Fernandez vs Grecia

A.C. No. 3694

Disbarment Cases

Facts:

Fernandez et al filed a disbarment case against Atty Grecia for theft of documents pertaining tothe
latters case against the petitioners. A certain Fe Linda Aves was admitted and diagnosed of having a
mild pre-eclampsia on December 20, 1990. Five days later, he was discharged to celebrate Christmas
with her family, unfortunately on December 26, 1990, the said patient died with her unborn child,
prompting the Aves family to brought an actgion for damages against the doctors and the hospital.
(Fernandez et al.)

During the litigation in the lower court, Atty Grecia, allegedly asked the clerk of court the medical
chart of the aforementioned patient which was at that time in the court's possesion, and thereafter
tore two pages identified as pages 72 and 73.

In view of Atty Grecia's unprofessional conduct, the petitioners filed the case for disbarment.

Issue:

WON the disbarment case is meritorious.

Held:

To quoute the Supreme Courts decision, they say that "by descending to the level of a common
thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his
moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his
membership in the BAR."

Atty Grecia was then ordered disbarred, his license to practice law in the Philippines cancelled and
his name was ordered to be stricken out of the Roll of Attorneys.

The Supreme Court cited Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 in the Rules of Professional Responsibility being
violated by Atty Grecia, notwitsanding that he was once disbarred to practice law on November 12,
1987 for his 'unholy alliance' with a judge in Quezon city to rip off banks and Chinese business firms.
And that 8 months after the Supreme Court heeding his pleas for compassion and promise to mend
his ways, it was just eight months after that he is faced with yet another disbarment case.



Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY
FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as
other information regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?

Held: NO.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that
a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know
his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged
to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the
clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the
disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the
lawyers legal advice was obtained.







Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the
petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a
complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the
respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time
became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or
agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed
that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing
money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of
actual expenses.

ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

HELD:

The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The
court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the
court found that petitioners deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue
and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of
the country.

Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.








Lawrence vs Texas
Brief Fact Summary. Police found two men engaged in sexual conduct, in their home, and they were
arrested under a Texas statute that prohibited such conduct between two men.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right, intimate sexual
relationships between consenting adults are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts. In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers were dispatched to a private home in
response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered (the right to enter does seem to have
been questioned) the home where John Geddes resided, and observed Lawrence and another man,
Tyron Garner, engaging in a sex act. The men were arrested, held over night and charged with
violating a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct. Specifically the statute provided A person commits and offense if he
engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex and goes on to
define deviate sexual intercourse as follows: any contact between any part of the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another person or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of
another person with an object. The two men were then convicted before a Justice of the Pease.
Issue. The issue is whether a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violates liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.















People of the Philippines vs Cayat
On November 6, 2010
Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or
any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera,
was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to
pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he
challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his
right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them
with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet
with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians
from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or
parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or
less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.