legal
provisions governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and
shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the disputed
property. Specifically, the Court applied the definition of the natural bed or
basin of lakes found in Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866.
Upon the other hand; what is involved in the instant case is the eastern bed
of the Cagayan River.
3. Article 70 of the Law of Waters applicable, not Article 74 Article 70 of
the Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 is the law applicable to the present case.
Article 70 provides that the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the
ground covered by its waters during the highest floods". Article 70 defines
the natural bed or channel of a creek or river as the ground covered by its
waters during the highest floods. The highest floods in the eastern branch of
the Cagayan River occur with the annual coming of the rains as the river
waters in their onward course cover the entire depressed portion. The
conclusion of the Court that the depressed portion is a river bed rests upon
evidence of record. The description of the lot acquired from Taguba and the
other from Taccad refer to the dried up bed or the eastern branch of the
river as the Cagayan River serving as the western boundary in the Deeds of
Sale. Further, Manalo himself, during direct examination, depict the
depressed portion separating Lot 821 and Lot 307 as a river bed. The dike-
like slope of such depression, or such topographic feature, is compatible
with the fact that huge volume of water passes through the eastern bed
regularly during the rainy season. Even if there is no record of when the
Cagayan River began to carve its eastern channel, the bed already existed
even before the sale of the land to Manalo (with the bed being referred to as
old bed or even Rio Muerte de Cagayan).
4. Private ownership of the bed of a river cannot be acquired as the
land constituted property of public dominion; Article 420 applies to
existing beds, Article 462 applies to new beds in relation to Article 457
(Accretion) Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, Manalo did not
acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even
if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba
and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have validly sold
land that constituted property of public dominion. Article 420 of the Civil
Code states that (1) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (2) those which belong to
the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are property of public
dominion. Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a
composite term which includes: (1) the running waters, (2) the bed, and (3)
the banks. Manresa, in commenting upon Article 339 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889 from which Article 420 of the Philippine Civil Code was
taken, stressed the public ownership of river beds. Still, evven if it were
alleged and proved that the Cagayan River first began to encroach on his
property after the purchase from Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad;
Article 462 of the Civil Code would then apply divesting, by operation of
law, Manalo of private ownership over the new river bed.
5. Accretion, requisites Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under
Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of three (3) requisites:
(a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (b)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or
the sea coast). In the present case, the Court notes that the parcels of land
bought by Manalo border on the eastern branch of the Cagayan River. Any
accretion formed by this eastern branch which Manalo may claim must be
deposited on or attached to Lot 307. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821)
lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite
Lot 307 across the river.
6. Alluvial process is slow and gradual, not sudden and
forceful Assuming (arguendo only) that the Cagayan River referred to in the
Deeds of Sale transferring ownership of the land to Manalo is the western
branch, the decision of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court are bare
of factual findings to the effect that the land purchased by Manalo received
alluvium from the action of the river in a slow and gradual manner. On the
contrary, the flooding, that caused the land to reappear making it susceptible
to cultivation, is sudden and forceful action, and is hardly the alluvial process
contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow and hardly
perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants to the riparian
owner.
7. Size of land considered alluvium and topography of land negates
conclusion of increment It is important to note that Lot 821 has an area of
11.91 hectares. Lot 821 (11.91 hectares) is the northern portion of the strip
of land having a total area of 22.72 hectares. It is difficult to suppose that
such a sizable area as Lot 821 resulted from slow accretion to another lot of
almost equal size. The total landholding purchased by Manalo is 10.45
hectares, even smaller than Lot 821 which he claims by way of accretion.
Further, there are steep vertical dike-like slopes separating the depressed
portion or river bed and Lot 821 and Lot 307. This topography of the land,
among other things, precludes a reasonable conclusion that Lot 821 is an
increment to the depressed portion by reason of the slow and constant
action of the waters of either the western or the eastern branches of the
Cagayan River.
8. Quieting of title requires equitable title or interest in subject real
property Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in an action for
quieting of title must at least have equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. The evidence of record
on this point is less than satisfactory, such as that both parties claim adverse
possession of Lot 821 and both parties presenting tax declarations on the
subject land; thus the Court feels compelled to refrain from determining the
ownership and possession of Lot 821, adjudging neither petitioners nor
respondent Manalo as owner(s) thereof.


Republic v. CA (132 SCRA 514)

Fac t s : Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco
Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land
covered by TCT T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an application for the registration of
3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu-131892: Lot 1, 33837 sq.m.;
Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq. m.) On 5 April 1974, Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a
written opposition to the application for registration. On 6 March 1975, the
Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with
respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court. On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was ordered
withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect to
Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892. On 26 June 1976, the lower court
rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in
question are accretions to the Tancincos' fishponds covered by TCT 89709.
On 30 July 1976, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19
August 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the lower cost; without costs. Hence, the petition for certiorari to
set aside the decision of the CA.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the
decision appealed from, and ordered the private respondents to move back
the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed
property to the river to which it belongs.
1. Power to review vested in the Court; Binding effect of the findings
of facts by lower court not absolute The rule that the findings of fact of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits
of certain exceptions. The Court retains the power to review and rectify the
findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee (Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., 97
SCRA 734).
2. No accretion to speak of as the transfer of dikes is man-made and
artificial; Article 457 NCC There is no accretion to speak of under Article
457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the
private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed
of the Meycauayan Rivers, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is
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man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river. Article 457 of the New Civil Code
provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters."
3. Accretion, requisites Article 457 requires the concurrence of three
requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to
have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
4. Alluvion as exclusive work of nature indispensable The requirement
that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work
of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that
the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of
the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers; but there is evidence that
the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the
exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The
alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the
current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the
river and encroaching upon it.
5. Reason in giving riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner
the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him
for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If
estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced
by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions,
said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is
proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof
should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila,
10 Phil. 567). In the present case, the riparian owner does not acquire the
additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed
to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes
and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of
the river.
6. Adjudication of land in question as private property is null and
void The conclusion that can be made from said alleged accretion being
declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 is that areas could not have been
there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred
their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What private
respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation. Thus, the lower court cannot validly order
the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These
lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore
classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1
and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are
not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication
of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private
respondents is null and void.


Republic v. CA (131 SCRA 532)

Fac t s : A lot with an area of 17,311 sq.m. situated in Barrio Pinagbayanan,
Pila, Laguna and 20 meters from the shore of Laguna de Bay; was purchased
by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on 19 April 1909. The Deed of Sale
evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year
1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When
Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate
and the subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's
share in the inheritance. Santos del Rio filed his application for registration
of said parcel on 9 May 1966. The application was opposed by the Director
of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from
Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although
there was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had made
voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original
agreement, private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land
which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the
former in 1966. Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966,
private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales applications
with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rio's
application for registration. The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for
registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the
Court of Appeals, setting aside that of the trial court. The Director of Lands
and the private oppositors filed their respective Petitions for Review of said
decision.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment affirmed from, and ordered the
registration of the land described in the application in favor of Santos del
Rio, applicant private respondent; with costs against private petitioners.
1. Classification of property as either of public dominion or of private
ownership; Public lands / public dominion Property, which includes
parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of public dominion or
of private ownership. Public lands, or those of public dominion, have been
described as those which, under existing legislation are not the subject of
private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. The New Civil
Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502
thereof. Article 402 includes those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and those which belong
to the State without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" as property belonging
to public dominion. Article 502 adds "rivers and their natural beds;
continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their
natural beds and the beds themselves; waters rising continuously or
intermittently on lands of public dominion; and lakes and lagoons formed
by Nature on public lands and their beds; to the enumeration.
2. Extent of a lake bed The extent of a lake bed is defined in Artcile 74 of
the Law of Waters of 1866, as the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or
pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary
depth."
3. Highest Ordinary Depth in a lake; Determinant is rainfall and not
gravitational pull (tides) The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been
interpreted in the case of Government. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such
depth being the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of
the time during the year; or thus rain "falling directly on or flowing into
Laguna de Bay from different sources." While the waters of a lake are also
subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in
seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the
case of lakes. The alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an
ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of
the Laguna de Bay as observed 4-5 months a year during the rainy season;
rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the
land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the
submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period than the level of the
water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be considered as
the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. The land sought to be
registered, therefore, is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay.
4. Foreshore land defined; Definition does not apply to land adjacent
to lake Foreshore land is that part of (the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides; or the strip of land
that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide. In the present case, since the
inundation of a portion of the land near the lake is not due to flux and
reflux of tides, it thus cannot be considered a foreshore land within the
meaning cited by the Director of Lands.
5. Purpose of land registration under Torrens System The purpose of
land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but
only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land.
Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as a means of
acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over the parcel
of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a public
instrument of sale in favor of his father from whom he inherited said land.
6. Tax declaration strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription; also Open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the land Applicant presents tax declarations
covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts dating back to 1948. While
it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Further,
applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in open,
continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the
disputed land for more than 30 years, counted from 19 April 1909, when the
land was acquired from a third person by purchase. Since applicant has
possessed the subject parcel in the concept of owner with just title and in
good faith, his possession need only last for ten years in order for ordinary
acquisitive prescription to set in. Applicant has more than satisfied this legal
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requirement.
7. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title Even if the land sought to be
registered is public land, applicant would be entitled to a judicial
confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied the
requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141 as amended by RA 1942).
Section 48 of the Act enumerates as among the persons entitled to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, such as those who, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title."
8. Reclamation requires proper permission; reclaimed land does not
automatically belong to party reclaiming the same Private persons
cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to the
public domain without proper permission from government authorities. And
even if such reclamation had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not
automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as they may still be
subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. In the present case,
private oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged
reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.
9. Tolerance of possession cannot ripen into ownership As the private
oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the
permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio; the fact that some of
them at one time or another did not pay rent. Their use of the land and their
non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant and these
could not have affected the character of the latter's possession which has
already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this application for
registration. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner
can serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription.


Grande v. CA

Fac t s : Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande are the owners of a
parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it
from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land
appears registered, as shown by OCT 2982, issued on 9 June 1934). Said
property is identified as Lot 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for
purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was
the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for
many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took
place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by
1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from
its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964
hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area.
On 25 January 1958, the Grandes instituted an action in the CFI Isabela
against Domingo and Esteban Calalung to quiet title to said portion (19,964
square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (Civil Case
1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful
and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when the
Calalungs entered upon the land under claim of ownership. The Grandes
also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as
well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer, dated 18 February 1958, the
Calalungs claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in
continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to
the year 1933 to the present. After trial, the CFI Isabela, on 4 May 1959,
rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to
the Grandes, and ordering the Calalungs to vacate the premises and deliver
possession thereof to the Grandes, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as
damages and costs.
Unsatisfied, the Calalungs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered, on 14 September 1960, a decision (CA-GR 25169-R) reversing that
of the CFI Isabela, and dismissing the Grandes' action against the Calalungs,
to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied
by the latter without the Grandes' consent. Thus, the appeal by the Grandes
to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with
costs against the Grandes.
1. Alluvium belongs to riparian owner By law, unless some superior title
has supervened, alluvium should properly belong to the riparian owners,
specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that to the owner of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the water. The area in
controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvion, which
started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence
for both parties. There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the
new Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, the Grandes are the lawful
owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
to which it adjoins.
2. Accretion to registered land does not ipso jure becomes entitled to
the protection of the rule of imprescriptability of title under Land
Registration Act An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific
provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural
accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of
the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act.
Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the
certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would
virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given
therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the
land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative
manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. vs. Tuason,
53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by
the Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the
provisions of the Civil Code on accession; and these provisions do not
preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person through
prescription. (See Galindez, et al. vs. Baguisa, et al., CA-GR 19249-R, 17 July
1959).
3. Ownership of a piece of land and registration under Torrens system
are different; Imprescriptibility of registered land under land
registration law; Accretion not registered subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons Accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a
Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible; just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land
does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a
piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that
ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the
land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land,
but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the
owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
The fact remains that the Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial
property (which was formed sometime after the Grandes' property covered
by OCT 2982 was registered on 9 June 1934) up to the time they instituted
the action in the CFI Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never
became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the
protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the
Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
4. Calalungs in possession of land since 1934, not 1948 Domingo
Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first time in
1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the Grandes. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for
purposes of taxation, the tax declaration of which was superseded in 1948 by
another, after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed
from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two
witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age,
who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms (recollection of
the Calalungs peaceful possession since 1940 or 1941), and Vicente C.
Bacani (Calalungs' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area
thereof was then less than one hectare). The testimony of the said witnesses
entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of Pedro Grande and
his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez.
5. Grandes relinquished possession of lot occupied by the
Calalungs The Grandes did not file an action until 1958, because it was only
then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor,
Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for
taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. The excuse they gave for not
immediately taken steps to recover possession of the lot was that they did
not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958
for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan. When the
Calalungs had their land surveyed in April 1958, Pedro Grande tried to stop
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it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and for the other
Grandes, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered
by their title. Thus, the Grandes relinquished their possession to the part
thus included, containing an area of some 458 sq. ms.
6. Finding of Court of Appeals conclusive; Prescription supervened in
favor of Calalungs The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the
evidence, was convinced that the Calalungs were really in possession openly,
continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership since 1933 or 1934,
immediately after the process of alluvion started up to the filing of the action
in 1958; and that the Grandes woke up to their rights only when they
received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the Calalungs. This finding of the existence of
these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the
evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.
7. Applicable law on prescription: Act 190 not Civil Code, since
possession started in 1933 or 1934 The law on prescription applicable to
the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code,
since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of
the Old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code in 1950. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the
Calalungs acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
accordance with law.


Reynante v. CA

Fac t s : More than 50 years ago, Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late
Don Cosme Carlos, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan with an area of 188.711 sq. m. (TCT 25618, Land Registry of
Bulacan). During the tenancy, Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and
his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on
lots 1 and 2 covering an area of 5,096 sq. m. and 6,011 sq. m. respectively.
These lots are located between the fishpond covered by TCT 25618 and the
Liputan (formerly Meycauayan) River. Reynante harvested and sold said nipa
palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the
late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the
fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own. After the death of
Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs entered into a written agreement denominated
as Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan dated 29 November
1984 with Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum
of P200,000 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don
Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker or "bantay-
kasama at tagapamahala. Pursuant to the said written agreement, Reynante
surrendered the fishpond and the 2 huts located therein to the heirs of Don
Cosme Carlos. The heirs of Leoncio and Dolores Carlos, and the heirs of
Gorgonio and Concepcion Carlos thereafter leased the said fishpond to one
Carlos de la Cruz. Reynante continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by
him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted
therein. On 17 February 1988, the heirs formally demanded that Reynante
vacate said portion since the latter had already been indemnified for the
surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, Reynante refused
and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2.
On 22 April 1988, the heirs filed a complaint for forcible entry with
preliminary mandatory injunction against Reynante with the MTC
Meycauayan Bulacan (Branch 1, 3rd Judicial Region, Civil Case 1526)
alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the
physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of
the kubos or huts bordering the Liputan River and cutting off and/or
disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto. On 10 January 1989,
the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and finding that
Reynante had been in prior possession of lots 1 and 2.
The heirs appealed to the RTC Malolos Bulacan (Branch 8, 3rd Judicial
Region) and on 8 August 1989 it rendered its decision in favor of the heirs,
and reversed the decision of the lower court. The Court ordered Reynante to
restore possession of the piece of land, together with the sasa or nipa palms
planted theron; without pronouncement as to attorney's fees, and each party
bearing their respective costs of the suit.
From said decision, Reynante filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review. On 28 February 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
(CA-GR 19171), affirming the decision of the lower court in toto, and thus
denied the petition seeking to issue a restraining order. On 5 November
1990, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Reynante. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 February 1990 and reinstated the decision of the MTC
Meycauayan, Bulacan (Branch I).
1. Action for forcible entry An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and actual title of the property is never determined. A party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in
his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria (German Management &
Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177
SCRA 495, 498, 499). On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior
physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer
even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil.
469 [1942]). In the present case, the Court of Appeals could not legally
restore the heirs' possession over lots 1 and 2 simply because Reynante has
clearly proven that he had prior possession over lots 1 and 2.
2. Reynante in prior possession Reynante was in possession of the
questioned lots for more than 50 years. He was the caretaker of the fishpond
owned by the late Don Cosme Carlos for more than 50 years and that he
constructed a nipa hut adjacent to the fishpond and planted nipa palms
therein. This fact is bolstered by the "Sinumpaang Salaysay " executed by
Epifanio Lucero, Apolonio D. Morte, and Carling Dumalay, all of whom are
disinterested parties with no motive to falsify that can be attributed to them,
except their desire to tell the truth. Moreover, an occular inspection was
conducted by the trial court dated 2 December 1988 which was attended by
the parties and their respective counsels. The court observed that the
controversial premises is beyond the titled property of the plaintiffs but
situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it being a part of the public
domain. On the other hand, the heirs based their claim of possession over
lots 1 and 2 simply on the written agreement signed by petitioner whereby
the latter surrendered his rights over the fishpond. There is nothing,
however, on the document that the tenant was giving other matters not
mentioned in the document. Neither was there any mention of the hut and
nipa palms for such to be included in the subsequent least to de la Cruz, a a
circumstance that gives the impression that said hut and palms do not
belong to the heirs.
3. Disputed lands not included in TCT 25618 The disputed lots involved
in the present case are not included in TCT 25618 as per verification made
by the Forest Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. That tract of land situated at Barrio Liputan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan containing an area of 1.1107 hectares as described in
the plan prepared and surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Restituto Buan for
Reynante falls within Alienable and Disposable Land (for fishpond
development) under Project 15 per B.F.L.C. Map 3122 dated 8 May 1987.
4. Requisites of accretion Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the
following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water;
and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a
river (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61647, October 12, 1984,
132 SCRA 514, cited in Agustin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos.
66075-76, July 5, 1990, 187 SCRA 218).
5. Accretion does not automatically become registered land Granting
without conceding that lots 1 and 2 were created by alluvial formation and
while it is true that accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually
receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owner of
the banks (Article 457), such accretion to registered land does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through prescription. In
Ignacio Grande, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. (GR L-17652, 30 June
1962, 115 Phil. 521) it was held that "an accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided
in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and
Cadastral Act does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and,
thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection,
the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein
certain judicial procedures have been provided." In the present case,
assuming that the heirs had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question),
by accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of 50
years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.



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Ronquillo v. CA

Fac t s : Rosendo del Rosario was a registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, situated at Sampaloc, Manila
and covered by TCT 34797 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Florencia
and Amparo del Rosario were daughters of said Rosendo del Rosario.
Adjoining said lot is a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub occupied
by Mario C. Ronquillo since 1945. Both del Rosario and Ronquillo have filed
with the Bureau of Lands miscellaneous sales application for the purchase of
the abandoned river bed known as Estero Calubcub and their sales
applications, dated 5 August 1958 and 13 October 1959, respectively, are still
pending action before the Bureau of Lands. Del Rosario claims that long
before 1930, when TCT 34797 over Lot 34 was issued in the name of
Rosendo del Rosario, the latter had been in possession of said lot including
the adjoining dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub, having bought
the same from Arsenio Arzaga. Sometime in 1935, said titled lot was
occupied by Isabel Roldan with the tolerance and consent of del Rosario on
condition that the former will make improvements on the adjoining dried-up
portion of the Estero Calubcub. In the early part of 1945 defendant
occupied the eastern portion of said titled lot as well as the dried-up portion
of the old Estero Calubcub which abuts del Rosario's titled lot. After a
relocation survey of the land in question sometime in 1960, del Rosario
learned that Ronquillo was occupying a portion of their land and thus
demanded Ronquillo to vacate said land when the latter refused to pay the
reasonable rent for its occupancy. However, despite said demand Ronquillo
refused to vacate. On the other hand, Ronquillo claims that sometime before
1945 he was living with his sister who was then residing or renting Del
Rosario's titled lot. In 1945 he built his house on the disputed dried-up
portion of the Estero Calubcub with a small portion thereof on the titled lot
of del Rosario. Later in 1961, said house was destroyed by a fire which
prompted him to rebuild the same but, this time it was built only on the
dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub without touching any part of
del Rosarios titled land. He further claims that said dried-up portion is a
land of public domain.
Rosendo, Amparo and Florencia del Rosario lodged a complaint with the
CFI Manila praying, among others, that they be declared the rightful owners
of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub. Ronquillo filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case since the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub is public land
and, thus, subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands. The Del
Rosarios opposed the motion arguing that since they are claiming title to the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian owners, the trial court has
jurisdiction. The resolution of the motion to dismiss was deferred until after
trial on the merits. On 26 December 1962, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering Ronquillo to deliver to del Rosario the portion of the land covered
by TCT 34797 which is occupied by him and to pay for the use and
occupation of said portion of land at the rate of P5 a month from the date of
the filing of the complaint until such time as he surrenders the same to del
Rosario and declaring Del Rosario to be the owners of the dried-up portion
of estero Calubcub which is abutting del Rosario' property; with costs
against Ronquillo.
On appeal (CA-GR 32479-R), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court on 25 September 1975 and declared that since Estero
Calubcub had already dried-up way back in 1930 due to the natural change in
the course of the waters, under Article 370 of the old Civil Code which it
considers applicable to the present case, the abandoned river bed belongs to
the Del Rosarios as riparian owners. Consequently, respondent court opines,
the dried-up river bed is private land and does not form part of the land of
the public domain. It stated further that even assuming for the sake of
argument that said estero did not change its course but merely dried up or
disappeared, said dried-up estero would still belong to the riparian owner,
citing its ruling in the case of Pinzon vs. Rama. Upon motion of Ronquillo,
respondent court modified its decision on 28 January 1976 by setting aside
the first portion of the trial court's decision ordering Ronquillo to surrender
to the Del Rosarios that portion of land covered by TCT 34797 occupied by
the former, based on the former's representation that he had already vacated
the same prior to the commencement of this case. However, the appellate
court upheld its declaration that the Del Rosarios are the rightful owners of
the dried-up river bed. Hence, the petition for review.
On 17 May 1976, the Supreme Court issued a resolution requiring the
Solicitor General to comment on the petition in behalf of the Director of
Lands as an indispensable party in representation of the Republic of the
Philippines, and who, not having been impleaded, was subsequently
considered impleaded as such in the Courts resolution of 10 September
1976.
In his Motion to Admit Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that
pursuant to a request made by this office with the Bureau of Lands to
conduct an investigation, the Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau sent
a communication informing him that the records of his office do not show
that Mario Ronquillo, Rosendo del Rosario, Amparo del Rosario or
Florencia del Rosario has filed any public land application covering parcels
of land situated at Estero Calubcub, Manila as verified by its Records
Division. The position taken by the Director of Lands (in his comment on 3
September 1978, in the 4 May 1989 reply, and 17 August 1989 comment)
explicates that Article 370 of the old Code does not apply as the abandoned
riverbed as such was abandoned not by the natural change in the course of
the river but by the drying up of the bed caused by human activity. The
Director of Lands also added that the del Rosario and Ronquillo have
claimed pending sales applications over the dried portion of the estero
(admitting thus that it is public land under the authority of the Bureau of
Lands), which were rejected as the Manila City Engineers Office needed the
dried portion of the estero for drainage purposes. On 29 June 1979,
Florencia del Rosario manifested to this Court that Rosendo, Amparo and
Casiano del Rosario have all died, and that she is the only one still alive
among the private respondents in the case. In a resolution dated 20 January
1988, the Court required Ronquillo to implead one Benjamin Diaz pursuant
to the former's manifestation that the land adjacent to the dried-up river bed
has already been sold to the latter, and the Solicitor General was also
required to inquire into the status of the investigation being conducted by
the Bureau of Lands. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General
presented a letter from the Director of Lands to the effect that neither of the
parties involved in the present case has filed any public land application. On
3 April 1989, Ronquillo filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari, this time
impleading the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which
subsequently bought the property adjacent to the dried-up river bed from
Benjamin Diaz. In its resolution dated 10 January 1990, the Court ordered
that DBP be impleaded as a party respondent. On 13 September 1990, DBP
filed a Manifestation/ Compliance stating that DBP's interest over TCT
139215 issued in its name (formerly TCT 34797 of the Del Rosarios and
TCT 135170 of Benjamin Diaz) has been transferred to Spouses Victoriano
and Pacita A. Tolentino pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated 11 September
1990.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the remaining effective portion
of the appealed decision which declares Del Rosario as riparian owner of the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub.
1. Findings of appellate court conclusive to the Supreme Court;
Exceptions The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to the review of errors of law, and that said
appellate court's finding of fact is conclusive upon this Court. However,
there are certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the
judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals in making its
findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
2. Evidence reveal change in the course of river not caused by natural
forces A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the
case at bar will reveal that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub was
caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumping of garbage therein by
the people of the surrounding neighborhood. There is nothing in the
testimony of lone witness Florencia del Rosario nor in said relocation plan
which would indicate that the change in the course of the estero was due to
the ebb and flow of the waters. On the contrary, the testimony of the
witness belies such fact, while the relocation plan is absolutely silent on the
matter. The inescapable conclusion is that the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub was occasioned, not by a natural change in the course of the
waters, but through the active intervention of man.
3. Article 370 of the old Civil Code applies only to natural change in
the course of the waters; Law clear, no room for interpretation Article
370 of the old Civil Code which provides that "the beds of rivers, which are
abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters, belong to
the owners of the riparian lands throughout the respective length of each. If
the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging to different owners the new
dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the other." The law is clear
and unambiguous; and leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies
only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions 23 nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.
Considering the finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was
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actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370
does not apply to the present case and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be
entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
4. Dried up portion of Estero Calubcub belongs to public domain;
Land used for drainage purposes cannot be subject of a miscellaneous
sales application The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot
be subject to acquisition by private ownership. This is made more evident in
the letter, dated 28 April 1989, of the Chief of the Legal Division of the
Bureau of Lands, stating that the alleged application filed by Ronquillo no
longer exists in its records as it must have already been disposed of as a
rejected application for the reason that other applications covering Estero
Calubcub, Sampaloc, Manila for areas other than that contested in the
presented case, were all rejected by the office because of the objection
interposed by the City Engineer's office that they need the same land for
drainage purposes. Since the land is to be used for drainage purposes the
same cannot be the subject of a miscellaneous sales application.
5. Del Rosario and Ronquillo estopped from claiming land is not
public land The fact that Ronquillo and del Rosario filed their sales
applications with the Bureau of Lands covering the subject dried-up portion
of Estero Calubcub cannot but be deemed as outright admissions by them
that the same is public land. They are now estopped from claiming
otherwise.


Baes v. CA

Fac t s : In 1962, the government dug a canal on a private parcel of land (Lot
2958, with area of 33,902 sq.m.) to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek.
This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes, who registered it in his name under
TCT 10990 and then had it subdivided into 3 lots (Lot 2958-A, 28,889 sq.m,
TCT 11041.; Lot 2958-B, 3,588 sq.m, TCT 11042.; and Lot 2958-C, 452
sq.m., TCT 11043). In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally occupied
by the canal, the government gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area as
Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated 20 June
1970. The property, which was near but not contiguous to Lot 2958-C, was
denominated as Lot 3271-A and later registered in the name of Felix Baes
under TCT 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up the old
bed of the creek. Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot
2958-A designated as Lot 1, Blk. 4, resurveyed and subdivided. On 12
January 1968, he submitted a petition for the approval of his resurvey and
subdivision plans, claiming that after the said lots were plotted by a
competent surveyor, it was found that there were errors in respect of their
bearings and distances. The resurvey-subdivision plan was approved by the
CFI Pasay City in an order dated 15 January 1968. As a result, the old TCTs
covering the said lots were canceled and new ones were issued (Blk. 4: Lot 1-
A, 672 sq.m., TCT T-14404; Lot 1-B representing the increase in size after
the resurvey, 826 sq.m., TCT T-14405; Lot 2958-C-1, 452 sq.m., TCT T-
14406; and Lot 2958-C-2 representing the increase after resurvey, 2,770
sq.m., TCT T-14407). Lots 2958-C-1 and 2958-C-2 were later consolidated
and this time further subdivided into 4 lots (Lot 1, 147 sq.m., TCT 29592.;
Lot 2, 950 sq.m., TCT 29593; Lot 3, 257 sq.m., TCT 29594; and Lot 4, 1,868
sq.m., TCT 29595). In 1978, the Republic of the Philippines discovered that
Lot 1-B (TCT 14405) on which the Baes had erected an apartment building,
covered Lot 3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of the
Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, Lot 2958-C (TCT 29592 to 29595), with
an increased area of 2,770 sq.m. after resurvey and subdivision, had been
unlawfully enlarged.
On 17 November 1982, the Republic filed a petition for cancellation of
TCT 14405 and 29592 to 29595 with the trial court (Civil Case 0460-P). Baes
did not object in his answer to the cancellation of TCT 29592, 29594 and
29595 and was not able to prove during the trial that the government utilized
a portion of Lot 2 under TCT 29593. The trial court therefore decreed that
the original Lot 2958-C (452 sq.m.) be reverted to its status before the
resurvey-subdivision of Lot 2958-C. Baes appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court, declaring TCTs 14405,
29592, 29593, 29594, 29595, and TCT 29593's derivative titles TCTs 124725,
124726, 124727 and 124729, ordering the Register of Deeds for Pasay City
to cancel them and issue new ones in their stead in the name of the Baes
after segregating from TCT 29593 452 sq. m., the actual area of Lot 2958-C
(covered by cancelled TCT 11043) belonging to Felix Baes, and dismissing
the counterclaim. Baes appealed to the Supreme Court by way of certiorari.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, with costs against Baes.
1. Article 461 of the Civil Code applies to a natural change in the
course of the stream; If change of course is due to works, belongs to
concessioners if not to owners of land covered by the waters Article 461
of the Civil Code provides that River beds which are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have
the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall
not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. Article 461 refers
to a natural change in the course of a stream. If the change of the course is
due to works constructed by concessioners authorized by the government,
the concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the concessioners. If
there is no such grant, then, by analogy, the abandoned river bed will belong
to the owners of the land covered by the waters, as provided in this article,
without prejudice to a superior right of third persons with sufficient title.
2. Riparian owner entitled to compensation if change in the course of
river by artificial means If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation
for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all
the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the
river is effected through artificial means. Baes loss of the land covered by
the canal was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government
when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was
therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.
3. Ownership of dried up portion of creek in addition to fair exchange
of similar lots by parties a double compensation Baes has already been
compensated as there has been a fair exchange of Lot 3271-A belonging to
the Government and Lot 2958-B belonging to Baes, which were similar in
area and value, through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property which the
parties freely entered into. Baes cannot claim additional compensation
because allowing Baes to acquire ownership of the dried-up portion of the
creek would be a clear case of double compensation and unjust enrichment
at the expense of the state. The exchange of lots between the petitioners and
the Republic was the result of voluntary negotiations. If these had failed, the
government could still have taken Lot 2958-B under the power of eminent
domain, upon payment of just compensation, as the land was needed for a
public purpose.


Jagualing v. CA

Fac t s : A certain parcel of land is located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental with an area of 16,452 sq. m., forming part of an island in a non-
navigable river, bounded by the Tagoloan river on the north, south, and east
and by the portion belonging to Vicente Neri on the west. Janita Eduave
claims that she inherited the land from her father, Felomino Factura,
together with his co-heirs, Reneiro Factura and Aldenora Factura, and
acquired sole ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial
Partition with sale. The land is declared for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration 26137 with an area of 16,452 sq. m. Since the death of her father
on 5 May 1949, Eduave had been in possession of the property although the
tax declaration remains in the name of the deceased father. The entire land
had an area of 16,452 sq. m. appearing in the deed of extrajudicial partition,
while in tax declaration the area is only 4,937 sq. m., and she reasoned out
that she included the land that was under water. The land was eroded
sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon Ineng, destroying the bigger
portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut tree. In 1966 due to
the movement of the river deposits on the land that was not eroded
increased the area to almost half a hectare and in 1970 Eduave started to
plant banana trees. In 1973, Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing asked her
permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent squatters
to come to the area. Eduave engaged the services of a surveyor who
conducted a survey and placed concrete monuments over the land. Eduave
also paid taxes on the land in litigation, and mortgaged the land to the Luzon
Surety and Co., for a consideration of P6,000.00. The land was the subject of
a reconveyance case, in the CFI Misamis Oriental (Branch V, Cagayan de
Oro City, Civil Case 5892), between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio
Factura, which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the
amicable settlement of the parties, dated 31 May 1979. The heirs of Antonio
Factura had ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1,289 sq. m., to
Janita Eduave in a notarial document of conveyance, pursuant to the
decision of the CFI, after a subdivision of the lot 62 Pls-799, and containing
1,289 sq. m. was designated as Lot 62-A, and the subdivision plan was
approved as Pls-799-Psd-10-001782. Eduave also applied for concession
with the Bureau of Mines to extract 200 m3 of grave, and after an ocular
inspection the permit was granted. Eduave, after permit was granted, entered
into an agreement with Tagoloan Aggregates to extract sand and gravel,
which agreement was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds.
Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing assert that they are the real owners of the
land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 sq. m. During the typhoon
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Ineng in 1964 the river control was washed away causing the formation of an
island. Jagualing started occupying the land in 1969, paid land taxes as
evidenced by tax declaration 26380 and tax receipts, and tax clearances.
Actual occupation of the land by Jagualing included improvements and the
house.
Rudygondo and Janita Eduave filed with the RTC Misamis Oriental an
action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question
against Jagualing. On 17 July 1987 the trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of
ownership over the land in litigation. The court found that the island is a
delta forming part of the river bed which the government may use to
reroute, redirect or control the course of the Tagoloan River. Accordingly, it
held that it was outside the commerce of man and part of the public domain,
citing Article 420 of the Civil Code. As such it cannot be registered under
the land registration law or be acquired by prescription. The trial court,
however, recognized the validity of Jagualing's possession and gave them
preferential rights to use and enjoy the property. The trial court added that
should the State allow the island to be the subject of private ownership, the
Jagualings have rights better than that of Eduave.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court found that the island was
formed by the branching off of the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto
the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and
465 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court, declared Eduave as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of
the case and ordered Jagualing to vacate the premises and deliver possession
of the land to Eduave. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court found no error committed by the appellate court,
denied the petition for lack of sufficient merit, and affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals; without pronouncement as to costs.
1. Evidence not properly appreciated by trial court; CA properly
applied Article 463 The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial
court because it did not take into account the other pieces of evidence in
favor of the private respondents. The complaint was dismissed by the trial
court because it did not accept Eduaves explanation regarding the initial
discrepancy as to the area they claimed (4937sq.m. v. 16452 sq.m.); because
it favored the theory that Eduave became interested in the land only in 1979
not for agricultural purposes but in order to extract gravel and sand, which is
belied by other circumstances tantamount to acts of ownership exercised by
Eduave over the property prior to said year (e.g. the payment of land taxes
thereon, the monuments placed by the surveyor whose services were
engaged by Eduave, the agreement entered into by Eduave and Tagoloan
Aggregates to extract gravel and sand, which agreement was duly registered
with the Register of Deeds); because it disregarded the testimony of 2
disinterested witnesses (Gergorio Neri, as to metes and bounds of the
property and the effect of the typhoon; and Candida Ehem, as to the
caretaker agreement between her and Eduave) without explaining why it
doubted their credibility. From the evidence thus submitted, the appellate
court had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave actually
existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the Civil
Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or
isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such
separation or isolation.
2. Island formed in a non-navigable and non-floatable river; Article
465 The parcel of land is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable
and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of
land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits. The Court of Appeals did not err in
applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island
belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner
thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of
Eduave, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which
corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.
3. Land formed by accretion belongs to riparian owner, even without a
specific act of possession over it; Land however may yield to adverse
possession of third party if riparian owner fails to assert claim Lands
formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is,
under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin
nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to
cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of
possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner
fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession
of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens
system must itself still be registered.
4. Doctrine of acquisitive prescription The property may be acquired by
adverse possession for the required number of years under the doctrine of
acquisitive prescription. Jagualings possession cannot be considered in good
faith, however, because they are presumed to have notice of the status of
Eduave as riparian owners who have the preferential right to the island as
recognized and accorded by law; they may claim ignorance of the law,
specifically Article 465 of the Civil Code, but such is not, under Articles 3
and 526 of the same code, an adequate and valid defense to support their
claim of good faith. Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good faith, they
may acquire ownership over the island only through uninterrupted adverse
possession for a period of thirty years. By their own admission, Jagualing
have been in possession of the property for only about 15 years, and thus,
the island cannot be adjudicated in their favor.
5. Origin of island not tackled as case is not between opposing
riparian owners but between a riparian owner and one in possession of
the land There is no need to make a final determination regarding the
origins of the island, i.e., whether the island was initially formed by the
branching off or division of the river and covered by Article 463 of the Civil
Code, in which case there is strictly no accession because the original owner
retains ownership, or whether it was due to the action of the river under
Article 465, or whether it was caused by the abrupt segregation and washing
away of the stockpile of the river control, which makes it a case of avulsion
under Article 459, as the case is not between parties as opposing riparian
owners contesting ownership over an accession but rather between a riparian
owner and the one in possession of the island.
6. Quasi in Rem; Judgment conclusive upon the parties and does not
bind the State and other riparian owners The Court is not prepared to
concede that the island is a delta which should be outside the commerce of
man and that it belongs to the State as property of the public domain in the
absence of any showing that the legal requirements to establish such a status
have been satisfied, which duty properly pertains to the State. Since the
petition is an upshot of the action to quiet title brought by Eduave against
Jagualing, it is thus not technically an action in rem or an action in personam,
but characterized as quasi in rem, which is an action in personam concerning
real property. Thus, the judgment in proceedings of this nature is conclusive
only between the parties and does not bind the State or the other riparian
owners who may have an interest over the island involved herein.

ndh.