Zoldivar v Gonzales

166 SCRA 317

Ponente: Per Curiam
Topic: Admission to the practice of law
Facts:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in a criminal case for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act pending before the Sandiganbayan. he !ffice of
the anodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal
informations in those cases.
Accordingly" the petitioner filed with the Supreme Court where he contended that the
anodbayan no longer has power and authority to investigate and institute criminal cases
independently. he Court ordered the anodbayan to cease and desist from the case while
it was pending before them. #owever" the anodbayan with the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of arrest for the petitioner.
As a conse$uence" the Court once again ordered the anodbayan to cease and desist
pursuant to another motion filed by the petitioner.
Some time after" the petitioner once again filed a motion before the Court" this time it is a
motion to cite in contempt the respondent for its contemptuous statements to the media.
%n answering the motion as re$uired by the Court" the respondent filed a &!mnibus
'otion for ()tension and %nhibition* and further asserted therein that he has doubts as to
whether he could still avail of a fair and +ust trial when" allegedly" at least , members of
the Court who will not render +udgment without bias. #e closed out his pleading with a
prayer that the four -,. 'embers of the Court %dentified and referred to there by him
inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the 'otion to Cite in Contempt.
ssue:
/hether or not the Court may discipline the respondent
!eld:
0es. he Supreme Court has the authority to discipline officers of the court and members
of the 1ar. he Supreme Court" as regulator and guardian of the legal profession" has
plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. he authority to discipline lawyers stems
from the Court2s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law"
which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 3uite apart from this constitutional mandate" the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court over members of the 1ar is an inherent power incidental to the proper
administration of +ustice and essential to an orderly discharge of +udicial functions.
'oreover" the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt" to control in
the furtherance of +ustice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including
lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. he
power to punish for contempt is 4necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of +ustice"4 4-it. is not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the party5litigant.
he Court has two related powers: the inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. he disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the 1ar is
broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee
both by lawyers and non-lawyers" both in and out of court. 6re$uently" where the
contemnor is a lawyer" the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. 78 /here the respondent is a lawyer" however" the Supreme Court2s disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the
respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. he power to punish for
contempt of court does not e)haust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. 79 he disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the 1ar is but
corollary to the Court2s e)clusive power of admission to the 1ar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such" he is called upon to share in the
tas: and responsibility of dispensing +ustice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on
his part which visibly tends to obstruct" pervert" or impede and degrade the administration
of +ustice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the e)ercise of disciplinary
action against him" and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.
%t is sometimes asserted that in the e)ercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the 1ar" the Court is acting as
offended party" prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time.