JULYAUGUST 2006 89

89
English translation 2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text excerpted
from A.A. Leontev, Slovo v rechevoi deiatelnosti. Nekotorye problemy obshchei
teorii rechevoi deiatelnosti, 2d ed. (Moscow: URSS, 2003), pp. 2441. Published
with the permission of Dmitry A. Leontiev.
Translated by Nora Favorov.
Notes renumbered for this edition.Ed.
Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 44, no. 4,
JulyAugust 2006, pp. 89103.
2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN 10610405/2006 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753RPO10610405440302
A.A. LEONTIEV
Some Problems in the General
Theory of Speech Activity
For Vygotsky, the concept of the sign grows out of a specific theoretical
interpretation of an activity that is distinctly human. It is a stimulus impact-
ing the organism just as other stimuli do, however it is not a stimulus-object,
but a stimulus-tool: one can discern a
dual relationship existing between the behavior and the external phenom-
enon: the external phenomenon (the stimulus) can at times play the role of
the object at which a behavioral act is directed in order to resolve a prob-
lem facing a person (to memorize, to compare, to choose, to evaluate, to
weigh something, etc.), and at other times it plays the role of the tool by
means of which we direct and realize psychological operations (memori-
zation, comparison, choice, etc.) essential to solving a problem.
1
But this definition of L.S. Vygotsky touches on only one aspect of the
sign, one that could conditionallyin the case of the language signbe
called the communicative aspect. But just as importantand philosophi-
cally, immeasurably more importantis another aspect, one associated with
the above-mentioned role of language in the process of awareness and re-
flection of the external world as an ideal form in the mind of man.
Here, it is most important to point out that the sign can genetically be
traced back to the material object or phenomenon, to the thing. This
thing (or symbol, in the terminology of E.V. Ilyenkov), in its capacity
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as a mediating element of activity, takes on particular properties. The mean-
ing of the symbol
always remains outside its immediately perceived guise, within other sen-
sory-perceived entities and is revealed only through the entire system of
relationships of other entities things to this given entity, or, the other way
around, of the sensory-perceived entity to all other entities. If it is actually
taken out of this system, this sensory-perceived entity loses its role, the
meaning of the symbol. This shows that its existence and function as a
symbol belongs not to the entity as such, but merely to the system within
which it resides. For its existence as a symbol, the bodily, sensory-per-
ceived encasement, the body of the symbol . . . is something absolutely
incidental, fleeting, temporary. The functional existence of such an en-
tity completely engulfs, in the words of Marx, its material existence. . . .
And if this has taken place, then the material body of this entity will reso-
nate with its function. As a result, the symbol will be transformed into a
sign, that is, into an object that in and of itself has no meaning, but merely
represents, expresses another object with which it has nothing immedi-
ately in common, such as, for instance, the name of the entity and the
entity itself. . . . The function of the symbol is actually constituted as an
immediate body of an ideal image of an external entity.
2
So, if we are to introduce a concept of a sign operation, it is evident that in
the genetic sense, this is an operation with two objects, but only in the ge-
netic sense. However, if we examine the operation of a sign not only in its
cultural historical or phylogenetic aspect, and not only in its ontogenetic
aspect, but simultaneously, as something given, then it becomes clear that
the stimulus-tool, or the sign, is not necessarily a real, material object. After
all, in the final analysis a real object functioning as a stimulus-tool presumes
the existence of a certain sensory, mental equivalent of this object, that is, it
does not presume the realization in activity of all of the properties intrinsic to
it as an object, as a thing, but only those objective properties corresponding
to the given activity, its inclusion in an activity not as a thing in its totality,
but as an aggregate of properties drawn from this object-entity.
If, in a given instance, we are not concerned with the properties of a stimu-
lus-tool that do not influence the fundamental structure of a particular sign
operation and the structure of the activity overall, that is, the nature of the
unity of operations into one dynamic whole, then it is evident that we can
also envision a sign operation in which the role of stimulus-tool will be played
not by an entity, and not even by a sensory-perceived object (such as, for
instance, the auditory encasement of a word); indeed, in cases where a sign
operation is directed toward self-communication, that is, when it serves
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exclusively as a means of self-regulation of behavior, the function of the
sign, of the stimulus-tool, can be carried out by a mental equivalent of the
sign not expressed in an immediate material form, such as the representation
of a word (although the very fact of the emergence of such an equivalent
presumes its secondary nature, its dependence on the actual object or objects
or, to be more precise, on the genetic conditionality of its full-fledged, exter-
nal activity).
In this connection, it is useful to distinguish two aspects of the concept of
the sign. In some cases we should talk about the virtual sign, while in others
we should talk about the real sign.
3
A virtual sign refers to certain features of
activity divorced from specific sign operations and attributed to the corre-
sponding material object that is fixed in a sign form; it concerns activities
objectified in a sign. A real sign is an element of a specific sign operation.
The key to resolving the question of the materiality of language rests, in
our view, in distinguishing between virtual and real signs. It is completely
obvious that a real sign is material or, at least, has the potential to be material
for instance, a word can always be pronounced. But a virtual sign is funda-
mentally nonmaterial. It is always and an abstraction, only inasmuch as we
view it as a mediating link within activity (but compare below the two types
of sign operations).
As we can see, the distinction between virtual and real signs corresponds
to two typical research situations in which we usually apply the concept of
the sign. The demands of psychological research create the necessity of un-
derstanding the real sign; the psychologist, in particular the psychologist
studying the mechanism of interiorization of external activity, is specifically
interested in the structure and course of particular sign operations. The con-
cept of the virtual sign is, perhaps, closer to a linguistic interpretation. It
arises as a result of the necessity of finding a fixed point of departure in
modeling various aspects of verbal activity. The problem is, as we will dem-
onstrate below, that any study of language involves modeling it to attain
certain objectives. A certain set of extralinguistic attributes is always involved
in this process, introduced into the model without any methodological basis,
that is, without a prelinguistic identity. They are selected arbitrarily for
each given model. However, in cases where we perform global modeling of
all three fundamental components of verbal activity, that is, when we create
a system of mutually intersecting models, our opportunities for choosing the
structure of these models, and the bases of prelinguistic identity supporting
them are limited. The concept of the virtual sign is suited to the intersection
of models of different components of speech activity.
Let us take a closer look at the problem of the structure of the linguistic sign.
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Let us imagine that we have been given a set of objects (or their equiva-
lents) serving the function of the stimulus-tool in activity. Let us also imag-
ine that within this set there are two subsets, M and M. Any object in
subset M can be substituted with another object from the same subset with-
out changing the content of the sign operation and structure of activity as a
whole. However, if that same object is substituted with an object from subset
M (or the other way around), the content of the sign operation and/or the
structure of activity as a whole will change. It is obvious that to simplify the
analysis we can express all objects from each subset using a conventional
virtual sign or, more precisely, using a certain model. The model will not
reflect those properties, those peculiar features of each of the objects m
1
,
m
2
, m
3
m
1
, m
2
, m
3
, . . . , that do not effect their functioning as signs, i.e.,
that are irrelevant to sign function. Then we will be ableinstead of set M of
real objectsto operate in the study of activity using two conditional, gener-
alized objects, two models[m ] and [m]each of which will replace the
series of objects m
1
. . . and m
1
. . . and correspond to a virtual sign.
How will these models differ from one another? Each of them can incor-
porate, or, rather, combine really different objects if they are used in the
same way in activity. Consequently, the material nature of the substituted
object is irrelevant. The objective content of the activity, the function of the
given object in activity is another matter. It is primarily in the objective con-
tent of the sign activity that our models differ from one another. To be more
precise, in the description above, they differ only in terms of sign function,
only in the objective content of the activity of the sign.
In reality, however, such a simplified scheme, evidently, is never encoun-
tered in sign activity. First of all, the sign is never an isolated given, but is
always part of a system of signs. Second, the sign is essentially polyfunctional;
it is characteristic of lower order signs that they take on more complex func-
tions, incorporating themselves in more complex sign systems. The third and
final point is centralthe sign, like sign operation in general, can serve not
only as the precondition and form of the realization of a particular activity,
but can also be the object of activity. In other words, the sign can serve as the
goal of the action, and consequently
4
can be conscious, can be activated in
consciousness.
Without, for now, delving into an analysis of this aspect of the question,
let us limit ourselves to the statement that the most typical action performed
on language signs is the juxtapositioning of signs (words) in terms of their
acoustic form and corresponding acoustic analysis of words, that is, the iden-
tification of diacritical elements in them,
5
which for now can be condition-
ally equated with phonemes. Keeping this aspect in mind, it is useful to
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JULYAUGUST 2006 93
introduce at least two components of the sign model into the analysis: these
are its semantic component, reflecting the function of the sign as a stimulus-
tool, that is, its place in activity that corresponds to it, and the phasic compo-
nent, reflecting the essential characteristics of the material body of the
sign that become evident in the process of comparing signs, and the change
that accompanies change in the function of the sign.
6
The progressive development of practical, production activity is expressed
(a) in the change of function of the tools used in this activity, particularly
machinery; and (b) in the increased complexity of the construction of these
tools (machinery), which leads to the possibility of change in their function;
and, as a result, creates the opportunity for functional change on a new level.
An analogous process takes place in theoretical sign activity, in particular,
speech activity. Corresponding to the change in the function of the tool there
is a change in the functional content, the functional load of the language sign
(given the identity of its language status); and corresponding to the increased
complexity of the construction of the tool, there is a change in the language
status of the given sign; that is, first and foremost a change in the morpho-
logical and phonological nature of the word or class of words. Of course,
such changes in the linguistic status of a language sign occur in steps and
unevenly, but this says nothing about the process of development of sign
activity in general, which lays the ground for these changes; and A.A. Potebnia
was right in comparing them with footprints in the sand; they can be fol-
lowed, but that does not mean that they contain the foot itself; and the word
does not contain the meaning itself, just a footprint of the meaning.
7
The reason behind the irregularity and step-by-step changes in the lin-
guistic status of the language sign is that the sign never enters into activity on
its own, as an independent, isolated unit; it can be viewed in this capacity
only if we deliberately limit ourselves to an analysis of sign activity that is
separate and removed from the overall context of activity. If we step out of
this frameworkand in examining any evolution of the sign, we must step
out of itthen it turns out that along with external factors rooted in the
particular features of the activity, the sign is also subject to the action of
internal, purely linguistic factors, and that it impacts a number of differently
directed vectors and finds itself situated in different types of interconnec-
tions with other signs.
8
In other words, a sign system or system of signs is the way we desig-
nate a special type of dependence in the functioning and development of
signsspecifically an interdependence of signs that are analogous in terms
of their place and function in activity.
Such a dependency can come in many forms; for example, the functioning
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and development of any given sign is guided by a whole array of differing
interconnections with other signs. When we talk about a language system or
rather about the aggregate of language subsystems, what we have in mind is
one or another form of an objective interaction of the functioning and devel-
opment of signs within a sign system.
What do we mean here by forms of interaction? Primarily, they are the
factors that determine the development of the semantic aspect of the sign in
different directions or the need to create a new sign in order to capture and
express new content. They are also the factors that specifically determine
what the newly created sign will be. They are the factors that condition the
morphological articulation within a sentence; that is, the factors that in the
final analysis determine the distribution of signs classifying them in terms of
their syntactical functions. They are the factors that determine the acoustic
(and the overall phonetic) makeup of a given sign-word. Finally, they are the
factors that determine any variability in the sound of a given word in connec-
tion with the varying conditions of communication.
It should be said that such a view of the nature of systematization is noth-
ing new. It relates back to the well-known philosophical thesis about the
identity of connection and interaction inasmuch as entities are mutually
connected, implying that they influence each other.
9
In the history of linguistics (independent of the general philosophical un-
derstanding of system and connections) there have been several attempts to
comprehend the concept of the system as a certain constant form of interac-
tion of elements (W. von Humboldt,
10
Baudouin de Courtenay, and others).
In recent years such attempts have been increasingly tied to the correlative
concept of system-norm.
In the view of E. Coseriu,
11
a languages system is a system of language
invariants or an aggregate of language phenomena that serves in defining a
specific function in language (usually the function of distinguishing), and
can take the form of a set network of oppositions (structures). A norm in
language
12
is an aggregate of the language phenomena that does not carry an
immediate distinguishing function in language, taking the form of common
and generally accepted (traditional) realizations.
We will introduce specific examples from the field of phonetics (phonol-
ogy). As is well-known, the correlation of consonants by hardness and soft-
ness does not apply to sibilants or the letter ts in standard Russian (system).
However, some sibilants (zh, sh) and ts, wherever they are placed, sound like
hard consonants [zhir] (fat), [shest] (six), [tsep] (chain), etc.; others that
do not correlate to them (sh, zh, ch, according to R.I. Avanesovs tran-
scription system), whatever their placement, are realized as soft: [ishu] (I
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search), [dazh:a] (even), [noch] (night), and so forth (norm).
13
In the Rus-
sian language there is a correlation based on whether consonants are voiced
or voiceless, which serves a functional role, that is, it serves to distinguish
(system). However, at the end of a word (and in certain other positions), this
correlation is neutralized, that is, there is a devoicing of voiced consonants
(norm). Because the phenomenon of neutralization of phonemic oppositions
(as with any positional alternation) should be considered as a reflection of
the norm and not system, it is evident that a change of positions, being com-
mon to all speakers, is not imperative by nature; if, instead of the normal
[vesh:j lek] we pronounce [vesh:ij oleg], this does not interfere with
our understanding, although it will leave a somewhat strange impression.
14
We find phonological correlations in the same identical form in the speech
of any native speaker of a given language. Here there can be no question of
correctness or incorrectness. At the same time, there are a number of
phenomena relating to the phonetic normthe nature of a vowel reduction
or the degree of assimilation, for instancethat vary from speaker to speaker.
[Rdilsa] or [rdilsa] (was born), [vnzit] or [vnzit] (plunge, thrust),
[lisa] or [li
e
sa] (fox)these distinctions are not essential to communica-
tion, they do not carry communicative weight. This is why in linguistic prac-
tice the problem of normalization arises, a problem that is essentially
nonlinguistic and is usually decided either statistically or by turning to some
language authority.
While the phenomena of norms do not create any functional oppositions
it represents a system of identification and not of oppositionone can talk
about a certain functional weight involved in phenomena of norms. This
weight involves the opposition of one norm to another norm, of one system
of realization to another system of realization. The opposition of different
degrees of reduction can serve to distinguish styles of speech; on the one
hand, the opposition of one norm to another can reflect social differentiation
of a speech community.
15
To get somewhat ahead of ourselves, we will say
that the concept of norms permits us to move from the category of linguistic
standards to the category of linguistic processes. On the other hand, if we
take into consideration that the variability of system phenomena is limited
by individual psychology, it can be said that the category of system itself
forms a transition between the category of language standards and the cat-
egory of language ability.
As it pertains to phonetics, the concept of norm as a product of averaging
the most typical phonetic features of individual speech (or norms as aggre-
gates of constant sound elements independent of their function)
16
is not
Coserius discovery. This concept is implicit in many works on phonetics
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96 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY
and phonology, especially those by linguists belonging to the Prague School.
17
In developing the views of I.A. Baudouin de Courtenay, G. Ulashin came
close to the idea of norms in opposing a subjective system based on . . . a
subjective acoustic-articulatory unity and an objective system based on an
internal functional unity.
18
Finally, the concept of norms is encountered in the
works of adherents to the phonometric school, which we will not be able to
address.
19
However, Coseriu was the only one to systematically delineate the
phenomena of system and norms,
20
identifying, instead of two traditional
branches of the study of the sounds of speech (phonetics and phonology),
three independent disciplinesallophonetics, normophonetics, and phonol-
ogy. Allophonetics deals with individual speaking, normophoneticswith the
overall language system of realization, and phonologywith the functional
system or structure.
Developing his idea further, Coseriu contrasted norm and system using
yet another important parameter: a norm is an aggregate of already realized
forms and models that should be used as such, while a system is a mecha-
nism allowing for a departure from what is already realized, that is, a system
of possibilities.
21
From this interpretation of system, which stems directly
from Humboldts definition of language form, it can be concluded that:
Usually a system is viewed as a given, and change, as a problem. However,
strictly speaking, it would be more logical for system and change to ex-
change places: the becoming of a language element precedes its real-
ized state. . . . Activity that creates language is itself a system; . . . the thing
due to which language is language is . . . the language activity creating
language and preserving it as a tradition.
22
A.W. de Groot arrived at a similar interpretation somewhat earlier. In the
history of words, in his opinion, one does not see a tendency toward orderly
change, as is usually thought, but a tendency toward a preservation of the
sound of a word that is undermined by various (primarily social and psycho-
physiological) factors.
For him, systematization represents the boundaries and trends in the dis-
turbance of the development of identity. In this connection, de Groot pro-
motes a concept of norm that is close to Coserius concept of norm.
23
And
even before 1931, analogous ideas could be traced back to the views of I.A.
Baudouin de Courtenay, which were expressed by E.D. Polivanov.
24
It is natural, however, that the linguist does not deal directly with a system
in this sense of the word, with system as interaction. What he calls a system
is a certain abstraction, a skeleton comprised of imagined elements (units) that
modelsalbeit in a very simplified formactual internalized relations.
This is how the majority of contemporary linguists understand the system
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of language. As a rule, however, they are not clearly aware that, in staying
within the framework of language, they are not dealing with an actual sys-
tematization, but with a model or complex of models. For this reason, within
contemporary linguistics, the concept of a system of language (and equally,
a structure of language) is not simply ambiguous, but in the majority of cases,
has not been given any explicit definition or interpretation whatsoever, re-
maining essentially an intuitive concept.
25
What is the content that most linguists assign to the terms system and
structure at present?
It seems that we can identify at least three approaches to interpreting the
concept of system, assuming we stay within the bounds of a statistical under-
standing (a synchronic understanding).
The first of these approaches attempts to ascertain a concept of system at
the level, so to speak, of language (of a linguistic standard) and nothing
more. This viewpoint is the most widespread, and it is not surprising that the
sessions devoted to this question at the Erfurt Symposium arrived at a defini-
tion of system as an (internal) articulation, inherent in the material, of (mu-
tually dependent) elements or linguistic devices that can be formally identified
through either a paradigmatic or syntagmatic analysis, or both.
26
Within that
approach, two trends can be identified. One of them applies the concept of
system both to paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, at times introducing
different terms for these two types (the London School: system in para-
digmatics, structure in syntagmatics), while the other adheres to an excep-
tionally traditional purely paradigmatic understanding.
The second approach reduces the concept of language system to an indi-
vidual language system. This viewpoint is represented, in particular, by E.
Buyssens, who states outright that in each person there exists a language
system. . . . The language of a people is the aggregate of diverse individual
systems and, in particular, what is common to all individual systems: the
language itself is not a system.
27
For the third approach, a language system, as formulated by R. Mikusch,
is no more, no lessa construct of the scholar that is absolutely the same as
the periodic system of elements or the classification of birds in zoology.
28
Along with these three approaches, we can divide all linguists into two
groups depending on whether or not they recognize a unity in the system of
language (E. Benveniste, A.A. Reformatskii) or view it as a complex of sub-
systems (R. Jakobson, M.M. Gukhman). Some authors (V. Skalichka, N.N.
Korotkov) attempt to find a compromise solution to this dilemma, interpret-
ing the relations within each subsystem as being paradigmatic par excel-
lence and connecting separate subsystems into a syntagmatic plan.
As should be evident from the above, we do not share any of the views on
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system described here. In other words, for us, a language system is neither a
text structure nor an individual language system of speech behavior, nor a
pure construct: it is the actual form of interaction among the elements of
speech activity that can be interpreted by using various models.
It is essential that the units or elements forming the system be very clearly
distinguished from the system itself, which is the form of organization of
these units. It is obvious that, in recognizing any mode of existence as a
system and asserting its being in a particular form, we are in no way obliged
to apply this same assertion to its units. In other words: systematic devel-
opment of the phonetic aspect of language is not, in principle, tied to any
particular phonological theory or to any particular understanding of the
phoneme.
In general, the problem of the unit is secondary in comparison with the
problem of the system of language; the language system is objective. It ex-
ists before the linguist and is independent of him. The systems nomencla-
ture, the complex of units, albeit organized accordingly, are constructs of the
linguist. The language system is conditioned by the subject of study; the
units to a great extent depend on the method of study, although, of course,
they are not only determined by it.
To make sense of this, we will follow the reasoning of a linguist studying
and describing a specific language.
The first thing that the linguist must deal with in this case, something that
he absolutely must have before him, is the object of study itself, that is, the
concrete language. We cannot, however, directly observe the language in
questionwe can only observe specific examples of speech, the verbal ac-
tivity of the language community.
It would be even more precise to say that we do not have before us he
verbal activity of a language community, but always the verbal activity of a
specific speaker of that language. In studying this activity, we more or less
explicitly exclude all the features that are not characteristic of the verbal
activity of other speakers of that language.
And, finally, even more to the point, what is happening could be formu-
lated in the following way: the linguist not only consciously or unconsciously
ignores everything individual in the verbal activity of his informant, but he
also ignores what is not needed for the specific task of describing language.
It can also work the other way: depending on a specific task, he may focus
attention on certain features of verbal activity that, given a different approach,
would not be taken into account (just compare the analysis of Russo-Japanese
phonological parallels and the discrepancies of E.D. Polivanov).
29
The second thing that the linguist who is describing a specific language
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has on hand is a linguistic tradition, a system of units and a method of
analysis (a system of scientific theories) that have been developed by science
at the moment that the linguist starts his work.
And finally, there is a third component that shapes any linguistic descrip-
tion. That is the specific objective of the research. This objective determines
precisely which of the available units and methods will be used in each spe-
cific instance.
Returning to our linguist, we must state that before him, as a given in
describing language, there always arise the verbal activity of a specific speaker
of the language and a system of units and methods of analysis. Thus, the
linguist does not find himself in a situation that can be depicted by using an
arrow uniting two points.
Language Knowledge of language

His situation can be more precisely described as shown in Figure 1.
In other words, our knowledge of language is mediated by a system of
units and methods of analysis. Language is realized in speech activity as a
multifaceted phenomenon, so that in speech activity we can observe not only
what has been represented in our diagram as a
1
a
3
a
6
a
8,
but also a
2
a
4
a
5
a
7,
which
is not needed by the linguist (at least at the given moment). What forces us
to choose just a part of the multitude of language data, in this case, a
1
a
3
a
6
a
8,
is the system of scientific theories imposed on us.
But what do we end up with once we have filtered verbal activity through
this system of scientific theories? It is something far removed from knowledge
of language, which is why this term has been enclosed in brackets in Figure 1.
For now, it is just a model of language. For it to become knowledge of lan-
guage we would need to confirm the validity of this model of language reality.
One way to confirm such a model would be to conduct a linguistic experiment
that could be constructed in any number of ways. Having been confirmed and
verified, the model could be placed at the foundation of knowledge about lan-
guage; however, it is not the same thing as our knowledge about language,
which represents an abstraction from all possible models of a given language.
Until now we have placed our linguist in an essentially linguistic situa-
tion. However, a no less characteristic situation for him can be called
metalinguistic. While in a linguistic situation we have speech activity and a
system of scientific theories as a given, which, as a result, provide us with a
model, at this point the circumstances are reversed. Knowing the nature of
the needed model, having it as a given and having speech activity also as a
given, we accordingly reshape the system of units and methods of linguistic
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analysis and the system of scientific theories, something that happened, for
instance, during the development of descriptive linguistics.
It is interesting to look back on how, over the history of linguistics, a
gradual differentiation occurred and an awareness of the distinction between
separate components of the linguistic and metalinguistic situation arose.
The first period in the history of the science of grammar is the logical-
grammatical period, the period of rational grammars. It is characterized by
a disregard for the specific task of description, a disregard reflected in the
complete absence of a metalinguistic context. The system of scientific theo-
ries here is a system of theories as in the most extensive sense of the word: it
represents a priori traditional schemes, subjected to no proofs whatsoever.
Based on this schema, one finds the results of transferring the approach in
logic to language research, which results in substituting a linguistic model
with a model of logic. This is the source of the one-sidedness and narrow-
ness of the understanding of the very subject of linguistics.
A classical example of such a construct is the famous General and Ratio-
nal Grammar by Lancelot and Arnauld (the Port-Royal Grammar, 1660).
R.O. Shor characterizes it in the following way:
General laws of the structure of speech are defined by the authors of the
Port-Royal Grammarin keeping with the views on language held by the
rational philosophy of the seventeenth centuryas laws of formal logic;
the sentence is equated with judgment, a word is defined as a sign of un-
derstanding; and all grammatical definitions are given accordingly. For the
authors of the Port-Royal Grammar, in language, everything is subordinate
Figure 1. [Language, System, and Speech Activity]
Language
[Knowledge of language]
System
Speech activity
b
1
b
3
b
5
b
8
a
1
a
2
a
3
a
4
a
5
a
6
a
7
a
8
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JULYAUGUST 2006 101
to logic and expediency. They . . . conceive language as an external mecha-
nism obedient to the will of scholars who set down laws to govern it in
their grammars.
30
The second period is completely dominated by the gigantic figure of
Wilhelm von Humboldt, who was able to completely overturn the old ap-
proach.
31
The history of the scientific study of language actually begins with
Humboldt, since he was the first to clearly proclaim the ontological indepen-
dence of language, to introduce the concept of linguistic forms,
32
and to de-
clare that language categories are not fundamental replacements for thought
categories and that language is a formative organ of thoughtan under-
standing that, in the end, is shared by all modern science. Humboldt was the
first to construct an actual linguistic model and the first to clearly determine
the object of linguistic study.
The third period can conditionally be called the psychological period, and
it included the neogrammarians and Steinthal, who stood at the fountainhead
of neogrammarianism. During this period, the system for describing lan-
guage was brought as close as possible to data of immediate linguistic per-
ception; either consciously or unconsciously, language was equated with
linguistic ability. The problem of method during this period was simply elimi-
natedthe basis for constructing a model of language was the intuition of a
speaker of that language.
Many vestiges of this period have been preserved in modern linguistics
and the worst of them is intuitionismthe uncontrolled introduction to lin-
guistics of the intuition, the linguistic feel, of the speaker. We are far from
thinking that it is possible to construct a languages grammar on a purely
rational or axiomatic basis; but it is clear that intuition in the study of lan-
guage must be assigned a limited and strictly defined place.
The next and fourth periodthe sociological periodis represented by
Meillet and the Geneva School, Shcherba and Polivanov, Sapir and Marr.
They are typified by a different understanding of the subject of linguistics as
well as an explicit separation of linguistic standards (language) and linguis-
tic ability.
After this period there is a certain turning point. Previously the problem
of methodif it was raised at allwas implicit; a linguist did not con-
sciously place himself in a metalinguistic situation. But now, with the emer-
gence of structural linguistics, this entire circle of problems became explicit.
Structural linguisticsdescriptive linguistics in particularis a modeling
approach to linguistics par excellence, and in their best works, proponents
of descriptivism explicitly take into account all three of the components
mentioned abovethe nature of the object, the system of methods and the
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102 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY
units of analysis, and the specific task of modeling that is connected to it.
We will go more deeply into the concept of the model and modeling in
general and as they apply to language in particular.
Notes
[Bibliographic information is incomplete in the original.Ed.]
1. L.S. Vygotskii [Vygotsky], Instrumentalnyi metod v psikhologii, pp. 226
227. See, for example, A.N. Leontev [Leontiev], Razvitie pamiati; V.V. Davydov,
Analiz stroeniia scheta, and others for experimental research of the role of stimulus-
tools in the psychological life of modern man.
2. E. Ilenkov [Ilyenkov], Idealnoe, p. 224.
3. These terms were proposed by A.N. Leontiev. A similar distinction (virtual and
actual signs) is made by E. Coseriu (Determinacin y entorno, p. 34).
4. In order that there be awareness of a perceived content it must occupy the
structural place of the immediate goal of action in the activity of the subject (A.N.
Leontev, Psikhologicheskie voprosy soznatlnosti ucheniia, p. 11).
5. K. Bhler, Sprachtheorie, p. 33.
6. The above relates to the virtual sign. However, as with any concept developed
for a class of real objects or phenomena, it can be attributed as well to specific phe-
nomena or objects belonging to a given class or, as in this case, used in examining
specific sign operations, that is, real signs. It was specifically during this type of
examination of verbal activity that the understandings of phasic and semantic compo-
nents of the sign were proposed. This was done by L.S. Vygotskii in his book Myshlenie
i rech.
7. A.A. Potebnia, Iz lektsii po teorii slovesnosti, pp. 13334.
8. This aspect of the question has been extensively developed by linguists of the
Geneva School. Compare, for instance, the concepts of grammatical transpositions
and semantic transpositions in S. Karcevski (Systme du verbe russe and Du
dualisme asymtrique); and H. Frei, Ramification des signes dans la mmoire.
9. F. Engels [Engels], Dialektika prirody, p. 392. For a discussion of the dy-
namic nature of the concept of connections compare I.I. Novinskii, Poniatiia sviazi v
marksistskoi filosofii.
10. W. von Humboldt, ber die Verschiedenheit, pp. lviiilix, and elsewhere.
11. See E. Koseriu [Coseriu], Sinkhroniia, diakhroniia i istoriia; E. Coseriu,
Sistema, norma y habla and Forma y sustancia; E. Coseriu and W. Vsquez, Para la
unificacin. Compare also A. Avram, Despre fonologia normej; N.D. Arutiunova,
Ocherki po slovoobrazovaniiu, pp. 3140; N.N. Korotkov, Norma, sistema i struktura,
and others.
12. Coserius concept of norm is genetically tied to an analogous concept in
Hjelmslev (see L. Elmslev [Hjelmslev], Iazyk i rech).
13. Violation of the norm while preserving the system creates the effect of an
accent. The pronunciation [zhir] and [shest] is typical of speakers of Turkic lan-
guages, and other peoples of the Soviet Union (Azeris, Chechens).
14. In making such a change we have left intact the phonological structure of the
word, which relates to the system. For instance, the vowel of the pretonic syllable
cannot be pronounced with a greater degree of reduction than the vowel of the pre-
pretonic syllable.
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JULYAUGUST 2006 103
15. See Coseriu, Sinkhroniia, diakhroniia i istoriia, p. 176, n. 68.
16. Coseriu, Forma y sustancia, p. 74.
17. See, for example, N.S. Trubetzkoy, La phonologie actuelle; G. Laziczius, Die
Scheidung langueparole; N. van Wijk, La dlimitation des domaines de la phonologie
et de la phontique, and so forth.
18. H. Ulaszyn, Laut, Phonema, Morphonema, p. 60.
19. See, for example, E. and K. Zwirner, Grundfragen der Phonometrie, and many
other articles by E. Zwirner in various periodical publications.
20. Unless we include L. Hjelmslev, in whose work this delineation is narrowly
defined.
21. Coseriu, Sinkhroniia, diakhroniia i istoriia, p. 335.
22. Ibid., p. 334.
23. His comment is interesting: the concept of language, which can include the
typical pronunciation of a word . . ., is broader than the concept that phonologists use
to operate (A.W. de Groot, Structural Linguistics and Phonetic Law, p. 190). After
all, a phoneme as a mark of a word (de Groots term) is an identity and phonologists
deal with oppositions. Thus, language-system opposes language-norms.
24. See A.A. Leontev [Leontiev], Boduen de Kurtene i peterburgskaia shkola,
p. 122.
25. Zeichen und System der Sprache, vols. 12; Tezisy dokladov na diskussii o
probleme sistemnosti v iazyke; A.A. Leontev, Diskussiia o probleme sistemnosti v
iazyke; Sens et usage du terme structure.
26. Zeichen und System der Sprache, vol. 2I, p. 90.
27. Ibid., p. 46
28. Ibid., p. 110.
29. E. Polivanov, La perception des sons.
30. R.O. Shor, Kratkii ocherk istorii lingvisticheskikh uchenii, p. 112.
31. We will not go into the views of Herder and certain other forerunners of
Humboldt here.
32. See G.V. Ramishvili, Nekotorye voprosy lingvisticheskoi teorii V. Gumboldta.
To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; outside the United States, call 717-632-3535.
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