[ G.R. No.

L-24693, July 31, 1967 ]

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL
DEL MAR, INC. AND GO CHIU, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. THE HONORABLE
CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT, VICTOR ALABANZA,
INTERVENOR-APPELLEE.

D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void. For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack
against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members,
Hotel del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of
the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued
in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances
of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen
(18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities regularly paying taxes, employing and
giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 persons and representing an investment of more
than P3 million."
[1]
(par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by
the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City
of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There
was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in
the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date
of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex
would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept
and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and
void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring
the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in
each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due
process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which
applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining
room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person
less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses,
tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making
it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in
Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the
automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a
transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July
6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions
of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relations to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and
that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged
invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination, with the
assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law,
respondent Mayor prayed for its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of
facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and
Hotel del Mar, Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the intervenor VictorAlabanza is a resident
of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2 That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels
and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor HerminioAstorga, then
the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances
of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in
his 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted
with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of
which is attached hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from
license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in
the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress
was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of
showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it,
citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners
against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the
lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law,
the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any
evidence submitted by the parties the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right
and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila
to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760
of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made
permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents
"to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower
court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision
cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted
standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity. *** . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people. * * *. The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation."
[2]

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity
for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
face, which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than
in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
[3]
where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the
matter thus: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope
of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and
the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle
of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
[4]
extending as it does "to all the
great public needs."
[5]
It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy
the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general
welfare.
[6]
Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society."
[7]

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then
CouncilorHerminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable
in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients
and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to
public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions
calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and
guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore
that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant;
[8]
providing a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public dance halls;
[9]
prohibiting
gambling;
[10]
prohibiting jueteng;
[11]
and monte;
[12]
prohibiting playing of panguingui on
days other than Sundays or legal holidays;
[13]
prohibiting the operation of pinball
machines;
[14]
and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an
opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used,
[15]
all of which
are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject
to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is
raised to the question of due process.
[16]
There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural
and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental
action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom?
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the
due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
[17]
It
exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever
branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect
[democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."
[18]
It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"
[19]
decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society."
[20]
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.
[21]

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to
meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern
is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be
more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and as has been set forth, none is even attempted here,
to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive
plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to
single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200%
for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-
class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating
occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.
[22]
As was explained more in
detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances
must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the
number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course,
generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license
fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in
the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable."
[23]

Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta
[24]
this Court affirmed the
doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made
to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to
affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the
only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purpose, just and uniform.
[25]

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of
Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police
power measure.
[26]
The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this
pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the
plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance would deprive them of their
lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public
markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage
meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted. *
* *. And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived
of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the
exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result
from the legal exercise of that power."
[27]

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any
room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when
there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be
unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs
through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty'
as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in
the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. * *
*. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of
the public order and safety or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."
[28]

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state * *
*. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
[29]

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of
undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,
[30]
no longer "retains
itsvirtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way
to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest."
[31]
What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.
[32]
How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age
and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those
arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with
him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso
in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in
a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-
day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on
its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer
it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.
[33]
to Adderley v. Florida,
[34]
the principle
has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is
an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this
the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but
there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."
[35]

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of
the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued
lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, JP, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official leave.


[1]
The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel,
Miami Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto
Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel,
New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
[2]
U. S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the
leading Salaveria decision in Eboa v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
[3]
282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
[4]
Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. Also: "To Frankfurter the
police power, true to its etymology, is the power to shape policy. It defies legal
definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a
constitutional formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases, it must not
fall back upon sterile cliches; its judgments are not to derive from an abstract dialectic
between liberty and the police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and
large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for
Holmes, 'society is more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no
higher peak than in vindicating interests not represented by the items in a balance-
sheet. In a progressive society, new interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social
consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with
certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well:
and how fragile in scientific proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic
adjustment. Social development is a process of trial and error; in the making of policy
the fullest possible opportunity must be given for the play of the human mind. If
Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez faire - not the individual - must be the
regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819)
[5]
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 US 412.
[6]
U. S. v. Gomez-Jesus (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
[7]
Rubi v. Provincial Board (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
[8]
U. S. v. Giner Cruz (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
[9]
U. S. v. Rodriguez (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-15719, May
31, 1961; Lapera v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
[10]
U. S. v. Pacis (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
[11]
U. S. v. Espiritu-Santo (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U. S. v. Joson (1913) 26 Phil. 1;
People v. Chan Hong (1938) 65 Phil. 625.
[12]
U. S. v. Tamparong (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
[13]
U. S. v. Salaveria (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
[14]
Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1960; Miranda v. City of Manila, L-
17252, May 31, 1961.
[15]
U. S. v. Ten Yu (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
[16]
There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of
privacy or the prohibition against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the
proper parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by
an accomodating intervenor "who has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively
relies on, the facilities, services and accomodations" offered by petitioner-motels. A
general merchant, doing business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has
no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has been
developed.
[17]
Frankfurter Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court (1938) pp. 32-33.
[18]
Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 US 420, at 487.
[19]
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy (1961) 367 US 1230.
[20]
Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 US 121.
[21]
Pearson v. McGraw (1939) 308 US 313.
[22]
Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
[23]
Citing Swarth v. People, 109 I11.,621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 I11., 627;
12 N. E., 227; United States Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 I11., 19; Drew
Countyv. Bennet, 43 Ark., 364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal., 46; 43 Pac., 392;
Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind., 84;
Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind., 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; Jones v. Grady, 25
La. Ann., 586; Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans, 31 La. Ann., 646; People ex rel.,
Cramer v.Medberry, 39 N.Y.S., 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89
Wis., 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 AM., 728,
andMuhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioners, 42 N.J.L., 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At
pp. 829-830
[24]
98 Phil. 148 (1955) citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L.
Ed. 1193; U. S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v. Bacolod-Murcia Milling,
L-19824, July 9, 1966.
[25]
Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21, 1967.
[26]
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
[27]
Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New
Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
[28]
Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones
(1916), 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. v. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala., 66.
[29]
Calalang v. Williams (1940) 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734.
[30]
46 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American
Supreme Court decisions having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this
Court except to follow the then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital
(1924) 261 US 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(1937) 300 US 379.
[31]
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G. R. No. 46496.
[32]
Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the
principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own
sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it
also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when
only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a
State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due
process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature way
have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly,
and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may
lawfully protect. (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v. Barnette, (1942) 319 US 624, at
639).
[33]
269 US 385 (1926).
[34]
L. ed. 2d 149, Nov. 14, 1966.
[35]
Roschen v. Ward (1929) 279 US 337, 339.


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