Molo v.

Molo Digest
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The
latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918.
He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner
Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for
the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside
on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will
this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked
under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will,
the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a
subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed
for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the
revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be
probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine
applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.

Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance
to the requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be
immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it.
This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was
asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has
already been destroyed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious
to withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown
from his own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital
where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for
probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and
testament of testator.
Gago vs. Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
Johnson, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel
Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was
already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased
executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the
ground of the existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors
alleged that the second will presented was merely a copy. According to
the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose
Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified
that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator.

3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled
and revoked.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after
due search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found
in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is
that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled
or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has
ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

Maloto v. CA Digest
Maloto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)


Facts:
1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died
in 1963. The four heirs believed that the deceased did not leave a will, hesnce they
filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.

2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly
discovered her last will which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence
the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the devisees
and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the househelp under
the instruction of the deceased

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in
the burning of the will was sufficiently proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to
occur,the 'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one without the other will not produce
a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an
intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence to
comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be the
will and the burning though done under her express direction was not done in her
presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will,
does not constitute an effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be
accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling
done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction
and presence.

May 31, 1922
G.R. No. 17714
In the mater of the estate of Jesus de Leon.
IGNACIA DIAZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DE LEON, opponent-appellee.
Montinola, Montinola & Hontiveros and Jose Lopez Vito for appellant.
Francisco A. Delgado, Powell & Hill and Padilla & Treas for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The only question raised in this case is whether or to the will executed by Jesus de
Leon, now, was revoked by him.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by
alleging that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another
will expressly revoking the former.
We find that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not cloth with all
the necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the
destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation.
(Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)
From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after
the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him.
The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the
document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this
effect. After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the
will, said that it had been destroyed.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the
testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first
will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto
and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo
revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
Judgement is affirmed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avancea, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., took no part.