Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 26

Basics of HAZOP 6-1

C H A P T E R 6
Basics of HAZOP
What Did we Do Before HAZOP Came Along?
We relied upon:
Good engineering practices
Codes of practice such as ASME, API, NFPA, etc.
Informal safety reviews
So what slips through the cracks?
Interface problems between equipment and systems
Abnormal conditions not envisioned during design
Human error in design, operation, maintenance
How Do We Know If a Plant Is Safe?
Historical record of plant incidents and near misses
History of incidents on similar plants
Record of onstream time
Can apply some risk ranking, e.g., Dow/Mond indices
Ask: What guarantee do we have that there isn't a serious accident about to happen?
If there is NO guarantee:
What can we do about it?
1=3 Increase Hazards & Risk Awareness
by:
Process Safety Management Program.
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6 -2
HAZOP Methodology
HAZOP
Acronym for HAZards and Operability Analysis.
Originated by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in Mond Division.
Basic Concept
Simulate abnormal behavior by considering deviations and disturbances due to causes
likely to impact immediate and surrounding plant resulting in consequences. Then decide
whether the design has adequate features (i.e., safeguards) that can prevent occurrence or
limit the consequential effects. If no such safeguards exist, then consider what actions are
needed to remedy the situation.
High Deviation
Normal (Design Intention)
Low Deviation
Other Deviations typically include:
Reverse of what was intended.
What else can happen?
System only partially functions.
What additional things can occur?
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6 -3
Methodology for Generating Deviations
G u i d e W o r d + P r o p e r t y = D e v i a t i o n
For example:
When Property = Parameter:
High + Flow
- -
Low + Pressure
- -
More + Reaction
- -
When Property = Operation:
No + Transfer
- -
Less + Empty - -
When Property = Material:
No + Steam
- -
More + Diluent
- -
High Flow
Low Pressure
Greater Reactivity
No Transfer
Residue Remaining
No Steam
More Diluent
9 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-4
What Type of HAZOP Should You Use?
Parametric Deviation (e.g., High pressure, Low temperature, etc.)
Good for continuous processes.
Most widely used in world today.
Critical Examination
The approach examines:
Material
= Activities
Sources and Destinations
Good for batch operations, start-up, shut down.
Procedural Methodology
Useful far HAZOPing:
Operating manuals, procedures
Batch operations
Start-up, shut down
Knowledge Based HAZOP (more like 'What i f with established Checklist)
Mainly applicable to:
Well established (continuous) processes
Organizations with very high quality engineering practices & standards
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-5
Steps in the HAZOP Process
1. Preparation
Assemble:
P&IDs (Full size and reduced copies for the team)
PFDs plus material and energy balances
Equipment specifications
Layout drawings
2. Facilitator and Process Engineer
Break P&IDs down into Nodes.
Nodes are equipment items (or numbers of items).
If nodes are too small you can loose sense of analysis and incur excessive
repetition.
If nodes are too large, hard to handle, becomes confusing.
Question: How do you size a node?
Answer: Based on system function.
Example: Reactor feed system may consist of Pump + Line + Exchanger.
3. Prepare HAZOP Outline with List of Deviations
4. Assemble HAZOP Team
2 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
5. Facilitator Explains
The facilitator or one of the team members explains the purpose and scope of the
HAZOP and sets the rules for the study.
6. Process Engineer Explains
Process in general
Immediate Node being HAZOPed
7. HAZUP Each Node Using Deviations Listed in Outline Working Through
the P&ZD.
Produce HAZOP worksheet recording the following:
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Actions/Recommendations
Remarks
8. At the End of HAZOP, the Facilitator Issues Preliminary HAZOP Report
(issuance is optional) consisting of
Attendance
Outline
Detail Report
Action/Recommendations Register
9. Issue Final Report Giving Full Details
A sample of table of contents is given in page 6- 11.
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-7
Variations in HAZOP Types
Three basic types:
Guide Word HAZOP
Knowledge Based HAZOP
"Creative Checklist"
The Guide Word method is the most accepted method. There are five main variations:
Cause-by-cause
Consequence-by-consequence
Deviation-by-deviation
Exception only
Action/Recommendation item only
Cause-By-Cause Methodology
Correlates Consequences, Safeguards and Actions to each particular Cause of a Deviation.
Precise method
Reduces ambiguity
Detail print-out can be followed, is fully auditable
Example: Deviation: Line Rupture
Cause-By-Cause provides full cross-referencing.
Action
Check fire protection
Action
Check fire protection
Action
Provide crash barrier
Safeguard
Pipe stress analysis
Safeguard
Charpee tested steel
Safeguard
None
Cause #I
Line overstressed
Cause #2
Brittle fracture
Cause #3
Vehicular impact
Consequence
Flammable release, fire
Consequence
Flammable release, fire
Consequence
Flammable release, fire
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-8
Consequence-By-Consequence Methodology
Correlates Consequences, Safeguards and Actions to each particular Consequence of a
Deviation.
Precise method
Reduces ambiguity
Detail print-out can be followed, is fully auditable
Example: Deviation: Line Rupture
Consequence-By-Consequence provides full cross-referencing.
Cause #I
Line overstressed
Cause #2
Brittle fracture
Cause #3
Vehicular impact
Deviation-By-Deviation Methodology
All Causes, Consequences, Safeguards and Actions are related only to a particular
Deviation.
Consequence
Flammable release
Fire
Consequence
Flammable release
Fire
Consequence
Flammable release
Fire
Fairly simple to execute
Some ambiguity
Fairly rapid
Detail print-out hard to follow
Safeguard
Pipe stress analysis
Safeguard
Charpee tested steel
Safeguard
None
Action
Check fire protection
Action
CheckJre protection
Action
Provide crash burrier
Check fire protection
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-9
Example: Deviation: Line Rupture
Deviation-By-Deviation provides no cross-referencing.
Exception Only Methodology (Not Recommended)
Causes
Line overstressed
Brittle fiacture
Vehicular impact
Includes only those deviations for which team believes there are credible causes.
Safeguards
Pipe stress analysis
Charpee tested steel
Consequences
Flammable release, fire
Reduces time
Cannot be audited
Actions
Check fire protection
Provide crash barrier
Citations have been issued by OSHA in the USA against covered facilities using this
method.
ActiorulCecommendations Item Only Methodology (Not Recommended)
Only suggestions that team makes for action items are recorded. (No proper analysis).
Not auditable
9 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 0
Preparation of HAZOP Reports
Basic Report Should Consist of
1. HAZOP Outline
Nodes
Deviations
Guide Words
Parameters
Design Intent
Design Conditions
2. Detail Report
Lists output of sessions.
For each Node and Deviation lists:
Causes
Consequences (+ Risk Ranking)
Safeguards
Actions/Recommendations
Remarks
3. Attendance Register
Facility, Unit
Location
Team members and expertise
Attendance (Present/Absent/Not required/Part-time)
) DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 1
4. Action/Recommendations Register
Action/Recommendations Item
Person(s) responsible for follow-up
Prioritization
Status
Target date for completion (Resolution)
Other
Risk ranking
Categorization
Final Report
1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. Process Description
4. Hazards of the process
5. Hazard and Operability Methodology
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendices
o Outline of Hazard and Operability Study
o Drawings
o Project Information Report
o Drawing Report
o Team Members Report
o Risk Matrix Report
o Worksheet Report
o Action~Recommendations Report
o Computer files
9 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-12
HAZOP Example
Table 6-1: Scope of HAZOP and Process Description
E?&&pslqk XYE Processing Corporation
t
LPenibw bypl ace
Pm$a3 IR: , AX Wl
t
Start Date: If2IReMI;I;
I '
end'rnk 1 -
r
C-t: LIGHT ENDS RECOVERY UNIT (See Figures 6- 1 and 6-2)
To imuam the li&hta& pottion of a liquid feed stream containing 50%, by weight, of light 4 s us& a
d m M 6 m t ~ . The feed rate is 100,000 lbhour and the intent is ta r-wr 81% af the light em&
w ,k
hF in ,order to prpduue a1W h , by weight, light ends distillate.
RYPOess Description:
The lmit is W &QI XI aq uptream &d dnxm, V- 10 1. Liquid feed is sqpplied at a btw@ MI
pdgdat 22QP. The f& Is pre-heated by heat exchange with the light emis wippwr bmggp&&m @ 3QQ F, in
that &&&M&m ~~b EX-101, before it enters the light ends stripper, C-101..
The light end$ t@l~per+ C- l Ql , is a 22 plate fractionation column, ushg valve-type h y s wl i hb~Pmd
ImWd
on plate 12.
Overhead vapors from the light ends stripper, C- 10 1, pass to the light ends condenser, EX-102, which is water
cooled. Fluids from this condenser flow to the reflux drum, V-102. Non condensible vapors entering the reflux
drum, V-102, are vented to the flare system while the condensed liquids pass to the reflux pump, P-101 or spare.
The total distillate is split so that product distillate is sent directly to storage while the main portioo is reflusedbaak
to the top of the light ends stripper, C- 10 1.
At the base of the light ends stripper, C-10 1, there is a vertical thermosiphon reboiler, EX-103, which is heated by
300 psig steam on the shell side. Bottoms liquid from the base of the light ends stripper, C-101, is pumped by a
bottoms pump, P-102 or spare, to the tube side of the feedhottoms exchanger, EX-101, in which it is cooled by feed
before passing to storage.
Process Controls:
The feed to column is under flow control via loop FRC-10 1.
The reflux flow is under flow control via loop FRC-116.
Distillate withdrawal is under level control via loop LlC-107, from the reflux drum level.
Non-condensibles bleed off under pressure control via loop PIC- 106 based on the overheads column pressure.
> DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 3
The rate of bottoms withdrawal is under level control via loop LIC-119 based on the column bottom level.
The steam flow to the reboiler is under composition control via temperature control loop TRC-126 based on the
process side of the reboiler outlet.
Protective Devices:
Relief valve PSV-105, protects against overpressuring of the light ends stripper and connected components.
Relief valve, PSV-106, protects against thermal expansion on the cooling water side of the light ends condenser.
High and low level conditions, LAH-120, LAL-12 1 and LAH & LAL-107, are alarmed respectively on the light
ends stripper and the reflux drum. The low level condition, LSL-12 1, on the stripper is also interlocked to stop the
bottoms pump. The low low level condition on the reflux drum stops the reflux pump.
In event of failure of the bottoms pump, the spare pump is started by a low low pressure switch, PSLL-125. The
same arrangement, for the reflux pump, is also supplied by a low low pressure switch, PSLL-109.
High or low column pressures are alarmed by PAH & PAL- 106 respectively.
Loss of reflux is alarmed by FAL- 1 16.
Loss of steam to the reboiler is alarmed by TAL- 126.
A minimum flow bypass on the bottoms pump protects against the no flow condition.
Remotely operable motor operated valve, MOV-122, can be manually initiated in an emergency, such as bottoms
line leaklfiacture, to prevent significant flammables inventory loss and fire.
The instrument air failure positions of the control valves are indicated as F.C. (fail close) or F.O. (fail open).
Car seal open (CSO) valves are as indicated.
Assumptions:
During a normal HAZOP you would normally have access to full equipment specifications, plant layout drawings,
piping specifications, line lists, tie points and other pertinent documents. As this sample demonstrates PHA-Pro,
rather than being an exercise in design, such documents are not included. Therefore make whatever assumptions
you think reasonable if you wish to modify or extend the HAZOP as shown.
Normal Operating Conditions:
Stream #1, Feed @ 220 F, 90 PSIG, 100,000 LbIHour, 50% Light Ends
Stream #2, Overhead @ 200 F, 75 PSIG, 135,000 LbIHour, 90.2% Light Ends
Stream #3, Bottoms @ 300 F, 120 PSIG, 50,000 LbIHour, 9.5% Light Ends
Stream #4, Reflux @ 200 F, 75 PSIG, 85,000 LbIHour, 90% Light Ends
Stream #5, Non Condensibles @ 200 F, 75 PSIG, 5,000 LbMour, 95% Light Ends
Stream #6, Distillate @ 200 F, 150 PSIG, 45,000 LbIHour, 90% Light Ends
Stream #7, Reboiler Feed @ 300 F, 80 PSIG, 185,000 LbIHour, 9.5% Light Ends
Stream #8, Steam Flow @ 420 F, 300 PSIG, 25,000 LbIHour
2 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-14
TI I -. . . . l --*---" .----, ",--'-'.""'" . - l l . l l l l " l-.l...-.. .
Heat Exchanger Duties: Y
1
Condenser, EX- 102: 19.5 MMBTUIHR
FeedlBottoms Exchanger, EX-] 01 : 1.9 MMBTUIHR
Reboiler, EX-103: 19.9 MMBTUIHR
) DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 5
Figure 6-1: P&ID of Light Ends Process
9 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 6
Figure 6-2: Process Flow Diagram
FOR L I G H T S WOVEBY Im
HEAT CONDENSER: 19.5 MMBTUl?W
FEEDIBCYITOMS EXCHANGER: 1.9 MMBTUlRR
REBOILER. 19.9 MMBTUIISR
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 7
Table 6-2: List of Deviations
Node: 1. Light Ends Recovery Unit Drawings: 1. Process Flow Sketch of Light Ends
I
'
Recovery Unit; 2. Piping & Instrumentation Diagra~
Types: Centrifugal Pump, Column, Heat Exchanger, Line,
# PCD-A1
Maintenance problems, Vessel
' ~ ~ u i ~ r n e n t ID: Distillation unit with heat recovery from 7
bottoms heating feedstream
r
Design ConditionsIParameters: Design conditions are listed
in Process Flow Sketch of Light Ends Recovery Unit
~rovided
Deviation
1.1. High Flow
r
1.2. LowINo Flow
1.3. ReverseJMisdirected Flow
1.4. Other than Flow
I
1.5. High Temperature
1.6. Low Temperature
1.7. High Pressure
1.8. Low Pressure
I
1.9. High Level
1.10. Low Level
I
1.1 1. Cavitation
1.12. Column Flooding
I
---
1.13. Low Tray Level
1.14. High Concentration of
Impurities
t
1.15. Leak
Guide Word Parameter Sessio Revision # Design Intent
High Flow
In I I
1 As per Process Flow
Diagram
, ---I----
LowINo As per Process Flow
/ 1 1 Diagram
ReverseIMisdirecte Flow
I 1 l o
As per Process Flow
d Diagram
Other than
--7"-7; O
As per Process Flow
Diagram
-
2 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 8
- . - - - -
Dev~ation Gu~de Word
I
1.16. Rupture I Other than
I
-- - - - -
t
l Parameter 1 Sessio Revision # 1 Design Intent
, ) DYADEM
1.17. Start-~ip1Shutdown I Other than 1 start- , 0 1 As per Operating
Hazards
1
/ ~~pl shut down I Instructions
. .
1.18. Maintenance Hazards Other than Maintenance 12 , O
1
1 As per Maintenance
I
1 Data
&2-w-sik-&& &> bSa-&"@& $~&&SY R~&QSI ,>a3k i bd&k, It L I $53 s ,wLk%**~~Q,&SI&&- 2 $-&&V.!~V& fik& "bbAi3ba2&. &#*& &&~-~t%%& "*>ihaw- &k 2)
-
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-1 9
Table 6-3: Sample Worksheet
Node: 1. Light Ends Recovery Unit Drawings: 1. Process
r
Types: Centrifugal Pump, Column, Heat Exchanger, Line,
Flow Sketch of Light
Ends Recovery Unit,
Equipment ID: Distillation unit with heat recovery from bottoms heating feedstream 2. Piping &
r Instrumentation
Design ConditionslParameters: Design conditions are listed in Process Flow Sketch of
Diagram # PCD-A I
Light Ends Recovery Unit provided
1.1. High Flow
2. Investigate recycling
line and/or additional
101 (dwg. no. PCD-
AA1) to trip FV- 101
closed using solenoid
3?, DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-20
- -- -.- * *-
Causes ' Consequences 1 Safeguards 1 S
room monitored as
opposed to local device
and add high
temperature switch and
control valve TV- 126
so that on fill1 opening
column will be in likely
to flood due to excess
vapor flow
Responsible
4. Control j 4.1. High bottoms 14.1. PSV-105 j I
' Tom Volke
valve or ' temperature I 1
' fails CV
' i ; f f - spec Products
I
TV-126 I
open or '
' bypass left
Phillip
Smith
open j
I
I
I
1 ,
I
14.3. Over-pressuring 14.2. TI- 1 17
of column
8. Add high
temperature alarm,
TAH- 126
To111 Volke
of col ~~mn
- -
i
I
5 Control 5 . 1 Column will 15.1. PAL-106 I 9. Add independent
pressure monitor on
column overheads with
high and low pressure
switches and alar~ns
Tom Volke
valve or i depressure to flare / (provided 1
controller ; 1w -
fails CV
, 5.2. Loss of products ! 1
PV- 106 ! 5.3. Off-spec products /
open or i
bypass left
open
- --- -" - - -- - - - -
I
I - ---- -
6. Control 6.1. Loss of products 1 6.1. LAL- 12 1
I
-- --
16.1. $
1 Safegilards f '
I are
I.<
r
9
, [adequate
I
4
$.
9
I =,'
I
2
iSi
k
1%
";:
1
.:'
6 I
i\
sE
3
!i
I 1
I 5
18.1, d 9
Safeguards
are 2
,
adequate '
R
i!
? k,A A ,4& &< W. 2h &&a A, - & . . . *
, val ve or - - - - - -
I
6.2. Off-spec prodi~cts 1
controller , I
falls CV
LV- 107
open or - -
bypass left 6.3. Low level in
6.2. LSL- I2 1
trips P-1021s
open column c o ~ ~ l d
I
I
I bottoms pumps P-
, 1021s
- -
7. Control 7.1. Excess reflux to 7.1. None 4 1 10. Add high flow
alarm to FRC- I 16
1 1 1. Consider
monitoring steam flow
to column by adding
i flow indicator on 3"-S-
i 10 1 as check on energy
!
, consumption
valve or column i I
I controller
I
I 7.2. Unecononiical
CV performance 1
FV-116 1
open or ;
bypass left '
open I
I
8. PSV-105 8.1. Column will
fails open depressure to flare
8.1. Block
and bypass
' due to I valves I
8.2. Loss of products PSV
spring . .
. -
failure ,8.3. Off-spec products 1 nl ~l r PI- 1 04 1
) DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-2 1
r
Causes
I
I
9. Steam
trap on 3"-
S-102 sticks
open
Consequences Safeguards
8.4. [Failure too for manual
infrequent to raise pressure
significant concerns] relief when
PSV-105 is
removed for
repair
9.1. Steam wastage 9.1. None
9.2. Uneconomical 1
RR I Recommendations
1 1. Consider
monitoring steam flow
to column by adding
flow indicator on 3"-S-
10 1 as check on energy
consumption
Responsible
Tom Volke
& Carl
Hanks
Remarks
1.2. Low/No Flow I
I--
maintenance inspection of
flow devices, such as FE-
system to make up in the
event of sudden loss of
steam to reboiler
> DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-22
--- - .-
Causes
--
1
- - -
Conseq~~ences Safeguards
4.2. Poss~ble " "-I I
L ' RR
Responsible , Remarks
- - - -- --
Tom Volke
closed 14. Interlock reflux return,
FV- 1 16, and feed, FV- I0 I
to close when PAL- 106 is
act uated
1 vacuum in
i
I
1 column causing 1
I
1 tray damage
I
I -
5. Control 5. I . Column will 15. I. PAH-106
- -
Tom Volke 9. Add independent
pressure monitor on
column overheads with
high and low pressure
switches and alarms
valve or
' controller
fails CV PV-
z 106 closed
overpressure (provided
P1C- 106 is
fi~nct ional)
5.2. Loss of
products
/
- " - 1 .
6. Control 16.1. Loss of / 6. I . LAH- 107 15. Add high level switch
and alarm on reflux drum
v - 102
Tom Volke
valve or 1 products 1 (provided
controller
fails CV
LV- 107
closed
. - -
7. Control
valve or
' controller
fails CV FV-
1 16 closed
" - - - .
7.1. Loss of 17. 1. FAL-I16
. . -
1 1. Consider monitoring
steam flow to c o l ~~mn by
adding flow indicator on
3"-S- 10 1 as check on
16. Add independent
pressure monitor on
co1~11nn overheads with
high and low pressure
switches and alarms
Tom Volke
& Carl
Hanks
reflux to column 1 (provided
- - "
' FIC-116is
7. 2 Off-spec fLlnctional)
products
Tom Volke
- . -
1 7.3. Over-
/ column
f -
- - - -
8.1. None 1 1. Consider monitoring
steam flow to column by
adding flow indicator on
3"-S-101 as check on
energy consumption
- " - - - "
Tom Volke
& Carl
Hanks 102 sticks
/ 8.2, Lois of
closed 1 products
!
' 9. 1.
/ Safegnards
l are
I - -
' - __" -
9. Bottoms 19.1. No
pump P- I withdrawal of
1021s stops j bottoms product
"- . ..
19.2. Loss of 9.2. Spare
products
9.3. High level in
base of column
" .
10.1. Loss of
9.3. LG- 1 18
10. Reflux
pump P-
1 o 1 IS stops
10.1. FAL-
116
j 10.1.
1 Safeguards reflux to column
; are
10.2. PSV-
105
t$asP&42- :,34&w&
products
-E-had
) DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP
6-23
1
Causes
1
t
1 1. MOV-
122 fails
closed
12.
Temporary
strainers on
P-1011s
plugged
r
13. Loss of
overhead
condenser.
I
pressuring of
column
would
cavitateldamage
bottoms pumps P-
1021s
would
cavitateldamage
bottoms pumps P-
1021s
13.1.
Overpressuring of
column to relief
condition.
10.3. Spare
11.1.
Interlock on
MOV-122
positioner
stops bottoms
pumps when
valve closes
13.1. Low 2 3
flow alarm
FAL-116 on
loss of reflux.
13.2. Pressure
relief valve
106 & PV-
106 opening
to flare.
MOV- 122 positioner ZC-
122 to stop bottoms pumps
when MOV- 122 valve
closes
strainers on P- 10 1 IS are
cleaned and removed when
no longer required
19. Check PSV-105 for
controlling case for sizing
valve. Must handle fire
case, tube rupture in
reboiler,total loss of reflux,
loss of cooling medium,
instrument or controller
failure, instrument air
failure, power failure, etc.
20. PV-106 to be checked
for maximum discharge
flow in event of cooling
water failure to EX-102.
Responsible Remarks
Phillip
Smith
1
1.3. ReverseIMisdirected Flow I
1.1. Possible explosive
9 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP
6-24
Table 6-4: List of Recommendations
- . - . . . , . . -. -
- ...
-. . -. . . . - - . . -
nsider monitoring stea
3"-S-101 as check on
/ _._
17. ' Provide interlock on M
num discharge flow in event of
) DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-25
7
# Recommendation Resp Status
I
22. Check on flow regime in 6"-P-113 to
slugging
'23. Check that line 3"-P-104 is both self-venting and is not pocketed Phillip ~ m i t h F
r
24. Evaluate need for emergency depressuring to prevent BLEVE in Phillip Smith Study
event of fire
I
25. Provide sample point on inlet feed. Also consider need for on-line Tom Volke Incomplete
analyzer for column feed.
' 26.1 Provide quality control check on feed stream to column / Carl Hanks 1 Study
Add high temperature alarm on overheads to indicate trend towards Tom Volke Incomplete
off-spec distillate
TR- 103 only
I I
Phillip Smith Incomplete
' 29.1 Add low temperature alarm to TR- 103. I Tom Volke
r
30. Consider adding independent high high level switch and alarm on Tom Volke
reflux drum
/ Incomplete
Study
i
31. Check sizing of control valve TV-126 so that CV is not oversized Phillip Smith
and could cause column flooding when fully open. If necessary & Tom
consider adding upper limit stop on control valve. Volke
Study
Check as to whether upstream water separation
Reconvene meeting if not met.
33. Provide bolt torquing procedure as part of
I
34. Consider need for environmental monitors. Mary Incomplete
Patterson
Add isolation valve immediately upstream of stripper on reflux line
2"-P- 1 10.
36. I Make valve on 3"-P-102 feed to column car seal open.
Phillip Smith Incomplete
t
37. Add check valve to 3"-P-102, close to stripper feed inlet.
Allen Brown Incomplete
rm that C-101 a
Pri Place(s
1 Used
7 1.4.1
I
3 DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC
Basics of HAZOP 6-26
SUGGESTED READING (URLs current at time of publication)
"Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" by AIChE, CCPS, 2"d edition, 1992 plus
"Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" by AlChE, CCPS, I st edition, 1985
w w w . a i c h e . o r r / p u L > c a t / s e a d t l . a s ~ ' ? A c ~ k 4 i n = 2 i ~
"HAZOP and HAZAN" by T.Kletz, published by IChemE, 1992
www.icl1e1ne.or~/framesetsiia1~o~1ti1~S~iiii~est. ht n~
"Size up plant hazards tllis way" by H.G.Lawley, Hydrocarbon Processing, April 1976, pages
247 to 258
www.livdrocarbon~~rocessin~.co~n~conte~~ts/pul~l icatiotis,:'hp/
"Eliminating Potential Process Hazards" by T.Kletz, Chemical Engineering, April 1, 1985, pages
48 to 59
www.che.com/
"An Introduction to Hazard and Operability Studies - The Guide Word Approach" by
R.E.Knowlton, published by Chemetics International, 198 1
www. kvaerner.co~n/co~i~pa~~ics!co~iipan iesdctai I.asp'?id::.::.79(i
"A Manual of Hazard & Operability Studies - The Creative Identification of Deviations and
Disturbances", published by Chemetics International, 1992
w~vw.kvae1ner.con1/co11i~.~atii~s/~o1ii~~ai1iesdetai.asp~!id=796
"Some Features of and Activities in Hazard and Operability (Hazop) Studies", by J.R.Roach and
F.P.Lees, The Chemical Engineer,October, 198 1, pages 456 to 462
\vwcv.ichenie.or~/fr~1111esets/i1bo~1 - tusfra~neset htln
"HAZOP: Guide to best practice" by F.Crawley, M.Preston, B.Tyler, IChernE, 2000
~vww.icherne.o~/fi.amesets/aboutusframesct.l~t~n
"The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) Method" (Website)
w~\~\\!.acusafc.co~n/I Iazard_A~ialysis/l IAZ0PTccliriiquc.pdf
"Hazard and Operability Studies", by M.Lihou (Website)
M!M!W. l i l ~oi ~t ecI ~. co~~i / h~p 1 fi.m.htm
"Hazard and Operability Studies", University of Florida, (Website)
litt~:l.'pie.clie.i~fl.edi~/~i~ideslhazopiindex.litn~l
"Process Hazards Analysis" by I.Sutton, published by SWISutton & Associates, 2002
litt~~://ww~~~.swbooks.co~i~/bool~~/bo~~k~~~prI~~t .slitml
) DYADEM
2003 by CRC Prcss LLC