Anticorruption Commissions

CORE ELEMENTS OF
ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS

Legal Memorandum

August 2013

Core Elements of Anti-Corruption Commissions, August 2013

1
CORE ELEMENTS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS

Executive Summary

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a survey of the core elements
of anti-corruption commissions. Anti-corruption commissions in most states are
governmental institutions focused on reducing corruption in the public and private
sectors. Most states have adopted models that incorporate one or more of five key
functions. These functions include: (1) investigatory powers; (2) public awareness;
(3) prevention; (4) prosecution; and (5) coordination among government entities.

Anti-corruption commissions in many states serve primarily an investigative
role. Some states limit the powers of their commission by requiring the executive
to approve an investigation before it can be initiated. Others states mandate that all
reports of corruption be investigated promptly. Raising public awareness about
corruption and anti-corruption efforts can also be important to the success of a
states efforts to combat corruption. Many states anti-corruption commissions use
public awareness campaigns to increase understanding of the importance of
reporting and denouncing corruption. Additionally, many states mandate that their
anti-corruption commission implement preventative measures.

Some states grant their anti-corruption commission the power to prosecute
corruption cases. This is often the case if there are inadequate prosecutorial
resources in a states judiciary or if the anti-corruption commission is the only
government entity with sufficient independence to initiate a judicial proceeding.
State practice illustrates that this model is not widely used and prosecution of
corruption typically remains the primary responsibility of the states judiciaries.

Effective coordination among the various institutions involved in combating
corruption can also improve the functioning of an anti-corruption commission.
Government entities sometimes have overlapping mandates related to anti-
corruption efforts to help ensure every case is pursued regardless of political biases
that may exist. Such overlapping mandates can be problematic, however, if they
lead to ineffective use of resources or conflicts between different entities.

This memo draws on comparative examples from states including Bahrain,
Botswana, Hong Kong, Kenya, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Australia/New South Wales, Singapore, South Korea, and Tanzania.

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of Purpose.............................................................................................. 3

Introduction............................................................................................................. 3

International Framework for Anti-Corruption Efforts...................................... 3

Independence of an Anti-Corruption Commission ............................................. 5

Investigation Authority .......................................................................................... 7
Scope of Investigatory Powers .............................................................................. 7
Approval of Executive Prior to Investigation........................................................ 8
Monitoring of Public Assets and Procurement ..................................................... 9
Mechanisms for Reporting Corruption ................................................................. 9

Education and Public Awareness Activities ....................................................... 10

Prevention Activities............................................................................................. 11

Prosecutorial Authority........................................................................................ 13

Coordination of Anti-Corruption Commission
and other Government Offices ............................................................................ 14

Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 16


3

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify, through comparative state
practice, the core elements of anti-corruption commissions.

Introduction

Anti-corruption commissions are independent public institutions that are
established for the purpose of reducing corruption within a state. The structures
and powers of anti-corruption commissions vary greatly from state to state. Most
states have adopted models that incorporate one or more of five key functions: (1)
investigatory powers; (2) education/public awareness; (3) prevention; (4)
prosecution; and (5) coordination of related activities among government entities.
This memorandum reviews state practice related to the core elements and
structures of anti-corruption commissions.

International Framework for Anti-Corruption Efforts

The non-governmental organization Transparency International defines
corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.
1
Corruption has
numerous harmful effects, including making states less responsive to citizens
needs, decreasing citizens trust in their governments, and harming economic
growth.
2

Many international anti-corruption instruments have been initiated during
the last decade to fight and prevent corruption. These instruments include the UN
Convention against Corruption,
3
the Inter-American Convention against
Corruption,
4
the European Union Convention on the Fight against Corruption
Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of

1
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, Anti-Corruption Handbook, available at
ww1.transparency.org/ach/dnld/non_gov_act_media_full_text.pdf.
2
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, Global Corruption Report 2001 (2001), available at
http://transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2001#download.
3
The following Arabic-speaking states have signed or ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption:
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_signatures_corruption.html.
4
Inter-American Convention against Corruption, March 6, 1997, available at www.oas.org/juridico/English/Sigs/b-
58.html.

4
the European Union,
5
and the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption,
6
amongst others. Through various means and mechanisms,
each of these instruments seeks to prevent, detect, and punish corruption in either
the public or private sector or both. Member states of these conventions and
institutions aim to work together to deter and punish corruption.

In some cases, corruption issues are addressed through addressing specific
industries or activities. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
represents one such sectoral approach. EITI supports improved governance in
resource-rich countries through the full publication and verification of company
payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining. Some 20 countries
have either endorsed or are now actively implementing EITI standards around the
world.
7

Similarly, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENAFAFT) is a voluntary regional body that was created to combat money
laundering and the financing of terrorist activities through financial systems. The
MENAFATF was set up as a complement to the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) created at the G-7 summit in Paris in 1989.
8

These international instruments and sectoral approaches provide helpful
frameworks for states anti-corruption strategies. Controlling corruption, however,
involves establishing comprehensive national solutions that involve all the affected
parties in the particular state. Establishing an anti-corruption commission should
be based on a systematic assessment of the local socio-political and cultural
context, and the particular needs and priorities of the state.
9

A number of international organizations have contributed to anti-corruption
efforts worldwide. Transparency International provides assistance to states

5
European Union Convention on the Fight against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or
Officials of Member States of the European Union, May 26, 1997, available at
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33027.htm.
6
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003 available at www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/Text/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf.
7
EITI WEBSITE, available at http://www.eitransparency.org/.
8
The following states are members of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
(MENAFATF): Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force
website, available at http://www.menafatf.org/; The Financial Action Task Force website, available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org.
9
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, REGIONAL CENTRE IN BANGKOK, Institutional Arrangements to
Combat Corruption: A Comparative Study, 2005, available at http://www.transparencynz.org.nz/index.php/indices-
reports/global-reports/undp-report.

5
involved in the design and application of national anti-corruption reform
measures.
10
Transparency International also supports the establishment of country-
specific offices in order to facilitate state-based solutions to corruption problems.
11

The World Bank has also identified corruption as among the greatest obstacles to
economic and social development. In its efforts to aid state develop of anti-
corruption mechanisms, the World Bank has promoted the use of diagnostic tools
for assessing government performance.
12

These organizations, among others, propose that corruption is not a
necessary stage of development. Rather it is a phenomenon that occurs in both
developing and industrialized states alike.
13
Based on the research and study of
these organizations, effective anti-corruption measures involve high levels of
transparency and accountability and a strong political will at all levels of
government and in a society as a whole.
14

Independence of an Anti-Corruption Commission

The independence of an anti-corruption commission is fundamental to its
success. Independence from the government can allow the commission to resist
the influence of individuals or groups with specific agendas (political or otherwise)
that may clash with the goals of government transparency and accountability.
Some states have constitutional provisions that guarantee an anti-corruption
commissions independence. Others have implemented institutional safeguards to
counter the possibility of undue influence and the potential for imbalances of
power (such as providing for the appointment of commission members by more
than one branch of government). Other states have designed creative oversight
mechanisms to ensure the unbiased functioning of corruption commissions. These
include specific reporting requirements as well as monitoring by multiple parties.

10
11
Civil society in a number of states in the Middle East and North Africa has established local Transparency
International branches. Unfortunately, many believe these efforts have not been effective because of the
unwillingness of governments to allow civil society to hold public officials accountable. A description of these
branches is provided in Annex I of this memorandum. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME-PROGRAM ON
GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION, Fighting Corruption, available at
http://www.pogar.org/governance/anticorruption.asp.
12
WORLD BANK, Anti-Corruption: Assessing Government Performance, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTANTI
CORRUPTION/0,,contentMDK:20221956~menuPK:1165672~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:384455,0
0.html.
13
14
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, Anti-Corruption Handbook.

6

Hong Kong is one instance illustrating the independence of an anti-
corruption commission. The independence of Hong Kongs Independent
Commission against Corruptions (ICAC)
15
is legally mandated and is protected by
institutional safeguards. Legislation and the Hong Kong Constitution guarantee
this independence.
16
In addition, while the Commission reports directly to Hong
Kongs Chief Executive, four independent committees monitor the activities of the
ICAC. These committees include representatives from civil society and an
independent ICAC Complaints Committee, which reviews all complaints against
the Commission itself.
17

Australia/New South Wales,
18
Latvia,
19
and South Korea have also
implemented institutional mechanisms to ensure the independence of their states
anti-corruption commissions. Australia/New South Wales Independent
Commission Against Corruption is accountable to multi-party Parliamentary Joint
Committees that monitor and oversee the commissions activities and guarantee
that it does not abuse its autonomy.
20
In Latvia and South Korea, different branches
of government share the selection and appointment of anti-corruption commission
staff. In Latvia, the Parliament appoints the head of the anti-corruption
commission after a recommendation by the Executive Cabinet.
21
The President of
South Korea appoints the chairman and standing members of the commission, and
Parliament and the Chief Justice recommend three members each.
22

Like Hong Kong and Australia/New South Wales, other states also enhance
the reach of their anti-corruption commissions, as well as their independence from
undue influence, by requiring that they report to multiple government authorities.
Indonesias Commission for the Eradication of Corruption,
23
for instance, is
required to submit reports to the President, the National Assembly and the State

15
Hong Kong, Independent Commission against Corruption website, available at
http://www.icac.org.hk/eng/main/index.html.
16
HONG KONG CONST. art. 57, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm.
17
UNDP, REGIONAL CENTRE IN BANGKOK, Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption: A Comparative
Study, 2005, available at http://www.transparencynz.org.nz/index.php/indices-reports/global-reports/undp-report.
18
New South Wales is a province of Australia. New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption
website, available at www.icac.nsw.gov.au/.
19
Latvia, Corruption and Combating Bureau website, available at http://www.knab.gov.lv/en.
20
John R. Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?, World Bank
Institute, (2004) available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf.
21
22
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Korea, 2001 (2001).
23
Indonesia, Commission for the Eradication of Corruption website, available at
http://www.kpk.go.id/modules/news/index.php?lang=Indonesia.

7
Auditor.
24
Lithuanias Special Investigative Service
25
is required to submit annual
reports to both the President and Parliament.
26

Investigation Authority

Anti-corruption commissions in most states primarily serve an investigative
role. The investigatory powers of an anti-corruption commission vary greatly from
state to state, particularly with regard to their scope. For example, a commissions
powers often include the examination of the assets of public officials or the
processes for procurement by government bodies, and may extend into the private
sector. This investigatory power may also be subject to the approval of another
government entity, and effective investigation can require safeguards to protect
individuals who report abuses. As a result, most commissions have a process for
assessing whether or not to initiate an investigation.

Scope of Investigatory Powers

The scope of an anti-corruption commissions investigatory powers varies
greatly from state to state. Both Singapore and Hong Kong, for instance, have
anti-corruption commissions with broad powers. Singapores Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB)
27
has broad discretionary powers and investigatory
authority. The powers of the CPIB include the right to seize the assets of civil
servants accused of corruption and the authority to establish the terms and
conditions of punishment.
28
Similar to Singapore, in Hong Kong the Independent
Commission against Corruption (ICAC) is a commission with broad powers, with
the authority to investigate and pursue corruption in both the public and private
sectors.

In contrast, the authority of Lithuanias Special Investigative Service (SIS) is
more limited in scope. The SIS may only investigate potential corruption among
state officials and civil servants, but, unlike the Hong Kong ICAC, it may not
explore misconduct in the private sector. Similar to the limited scope of
Lithuanias SIS, Indias Central Vigilance Commission is directed to conduct most
of its investigatory functions through the Delhi Special Police Establishment,

24
25
Republic of Lithuania, Special Investigation Service website, available at http://www.stt.lt/?lang=en.
26
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Lithuania, 2001 (2001).
27
Singapore, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau website, available at www.cpib.gov.sg/.
28
Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?, World Bank Institute,
(2004).

8
rather than conduct investigations directly.
29
It is authorized, however, to directly
investigate conduct of public servants falling under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, but only where the Central Government has first referred such an inquiry to
the Commission or where a formal complaint has been submitted.
30

Approval of Executive Prior to Investigation

Some states require commissions to obtain the approval of another
government or judicial entity before exercising investigatory authority. Although
Singapores Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) has broad authority to
investigate allegations of corruption, before beginning an investigation the
investigating officer must first seek prior written approval from the state
Prosecutor.
31
In addition, the CPIB must seek the consent of the Prime Minister or
the President to investigate high-level officials, such as Ministers.
32
Likewise, in
Tanzania an investigation officer must first obtain the approval of the head of the
respective anti-corruption commission before initiating an investigation.
33

In contrast to Singapore and Tanzania, Hong Kongs Independent
Commission against Corruption must investigate every report of alleged corruption
that it receives and does not have to seek or obtain the approval of any other
government office.
34
This gives Hong Kongs Commission against Corruption
greater independence in its activities than the commissions of Singapore and
Tanzania. Likewise, Kenyas Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission Bill places no restrictions on the Commissions discretion or ability to
investigate corrupt conduct.
35

Monitoring of Public Assets and Procurement

Most anti-corruption commissions are also tasked with monitoring the asset
declarations of public officials and/or overseeing government procurement

29
Central Vigilance Commission Act, art. 8(a)-(b), (e) (India, 2003), available at http://cvc.gov.in/cvcact.pdf.
30
Central Vigilance Commission Act, art. 8(1)(c), (d) (India, 2003), available at http://cvc.gov.in/cvcact.pdf.
31
32
Combating Corruption: What the Ecuadorian Anti-CorruptionAgency Can Learn from International Good
Practice, available at http://www.ecuatorianistas.org/landette.pdf#search=%22Anti-
corruption%20agency%20investigative%22.
33
34
35
See generally, Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 11(d) (Kenya, 2011).

9
procedures. The purpose of obtaining public officials asset declarations is to
identify when their wealth is not attributable to legitimate sources such as
income, a gift, or a loan. In many states, such as Lithuania, the anti-corruption
commission works in conjunction with a governmental office charged with
registering these asset declarations. Specifically, the Lithuanian Special
Investigative Service works with the Chief Officials Ethics Commission to analyze
the integrity of the disclosure of all income and assets declarations by public
officials.
36

Some Arab states have implemented rigorous monitoring mechanisms to
supervise public procurement procedures. In Jordan, the General Supplies
Department of the Ministry of Finance regulates all public procurement by
government departments in accordance with the Supply Act 32 of 1993.
37

According to Bahrains Public Tenders Law, the Council for Tenders audits the
allocation of all government contracts.
38
Members of the Council and their
relatives are not permitted to bid for government contracts.
39

Kenyas Anti-Corruption Commission Bill grants the Anti-Corruption
Commission broad oversight over public assets. In particular, the Bill authorizes
the Commission to institute and conduct court proceedings for the purpose of
recovering or protecting public property or for the purpose of freezing or
confiscating proceeds of, or unexplained assets related to, corruption.
40

Mechanisms for Reporting Corruption

In order for an anti-corruption commission to effectively investigate
corruption, the public must have easy access to the commission for the purpose of
sharing information and reporting potential violations. In Kenya, for instance, the
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill grants the Commission
the power to conduct investigations on its own initiative or on a complaint made by
any person.
41

36
Where resources are limited, states have only required disclosure of assets from specific public officials (for
instance, only elected or appointed officials, high-level civil servants, or those employed in sectors prone to high
levels of corruption). TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report
Lithuania, 2001 (2001).
37
UNDP, Fighting Corruption, Jordan Country Profile, available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/anticorruption.asp?cid=7.
38
UNDP, Fighting Corruption, Bahrain Country Profile, available at
http://www.pogar.org/countries/anticorruption.asp?cid=2.
39
UNDP, Fighting Corruption, Bahrain Country Profile.
40
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 11(n) (Kenya, 2011).
41
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 13(2)(c) (Kenya, 2011).

10

Fear of reprisal can be a serious impediment to public involvement in anti-
corruption efforts. Many states have therefore instituted anonymous reporting
practices. Moreover, many anti-corruption commissions have direct legislative
mandates to protect witnesses and others who report acts of corruption.
42
To ensure
that its citizens have access to the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against
Corruption, for instance, the Commission has regional district offices throughout
the state.
43
Similarly, to enhance ease of reporting, South Korea has established a
Corruption Report Center.
44

Education and Public Awareness Activities

Anti-corruption commissions often have a role in raising public awareness
about corruption, as well. Many anti-corruption commissions use public
awareness campaigns to increase citizens understanding of the importance of
reporting and denouncing corruption. These campaigns may play an important part
in a states anti-corruption strategy. They may also serve as useful tools to monitor
public perceptions about corruption.
45

Hong Kongs Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has
implemented a vigorous public awareness campaign as part of its anti-corruption
strategy. The ICAC uses press releases, public information announcements,
interviews, documentaries, posters, informational leaflets, and cooperation with
schools and universities to convey an anti-corruption message to the public.
46

Similarly, the Australia/New South Wales Independent Commission against
Corruption regularly holds public meetings to expose corruption.
47
Botswanas
Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) uses the media to
promote public awareness and educational campaigns.
48

42
The term whistleblower refers to an informant, most often an employee, who reports employer misconduct.
43
UNDP, REGIONAL CENTRE BANGKOK, Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption: A Comparative Study,
2005, available at http://www.transparencynz.org.nz/index.php/indices-reports/global-reports/undp-report.
44
45
Combating Corruption: What the Ecuadorian Anti-CorruptionAgency Can Learn from International Good
46
47
48
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Botswana, 2001, available
at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/1630/8311/file/botswana.pdf.

11
Kenyas Anti-Corruption Commission is directed to educate and create
awareness on any matter within the Commissions mandate.
49
Additionally, the
Commission is required to publish an annual report setting forth its activities,
finances, and any other information related to its functions.
50
Because of its
nascence, however, review of the implementation of the public education function
is not yet available.

Prevention Activities

Many states anti-corruption commissions are required to implement
preventative measures as part of the respective states anti-corruption strategy.
Such measures may include reviewing the practices and procedures of government
departments, and help revise those that may more readily lead to corruption.

States may provide broadly for prevention activities, such as in Kenya, or
prescribe more specific efforts, such as in Hong Kong. Kenyas Independent
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill broadly authorizes the Commission
to undertake preventive measures against unethical and corrupt practices.
51
The
Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), by contrast, has
an extensive mandate to prevent corruption. The ICAC is required to provide
guidance to government offices and institutions on ways in which they can
eliminate corrupt practices. The ICAC is also required to advise the heads of
government departments of changes in practices or procedures that they can
implement to reduce corrupt practices.
52

Botswanas Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes (DCEC) is
required to examine the practices and procedures of public agencies and advise
public officials on the means to eliminate the potential for corrupt activities.
53
The
DCEC created a specialized body, the Corruption Prevention Group (CPG), to
carry out these preventative objectives. The mission of the CPG is to identify areas
in government that are particularly susceptible to corrupt transactions, such as

49
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 13(2)(a) (Kenya, 2011).
50
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 28(3), (4) (Kenya, 2011).
51
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 13(2)(b) (Kenya, 2011).
52
53
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Botswana, 2001, available
at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/regional/africa_middle_east.

12
purchasing and contract bidding. The CPG also advises government leadership on
work practices that limit the potential for corruption.
54

Some states, such as Australia/New South Wales, have anti-corruption
commissions that focus primarily on corruption prevention and only reserve
limited resources for investigation. While the Australia/New South Wales
Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) maintains an investigation
unit, corruption prevention is the main focus of the commission. The ICAC
distributes information to government offices and to the public about the costs of
corruption.
55
Similarly, the mandate of the United States Office of Government
Ethics (OGE)
56
is to deter conflicts of interest by disseminating information on
laws and regulations that govern public sector employment.
57
Accordingly, the
OGE defines corrupt practices and informs public servants about United States
laws to prevent corruption.
58
The OGE has no investigative capacity. Rather, the
role of the OGE is entirely preventative and aimed at improving bureaucratic
understanding of laws and regulations.

A limited number of states anti-corruption commissions may also enhance
prevention by proposing amendments to laws and regulations. For instance, the
Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau in Latvia and the Special
Investigation Service (SIS) in Lithuania are authorized to review legislation and
make proposals for review.
59
The SIS in Lithuania also has the power to propose
legislation to the President and the Parliament.
60

54
Combating Corruption: What the Ecuadorian Anti-Corruption Agency Can Learn from International Good
55
(2004).
56
United States, Office of Government Ethics website, available at www.usoge.gov/.
57
(2004).
58
(2004).
59
UNDP, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE, Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption: A Comparative
60
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Lithuania, 2001 (2001),
available at
http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.transparency.org/content/download/1754/8762/file/lithuania.pdf&sa=U&
ei=0OyNT7f4OomXtwfasITBCw&ved=0CAQQFjAA&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNGt0cj-
8H9QOrLodgZQCXNgaLGQwg.

13
Prosecutorial Authority

Some states anti-corruption commissions also assume responsibility for the
prosecution of cases of corruption. The authority of an anti-corruption commission
to prosecute cases of corruption can be important if a state does not have a judicial
system with adequate capacity to prosecute corruption cases.
61

Tanzania and Botswana are two states that grant their anti-corruption
commissions with the power to prosecute cases of corruption. In Tanzania, the
Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB)
62
is specifically granted power to
prosecute cases with the approval of the Director for Public Prosecution.
63

Botswanas Constitution requires the Attorney General to oversee all criminal
prosecutions. However, due to a heavy workload, the responsibility to prosecute
cases of corruption has shifted to the Directorate on Corruption and Economic
Crimes (DCEC).
64

Kenyas Anti-Corruption Commission, which represents the most recent
state practice in the area of anti-corruption commissions, is authorized to
investigate and prosecute acts of corruption or violations of the codes of conduct,
as well as any other matters that fall under Chapter Six of Kenyas constitution.
65

Chapter Six of Kenyas constitution provides for the responsibilities and duties of
state officers who are in a position of public trust, and prohibits certain conduct on
behalf of such officials.
66
Kenya is thus an instance of state practice where the
commission has a broad grant of prosecutorial power.

In most states, prosecution of corruption cases remains primarily the
responsibility of the judiciary and is not transferred to the anti-corruption
commission. For instance, Singapores Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
(CPIB) cannot independently prosecute a suspect. It can only investigate and
present evidence to the Singapore Attorney General. The Attorney General then

61
62
Tanzania, Prevention of Corruption Bureau website, available at http://www.pccb.go.tz/.
63
64
65
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 11(d), (m) (Kenya, 2011).
66
KENYA CONST. arts. 73-77 (2010).

14
decides whether or not to prosecute the case.
67
The Hong Kong ICAC likewise
cannot prosecute cases and merely presents evidence to the states Secretary of
Justice, who will then make a decision regarding prosecution.
68
Similarly, the
United States Office of Government Ethics (OGE) submits any evidence of
misconduct to the states Department of Justice for further investigation and
prosecution.
69

Indias Central Vigilance Commission enjoys some judicial authority, but
does not have complete prosecutorial ability. In particular, for purposes of
conducting any inquiry that has been referred to the Commission, the Commission
has all of the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil
Procedure, and every proceeding before the Commission is deemed a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code.
70
In conducting an
inquiry, the Commissions judicial powers extend to summoning and enforcing
attendance of any person in India and examining him or her under oath, requiring
discovery and the production of documents, receiving evidence and affidavits, and
requisitioning public records from any court or office.
71
Beyond its pre-trial
judicial powers, however, the Central Vigilance Commission does not have the
ability to directly prosecute corrupt acts. Rather, the Central Vigilance
Commission is authorized only to review the progress of investigations that have
been referred to the Delhi Special Police Establishment or other competent
authorities for prosecution.
72

Coordination of Anti-Corruption Commission and other Government Offices

In some states, particularly those with complex governmental structures,
anti-corruption commissions are also sometimes tasked with the coordination of
the national anti-corruption effort. Government entities sometimes have
overlapping mandates related to anti-corruption efforts. This redundancy can
ensure that every case is pursued irrespective of political biases that may exist.

67
68
69
(2004).
70
Central Vigilance Commission Act, arts. 11, 12 (India, 2003), available at http://cvc.gov.in/cvcact.pdf.
71
Central Vigilance Commission Act, art. 11(a)-(f) (India, 2003), available at http://cvc.gov.in/cvcact.pdf.
72
Central Vigilance Commission Act, art. 8(1)(e)-(f) (India, 2003), available at http://cvc.gov.in/cvcact.pdf.

15
Such overlapping mandates can be problematic, however, if they lead to the
ineffective use of resources or conflicts between different entities.

In the United States, a number of distinct government offices work together
to form a network of agencies to combat corruption. The Office of Government
Ethics (OGE) is charged with coordinating the cooperation amongst all the offices.
Latvias Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (CPCB) also has a mandate
to coordinate the implementation of anti-corruption efforts amongst government
institutions.
73
All other bodies with investigative mandates are required to assist the
CPCB in carrying out its investigations.
74

In Kenya, the Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill
provides for early coordination with other government agencies and civil groups.
Article 6 provides that a special selection panel consisting of persons from various
governmental and non-governmental offices will be responsible for the
appointment of the Commissions chairperson and members.
75
Specifically, Article
6 requires that one person from each of the following bodies serve in the selection
panel: the Office of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry
responsibility for ethics and integrity, the Judicial Service Commission, the Kenya
National Human Rights and Equality Commission, the Commission on
Administration of Justice, and the Commission responsible for gender issues.
76

Additionally, the Media Council of Kenya and a joint forum of religious
organizations must nominate one person each to serve on the selection panel.
77

Additionally, Kenyas Anti-Corruption Commission Bill provides that one of the
functions of the Commission will be to work with other state and public offices to
develop and promote standards and best practices.
78
With respect to reducing
redundancy and overlap, the Bill provides that the Commission will serve as the
central authority in Kenya for all international cooperation directed toward anti-
corruption efforts.
79

73
74
75
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 6 (Kenya, 2011).
76
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 6(1)(a)-(g) (Kenya, 2011).
77
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 6(1)(h), (i) (Kenya, 2011).
78
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 11(b) ( (Kenya, 2011).
79
Independent Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, art. 11(l) (Kenya, 2011).

16
Conclusion

State practice illustrates that while the structures and functions of anti-
corruption commissions vary widely, most states have adopted models that address
the autonomy or independence of the commission as well as its mandate and
functions. Core elements of anti-corruption commissions typically include one or
more of five key functions: (1) investigatory powers; (2) education/public
awareness; (3) prevention; (4) prosecution; and (5) coordination of related
activities among government entities.

State practice illustrates that most states adopt a three-pronged approach that
includes investigation, prevention and education. Limited resources and potential
biases within other government offices of the state may, however, increase the
responsibilities of an anti-corruption commission. In such cases, anti-corruption
commissions may also prosecute corruption and coordinate national anti-corruption
efforts involving multiple governmental offices engaged in the identification,
prevention and prosecution of corruption cases.

State practice indicates that with an appropriate legislative framework and
adequate provision of resources and support for their efforts, the overall impact of
an anti-corruption commission is one of increased government effectiveness and
increased confidence in government by the people it serves.

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