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Dann Sl ayden Cross l l l , MBA,

et al i a
In the United States District Court
. for the Middle District of Georgia
Macon Division
Dr. Sharon Cross,
)
plaintiffs
in propria persona
V.
Patrick Eidson, et alia
defendants
Jury Trial Demanded
Plaintiffs' rebuttalto defendant Patrick Eidson' s motion to dismiss
Plaintiffb have thrice attempted to bring defendant Patrick Eidson (Eidson)
to the instant federal
conversation within which he is being sued in his individual capacity. Plaintiffs third attempt, resulted
i n Ei dson' s moti on,to di smi ss. Pl ai nti ffs, herei n, rebut Ei dson' s moti on to di smi ss bri ef document 100.
Eidson asserts that he acted as a "SpecialAssistant Attorney General with the Macon County
DFCS" during the instant matter. Document 100 does not evidence that Eidson is authorized by Law,
license, or parental
consent to make medical decisions for the plaintiffs.
Eidson' s role in this matter
Defendant Eidson prepared
the so-called "ORDER FOR SHELTER CARE" (ORDER) at exhibit
A to the complaint utilized by defendants Lewis, Albritton, and Barr to unreasonably seize F,C. The
ORDER contains some factual statements, a few deceptions, and is not supported by Oath or
affirmation as is required by Law as evidenced at the Fourth Amendment. Eidson crafted the ORDER
based exclusively upon hearsay. Eidson' s ORDER expresses no exigency regarding F.C. receiving
the vaguely and inadequately described "shot" or "shots".
Defects on the face of the ORDER
The second paragraph
of the ORDER references private (copyrighted)
GEORGIA CODE 15-
11-58 (a) and asserts that "reasonable efforts have been made by the Deparlment to preserve
and
reuntfy the family prior to the placement
of the chitd in foster care..." lf the "child" being referenced is
Ci vi l acti on number:
5:14-cv-00006-CAR
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 1 of 12
the natural person, F.C., then this aspect of the order is a complete fabrication. Defendants and social
workers Jane and Janet Doe, by way of terroristic threat, expressed to plaintiffs that F.C, would be
taken by DFCS if plaintiffs failed to provide
consent for the administration of the tetanus vaccine to
F.C. Terroristic threats levied by State actors toward plaintiffs do not constitute "reasonable efforts to
preserve plaintiffs' family".
The third paragraph
of the the ORDER then makes a one hundred and eighty degree turn
expressing that "reasonable efforts to preserve the family were nof required pursuant
to GEORGIA
CODE 15-11-58 (a) (4) (A-C) whi ch reads:
(4)Reasonable efforts of the type described in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall not be
required to be made with respect to a parent
of a child if a court of competent
jurisdiction
has
determihed that:
(A)The parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances which may include but
need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse;
(B)The parent has:
(i)Committed murder of another child of the parent;
(ii)Been convicted of the murder of the other parent
of the child;
(iii)Committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent;
(iv)Aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit murder or voluntary
manslaughter of another child of the parent;
or
(v)Committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of
the parent;
or
(C)The parental rights of the parent
to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily;
Utilizing the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing
excludes all others") defendants Eidson and Lisa Rambo are asserting that plaintiffs have been found to
be guilty of at least one of the following as per the list contained in 15-11-58 (a) (4) (A-C): abandoners,
torturers, chronic abusers, sexual abusers, murderers, a convicted murderer, voluntary man-
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 2 of 12
slaughterers, felony assaultors. Plaintiffs have never been involved in any of those actions listed at 15-
11-58 (a) (4) (A-C) and defendants Eidson and Rambo know it, Therefore, this third paragraph is a
complete fabrication written by Eidson and authorized by Lisa Coogle Rambo. Defendants within this
so-called
juvenile
court deceived at every possible turn in order to have F.C. unreasonably seized.
Defendant Eidson was being paid with public funds while he was, by way of plain and demonstrable
deception, depriving plaintiffs
of their rights making him an embezzler of public
funds,
On January 19th, 2013 pl ai nti ff
Dann Cross questi oned
defendant Barr about the statement
concerning the preservation
of the family as stated on the "ORDER FOR SHLELTER CARE,,,
Specifically, plaintiff Dann Cross asked defendant Barr,"The MACON COTJNTY DE?ARTMENT OF
FAMILY AND CHILDRENS SERV/CES made reasonable efforts to preserve
and reunify the famity
prior
to the ptaiement
of the chitd in foster care? Can you explain that?" Defendant Barr responded,
"That is some standard wording that is in court orders and the bottom tine is we had to get
emergency
[emphasis
added] custody based on the information we were given
and so that had to be
done. Ihose things are required wording in our court orders". Dann Cross then respo nds,
,,What
sfnkes me about fhis is that's also an inaccuracy. The other DFCS workers up there said lf you don,t
do this we are going to take your
children. Other than that there was never an attempt to preserve
the
family prior to F.C. being taken. Defendant Barr replies
,
"YotJ are welcome to address that with our
attorney". The attorney referenced by Barr is defendant Eidson. Eidson flat out lied within a court
order, when he asserted that reasonable efforts have been made by the Department to preserve
plaintiffs' family
then lied again when he asserted that said reasonable efforts were not required
because plaintiffs have been found by a competent court of being abandoners, torturers, chronic
abusers, sexual abusers, murderers, a convicted murderer, voluntary man-slaughterers, or felony
assaultors. Defendant Barr then asserts that "standard wording", true or not, goes
on these court
orders. Defendant Eidson conspired with defendant Rambo to kidnap (criminal
side) and
unreasonably seize (civil side) F,C. under color of Law and by misrepresenting private
statutes as
evidenced at GEORGIA CODE 15-11-58 (a) (4) (A-C). Furthermore, plaintiffs
attempted to ascertain
information regarding their case from defendant Eidson via defendant, and DFCS supervisor, Karan
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 3 of 12
Albritton. The plaintiff
never received responses to these requests.
Defendant Eidson operates within a Court of No Record without
plaintiffs'
express and willing consent to do so
Juvenile Court is not a Trial Court nor is it a Court of Record. A Court of Record must meet all
of the following five criteria:
1. Keeps a record of the proceedings.
2.The tri bunal must be i ndependent
of the magi strate (Judge).
3. Proceed according to the common law (not statutes).
4. Has the authority to fine or imprison for contempt.
5. Has a Seal .
Plaintiff6 were deprived of their inalienable rights without a trial, without a
jury,
the
judge
and
prosecutor
relying exclusively upon hearsay testimony within the auspices of a court of no record and
were never charged or convicted of any crime whatsoever,
Plaintiffs made several written and verbal requests to defendants Rambo and Albritton to
produce
the record evidencing their accuser and what he or she actually alleged, Said requests were
ignored or maintained as "confidential" by defendants Albritton, Rambo, and Eidson. No Court of
Record is authorized by Law to maintain secret records in regards to an "accuser" especially when
that accuser misrepresented plaintiffs putting into motion the seizure of their two year
old son.
The tribunal and Judge were apparently identical that being defendant Lisa Coogle Rambo,
The
juvenile
court (this would be defendant Lisa Rambo, Eidson, Hurt exclus ive of a
jury) proceeded
according to profound personal
bias and the misrepresentation of
juvenile
statutes nof common law
(Constitution),
' The
juvenile
court may have the ability to fine and imprison yet plaintiffs
assert that the
juvenile
court has not the lawful authority to fine and imprison beneficiaries of the Trust. Plaintiffs have
provided
many of the documents issued by the
juvenile
court and not one "order" signed by defendant
Lisa Rambo (prepared
by defendants Eidson and Hurt) has, upon its face, a Court Seal. The physical
juvenile
court room was devoid of a Seal and of Federal or State standards (flags). By all
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 4 of 12
appearances, the
juvenile
court was 1000/o private
and not subject to common Law.
Therefore, the plaintiffs,
also beneficiaries of the common and fundamental law Trust, were
subjected not to a Court of Record but to a private
cabal of attorneys intending to deprive plaintiffs
of
their property (inclusive
of plaintiffs' wealth
and young sons).
Plaintiffs' rights violated by defendant Eidson
Defendant Eidson wrote the order to unreasonably seize F.C. thereby subjected or caused to
be subjected the plaintiffs
to deprivations of their inalienable rights as expressed at the Fourth
Amendment, their rights to due process,
and their parentar
rights.
No l mmuni ty for defendant Ei dson
Defendant Eidson acted under color of law thus had the superseding obligation to protect
the
beneficiary' s' (plaintiffs' ) rights to life, liberty, and property. An obligation defendant Eidson simply and
maliciously refused to perform to the manifest injury of plaintiffs. Furthermore, defendant Eidson
prosecutes
by way of deception and outright lies within a Court of No Record which is to say that his
juvenile
court is not a "State" Couil". Instead the
juvenile
court is a private
court depending entirely
upon the consent of all parties
in order to proceed.
Plaintiffs were at all times coerced via duress into
participating with said court thus plaintiffs
never consented to the
jurisdiction
of the private juvenile
court. Defendant Eidson appears to be a private
actor proceeding under mere pretense
of Law making
him fully liable for the injuries he caused plaintiffs.
Defendant Eidson is not a duly licensed attorney
Eidson asserts that plaintiffs
are not lawyers. In fact, plaintiffs
are not attorneys nor are they
licensed attorneys, nor could they be if they wanted to be, nor do these facts have any relevance
whatsoever, Does OCGA 15-19-51 empower and authorize the courts or the BAR to issue business
licenses not under the Great Seal of the State of Georgia? lf so, where is the enabling authority
empowering the Legislature to give executive power(s)
to the Judiciary or to a privately held and for
profit professional
organization to be found? Defendant Eidson is not a duly licensed
attorney thus illegally "represents" his client the "DEPARTMENT". Plaintiffs (all five having an interest
in the Trust) will not tolerate defendant Eidson or anyone depriving them of their rights to prosecute
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 5 of 12
those who deprive them of their rights or compromise their estate of which all three of plaintiffs'
sons
are a part. Furthermore, plaintiffs have been viscously attacked by several BAR attorneys regarding
the instant case. Plaintiffs would be remiss to hire BAR attorneys to prosecute BAR attorneys or to
defend their (plaintiffs' ) positions.
Rooker-Fel dman
Defendants, including defendant Eidson, are raising, in their defense, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. To apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in this instant matter would indicate that the plaintiffs
have no lawful remedy for the deprivation of their inalienable rights by state actors and those utilizing
state actors to "do their dirty work." Furthermore, to do so would also allow and encourage the
violation of Constitutional rights in "State" court, or any court' s, proceedings. Plaintiffs specifically
rebut the deferidant' s presumption
that Rooker-Feldman decisions are relevant or applicable in the
instant action for the following reasons:
Beneficia[ies of the Trust are guaranteed
the benefits expressed within the Trust.
A Trustee liability for breach of the Trust is personal (no immunity for State actor Trustees) in
character with all the consequences and incidents of personal
liability and is enforceable against the
Trustee' s estate. To be sure, the Trust' s authority supersedes any and all presumptions provisioned
within the Rooker-Feldman "doctrine", "statute,' , "code' ,, "case law,' , etc,
Plaintiffs will not receive a fair trialwithin a Georgia Court.
It has been demonstrated to plaintiffs
that Georgia
judicial,
legislative, and executive officers,
regarding this case, have combined their offices to specifically deprive plaintiffs
of their inalienable
rights. Attorneys and defendants James Hurt, Patrick Eidson, and Lisa Rambo came together to form
a united front upon the pretense
of being
judicial
Trustees (while waging all out war upon the
Constitution and its beneficiaries) to deprive plaintiffs
of their rights to the manifest physical
and
emotional injury of plaintiffs (beneficiaries).
In response, plaintiffs
sought assistance from Sumter
County Sheriff Smith, Macon County Sheriff Cannon, Peach County Sheriff Deese, Dooly County
Sheriff Peavy, and Richmond County Sheriff Roundtree to report the injuries and crimes committed
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 6 of 12
against them (plaintiffs).
Said executive branch Trustees refused to address these crimes in any
meaningful, reasonable, or professional
way thereby vacating the Office of the Sheriff in the instant
case,
Plaintiffs then escalated their complaints to the Governor, Nathan Deal, in order find someone
within the Georgia Executive Office to enforce the Law and to hold the Official wrongdoers to account.
Mr. Deal has been a criminal prosecutor,
a State circuit Judge, a
juvenile judge,
and was elected to the
Georgia Senate, Nathan Deal, vacating his Office, has demonstrated that he is also at war with the
Constitution and with the plaintiffs
by also refusing to enforce the Law as it is found at the Georgia
Constitution. Nathan Deal has also exhibited considerable interest and promotion
of both defendant
Lisa Rambo and her (allegedly)
state Court Judge spouse William Rambo who both work within the
Sumter County Courthouse. Consider that the STATE OF GEORGIA is demonstrably adverse to the
plaintiffs' rights given that State attorney general
and executive legal advisor to the Governor, Sam
I
Olens, currently opposes plaintiffs in this civil action. Given
just
these examples it should lead this
Court to reasonably conclude that no Georgia Judicial Trustee, Executive Trustee, or Legislative
Trustee will be in any way committed to remedying the deprivations heretofore suffered by plaintiffs
(beneficiaries).
Relevant Court Gonversations
As i ndi catedi nWal l acev. Powel l , No,3:09-cv-286, No.3:10-cv-1405,(2012), "Wi th respectto
liability for these claims, guilt
or innocence is not relevant to the determination of whether a
constitutional right has been violated. lf someone were subjected to a search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the the search produced incriminating evidence and may even
have resulted in a criminal conviction, would not nullify the violation of the Fourth Amendment or
necessarily bar a
$
1983 claim for damages. Indeed, this is the hypothetical posed by the Supreme
court i n Heckv. Humphrey,512 u.s. 477,497 n.7,114 s. ct. 2364, 1| 29 t. Ed. 2d (1gg4):
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 7 of 12
For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even
if the challenged search produced
evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial
resulting in the
S
1983 plaintiffs still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like
independent source and inevitable discovery and especially harmless error, such a
$
1983
action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiffs conviction was
unlawful. ln order to recover compensatory damages, however, the
$
1983 plaintiff must prove
not only that the search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensabld injury, which,
we hold today, does not encompass the "injury" of being convicted and imprisoned (until his
conviction has been overturned)."
"Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite
to an action under
$1983"
Patsy v. Board of
Regenfs of F\a.,457, U.S. 496, 501 (1982). The Supreme Court has expounded on thi s concept
extensively as seen in their commentary of Patsy, "beginning with McNeese
y.
Board of Education,
373-U.5. 668, 379 U.S. 671-673 (1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a
S1983
action should be dismissed where the
plaintiff
has not exhausted state administrative remedies.
See Barryv. Barchi ,443 U.S. 55,443 U.S. 6A n, 10 (1979); Gi bsonv. Berryhi l l ,411 IJ.S.564,411 u.S.
574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 405 U.S. 671
,
(1972); Wilwording
y.
Swenson,4O4
tJ.S.
249, 404 U.S. 251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 392 U.S. 640 (1968); King v, Smith,392
U.S. 309, 392 U.S. 312 n. a (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
Cf. Steffetv.
Thompson,415 U.S. 452,415U.5.472-473 (1974) ("When federal cl ai ms are premi sed
on
tS
19831
--
as they are here
--
we have not required exhaustion of state
judicial
or administrative remedies,
recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional
rights").
Brokaw v Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 665 (7th Cir 2002) found that whether a plaintiff is
presenting
an independent claim, rather than a claim premised on an injury caused by the state court' s
judgment,
is paramount,
but is also a complex question. The Court indicated that it is often "' difficult
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 8 of 12
to distinguish' between situations in which the plaintiff is seeking to set aside a state court
judgment
and ones in which the claim is independent." Edwards v. lllinois Bd. of Adm. to the Baf 261 F.3dT23,
728-29 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 555). However, in this instant matter plaintiffs
are
clearly not indicating that any' Judgment" be set aside--they are seeking remedy for constitutional
rights violations at the hands of the defendants. In support of this position,
the plaintiffs
cite Nesses
v. Shepard, 68. F, 3d. 1003. In that case, Nesses brought suit in federal court against the lawyers and
some of the
judges
involved in a breach of contract case wh.ich he had filed in Indiana state court and
lost. ld. at 1004. Nesses claimed that his opponents' lawyers used their political
clout to turn the state
judges
against him. ld. The district court dismissed Nesses' suit for lack of
jurisdiction
based on
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ld, The appeals court rejected that conclusion, reasoning that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar Nesses' claim because his suit was not premised
on a claim
that the state court
judgment
denied him some constitutional right; rather, his federal claim was based
on a right indepetdent of the state court proceeding, As explained in Nesses v. Shepard, any other
conclusion would mean that "there would be no federal remedy for a violation of federal rights
whenever the violator so far succeeded in corrupting the state
judicial process
as to obtain a favorable
judgment,...."
ld. at 1005. Moreover, the court reasoned that such a "result would be inconsistent with
cases in which, for example, police
officers are sued under 42 U,S.C.
S
1983 for having fabricated
evidence that resulted in the plaintiffs being convicted in a state court." ld, Other circuits have applied
similar reasoning to arrive at this conclusion. See Holtoway v. Brush,22O F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000),
and Emsf v. Child and Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997). ln Hoiloway,a
mother brought a Section 1983 action against the county and the county social worker alleging that
they had improperly interfered with her right to the custody of her children, (Hottoway
v. Brush
,220
F.3d at 772). The Sixth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the mother's federal
claim because she was not seeking review of the custody decision, which was an entirely separate
state matter. ld. at778-79.Instead, as the court in Holloway explained, the mother' s claim presented
a
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 9 of 12
distinct question
as to "whether certain actions in the course of those proceedings
may have involved
a violation of her federal constitutional rights for which the responsible party may be held liable for
damages." l d. at779.
Similarly, in Ernsf, 108 F.3d 486, the Third Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar a claim
based on alleged constitutional violations stemming from child custody proceedings. /d. at 491-92.
In Ernsi a grandmother, who had sole guardianship
of her granddaughter, sued the child welfare
department and case workers alleging substantive and procedural due process
claims after the
defendants removed and retained custody of her granddaughter for five years. /d. at 488-8g. The court
held that "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude the district court from deciding those claims
because a ruling that the defendants violated Ernst' s right to substantive due process by making
recommendations to the state court out of malice or personal bias would not have required the court to
find that the state court
judgments
made on the basis of those recommendations were
erroneous." ld.at 491-92. The court fudher reasoned that "it is clear that deciding the substantive due
process
claims did not involve federal court review of a state court decision because Ernst' s
substantive due process claims were never decided by the state court." ld, at 492.
On the other hand
,
in Goodman v. Srpos, 259 F.3d 1327 (11th
Cir.2001), the Eleventh Circuit
held that Rooker-Feldman barred
jurisdiction
over due process claims brought by a mother and her
son against the Georgia Department of Family Services for damages caused by the defendants'
allegedly unconstitutional investigation and initiation of state removal proceedings. To the extent
Goodman conflicts with Holloway and Ernst, the findings in Holloway and Ernst are more consistent
with the Supreme Court' s rulings on exhaustive claims and with other circuits' rulings on Rooker-
Feldman, namely that constitutional violations may arise independently from state court proceedings,
and thus not be barred by Rooker-Feldman. Moreover, while Goodman expressly rejected the
holdings of Holloway and ErnsL the court in Goodman did so in a conclusory manner with litfle
explanation (see Goodman,259 F,3d at 1333 n. 7). Of primary importance in Goodman was the
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 10 of 12
ability of the plaintiffs
to have a "reasonable" opportunity to present constitutional claims in state court
proceedings.
Of relevance to this instant matter is that Plaintiffs Dann and Sharon Cross did present
constitutional claims to several of the defendants, including defendant Rambo, and had these claims
ignored. While many of the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims must be barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine because a successful constitutional challenge in federal court could mean that the
state court erred, "the fact that the plaintiffs pursuit
of federal claims could ultimately show that the
state court
judgment
was erroneous
[does]
not automatically. make Rooker-
Fetdman applicable." Long,182 F.3d at 555-56. Rather, the appropriate question is whether "the
federal plaintiff
[is]
seeking to set aside a state court
judgment,
or does
[s]he
present
some
independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to
which he was a party." GASHAssoc. v. Village of Rosemonl 995 F.2d726,728 (7th
Cir.1993),
While the above is by no means an exhaustive selection of decisions involving the Rooker-
t
Feldman Doctrine, it is illustrative and supportive of the plaintiffs'
assertions that the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine is not applicable in this instant matter.
For the foregoing reasons and all the others reve.aled in the plaintiffs' complaint,
defendants'
moti on to di smi ss thi s i nstant acti on shoul d be deni ed.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of May 2014,
C*'477'a4
plaintiffs
in propria persona
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 11 of 12
Gertificate of Service
I hereby certify that I have electronically filed plaintiffs' rebuttal to defendant James Hurt's
motion to dismiss wiifr tfre Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically send
email notification of such filing to the following attorneys of record:
AIMEE P SANDERS aimeesanders@frailswilsonlaw.com
BRETT A Wl LLIAMS bwill iams@i nsleyrace, com, ehoward@insleyrace. com
BRYAN M GRANTHAM bg.rantham@hptylaw.qom
DAVI D V JOH NSON dj @i nsleyracq. com, cdeel
@i
nsleyrace. com, ehoward@insleyrace, com
JAMES W HURT
iameshuftlaw@bellsouth,net
JOH N S I-ADE EDWARDS isedwards@m artinsnow. com
JOSEPH CHARLES LEWIS timlewis@thetimlewisfirm.com
KEVIN P RAC' E krace@insleyrace,com, klatos@insleyracq' com
KIM M JACKSON kjackson@hptylaw.com, measton@hptylaw.com, mhyde@hptylaw.com
PATRICK S EIDSON ei dtheki d@gmai l .com
RAN DOLPH FRAI LS ra ndvfrai ls@frailswi lsonlaw com
ROGER E HARRIS roger.harris@swiftcurrie.com, sharon.noble@swiftcurrie.com
SHANNON S HINSON shannon.hi nsgn@swi ftcqrri e.com
SUSAN ELIZABETH TEASTER steaster@law.ga.gov,.04crmail@law.ga.gov,
dorland@lawga.gov
WILLIAM DALLAS NESMITH
,
l l l wnesmi th@sumtercountyga,us
Thi s 7th day of May, 2014.
;/z/
zg/Ll
plaintiff in pro per
Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 12 of 12