Eleatic Pluralism

by R.B.B. War dy (Cambridge)

I
According to a well-entrenched and highly influential scheme for
interpreting the development of ancient philosophy, to group Empedo
cles, Anaxagoras and the atomists together as
4
the post-Parmenidean
thinkers
9
is no mere exegetical convenience.
1
That they come after
Parmenides is not just a chronological fact: what they have to say is
importantly constrained by their acceptance of central Eleatic tenets.
The individual contributions of these Presocratics together constitute
a cohesive chapter of philosophical history because all of them either
endorse Parmenides' fundamental contention,
2
that in truth nothing
comes into or goes out of existence, or at the very least agree that
1
Scholars naturally enough reveal their commitment to the scheme in their choice
of chapter and section titles, e.g. "THE IONIAN RESPONSE" (G. S. Ki rk,
J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, revised edition
[Cambridge: 1983], hereafter KRS) and "PARADISE REGAINED" following
Eleaticism's
U
THE SERPENT" (Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers,
revised edition [London: 1982]). Not that their allegiance is by any means
restricted to expression in rubrics: "Parmenides' metaphysics dominated fifth-
century Ionian philosophy, which constitutes the last stage of Presocratic specula-
tion. Individual, ingenious and often creative as the leading Ionian thinkers were,
each of them is appropriately seen as responding to his radical critique of
common-sense belief in the world about us" and "... these post-Parmenidean
systems are deliberately designed to take account of the findings of the Truth
(mediated, in the atomists' case, by Melissus)" (KRS, 351, largely preserving the
substance and tone of the original Kirk and Raven). That the revamped KRS
will serve as the handbook of a new generation of students is in itself enough to
guarantee the currency of this type of interpretation.
2
This is not to imply that Parmenidean rather than Melissan reasoning prompted
rejection of the possibility of existential change (sec KRS' description of the
atomists' situation in the preceding note); one should perhaps speak of a general
s
Eleatic 'heritage', and in what follows I shall in fact concentrate on the repercus-
sions of an argument of Melissus'.
9 Arch. Gesch. Philosophic Bd. 70
126 R . B . B . War dy
t here mu s t be something in the world satisfying his demands for
changelessness. Thus one might conceive of the post-Eleatics as re-
wri t i ng or supplement ing the Way of Seeming, either by explaining
how it is t hat delusive appearances occur or by offering alternative
specifications of them (obviously this division of labour is artificially
neat and cannot be exclusive).
Clearly, to believe that this is all there is to these philosophers would
be to do an injustice to the richness of their speculations and unfairly
to exaggerate the demands of the dominant interpretation, since the
implicat ion is not that their thought include no more than a recognition
of the Eleatic dismissal of genesis and destruction, but rather that it
contains at least so much. Nevertheless an adherent of this view ought
to concede that the first criterion to be employed in evaluating this
phase of Greek philosophy should be a measure of the success of the
various responses to Parmenides
So far as the atomists
3
in particular are concerned, an appropriate
specification of the standard scheme is to be found in Aristotle, the
originator of the tradition. I shall return to Aristotle's specific idea
t hat Leucippus attempted to effect a compromise between Eleatic argu-
mentation and the perceptual phenomena in due course; for the con-
struction of the problem which I wish to confront, simple recognition
of the almost universally accepted claim of De Generatione et Corrup-
tione (A8), that the atomists inherited a major portion of their metaphy-
sics from Parmenides and his followers, will suffice.
According to this respected description of atomistic basics, the
Eleatic cornerstone is left untouched insofar as there is no coming to
be or passing away of the atoms themselves. It is granted that motion
is impossible without void, but maintained that since what is not
somehow is, locomotion can and does occur. Zeno's divisibility di-
lemmas are met by the introduction of atomism's characteristic thesis.
Finally, since there is what is not to divide up homogeneous being,
Leucippus and Democritus are free to postulate the existence of a
mult it ude of bodies each of which is like the One,
4
perhaps stimulated
by Melissus' confident avowal that a pluralit y (per impossibile, he
t hinks ) would have to be like that: ,
3
None of my arguments will depend on any supposed differences between Leu-
cippus and Democritus, and I intend them to apply to both atomists indiffererft ly;
variat ions in reference are accordingly altogether casual.
4
Needless to say my swift resume has skirted a cluster of fearfully thorny difficul-
ties, but they can safely be ignored so far as the present task is concerned.
Elealic Pluralism 127
(DK 30B 8).
5
Thus Presocratic
atomism seems to follow the pattern of post-Parmenidean response:
although the arguments for monism and against motion are rejected,
those banning genesis and destruction are respected, at least with
regard to the system's elements, so that it might be characterised as
an Eleatic pluralism, albeit in a sense vague but likely to prove weak.
Since they apparently all failed to detect the flaws in his deduction
and so were not capable of actually dismantling Parmenides' Truth,
what philosophical challenge remained to stimulate the contributors to
the Ionian reaction? If the rejection of the very possibility of existential
change is regarded as legitimate, then the primary difficulty with
monistic Eleaticism is not so much the sheer bizarreness of its positive
doctrine as its total incapacity to cope with error. The world looks as
though it has parts which alter in a great variety of ways, or rather
more strongly, all that appears to us is a multiplicity of ephemera: how
can the static One generate such appearances? The original Eleatics
may have got hold of the truth, but so long as they cannot account
for falsity consistently with their endorsed theses, they are liable to the
charge of incoherence.
The Way of Seeming could routinely be read in antiquity
6
(and on
occasion considerably more recently) as straight assertion by those
convinced that Parmenides was compelled to give way before the force
of an undeniable, familiar reality.
7
Scholars sympathetic to his thought
can do no better than plead for the consistency of his intentions on
the basis of a 'rhetorical' reading of the goddess's deceitful words
8
without explaining how it might be that Parmenides can without
5
References to texts as in H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds.. Die Fragmente der Vorsokra-
tiker (Z rich: 1951) (DK), unless otherwise indicated.
6
E. g. DK 28A 23 (Hippolytus), 34 (Plutarch, Simplicius).
7
... ' 9 ,
,
, , > ...
(Aristotle, Met. 986B31 -4).
8
. g. A. A. Long, The principles of Parmenides' cosmogony', Phronesis 8 (1963).
90-107 and A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven: 1970).
In 'Parmenides' dilemma', Phronesis 27 (1982), 1-12, M. M. Mackcn/ic directly
confronts the problem, but concludes that Parmenides positively embraced its
insolubility: "Monism requires that t hi nk i ng be indiscernible from being, and
denies that there are a plurality of thinkers. That is f atal to dialectic, and Ihus
to the argument itself. Pluralism allows for individuation; but commits us to the
irrational. This dilemma is the relation between the Alcthcia and the \. The
9*
1 2 X R . B . B . Wa r c i y
e m b ar r as s m e n t af f o rd t o ackn o wl e d ge even t he mere appearance o f
w h a t l ie i n s i s t s can n o t be . Pl at o depict s a Zcno who impl icit l y confesses
his mas t e r' s t ro u b l e : he wishes t o d e mo n s t rat e t hat consequences even
more ahsnrtl ( , Parm. 128D) t han those entailed by
Pan n e n id e s ' hypo t he s is f o l l o w f ro m t he supposit ion t hat t here is a
pl u r a l i t y.
Thu s we mi ght speculate t hat Eleat ic pluralism evolved as an attempt
t o pro vid e t he armo u r wi t h which t o shield t he immensely vulnerable
u n d e rs id e of Parme nid e an philo s o phy: the atomists come up wit h a
genesis of f alsehood to supplement the deduction of t rut h. Accordingly
we suppose t hat t hey int ro d uce t heir hypotheses in the belief that they
are the min imal modif icat ions requisite for the provision of an
. So in f o llo wing up the t radit ional interpretation of the
at o mis t s we wo ul d anticipate t hat Democritean philosophy is centrally
concerned wit h, if not the explanat ion of error, then at least the
e s t ab l is hme n t of its possibilit y, rather than wit h t rut h t rut h is in
large measure a given.
The problem wit h t his story as usually told is t hat it uncomfortably
suggests t hat the atomists put in a very poor performance. At first
b l us h it would seem t hat Leucippus and Democritus are content to
co nt ravene the Eleatic ban in their conception of macroscopic objects
so long as t hey obey it in their description of the microscopic constitu-
e nt s of those objects but why should the difference in scale be a
dif f erence relevant to the admissibility of genuine existential change? I
shall claim t hat st udent s of ancient philosophy at this juncture typically
eit her f ail to perceive the apparent gravity of the atomists' plight, or
if t he y do recognize it, nevertheless shirk a f ull consideration of the
consequences. There are two prima facie choices: we must either fight
against the now standard view of this stretch of philosophical history
or develop a reading of atomism novel at least in its emphasis.
I shall at t empt the lat t er task. Thus my motivating contention is
t hat a posit ion combining adherence to the favoured exegetical scheme
and some version of the conventional interpretation of atomism should
be occupied o nl y as a last resort, since this conjunction presents a pair
of major philosophers in a surprisingly unattractive guise. Accordingly
I o f f e r a disjunct ion: either endorse something like my reading of
at omism or j u n k the idea of a general post-Parmenidean reaction; to
t ension between the two is not only a necessary consequence of Parmenides'
argume nt , but is a consequence t hat he foresaw and wished to exploit" ( 7 8).
Eleatic Pluralism 129
the extent that my account (or a comparable alternative) f ails to
convince, we should regard that popular idea as under threat before
concluding that the atomists were indeed seriously concerned to de-
velop a response to Eleaticism which turns out a disappointment.
My procedure will be as follows. First, I shall employ the conceptual
materials of ancient atomism in order to delineate a thesis about
the distinction between micro-constituents and macro-conglomerates
intended to meet the challenge of a particular Eleatic argument. Only
then shall I attempt to attribute such a stance to Democritus. I adopt
this order because the pertinent doxography is scanty, uninf ormative
and actually misleading if I am correct in my major claims, a
state of af f airs itself significant and worthy of some explanation.
Furthermore, since I maintain that any alternative reconstruction suf f i-
cient for salvaging the unitary overview of post-Parmenidean philoso-
phy must at least match mine in strength, in the last analysis it perhaps
suffices to have a version of radical atomism before us for inspection.
That is to say that the situation demands serious consideration of the
possibility that Leucippus and Democritus advocated a theory that
deserves to be regarded as Eleatic pluralism in a strong sense.
II
In the course of his methodical negative description of the One
Melissus rules out the possibility of the rearrangement of what is: "for
the which was earlier does not perish, nor does a
which is not come into being" (DK 30B 7). The repercussions of his
rigour can hardly be exaggerated:
9
this particular denial obliges an
9
Barnes denies that any of the later Presocratics recognised the f ull force of
Melissus' contention (216: his f ormulation of the argument involves reference to
the arrangement of what is, over and above what is arranged). In his summing-
up of this philosophical epoch he concludes: "I do not t hi nk that any neo-Ionian
got a glimpse of the danger, or took any evasive action" (433), the danger being
that Melissus' denial forbids locomotion because it excludes change in relative
position. However, Barnes's case depends on the supposition that no nco-Ionian
intentionally did avoid (or could have avoided?) reference to patterns (432),
where again these must be real things constituted by their ingredients' positional
relations, so t hat atomic relational change might be identical wi t h, or at any rale
responsible for, macroscopic real change. My project is precisely to work oui
how the atomists might have evaded the grave di f f i cul t y which Barnes believes
they didn't even perceive, and to claim t hai this was indeed their st rat egy
130 R . B . B . Wa r d y
a t o m i s t i c l i l e a t i c lo a b s t a i n f ro m q u a n t i f y i n g over macroscopic aggre-
g at e s of m i c ro s c o pi c c o rpu s c l e s (o r i ndeed over any group). Rearrange-
m e n t o f wh a t i s c o nt rave ne s t he ban o n e xi s t e nt i al change, i f a configur-
a t i o n i s a t h i n g o ve r and abo ve, di s t i nc t f ro m , t he ent i t i es const i t ut i ng
i t . In o rde r t o par r y t he Meli s s an arg u m e nt o ne m u s t make o u t t hat
r e ar r ang e m e nt pro pe rl y u nders t o o d i nvol ves ju s t relat i onal change, i n
po s i t i o n . Mo reo ver, i f t enabl e t hi s stance wi l l provi de t he beginnings
of a defenc e for Parmenides: since mere spatial s hi f t is typically mis-
c o ns t r u e d as real change, appare nt l y cont radi ct i ng Eleatic reasoning,
g ro u nds for t he pos s i bi li t y of hu m an error and i t s diagnosis become
avai l ab l e o n t he at omi s t i c hypot hes i s .
However, t he re is ju s t the appearance of actual change only so long
as it is at least theoretically possible to s ubs t i t ut e for every ostensible
referenc e to a macroscopic object or its correlative atomic configuration
a de s c ri pt i o n cast exclusively in terms of atoms and their spatial
re l at i o ns . Ot herwi se, one's ontology contains a fat al residue of change-
abl e , ephemeral t hi ngs , and the game against Melissus is lost. Refusal
to c o u nt enanc e groups of atoms is necessary to fend off the criticism
t hat a new is an impossibly new t hi ng it's not, inasmuch as
an arrang e me nt , whether of atoms or anyt hi ng else, dissolves i nt o the
sum of the relat i ons subsisting between the only authentic beings, since
these spatial relat i ons are not themselves . Properly understood,
the succession of which constitutes the delusive play of appear-
ance is simply relational change, safely involving no alteration of the
i nt ri ns i c properties of what really is, let alone any substantial coming
to be or perishing. There is no macro-world. There is a micro-world,
but t hat means t hat there are atoms, not groups of them, and proper
discourse woul d reflect t hi s crucial fact by restricting its referring terms
to i ndi vi du al atoms. The sole feat ures of an o rdi nary macro-description
whi c h s u rvi ve transcription i nt o the proper micro-vocabulary are plu-
ral i t y and movement .
The belief t hat the atomists should have adopted such a position
fol l ows di rect ly fro m the not i on t hat they sincerely endorsed the thesis
t hat real change does no t , cannot occur, and grasped its ramifications,
especially the i mpli cat i ons of Melissus' elimination of rearrangement.
As previ ously not ed, there are grounds for supposing that his deduc-
Thus al t ho u g h my conclusions contradict his, Barnes's work provides the direct
s t i mu l u s for mine, and all students of the Presocratics owe him t hanks for
stressing the i ndependent importance of Melissus' reasoning.
Eleatic Pluralism 131
tions rather than the Parmenidean arguments themselves were the
primary influence on Leucippus and Democritus: they take up the
challenge preserved in his fr.8 by asserting that there are many things
each of which possesses the immutable attributes characteristic of a
true entity, according to the inherited truth. But postulation of a
strongly Eleatic plurality does nothing to establish that the fami l i ar
stuffs castigated by Melissus are real. His enumeration of what merely
seems to be includes substances like earth, water, air, fire, iron and
gold as well as qualities like pale and dark. The attack embraces all
ordinary objects and properties, and thus undermines the claim that
we see and hear and understand aright.
It might be supposed that the atomistic hypotheses somehow ensure
the survival of the macro-world and its inhabitants on the grounds
that composite objects are identical with their constituent atoms and
void, and these are properly immutable. However, this cannot be so.
A bit of gold is identical with its atoms taken not individually, but
collectively; the gold is the aggregate,
10
which is thus no less impossibly
mutable than any object considered in ordinary, non-atomistic terms.
Viewed aright, the identity of composite with its constituents, so far
from confirming its actuality on the faulty supposition that it might
inherit the changelessness which its atoms severally possess, in fact
establishes the unreality of those constituents as a group.
The atomists' theory does not vindicate the apparent macroscopic
world even if it be re-described in accordance with that theory. We
should not assume that they were concerned to protect Melissus'
original targets or to disavow his condemnation of the senses (perhaps
more accurately, of the beliefs to which they give rise). Nothing which
changes is real, or rather, nothing which really changes is real if
this line of thought is correct, then Democritus is not a reductionist.
To qualify as such, he would have to reduce macroscopic objects to
collections of atoms and void:
11
but he does not concede the reality of
10
The idea that the gold irreducibly 'supervenes' on the aggregate hardly helps,
since it would effectively block from the outset any hope t hat atomic changeless-
ness might somehow percolate up to the macroscopic level. For comment on t hi s
issue in general see the following note.
11
My position is that the whole issue of reductionism is simply irrelevant to t he
discussion of Democritus, since if I am right then he docs not even recognise t he
existence of anyt hi ng that mi ght be a candi dat e for reduction. The belief t ha t
' Democritus is a reductionist, indeed the fat her of reductionism, is widespread,
e. g.: "Because phenomenal objects and properties seemed to reduce to mere
1 3 2 R . U . B . W a r c l y
s uc h c o l l e c t i o n s be cause t h e y a r c n o less v u l n e r a bl e t h a n t he supposedly
r e duce d o bj e c t s t o Me l i s s a s ' accusat i o n t h a t such t hi n gs wo ul d be
i m po s s i b l y c h a n ge a bl e .
On e m u s t n o t a dm i t t h a t distinct c o n f i gu r a t i o n s evolve over t i me.
The a t o m i s t s do n o t wi n i f t he y me r e l y speak o f collect i ons o f atoms
an d v o i d i n s t e a d o f pe r ce pt i bl e , large-scale t hi n gs, since such collections
do n o t e x i s t . R a t h e r t he y succeed i n me e t i n g Meli ssus' challenge i f t hey
can (i n a sense t o be di scussed) re-describe a macroscopic object as a
f a c t i t i o u s "aggre gat e ' o n l y a r bi t r a r i l y e xt r i cabl e fr o m t he cont i nuous
l o c o mo t i ve pa t hs followe d by some ar bi t r ar i l y selected group of
a t o m s .
1 2
I f , o n t he c o n t r a r y , po si t i o n al specification i s n o t arbi t rary,
i de n t i t y c o n di t i o n s for aggregates whi ch force recognition of tempor-
a r i l y e x i s t e n t co n fi gur at i o n s can n o t very well be ignored. For instance,
i f a t o m i c pa t t e r n p were t o be correlated wi t h a man (whether or not
any r e duc t i ve i de n t i t y mi ght be i n que st i on), t he n p would come and
cease t o be whe n t ha t man di d. For n ut she l l effect one could say t hat
an Ele at i c pl ur a l i s t avo i ds depicting t he world fro m t he t op down not
c o n f i gur a t i o n s of at oms and void, Democritus was inclined to suppose that the
at o ms and voi d were real whi l e t he phe nome nal objects and properties were no
mo r e t h a n a r bi t r a r y co n st r uct i o n s placed upon them by human cognitive organs"
(Da v i d Sedley, 'Epi curus' R e fut at i o n of Determinism', in . Studi
sulT epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Mar cello Gigante, vol. 1 [Naples: 1983],
1 1 5 1 [33]). Sedley pl ausi bl y suggests t hat Epicurus i s an anti-reductionist, and
f u r t h e r speculat es t ha t i n t hi s he reacted against t he views of t he earlier atomists.
The a r gume n t t ha t Epi curus read Democritus as a reduct i oni st is attractive, but
sho ul d not lead us i n t o t he same mi st ake. Once t he Eleatic ban was fi nally li ft ed,
it was pe rhaps i n e vi t abl e t hat the subt let y of Democritus' response to it would
be i gnore d but t hi s i s t o an t i ci pat e t he argument for at t ri but i ng a strong
El e at i c pl ur al i sm to the at omi st s despite the appare n t l y adverse implications of
muc h o f t he do xo graphy.
12
Cf. t hi s pare n t he t i cal r e mar k of Sarah Waterlow, made in the cont ext of her
di scussi on of Ari st ot le 's di ssolut i on of the Eleatic 'paradox of becoming': "The
r e duct i o n of all change to locomotion of particles mi ght seem to o ffe r anot her
way o ut , since it is clear t ha t in locomotion no new thing (i. e. subject of change)
comes to be. Moreover the mat he mat i cal co n t i n ui t y of abstract mot i on entails a
sense in whi ch a new ar r an ge me n t B of particles can never be said to supersede
any si ngle spe ci fi able di ffe r e n t arrangement A, since between any two there was
an o t he r . Thus B comes t o be n e i t he r ' fr o m' itself nor 'fro m' any condi t i on
definitely not i t self, and so the paradox can perhaps be avoided" (Sarah Waterlow,
Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle's Physics, A Philosophical Study [Oxford:
1981], 12, n. 9).
Eleatic Pluralism 133
on account of reductionist leanings, but just because there is no top.
For him nothing can intervene between the level of single atoms and
the factitious macrocosm, since arguments that he endorses dictate
that there are no collections: in the Democritean universe the individual
rules supreme because it alone is.
Granted that the supposed aggregates of atoms and void that appar-
ently correspond to ordinary objects have turned out not to exist,
might there nevertheless not be other microscopic groupings, not corre-
lated with macroscopic ephemera, which enjoy the permanence that
Melissus demands? Expressed in linguistic terms, the condition for the
acceptability of such patterns would be that no description referring
to them could incorporate any features analogous to those which in
ordinary language permit distinction between an object's history and
the rest of time. Obviously if we prove capable of discerning any such
'proper' patterns, we shall hardly be tempted to assume that they are
identical with macroscopic things. There is not always the same man
because there is not always a man, while (and this would be the essence
of the atomists' response, were they to advocate the concept of a
permanent atomic collection) there is always a 'proper' pattern because
the continuity of positional shift ensures that it remains the same.
But could this last-ditch attempt to retain existents above the level
of the incomposite individual achieve any worthwhile result? Eleatic
pluralism prohibits quantification over the mutable atomic collections
which would correspond to the apparently changeable things that we
unreflectingly believe the senses present to us. Acceptance of these
phantom aggregates into our ontology would induce a fundamentally
mistaken, ultimately incoherent view of the world, as if one were to
forget that our perceptual freeze-frames crucially omit the ceaseless
movement of a sort of Democritean cinema. Were we only capable of
seeing it properly, perhaps with the eyes of the mind, we would realise
that in that film of reality a pattern remains the same to the extent
that it does not become definitely different.
13
But then of course one
is not entitled to claim more than that it remains indefinitely the same,
and should confess that it is impossible to discern a single configuration
objectively distinct from its predecessors and successors.
Accordingly it might prove wisest to forgo talk of 'arrangements'
altogether. An ostensible reference to a pattern, if licit, is equi val ent
to (at least the pretence of) a specification of instantaneous at omi c
13
Again cf. Walerlow's conjecture (previous note).
134 R . B . B . Wa r t l y
p o s i t i o n . U c a n n o t r e al l y refer to the ephemeral apparently
c o n s t i t u t e d by g i v e n g rou pi ng s of atoms at some time, but only to the
a t o ms so r e l at e d . The sole pattern for which one mi g ht claim strict
i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s t ha t whi ch comprises every atom i n the enti re universe,
since i t al one i s not subject to i n d e f i n i t e s hi f t i nto arrangements neither
q u i t e the same nor q u i t e d i f f e re nt at its edges it doesn't have any,
and so perhaps ou g ht not to be accepted in any case.
The i n ha b i t a n t s of thi s f ami li ar world dissolve without remainder
i n t o r e l at i ons between immutable microscopic existents. The appearan-
ces whi ch d e l u d e us, leading us to suppose that there are things which
a c t u a l l y undergo change, are themselves the products of shifts in these
r e l at i ons and so less than real. Wi thi n a rigorous Eleatic language
it is not even possible to begin to talk about the macrocosm which
seems to be. We are not suspiciously requested to conform to the
dictates of this austere discourse simply to avoid trouble for Parmeni-
des: the all-important difference between real change and relational
change provides an authentic justification for the prohibition.
This completes my sketch of what I should like Democritus to have
believed. It delivers just so much as is required in order to account for
the misapprehensions to which ordinary people are liable. It allows
one to see how on a view Eleatic in more than name mistakes are
possible. Furthermore, no alternative, weaker thesis, permitting a more
generous ontology, can successfully avoid the snares of Melissus' argu-
ment. Untutored humanity's basic blunder occurs when what are in
fact relations are wrongly regarded as things over and above their
relata, wi th the disastrous consequence that mere relational change is
fallaciously assimilated to impossible real change. Working out the
details of this diagnosis is of secondary importance: given that indivi-
dual atoms are inaccessible to our apprehension, it might even be the
case that one must rest content with the general analysis of the delusive
appearances and do without explanations of specific types of error and
parti cular mistakes. However, the simple, undetailed account suffices
for the supplementation and protection of Parmenidean philosophy's
core, and thus would establish the validity of Eleatic pluralism on its
own terms. It remains to attempt to attribute this success to Democritus
himself.
Ill
The doxography provides some meagre evidence which I might exploit in support
of my story, in particular the reports that Democritus insisted that the derivation
Eleatic Pluralism \ 35
of an authentic uni t y from a plurality is impossible and that only atoms and the
void are real.
14
Confusion sets in when one considers the plethora of interpretations
of these striking (and puzzling) restrictions on offer, perhaps complementary, but
not even clearly compatible. Obviously I should like to associate this famous dictum
wi t h Eleatic pluralism as defined in the preceding section: only (individual) atoms
and the void are real because anything composite would fall foul of Melissus'
stringent argument against the possibility of rearrangement. Since there is no
testimony explicitly to this effect, I shall review the various glosses on the atomistic
denials, suggesting that some are inappropriate, others applicable but best combined
with my reading.
Perhaps the idea that composites only seem to be but are not really unities could
underpin the unreality thesis, but if so one must explain why it should be supposed
that macroscopic things lack unity and why this defect should undermine their claim
to existence. It might be felt that on a certain reading satisfaction of this second
requirement is easy. Legitimate entities are obviously not just simple manifolds:
there are not 'really' any flocks of birds per se because all that is required to
constitute some flock is a number of birds, and it apparently persists despite
considerable and frequent changes in membership. The very fact that we are irremedi-
ably vague on the survival conditions for such groups testifies to their dubious
status (cf. the discussion of indefinite, 'permanent' atomic patterns in the last
section). Therefore what remains obscure on this hypothesis are the atomists"
grounds for believing that all macroscopic things lack organisational or structural
unity, e. g. that despite appearances there is nothing to choose in this respect between
the bird and the flock.
Of course such a stance would be doomed from the outset: wilfully to insist that
a bird is merely a random assortment of ingredients, corpuscular or otherwise,
would be perversely to saddle oneself with an untenable view of organisms as
fortuitous aggregates. This thesis is comparable with the consequences which Aris-
14
No strict unity from a plurality: Aristotle, GC A8 (325A35-6); DK 68A 37
(Simplicius); 68A 42 (Aristotle, Met. Z13, 1030A9-10). Alexander's claim that
on the Democritean model true mixture does not occur (68A 64) might preserve
a comparable denial on the part of the atomists, although it could simply reflect
the fact that a collocation of discrete micro-particles is not a genuine
from the Peripatetic point of view.
Nothing but atoms and the void are real: DK 67A 32 (Aetius); 68A 49 (Galen);
68A 57 (Plutarch); 68B 9 (from Sextus); 68B 125 (from Galen); Plutarch, adv.
Colot. 11JOE-F. In 67A32 "real" renders "" rather than "|", but the
report clearly derives from the original group expressing the / contrast
(indeed in 68A 49 Galen employs "" in conjunction with the quoted,
perhaps narrowly atomistic technical terms). 68A 57, which distinguishes between
the mere appearance ("&") of macroscopic complexes and atomic being
%
(""), follows closely after Plutarch's uni que version of the / opposi-
tion (to be discussed in the following).
1 3 6 R . B . H . W u r d y
l o l l e e x t r a c t s f r o m t h e R m pe do e l e a n s c heme o f de ve l o pm e nt a nd c ons iders a reductio
o f t h a t t h e o r y (Physics i i . 8 ) it w i l l no t do t o a s s um e t h a t Democ rit us o f h is o w n
accord e m br a c e d s uc h u n a t t r a c t i v e a nd unm o t iva t c d pro po s it io ns .
Ac c o rdingl y w e m i g h t t u r n t o t he c onjec t ure t h a t t he atomisls denied t he unit y
( a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y t he r e a l it y) of macroscopic c o mpl e x object s not a s a res ul t of
i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o t he presence of va r io us s t ruc t ures or princ ipl e s of orga nis a t ion
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e m f r o m mere heaps, but ra t her a t t he pro mpt ing of reduc t ionis t
a m b i t i o n s . The new idea is t ha t t he pre s umpt ion t ha t t he bird consists of not hing
but a t o m s a nd void, t h a t it is e x ha us t ive l y composed of a f unda me nt a l pl ura l it y,
e n t a i l s t h a t it is n o t h i n g but a collect ion of a t oms a nd void. Of course t o a rgue in
s uc h a f a s h io n w o ul d be t o commit a t ra ns pa re nt reduc t ionis t fallacy, so t ha t w e
s h o ul d f a l l back on t his int e rpre t a t io n onl y if no t hing else is t o be f o und.
H o w e ve r one c oul d object t ha t t his line of rea s oning is ha ppily s uperf l uous
because t he a t o mis t s ' El ea t ic legacy w ould have inclined t he m t o t he belief t ha t
a n y t h i n g w h ic h is a pl ur a l it y ( e. g. a complex, w he t he r a st ruct ured w hole or a loose
c ol l e c t ion) ipso facto c a nnot be a unit y in any sense w hatsoever, precisely because
t h e y fa iled to dis t inguis h betw een such senses. The evidence for this claim w ould be
an e x t ra po l a t io n f rom Socrates' rejoinder t o Zeno (Farm. 129B C ) t ha t there is
n o t h i n g odd in objects' being bot h one and ma ny in dif f e re nt respects by virt ue of
pa rt ic ipa t ion in bot h Unit y and Plura lit y. Evident l y Plato implies that t he original
a nt i-Pa rme nide a n plura lis t s w ere blind to such a possibility ( w hich Zeno in his
pol emic a l zeal recognised but concealed?).
15
Thus one might conclude t ha t unde r t he misleading influenc e of Zenonian
pa ra dox es t he a t omis t s argued as follow s for t he thesis t ha t no t rue unit y can come
f rom a pl ur a l it y as a basis for the denial of reality to macroscopic composite objects.
I f an a ppa re nt l y single something is in any w ay characterised by pluralit y, then it
w o ul d per impossibile be at once one and ma ny, or really is jus t a pl ura l it y pure
and s impl e. But since w ha t ever is, is a unit y, on t his l a t t er option it w ould be
no t h ing in its ow n right ; in either case it does not actually exist.
16
Thus Democritus'
15
Tha t Pl a t o does not ment ion /?r0-Parmenidean pluralists w ho conceded t he
va l idit y of the Zenonian dilemmas is neit her here nor there, since he notoriously
omit s all ment ion of the atomists t hroughout his corpus.
16
Ba rnes seems to a t t ribut e some such reasoning to the atomists. Rema rking t ha t
( on his int e rpre t a t io n) t hey c a nnot have recourse t o an Eleatic ra t iona le for t he
unre a l it y t hes is (444), he w rites: "Anything t hat t rul y exists is one t hing, a unit y;
macroscopic objects are conglomerat ions of atoms; no conglomeration of objects
can ever c ons t it ut e one t hing, a unit y; hence macroscopic objects do not t rul y
ex is t . Tha t , I suppose, is t he met a phys ic a l f o unda t io n of t he At omist s' view t ha t
macroscopic objects are unrea l " (445: w ha t relation, if a ny, t his claim bears to
the ea rlier suggestion ( 225) t ha t macroscopic objects are unreal inasmuch as
a ut h e nt ic physical bodies are necessarily solid is left obscure). This is ha rdl y lucid.
Since he f a il s to expla in why he supposes Democritus denied t ha t a conglomera-
t ion of objects can ever c ons t it ut e one t hing, a unit y, w het her on account of
El eat i c P l u r a l i s m 137
posi t i on derives from nei t her a concern to respect the ban on real change nor
r educt i oni s t leanings, but r at her originates in a logical misconception fostered
( i nnoc e nt l y or not ) by Zeno, an error pr i mi t i ve yet nevertheless genui nel y t r ou bl i ng
before Plato got to work.
My response to these accounts of the atomistic conviction t ha t no t r ue u ni t y ,
and t hu s no actual existent, is complex, is qui t e st rai ght forward. Gi ven t ha t none
of our sources i nfor ms us of the reasons that Democritus adduced for the adopt i on
of t hi s mani fes t l y significant view, guided by an obvious principle of exegctical
char i l y we ought to adopt t hat candidate explanation from the range of plausibility
which does him most credit. I f this is the approach to be followed, then clearly my
reading (if possible) is preferable, since rather than accusing the atomists of fa u l t y
logic or a very crude reductionism, it attributes to them an ar gument of a piece
wi t h reasoning t ha t I have claimed they shoul d in consistency have endorsed.
According to t hei r theory a complex would consist of a collection of atoms and
void; but since such collections would be subject to rearrangement, which Melissus
had established cannot occur, there are none. Thus onl y an incomposite i ndi vi dual
is a u ni t y , because groupings are not real, single things.
However, my at t i t ude towards the logical and the reductionist fallacy accounts
need not be the same: while, as I have expl ai ned, Eleatic pl ur al i sm is s i mpl y
incompatible wi t h advocacy of a reductionist programme, I need not insist t hat it
could not be combined wi t h a belief, inspired by Zeno, t hat uni t y must be absolute.
I n t hat case perhaps the atomists mi ght have argued dialectically on behalf of
Eleaticism t hat even on the hypothesis t hat there is a pl ur al i t y (i. e. t ha t t here are
groups over and above the i ndi vi dual s supposedly their members), no collection
constitutes a real uni t y. But according to this story Democritus attempted doubl y
to di s comfi t his opponents by seeking to wring embarrassment from the conse-
quences of a hypothesis whose val i di t y he did not in propria persona concede no
conflict wi t h Eleatic pluralism arises. So if we reject the reductionism interpretation,
which lacks compelling grounds for its adoption, Democritus' doctrine concerning
u ni t y is at the very least consistent wi t h, if not act ual l y prompted by, a theory
constructed in order to avoid the admission of real change.
So much for the implications of the first set of suggestive doxographical reports -
the verdict must remain unclear, but certainly does not endanger the possibility t ha t
as a mat t er of historical fact the ancient atomists indeed advocated a version of
Eleatic pluralism. The remaining evidence whi ch mi ght tell in my favour , preserved
in the formul ae recording a contrast between microscopic real i t y and macroscopic
convent i onal i t y, yields r at her more decisive positive i ndi cat i ons . However, in order
to glean t hi s benefi t from the fr agment s I must first t ake issue wi t h a c u r r e nt l y
popu l a r reading of the restriction of true being to atoms and t he void based on
these )/ di st i nct i ons.
x
r educt i oni st s ympat hi es or t he Zenoni an puzzles or s omet hi ng else, Barnes does
not ma ke clear i f he t h i n k s t ha t t he a t omi s t s had good gr ou nds for t he i r bel i ef
138 R . B . B . Wa r d y
Barnes n l l c m p l s to e x p l ai n I h e at omi s t s ' contrasl i n terms of a di vi si on he draws
b et ween, on the one h an d, p ri mary (i . c. necessary) and proper qual i ti es of bodies
( i . e . de t e r m i n at i o n s of de t e rmi n ab l e pri mary features), and secondary physical
qual i t i e s on the ot h e r.
17
He suggests t h at Democri l us denied th at atoms possess
secondary qual i t i e s for the sake of expl anatory economy and si mpl y because some
of t h e m , at l east, c annot characteri se the corpuscles (374). Havi ng assembled hi s
Loc kei un mac h i nery Barnes sets it to work on the ancient unreal i t y thesis: "An easy
gloss suggests i tsel f: if i mproper secondary qual i ti es can be accounted for by way
of p ri mary and proper qual i ti es, then a complete account of the real world need
me n t i on no i mproper secondary qual i ti es at all; for every fact expressible by a
sentence of the form 'macroscopic object M has Q*' is equal l y, and more fundamen-
t al l y, expressi bl e by a sentence of the form 'Atoms A
t
, A
2
, ... , havi ng Q
t
, Q
2
, ... ,
are arranged in pattern P' " (374). In order to make sense of the choice of ""
as the general term for the secondary and unreal, he finally appends to his reading
the idea t h at "All improper secondary qualities are explicable by way of qualities;
and the expli cati on reveals that they are all mind-dependent" (376).
18
The probl em wi t h thi s i nfl uenti al reading is just that it is unmotivated and
anachroni sti c, or rather lacking any moti vati on connected wi th concerns even
tangenti al l y relevant to Democritean philosophy, unless one begs the question with
the clai m that ancient atomism was essentially a project in reductionism. It borrows
much of its appeal from the assumption that "" is to be construed as "mind-
dependent" once that gloss is permitted, the temptation to accept the alleged
17
Havi ng formul ated what he labels principle (D3) "Q is if and only if Q
is ei ther a pri mary or a proper qual i ty of bodies" Barnes does register a caveat:
"I do not mean that the Atomists explicitly embraced (D3) there is no trace
of any such definition in the doxography; but I think that (D3) is the thesis
whi ch best expl ai ns the atomist atti tude to atoms and qualities"(373). My rival
i nterpretati on is admi ttedly no less speculative, but has the advantage of chiming
in wi th at t ri but i on to the atomists of a view on 'real' change (it is unreal) that
permi ts them a success in confronti ng the Eleatic challenge which Barnes denies
them (see the preceding note).
18
I focus my criticism on Barnes not because his version of such a story is inferior,
but rather in response to his exceptionally unambiguous expression of this line
thought, often apparentl y endorsed en passant (e. g. Sedley as quoted in note 11).
KRS' attri buti on to Leucippus of a negative atti tude towards the deliverances of
the senses i nsofar as they suggest that existential change occurs (410 11) is very
close to my starti ng-poi nt. Their further idea that Democritus elaborated this
i nheri ted critique, relegati ng all (potentially?) conflicting appearances to the
conventi onal category in a move against Protagorean relativism, is again unexc^p-
ti onabl e, and evidently compatible wi th my own reading. However their desig-
nati on of the items classified as in fragment 9 as "secondary qualities"
(411) is not explained and perhaps casual.
Eleatic Pluralism 139
Lockeian parallel becomes overpowering.
19
But of course that is not what ""
means (I do not intend to suggest that Barnes, or any other advocate of an exegesis
resembling his, pretends otherwise), ""of itself means "conventional", and in
the first instance we ought to assume nothing more than that in seeking an under-
st andi ng of its import as a philosophical term with a quasi-technical status. (This
is to neglect the triviality that all conventions are in an unexciting sense dependent
on human minds for their creation and maintenance, but that is a point irrelevant
to the evaluation of Barnes's interpretation.)
Plutarch's version of the / contrast is unique in its accurate reflection
of the atomists' unreality thesis in its full strength:
, (adv. Coloi.
1110E-F).
20
We must not automatically dismiss this formulation as aberrant and
19
This is not to deny that there are subjectivist analyses of what Democritus
classifies as merely "" to be found in the doxography, e. g. this comment
of Galen's (DK 68A 49): .

, '
, '' ''
4
\
' , '' ,
', , . It is not part of my brief to argue
that according to the atomists the sensible characters of macroscopic objects (for
a start) are not somehow imposed on the world by the human mind. My complaint
is that Barnes does nothing to draw a connection between the conventional
category's nature as a mental (social?) construct and its recommended definition
as the class of improper, secondary qualities, and invites the suspicion that he is
playing on the conjunction of theses in the texts of Locke which inspire his
conjecture to foist a similar doctrinal combination on Democritus.
20
Unfortunately the text is not certain, although the case for the significance of
the adv. Colot. quotation luckily does not depend on emendation. Immediately
after the crucial word, "", there is a lacuna in the manuscripts, which
Wyttenbach suggests be stopped with "". This is perhaps preferable to
the Loeb editors' " ", since on Wyttenbach's conjecture the conven-
tional series culminates, as it should, with the inclusion of all complexes: see the
apparatus in B. Einarson and P. H. De Lacy, eds., Plutarch's Moralia, vol. xiv
(London: 1967).
It is all too easy to dismiss the singular nature of Plutarch's version; for
example, the punctuation of the Loeb translation surreptitiously brings it i nt o
line with the other reports: "... 'colour is by convention, sweet by convention/
a compound by convention, and so the rest, 'what is real are the void and the
atoms' ...". Professor Sandbach once actually went to the length of recommending
that ""itself be eliminated (see the Loeb apparatus), but did so in t he
belief that Democritus could have had no reason for denying the reality of atomic
combinations, and confesses the palaeographical i mprobabi l i t y of t he corruption
of his suggested "" i nt o "" (private communi cat i on).
140 R . B . B . Wa r dy
presume ( h at i h c o ri g i n al cat egory of wh at is ) was rest rict ed t o qual it ies, rel ying
in p ar t i c u l ar on t h e correct ness o fSc xt us ' quo t at i o n ( 68B 9). if suspicion sh ould fal l
on any source, Sext us' re l i ab i l i t y comes i n t o quest i on rat h er t h an Plut arch 's, since h is
Jesire t o po rt ray Democri t us as an anci ent prot o-Pyrrh oni st mi gh t very well encourage
h im t o expl o i t h is mat eri al in a mi sl eadi ngl y n arro w fash i o n . Of course Democritus
is a scept ic w i t h regard t o t h e appearances, according t o a reasonable underst anding
of 'scept icism', and of course Sext us' evidence makes it cert ain t h at h e denies at least
t h e real i t y of t h e propert ies enumerat ed. However, if we not e t h at Sextus' interest in
t h e at o mi st i c t h esis woul d prob ab l y not ext end beyond it s apparent overlap wit h
i n depen den t l y mot ivat ed worries ab out t h e rel iab il it y of t h e senses, we h ave sufficient
reason t o t ake Pl ut arch 's addit ion seriously and ent ert ain t h e possibilit y t h at it
preserves a h i n t of Democrit us' allegiance t o Eleat ic pl ural ism.
21
To sum up t h e posit ive indicat ions: first , from Pl ut arch , t h e compreh ensive claim
t h at everything macroscopic is merely . On my h ypot h esis t h is is because t h e
mut ab i l i t y of all comb inat ions renders t h em unreal; t o suppose t h at there act ually
are ei t h er men or groups of at oms is arb it raril y t o impose a makebelieve (because
impossib l e) convent ion on realit y. Second, perh aps t h e reject ion of complex unit ies
fol l ows from t h e at t empt t o avoid post ulat ing t h e existence of any pluralit y. Finally,
one mi gh t speculat e t h at t h e neat division of t h e fact ors held responsible for t h e
appearance of macroscopic change int o int rinsic atomic characteristics and relational
feat ures is suggest ive, al t h ough far from conclusive. Shape, size and maybe weight
are int rinsic, arrangement , posit ion and numb er are relat ional; change in intrinsic
propert ies, wh ich would indeed be real, is forbidden. Th e possible support for Eleatic
pl ural i sm in t h e ancient sources is admit t edly not pl ent iful : in t h e following section,
wh ere I sh all confront t h e much more imposing negat ive implicat ions of t h e doxogra-
ph y, I sh all also at t empt t o account for t h e lack of help t o be found.
IV
To put t he difficul t y as b l unt l y as possible: If t he atomists are
ul t imat e Eleat ics in t h e fash ion described, wh y don't t h e sources say
21
Barnes asks: "Does freezing wat er change from being t ransparent to being opaque?
Does grass in high summer change from green to brown? Transparency and opacity,
green and brown are not
4
real' qualities; they exist only
c
by convention'. Then
perh aps t h e changes are similarly unreal, occurring only 'by convent ion'. Does t h e
world cont ain apparent changes from green t o brown, or genuine changes from
apparent green to apparent brown? As far as I can see, the Abderites did not pose
t h ese quest ions; nor did t h ey grasp the importance of alteration in the neo-Ionian
answer to Elea" ( 4345). Barnes fails to grasp the importance of Plutarch's
t est imony and evident ly assumes t h at Sextus' catalogue is accurately comprehensive.
Democrit us would reply t h at t h ere are only apparent , i. e. relational changes
green is an apparent qualit y not because it is secondary, but precisely because its
aut h ent icit y would ent ail the impossible occurrence of real change.
Eleatic Pluralism 141
as much? In particular, why don't they explicitly remark that atomic
aggregates, which are easily supposed to be acceptable reductive re-
placements for ordinary objects, are in fact inadmissible for the reasons
recounted? The beginnings of an answer become apparent if we recon-
sider the moral of Parmenides' fate at the hands of the ancient histor-
ians of philosophy (see nn. 6 and 7). The doxographers freely extract
claims from either part of his poem which they indiscriminately ascribe
to him as endorsed doctrine. In our opinion this is wantonly to
disregard the all-important distinction between the Truth and the god-
dess's instructively deceitful account of mortal opinion, although we
concede that the precise workings of the stratagem remain obscure.
What is the origin of this fundamental distortion in the sources?
Aristotle tellingly informs us that Parmenides was compelled to follow
the appearances: that is, as I interpret this intriguing description, even
if he did not honestly own up and abandon his deduction under
pressure from the palpable truth of things, Parmenides must seriously
mean what he says in the latter half of his poem, where his ideas are
(relatively) sensible. As an initial defence of my reading I suggest that
in parallel fashion the ancient authorities fail accurately to express the
actual nature of atomistic metaphysics and epistemology because they
take it very much for granted that the core tenet of Eleaticism. the
impossibility of real change, is a dead letter. They routinely misrep-
resent Democritus, often as the advocate of the simple-minded reduc-
tionism which I have been at pains to dismiss from serious considera-
tion.
In order to deepen this critical estimation of the standard portrayal
of philosophers within the Eleatic tradition it will prove useful to
subject Aristotle's exposition of the origins of atomism (De Generatione
et Corruptione A8) to suspicious scrutiny. His analysis is generally
accepted as pretty convincing: indeed, some commentators come
dangerously close to according it canonical status without acknowledg-
ing the full extent of their reliance on this single influential text. It is
indeed of a high quality and not lightly to be set aside, but we should
at least question Aristotle's famous explanation of Leucippus' motives.
Aristotle asserts that Leucippus was concerned to effect a compro-
mise between the appearances and Eleatic argumentation. But can t hi s
claim as it stands be correct? Perhaps the atomist t hought he had
arguments which, in saying things in agreement wi t h perception, did
not abolish motion or the plurality of what is. However, t hat is not to
agree that Leucippus must have regarded himself as re-i nst at i ng a ut he n-
tic coming to be and passing away - rat her he seeks to show how
10 Arch (icsth Philosophic Bd 70
142 K . B . B . Wa r dy
t h i n g s could look t h at way. The ru l i n g purpos e of t h e at omi s t s ' ent er-
pri s e i s l o en ri c h t h e ori g i n al Eleat i c on t olog y an d al l ow some mi n i mal
v a l i di t y t o t h e deli v eran ces of t h e senses wi t h out count enanci ng genuine
ch an g es . Vi ewed as an at t empt at recon ci li at i on , t h ei r ext ens i on of t h e
ran g e of permi s s i ble t h i n g s an d h appen i n g s may be judged di s appoi n t -
i n g l y s mal l : all t h at remai ns of man i fold appearance i s plurali t y an d
mot i on . Ari s t ot le's account glosses ov er t he meagre ext en t of Leu-
ei ppus ' os t en s i ble concessions to the appearances not nearly s uffi -
ci en t for hi s h ypot h es i s t o serv e as a leg i t i mat e compromise between
the senses and reason. The Peri pat et i c present at i on of atomism as a
recon ci li n g project has been allowed to pass mus t er far too easily.
I n fact Ari s t ot le claims wh at one would expect hi m t o s ay for
ph i los oph ers who enjoy his quali fi ed approv al, t h at they are rather like
h i ms elf. An Ari s t ot eli an dul y considers t he suggestions of t he wise and
the i n di cat i on s of perception, nicely balances competing ideas against
each ot her, sagely eli mi n at es t he con v en i en t ly t i n y residue of intractable
di s ag reemen t and luci dly present s a conserv ativ e theory which preserv es
the best in the div erse sources on which he draws. Since Aristotelian
ph i los oph y is an art of compromise, he n at urally pays Leucippus the
compli men t of at t ri but i n g to him a mot i v at i on of which he highly
approv es , alt h oug h t he atomist's v ali ant effort s failed t o unt i e t he kn ot
wh i ch Ari s t ot le hi ms elf later unrav els . But t he pluralist Eleatics must
hav e been rat h er more uncompromi si ng t h an t h at their aim was to
accoun t for the pos s i bi li t y of error, not to concede ev en the part i al
t rut h of the ontological claims of Parmenides' opponents, illicitly extra-
polat i n g from the senses' acceptable testimony regarding the existence
of plurali t y and mot i on to the unacceptable occurrence of real change.
I t mi g h t be objected t hat this is jus t wh at Aristotle says about the
mot i v at i on of at omi s m. But hi s actual formulat i on , t h at Leucippus
i mag i n ed he had argument s which, agreeing with sense perception
( ), would not do away wi t h
generat i on or perishing ( ),
is indeed misleading. The at omi s t i c 'agreement wi t h the senses' comes
to t hi s: t h ey dev elop a met aphysi cs whi ch can accommodate perceptual
appearance wi t h out abandoni ng Eleatic fundament als . That man-
oeuv re i n v olv es 'not doi n g away wi t h ' existential change on ly i nsofar
as it allows for the possibility of mistakenly supposing that such change
occurs. (The tactic is not un li ke t hat whereby a hard determinist
recognises the subjective ph en omen on of free will and achiev es 'agree-
men t wi t h the appearances' by pos t ulat i ng t h at merely epistemic possi-
bi li t y s uffi ces for the explanat i on of our feelings.) Ari s t ot le's "
Eleatic Pluralism 143
" wrongly suggests a much more significant concession
to the phenomena.
The passage continues, "... [arguments which] would not do away
with either generation or perishing or movement or the plurality of
what is"; but and are for the atomists in a category
entirely distinct from existential change. Since they really are, they
truly are not 'done away with', and serve to account for the conceded
appearance of and . Aristotle's words improperly suggest
otherwise because for him the appearances together with their indica-
tions of real change are manifestly veridical, not just 'apparent'. Aris-
totle's highly influential and skewed portrait of atomism as a
project of reconciliation is the first stage in the doxography's misrepre-
sentation of Democritus' philosophical inspiration which is responsible
for subsequent confusion concerning the nature and even the coherence
of his attitude towards the appearances. If it be protested that this is
special pleading prompted solely by the desire to explain away awkward
evidence, one might respond that we are happy to dismiss very similar
reports concerning Eleaticism's founder, and that a like privilege ought
to be extended to his most subtle successor.
Another potential source of embarrassment is the various reports
recording Democritus' detailed atomistic account of the mechanisms
of perception, Theophrastus' De Sensu in particular, since they correlate
atoms with the macroscopic objects and properties that I claim are
rejected by Democritus as unreal. For example, when Theophrastus
(DK 68A 135) asserts that according to the Democritean theory of
vision "the air between the eye and the object of sight is contracted
and stamped by the object seen and the seer", he clearly takes it for
granted that the atomists' theory involved reference to macroscopic
objects of perception (similar instances are of course to be found
throughout the ancient reports).
In response we should again indulge in a healthy suspicion t hat t he
doxographers simply disregarded the Eleatic obligations of the at omi st s
and were insensitive to the original dialectical context wherein these
theories of perception were propounded. That is, Democritus mi ght
on the one hand have committed himself to the possibility in principle
of reformulating his perceptual analyses so as to avoid any conflict
with the restriction of reality to i ndi vi dual atoms, but on t he ot her
1 0 *
144 R . B . B . W a r d y
h a v e p c r m i l l c d h i ms e l f a r ange of f l e x i b l e di al ecti cal strategies on the
s t r e ngt h o f t h a t t h e or e t i c a l t r a ns l a t i on. Perhaps t h e atomi sts' treatment
of the senses took its s t ar t f rom the necessary concession that people do
on I h e b asi s of t h e i r perceptual experiences ' i nf e r ' (or pre-theoretically
a s s ume ) the ex istence of mut a b l e substances and properties, and offered
c aus al e x p l a na t i ons of the sensation of i ntenti onal objects whi ch merel y
seem to be. However, the ostensi b l y awkward referring terms of thi s
p or t i on of the theory lack existential import. Their employment is
excused by the need to engage the at t e nt i on of possible converts to the
E l c ut i c t r ut h and al l ay doub ts about the prospects f or a satisfactory
d i s s ol ut i on of the uni v e r s al l y f ami l i ar phenomena resistant to the
or i gi nal Parmeni dean attack. Evi dentl y the sacrifices in expressive
r i gour demanded b y the duty to ex tirpate anti-Eleatic error would
render at omi s m vul nerab l e to subsequent distortion.
A side-benefit of thi s reading is that it suggests a means of disposing
of di s s ati s f acti on wi th Democritus' exclusive reliance on intrinsic
atomi c di f f er enti ae in his aetiology of perception. On the standard
i nt e r p r e t a t i on, one might very well feel disappointed with this feature
of the account. A good reductionist should realise that he can and
mus t avai l himself of the emergence of higher-order properties at levels
ab ove base in order adequately to explain the unreduced phenomena.
The complaint then is that Democritean reductionism is woefully
def ecti ve because it attempts to compose manifestly inadequate ana-
lyses drawi ng solely on base-level atomic characteristics. But according
to my hypothesis Democritus is not a reductionist, and so trivially not
a bad one. Because any acceptable candidate ex planation of perception
mus t be susceptible, at least in principle, to translation into a final
account maki ng reference only to individual atoms and the void,
Democritus properl y abstained from employing non-existent atomic
as essential postulates in his theory of sensation.
Fi nal l y, one mi ght suppose that Democritean cosmogony poses an
i ns urmountab l e problem for my reading surely this is the coming
to be and passing away of massive atomic complexes! Any of the
doxographical reports of the atomists' views on the formation of worlds
seems inconvenient: according to them all Leucippus and Democritus
cheerf ul l y quanti fi ed over in the cosmic sense, enormous pat-
terns whi ch periodically arise and perish throughout the unlimited
void. A pl ur al i ty of atoms comes together and produces a single world-
generati ng (already the description is hardly consistent wi th the
severity of the Eleatic restrictions on talk of 'patterns' rehearsed in
Elealic Pluralism 145
section II), succeeded by the first spherical structure, etc., as cosmic
evolution progresses.
I again recommend placing these narratives in a perspective which
discourages any automatic presumption that the atomists are necessar-
ily committed to the existence of discrete, finite patterns that undergo
genuine change. Expressed in a properly regimented Eleatic language
whose referring terms range over nothing but individual atoms, cosmo-
gony would no longer even seem to involve real , only a shift
in the relations subsisting between a very great number of intrinsically
immutable particles. Much more obviously than in the case of the
theory of perception, effecting this translation would prove an imprac-
ticable task: there are too many atoms, unmanageably related according
to position. But that some regimentation isn't practically feasible does
not and perhaps should not prohibit theoretical allegiance to the
translation project this is a position occupied by some philosophers
of science, and perhaps the ancient atomists adopted an analogous
attitude. Furthermore, a philosopher convinced that some portion of
ordinary discourse is radically misleading in its logical and ontological
implications may nevertheless condone its use as innocuous so long as
one recognizes that such talk is loose and inaccurate. Both Empedocles
(DK 31 8) and Anaxagoras (DK 59B 17) make this point with regard
to standard locutions for coming and ceasing to be. Democritus might
very well have employed the same strategy, especially since fully ex-
panded, proper expression according to his standards is beyond human
capacity.
VI
One might fear that whatever the final, judicious verdict on the
reliability of the doxography, on the possibility of a pervasive, distortive
selectivity in the reports, Eleatic pluralism as I have sketched it is in
any case far from constituting even a limited philosophical ideal. If
there are not really any composite things, how can Democritus t hi nk
correctly, ourselves, incorrectly? How can anyone perceive or t hi nk?
Individual atoms are not sensate. If groups of them are, then at
least one set of apparent macroscopic objects does not dissolve away:
individual minds. To attempt to do away with oneself philosophically
is futile, to commit oneself to the effort, incoherent - someone is
attempting metaphysical suicide.
This is to launch a post-Cartesian attack: one is chargi ng t ha t , in
order to make a clean sweep, Democritus would be obliged f ut i l c l y lo
146 R . B . B . Wa r d y
de n y t he Cogit o. Nevert heless, it w i l l not do to attempt to excuse his
neglect of the l oomi ng danger of sel f- refut at ion on the grounds that
t h i s is a t ype of argume n t w it h w hich neither the atomist nor his
compe t it ors w ere famil iar. Sextus informs us that Democritus himself
mai n t ai n e d the falsity of the Protagorean doctrine that every appear-
ance is t r ue " " (. vii. 389 90, and cf. adv. Colot.
1109A) . No mat t er t hat these reports might prove suspect in details;
w e are best advised to assume that a Democritus advocating a version
of Eleatic pl ural ism w ould be w ell aw are of the penalty thereby in-
curred.
Mi gh t one not then speculate that such a realisation w ould abundant-
ly suffice for the motivation of Democritus' epistemological pessimism
(DK 68B 6, 10, 117), w hose occasion otherw ise remains obscure, and
perhaps account for the notorious nihilism of his successor Metrodorus
(DK 70B 1)? To proclaim no one know s w hether w e know or not, or
even w hether there is or is not anything, w ould be an apt expression
of the profound dilemma inherited by the follow ers of Parmenides,
t hat to embrace and expound his truth inevitably entails succumbing
to error, if only by instantiating it. If so, our reaction to the ultimate
unt enabil it y of Democritus' stance ought to be admiration for his
combination of dexterity in formulating his unreality-thesis and honesty
in confessing its signal defect; on my hypothesis he has after all greatly
improved on the sheer inexplicability of the appearances given the
resources of Eleatic monism. I submit that Eleatic pluralism is a
philosophical system of considerable intrinsic interest, and that it is
w hat Democritus should have maintained; if he did not, then w e
must question our supposition that the repercussions of Parmenides'
deduction shape an entire epoch in the history of philosophy.
22
22
An earlier version of t his paper w as read at the Cambridge 'B' Club. I' am
t h a n kf ul for the audience's incisive criticisms on that occasion, and have derived
furt he r help from discussions w ith M. F. Burnyeat, N. C. Denyer, and G. E. R.
Lloyd.