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The document provides a historical overview of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) from its formation in 1961 until 1967 and examines its goals and relationship to regional politics and foreign powers like the US and China. It discusses how ASA was initially formed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand with stated goals of economic cooperation but was also implicitly meant to counter Chinese influence. However, ASA struggled to achieve its objectives and define its identity amidst the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War. It eventually transitioned into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.
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ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967 Southeast Asian Regionalism
The document provides a historical overview of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) from its formation in 1961 until 1967 and examines its goals and relationship to regional politics and foreign powers like the US and China. It discusses how ASA was initially formed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand with stated goals of economic cooperation but was also implicitly meant to counter Chinese influence. However, ASA struggled to achieve its objectives and define its identity amidst the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War. It eventually transitioned into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.
The document provides a historical overview of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) from its formation in 1961 until 1967 and examines its goals and relationship to regional politics and foreign powers like the US and China. It discusses how ASA was initially formed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand with stated goals of economic cooperation but was also implicitly meant to counter Chinese influence. However, ASA struggled to achieve its objectives and define its identity amidst the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War. It eventually transitioned into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.
ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism
Author(s): Vincent K. Pollard
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Mar., 1970), pp. 244-255 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642577 . Accessed: 15/11/2013 07:30 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ASA AND ASEAN, 1961-1967: SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM / Vincent K. Pollard* 7he comparatively short but turbulent political development of the As- sociation of Southeast Asia (ASA) from July 1961 through August 1967 provides an excellent opportunity to understand how a subregional pattern of alliance, apparently "promising" in terms of publicly stated objectives, can often fail to meet those objectives in the context of Sino-American re- lations. The development of ASA up until the launching of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967 also affords examples of how the policy makers within these Southeast Asian international organi- zations relate to the American foreign policy objective of "containing" China. The central, but not exclusive, focus of this study relates the notion of regionalism promoted by ASA and ASEAN to the ideological thrust of the organizations' declared foreign policy. These aspects, in turn, are related to the frequency and nature of the American perception of these organiza- tions. The paper does not attempt to take into account developments subse- quent to August 1967. The focus will be on an examination of the individual and collective self-perception of the ASA and ASEAN states, as revealed through their public diplomacy, and related to (1) contemporary events and (2) their varying perceptions of the two major national bloc actors in East and Southeast Asia-China and the U.S. We will thereby tentatively suggest the major political meanings ASA and ASEAN assumed in the re- spective foreign policies of the several ASA states. SOURCES AND MOTIVATIONS FOR ASA ASA originally included the former Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. The ideological alignment of these states with the West hap- pens to serve as a continuing reference frame for explaining some of the more significant variables encountered in ASA's history of expectation, dis- appointment, stalemate, and self-subsumation. *1 would like to express my appreciation to Norton Ginsburg and Tang Tsou of the University of Chicago for their comments and suggestions. Responsibility for the views expressed is entirely mine. 244 This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VINCENT K. POLLARD 245 Initially both the U.S. and China barely acknowledged ASA's existence in their foreign policy statements, which suggests that either (1) from China's point of view, it was difficult or pointless to distinguish ASA activities from SEATO activities, particularly after Peking's denunciation of an abortive prototype of ASA in the proposed Southeast Asian Friendship and Eco- nomic Treaty,' and/or (2) ASA's politico-economic potential for strengthen- ing the Western bloc was greatly underestimated by the U.S. The Charter of the Association of Southeast Asia, more commonly known as the Bangkok Declaration of July 31, 1961,2 suggested to a number of observers that Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand were on the verge of a "new era of awakening" and of real economic cooperation in Southeast Asia. One could, of course, develop a selected list of indications that a sub- regional organization such as ASA would be a viable economic alliance even in a political atmosphere chilled by cold war tensions the renewal of "armed struggle" in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. For example, the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand had, respectively, the three highest rates of growth in Southeast Asia by 1960, and together they produced half the world's tin, rubber, and coconut oil. Implicit and Explicit Goals of ASA: Despite the real predisposition for meaningful regional and subregional economic cooperation the two SEATO-aligned future members of ASA prematurely "overplayed their hand and disclosed the true goals of ASA." For example, a remark attributed to General Thanom Kittikachorn, Defense Minister of Thailand, on the eve of the signing of the Bangkok Declaration, intimated that while the ASA states were to develop cultural and economic programs during the early stage of the organization, this stage or level of cooperation should quickly be replaced by or subordinated to a coordination of military policies.3 During the July 1961 sessions of the preliminary working group of what would become ASA, it was reported from Manila that: If Philippine proposals are followed, the Association would provide for the following: 1. preferential trade agreements among members; 2. free trade in certain commodities; 3. lowering of tariffs; 4. easing of customs rules and procedures; 5. standardization and control of ex- ports; 6. joint business venture; and 7. cooperation in commercial avia- tion and shipping.4 1" 'Neutral' Malaya," reprinted from "A So-Called Neutral State," Jen-min Jih-pao, March 12,1961, in Peking Review, March 17, 1961, p. 13. 2For official text, cf. Thailand, "Economic and Social Cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asia." Official Yearbook, 1964 (Bangkok: 1964), pp. 124-125. 3Hugo Durant, "ASA-Prospects and Results," Eastern World, Vol. XVII (August 1963), p. 12. However, a careful check of the Bangkok Post for July-August, 1961, un- covers no reference to Thanom's remark. 'Straits Echo and Times of Malaysia (Penang), July 21, 1961, p. 4. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 246 SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM These proposals suggested a lessened Philippine dependence on the U.S. and may have been intended to give Asian states a new Philippine posture to evaluate.' A different perspective was given by an American political commentator who saw ASA as politically subordinate to U.S. interests in East and South- east Asia: They may have taken another first vital step toward the consolidation of all the defense arrangements of the Far East, from Japan to New Zealand, into a single sort of Pacific NATO, able to concert its defense efforts effectively. Such a consolidation could be the greatest victory for freedom since the creation of NATO back in 1949.6 While not striking precisely the same mechanical notion of "containment," Thailand's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thanat Khoman, three months later characterized the relationship between ASA's economic plans and its anti- Communist tenor more subtly: . . . to the extent that we achieve political, economic and social progress at home, we strengthen our ability to withstand political subversion, economic penetration, and outright attempts at domination. At the same time, we acquire the capacity to assist other countries and to participate actively in the collective effort to expand the area of security and con- tentment in the world. In line with this two-fold concept, the Philippines ... has also joined hands with its close friends and neighbors, Malaya and Thailand, in a cooperative venture for mutual assistance in the economic social and scientific fields through the establishment of the Association of South- east Asia.... This strictly non-political organization is taking the first modest step towards what we believe to be an essential and inevitable development, already foreshadowed in other areas of the world, namely, the augmentation of national efforts by freely agreed and mutually bene- ficial modes of regional cooperation.7 The July 31, 1961, Bangkok Declaration was an executive agreement signed by Thanat Khoman, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Ma- laya, and the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano. WZhile the contents were formally nonideological, the context was not. The 'Straits Times (Singapore), August 1, 1961, p. 1. Cf. also Straits Echo and Times of Malaysia, July 28, 1961, p. 4, for Felixberto Serrano's response to the neutralist nations which had declined to join ASA. Cf. "len-min Jih-pao Commentator Tells U.S. to Get Out of Philippines," New China News Agency (English), December 30, 1964, in U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3370, pp. 36-37. 'Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "New Asian Agreement Will Help Stop Reds," in "Extension of Remarks of Walter H. Judd," Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A6518. 7"Statements by His Excellency, Mr. Thanat Khoman, Leader of the Delegation of Thailand, Made During the Colombo Plan Meeting held at Kuala Lumpur in November 1961," SEA TO Record, I (February 1962), p. 11. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VINCENT K. POLLARD 247 Preface exalted "the ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being," and urged a new beginning for "common action to further economic and social progress in Southeast Asia," but the three-point docu- ment merely announced the establishment of ASA, the seven general cate- gories of cooperation, and a disclaimer of any connection "with any outside power bloc" and an assertion that it was "directed against no countries of Southeast Asia . . presumably including North Vietnam. On August 1, the foreign Ministers of Thailand, Malaya, and the Philip- pines issued another ASA document which summarized the organization's aims and specific plans.9 The two initial documents represent a probing re- sponse to the unenthusiastic reaction provoked by the original "trial bal- loons" for a regional economic pact. While statements of individual ASA Foreign Ministers were at variance with the non-alignment professed in the Bangkok Declaration, that document reflects an awareness that close associa- tion with U.S. foreign policy, especially on anti-Communism and China, would undermine any chance left for ASA's expansion into a larger, more genuinely regional grouping. But after July 1961 it may have been too late for this tactic to be effective. The goals proposed in the Bangkok Declaration were such that few na- tions in the region could or would argue against their desirability, even if outright cooperation was not forthcoming, but the decidedly pro-Western connections of the three member-states could not be overlooked. On the first day of the Bangkok Conference, Prime Minister Rahman of Malaya at- tempted to link cooperation between ASA and similar groups to the concept of non-alignment and the contradictory political goals implied thereby: '. . . As we have stated, many times before, this organization is in no way intended to be an anti-Western bloc or an anti-Eastern bloc, or for that matter, a political bloc of any kind. It is not connected in any way with any of the organizations which are in existence today; it is purely a Southeast Asian Economic and Cultural Cooperation Organization [a proposed name for what becomes ASA] and has no backing what- soever from any foreign source. It is in fact, in keeping with the spirit, and is in furtherance of the purpose and the principles of the United Nations.10 In early 1963, Rahman castigated as shortsighted the Southeast Asian re- jections of ASA-type regionalism, characterizing them as retrogressive over- reactions to the respective states' histories of colonialism.'1 At the same time, 8"Bangkok Declaration Establishing ASA," Official Test, Bangkok Post, August 1, 1961, pp. 1 and 4. 'Bangkok Post, August 2, 1961, pp. 1 and 14. 10Bangkok Post, July 31, 1961, p. 1. For a different interpretation see "ASA and Neutrals," Manila Times, p. 4-A, and also "The Three Jugglers" Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXIII (August 3, 1961), p. 199. "1The Times (London), April 3,1963, p. 11 This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 248 SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM however, he chose to softpedal the key role he had played in 1959 in the abortive Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) 12 Despite ASA's concerted stress on the non-political character of the alli- ance, one commentator noted laconically that "most of the neighboring countries preferred to remain silent observers.'3 When Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, was in New Delhi in 1962, skepticism was ex- pressed over "Mr. Lee's belief that SEATO members in ASA can break themselves away immediately from the military pact." The skeptics' mis- givings were well-founded. Malaysia's response to the increased attention paid to the politicization or alignment of ASA was to stress economic gaols, pure and simple, in its foreign policy statements. It characterized the negative Indonesian response, for example, as a smear tactic.14 Similarly, despite defense arrangements with the United Kingdom, Kuala Lumpur felt compelled in late 1963 to claim that it was "not a member of any military bloc and not involved in any regional collective defence arrangement."'5 However, these public protestations of "neutrality" neither attracted new members to ASA nor forestalled subsequent difficulties among the ASA states. As already suggested, the earlier Chinese campaign against SEAFET probably succeeded rather well. A July 1961 news release from Manila indicated for example, that the ASA Foreign Ministers were acutely aware that their pro-Western alignment would lessen the chances for the organiza- tion's expansion.'6 The development described above set the tone and the climate for a fur- ther series of events which involved two ASA states and provoked various reactions. The outcome effectively disrupted ASA's new economic and cul- tural proposals as well as its incipient technical, economic, social and cul- tural programs. In 1963 the Philippines renewed its century-old claim to North Borneo (Sabah) in response to the formation of Malaysia. Manila saw the expansion of the Federation of Malaya as an unfriendly attempt to consolidate the remnants of the United Kingdom's former possessions in Southeast Asia. There was a strong anti-Chinese and anti-Communist element involved also, and attention was drawn to the fact that the Chinese would constitute the largest minority (est. 41%) in the new Malaysia. The Philippine's non- recognition of Malaysia, exacerbated by Indonesia's resumption of its Kon- "2Bernard K. Gordon, Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 165-66. "3M. P. Gopalan, "The Launching of ASA," Far Eastern Economic Review XXXIII (September 21, 1961), p. 551. "Dato Muhammed Ghazali bin Shafie. Malaysia in Afro-Asia, Speech by the Perma- nent Secretary for External Affairs, Malaysia, to the Consular Corps in Singapore, on November 26, 1964, (1965), p. 8. "Malaysia, Department of Information, Malaysia In Brief (Knala Lumpur: Tai Than Fong Press, 1963, 1964), p. 116. "Straits Echo and Times of Malaya, July 28, 1961, p. 4. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VINCENT K. POLLARD 249 Irontasi campaign against Malaysia, produced a stalemate in ASA that lasted almost three years. It was only on June 1, 1966, that an agreement was reached between Indonesia and Malaysia ending the Konfrontasi. A formal Peace Agreement was signed in Djakarta on August 11, 1966. The Philippine government's decision to press its claim to Sabah so em- phatically in the early 1960's may have been a manifestation of a burgeoning desire to alter one tendency in foreign policy that had been an obstacle to the expansion of ASA membership: that is, how to distinguish its anti- Communist policies from its real links to the West. The Philippines was less than enthusiastic about being regarded by their neighbors as a "South- east Asian subsidiary," of the U.S., as exemplified by the presence of U.S. military establishments and personnel in the Philippine Islands. Manila probably anticipated Washington's extreme lack of enthusiasm over its claim to Sabah which could only serve to divide the loyalties of nations already aligned with the West. Further, if the claim to Sabah is regarded as evidence of a growing drive toward self-assertion vis-a-vis the U.S. rather than a sub- sidiary form of imperialism, then Manila's actions assume added meaning in the light of the expected phasing out in 1972 of such forms of dependency as special trade concessions. Prior to the preliminary sessions of the Second ASA Foreign Ministers' Meeting in April 1962, Tunku Abdul Rahman had issued a statement indi- cating "that it was the intention of the ASA countries - . . to show the world that the peoples of Asia could think and plan for themselves."'7 ASA, which went to such lengths to posture as a non-political-i.e., non-aligned-and "solely economic" organization, foundered through its first two years al- though not necessarily because it was inspired and guided by political and ideological considerations. Rather a lack of attention to national and bloc considerations that shape the structure of international politics in the region probably impeded the development of a larger number of joint regional economic ventures. Revival and Response, 1964-1966: The U.S. paid considerably more public attention to ASA during 1964-1966 than it had the preceding three years. ASA's potential for "containing China," had probably been over- estimated by policy makers. As a result, U.S. foreign policy statements had virtually ignored the lack of "spectacular successes" by ASA in the region. But there is no evidence to suggest that the ASA states were discouraged from maintaining their subreional anti-China posture, either as abstract anti-Communism or as a heightened concern, for example, over their Chinese minorities. The lack of overt American interest in ASA during the 1961-63 period was partly a reflection of the greater concern over developments in Vietnam. But it is also possible that Washington had tentatively concluded that ASA was not particularly germane to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals "Straits Echo and Times of Malaya (Penang), April 4, 1962, p. 1. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 250 SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM in East Asia. This may explain why there were so few public statements from the United States, which in any case would have had to explain away (and thereby publicize) the internal dissension and the failures of ASA in South- east Asia. Between January 1964, and August 31, 1967, ASA's relationship to a "loose bipolar" international system was articulated more clearly and more often by both ASA and the U.S., the major actor in the Western bloc. In the content of the escalating politico-military conflict in Southeast Asia, the U.S. came to regard ASA as of increasing importance to the interests of the Western bloc in Southeast Asia. The nature of the conflict in Southeast Asia suggests two further questions regarding ASA: 1) Did the U.S. see ASA as a curious obversion of China's "principle of self-reliance" for the carrying out of People's War, and 2) did U.S. statements about ASA seem to encourage or condition any specific ASA response? An examination of the major developments in ASA during 1964-1966 reveals no clear-cut answer to either of these questions. What does emerge clearly is that the expressed U.S. foreign policy on ASA's relation- ship to a desirable regionalism in Southeast Asia did reinforce the public expression of the organization's pro-Western ideological alignment. Although President Johnson made no reference to ASA in his April 1965 Johns Hopkins Speech, he evidently felt that, in general, expanded eco- nomic cooperation among U.S.-aligned Southeast Asian nations was in the interests of the U.S. This was in no way inconsistent with the massive U.S. military involvement in the region or with the escalation of the war. Contain- ment of China, as will be seen, had not become a hoary cliche, but was to be fleshed out and supplemented in ways more sensitive to the immediate cir- cumstances. The subsequent temporary revival of ASA, formalized at the 1966 meeting of the ASA Standing Committee in Bangkok, has been attributed to the "pa- tient diplomacy" of Thailand's Thanat Khoman,'8 the most vocally anti- Communist ASA foreign minister. On January 3, 1966, he was reported to have stated that the newly-elected Philippine President Marcos had indicated that Manila would move to recognize Malaysia.19 However, the Philippines stalled at this point when it became clear that too speedy a recognition might trigger a renewal of Indonesia's Konfrontasi policy.20 At the March 2, 1966, meeting of the ASA Standing Committee, the Thai, Malaysian, and Philippine officials in attendance decided to reactivate the Joint Working Party of ASA. At the subsequent ASA Ministerial Meeting in late April 1966, Thanat Khoman called for an Asian attempt to end the Vietnam War. He may have hoped thereby to arouse greater interest in 18"ASA and ASPAC," 1967 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1967), p. 65. "9Amando Doronila, "Khoman on Vietnam, Sabah, ASA Revival," Manila Times, Janu- ary 3, 1966, p. 14-A. 20Thanakan Krungthep Chamkat, "The Southeast Asian milieu," Monthly Review, (Bangkok Bank Ltd.), March 1966, p. 96. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VINCENT K. POLLARD 251 ASA on the part of neutralist Southeast Asian states since "ending the war" meant different things to different parties. If this was his intention, he failed, for his call did not disassociate itself from American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, nor was he assisted by the ASA governments' repetition of the U.S. position on regionalism. Thanat's statement is illuminating: Malaysia and Thailand are ready to have full participation in ASA. The relevance of the ASA to the Vietnam conflict is that its members should look to [ASA] as a significant attempt to collaborate and strengthen themselves internally while the Vietnam situation awaits political solution. The success of the ASA will have a great deal to do with the long-range efforts of our countries for a peaceful future in this region. We cannot wait until peace is restored in Vietnam. We think that ASA is only the starting point. It is bound to develop, grow and spread.... It is difficult to divorce economics from politics.21 Bangkok's understanding of this particular relationship between regional economic programs and politics was further clarified in a joint statement by U.S. Vice-President Humphrey and Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittaka- chorn: The Prime Minister concurred with the principle underlying the Decla- ration of Honolulu: that the war in Southeast Asia must be waged on two fronts simultaneously-the military front and the strugggle to im- prove the social, economic, and physical well-being of the people. ... ......................... ............................ .......................... ............................. ... . ... ....... .. ....... .................. It was agreed that organizations such as the Association of South- east Asia could play a valuable role in fostering new cooperative in- stitutions and stimulating the ideas that would make dramatic economic transformations possible.22 In an address to the influential Council of Foreign Relations in New York on May 24, 1966, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk used ASA as an ex- ample of how Western-aligned Southeast Asian nations could begin to do for themselves what the United States had been trying to do overtly for some time and by itself.23 Prime Minister Rahman of Malaysia was reported to have proposed an expansion of ASA to include Indonesia, Burma, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Singapore. This was publicized after the exchange of notes on the normalization of full diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Malaysia on June 3, 1966.24 On this occasion, the Thai 21Doronila, op. cit. 22"Vice President Reviews Asian Problems with Thai Premier," (text of joint com- munique released in Bangkok on February 15), Department of State Bulletin, LIV (March 14, 1966), pp. 396-397. 23"Organizing the Peace for Man's Survival," ibid., LIV (March 14, 1966), 933. 2"Malaysia, Department of Information, Malaysia at a Glance (Kuala Lumpur: Life Printers, 1967), p. 37. The "Agreement to Normalize Relations Between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia" was signed at Djakarta on August 11, 1966 (Foreign Affairs Malaysia, I, no. 3, pp. 1-2). This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 252 SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Prime Minister suggested in a message to the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs that this agreement should provide the basis for resumption of pre- vious ASA programs.25 What began to emerge in the 1961-66 period was a pattern of alternating emphasis on, first, the domestic, economic aspects of ASA and, second, ASA's intermeshing with the West's program to "contain China." Shortly after the August 1964 Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution, Philippine Congress- man Cornelio Villareal described ASA's role as an extension of the South- east Asia Treaty Organization: Our collaboration did not stop with this military alliance. We know that the greatest bulwark against any tyranny threatening our way of life is a contented people . . . living at peace with neighbors. Thus, the leaders of our two countries and Malaya met and signed. . . the agree- ment which brought about. . . the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), aimed at providing economic, social, cultural, and administrative col- laboration among the three counties concerned.26 To follow up the meeting of ASA's Joint Working Party, the Standing Committee met for the third time in Bangkok on July 25, 1966. A Special Joint Working Party meeting was held on July 27, and the Foreign Minis- ters' meeting on August 3-5. Rahman felt it necessary to stress again that ASA "was not aimed against anyone" [his emphasis].27 Tun Razak of Malaysia later emphasized the same point.28 However, the three ASA foreign ministers also discussed the Vietnam War, a matter beyond the publicly defined scope of ASA's deliberations. They jointly issued the Bangkok Peace Appeal of August 3, 1966, which called for recognition that the war constituted "a grave threat to the peace and stability" of the region and expressed the fear that political instability would undercut the possibility for economic cooperation on a regional level.2 Apparently in order to avoid any mistaking of his meaning, Rahman specified in late September 1966 that the "grave threat" came "from the North." But whereas the Bangkok Peace Appeal had seemed to stress stop- ping the Vietnam War in order to assist regional economic development, Rahman now reversed the emphasis, saying that the surest way to meet the 25"PR-Malaysia Ties," SEATO Record, V (August 1966), p. 23. 20"Thai-Philippine Accord," Speech by the Honorable Cornelio T. Villareal, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Republic of the Philippines, at the banquet given in his honor by the president of the Constituent Assembly of Thailand, August 24, 1964, ibid.. IT (October 1964), p. 28. 27"Tunku's Message on the Occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of ASA," Foreign Af. fairs Malaysia, III, no. 1 (n.d.). p. 15. a284Tun Razak's Speech at ASA Foreign Ministers Conference in Bangkok-3rd August 1966," ibid., pp. 9-12. 29"Bangkok Peace Appeal," text in ibid, I, No. 3 (n.d.), pp. 12-13. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VINCENT K. POLLARD 253 threat to Southeast Asia was to stabilize and strengthen the economy of every country in the region.30 Rahman was not being inconsistent; both elements were too tightly intertwined to be separated for long, but one or the other could be emphasized, depending on the circumstances. Further, if Rahman's expressed admission that ASA had yet to prove itself to its own members is remembered, the emphasis on making ASA "succeed" becomes more ob- viously grounded in his operational set of assumptions about China. Secretary of State Rusk reiterated his earlier views on ASA and rec- ognized its key role in the background to the October 1966 "All-Asian" Conference on the Vietnam War-one of many attempts to "de-Americanize" the war. He declared: . . . We will see substantial advantage in the development among the Asian nations themselves of systematic machinery for consultation on political problems and security questions in which they are all involved. We have been greatly encouraged by what has happened in the last several months in just that sort of direction [, including] the recent meeting of the ASA countries which led to the formal proposal by these nations that there be an Asian Conference to take up the question of Vietnam.3' President Johnson expressed a similar viewpoint in Canberra32 and in Kuala Lumpur33 during his Southeast Asian sojourn to and from the Manila Conference. EXPANSION AND CONCLUSION The fundamental problem as preceived during 1961-1967 by the ASA governments was their alignment with the Western bloc, possible exacerbated by evidence of U.S. encouragement of the revival of the organization. Al- though no ASA state openly repudiated their anti-China stance, even the July 31, 1967, Philippine-Malaysian attempt to stress the "non-political" aspects of ASA34 was undermined by Thailand's more militaristic inter- pretation of ASA to the region. However much Kuala Lumpur or Manila may have interpreted Bangkok's position as a threat to the economic promise of regionalism, their rebuttals were indirect, hesitant, and could be inferred only with difficulty. With establishment of the ASEAN on August 8, 1967, Indonesia and "0As summarized in "Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's Views on the World Situation-Southeast Asia," ibid., I (December 1966), pp. 48-49. 31"Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 16," Department of State Bulletin, IV (October 3, 1966), p. 480. "2Lyndon B. Johnson, "Address at Parliament House, Canberra, October 21" ibid., LV (November 29, 1966), 821. 33"Text of Remarks by President Johnson Delivered on October 30, 1966, at Parliament House," Foreign Affairs Malaysia, I (December 1966), p. 106. 8"Cf. July 31, 1967, See President Marcos' statement of July 31, 1967, in Straits Times, August 1, 1967, p. 20. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 254 SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM Singapore joined with the three ASA states in a more broadly regional economic and cultural union. The ASEAN Declaration expressed motiva- tions and purposes strikingly similar to those of ASA. One possible differ- ence, however, was this passage which stated that: ... all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development; . . .35 While this seems to be a concession to Indonesia, it has also been noted that any specific rejection of bloc-oriented collective arrangements is "conspicu- ously absent from the ASEAN document."36 What this meant in August 1967 is not completely clear. According to a Singaporean interpretation, Indonesia wished to make it clear that foreign bases on ASEAN territory "detracted from the non-military nature of the group."37 On the other hand, Djakarta may have sensed the compatibility of ASEAN with a possible pro- Western regional defense organization.38 ASA was not to be dissolved unless its members were convinced that ASEAN's viability was "firmly established." The advisability of an ASA/ ASEAN merger was considered, but at the August 29, 1967, ASA Foreign Ministers' meeting it was decided that, instead, several ASA programs would be transferred to ASEAN immediately in order to prevent duplication of activities and secure optimum use of available resources. In spite of some bilateral cooperation in ASA on specific projects, eco- nomic programs were often best understandable in an ideological context. To overemphasize the lack of cooperation among ASA members in the pursuit of regional economic cooperation is to miss ASA's deeper political significance. National and bloc interests overrode such considerations. 35ASEAN/DOC/1; this style of citation follows that of a typescript copy of the decla- ration in this writer's possession, courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. The text hereof can also be located, inter alia, in International Legal Materials, VI (No- vember 1967), 1233-1235. 36"Welcome ASEAN," (editorial), Far Eastern Economic Review, LVII (August 17, 1967), p. 311. "7Straits Times, August 8, 1967, p. 22. 38Cf. "Statement of Dr. Bernard K. Gordon," in U.S., House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Future United States Role in Asia and the Pacific, Hearings, before the Sub- committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 94-95 and 106-109. Bernard K. Gordon, Southeast Asia Project Chairman for the Research Analysis Cor- poration (RAG), further develops the rationale for U.S. encouragement of Southeast Asian regional organizations in his Toward Disengagement in Asia; A Strategy for American Foreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). My approach sharply differs from his analytical framework, as well as from the assumptions he brings to his study. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VINCENT K. POLLARD 255 While some ASA members occasionally asserted their "independence" from the U.S., this was in no way envisioned as a break from the bloc. From July 1961 to August 1967, ASA provided a structure within which states with similar ideological interests could cooperate, and hopefully without provoking strong reactions from neutralist or Communist bloc states in the region. The available evidence, also indicates that the U.S. views on ASA and ASEAN do not represent a sharp break from the "containment of China" strategy that has occupied the forefront of U.S. foreign policy objectives for some two decades, but rather the outgrowth of a more sophisticated understanding of the requirements for and constraints upon that policy. For in the development of the attitude of U.S. policymakers toward "regional- ism" and its logical correlate, "disengagement," can be found the ideological underpinnings for a continued U.S. presence and involvement in East and Southeast Asia during the next decade. VINCENT K. POLLARD is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. This content downloaded from 115.135.206.164 on Fri, 15 Nov 2013 07:30:32 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions