[A.C. No. 2597.

March 12, 1998]

GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner, vs. ATTY. CONRADO S.
GONZALES, respondent.

FACTS:
Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V.
Maturan (herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) dated November 6, 1981. Said SPA authorized Maturan to
file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50375,
located in General Santos City, as well as criminal cases against the latter for
violation of P.D. 772, again in connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty.
Conrado Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special Power of Attorney.
Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in
ejecting several squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50735. While said lot
was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had,
however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration of
nullity against the former, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067.
As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales
filed Civil Case No. 1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several
individuals. On February 18, 1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a motion for issuance of a writ
of execution on March 10, 1983.
In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise
agreement, which was judicially approved in a judgment dated March 28,
1983.
On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was
pending, and without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed,
on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No. 2746, an action to annul
the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 2067. The action was predicated on
the lack of authority on the part of petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria
Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record in Civil Case
No. 2067. On August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et
al., also filed Special Civil Case No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, with damages, against petitioner.
Aggrieved by respondents acceptance of professional employment from
their adversary in Civil Case No. 2067, and alleging that privileged matters
relating to the land in question had been transmitted by petitioner to
respondent in Civil Case 1783-11, petitioner filed an administrative complaint
against the former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for
his disbarment.
Respondent, in a comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having
committed any malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act
against his client. Respondent declared that he was of the belief that filing a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final act in the
lawyer-client relationship between himself and petitioner, and that his formal
withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the
lawyer-client relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his
acceptance of employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to
honestly earn a little more for his childrens sustenance.
The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in
his report dated August 21, 1997, found respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended for three (3)
years. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the investigating commissioner but recommended that the
suspension be reduced from three (3) years to one (1) year.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent committed malicious, unethical, immoral or
anomalous acts against his client.
HELD:
This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding
respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a
lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his
client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty
of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client.
[1]
That the representation of
conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the
lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and
client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer
becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clients case. He learns
from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A lawyer must
have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the
profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
[2]

This Court finds respondents actuations violative of Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which provide in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
Moreover, respondents justification for his actions reveal a patent
ignorance of the fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A
lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ of
execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to
its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to
the prejudice of his client.
As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from
three years to one year, we find the same to be unwarranted. In similar cases
decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty of two or three years suspension
has been imposed where respondent was found guilty of representing
conflicting interests. In Vda. De Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, Sr.,
[3]
the respondent,
who appeared for complainant in a case for revival of judgment, even though he
had been the counsel of the adverse party in the case sought to be revived, was
suspended for a period of two years. In Bautista vs. Barrios,
[4]
a suspension of
two years was imposed on respondent Barrios, who had drafted a deed of
partition for petitioner, but who appeared for the other party therein, when the
same was sought to be enforced by petitioner. In PNB vs. Cedo,
[5]
the Court
even suspended the respondent therein for three years, but only because
respondent not only represented conflicting interests, but also deliberately
intended to attract clients with interests adverse to his former
employer. Finally, in Natan vs. Capule,
[6]
respondent was suspended for two
years after he accepted professional employment in the very case in which his
former client was the adverse party.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to
suspend respondent for one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective immediately.










[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L.
TAPUCAR, respondent.

FACTS:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios
Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were married on
October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon
City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their
eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last three children
were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a
CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent
began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del
Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia
Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an
administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After
investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months
without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.
[5]

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena,
giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases,
such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral
conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court
ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.
[6]

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his
ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on
September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea
Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by
her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo,
Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992,
respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by
Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This
was done while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing
on record shows the dissolution thereof.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Tupacar should be disbarred based on unlawful, dishonesty
and immoral or deceitful conduct.
HELD:
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact
in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity.
[9]
There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in
which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.
[10]
The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
*

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the
standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals
and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well
as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all
times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community
approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private
fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, penalized accordingly.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions
imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a
woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner
assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from
contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in
the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to
determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the
legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of
grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained
away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still
subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their
children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the
law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time
clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to
scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All
these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity
of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is
hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.







































[A.C. No. 2387. September 10, 1998]
CLETO DOCENA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q.
LIMON, respondent.

FACTS:
On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena
against Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross
misconduct, and violation of attorney's oath.
It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on
appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending
before the then Court of First Instance of Eartern Samar, Branch I, respondent
required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas
bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the
appealed decision.
To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan
of P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development
Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and
applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself acted as
guarantor. The amount ofP4,860.00 was produced by complainant in response
to respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 demanding delivery of the
aforesaid amount.
On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar
rendered a decision on the appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses.
After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the
supersedeas bond of P10,000.00 but he thereupon discovered that no such
bond was ever posted by respondent.
When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he
never complied with such undertaking despite repeated demands from the
Docena spouses.
In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that
the P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees for representing the Docena spouses in
their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied by the letter (quoted
above) of respondent himself demanding from the Docena spouses the balance
of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the execution of the
appealed decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to
return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also an admission that the
money was never his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent committed gross misconduct and malpractice.
W/N the respondent was allowed to received money in behalf of his
client.
HELD:
The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount
involved may be small, but the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier
sanction. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Canon 1. x x x
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 16. x x x
Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received from the client.
Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral
character is not a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but
it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing
in the exclusive and honored fraternity.
It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that the
law is not a trade nor a craft but a profession. Its basic ideal is to render public
service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their live,
accord continuing fidelity to them. By extorting money from his client through
deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law
profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible.
He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly,
eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible
conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made
himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby
DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is likewise ordered to return the
amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted to him by
complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.



[A.C. No. 3046. October 26, 1998]
REGALADO DAROY, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESTEBAN
ABECIA, respondent.

FACTS:
This refers to the complaint for malpractice filed by Regalado Daroy (now
deceased) against Esteban Abecia, a member of the Bar. Complainant Daroy
accused respondent Abecia of having forged his signature in a deed of absolute
sale by means of which the latter was able to transfer a parcel of land in Opol,
Misamis Oriental, first to Jose Gangay and eventually to his (respondents) wife
Nena Abecia.
Respondent Abecia was counsel of complainant Daroy in a case for forcible
entry before the Municipal Trial Court of Opol, Misamis Oriental.
[1]
Judgment
was rendered in favor of complainant as plaintiff in the ejectment case,
ordering the defendants to pay damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of the
suit. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff sold at public auction on March 25,
1971 a parcel of land belonging to one of the defendants to complainant Daroy
as highest bidder for P1,250.00. Upon failure of the defendants to redeem the
land, its ownership was consolidated in complainant Daroy.
Complainant Daroy claimed that respondent Abecia forged his signature in
a deed of absolute sale, dated March 31, 1971, transferring the subject parcel
of land to Jose Gangay purportedly for the sum of P1,250.00 and that in a
fictitious deed of absolute sale, dated April 17, 1971, it was made to appear
that Gangay in turn conveyed the land to Nena Abecia, wife of respondent
Abecia, for the sum of P1,350.00.
[2]
Complainant alleged that he entrusted the
title to the land (TCT No. T-315) to Abecia as his counsel and allowed him to
take possession of the land upon the latters request. By means of the forged
deed of sale, Abecia was able to obtain new transfer certificates of title, first in
the name of Gangay and then in that of Mrs. Abecia, from the Registry of Deeds
of Misamis Oriental.
[3]
Daroy claimed he discovered the fraud only in 1984.
Daroy submitted in evidence a report of the National Bureau of
Investigation, which had examined the deed of sale in favor of Jose Gangay,
showing that Daroys signature in the deed of sale had been written by a
different hand. In addition, Daroy presented the affidavit, executed on August
10, 1988, of Anita Gangay, wife of Jose Gangay, in which she retracted an
earlier affidavit executed on June 5, 1985. In the first affidavit, she stated that
she had bought the land in question from Regalado Daroy and then sold it to
her sister Nena Abecia, wife of respondent Esteban. Now, in her present
affidavit, it is stated that she did not buy the land from Daroy nor later sell it to
Nena Abecia and that she really did not know anything about the controversy
between Regalado Daroy and Esteban Abecia, both of whom are her brothers-
in-law. (It appears that Mrs. Conchita Daroy, Mrs. Anita Gangay, and Mrs.
Nena Abecia are sisters, although Conchita Daroy and Regalado Daroy are not
married but lived together in a common-law relationship.)
A complaint for falsification of public document was also filed against
respondent Abecia in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro
which, however, dismissed the same.
[4]
On appeal, then Undersecretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello III reversed on May 6, 1988 the findings of the City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro and consequently ordered the filing of the
corresponding information in court.
[5]
Accordingly, City Prosecutor Rodolfo R.
Waga filed an information for falsification of public document, dated June 30,
1988, with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.
[6]

Respondent Abecia was unable to attend the hearings. He asked for their
transfer to Cagayan de Oro on the ground that he did not have the means to
travel, but his request was apparently denied sub silencio as the Commission
continued the hearings in Pasig, Metro Manila. As a result only his counsel was
present at the hearings.
[7]

As respondent reiterated his request for the transfer of venue, it was agreed
at the hearing of January 30, 1989 that respondents answer, dated August 3,
1987, and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as his own would be
considered as their direct testimonies.
[8]

ISSUE: W/N the respondent forged the signature of his client in the deed of
absolute sale.
HELD:
Indeed, what appears to have happened in this case is that the parties
thought that because the land had been acquired by complainant at a public
sale held in order to satisfy a judgment in his favor in a case in which
respondent was complainants counsel, the latter could not acquire the
land. The parties apparently had in mind Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which
provides, in pertinent parts, as follows:
ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public
or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
. . . .
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before
the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession
It is true that the NBI found the signature of Regalado Daroy on the deed of
sale made in favor of Jose Gangay to have been forged. But Erasmo Damasing,
the notary public who notarized the deed, affirmed that Daroy and his wife
appeared before him on March 31, 1971 and, in his presence, signed the
document in question.
[19]
Daisy Felicilda likewise stated in an affidavit executed
on February 17, 1986 that she was a witness to the execution of the deed of
sale and that she saw Daroy signing the deed of sale.
[20]

Daroy never denied these claims of the notary public and a witness to the
execution of the deed of sale. Nor was the NBI writing expert ever called to
testify on his finding that the signature of Daroy in the deed of sale appeared to
have been signed by a different hand. The finding that the deed of sale was
forged was simply implied from the report of the NBI writing expert. As
complainant, Daroy had the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in
the jurat he and his wife never appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged the deed to be their voluntary act.
WHEREFORE, the resolution dated March 26, 1994, of the IBP Board of
Governors is RECONSIDERED and the complaint against respondent Esteban
Abecia is DISMISSED.

















[A.C. No. 1037. December 14, 1998]
VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant, vs. ATTY. CIRIACO C.
SAYSON, respondent.

FACTS:
In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurrecion charged Respondent
Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson with acts constituting "malpractice, deceit and gross
misconduct in his office and a violation of his duties and oath as a
lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through reckless imprudence
case, in which Complainant Resurrecion was the defendant and Respondent
Sayson was the counsel for the offended party, Mr. Armando Basto Sr. The
complainant alleged that, pursuant to the amicable settlement previously
reached by the parties, he gave P2,500 to the respondent who, however, never
gave the money to his client. Thus, the complainant was compelled to give
another P2,500 to Mr. Basto as settlement of the case. The complainant then
demanded the return of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the
Complaint for Disbarment.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Ciriaco Sayson violated his duties and oath as a lawyer.
HELD:
In the present case, the Court notes that even if respondent's culpability for
estafa has been indubitably established, there is no indication that he has
served sentence, returned to complainant what was due him or showed any
remorse for what he did. The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was,
to a large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the
Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that
also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against
him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is not worthy to
remain a member of the bar.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in
a manner beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.


[A.M. No. P-99-1292. February 26, 1999]
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R.
GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.

FACTS:
The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges Rolando R.
Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in
the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his
official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister
Flor Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A
typographical error was committed in the complaint which stated that the
address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City. The mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint
which was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for execution. Complainant however,
was surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge
Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando
Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of the
temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified
of the application for preliminary injunction.
Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC,
Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance of the temporary
restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for
writing the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if
she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain
the law office of respondent at the same time giving his calling card with the
name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220
Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not
be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To her
consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary
injunction as threatened by respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Branch
37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case
No. 37-14552.
The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the
hearing of the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because of the issuance of the
order stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent
tried to calm her down, and assured her that the restraining order was only
temporary and that the application for preliminary injunction would still be
heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The complainant went back to court "fuming mad"
because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his
office, and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and that a friend
of hers recommended the Law Finn of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig
and Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he could
handle her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law
firm, although he was invited to join but he chose to remain in the
judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days later and told him that if
he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she
will file an administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat
was repeated but the respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the
Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed this
administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of
the defendant lessee from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of
the complaint against him.
ISSUE: W/N there exists a conflict between the respondents function as a
Branch Clerk of Court and him engaging into private practice.
HELD:
Based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached as
Annex "B" of complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given
by respondent to complainant would show that the name of herein respondent
was indeed included in the BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG &
CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed any
position in said office, the fact remains that his name is included therein which
may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while
he may not be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his
name appears on the calling card as a partner in the Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the impression that he is
connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private practice
which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to be noted,
however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that
respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the
violation committed by respondent in having his name included/retained in the
calling card may only be considered as a minor infraction for which he must
also be administratively sanctioned."
and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the
minor infraction he has committed.
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is
his name which appears on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising
or solicitation of legal services.
[1]
Respondent does not claim that the calling
card was printed without his knowledge or consent and the calling
card
[2]
carries his name primarily and the name of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the impression
that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his
name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates
Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with official functions."
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every
one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk. should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only be
characterized by proprietor and decorum but above all else must be above
suspicion.
[3]

WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court,
RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the
private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of the same offense
will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of
his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
















[A.C. No. 4758. April 30, 1999]
VICTOR NUNGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY, respondent.

FACTS:

In his complaint, Victor Nunga seeks the disbarment of respondent
Venancio Viray on the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents
without a commission to do so. After issues were joined, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines conducted an investigation.
The Investigating Commissioner was Atty. Lydia A. Navarro. Report dated 4
August 1998 reads as follows:
Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Venancio M. Viray on the ground of gross and serious
misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do so
at the time the said documents were executed.
Complainant alleged that in May 1996, he was appointed by the board of
directors of Masantol Rural Bank after his fathers resignation as its president.
A few month thereafter, he allegedly discovered that one of the banks
assets consisting of 250 square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was sold
without proper bidding by its manager Jesus B. Manansala to Jesus Carlo
Gerard M. Viray, a minor born February 2, 1969 during the transaction on May
22, 1987. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by the respondent who is
not only the father of the buyer minor but also a stockholder and legal counsel
of the vendor bank and was not duly commissioned as notary public as of that
date.
Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasnt capable to
buy the said property at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P400,000.00) but his parents Atty. and Mrs. Venancio Viray, respondent
herein [sic]. Being a minor he must [have been] represented by a guardian in
the said transaction. After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the
minor vendee Jesus Carlo [M.] Viray, the same title was allegedly used by
Respondent and his wife in mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and
Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) on
July 15, 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of Attorney annotated at the
back of the TCT No. 362813 PR 9907. The annotation of the cancellation of the
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) loan in favor of Crown
Savings and Loan Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered
in the notarial registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasnt
commissioned as notary public.
The aforesaid acts of Respondent allegedly constitute not only
unprofessional and unethical misconduct unbecoming of a lawyer but also
gross and serious malpractice which justifies disbarment.
Respondent for his part alleged in his comment that complainant holds no
position at the Masantol Rural Bank Inc. [i]n 1987 and 1997, but is facing
criminal charges for having plundered the said bank of millions of pesos and
[for] trespass to dwelling; while his father is facing a case before the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The sale of the lot by the Masantol Rural Bank
Inc. to his son was allegedly done in good faith all the formalities required by
law [were] properly complied with and the complaint from all indications is a
leverage in persuading him into a possible compromise.
From 1965 to date Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as
notary public and the fact that Pampanga is under several feet of floodwaters,
he could not annex all the needed documents to support the
allegations. According to Respondent, there was no year in his practice of law
that he was not commissioned as notary public. In fact, in the alleged
documents he had PTR for that purpose [, and] he would not [have obtained a
commission without the PTR.
The respondents contention that he had a PTR for all the documents he
prepared is only an indication that the Professional Tax Receipt is a license for
him to engage in the practice of his profession as a lawyer but not a
commission for him to act as notary public.
ISSUE: W/N the ground of grave misconduct for notarizing documents without
a commission to do so may prosper.
HELD:
We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent Atty. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary public in
1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents. Respondent knew
that he could not exercise the powers or perform the duties of a notary public
unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to the Notarial Law (Chapter
11, Title IV, Book I, Revised Administrative Code). He tried to impress upon
the investigating commissioner that since 1965 to date he has always been
commissioned as a notary public. Yet, he was unable to rebut complainants
evidence that he was not so commissioned for the years in question.
We have emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the
public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document
is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so,
the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the
laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that
he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and
purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon
7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Elaborating on this, we said
in Maligsa v. Cabanting (supra):
A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of
the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession. (Citing Marcelo v. Javier, 214 SCRA 1
[1992]).
What aggravated respondents unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact
that the transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was then only
eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code,
which was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the said transaction was
made, the age of majority was twenty-one years. Republic Act No. 6809, which
reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13
December 1989 and became effective two weeks after publication in two
newspapers of general circulation.
Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his
capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too light. Respondent must be barred from
being commissioned as a notary public for three (3) years, and suspended from
the practice of law for also three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the
penalty recommended by the said Board of Governors. As modified,
respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED from being
commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present
commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also
for THREE (3) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.























[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999]
MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO
CALIS, respondent.

FACTS:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of
his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992,
she was referred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary
documents required for complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required
fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received
by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several
conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of her travel
documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional
amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon
complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on
Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents
complainant issued Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the
amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis
who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the
complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application
(Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked during interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the
former that she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto
Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant
was furnished documents to support her assumed identity.
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the
complainant demanded the return of her money, however she was assured by
respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in
the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be
refunded if something goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the
required fee which was paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt was
not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the
complainant that it will be given to her on her departure which was scheduled
on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and
visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with
Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together
with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport
Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her
predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at
Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the
Philippines and respondent fetched her from the airport and brought her to his
residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took
complainants passport with a promise that he will secure new travel
documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her
travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial
refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter
to respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen
Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however
his wife informed her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to business
matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however
she found out that the respondent had transferred to an unknown residence
apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount
paid by complainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers
asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by
the complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One
Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the
respondent.
[2]

Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or
comment on the complaint, there was no response. Respondent likewise failed
to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was
made by the respondent.
[3]
As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not
obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply with the orders of the
Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent violated his oath as a lawyer.
HELD:
It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of
securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job
placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the
respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the
complainant under an assumed name was accepted by the complainant which
negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial
refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the complainant. However,
the transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his attempt to
escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable
practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the
lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but
a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.
[6]
The nature of the
office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character.
[7]
This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.
[8]
We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a
lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.
[9]

It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and
liberty of complainant when he made her travel with spurious
documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal
recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake
travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the
complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are
respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of
view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar
and the administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
[10]
We must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has
the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of
his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after giving him the opportunity to be heard.
[11]

Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply
with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the
IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find
no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys
for his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward
complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the
P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in order.
[12]
Respondent not only
unjustifiably refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but he
stubbornly persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and
humiliation suffered by the complainant.















[A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999]
GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY.
PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.

FACTS:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before
this Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The
precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for
complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that respondent
should be disbarred for the following acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and
executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US
dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the
appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.
[1]

x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees
to be paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket
fees for such kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondents
misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of
an alleged Supreme court receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant
corporation revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurers office of the
Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said
verification revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the Supreme
court was the amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the
Supreme Court Docket-Receiving Section showing the handwritten name of the
respondent for purpose of showing that the said computation was requested by
and addressed to the respondent.
[5]

Meanwhile, a criminal case
[6]
for estafa based on the same facts was filed
against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly
liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in
the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.
[7]

On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors
Resolution, which approved the investigating commissioners report
[8]
and
recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
(1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his
recommendation in this manner:
HELD:
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary;
[17]
in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required.
[18]
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.
[19]

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative
case.
[20]
Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in
the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.
[21]
The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to
remember the Courts ruling in In re Almacen,
[22]
which we quote:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x
(emphasis ours)
Juxtaposed to the complainants evidence, the bare denials of respondent
cannot overturn the IBPs findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt
to conceal his misappropriation of his clients money. We agree with the IBP
that it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio
Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of
filing a case before the Supreme court, could spuriously weave such
documents which are denied by the respondent.
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his
noble profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:
[35]

[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach.
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money
from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued
a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,
[36]
the Court ordered
the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount
he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.:
[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former
client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the
amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of
the canons of professional responsibility.
In Obia v. Catimbang,
[37]
we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who
had misappropriated the money entrusted to him:
The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by
the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal
profession."
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the
money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with
his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to
cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a
member of the bar.
































A.C. No. 5170 November 17, 1999(FORMERLY A.C. CBD-445)
LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL R.
TUCAY, respondent.

FACTS:
Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of
her husband Atty. Manuel Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant
administrative proceedings.
Complainant and respondent have long been married, the two taking their
vows years back on 14 July 1963 at the St. Ignatius church, Camp Murphy, in
Quezon City. For thirty years, the couple have lived together with their
children.
Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be
exact, with the first marriage still subsisting, respondent lawyer contracted
another marriage with one Myrna C. Tuplano, herself married since 1983 to a
certain Florante T. Tabilog. Respondent left the conjugal dwelling in July 1993
to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano.
Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer
and his second wife, docketed Criminal Case No. Q-94-54709, before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, of Quezon City, which case still pends. In an
attempt to defeat the early prosecution of the criminal case, respondent filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the judicial
declaration of nullity of the second marriage. The petition was later dismissed
due to lack of interest; subsequently, however, respondent filed a second
petition for the same purpose, this time with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City. In both petitions, he averred that neither he nor the other supposed party
to the second marriage was physically present on the date of its alleged
celebration thereby rendering void any such marriage, if at all, under the
provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3, and Article 6 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this
administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which
his license confers upon him.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney.
The grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court,
including deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature
even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety
that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A
lawyer at no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only
are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands
for his continued membership in, a great and noble profession.
The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors in their
findings and thus accepts their recommendation that respondent lawyer,
having ceased to meet and possess the qualifications required of every lawyer,
must forthwith be disbarred.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay
immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution. Let a copy hereof be made a
part of the records of said respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.