Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision,
2
dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution,
3
dated 19 December
2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in
favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed
Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba,
Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and,
thus, reversed and set aside the Decision,
4
dated 2 December 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-
C.
5
The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two
sales agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with
different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale
siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as
Naves successor-in-interest.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition,
determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
[Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.,
docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner
of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-
3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a
handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was
entered into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of
land. However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the latter
refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as
previously agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him
anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be
ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to
pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered
to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based
on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of
the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to her for her signature on
January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it was for the sale of her
property in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she
immediately returned to [Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the
same time repudiating the same. Her repudiation was further bolstered
by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment to
her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the
property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all
surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the
complaint was filed against her but before she received a copy thereof.
Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of action against
her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
who is not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that
said entity is the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in
representation of the corporation there being no evidence to show that
he was duly authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging
that they are now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the
complaint was amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party
defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court denied
[Naves] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a Manifestation and
Motion stating that she was adopting the allegations in her Motion to
Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos] amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her
defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was
made to appear as widow when in fact she was very much married at
the time of the transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of
[Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the
aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo
filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply
and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this time including the
fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally deficient based on
the psychological evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by
Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the
motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in
Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she
raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive
factor to determine once and for all whether the contract entered into
by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and void, the
Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim against
[the Pabale siblings] should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the
proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of
the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C
with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a
Decision was rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who
now resides with the Brosas spouses has categorically refused
to be examined again at the National Mental Hospital, the Court
is constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation
report dated April 14, 1986 submitted by Dra. Nona Jean
Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20, 1987
submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National
Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent
within the purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
person who, by reason of age, disease, weak mind and
deteriorating mental processes cannot without outside aid take
care of herself and manage her properties, becoming thereby
an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition having
become severe since the year 1980. She and her estate are
hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is
hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of
bond, until further orders from this Court. Upon his taking his
oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to
participate actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with
the end in view of protecting her interests from the prejudicial
sales of her real properties, from the overpayment in the
foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering
her lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom,
while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas
was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required docketing
fees within the reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20,
1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an orphan
and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to
his inherited properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the
instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision
dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for guardianship) was
filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the court a
quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to the motion on
grounds that (1) they were not made a party to the guardianship
proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision therein; and (2)
that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late
[Nave] in their favor was never raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997,
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the courts permission
for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not
long after the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a
motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri]
alleging that since the subject property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be
substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a
Manifestation stating that what he executed is a Deed of Donation and
not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same
was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for
substitution should be denied.
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it
cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits, the trial
court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3,
1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null
and void and of no force and effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984
executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings]
similarly null and void and of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the
property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of
Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title
over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the
concept of reconveyance because the sale in their favor has
been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over
the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its income
from the time they took over possession to the time the same is
turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the
said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and
severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.
6

S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question
the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering him and the
Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00
as attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring
that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null
and void on the ground that Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals
of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando
Realty Corporation, represented by its President, Sesinando M.
Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin,
Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil
Case No. 675-84-C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 20, 1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.
7

Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate
court, invoking the Decision,
8
dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the
guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found
Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and thus
appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already
became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued
that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an incompetent since
1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null
and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she
executed over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of
the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having
participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose
Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale
as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19
November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on 21 November
2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could
mark and submit as evidence certain documents to establish that the Pabale
siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject property as owner upon
Naves death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must be remembered
that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed transfer of his rights
to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo refrained from ruling
thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack
of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment
of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING
THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING
NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE
VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20,
1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT
BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION
TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE
FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
9

It is Alamayris position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22
June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since
1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-
C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly, the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that
an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud
or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
10

It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47,
Rule 39, which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated
as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or
demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two
main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two
typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence.
11
In speaking of
these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the
afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is
referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is
embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the
following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1)
bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact
or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially
passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be
again litigated in any future action between such parties or their
privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction
on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order
that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular
matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is
essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is
in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in
the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76
SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by former
judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment
which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or
questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action
are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with
the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to
questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although
no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto
and although such matters were directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under
this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the
judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a
judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are
as conclusive as the judgment itself.
12

Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation,
further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case
where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to
be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or
decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted
and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is
the concept of res judicata known as"conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
13

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a
fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case, however,
may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or
question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only
the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application
to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for
the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave
alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor
or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering the penalty
of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason
of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation."
14

Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a
guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for
resident. Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident
minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the
minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court
having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the
person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of
the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines may
also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health,
in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of
an isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a
general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment
necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the
minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their
care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship
are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or
verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition
for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a
time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in
the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the
incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice
thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may, by filing a
written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the
alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the
unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray
that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to
himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the
petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and
it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon
the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their
respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor or
incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate,
or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter specified.
x x x x
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or judgments under this rule
shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part
thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the
usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case.
Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly
S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no
named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the
petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed
minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those residing
within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified of the
time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a
minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his
properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian.
The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could help the trial court
settle such issues would be those who are closest to and most familiar with the
supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same
province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the
minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple:
because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a
guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will only insist
that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into
contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed
minor or incompetent obligated to comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and
actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor
are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the
giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the petition for
appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC actually did so in
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-
86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 1987
15
and 19 November
1987,
16
issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the
presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings,
during the hearings held on the same dates. However, the said Orders by
themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of the Pabale
siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the said
hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit
and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the
Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. In
general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receives
evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment.
17
It must be pointed
out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark
Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to submit
additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV
No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had
already promulgated its Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and
available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before
the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment;
18
otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties
may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri
failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence earlier.
Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served if she was
allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from
the general rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural
rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.
19
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation
in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in
the interpretation and application of the rules applies only to proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not
a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
20

Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny
her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being
late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals also
denied the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents
Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship proceedings
considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father,
[herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary evidence
to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this late
stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to their father is
not notice to them there being no allegation to the effect that he
represented them before the Calamba Court.
21

As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit
do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October
1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the
Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to represent his
children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was
not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February 1984 over the subject
property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without
proper authority, Jose Pabales presence at the hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-
86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or affect
their right to the subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No.
675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil
Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from
ruling on Naves competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over
the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent
at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the
appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when
she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale
siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Naves incompetency, it must be
established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding
that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so
in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,
22
the Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller
was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the
execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so when she
executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot
be gainsaid since Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of
1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the
contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was
incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.
23
The burden of proving incapacity
to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
24

Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only
in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not
judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said
case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C.
Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be
capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over
the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20
February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she
dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the
RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June
1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having become severe
since the year 1980."
25
But there is no basis for such a declaration. The
medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona
Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,
26
and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba,
dated 20 April 1987,
27
both stated that upon their examination, Nave was
suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis
with psychotic episodes," which impaired her judgment. There was nothing in
the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on when Nave began to
suffer from said mental condition. All they said was that it existed at the time
Nave was examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only
able to observe Nave, which made him realize that her mind was very
impressionable and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave
visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision
dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves
incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And
other than invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-
86-C, Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was
mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale
over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said
deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former
on Naves incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of
judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had capacity and was
competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984
Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner
Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and
Vincent Vancil Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes,
Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated
December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:
"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy
serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said
country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2)
children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes.
"Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the
persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years
old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition
that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an
estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension benefits
with a probable value of P100,000.00.
"Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for
hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar
Daily.
"On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and
Vincent Vancil Jr.
"On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes,
submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pagadian City.
"Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition
with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New
One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing;
that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the
time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140
Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized
American citizen.
"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected
and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as
guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such
guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent
attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated
November 24, 1988."
1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the
RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-
CEB.
The Court of Appeals held:
"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents,
the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her
minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or
P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family
Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93
of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as
ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court
appointment and only for good reason may another person be named.
Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at
all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her
legal rights as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away
such privilege from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation
of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on
family solidarity."
2

On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition,
raising the following "legal points":
"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential
right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate
of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence.
"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G.
Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the
minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her
daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by Oppositors
live-in partner.
"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact
that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as
judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is
clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated
September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie
turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth
Certificate.
3
Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect to
Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The
said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated
November 11, 1998.
Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot
with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by
petitioner should be resolved.
The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother
of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the
natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to
be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code
which provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of
Appeals,
4
this Court held:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that
the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the
natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of
the parental relationship."
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way
of substitute parental authoritypursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,
5
this Court ruled:
"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of
either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability
may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent."
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.
Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to
be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has
not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be
the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner
raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a
subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is
an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able
to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in
her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian
by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to
someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set
foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,
petitioners old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-16884
6
filed by one Danilo R.
Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to
this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years
is not certain.
Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it
difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,
7
this Court held:
"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon
the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in
the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the
courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians.
However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of
the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory
requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of
persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in
the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be
under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION


HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and
OSCAR SY,
[1]

Petitioners,




- versus -




ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE
SY, ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY,
LOURDES SY, JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-
SY,
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 114217




ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES JULIAN SY AND ROSA
TAN, ZENAIDA TAN, and MA. EMMA SY,
Petitioners,




- versus -




BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO SY, FLORECITA SY,
ROLANDO SY, LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY, JULIETA
SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY,
Respondents.



G.R. No. 150797

Present:

CARPIO, J.
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.







Promulgated:

October 13, 2009


x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The first Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the
Decision
[2]
dated May 6, 1993 and the Resolution
[3]
dated February 28, 1994 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686. On the other hand, the
second Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions the Decision dated February 28,
2001 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
46244.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

G.R. No. 114217

On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition
against spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa
Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy,
Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy, Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy,
and Renato Sy before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 2,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8578.
[4]


Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang
by his second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose
Sy Bang, Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first
marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the
children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan.
[5]


Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal
properties, including several businesses.
[6]


During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents,
it was agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the
common properties and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be
placed temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee, with
authority to delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or private
respondents. Thus, the function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated by Jose Sy
Bang to his co-petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty or function of management and
operation of the business of cinema of the common ownership was delegated by
petitioner Jose Sy Bang to respondent Rosauro Sy.
[7]


Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the
three cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall
exclusively pertain to respondents for their support and sustenance, pending
the termination of Civil Case No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and the income
from the vast parts of the entire estate and other businesses of their common
father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the year 1980, private
respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of the operation
and management of the three cinema houses, with the income derived
therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and
maintenance.
[8]


On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on
the Compromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case
No. 8578 by plaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On
April 2, 1981, the Judge rendered a Second Partial Decision based on the
pretrial order of the court, dated March 25, 1981, entered into by and between
respondent Renato Sy and petitioner spouses. Said First Partial Decision and
Second Partial Decision had long become final, without an appeal having been
interposed by any of the parties.
[9]


On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision,
[10]
the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third
Partial Decision:

(a) Declaring that all the properties,
businesses or assets, their income, produce and improvements,
as well as all the rights, interests or participations (sic) in the
names of defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan
and their children, defendants Zenaida and Ma. Emma; both
surnamed Sy, and defendants Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan,
as belonging to the estate of Sy Bang, including the properties
in the names of said defendants which are enumerated in the
Complaints in this case and all those properties, rights and
interests which said defendants may have concealed or
fraudulently transferred in the names of other persons, their
agents or representatives;

(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy
Bang, namely: his surviving widow, Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy
and her children, Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, Rolando,
Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed Sy,
and his children by his first wife, namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian
Sy, Lucio Sy, Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;

(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy
Bang among his heirs entitled thereto after the extent thereof
shall have been determined at the conclusion of the proper
accounting which the parties in this case, their agents and
representatives, shall render and after segregating and
delivering to Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half (1/2) share
in the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased
husband Sy Bang;

(d) Deferring resolution on the question
concerning the inclusion for partition of properties in the
names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all
surnamed Sy.

SO ORDERED.


On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and for Inhibition, alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown
partiality in favor of their co-defendants in the case. This motion was denied on
August 16, 1982.
[11]


On July 4, 1982, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for
Inhibition (Disqualification) and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The Petition for Prohibition and for
Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order
was Noted.
[12]


On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first
Order,
[13]
Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners
Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their
Supplemental Motion, dated July 12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit; and
(2) in the second Order,
[14]
the Judge ordered the immediate cancellation of
the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title in the names of
Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.

On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the
receiver, Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy.
[15]


While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending
before the First Division of the Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition
for Certiorariand Prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No.
61519. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued on August 31, 1982, to
enjoin the Judge from taking any action in Civil Case No. 8578 and, likewise,
restraining the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution dated August
16, 1982, the two Orders dated August 17, 1982, and the Order dated August 18,
1982.

On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for
Mandamus with Restraining Order, docketed as G.R. No. 60957.

On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed
by Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by
petitioners on September 24, 1982.
[16]


After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred
the petition to the CA for proper determination and disposition.

The CA rendered the assailed Decision
[17]
on May 6, 1993, denying due
course to and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno
acted correctly in issuing the assailed Third Partial Decision. The CA said that
the act of Judge Puno in rendering a partial decision was in accord with then
Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, which stated that in an action against
several defendants, the court may, when a judgment is proper, render judgment
against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. It
found that the judges decision to defer resolution on the properties in the name
of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would not affect the resolution on
the properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian, Rosa, Zenaida,
and Ma. Emma, since the properties were separable and distinct from one
another such that the claim that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate
could be the subject of separate suits.

The CA also upheld the judges appointment of a receiver, saying that
the judge did so after both parties had presented their evidence and upon
verified petition filed by respondents, and in order to preserve the properties
under litigation. Further, the CA found proper the order to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of title in the names of Rosalino,
Rolando and Bartolome.

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994.
[18]


On April 22, 1994, petitioners filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88
and 19-91 for failure of petitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, and the Petition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.

In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA
Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the
nullification of the Third Partial Decision and orders of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 8578. They also pray for the Court to direct the trial court to proceed
with the reception of further evidence in Civil Case No. 8578.
[19]
In particular,
petitioners allege that the CA decided questions of substance not in accord with
law when it upheld the trial courts Third Partial Decision which, they alleged,
was rendered in violation of their rights to due process.

Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days
May 26 and 27, 1982 to present their evidence. However, at the hearing on
May 26, the judge forced them to terminate the presentation of their
evidence. On June 2, 1982, following petitioners submission of additional
documentary evidence, the trial court scheduled the case for hearing on June 8
and 9, 1982, at 2 oclock in the afternoon in view of the importance of the issue
concerning whether all the properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as those in
the names of other party-litigants in this case) shall be declared or included as
part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary
evidences (sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan. At the June 8 hearing,
petitioners presented additional evidence. Unknown to them, however, the trial
court had already rendered its Third Partial Decision at 11 oclock that
morning. Thus, petitioners argue that said Third Partial Decision is void.
[20]


They also question the trial courts First Order dated August 17, 1982 and
Order dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and
appointing a receiver, respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing and
without showing the necessity to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they question the
Second Order dated August 17, 1982 canceling the notice of lis pendens ex
parte and without any showing that the notice was for the purpose of molesting
the adverse parties, or that it was not necessary to protect the rights of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
[21]


On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widows
Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive
estate. The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their
conjugal properties. From the time of Sy Bangs death in 1971 until the filing of
the motion, Rosita was not given any widows allowance as provided in Section
3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court by the parties in possession and control of her
husbands estate, or her share in the conjugal partnership.
[22]


In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widows Allowance,
petitioners argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that the same is granted only during the settlement of the estate of
the decedent, and this allowance, under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now
Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken from the common mass of
property during the liquidation of the inventoried properties.
[23]
Considering
that the case before the trial court is a special civil action for partition under
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not entitled to widows allowance.

On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of
Widows Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay
RositaP25,000.00 as the widows allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy
Bang, effective September 1, 1996 and every month thereafter until the estate is
finally settled or until further orders from the Court.
[24]


In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court
that Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present
and future claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to
the case.
[25]
Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Rosita and
Enrique stated that they were given P1 million and a 229-square meter parcel of
land, for which reason they were withdrawing as plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
8578.
[26]


Respondents, except Enrique Sy, filed a Counter-Manifestation and
Opposition to Drop Rosita Sy as a Party.
[27]
They said that it would be ridiculous
for Rosita to give up her share in Sy Bangs estate, amounting to hundreds of
millions of pesos, which had already been ordered partitioned by the trial court,
to the prejudice of her seven full-blooded children. They alleged that Rosita was
not in possession of her full faculties when she affixed her thumbmark on
the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age, her frequent illness, and her lack
of ability to read or write. Hence, they filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of LucenaCity for guardianship over her person and
properties. They also alleged that Enrique and some of Jose Sy Bangs children
would stealthily visit Rosita in Rosauros house while the latter was away. On
one of those occasions, she was asked to affix her thumbmark on some
documents she could not read and knew nothing about. They claim that Rosita
has never received a single centavo of the P1 million allegedly given her.

In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation,
[28]
petitioners countered that
respondents failed to present any concrete evidence to challenge
the Sinumpaang Salaysay. Since the same was duly notarized, it was a public
document and presumed valid. They, likewise, alleged that the Counter-
Manifestation was filed without Rositas authorization as, in fact, she had
written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said pleading.
[29]
Further,
they averred that Rosita executed theSinumpaang Salaysay while in full
possession of her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended to oppose the
petition for guardianship and they presented a copy of a sworn certification
from Rositas physician that she (Rosita) is physically fit and mentally
competent to attend to her personal or business transactions.
[30]


On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Courts September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique
executed theirSinumpaang Salaysay on August 29, 1996. However, this
development was made known to the Court only on October 1, 1996; hence, the
Court was not aware of this when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners prayed for
the reconsideration of the September 23, 1996 Resolution and dropping Rosita
and Enrique as parties to the case.
[31]


In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents
maintained that the Court should not consider the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondents alleged that Rosita thumbmarked the Sinumpaang
Salaysay without understanding the contents of the document or the
implications of her acts. Respondents also tried to demonstrate that their
mother would thumbmark any document that their children asked her to by
exhibiting four documents each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay and
thumbmarked by Rosita. One purported to disown the earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay. The second was a reproduction of the earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay with the amount changed to P100.00, the Transfer Certificate of Title
number changed to 12343567, and the size of the property to as big as the
entire Lucena City. The third purported to bequeath her shares in the conjugal
partnership of gains to Rosauro, Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino, while
refusing to give any inheritance to Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and
Enrique. Lastly, the fourth contradicted the third in that it was in favor of
Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique, while disinheriting Rosauro, Bartolome,
Rolando, and Rosalino. These, respondents assert, clearly show that their
mother would sign any document, no matter the contents, upon the request of
any of her children.
[32]


The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18,
1996.
[33]


Petitioners filed a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing
that the Third Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without
due process, but also ignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility
of Torrens titles.
[34]


G.R. No. 150797

Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents filed a Joint Petition
for the Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of
Lucena City, Branch 58 (Guardianship court), docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 96-34. On May 19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named as the special
guardian, filed before the Guardianship court a Motion to Order Court Deposit of
Widows Allowance Ordered by the Supreme Court.
[35]
Then, he filed a Motion
before this Court seeking an Order for petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000.00
in widows allowance and P25,000.00 every month thereafter, as ordered by
this Court in its September 23, 1996 Resolution. He also prayed for petitioners
imprisonment should they fail to comply therewith.
[36]


On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:


WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada
Tan; and their children, Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and
Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, are hereby ordered to deposit
to this Court, jointly and severally, the amount of P250,000.00
representing the widows allowance of the incompetent Rosita
Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods from September 1,
1996 to June 30, 1997, and additional amount of P25,000.00
per month and every month thereafter, within the first ten (10)
days of each month.
[37]



Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the
appointed guardian, then asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of
execution. Meanwhile, on December 10, 1997, petitioners filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul the July 8,
1997 Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution of the Guardianship court.
[38]


In a Decision
[39]
dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents
favor, finding nothing legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sys
filing of the motion to order the deposit of the widows allowance ordered by
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 114217 or, for that matter, in the public
respondents grant thereof in the order herein assailed. More so, when the
public respondents actions are viewed in the light of the Supreme Courts
denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration of its resolution dated
September 23, 1996.
[40]
Thus it held:


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit
and the assailed resolution dated September 23, 1996 (sic)
is AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5,
2001,
[41]
petitioners filed this Petition for Review
[42]
under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court praying for this Court to reverse the CAs February 28, 2001 Decision
and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to declare the
Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of
the widows allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34.
[43]
They argued that
the Guardianship courts jurisdiction is limited to determining whether Rosita
was incompetent and, upon finding in the affirmative, appointing a guardian.
Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, a widows allowance
can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the complaint for partition
were to be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the
partition case had the exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the
widows allowance.
[44]


They raised the following issues:


The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Guardianship
Courts Order dated 8 July 1997, and Resolution dated 9
October 1997, in that:

I
The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited
jurisdiction, had no authority to enforce payment of widows
allowance.

II
The payment of widows allowance cannot be implemented at
[the] present because the estate of Sy Bang the source from
which payment is to be taken has not been determined with
finality.

III
The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of
widows allowance unduly modified the express terms of this
Honorable Courts Resolution granting it.
[45]



Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship courts omission of the
phrase to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang from the July 8, 1997 Order.
They interpreted this to mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that the
widows allowance be taken from their own properties and not from the estate
of Sy Bang an undue modification of this Courts September 23, 1996
Resolution.
[46]


On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217
and G.R. No. 150797. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on May
21, 2003 and June 19, 2003, both of which were noted by this Court in its
August 11, 2003 Resolution.

Pending the issuance of this Courts Decision in the two cases, respondent
Rosauro Sy filed, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Court of
Supreme Courts Ordered Widows Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and
Upon Failure of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to Comply Therewith to Order Their
Imprisonment Until Compliance. He alleged that his mother had been ill and had
no means to support herself except through his financial assistance, and that
respondents had not complied with this Courts September 23, 1996 Resolution,
promulgated seven years earlier.
[47]
He argued that respondents defiance
constituted indirect contempt of court. That the Guardianship court had found
them guilty of indirect contempt did not help his mother because she was still
unable to collect her widows allowance.
[48]


Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the
widows allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated that
Rosita, together with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving
all claims against petitioners. Hence, there was no legal ground to cite them in
contempt.
[49]


On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauros Motion, to wit:


WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds
petitioner Iluminada Tan (widow of deceased petitioner Jose
Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners Zenaida
Sy, Ma. Emma Sy,Julian Sy and the latters wife Rosa
Tan, GUILTY of contempt of this Court and are collectively
sentenced to pay a FINE equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the
total amount due and unpaid to Rosita Ferrera-Sy by way of a
widows allowance pursuant to this Courts Resolution of
September 13, 1996, and accordingly ORDERS their immediate
imprisonment until they shall have complied with said
Resolution by paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy the amount of TWO
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P2,600,100.00), representing her total accumulated unpaid
widows allowance from September, 1996 to April, 2005 at the
rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) a
month, plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court
further DIRECTS petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy
her monthly widows allowance for the succeeding months as
they fall due, under pain of imprisonment.

This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.
[50]



Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court fine of P260,010.00 on
April 5, 2005.
[51]


Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), filed a Motion for
Execution
[52]
before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner
Rosa Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for
Clarification.
[53]
She alleged that, in accordance with Chinese culture, she had no
participation in the management of the family business or Sy Bangs
estate. After her husbands death, she allegedly inherited nothing but debts and
liabilities, and, having no income of her own, was now in a quandary on how
these can be paid. She asked the Court to consider that she had not disobeyed
its Resolution and to consider her motion.

Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clarification.
[54]
They stressed that
the P1 million and the piece of land Rosita had already received from Jose Sy
Bang in 1996 should form part of the widows allowance. They also argued that
whatever allowance Rosita may be entitled to should come from the estate of Sy
Bang. They further argued the unfairness of being made to pay the allowance
when none of them participated in the management of Sy Bangs estate; Zenaida
and Ma. Emma being minors at the time of his death, while Iluminada and Rosa
had no significant role in the family business.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring
Respondents to Deposit with the Supreme Courts Cashier its Ordered Widows
Allowance
[55]
and a Motion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4,
2005.
[56]
Petitioners opposed the same.
[57]


On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of
respondents motions and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[58]


Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed, on August 15, 2005, a
Manifestation of Compliance and Motion for Clarification.
[59]
They maintained
that the issues they had raised in the motion for reconsideration had not been
duly resolved. They argued that when this Court issued its September 23, 1996
Resolution, it was not yet aware that Rosita had executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay, wherein she waived her claims and causes of action against
petitioners. They also informed this Court that, on April 17, 1998, the
Guardianship court had issued an Order which recognized a temporary
agreement based on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a financial assistance
of P5,000.00 per month to Rosita while the case was pending. Moreover, as a
manifestation of good faith, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid
the P430,000.00 out of their own funds in partial compliance with the Courts
Resolution. However, the same did not in any way constitute a waiver of their
rights or defenses in the present case. They underscored the fact that the
allowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang, and not from Jose Sy Bang or
any of the latters heirs, the extent of which remained undetermined. They
further asked the Court to adjudicate the liability for the widows allowance to
be equally divided between them and the other set of petitioners, the heirs of
Julian Sy.

On August 30, 2005, respondents filed a motion asking this Court to issue
an Order for the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply
with the Courts resolution.
[60]
They aver that the period within which
petitioners were to comply with the Courts Resolution had now lapsed, and
thus, petitioners must now be incarcerated for failure to abide by said
Resolution. They likewise asked the Court to refer petitioners counsel, Atty.
Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violations of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility or to declare him in contempt of
court. They alleged that despite the finality of the Courts denial of petitioners
motion for reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still filed a Manifestation with
compliance arguing the same points. Further, Atty. Joyas is not petitioners
counsel of record in this case since he never formally entered his appearance
before the Court.
[61]


In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to
refer Atty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy.
[62]


Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then filed an Omnibus
Motion,
[63]
seeking an extension of time to comply with the Courts Resolution
and Motion to delete the penalty of fine as a consequence of voluntary
compliance. They insist that their compliance with the order to pay the widows
allowance should obliterate, expunge, and blot out the penalty of fine and
imprisonment. They alleged that for their failure to comply with this Courts
Resolution, the RTC, LucenaCity, found them guilty of indirect contempt and
imposed on them a fine of P30,000.00. They had appealed said order to the CA.

They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms joint and
several in the September 23 Resolution, and collectively in the April 5, 2005
Resolution. They argued that joint and several creates individual liability for
each of the parties for the full amount of the obligation, while collectively
means that all members of the group are responsible together for the action of
the group. Hence, collectively would mean that the liability belongs equally to
the two groups of petitioners. They requested for an additional 60 days to raise
the necessary amount. They also asked the Court to hold their imprisonment in
abeyance until their just and reasonable compliance with the Courts orders.

Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, filed another
Manifestation stressing that Sy Bangs marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void. They
claimed that respondents have falsified documents to lead the courts into
believing that Rositas marriage to Sy Bang is valid.

The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration of
Petitioners,
[64]
which petitioners opposed.
[65]


In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005,
[66]
the Court issued a Warrant of
Arrest
[67]
against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to detain them until they complied with this Courts April 4, 2005 and July
25, 2005 Resolutions.

Petitioner Rosa Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion.
[68]
She informed the
Court that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of the Court
and its orders, she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to raise money to
comply, but concedes that she was only able to raise a minimal amount since
she has no source of income herself and needs financial support to buy her food
and medicines. She obtained her brothers help and the latter issued six checks
in the total amount of P650,000.00. She also alleged that she was not informed
by her husbands counsel of the developments in the case, and remained
unconsulted on any of the matters or incidents of the case. She reiterated that
she had no participation in the management of the Sy Bang estate and received
nothing of value upon her husbands death. She prayed that the Court would
not consider her failure to raise any further amount as contempt or defiance of
its orders.

The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.

In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions
with Payment of Widows Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of
Warrant of Arrest on Humanitarian Grounds,
[69]
petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida
and Ma. Emma asked the Court to delete the penalty of indefinite imprisonment
considering their partial compliance and the partial compliance of Rosa
Tan. They expressed willingness to deposit the widows allowance with the
Supreme Courts Cashier pending the determination of Sy Bangs estate. They
reasoned that the money to be deposited is their own and does not belong to Sy
Bangs estate. The deposit is made for the sole purpose of deleting the penalty
of indefinite imprisonment. They claim that they are not willfully disobeying the
Courts order but are merely hesitating to comply because of pending incidents
such as the falsification charges against Rosita, the resolution of the partition
case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Rosita, and the pendency of Rositas
guardianship proceedings, as well as humanitarian considerations. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to reconsider the order of contempt and to recall the
warrant of arrest.

On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution
[70]
lifting the warrant
of arrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on the
condition that they issue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued
widows allowance of Rosita Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to submit
proof of their compliance to the Court within ten (10) days from notice.

In a Manifestation
[71]
dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada,
Zenaida and Ma. Emma informed the Court that they had deposited the checks
in favor of Rosita with the RTC, Lucena City, Branch 58, during the proceedings
on February 28, 2006.
[72]


Respondents filed a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit
of said checks, amounting to P1,073,053.00, does not amount to full compliance
with the Courts order considering that the accrued widows allowance now
amounted to P4,528,125.00.

Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma filed a Motion to
include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as
Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as
they may also hold Assets-Properties of the Estate of Sy Bang.
[73]
They argued
that it is denial of the equal protection clause for the Court to single out only the
two children of the first marriage Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy and their heirs,
as the ones responsible for the widows allowance. This ruling, they aver, does
not take into consideration the numerous and valuable properties from the
estate of Sy Bang being held in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and
Enrique. They alleged that two compromise agreements, both approved by the
trial court, transferred properties to Rolando and Renato. They further alleged
that respondents Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita, Rosalino, Enrique, and
Rosita Ferrera-Sy have executed separate waivers and quitclaims over their
shares in the estate of Sy Bang for certain considerations. However, out of
respect for the Court and their fear of incarceration, they complied with the
Courts orders using their personal funds which they claim is unfair because
they have never participated in the management of the properties of Sy Bang.
They prayed that the Court pronounce that the liability for the widows
allowance be divided proportionately among the following groups: Iluminada,
Zenaida, and Ma. Emma; Rosa Tan; Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo; Bartolome
Sy and wife Virginia Lim; Rolando Sy and wife Anacorita Rioflorido; and the
heirs of Enrique Sy, namely, Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda.

On March 23, 2006, petitioners filed an Urgent Reply to respondents
Comment on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition
[74]
to the motion
filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order for the NBI to arrest
petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. They
argued that they had fully complied with the Courts orders. They alleged that
on three occasions within the period, they had tried to submit 12 postdated
checks to the Courts cashiers, but the same were refused due to the policy of
the Court not to issue receipts on postdated checks. They then filed a motion
before the RTC of Lucena City praying for authority to deposit the checks with
the trial court. The motion was denied but, on reconsideration, was later
granted. The checks are now in the custody of the RTC. The only issue
respondents raise, they claim, is the amount of the checks. Hence, there is no
basis for the Court to direct the NBI to effect their arrest.

The Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to
comment on the motion to include some of them in the payment of widows
allowance. Petitioners, on the other hand, were required to comment on a
motion filed by respondents for the Court to reiterate its order to the NBI to
arrest petitioners for failure to comply with the February 15, 2006
Resolution.
[75]


Petitioners filed their Comment with Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the March 29, 2006 Resolution.
[76]
They reiterated their
arguments in their Urgent Reply to respondents Comment on the manifestation
of compliance with Opposition. They further alleged that there is now a
Resolution by the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, San Pablo City, finding
probable cause to charge respondents with falsification of three marriage
contracts between Sy Bang and Rosita Ferrera. According to them, this
development now constitutes a highly prejudicial question on whether they
should comply with the order to pay widows allowance. They claim that, while
the filing of the information is merely the first step in the criminal prosecution
of respondents, it already casts doubt on whether Rosita is legally entitled to the
widows allowance. They now seek partial reconsideration of the Resolution
inasmuch as it requires them to deposit with the Clerk of Court, RTC of Lucena
City, Branch 58, new checks payable to Rosita Ferrera.

Respondents, on the other hand, filed a Comment and Manifestation
[77]
on
why they should not be made to pay the widows allowance. They argued that
the RTC had already decided that the estate of Sy Bang was comprised of
properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida, Ma. Emma,
Julian Sy, and Rosa Tan, and the same was affirmed by the CA. Pending the
resolution of the appeal before this Court, this Decision stands. Thus,
petitioners claim that the estate of Sy Bang is yet undetermined is false. They
also claim that, contrary to petitioners claims of being poor, they still hold
enormous properties of the Sy Bang estate, which had been transferred in their
names through falsification of public documents, now subject of several cases
which respondents filed against them before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Respondents further claim that the validity of their mothers marriage to
Sy Bang has been recognized by the courts in several cases where the issue had
been raised, including the case for recognition of Rositas Filipino citizenship,
the guardianship proceedings, and the partition proceedings.

On June 23, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Substitution of
Parties.
[78]
They averred that Jose Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001, leaving
behind his widow Iluminada and 14 children, while Julian Sy died on August 28,
2004, leaving behind his widow Rosa and eight children. The claims against
Jose and Julian were not extinguished by their deaths. It was the duty of
petitioners counsel, under Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, to inform the
Court of these deaths within 30 days thereof. Petitioners counsel failed to so
inform this Court, which should be a ground for disciplinary action. Hence,
respondents prayed that the Court order the heirs of the two deceased to
appear and be substituted in these cases within 30 days from notice.

In a Resolution
[79]
dated July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for
substitution and noted the Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to
include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as
Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.

Respondents then filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the
Supreme Courts Resolutions of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25,
2005, December 12, 2005, and February 15, 2006.
[80]
They prayed that
petitioners be given a last period of five days within which to deposit with the
Supreme Court Cashier all the accrued widows allowances as of June 2006.

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents
manifestation and motion.
[81]
They argued that the resolutions sought to be
implemented were all issued prior to the DOJ Resolution finding probable cause
to file the falsification charges against respondents. They contended that the
criminal cases for falsification expose Rosita as a mere common-law wife and
not a widow; hence, there is no legal justification to give her the widows
allowance. They also reiterated their earlier arguments against the grant of
widows allowance.

Meanwhile, Rosa Tan filed a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with
Motion for Reconsideration.
[82]
She argued that since the trial court had already
appointed a judicial administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which includes
Julian Sys estate, the proper party to be substituted should be the administrator
and not Julians heirs who never exercised ownership rights over the properties
thereof.

The Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution
granting substitution of parties for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.

The Courts Ruling

G.R. No. 114217

Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision.

The Third Partial Decision of the RTC

To review, the CA held, to wit:


The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his
decision to defer the resolution on the question concerning the
properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and
Enrique, all surnamed Sy, will not necessarily affect the
decision he rendered concerning the properties in the names
of Jose Sy Bang and wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and
Maria Sy, considering that the properties mentioned were
separable and distinct from each other, such that the claim that
said properties were not their own, but properties of the late
Sy Bang, could have been the subject of separate suits.
[83]



We agree with the CA.

Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:


SEC. 4. Several judgments. In an action against
several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is
proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving
the action to proceed against the others.


The trial courts Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several
judgment as contemplated by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on
the status of the properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below)
while deferring the ruling on the properties in the names of respondents
pending the presentation of evidence.

A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly
separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against
each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or
against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
[84]


Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and
separable interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.

The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did
not affect the determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties
in the names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not
preclude any further findings or judgment on the status or nature of the
properties in the names of the other heirs.

The trial courts June 2, 1982 Order reads:


IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all
the properties in the name (sic) of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as
well as those in the names of the other parties litigants in this
case), (sic) shall be declared or included as part of the Estate of
Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences
(sic) presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan after the said
question was agreed to be submitted for resolution on May 26,
1982, the Court hereby sets for the reception or for the
resolution of said issue in this case on June 8 and 9, 1982, both
at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon; notify all parties litigants in
this case of these settings.
[85]



It is obvious from the trial courts order
[86]
that the June 8, 1982 hearing
is for the purpose of determining whether properties in the names of Enrique
Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives are
also part of the Sy Bang estate.

Hence, in the assailed Decision, the trial court said:


[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against
any of the parties in this case in the matter of whatever sums of
money, property or asset belonging to the estate of Sy Bang
that came into their possession in order that the Court may be
properly guided in the partition and adjudication of the rightful
share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latters
estate; this becomes imperative in view of new matters shown
in the Submission and Formal Offer of Reserve Exhibits and the
Offer of Additional Documentary Evidence filed respectively by
Oscar Sy and Jose Sy Bang, et al., thru their respective counsels
after the question of whether or not the properties in the
names of Enrique, Bartolome, Rosalino, and Rolando, all
surnamed Sy, should form part or be included as part of the
estate of Sy Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of May
26, 1982; the Court deems it proper to receive additional
evidence on the part of any of the parties litigants in this case if
only to determine the true extent of the estate belonging to Sy
Bang.
[87]



The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and
narrated the details, then carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed
Decision. The evidence that formed the basis for the trial courts conclusion is
embodied in the Decision itself evidence presented by the parties themselves,
including petitioners.

However, notwithstanding the trial courts pronouncement, the Sy Bang
estate cannot be partitioned or distributed until the final determination of the
extent of the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations under Rule 90,
Section 1,
[88]
have been settled.
[89]


In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2)
before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations.
[90]


Settling the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for
partition.
[91]
As this Court has ruled:



The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise,
must first be resolved in order to effect a partition of
properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself.
As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:


In actions for partition, the court
cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a
determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the
issue of ownership, the first stage in an action
for partition. Needless to state, an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no
rightful interest over the subject property. In
fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party
filing the action to state in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title to the real
estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership
is definitely resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the properties x x x.
[92]



Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of
terminating the proceedings for partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial
Decision is but a determination based on the evidence presented thus
far. There remained issues to be resolved by the court. There would be no final
determination of the extent of the Sy Bang estate until the courts examination
of the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and
Enrique. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court will have to make a
pronouncement whether the properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome,
Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only after the full
extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined can the trial court finally
order the partition of each of the heirs share.

Appointment of Receiver

As to the issue of the judges appointment of a receiver, suffice it to say
that the CA conclusively found thus:


The records show that the petitioners were never
deprived of their day in court. Upon Order of the respondent
Judge, counsel for the petitioners submitted their opposition to
[the] petition for appointment of a receiver filed by private
respondents. x x x.

Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent
Judge appointed the receiver after both parties have presented
their evidence and after the Third Partial Decision has been
promulgated. Such appointment was made upon verified
petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners
are mismanaging the properties in litigation by either
mortgaging or disposing the same, hence, the said properties
are in danger of being lost, wasted, dissipated, misused, or
disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting
the appointment of a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order
to preserve the properties in litis pendentia and neither did he
abuse his discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. On the
contrary, We find that it was the petitioners who violated
the status quo sought to be maintained by the Supreme Court,
in G.R. No. 61519, by their intrusion and unwarranted seizures
of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the litigation, and which are
admittedly under the exclusive management and operation of
private respondent, Rosauro Sy.
[93]



Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens

Next, petitioners question the trial courts Order canceling the notice
of lis pendens.
[94]


Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property
Registration Decree, provides:


SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final
judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is
for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused
it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register
of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the
registration thereof.

At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to
terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land
and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered
as provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis
pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of
certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal
thereof.


The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of
the final judgment in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated
by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the
land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.
[95]


While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis
pendens, such power is to be exercised within the express confines of the
law. As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation
was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the
annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
recorded.
[96]


This Court has interpreted the notice as:

The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one,
to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended
merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal
with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk,
and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action,
and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may
be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation
of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident
in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or
a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on
the merits thereof.
[97]



The CA found, and we affirm, that Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando
were able to prove that the notice was intended merely to molest and harass the
owners of the property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was also
proven that the interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be annotated, was
only 1/14 of the assessed value of the property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome
and Rolando were ordered to post a P50,000.00 bond to protect whatever rights
or interest Oscar Sy may have in the properties under litis pendentia.
[98]


G.R. No. 150797

In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are asking this Court to reverse the CAs
February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its
jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance in Special
Proceedings No. 96-34.

We find merit in petitioners contention.

The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited
jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance
ordered by this Court.

Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widows
allowance was made before the Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from
the guardianship proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition
(Civil Case No. 8578) is still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.

Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:


SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during
the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 188. From the common mass of property support
shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until
what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the
fruits or rents pertaining to them.


Obviously, the court referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of
Court is the court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the
provision of the law that the widows allowance is to be taken from the common
mass of property forming part of the estate of the decedent.

Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing
the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widows allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of all other courts.
[99]


In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this
Court has pronounced that:


Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and
limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the
property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed, or
conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in
extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or
where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may
the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can
only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said
ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any
property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in
dispute, x x x the determination of said title or right whether in
favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or
conveyed the property must be determined in a separate
ordinary action and not in a guardianship proceedings.
[100]



Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the
guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are at
liberty to initiate.
[101]


Other Unresolved Incidents

Payment of Widows Allowance

It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita
Ferrera-Sy her monthly widows allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and
Ma. Emma have since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance,
grudgingly complying only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they again
argued against the grant of widows allowance after the DOJ issued its
Resolution finding probable cause in the falsification charges against
respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsification proved
that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a widow and, therefore, not
entitled to widows allowance.

This argument deserves scant consideration.

A finding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of
falsification against respondents.

In a preliminary investigation, probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause needs to rest
only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
[102]


Hence, until the marriage is finally declared void by the court, the same
is presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widows allowance to be
taken from the estate of Sy Bang.

We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with
whatever the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order.

Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of
Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widows Allowance as
Heirs of Sy Bang


On March 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion to include Rosalino Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the
Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.

The Motion is denied.

The widows allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bangs
estate. It must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names
of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique Sy form part of Sy Bangs estate
remains unsettled since this Petition questioning the trial courts Third Partial
Decision has been pending. On the other hand, there has been a categorical
pronouncement that petitioners are holding properties belonging to Sy Bangs
estate.

That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is
no excuse from complying with this Courts order. Properties of the estate have
been identified i.e., those in the names of petitioners thus, these properties
should be made to answer for the widows allowance of Rosita. In any case, the
amount Rosita receives for support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining
to her, will be deducted from her share of the estate.
[103]


A Final Note

We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought
about by petitioners propensity to challenge the Courts every directive. That
the petitioners would go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their
duties under the law and the orders of this Court is truly deplorable. Not even a
citation for contempt and the threat of imprisonment seemed to deter
them. Their contumacious attitude and actions have dragged this case for far
too long with practically no end in sight. Their abuse of legal and court
processes is shameful, and they must not be allowed to continue with their
atrocious behavior. Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and ordered to pay
the Court treble costs.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R.
No. 150797 is GRANTED, while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217
is DENIED. TheRegional Trial Court of Lucena City is directed to hear and
decide Civil Case No. 8578 with dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the
Payment of Widows Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang is DENIED. Treble costs
against petitioners.


SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and
TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and,
LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO,petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.
Estanistao A. Fernandez for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the rights
acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de
Leon
1
arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more or less,
situated in Malaking Kahoy, Paraaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla,
was the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their children,
Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes,
2
who
thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their contention
that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate court on
June 2, 1953, it could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move.
Moreover, the guardianship proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was
heard without the two elder children, Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo being
notified although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of
Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the property in
question,
3
intervened in such action. In the lower court decision, they were
adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the property, the sale
by the widow being considered null and void insofar as they were concerned.
The rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-
half of the three-fourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded
recognition.
The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the
spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its decision,
now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of sale executed by the
mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon as to the
whole three-fourths, without prejudice however to the children demanding
from their mother their participation in the amount paid for the sale of such
property. It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the
challenged orders, starting with the two elder children not being notified of the
petition for guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as pointed out
and stressed in their petition for review. There is need then for the exercise of
the corrective power of this Court. The original decision of the lower court has
much more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights of the children are fully
respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court,
there is a corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
So we decide.
The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus: "After
hearing the evidence, the lower court handed down decision on June 24, 1961,
finding that in the guardianship proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction
over the persons of the minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2
of them being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory submitted by the
guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly
authorized its sale, and the total absence of the requisite notice necessarily
rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the defendant, Martin S. Nery, a
lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half
portion of the land belonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the
sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the deed of sale ... upon her death in
1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest relatives, the third-party
plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose action had not
prescribed 'because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of
the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed';
and that the remaining 3/4 of the land in question was the conjugal property of
Leoncio Lorenzo and his wife, Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2 of which, upon the
demise of Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida and the other half to their
children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal shares."
4

Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was explained this
way: "It is unquestioned that the property in question formerly belonged to
Florentino Ferrer and his three sisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and
brother, Meliton. When, after the death of Florentino, that is, on December 6,
1943, the document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ... was
executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of Agueda and
married to Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the children of
Meliton, already deceased, said Leoncio merely acquired the participation of
said sellers, equivalent to 3/4 undivided part of said land, and became a co-
owner to that extent with Silvestra who did not execute said document and,
therefore,did not sell her 1/4 undivided portion of the said land, which 1/4
undivided portion passed, upon her demise in 1952, to her nearest relatives
who are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre,
Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the children of her deceased
sister, Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo,
knew of this purchase made by her deceased husband, and she had no right to
mortgage the whole land which, for taxation purposes was declared in her
husband's name, without the consent of aforenamed successors-in-interest of
Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the same afterwards to the defendant spouses,
Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon, even if authorized by the guardianship
court, said authority having been granted upon her misrepresentation,
contained in her petition of May 26, 1953, that her minor children, the plaintiff's
herein, were the owners in common of 1/2 portion of the land in question, the
other 1/2 pertaining to her. However, inasmuch as the said minor plaintiffs
were really the owners in common of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided part of the said land,
and the other 1/2, to their mother and guardian, the orders of the guardianship
court authorizing the guardian to sell the real property of the minors, and
approving the deed of sale executed in accordance with said authority must be
construed as referring to the correct real property of the said minors."
5

Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the appealed
judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the deed of sale ..., executed by
Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the defendants valid only insofar as the
undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned, as to which portion,
the defendants are declared owners, and that the third-party plaintiffs, Rosario,
Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad, all surnamed
Lorenzo, are declared owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4
portion of the said land. In all other respects, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed. No Costs."
6

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of the
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, not being
satisfied with the above decision instituted the petitions for review. As noted at
the outset, the failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the
grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in
its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of the
children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be
maintained. In that sense, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
subject to modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the lower court decision
sustaining the claim of the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer,
7
it is free from any
infirmity.
1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it
was the lower court and not the respondent Court of Appeals that yielded
obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded thus: "When a petition
for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and
place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the
minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other
general or special notice thereof to be given."
8
The late Chief Justice Moran was
quite explicit as to its jurisdictional character. These are his words: "Service of
the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is
jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint
a guardian."
9

The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First
Instance,
10
a 1915 decision. As was therein made clear: "There is no need for
interpretation or construction of the word in the case before us. Its meaning is
so clear that interpretation and construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty
is to leave untouched the meaning with which the English language has
endowed the word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would
accord to it on reading a sentence in which it was found. Where language is
plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That
which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult
for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given
matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting
out words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of
what the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting,
trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to
advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has
been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction.' "
11

Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its assumption
that the probate court could have authorized the sale in question. The
jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome. It was the lower court
that acted correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as we do considering
that the rights of minors are involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one
that is quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be affected, its
solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely
their stage of immaturity calls for every procedural principle being observed
before their interest in property to which they have a claim could be adversely
affected. It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as
1811, inSalunga v. Evangelista,
12
Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a
mother could have an "interest opposed to that of her children."
13
That may not
have been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from the facts as found
by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have been better protected
if they were notified as is required by law. If there is any occasion then why
there should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a jurisdictional
requirement, this is it.
Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is
cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of
age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable
as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to.
It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person
or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most
beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves."
14

2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and
respondent Court of Appeals as to the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer
15
being entitled
to
one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the deceased
Leoncio Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such property in the capacity
of trustee for them. At the time then that the settlement of his estate was
pending in the probate court, his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could
not assert any other right, except that traceable to her late husband.
Respondent Court of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer.
As a member of the bar, he could not have been unaware that his vendor could
not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose of. It is much too late in
the day to depart from the well-settled principle as to a trustee being incapable
of acquiring interest opposed to that of his principal. So it was announced
in Severino v. Severino.
16
That is in conformity with an overmastering
requirement of equity and conscience. He should thus be held to the strictest
degree of acccountability. The law would lay itself open to well-deserved
criticism if a principle other than the above were followed. The Nery spouses
ought to be aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its authoritative force
whenever called for.
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate its
inapplicability by the two principal errors assigned, namely, that Silvestra
Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far back as 1943 and that even if it
were not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and thereafter his widow,
Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of ownership therein. It is obvious that on
the face of such alleged errors that they are essentially factual. We are thus
precluded from inquiring into their veracity as on such a matter what was
decided by respondent Court of Appeals is binding on us. Moreover, as to the
alleged prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower court in
this fashion: "The action of said children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet
prescribed because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of
the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six years had elapsed.
Moreover, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence that Leoncio Lorenzo and
his successors-in-interest had been in continuous, adverse, and open
possession, and under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion
corresponding to Silvestra Ferrer as to acquire same by acquisitive
prescription."
17
Consequently, it was appropriate for the Court of Appeals to
affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it recognized the rights of the
heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the land sold.
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth that
Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all surnamed
Lorenzo, children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla are
adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of the three-fourths of the
property in question, as was decreed by the lower court, the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against Martin Nery and Leoncia
L. de Leon.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45622 May 5, 1939
JUAN GOROSTIAGA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA SARTE, defendant-appellant.
Calleja and Sierra for appellant.
Bonto and Gutierrez Lora for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
On May 27, 1936, Juan Gorostiaga, plaintiff-appellee, institutes an action against
Manuela Sarte to recover the sum of P2,285.51. An answer was filed by Attorney
Gregorio A. Sabater in the name of the defendant, wherein a general denial was
made, and several defenses interposed, among them, that the defendant was
physically and mentally incompetent to manage her estate. At the trial, the
defendant did not appear in court and her non-appearance had no been
accounted for. On September 21, 1996, judgment was rendered sentencing the
defendant to pay the amount claimed. On December 23, 1936, a motion under
section 113 of Act No. 190 was filed by the general guardian of the defendant,
praying that all the proceedings had against the defendant be declared null and
void for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The motion was denied; hence, this
appeal.
There is no question about the facts. On May 18, 1936, that is, nine days prior to
the institution of the action against the defendant, a petition for guardianship
was filed with the lower court in favor of the defendant, on the ground that she
was incompetent to manage her estate by reason of her physical and mental
incapacity. After hearing the petition, wherein the depositions of alienists were
presented, the court issued an order declaring that the defendant Manuela Sarte
"se halla ficica y mentalmente incacitada para administrar sus bienes poe razon
de debelidad senil, cuya inteligencia si bien le permite sostener una
conversacion por algunos minutos de una manera satisfactoria, no tiene la
consistencia necesaria para atender a sus necesidas y administrar sus propios
bienes."
Although this order was issued on December 3, 1936, it relates to the incapacity
alleged in the petition of May 18, 1936. Consequently, the incapacity thus
declared existed at least at the date of the filing of the petition, that is, on May
18, 1936, nine days prior to the institution of the action in the present case. In
fact, according to the evidence relied upon by the lower court, the defendant
was incompetent to manage her affairs for about two or three years prior to her
examination by the alienists. It appears thus clear that during all the
proceedings in the case at bar, from the time of the filing of the complaint to the
rendition of the judgment, the defendant was physically and mentally unfit to
manage her affairs, and there having been no summons and notices of the
proceedings served her and her guardian, because no guardian was then
appointed for her, the court trying the action acquired no jurisdiction over her
person (sec. 396, No. 4, of Act No. 190).
It is argued that Attorney Gregorio A. Sabater appeared for the defendant in the
case and filed an answer in her behalf and that the attorney's authority is
presumed as well as the capacity of the defendant giving the authority. But this
presumption is disputable and it is here entirely rebutted by no less than an
order of the same court declaring the defendant physically and mentally unfit to
manage her estate since at least May 18, 1936. If the defendant was thus
incompetent, she could not have validly authorized the attorney to represent
her. And if the authority was given by her relatives, it was not sufficient except
to show the attorney's good faith in appearing in the case.
It is contended that the issue as to the incapacity of the defendant was pleaded
in defendant's answer and was squarely decided and that therefore it cannot be
reopened unless on the ground of newly discovered evidence. That answer was,
however, filed by an attorney not validly authorized to appear for the defendant
who had never been in court except when her guardian filed a motion to quash
all the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. In matters of this kind, affecting the
jurisdiction of the court and the validity of all proceedings, the court, instead of
observing a passive attitude, should take the initiative of, and exercise utmost
care in, ascertaining the facts. And although the evidence gathered at the trial is
insufficient, if, after judgment, the lack of jurisdiction is clearly shown, and there
has been no waiver thereof, as in this case where a waiver could not have been
possible, it is the duty of the court to set aside all the proceedings, take the
necessary steps to acquire jurisdiction, and grant a new trial. The position taken
by the lower court in this case can hardly be reconciled with its position in the
guardianship proceedings.
Appellee contends that in the motion filed by the guardian under section 113
there is no showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable negligence
as grounds for relief provided therein. It is, however, more than a surprise to
the defendant that she be tried and sentenced without valid summons or notice.
And as to the affidavits of merit required to be attached to a motion under
section 113, they are not necessary, as we have already held, where the court
acted without jurisdiction over the defendant's person. (Coombs vs. Santos, 24
Phil., 446.)
Judgment is reversed, all the proceedings had in the lower court are hereby
declared null and void, and the case is remanded to the court below for new
trial after the guardian making him a party defendant. With costs against
appellee.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
Nicomedes M. Jajardo for petitioner.
Crescini & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision and
resolution of the defunct Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
dated April 27, 1981. and June 26, 1981. respectively, dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner Feliciano Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172
entitled "Feliciano Francisco versus Judge Jesus R. De Vega and Pelagio
Francisco". In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner Feliciano Francisco
challenged the validity of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, now Regional Trial Court, granting execution
pending appeal of its decision by relieving petitioner Feliciano Francisco as
guardian of incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing respondent
herein, Pelagio Francisco, in his instead.
The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
showed that:
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent
Estefania San Pedro in Special Proceedings No. 532 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided over by respondent
Judge. On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco,
claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together
with two others, said to be nieces of the incompetent,
petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and for the
appointment in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco.
Among other grounds, the petition was based on the failure of
the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward
and to render an accounting.
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an
accounting but failed to submit an inventory, for which reason
the court on March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10) days
within which to do so, otherwise he would be removed from
guardianship Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to
which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an objection on the
ground that petitioner actually received P14,000.00 for the
sale of a residential land and not P12,000.00 only as stated in
the deed of sale and reported by him in his inventory. The
respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in his order
of April 17, 1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.
On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge
reconsidered his finding, relying on the deed of sale as the best
evidence of the price paid for the sale of the land. in his order
dated September 12, 1980, respondent judge acknowledged
that his finding was "rather harsh and somewhat unfair to the
said guardian." Nevertheless, respondent Judge ordered the
retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age. The order
states in part as follows:
"... considering the rather advanced age of the
present guardian, this Court is inclined and so
decrees, that he should nevertheless be, as he
is hereby, retired to take effect upon the
appointment by this court and the assumption
of office of his replacement, who shall be
taken from the recommendees of the parties
herein. For this purpose, the present guardian
is hereby given twenty (20) days from receipt
of a copy of this order within which to submit
his proposal for a replacement for himself and
to comment on petitioner's recommendee and
the latter a like period within which to
comment on the present guardian's proposed
substitute, after which the matter will be
deemed submitted for resolution and final
action by the court.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that
he was only 72 years of age and still fit to continue with the
management of the estate of his ward as he had done with zeal
for the past twelve years. In an order dated November 13,
1980 the court denied his motion. Accordingly, on December
17, 1980, petiti/ner filed a notice of appeal 'from the order
issued by the court on November 13, 1980' and paid the appeal
bond. On February 2, 1981 he filed the record on appeal. 1
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of
private respondent, required petitioner to submit within three
days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as
required in its order of September 12, 1980. In issuing the
order, the court stated that 'an indefinite discontinuance in
office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of
September 12, 1980 relieving the present guardian.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition. (referring to CA-G.R. No. SP-1217)"
On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco filed
an "Omnibus Motion" with the court a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain
guardian from exercising office; (2) order guardian to surrender to court all
properties of the ward; and (3) appoint new guardian .
2

Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion
claiming that the same was premature.
3
The trial court, however, disregarded
the opposition and required petitioner on January 27, 1981 to submit within
three (3) days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in
its order of September 12, 1980, the court holding that "an indefinite
continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said order of
September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian."
4

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order,
5
but the trial court
overruled the same on March 4, 1981. Subsequently, on March 11, 1981,
6
the
court a quo appointed respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of the
person and property of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro.
7

On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the
execution pending appeal of its decision and appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as the new guardian despite the fact that respondent is five (5) years
older than petitioner, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the pertinent
portion of its decision reading as follows:
The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal
"upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." (Rule 39,
Sec. 2). In the case at bar, the retirement of petitioner was
ordered on the ground of old age. When this ground is
considered in relation to the delay of the petitioner in the
making of an accounting and the submission of an inventory,
the order amounts to a finding that petitioner, considering his
"rather advanced age," was no longer capable of managing the
estate of his ward. Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is clear
that petitioner's continuance in office would not be in the best
interest of the ward.
It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final.
Considering the time -it normally takes for appeals to be finally
determined as well as the purpose of the order under appeal,
which would be frustrated if it is not immediately executed, we
cannot say that respondent acted with grave and irreparable
damage and that the order of September 12, 1980 is not yet
final, petitioner has not demonstrated that in ordering
execution pending appeal, the respondent Judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal ties within
the sound discretion of a court. Appellate courts win not
interfere to discretion, unless it modify control or inquire into
the exercise of this be shown that there has been an abuse of
that discretion. (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 260
[1979].
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
8

Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration advancing the
following arguments: that to grant execution pending appeal would render
petitioner's appeal moot and academic that "advanced age" was not one of the,
grounds raised by private respondent in the court below; that the court a
quo abuse its discretion in appointing respondent as guardian despite the fact
that private respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner.
9

The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981, denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the court finding it unnecessary to
repeat the discussion of the arguments which it had already considered and
only entertained the argument regarding the competency of the respondent as
the new guardian. On this point, respondent Court ruled:
The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent Francisco
as guardian was never assailed in the petition in this case. As
already stated, this case concerns the validity only of the
orders of January 27, 1981 and March 4, 1981 which required
petitioner to recommend his own replacement, otherwise the
court would appoint a new guardian. It does not appear that
petitioner objected to the appointment of respondent
Francisco on the ground now invoked, namely, that Francisco
is in fact older than petitioner. Nor does it appear that
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
March 11, 1981, calling attention to the fact that respondent
Francisco is older than petitioner, In short, the point now
raised does not appear to have been urged in the lower court
so that the latter could have rectified the error, if it was error
at all, For this reason, it is not proper ground for certiorari
before this Court, much less for a motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 10
In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable Court of
Appeals has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the removal of
petitioner as guardian of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old age
is a good ground for the execution of the decision pending appeal; and (b) The
Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave misapprehension and
misinterpretation of facts when it declared that petitioner did not question the
appointment of private respondent as guardian in his stead on the ground that
the latter is older than the former by five (5) years.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs.11 A guardianship is designed
to further the ward's well-being, not that of the guardian, It is intended to
preserve the ward's property, as wen as to render any assistance that the ward
may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well. 12
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and
welfare of the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very
purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a guardian, the court may
consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the sound judgment,
prudence and trustworthiness, the morals, character and conduct, and the
present and past history of a prospective appointee, as wen as the probability of
his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for the full period
during which guardianship will be necessary. 13
A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified
by mental incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical
disability as to be prevented from properly discharging the duties of his
office. 14 A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case he becomes
insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or
has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days after it is due
to render an account or make a return.15
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for
petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the
person and property of incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion
reached by the trial court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72
years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to continue the trust
cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this finds
direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory made by petitioner.
To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to the ward.
While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's fitness or
qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for
consideration. 16
Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties of a
guardian, We sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner Feliciano Francisco
as guardian, affirming thereby the rulings of both the trial court and the
appellate court.
With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing respondent
Pelagio Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the latter's appeal
was still pending, We hold and rule that respondent appellate court correctly
sustained the propriety of said execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and
compelling reasons, execution pending appeal is a matter of sound discretion on
the part of the trial court, 17 and the appellate court will not interfere, control
or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless there has been an abuse
thereof, 18 which We find none herein.
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the
protection of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate
execution of the lower court's judgment for the replacement of the first
guardian. We agree with the reason given by the appellate court in sustaining
execution pending appeal that "an indefinite continuance in office would defeat
the intent and purpose of the order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present
guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."
As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio Francisco as
the new guardian, We likewise agree with the respondent appellate court in
denying in its resolution of June 26, 1981 for lack of merit the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner questioning the appointment of private
respondent Pelagio Francisco. We also find no abuse of discretion committed by
the appellate court.
The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain issues
brought before it for the first time on appeal. (Jose Matienzo vs. Martin
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; Garcian vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597; Director
of Lands vs. Dano 96 SCRA 160).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and
resolution of the respondent court dated April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. and De Castro, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur and I would have simply denied the petition for lack of merit without
an extended decision.
Aquino, J., concur. The removal of a guardian, like the removal of an
administrator, may be immediately executory (Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. vs. CA,
105 Phil. 466).
Escolin J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
and its resolution denying reconsideration
2
reversing that of the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo, Branch 32
3
and declaring void the special proceedings instituted
therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the
comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of
the court, to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their
daughter and son in law, for the ostensible purpose of "financial need in the
personal, business and medical expenses of her incapacitated husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent) on the
one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law,
the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other
hand. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s
suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of
any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein
respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda
Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza
spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991,
filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it
was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the matter of the guardianship
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner averred therein that the present
physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from
competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and
dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a
court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein
that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent
Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It was further prayed
that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated,
mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291
and all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and
covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed
a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the
R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and
authorization to sell the same (Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L.
Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was
then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors
Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husbands
medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to
several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to
sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements.
Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City issued an
Order (Annex "C") finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in
form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for June 20, 1991. The
scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended by therein petitioner
Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children, namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and
Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s
attending physicians.
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City rendered
its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was
necessary to defray the mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization.
The said court also made the pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L.
Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings
sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated June 13,
1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners husband, to be incapacitated
and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey
of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in the
names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the buildings standing
thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to
the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No. 4691, said petitioner
being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on
the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for
consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument that
the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code. It should follow the rules
governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require
procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits. On the other hand, even if Gilda Jardelezas petition can be prosecuted
by summary proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a defective
one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had
acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these rights cannot be
impaired or prejudiced without his consent. Neither can he be deprived of his
share in the conjugal properties through mere summary proceedings. He then
restated his position that Spec. Proc. No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec.
Proc. No. 4689 which was filed earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No. 4291 and
the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial
obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s hospitalization. He alleged that
the market value of the property would be around Twelve to Fifteen Million
Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be sold for much less. He also
pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a
monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s industry, labor and service to his
fellowmen. Hence, the said property has a lot of sentimental value to his family.
Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza, then conjugal partnership had other liquid
assets to pay off all financial obligations. He mentioned that apart from
sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr. owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital which can
be off-set against the cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to
pay on installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.s attending
physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional
services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a supplement
to his motion for reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated his contention that
summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also noted that the provisions
on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under
the heading on "Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife" which
contemplates of a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Thus, he
argued that were one spouse is "comatose without motor and mental faculties,"
the said provisions cannot be made to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by
absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda
Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed
Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991 executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under
date of July 23, 1991, Gilda Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for
approval of the deed of absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for
approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was
prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution of
the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications for the
sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. been
competent, he would have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent Court,
who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the meantime
formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case (Annex "I"). The case
was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M") denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and approving respondent
Jardelezas motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale. The said court ruled
that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991, the
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by "oppositor",
Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by petitioner, through counsel,
this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-
Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch 32, of this Court, has properly observed
the procedure embodied under Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the
Family Code, in rendering her decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor"
Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the instant petition
considering that the property or properties, subject of the petition, belongs to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and Gilda Jardeleza, who are
both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro L.
Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which among
others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral Survey
of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47337 issued in the names
of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the building standing
thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner, through counsel, is hereby granted and
the deed of absolute sale, executed and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and
between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is
hereby approved, and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register
the sale and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
"SO ORDERED."
4

On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing
the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the special
proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared void.
5

On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,
6
however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the decision.
7

Hence, this appeal.
8

The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their
conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel
of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with the
approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own
daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the
procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the
Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take
care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had
rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial
guardian of the person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93,
Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such
a petition for judicial guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The
situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact
or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such
rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a
victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties,
and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct.
9
In such case, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family
Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law
provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same
powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
10

Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator
of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards
estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the
Revised Rules of Court.1wphi1 Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus,
the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it
did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be
heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.
The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial of due
process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.
11
A decision rendered without due process is
void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
12
"A decision is void
for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of
being heard."
13
"A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either
directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked."
14

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 26936, in toto.
Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC,
Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO,
as Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101,
promulgated on 19 April 1994 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, of Cotabato City in Special Procedure Case No. 331.
As culled from the records, the following facts have been established by
evidence:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple
begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard
Pride Alonzo.
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City a Petition
1
which is reproduced hereunder:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION
OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER
THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF
MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331
and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
Petitioner
PETITION
COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this
Honorable Court most respectfully states:
1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her
husband and residing at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City, Philippines;
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner
lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union
they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who
was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride
Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox
copy of the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached as annex "A"
and "B", respectively.
3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both
staying with herein petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue,
Cotabato City;
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died
intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and
personal worth P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:
a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq. m. estimated at
P50,000.00
b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT
No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq. m. 50,000.00
c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
No. T-126583 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT
No. T-126584 with an area of 303 sq. m. 50,000.00
e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued at
30,000.00
f) Residential house in Davao City valued at
600,000.00
g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3 AF6393
210,000.00
h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor
No. 4G37-GB0165 545,000.00
i) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G52-52D75248
110,000.00
j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor
No. DA640-838635 350,000.00
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100-T47148
350,000.00
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par
value
estimated at 3,335,000.00
Total P5,000,000.00
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate
descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert
Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with
herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
(Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors
are the following, to wit:
Names Relationship Ages Residence
1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue,
Cotabato City
2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 Rosary Heights,
Cotabato City
3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas
Fishing Exporation
Co. Inc., Matina,
Davao City
6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by
operation of law are to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua
under the provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, it is necessary that for the protection of the rights and
interest of Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua,
both minors and heirs of deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over
the persons and properties of said minors be appointed by this
Honorable Court.
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said
minors is also competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors
Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua both
staying and living with her; that petitioner possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a guardian.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed:
1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued declaring
minors ROBERTO RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE
ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate estate of deceased ROBERTO
LIM CHUA;
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the
administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;
3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and
estate of minors ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD
PRIDE ALONZO CHUA;
4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been
inventoried and expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate
estate of Roberto Lim Chua be distributed to its rightful heirs, the
minors in this case, pursuant to the provisions of Article 988 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines.
5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may
consider fit and proper in the premises.
Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992.
(Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO
(Petitioner)
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August
1992 and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing
to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss
2
on the
ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's
death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is the proper forum.
Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
3
dated July 20,
1992 based on the following grounds:
(1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of
the petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua
and under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at
the place where the minor resides;
(2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City:
(3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor
oppose in the granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total
stranger to the minors Robert Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride
Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
(4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of
the above-named minors with the petitioner in this case;
(5) That movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse
of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter
since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he
died.
On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an
Amended Petition
4
"in order that the designation of the case title can properly
and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in
the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the
nature and real intent and purpose of this petition." The amended
petition
5
contained identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus:.
IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE
OF ROBERTO L. CHUA, DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP
OVER THE PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND
RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
Petitioner.
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows:
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a
resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original petition.
Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of
said motion on 24 July 1992, private respondent's counsel allegedly admitted
that the sole intention of the original petition was to secure guardianship over
the persons and property of the minors.
6

On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order
7
denying the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no
personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of
the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased
was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was concurrent venue among
the Regional Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato
had already taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's estate to the
exclusion of all others. The pertinent portions of the order read:
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for
movant Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her
allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the
latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was the
xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and
the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the
timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is
the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot
produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented
the following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned
that no such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a letter
from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the
alleged marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.
Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among others of Transfer Certificate of
Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta
Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988
and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was
born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in
Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married;
passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his
residence was Davao City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the
admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to
establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and
Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract.
They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to
show that Davao City was the business residence of the decedent.
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to
support her allegation that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato
City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate children
with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax
Returns filed in Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating
therein that he was single; birth certificates of the alleged two
illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the
decedent issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of
the decedent showing that his residence is Cotabato City.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the
truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The
best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to
produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when
the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a
letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he
has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no
personality to file the subject motion to dismiss.
On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death,
the decedent as a businessman has many business residences from
different parts of the country where he usually stays to supervise and
pursue his business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be
denied that Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged
illegitimate children also reside.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate
of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive
of venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming
that there is concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the
places where the decedent has residences, the Regional Trial Court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule
73). It was this Court which first took cognizance of the case when the
petition was filed on July 2, 1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
331 and an order of publication issued by this Court on July 13, 1992.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby
denied for lack of merit.
On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an
order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special
administrator of the decedent's estate.
8

On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing Florita
Vallejo as guardian over the persons and properties of the two minor children.
9

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 1993
10
praying that the
letters of administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of
administration be issued to her. She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 November
1993
11
to declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both motions were denied by the
trial court in its Order dated 22 November 1993.
12
Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 13
December 1993.
13

Assailing the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) with the respondent Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101, alleging that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in:
(1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the
guardianship proceedings into an intestate proceeding;
(2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without jurisdiction
and without any notice to herein petitioner whatsoever; and
(3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that
herein petitioner has no personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331
questioning the highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex-
parte by the public respondent R.T.C. without notice to the petitioners.
Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in her
opposition to petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open
court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial
court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration over
the estate of Roberto L. Chua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate
proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a newspaper of
general circulation as required by Section 3, Rule 79.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on 19 April 1994,
14
denied
the petition ratiocinating that the original petition filed was one for
guardianship of the illegitimate children of the deceased as well as for
administration of his intestate estate. While private respondent may have
alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for
guardianship, the fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition
unmistakably showed a twin purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) issuance of
letters of administration. As such, it was unnecessary for her to republish the
notice of hearing through a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the motion for
leave: so that the "case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize
in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings; thus
avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent and
purpose of this petition," which was for guardianship over the persons and
properties of her minor children and for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the decedent who was their father. In other words, there being no change in the
material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the
publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for
purposes of compliance with the legal requirements of notice.
Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from
the orders complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court,
not certiorari and prohibition.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to this
Court contending that the appellate court committed the following errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION
(Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A TWIN PURPOSE, TO WIT: FOR
GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED
PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE
THEREBY CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND THE RULINGS
OF THE SUPREME COURT.
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT NULLIFYING THE ORDERS (Annex "P" to "T") PRECIPITATELY
ISSUED EX-PARTE BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING
OR NOTICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING THE
LATTER (ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA ) OF DUE PROCESS
AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
IV
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
SWEEPINGLY HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL.
15

In support of her first assignment of error, petitioner submits that the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the original petition was one for guardianship and
administration of the intestate estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand,
asserting that the original petition failed to allege and state the jurisdictional
facts required by the Rules of Court in petitions for administration of a
decedent's estate, such as: (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the
time of his death; (b) names, ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names
and residences of the creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her
argument regarding private respondent's alleged admission that the original
petition was one for guardianship and not for issuance of letters of
administration, pointing to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 20
July 1992, where the private respondent alleged.
1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the
petitioner who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and
under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the
place where the minor resides.
16

as well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during
the 24 July 1992 hearing on the motion to dismiss:
ATTY. RENDON:
We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition
because this is a petition for guardianship of minors, not for intestate
proceedings. So this is a case where the mother wanted to be appointed
as guardian because she is also the litigant here. Because whenever
there is an intestate proceedings, she has to represent the minors, and
under the Rules of Court in any guardianship proceedings, the venue is
at the place where the minor is actually residing.
17

The petition is devoid of merit.
The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one
which includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition
reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS, GUARDIANSHIP
OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO
AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
18

Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the
administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of
Court reads:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent'
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;.
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed;
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration. (emphasis ours).
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of
administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of
death in the province where the probate court is located; and (3) if the decedent
was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that the
decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting.
19

While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died
intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the
omission was cured by the amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now
reads:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a
resident of Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao
City.
20
(Emphasis in the original.)
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be
stated in the petition for letters of administration. Consequently, there was no
need to publish the amended petition as petitioner would insist in her second
assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as
she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as
creditor or otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration Any interested
person, may by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the
ground of incompetency of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's
own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to
himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the
opposition..
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or
contingent.
21

Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which
Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the
photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a
violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of
evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
. . . Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and
other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the
petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter
from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not
solemnized said alleged marriage. . . .
22

Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued
its orders, Annexes "P" to "T" without prior hearing or notice to her, thus,
depriving her of due process.
The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992
appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator
of the estate; Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing private respondent as
guardian over the person and property of the minors; Order dated 5 August
1993, directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from Davao City to
Cotabato City; Order dated 6 September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a
Mitsubishi Gallant car owned by the estate of the deceased to the special
administrator; and Order dated 28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to
break open the deceased's house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of
the properties found therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to the house by
the driver and maid of petitioner.
Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings
of the trial court, not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the
deceased, or of her interest in the estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner
categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25 October 1993 she filed a
motion praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued by the trial
court and another motion dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings
conducted by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders
relative thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further stated that her
motions were denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 21, 1993
and that on 30 November 1993 she filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13 December
1993.
Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that an actual
hearing should always and indispensably be held.
23
The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard.
24
Here, even granting that the petitioner
was not notified of the orders of the trial court marked as Exhibits "P" to "T,"
inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions to recall letters of
administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a "mistrial," which
motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1993.
25
A motion for the
reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial court but
was denied in its Order of 13 December 1993.
26

Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
27

As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
proper remedy of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a
special civil action for certiorari; which can be availed of if a party has no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Except for her bare
allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record
would indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is
warranted.
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the
ruling of the Court of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for
both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling
in Gomez vs. Imperial,
28
which the petitioner quotes:
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a
function pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but
to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action
before the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court
did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While in
the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and
settlement of estate.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antonietta Chua is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14391 May 30, 1960
GENARO SENEN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMA A. DE PICHAY, defendant-appellant.
Zacarias A. Crispin for appellee.
Diokno and Sison for appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
In Civil Case No. 27816 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Genaro
Senen, plaintiff, vs. Maxima A. de Pichay, defendant," the defendant appealed to
the Court of Appeals from an adverse decision of the Court of First Instance. By
virtue of a resolution dated April 17, 1958 of the Court of Appeals, the case was
certified to this Court because one of the issues involved in the appeal is the
jurisdiction of the said Court in First Instance to try the case.
The record discloses the following facts: In special proceedings No. Q-86, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch III), sitting at Quezon City, appointed the
defendant Maxima A. de Pichay, guardian over the person and properties of the
minors Genaro, Rufina, Perfecto and Simplicio, all surnamed Senen. But said
guardianship proceedings were dismissed by said court on March 16, 1955, by
reason of abandonment (p. 8, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Brief for Defendant-
Appellant). On September 30, 1955, Genero Senen, one of the wards, brought
the present action against the guardian, Maxima A. de Pichay, for a full
accounting of the amounts she had received for the wards, alleging the
appointment of defendant as guardian of his brothers and sister and himself,
and that defendant had received for the wards the sum of P900.45, as arrears in
pay of their deceased father, Pfc. Carlos Senen, and P10.00 a month as pension
for each of the wards since June 26, 1950 until they reach 18 years of age; that
defendant withheld the pensions due plaintiff and his brothers and sister and
appropriated the same to her own use, so that the children had rely upon other
people for support; that his brothers Roberto, Perfecto and Simplicio, are still
minors; that by reason of the malevolent acts of the defendant, the plaintiff and
his brothers and sister suffered damages. Plaintiff prays that the court order
defendant to render full accounting of the money of her wards and indemnify
them for their rightful share in the estate of their deceased father, revoke the
letters of guardianship issued to defendant in special proceedings No. Q-86 and
appoint plaintiff in her place, and award plaintiff and his brothers and sister
actual damages of P3,310.45, moral damages of P5,000 and attorney's fees of
P1,000.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the claim
of petitioner or plaintiff has been released by the dismissal of the guardianship
proceedings, Case No. Q-86, and on the further ground that the venue is
improperly laid. An opposition thereto was filed and the court denied the
motion; so defendant filed her answer, denying having appropriated the
amounts she had received as guardian, or committing a breach of her trust, with
a counterclaim for P220.00. The court below, after trial, rendered judgment
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,859, which represents the
pension of the ward and the backpay of their father, the sum of P1,000 as moral
damages, and a similar amount as attorney's fees. In the same decision, the
court appointed plaintiff guardian of the persons and properties of his minor
brothers. This is the decision sought to be reviewed on appeal.
One question of law was raised in this appeal, thus: Had the court below
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action?
Defendant-appellant claims that the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
which appointed defendant as guardian, still retains exclusive jurisdiction over
the guardianship proceedings and no other court can validly interfere with its
continuing jurisdiction. This argument cannot be sustained. The jurisdiction of a
court in a guardianship proceeding and all incidents thereof exists as long as the
case is pending in that court. But when the case is terminated, by dismissal or
otherwise, the court ceases to exercise the power and authority to try said case
or any incidental matters thereof.
After final judgment or decree has been rendered and the parties
dismissed, in general, the jurisdiction of the court is exhausted. ... . (21
C. J. S. 147.)
After termination, by dismissal or otherwise, of litigation in one court ...
any exclusive jurisdiction or freedom from interference it may have
possessed is at an end; and another court may deal with the property or
subject matter which, by the former suit, was not withdrawn forever
from subsequent litigation. (Id., p. 816.)
A petition for accounting, etc., which is an incident of a guardianship
proceeding, should be filed in the court where the guardianship proceedings are
pending. But once the guardianship proceeding is terminated, said petition can
no longer be filed in the same case, but must be filed as a separate case, in the
same court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
The general rule that the authority of the court first acquiring
jurisdiction must prevail is subject to the exception that where the
proceeding in the court first acquiring jurisdiction is terminated,
abandoned, or void, then another court of concurrent jurisdiction may
take jurisdiction of the same subject matter. (14 Am. Jur. 445.)
An action for accounting may be brought in a court of law whenever the
guardianship for any reason terminates without any prior settlement in
the court. (39 C. J. S. 253.)
The court below, therefore, validly acquired jurisdiction over the present case.
The other issues involved are factual. To speedily administer justice in this case,
we have resolved them.
The parties agree that defendant had received P757.94 as backpay of the
deceased father of plaintiff and his brothers and sister (five in all), and the sum
of P2,450 as monthly pensions of the latter while minors under the age of 18.
For convenience we have taken as basis the "inventory and accounting," dated
April 10, 1956, signed under oath by defendant and presented in court as
Exhibit "1". Also for convenience we have grouped the different items into four
namely, (1) judicial and administrative expenses, (2) expenses for burial of the
deceased mother of plaintiffs and debts of said mother for the support and
maintenance of the minors, and (3) the amounts spent by defendant-guardian
for the maintenance and support and education of the minors, including plaintiff
herein.
The judicial expenses include P80 paid to Atty. Marino Alagar for preparing
papers for the claim for compensation, P50 expenses in securing affidavits and
supporting papers for the claim and P69 judicial expenses incurred in the
guardianship proceedings, or a total of P199.00. These expenses are not
disputed and the claim of defendant, therefore, should be, as it hereby is,
approved, the same to be charged against the monthly pensions of the minors.
The sum of P200 appears to have been loaned to the mother of the minors in the
year 1943 in cash and in rice, corn and tobacco for the mother and her children
(See Exh. "1-A"). Another amount of P130 was paid by defendant to Eligia A.
Aquino (Exh. "1-B") who had advanced said sum for the burial expenses of the
mother of the minors. The amount spent by the deceased mother of minors for
the support of the latter and the burial expenses of the mother of minors are
legally chargeable against the earnings of the husband, which in the present
case is his backpay. The defendant should be credited with said payments
totalling P350 against the backpay of the minor's father of P757.94, so that of
said backpay defendant should pay to plaintiffs the sum of P407.94.
As to defendant's claim for expenses for the support of plaintiff and his brothers
and sister, the record discloses that except for plaintiff, the testimonies of the
witnesses were taken before the clerk of court. We have, therefore, taken the
trouble to read all the testimonies that we may better determine who is to be
believed, plaintiff and his witnesses or defendant and hers.
There is no question, however, that in the year 1949, defendant took into her
house four of the minors, namely, Genaro, Roberto, Rufina and Rogelio and in
May, 1950 she also took Simplicio with her. This was necessary for she had to
bring them before the court of the guardianship proceedings and to get their
pension from the Judge Advocate General's Office. Defendant is married to a
sergeant in the Army, with whom she had some ten children. That the minors
lived for some time in her home is corroborated by Severino Tangan, also a
soldier and brother-in-law of defendant. This is also corroborated by the school
record of the three minors, Simplicio, Rufina and Rogelio (Exh. "3"). The issue is,
how long did each of them live with defendant and was supported by her and
what should be the amount to be charged by her against them for such stay.
On the question of the length of time that each of the minor wards stayed with
their guardian, we have found the following: Genaro Senen testified that he
stayed with the defendant, her aunt, for only three months in 1955. But he
admits that upon the death of his father in 1950, defendant called him for the
purpose of collecting the money awarded his father by the Judge Advocate
General's Office. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that Genaro, Rufina and
Roberto were taken by her since 1949 when she applied for the guardianship
proceedings, and that Genaro stayed with her until he was employed in the
Bureau of Census from 1953 to 1955. In this respect her testimony is
corroborated by those of Anastacio Eduarte, a soldier and Severino Tangan, who
lived beside the house of Mrs. Pichay. Rufina declared that she stayed with
defendant since 1950 when defendant went to get her from an uncle, but
thereafter went away and returned to her in 1952 till she got married in
October, 1953; that of the five children only four of them stayed with defendant,
namely, Genaro, Rogelio, Roberto and herself and were brought to the Judge
Advocate General's Office, but that they went away later to their grandfather in
the provinces. But her testimony is contradicted by that of defendant and her
witnesses, and by Exhibit "3", which shows that she, Rogelio and Simplicio were
enrolled in 1949-1950, 1950-1951 and 1950-1951, respectively, which shows
that she was lying. Rogelio Senen, 16, denied having lived with defendant,
although he admits that defendant gave P40 to the aunt with whom he was
living. Simplicio Senen, 14, also testified, denying ever having lived with
defendant. Since these boys testified in 1955, it is possible that they did not tell
the truth or had forgotten where they had lived some five or six years before.
The witnesses for defendant, however, asserted that they were living with
defendant and their enrollment in school from 1950-1951 seems to support the
claim of defendant and the testimonies of her two witnesses. Besides, one
witness presented by plaintiff who appears to be credible, Juan Asistin, lived in
the provinces and came to Quezon City to the house of defendant only once, and
he could not tell with whom the minors were actually living.
After considering all the testimonies, we are led to the conclusion that those of
defendant and her witnesses preponderate against the denials of plaintiff and
his minor brothers. The appraisal by the lower court of their credibility is not to
be given much weight as only plaintiff and an employee of the Judge Advocate
General's Office testified in his presence, all the testimonies of the others having
been taken before the clerk of court as commissioner. We believe, as Rufina
Senen had admitted, that the minors must have stayed with plaintiff for from
one and a half years to two years, or at least eighteen months each.
As to the amount to which defendant is entitled, her claim of P30 per month is
not justified. The pension each minor under 18 years is supposed to receive is
P10. She should not be allowed an amount beyond this as what was legally
authorized to be spent for each child is only P10 a month. For 18 months she
was authorized to spend for each of the five minors only P180, or a total amount
of P900. Since she actually received for their pensions P2,450, the amount of
P1,550 remains due from her.
As to moral damages, we do not consider the act of defendant so malicious as to
make her liable for moral damages. She certainly must have, in some way, taken
advantage of the sums she had received, but the fact that she enrolled the
minors in school and tried to keep them in her home, although the pensions
were very limited and she herself had ten children of her own, should be
sufficient reason for exempting her from moral damages.
As to attorney's fees, the Court believes that in view of the poverty of the
minors, their lawyer should be entitled only to ten per centum of the recovery,
the same to be charged against the defendant. As the sums awarded are P407.94
and P1,500 or a total of P1,907.94, plaintiff's attorney should be paid P200 as
attorney's fees.
Wherefore, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff for himself and as
guardian of his minor brothers the sum of P1,907.94, to pay plaintiff's attorney
the sum of P200 as fees, plus the costs. The order of the court appointing
plaintiff guardian of his minor brothers is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 81969 September 26, 1988
JOCELYN RULONA-AL AWADHI, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH, District Judge of the Fourth Sharia Judicial
District Court and NABIL AL-AWADHI, respondents.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
Talib Umpar for private respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by Jocelyn Rulona-Al Awadhi,
assailing the order dated January 12, 1988 of the Sharia Judicial District Court of
Marawi City which denied her motion to dismiss Special Proceedings No. 011-
87, entitled "Nabil Al-Awadhi, Petitioner, vs. Jocelyn Rulonba, Respondent" for
custody and guardianship of their minor children named Abdul Wahab Nabil, 5
years old, Adare Nabil, 3 years old, and Sabihab Al Abdullah Nabil, 6 months old.
The petitioner and the private respondent were married in Kuwait on August 1,
1981. The petitioner is a Filipino nurse and a Roman Catholic. Her husband, the
private respondent is a Kuwaiti student. The petitioner resides with her
children in Sta. Cruz, Calape, Bohol, while the private respondent resides at 49-7
Pamaong Street, Tagbiliran City.
On or about August 25, 1987, she filed an action for support and guardianship of
her three (3) minor children (who are in her custody) in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 2, in Tagbilaran City (Civil Case No. 4170, entitled "Jocelyn
Rulona-Al Awadhi Petitioner, vs. Nabil Al-Awadhi Defendant"). Upon her
motion, she was appointed the children's guardian by order of the court dated
August 25, 1987 (Annex B, p. 20, Rollo). The defendant, her husband filed in the
same court a motion to be allowed to exercise joint parental authority over their
children (Annex C, p. 21, Rollo). However, without waiting for the action of the
Tagbilaran Court, he filed on November 4, 1987 a petition for custody and
guardianship of their minor children in the Fourth Sharia District Court in
Marawi City (Annex A, p. 10, Rollo). It was docketed therein as Special
Proceeding No. 011-87.
After having been summoned, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that: (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of
the petition, nor over the parties, least of all, herself; (2) there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (3) improper venue
(Annex B, p. 45, Rollo).
In its order dated November 20, 1987, the Sharia District Court denied her
motion to dismiss (Annex C, p. 23, Rollo). Its order was based on Section 13 of
the Special Rules of Procedure in the Sharia Courts which provides:
Section 13. Pleadings and Motions Disallowed. The court
shall not allow the filing of the following pleadings, petitions or
motions, to wit:
(a) Motion to dismiss or to quash;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings or any other
paper;
(d) Motion to declare defendant in default;
(e) Reply, third party complaints, or intervention;
(f) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(g) Petition for relief from judgment;
(h) Motion for new trial or re-opening of trial; and
(i) Any dilatory motion for postponement.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of that order (Annex D, p. 24, Rollo) was
also denied by the court on January 12, 1988. Hence, this petition for review
raising only the legal issue of jurisdiction, or lack of it, of the respondent Sharia
District Court over the parties and the subject matter of the case. Only the
Sharia District Judge filed a Comment on the petition; the private respondent
did not.
Article 13, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (PD
1083) provides:
BOOK TWO
TITLE II
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Art. 13. Application (1) The provisions of this Title shall
apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim, and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code,
the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the
essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage,
divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of
minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower
(mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization
and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and
obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and
the property relations between husband and wife shall be
governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the following admitted facts:
(1) That the plaintiff husband in Spl. Proc. No. 011-87 is not a Philippine Muslim
but a Kuwaiti national;
(2) That he resides at 49-7 Pamaong Extension, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, not in
Marawi City where the Sharia court sits;
(3) That the defendant wife (herein petitioner Jocelyn Rulona) is a Filipino
citizen and a non- Muslim (a Roman Catholic Christian);
(4) That their Muslim marriage was not solemnized in any part of the
Philippines, for they were married in Kuwait (Annex A, par. 2, p. 40, Rollo); and
(5) That they do not reside within the Fourth Sharia District, embracing the
provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the cities of Iligan and
Marawi (Art. 138-d, P.D. No. 1083), for both of them reside in the province of
Bohol; it should have been self-evident to the Fourth Sharia District Court that it
had no jurisdiction over the spouses of their marriage, nor over the custody and
guardianship of their children (Art. 143, P.D. No. 1083).
The Regional Trial Court, Branch II, at Tagbilaran City which had assumed
jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint for support and guardianship of her
children on August 25, 1987 (p. 19, Rollo), may not be divested of its
jurisdiction over the parties (the husband having voluntarily submitted to its
jurisdiction by filing a motion therein for joint custody of his children) by the
Fourth Sharia District Court in Marawi City by the husband's filing therein three
(3) months later his own petition for custody and guardianship of his children
(p.10, Rollo). The rule is that once a court has assumed jurisdiction of a case, its
jurisdiction shall continue until the case is finished. It may not be ousted from
its jurisdiction by a co-equal court (People vs. Layno, 111 SCRA 20; Denila vs.
Bellosillo, 64 SCRA 63; Lat vs. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425; and People vs. Ocaya, 83
SCRA 218).
Moreover, Article 3 of the Muslim Code (P.D. No. 1083 expressly provides:
Art. 3. Conflict of provisions ...
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to
Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to
the prejudice of a Non-Muslim.
The application of the Muslim Code to the Christian wife will be prejudicial to
her.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws was promulgated to fulfill "the aspiration of
the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced in their communities"
(Exec. Order No. 442, Dec. 23, 1974). Those communities are found in the ten
(10) Mindanao provinces and six (6) cities comprised within the five (5) Sharia
judicial districts which were created under Article 138 of the Muslim Code. As
neither the petitioner nor the private respondent and their children live in or
are members of those communities, they do not come within the ambit of the
Sharia courts' jurisdiction.
Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have
recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the parties and promptly dismissed the
action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a
futile and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to
dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction
when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in
view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may
be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29, 35-36; Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54; Zulueta vs.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 49 SCRA 1, 6; Nueva Vizcaya Chamber of
Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 856).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. All the proceedings in
special Proceeding No. 011-87 of the Fourth Sharia District Court at Marawi City
are annulled and the petition therein is dismissed. Costs against the private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982
LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge, COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO
RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal Guardian of the Incompetent SOLEDAD
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971
1
which revived and
declared in full force and effect its decision on August 20, 1970
2
dismissing the
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. No. 43732, entitled
"Luis Parco, et al. vs. Hon. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch
IV, Calauag, et al., " and pray that the decision dated April 15, 1969
3
and all
subsequent orders
4
issued by respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of
First Instance of Quezon in Special Proceedings No. 2641 be declared as null and
void.
This case, G. R. No. L-33152, started from Special Proceedings No. 2641. a
guardianship proceedings for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez of Sriaya,
Quezon, which originally pertained to Branch 1, Court of First Instance of
Quezon, then presided by the late Hon. Judge Vicente Arguelles,
5
later on
succeded by Hon. Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera (now Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court). In 1966, respondent Judge of Branch IV-Calauag of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Hon. Union C. Kayanan, took cognizance of
Special Proceedings No. 2641 when the Secretary of Justice authorized
respondent Judge to help unclog the docket of Branch I at Lucena City, Quezon.
For clarity, We have hereunder summarized the sequence of events and
material dates as it appears in the records from the time respondent Judge of
Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon took cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 2641.
On December 20, 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon
motion of Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez), hereinafter
referred to as private respondent, the sale to Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista,
hereinafter referred to as the petitioners, of Lot Nos. 3437 (613 sq. meters) and
4389 (4,068 sq. meters) covered by TCT Nos. 16939 and 18035, respectively,
for the sum of P4,400.00 for the support, maintenance and medical treatment of
the ward Soledad Rodriguez.
On January 6, 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized, upon
motion of private respondent, the sale to petitioners of Lot No. 1207 covered by
TCT No. 16944 containing an area of 63,598 sq. meters, more or less, for the
same reason. All the sales of the three (3) lots being absolute, new transfer
certificates of title were issued in the name of petitioners.
On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval of the
sale of Lot Nos. 3437, 4389, and 1207, private respondent filed an urgent
petition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, invoking
Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court, praying that an order be
immediately issued requiring petitioners to appear before the court so that they
can be examined as regards the three (3) lots in question which are allegedly in
danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon failure to
do so or to comply with any order that may be issued in relation therewith to
hold them in contempt of court. The pertinent allegations read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That as legal guardian (private respondent) of the
abovenamed incompetent and upon authorization by this Hon.
Court he has transferred in good faith to the spouses LUIS
PARCO and VIRGINIA (UY) BAUTISTA, both of Atimonan,
Quezon, the titles over the following realties belonging to his
ward, namely:
a. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3437 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) with the
improvements thereon situated in the
Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of
Six Hundred Thirteen (613) sq. meters, more
or less;
b. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4389 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in the
Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of
Four Thousand And Sixty-Eight (4,068) sq.
meters, more or less;
c. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1207 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sariaya) situated in the
Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an area of
Sixty-three Thousand Five Hundred and
Ninety-eight (63,598) sq. meters, more or less.
2. That anent the first TWO (2) PARCELS above-described he
transferred the titles thereto in favor of the recited spouses
under a loan agreement (not an absolute sale thereto and with
the express commitment in writing that he can recover the
same within three (3) months from December 19, 1966, ...
That prior to the expiration of the cited period of three months,
he tried to recover the stated two parcels of land from them,
however, the same was not carried out because he was then
transacting with them the sale of PARCEL THREE and under
the Agreement that they will not sell cede, or convey the
mentioned two (2) lots to anyone (except to petitioner now
private respondent herein) and once the stated PARCEL
THREE has been sold at the price of P48,000.00 the borrowed
amount of P4,400.00 shall be deducted therefrom and said two
parcels shall be returned to him;
3. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple, in bad
faith and in violation of their agreement and of the trust and
confidence which he had reposed upon them, have
fraudulently ceded and transferred the titles over the stated
two parcels of land to another person, allegedly for a price of
(over P30,000.00) and in spite of his repeated request upon
them to reconvey to him the titles thereto or to turn over to
him the total proceeds they have received (minus the sum of
P4,400.00), they have maliciously and unjustly refused to do
so, and are intending to keep and retain said amount for their
own personal use and benefit;
4. That as already adverted to in the previous paragraph
hereof, the mentioned couple induced him to transfer to them
the title of parcel three, so that they can sell the same for the
agreed price of P48,000.00 and believing in good faith that the
cited spouses are honest and trustworthy, he agreed and
executed the requisite document transferring the title to them
subject to the following conditions:
a. They shall pay to him the amount of Twelve
Thousand (Pl2,000.00) Pesos after they have
secured a buyer of the property, ...
b. They shall pay to NIEVES ALCALA and
PURA AGCAOILE (who are private
respondent's agents and representatives in
negotiating the sale of parcel three) the sum
of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos after
they have sold the realty, ...
5. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple have
already sold and ceded the mentioned parcel three to another
person, and despite his repeated request upon them to pay and
deliver to him or to Nieves Alcala the sum of money specified
in the foregoing paragraph, they have maliciously and unjustly
failed and refused to do so, and have fraudulently retained the
said amount of money for thier own personal use and benefit;
6. That the enumerated parcels of land together with all the
proceeds derived therefrom, undeniably belonged to his ward
as trust properties, which are subject to the disposition of this
Hon. Court, and due to the mentioned fraudulent, malicious
and dishonest acts of the above- named couple, are in danger
of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled;
xxx xxx xxx
In an answer dated June 5, 1968, petitioners contended mainly, among others,
that the three lots have been conveyed to them by deeds of absolute sale which
were duly approved by the guardianship court.
Pre-trial hearings were set for possible amicable settlement beginning on
September 6, 1968 but was postponed and reset to October 9, 1968 on
petitioners' counsel motion. On October 9, 1968, both parties and their counsels
appeared but failed to reach any amicable settlement. Again, the pre-trial
hearing was reset to November 28 and 29, 1968 but was likewise postponed to
January 8, 1969 at petitioners' counsel motion.
On January 8, 1969, for failure to petitioners and their counsel to appear
although there was a telegram requesting for postponement, respondent Judge
issued an order,
6
authorizing private respondent to present evidence before the
Clerk of Court who was instructed to make the corresponding report which
shall be made as the basis of this decision.
In a petition dated January 30, 1969, petitioners prayed for the reconsideration
of the order of January 8, 1969 pointing out, among others, that there was a
First Order dated July 29, 1968,
7
issued by then Judge Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Quezon that said branch
"will henceforth take cognizance of this case" and thus, asked for the transfer of
the incident sought before Branch IV to Branch I for proper action.
On February 20, 1969, respondent Judge, finding the petition for
reconsideration well-grounded, issued an order directing the Clerk of Court to
transmit the records of the case to the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Lucena
City, quoted below:
ORDER
Acting on the Petition for Reconsideration filed by counsel for
the respondent on February 4, 1969, considering that Hon. A.
Melencio-Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch 1, CFI, Lucena
City, issued an order on July 29, 1968, the dispositive portion
of which is quoted as follows. 'WHEREFORE, it is hereby
confirmed that this court will henceforth take cognizance of
this case,' and considering that this special proceedings
actually belongs to Branch I, although incidents therein were
taken cognizance of by the Presiding Judge of CFI, Branch IV
when he was holding court session in Lucena City and
notwithstanding Administrative Order No. 261 dated October
7, 1968 which states that 'This administrative order shall not
apply to cases pending in the different salas which have been
partially tried and shall remain therein for final disposition',
because to case was originally filed during the incumbency of
the late Judge Vicente Arguelles, finding therefore the said
petition to be well-grounded, the Clerk of Court is hereby
authorized to transmit these records to the Deputy Clerk of
Court, CFI, Branch I, of Lucena City.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Calauag, Quezon this 20th day of February, 1969.
(SGD.) UNION C. KAYANAN Judge
On March 24, 1969, Private respondent, without the assistance of a counsel,
filed before Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon an amended petition
praying that the three (3) lots subject matter of the original urgent petition be
ordered reconveyed to the ward in said Special Proceedings No. 2641 for he
was informed that petitioners win transfer and properties to third person.
On March 26, 1969, the Clerk of Court of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of
Quezon, issued the notice of hearing of the amended petition filed by private
respondent dated March 24, 1969 notifying counsel for both parties that the
case will be heard before Branch IV on April 10, 1969 at 2:30 p.m. at Calauag,
Quezon. On the date set for hearing, counsels for both parties appeared but for
failure of the petitioners to appear respondent Judge issued an
order
8
reiterating its previous order dated January 8, 1969 allowing private
respondent to present his evidence ex-parte and considered the case submitted
for resolution.
On April 15, 1969, respondent Judge rendered a decision
9
on the basis of the
report of the Clerk of Court dated February 19, 1969 ordering petitioners to
reconvey the three (3) parcels of land to private respondent.
On June 14, 1969, petitioners moved to reconsider the decision stating, among
others, that respondent Judge has no authority to take cognizance of the case
which, according to petitioners, is an issue raised in the petition for
reconsideration of the court order of January 8, 1969, and that the decision was
without legal basis. Petitioners prayed that the case or incident be transferred
to the proper court which had taken cognizance of this case.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge denied the petition for reconsideration for
lack of merit. Petitioners' counsel received the said order of denial on June 26,
1969.
Meanwhile, on June 21, 1969, private respondent filed an urgent motion in
Branch IV praying that petitioners be required to appear before the court to be
examined as regards the properties of the ward and to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for not complying with a final order of the court
directing the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of land to private
respondent.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge, acting on the urgent motion, issued an
order
10
directing petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt of court pursuant to par. (b) Section 3 Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
On June 27, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion claiming that the urgent
motion for contempt of court was premature considering that the decision
ordering the reconveyance of the properties in question has not yet become
final and executory and is still subject to appeal. In their prayer for the setting
aside of the order of June 23, 1969, petitioners informed the court that they win
appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals and that the corresponding notice of
appeal, appeal bond and the record on appeal will be filed in due time.
The following day, June 28, 1969, petitioners filed the notice of appeal and
appeal bond with a manifestation that the record on appeal will be filed in due
time.
On July 3, 1963, respondent Judge issued an order
11
denying for lack of merit
petitioners' urgent motion of June 27, 1969, thus declaring that the order dated
June 23, 1969 stands considering that petitioners' right to appeal has already
lapsed. In the same order, petitioners were given ten (10) days upon receipt to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt pursuant to Section 4, Rule
71 in relation to Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On July 7, 1969, petitioners filed a petition for extension of ten (10) days to
expire on July 20, 1969 within which to file the record on appeal. In an
order
12
dated July 9, 1969, respondent Judge denied the said petition for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period.
On July 10, 1969, petitioners filed an unverified second petition for
reconsideration of the decision dated April 15, 1969 and the order of July 3,
1969 contending that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over the raise from the time
the order dated February 20, 1969 was issued by Judge A. Melencio- Herrera;
that the proceedings under Section 6 Rule 96 do not authorize the Hon. Court
(Branch IV) to determine the question of right over the property or to order
delivery thereof; that the purpose is merely to elicit information or secure
evidence from the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or
conveyed away any personal property of the ward; that if the court finds
sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of
the guardian to bring the proper action.
On the other hand, on July 17, 1969, a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated July 9, 1969 was filed by petitioners claiming that all the pleadings related
to the intended appeal were filed within the period allowed by the Revised
Rules of Court. After an opposition was filed, respondent Judge issued an order
on
13
July 18, 1969 denying the second petition for reconsideration for lack of
basis and on the ground that the period to appeal either the decision or any of
the previous orders had already expired.
On August 20, 1969, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction pleading nullity of the decision of the
Court of First Instance, Branch IV,
Quezon dated April 15, 1969 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse
of discretion in denying their right of appeal.
On September 27, 1969, the Court of Appeals dismissal the petition for lack of
merit.
14
On motion by petitioners, the dismissal was reconsidered in a split
resolution dated December 15, 1969 thereby giving due course to the petition,
and private respondent was required to answer.
After private respondent filed their answer and the parties submitted their
respective memoranda, the Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote
decision
15
dated August 21, 1970 dismissed the petition.
On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in a
split resolution
16
dated October 10, 1970 granted the motion for
reconsideration and set aside the decision dated August 20,1970.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the
Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote resolution
17
dated January 20, 1971,
reverted to its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissing the petition.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
I
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RETENTION
BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF BRANCH IV-CALAUAG OF
THE CASE OF BRANCH I-LUCENA CITY AFTER HE ORDERED
THE RETURN OF THE CASE TO BRANCH I,LUCENA CITY TO
WHICH THE CASE BELONGS AND AFTER THE PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY HAD RESUMED AND
EXERCISED HER JURISDICTION OVER SAID CASE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COULD LEGALLY
AND VALIDLY RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE OF
BRANCH I LUCENA CITY DESPITE THE CIRCUMSTANCES
ADVERTED TO IN THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR, THE
MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE'S ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND/OR ORDER RECONVEYANCE OF
PETITIONERS' PROPERTY SOLD TO THEM AND TITLED IN
THEIR NAMES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITED
JURISDICTION OF A GUARDIANSHIP COURT.
III
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE SALES ARE
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE VALIDITY AND REGULARITY OF SAID
SALES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN
INTEREST.
IV
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING BY SILENCE
THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE
ENFORCING HIS DECISION BY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS.
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING DENIAL OF
PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO APPEAL.
This petition was given due course in view of the peculiar incidents during its
trial stage where, as borne out by the records, two (2) branches of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon Province, 9th Judicial District assert jurisdiction over
Special Proceedings No. 2641, which, when the decision rendered by one
branch was brought in the Court of Appeals on certiorari with preliminary
injunction, the Special Division of Five Justices, in a three-to-two vote resolution
in four (4) occasions after its dismissal for lack of merit on September 27, 1968,
reconsidered the same and was given due course on December 15, 1968, again
dismissed on August 21, 1970, but again reconsidered on October 10, 1970,
until finally dismissed on January 20, 1971 when the Special Division of Five
reverted to its August 21, 1970 resolution. The Special Division was equally
split on the issue whether or not the Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Calauag,
Quezon, acting with limited jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6
Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, has the authority to adjudicate the question of
ownership and order the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels of land in
question to private respondent, guardian of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. On
these two (2) principal issues, We are called upon to finally resolve the legal
controversy peculiar on this case.
After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the case was deemed
submitted for decision on October 28, 1971.
In a Resolution
18
of this Court dated November 29, 1978, the urgent
manifestation and motion of Leonisa S. Rodriguez, the surviving spouse of Mario
Rodriguez (brother of the ward) that the ward Soledad Rodriguez died on
September 15, 1970 and private respondent Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. died on
October 24, 1973; and that the heirs of the ward be substituted as the private
respondents in this case was noted. To begin with, the principal issue al hand is
whether or not respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch IV-Calauag has the authority or power to take further action in Special
Proceedings No. 2641 after the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch I-Lucena City asserted its jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders
dated July 29, 1968 and respondent Judge correspondingly ordered the return
of the case to Branch I in an order dated February 20,1969.
Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance
of Quezon has no power or authority to retain jurisdiction over Special
Proceedings No. 2641 which, at its inception, originally pertained to Branch I-
Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon. To support such chum,
petitioners contend that the Second Order dated July 29, 1968 requiring private
respondent for an inventory and accounting of the ward's property confirms
that the Presiding Judge of Branch I has resumed its jurisdiction over said case,
more so, when respondent Judge ordered on February 20, 1969 the transmittal
of the records of the case to the Deputy Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance,
Branch I-Lucena City.
Private respondent, on the other hand, justifies the retention of jurisdiction by
respondent Judge over Special Proceedings No. 2641 contending, among others,
that the two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 issued by then Judge A. Melencio-
Herrera are not sufficient bases for claiming that Branch IV has been deprived
of its, jurisdiction because jurisdiction is vested upon the court not upon any
particular branch or judge thereof and the issuance of such orders constitute
undue interference with the processes and proceedings already undertaken by
respondent Judge; that petitioners are guilty of estoppel when they failed to
raise the issue of jurisdiction from the very beginning and when they
voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, filed their answer and other
pleadings, and moved for postponements of the scheduled dates of hearing.
We sustain petitioners' stand. Of course, jurisdiction is vested in the court not in
any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of
the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal
courts
19
one branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference
by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the
language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a
province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising
as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are
not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments.
20
A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and
might seriously hinder the administration of justice. A judge is competent to act
so long as the case remains before him, but after it passed from his branch to
the other, the case could be acted upon by the judge of the latter
branch.
21
Otherwise, an anomalous situation would occur at the detriment of
the party litigants who are likewise confused where to appear and plead their
cause.
In the case before Us, there is no dispute that both Branch I and Branch IV of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, have jurisdiction over the subject matter, a
guardianship proceedings under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court and
Section 44(a) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. While it is recognized that when a
case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the
branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches,
22
We are of the
view however, considering the unusual circumstances and incidents attendant
in this case the situation in the case at bar is different. Here, it must be noted
that the Presiding Judge of Branch I asserted and resumed its prior jurisdiction
by issuing two (2) orders, one of which requires private respondent to render
an inventory and accounting of the property of the ward. On the other hand,
respondent Judge of Branch IV, in confirmation of such resumption of
jurisdiction, ordered the return of the records of Special Proceedings No. 2641
to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon, but, instead of
regularly relinquishing jurisdiction over the case, respondent Judge continued
to take further action on the case in total disregard of the two (2) orders of the
Presiding Judge of Branch I. Should one branch be permitted to equally assert,
assume or retain jurisdiction over a case or controversy over which another
coordinate or co-equal branch has already resumed its jurisdiction, We would
then sanction undue interference by one branch over another. With that, the
judicial stability of the decrees or orders of the courts would be a meaningless
precept in a well-ordered administration of justice.
There is no question that the prior proceedings had in Branch IV by respondent
Judge were valid and regular as they were admittedly authorized by the
Secretary of Justice. It must be emphasized however, that Branch IV lost its
jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 when respondent Judge ordered
the return of the records to Branch I after having been informed in a motion for
reconsideration filed on January 30, 1969 of the existence of the two (2) orders
issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch 1. From that point of time, all
subsequent proceedings and processes in connection with or related to Special
Proceedings No. 2641 undertaken by the respondent Judge became irregular. It
amounted to an undue interference with the processes and proceedings of
Branch I.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the pertinent law on the matter, it may be
observed that the detail of respondent Judge of Branch IV stationed
permanently in Calauag, Quezon to Branch I in Lucena City, Quezon
authoritatively rests on the provision of Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
which reads:
Section 51. Detail of judge to another district or province.-
Whenever a judge stationed in. any province or branch of a
court in a province shag certify to the Secretary of Justice that
the condition of the docket in his court is such as to require the
assistance of an additional judge, or when there is any vacancy
in any court or branch of a court in a province, the Secretary of
Justice may, in the interest of justice, with the approval of the
Supreme Court and for a period of not more than three months
for each time, assign any judge of any court or province, whose
docket permits his temporary absence from said court, to hold
sessions in the court needing such assistance or whether such
vacancy exists. No judge so detailed shall take cognizance of
any case when any of the parties thereto objects and the
objection is sustained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Apparently, when the circumstances contemplated under Section 51 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 occur, the detailed Judge holds sessions in the court
needing such assistance or where such vacancy exists as if he is the presiding
judge of that particular branch where the clogged docket or vacancy exists. The
detailed Judge does not hold sessions therein as if he is the Presiding Judge of
the branch where he is originally or permanently designated. In the case before
Us, respondent Judge Kayanan was duly authorized to help unclog the docket of
Branch I stationed in Lucena City, Quezon which at that time was rendered
vacant due to the death of Judge Vicente Arguelles. When respondent Judge
Kayanan took cognizance of the cases left by Judge Arguelles, pending the
designation of a replacement, he merely sits as a judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Quezon Province. In the event of designation of a new Presiding
Judge of Branch 1, accepted practice and procedure of speedy administration of
justice requires that the detailed judge turns over the cases he took cognizance
of to the new Presiding Judge. Justification for the continued retention of
jurisdiction over those cases in the case at bar appears to be not convincing.
We find no plausible indication how estoppel could operate against petitioners.
It is true that petitioners filed their answer to the urgent petition of private
respondent and appeared before respondent Judge of Branch IV without
questioning the latter's authority to hear the case. The answer to the urgent
petition of private respondent dated May 13, 1968 was filed by petitioners on
June 5, 1968 or almost two (2) months before Judge Melencio-Herrera of
Branch I issued the two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 asserting jurisdiction
over the case. The appearances of petitioners and counsel in the sala of
respondent Judge during the intervening period from July 29, 1968 were
apparently due to the fact that petitioners came to know only of the two orders
of Branch I when they examined the records of the case prompted by the
manifestation of the counsel of private respondent, in the course of the
proceedings in Branch IV, to submit for an accounting in connection with the
administration of the properties of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. Petitioners
manifested such information to respondent Judge in a petition for
reconsideration of the order of January 8, 1968 authorizing the presentation of
evidence ex parte. The silence or inaction of petitioners was therefore due to
their lack of knowledge of respondent Judge's lack of authority to retain or take
further action on the case. Such lack of authority was confirmed when
respondent Judge, acting on the petition for reconsideration dated January 30,
1969, issued on February 20, 1969 an order authorizing the return of the
records of the case to Branch I. In claiming that the records referred to by the
order concern the first portion of the records of Special Proceedings No. 2641
and not the second portion containing the urgent petition filed by private
respondent on May 13, 1968, private respondent would then encourage split
jurisdiction of courts which is abhorred by the law.
Assuming that Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon has
jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 notwithstanding the attendant
circumstances adverted to earlier, We now dwell on another issue, which
standing alone would decisively resolve the assigned errors raised in this
petition, that is, whether or not Branch IV exercising limited and special,
jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court has jurisdiction to order the delivery or reconveyance of the three parcels
of land in question to the ward, represented herein by private respondent.
In two leading cases, Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 and Cui vs. Piccio et al,
91 Phil. 712, this Court laid the rule on the issue raised before Us as interpreted
in the light of Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling
or concealing property of the ward. Upon complaint of the
guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or
prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir,
or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled,
concealed, or conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or
a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the
court may cite the suspected person to appear for examination
touching such money, goods, interests, or instrument, and
make such orders as will secure the estate against such
embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the
purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be
instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. Generally, the
guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually
order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed
or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases,
where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been
already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
23
In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary
action and not in guardianship proceedings.
In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether
or not, on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the
title or right of the ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels of land in
question is clear and undisputable. What is certain here is the fact that the sale
of the properties in question were duly approved by the respondent Judge in
accordance with the provisions on selling and encumbering of the property of
the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must be noted that while the
original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the examination of
petitioners herein regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and
embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24,
1969 asked for reconveyance.
Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale
of the first two lots was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while
that of the third lot was subject to condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated
sale. On the other hand, according to petitioners, the sales were all absolute and
protected by the Torrens System since new transfer certificate of titles were
issued in their name. Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better
right or title to the disputed properties. This, We believe, requires the
determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which
is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out
in a separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui vs.
Piccio supra.
The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private
respondent finds no application in the instant case. As differentiated from the
case at bar, in Castillo case, the right or title of the ward to the property in
dispute was clear and undisputable as the same was donated to her through
compromise agreement approved by the court which title had the authority
of res judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of the ward to the
properties in question is in dispute and as such should be determined in a
separate ordinary action.
Furthermore, private respondent's claim that petitioners are barred by laches
to raise the issue of jurisdiction is without merit. In support of such claim,
private respondent invoked the exception laid down in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to the rule that the lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings; that it
is conferred only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection
on the lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties; and the infirmity
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent, or win of
the parties.
24

The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra, and in the latter case
of Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,29 SCRA 419 is not applicable in the case at bar.
In Tijam case, the appellant had all the opportunity to challenged the court's
jurisdiction in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals but instead
invoked its jurisdiction to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for
final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals and fifteen (15) years later from the inception
of the case that it finally chose to raise the question of j jurisdiction. I t is clear
that t the circumstances present in Tijam case are not present here. The
petitioners in the instant case challenged the authority of the trial court to take
further cognizance of the case the moment they become aware of Branch I
assuming jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was raised in a petition for
reconsideration of the order dated January 8, 1969, in a petition for
reconsideration of the decision dated April 15, 1969, in a second petition for
reconsideration of the said decision, and alleged as an additional ground in the
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. In any case, the operation of the
principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction. If it had no jurisdiction, but
the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same
must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel.
25

As respondent trial court has no jurisdiction, We deem it unnecessary to pass
upon the assigned errors raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 is
hereby reversed and set aside, and the decision rendered by respondent Judge
of Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon dated April 15, 1969 and
the orders issued thereafter are declared null and void, and the case is hereby
remanded to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:
I dissent. I vote for the affirmance of the decision of Judge Union C. Kayanan,
Calauag Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province dated April
15, 1969 in Special Proceeding No. 2641, entitled "Guardianship of the
Incompetent Soledad Rodriguez, Francisco Rodriguez, Jr., Guardian".
In that decision, Judge Kayanan ordered the spouses Luis Parco and Virginia
Bautista to reconvey Lot No. 3437 (613 square meters), Lot No. 4389 (4,069
square meters) and Lot No. 1207 (63,598 square meters), all of the Sariaya,
Tayabas cadastre, to the guardian Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. upon the latter's
payment to the said spouses of the sum of twelve thousand pesos which he had
borrowed from them (p. 65, Rollo).
Since the ward died intestate on September 15, 1970 and the guardian died on
October 24, 1973, the reconveyance should be made to the ward's heirs,
namely, her sisters, Concepcion Rodriguez- Sapalo and Milagros Rodriguez-
Sanchez, and the children of the ward's deceased brother Mario Rodriguez (who
died on March 8, 1972), namely, Mario, Jr., Ramoncito, Liza and Rodulfo, all
surnamed Rodriguez, represented by their guardian, their mother, Leonisa S.
Rodriguez (pp. 232-236, Rollo). Said heirs should pay the Parco spouses the
sum of twelve thousand pesos as a condition for the reconveyance.
It should be noted that the said guardianship proceedings was assigned
originally to Branch I presided over by Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It
was transferred to Branch IV presided over by Judge Kayanan who was detailed
at Lucena City to assist in decongesting the dockets of Branches I and II.
Judge Kayanan had authorized the sale of the three lots to the Parco spouses so
that the proceeds of the sale could be used for the maintenance of the ward. it
turned out that the sales or transfers were made under certain conditions which
were violated by the Parco spouses.
A copy of Judge Kayanan's decision was received by petitioners' counsel on May
29, 1969. Sixteen days later or on June 14, they filed a motion for
reconsideration. The order denying that motion was received by the petitioners
on June 26. They filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond on June 28 (pp- 86
and 92, CA Rollo).
The last day for submitting the record on appeal was July 10. The petitioners
asked for a ten-day extension within which to file their record on appeal Instead
of submitting it, they filed on July 10 a second motion for reconsideration on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court denied the motion for extension of time within which to file the
record on appeal It also denied the second motion for reconsideration in its
order of July 18, 1969.
The petitioners did not file any record on appeal They filed on August 20, 1969
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the said decision of
April 15. The Court of Appeals in its extended resolution of September 27, 1969
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioners' remedy was an appeal
which they had abandoned.
That resolution was reconsidered. The petition was given due course. The Court
of Appeals in its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissed the petition. (Per Justice
Eulogio Serrano with Alvendia and Nolasco JJ., concurring. Justice Enriquez and
Yatco dissented.)
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that decision was denied in the
resolution of January 20, 197 1. (Per Justice Eulogio Serrano with Justices
Nolasco and Soriano concurring. Justices Enriquez and Alvendia dissented.)
The petitioners appealed to this Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed because (1) the petitioners inexcusably did not file a record
on appeal (2) the question as to whether the guardianship court should set
aside the conveyances to the petitioners is not a jurisdictional question but
merely a procedural matter which could be waived (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257
June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262) and (3) the petitioners and the guardian
hoodwinked the guardianship court to the ward's prejudice.
It is the duty of the courts, in the exercise of the State's prerogative to protect
persons under disability (parents patriae) to set aside the transfers to the
petitioners and thus avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of the ward and do
justice in this case. Technicalities should be eschewed.
As to the power of a branch of the Court of First Instance to act in a case
transferred to it from another sala of the same court, see Eleazar vs. Zandueta,
48 Phil. 193; Hizon Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318; San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 91 Phil. 178.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-5893. February 28, 1956.]
CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA y LOPEZ MANZANO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EL
HOGAR FILIPINO, INC., MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC. and ERNEST
BERG, Defendants; EL HOGAR FILIPINO, INC. and MAGDALENA ESTATE,
INC., Defendants-Appellants.

D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J.:
A parcel of land containing an area of 2,784 square meters as described in
transfer certificate of title No. 36234 issued on 6 September 1930 by the office
of the Register of Deeds in and for the City of Manila was registered in the name
of Andres Luna de Pardo de Tavera, single; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryCarlos
Pardo de Tavera, married to Belen Ramirez; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryGonzales; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryMaria Audotte
Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 3 years of age, single; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryRoberto Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 9 years of age,
single; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez
Manzano, 11 years of age, single (Exhibit B). On 6 August 1930 the co-owners
agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. for the
purpose of building a modern structure on the parcel of land and to that end
they also agreed to accept shares of stock of the corporation to be organized in
exchange for their respective shares in the parcel of land and building erected
thereon to be transferred to the corporation (Exhibit D-2). On 12 August 1930
the duly appointed guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez
Manzano, mother of the minor, filed a petition in the probate court (Special
Proceeding No. 34154) praying for the approval of the agreement referred to
(Exhibit D-2) and seeking authority to accept shares of stock of the corporation
in exchange for the share of the minor in the property (Exhibit D-1). On 28
August 1930 the probate court approved the agreement in so far as the minor
Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano was concerned and authorized the
guardian to accept the shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for the
share of the minor in the property (Exhibit E-1). The Tavera-Luna, Inc., was
actually incorporated on 14 December 1930 and the guardian of the minor
Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano transferred her share in the
property on 16 January 1931. After the transfer of the shares of the co-owners
in the property, transfer certificate of title No. 36234 (Exhibit B) was cancelled
and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 37347 in the name of Tavera-
Luna, Inc. was issued on 23 January 1931 (Exhibit H). On 17 January 1931 upon
application of the corporation, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., a loan and building
association, granted it a loan of P1,000,000 for the purpose of erecting a
concrete building in lieu of the wooden building standing thereon. This loan was
secured by a first mortgage registered on the certificate. On 11 February 1932
an additional loan of P300,000 was obtained by the corporation from El Hogar
Filipino, Inc. secured by a mortgage on the same property. The period of the
first mortgage of P1,000,000 was extended. Transfer certificate of title No.
37347 in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. (Exhibit H) was cancelled and in lieu
thereof transfer certificate of title No. 40177 was issued on 28 April 1932 in the
name of Tavera-Luna, Inc., but the parcel of land was subdivided into several
lots with their respective description (Exhibit K). Again, transfer certificate of
title No. 40177 (Exhibit K) was partially cancelled as to one of the several lots
and transfer certificate of title No. 41127 was issued in the name of Tavera-
Luna, Inc. on 25 August 1932 (Exhibit K-1). Thereafter, partial cancellations
were made of transfer certificate of title No. 40177 (Exhibit K) as to some of the
small lots and transfer certificates of title Nos. 41128, 43104, 43105, 43107,
43108, 43109 and 7276 were issued in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. The last
certificates of title cover small parts of the original parcel of land. The larger
part of the parcel of land is described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 40177
(Exhibit K) and 41127 (Exhibit K-1). Not long after the construction of the
building known as Crystal Arcade was finished, El Hogar Filipino, Inc., the
mortgagee, took over the possession and management of the property to apply
the rents, after deducting management expenses, to the payment of the
mortgagee debt and on 28 September 1933 the mortgagee foreclosed the
mortgage extrajudicially and purchased the whole property at public auction
sale for P1,363,555.37 (Exhibits L and L- 1). The mortgagor having failed to
redeem the property, the mortgagee consolidated its title and the certificate of
title Nos. 40177 (Exhibit K) and 41127 (Exhibit K-1) in the name of Tavera-
Luna, Inc. were cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificates of title Nos.
59596 (Exhibit M), and 59570 (Exhibit M-1 were issued in the name of the
mortgagee, El Hogar Filipino, Inc. on 12 August 1940. On 26 August 1943, nearly
nine months after the filing of the original complaint in this case, El Hogar
Filipino, Inc. sold the whole property to Magdalena Estate, Inc. for P1,400,000 in
Japanese war notes (Exhibit P). The certificates in the name of El Hogar Filipino,
Inc. Nos. 59569 and 59570 (Exhibits M and M-1) were cancelled and lieu
thereof transfer certificates of title Nos. 67102 and 67103 were issued in the
name of Magdalena Estate, Inc. on 26 August 1943 (Exhibits Q and Q-1). On 22
September 1943 Magdalena Estate, Inc. sold one-third undivided share in the
property to Ernest Berg for P466,666.66 in Japanese war notes (Exhibit R).
On 17 November 1942, Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the transfer of her right,
share and interest in the property made by her guardian to Tavera-Luna, Inc.
However, before judgment could be rendered by the Court, the battle for
liberation of Manila supervened and the record of the case was destroyed. After
reconstitution of the record of the case, amendment to the pleadings to include
the Magdalena Estate, Inc. and Ernest Berg to party-Defendants and trial on the
merits, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment annulling the
order of the probate court that had granted authority to the guardian of
the Plaintiff to transfer her wards right, share interest in the parcel of land to
Tavera-Luna, Inc. and the transfer thereof pursuant thereto; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythe transfers of the wards share in the property to El
Hogar Filipino, Inc., Magdalena Estate, Inc. and Ernest Berg; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythe certificates of title issued to the transferees in so far
as the wards share in the property is concerned; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand ordering cancellation of transfer certificates issued
to the transferees and issuance of new ones in the name of the transferees and
the Plaintiff with the statement in the certificates to be issued that Plaintiffs
share in the property is two-ninths, free from any lien or encumbrance, and
accounting of the income collected by the transferees during the periods of their
respective possession of the property and payment or delivery thereof to
the Plaintiff in so far as her share in the property is concerned.
The Defendants have appealed.
The point that the Plaintiffs action is barred by the statute of limitations is no
longer urged, because the Plaintiff became of age and released from
guardianship on 19 November 1940 (Exhibit N-1 and 0- 1) and the action was
brought on 17 November 1942, or within the period provided for in section
579, Act No. 190, which says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be maintained by
the ward, or by any person claiming under him, unless it is commenced within
three years next after the termination of the guardianship, or, when a legal
disability to sue exists by reason of minority or otherwise, at the time when the
cause of action accrues, within three years next after the removal of such
disability.
The Plaintiff contends and the trial court sustained her claim that the order of
the probate court of 28 August 1930 (Exhibit E-1) is a nullity because the
provisions of section 569, Act No. 190, the law then in force, were not complied
with and for that reason the probate court was without jurisdiction to order the
transfer of her share in the property to the corporation to be organized and
formed. She alleges and argues that as the petition which brought about the
entry of the order of the probate court of 28 August 1930 was not verified; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryit did not set forth the condition of the estate of the ward
and the facts and circumstances upon which the petition was founded tending
to show the necessity or expediency of the sale (transfer); chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythe Court did not direct the next of kin to the ward, and
all persons interested in the estate, to appear before the judge or court, at the
time and place therein specified, not less than four nor more than eight weeks
from the time of making such order, to show cause why an order should not be
granted for the sale or such estate, the order is a nullity for lack of jurisdiction
of the court issuing it.
That the probate court in guardianship proceedings No. 34154 entitled Tutela
de la menor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, had jurisdiction over
the petition filed by the guardian admits of no doubt. Only upon the ground of
lack of jurisdiction may an order entered by a court be assailed collaterally. If
the court had jurisdiction, irregularities in the proceedings which would or
could invalidate the courts order may be assailed directly by means of an
appeal but not collaterally. 1 Lack of verification of a petition filed in a probate
court for the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a minor is not a
jurisdictional defect. 2 It should have been attacked directly and not collaterally.
3 In her petition the guardian alleged that the transfer of her wards share in the
property to the corporation then to be organized would be to or for her benefit
and she expected that the construction of a new building would enhance the
value of her wards share in the property and increase her income (Exhibits D-1
and D-2). No other consideration or motive could have prompted the guardian,
mother of the minor, to file the petition. It is not necessary for a grant of
authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward to state that the income
is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to maintain or educate the
ward when a minor. It is enough, as the other alternative of the law provides,
that it appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the
ward that his real estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds
thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security. 4 The
petition of the guardian falls under the last quoted part of section 569, Act No.
190. That part of the section, requiring the probate court to enter an order
directing the next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the estate to
appear before the court at a time and place therein specified, was substantially
complied with, because the next kin to the ward was her own guardian and
mother and all persons interested in the estate of the ward were her uncles and
aunt who agreed to make the transfer of their respective shares in the property
to the corporation, Tavera-Luna, Inc. Moreover, next of kin are those whose
relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 5
There were no creditors to the wards estate. Notice to the next of kin to the
ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear before the judge or
court, at the time and place therein specified, was not necessary, because the
next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the estate were her mother
and guardian, uncles and aunt. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion
that part of the provision of section 569, Act No. 190, has been complied with.
Hearing on the petition, as required in said section does not necessarily mean
that witnesses testify or documents be produced or exhibited. If the court be
satisfied that the allegations of the petition are true and the interested persons
or close relatives of the ward did not object because they themselves were
interested in the scheme to organize a corporation to which all their shares in
the property were to be transferred, the provisions of the law on hearing were
also complied with. The conclusion arrived at renders it unnecessary for us to
pass upon the question whether El Hogar Filipino, Inc. was a purchaser for
value and in good faith. Suffice it to say that even if the loan was granted when
the certificate of title was still in the name of the Plaintiff and her co-owners, the
fact that the loan was applied for by an entity that was in the process of
organization and by the same persons who were the registered owners of the
property, the mortgagee was entitled to rely upon the order of the probate court
granting authority to the guardian to make the transfer of the share of her ward
in the property and was not bound to inquire further to find out whether there
were irregularities committed or defects or vices that would render the order
null and void. 1 So also the question whether the action brought by Carlos Pardo
de Tavera y Cembrano in his own behalf and in behalf of the minor, the
herein Plaintiff-Appellee, is res judicata need not be passed upon. Certainly, it
would be awkward for this Court to review a final decree or judgment which
upheld the validity of the mortgage in favor of the Appellant, El Hogar Filipino,
Inc., in the case of Carlos Pardo de Tavera and Carmen Pardo de Tavera
Manzano vs. El Hogar Filipino, Inc., 68 Phil., 712, and to declare null and void the
order of the probate court as far as the share in the property of the minor is
concerned, a declaration which would partly reopen, review, reverse or set
aside that final decree or judgment rendered by this Court.
This action would not have been brought if the scheme and plan of the
organizers or incorporators of the Tavera-Luna, Inc. should have met with
success.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, the complaint dismissed, with costs
against theAppellee.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982
PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Leyte and Southern Leyte; FELICIANA CALLE,
court-appointed guardian of the minors Shirley and Leandro, both
surnamed HOMERES; the SOLICITOR GENERAL; THE CITY FISCAL OF
TACLOBAN; and, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Tacloban City, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an
April 24, 1981 order of the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Leyte which required the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum to
give and deposit with the clerk of this court the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (PI0,000.00) more as additional
consideration of Lot No. 3085-G of the Tacloban Cadastre
which the court believes to be fair and reasonable price of the
property. This amount should be deposited with the clerk of
this court on or before June 24, 1981; otherwise TCT No. T-
13238 in the name of Patria Paciente now subject of a
mortgage in favor of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation to guarantee an obligation in the amount of
P30,000.00, dated December 27, 1978, will be cancelled.
as well as the validity of its resolution dated August 21, 1981 which denied the
motion for reconsideration of the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum of the
aforesaid order and directed the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
to cancel TCT No. 13238 of Patria Paciente and issue in lieu
thereof a new transfer certificate of title to the following
present owners of Lot 3085- G of the Tacloban Cadastre: Patria
Paciente, of legal age, Filipino, married, residing in Tacloban
City, 1/3; Shirley Homeres, 10 years old, residing in Tacloban
City, 1/3; and, Leandro Homeres, 10 years old, residing in
Tacloban City, Philippines, 1/3, subject to the mortgage lien of
the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation.
because of their failure to comply with the same aforestated order. The facts of
the case are as follow:
In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and
two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot No.
3085-G situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City, covered by TCT No. 12138. This lot
which he had inherited from his deceased father, Felizardo Homeres, has an
area of one thousand seven hundred one (1,701) square meters.
On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita
Dumdum for P10,000.00.
On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over
the persons and estate of the minors. The petition was granted on August 9,
1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her oath as guardian on September 13, 1977,
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which had
been titled in her name under TCT No. T-13121, to petitioner Patria Paciente for
the amount of P15,000.00. Consequently, Patria Paciente was issued TCT No. T-
13238 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corporation for P30,000.00.
On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, filed
a manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is the
subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name of the
petitioner under TCT No. T-13238 and that it was mortgaged to the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee petitioner's loan of
P30,000.00.
Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court issued
an order on November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the manager of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to appear before the court on January
21, 1981 and show cause why TCT No. T-13238, covering a parcel of land co-
owned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro Homeres, should not be cancelled for
having been alienated without authority from the court.
When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corporation did not appear before the court. Instead, Conchita
Dumdum appeared and explained to the respondent court that she sold the lot
which she acquired from Lilia S. Homeres to the petitioner without obtaining
the approval of the court because she was not aware of such requirement
regarding the properties of the minors. On the same date, the respondent court
again issued an order requiring the petitioner and the manager of the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to explain why TCT No. T- 13238
should not be cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial authority before
disposing of the said property.
At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's husband, apprised
the court that the petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in
question. Respondent court then issued the questioned order.
A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum having been
denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent court acting as a guardianship
court has jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer
certificate of title of petitioner and to order the issuance of a new title to include
the minors as co-owners with the petitioner for her having failed to comply with
the court's order directing her to pay the minors the reasonable price of their
property that their mother alienated without authority of a competent court.
Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and Parco and
Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, petitioner
contends that respondent court in hearing a petition for guardianship is not the
proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title. In the Cui case, this Court
ruled:
... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have some
relevancy is that of Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839. In this
case, the court made a distinction between the provisions of
sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil Procedure which now
correspond to section 6, Rule 88 and section 6 of Rule 97 of the
Rules of Court. This Court in that case said in effect that while
in administration proceedings the court under section 709 may
only question the person suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed away property belonging to the estate,
section 593 of the same Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the
Judge or the court to issue such orders as maybe necessary to
secure the estate against concealment, embezzlement and
conveyance, and this distinction is now given emphasis by
respondents' counsel. the way we interpret section 573 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97, section 6
of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid down in the
case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that the court may
issue an order directing the delivery or return of any property
embezzled, concealed or conveyed which belongs to a ward,
where the right or title of said ward is clear and indisputable.
xxx xxx xxx
In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no
jurisdiction to issue his order of September 5, 1951, in the
guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver
the rentals collected by them to the guardian and authorizing
the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that the
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings,
ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the
purpose of obtaining information which may be used in action
later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the
ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the
guardian.
and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows:
In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held that the
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings,
ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for
the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an
action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right
of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court exercising
special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the
delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled,
concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court,
only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the
ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially
decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right
or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where
title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or
conveyed is in dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the persons said to have
embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a
guardianship proceedings.
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or
return of the property conveyed are concerned, We find the orders of the
respondent court valid. The petitioner's contentions in this regard are
untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do not support her argument.
While it is true that in these two cases We ruled that where title to any property
said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of
said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to
have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a
separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, We also
emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and
indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear
and indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from their father.
The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their mother without the
authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de Pua vs. San Agustin, 106
SCRA 7, 16).
In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did
not exceed its jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons
under disability.
The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional
consideration of P10,000.00 is a different matter. It was issued without a
hearing to determine not only the valuation of the property but the time frame
for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is, consequently, null and void.
It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to give the
additional amount, the second order directing the cancellation of the
petitioner's title may be said to have superseded or cancelled the first order.
The second order directed the issuance of a new title over the land inherited by
Leandro Homeres from his late father with each heir getting title to one-third of
the property. Considering, however, the petitioner's protestations of violations
of due process and the guardianship court's unusual procedures in dealing with
the properties under guardianship, the respondent court is directed to conduct
regular hearings and take evidence on the reasonable price of Lot No. 3085-G, if
its alienation is found to be in the best interests of the wards and consistent
with the rights of all parties involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in Special
Proceedings No. JP-0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte
is hereby ordered to conduct further hearings of the case as above indicated.
SO ORDERED,

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17066 December 28, 1961
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE
BENGSON, Incompetent. CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, guardian-appellant, ADMINISTRATION OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, oppositor-appellant.
Pedro O. Arciaga for petitioner-appellee.
C.E. Medina and R.B. de los Reyes for guardian-appellant.
Cesar Pablite for oppositor-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:
As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de
Bengson became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits which amounted
to P10,738 as of July 1, 1957, and to a monthly death compensation for the rest
of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Upon
inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans
Administration filed Special Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of
La Union, where in due course, an order was entered on August 8, 1957,
adjudging Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and appointing the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her estate comprising the monies
due from the said Veterans Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued
in favor of the Philippine National Bank.
On March 5, 1960, alleging that she had regained her competence, her ward, by
counsel, filed a petition asking for an order terminating the guardianship, and
for delivery to her of the residuary estate. Attached to this petition was a
medical certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and possessed full
knowledge of her environmental surroundings. This was opposed by the
Veterans Administration on the ground that by reason of her advanced age (78),
physical and mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. On March 30, 1960, the son of the ward,
Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the personal
guardian of the incompetent; that if appointed guardian of her estate as well, he
will comply with all the provisions of the Rules of Court, will not ask any
remuneration for his services, and will file a nominal bond. He prayed to be
appointed guardian of the ward's estate in place of the Philippine National Bank,
and for the balance of her estate to be withdrawn or transferred from the
Philippine National Bank's main office to its branch at San Fernando, La Union,
in his account as guardian. On the same date, the lower court ordered Francisco
Bengson to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate to substitute the
Philippine National Bank, upon filing a P1,000 bond with proper sureties; the
Philippine National Bank to transfer to its branch office at San Fernando, La
Union, whatever funds it has belonging to the ward, upon Francisco Bengson's
filing the required bond and taking his oath. As reasons for the removal of the
Philippine National Bank and the appointment of Bengson, the lower court
observed that the ward was living with Francisco Bengson in the latter's
capacity as personal guardian; that the appointment of Bengson in place of the
Philippine National Bank would save the compensation being paid that Bank;
and that the transfer to the Philippine National Bank branch at San Fernando, La
Union would be more convenient to all concerned for the proper administration
of the estate. The required bond was thereafter filed and letters of guardianship
issued to Francisco Bengson. A motion to reconsider was denied by the order of
May 11, 1960, which, however, raised of the amount of the bond to P13,000,
based on a finding that the cash balance of the estate then amounted to
P11,464.34 plus the monthly income estimated at P134, or P1,608 per annum.
Hence, this joint appeal by the Philippine National Bank and the Veterans
Administration..
We find this appeal meritorious. The grounds for which a guardian may be
removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules.
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging
his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate,
or failed for thirty days after it is due to render an account or make a
return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove
him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person
found to be lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied).
Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian
cannot be legally removed from office except for the causes therein mentioned
(Alemany vs. Moreno, 5 Phil. 172; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
II, 1957 Ed. p. 515). This is also the American law (39 C.J.S., p. 657). Accordingly,
conflict of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya, 74 Phil. 254; Gabriel vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil.
25) has been held sufficient ground for removal, premised on the logic that
antagonistic interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To the
extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person
is insuitable or incapable of discharging his trust, that much it can be said that
removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be exercised within the law,
and when the latter has laid down the grounds for removal of a guardian,
discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those
grounds.lawphil.net
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that
there was any legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National
Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's manifestation
nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that the Philippine
National Bank had become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable
therefor, or that it had committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds
for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all throughout, the
Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. The it has
received commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it,
especially since the Bank's commission averages no more than P100.00 a year
and is offset by interest on the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would
probably have to disburse in bond premiums. Neither is it sufficient to base
removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the
interests of the ward and more convenient for the administration of the estate.
A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent reasons (39 C.J.S.
65); otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.
As to the alleged inconvenience of the guardian of the incompetent's person
having to come to Manila to obtain money for the ward's sustenance, the same
can be obviated by merely requiring the appellant Bank to keep part of the
moneys in the San Fernando (La Union) branch, without altering the
guardianship.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from dated March 30, 1960 and May 11,
1960 are reversed, costs against the appellee Francisco Bengson.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47867 November 13, 1942
CARMEN GARCHITORENA and JOAQUIN PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE SOTELO, as judicial guardian of the Gatchalian y Jarata
minors, respondent.
Jose Ayala for petitioner Gabriel.
Monzon, Diaz and Sunico for petitioners Garchitorena and Perez.
Claro M. Recto for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
The property involved in this litigation is the house and lot situate at 97 Sta.
Potenciana Street, corner of Cabildo Street, Manila. Originally it belonged to
Asuncion Jarata, who mortgaged it to Perfecto Gabriel. The latter foreclosed the
mortgage and after buying the property at public auction transferred it to
Carmen Garchitorena, who in turn transferred it to Jesus Pellon in whose name
the Torrens certificate of title now stands.
This action was commenced on June 3, 1932, by Vicente Sotelo, as judicial
guardian of the eight minor children of Asuncion Jarata, against Perfecto Gabriel
and Carmen Garchitorena to annul the judgment obtained by Gabriel in the
foreclosure of his mortgage and the subsequent transfers of the mortgaged
property on the ground that said judgment had been obtained through fraud.
Jesus Pellon was joined as party defendant after the property was transferred to
him by Carmen Garchitorena subsequent to the commencement of the action.
On January 31, 1936, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering that the new title in the name of Jesus Pellon be canceled and replaced
with a new one in the name of the minors. From that decision Gabriel and
Garchitorena appealed, but Pellon did not. On August 22, 1940, the Court of
Appeals in banc, by a majority of nine justices (two justices dissenting), affirmed
the judgment of the trial court with modification as follows:
It is therefore our decision that the sales of the property described in
the complaint by the sheriff to Perfecto Gabriel, by Gabriel to Carmen
Garchitorena, and by Garchitorena to Jesus Pellon should be and they
are hereby annulled; that the title to this property now standing in the
name of Jesus Pellon should be cancelled and a new certificate issued in
the name of plaintiff's wards subject to the alleged mortgage in favor of
the Santa Clara Monastery; that the amount the plaintiff shall have paid
on account of this mortgage shall be deducted from the amounts due by
the minors to Perfecto Gabriel or the Santa Clara Monastery, or both, it
being understood that the mortgage debts, P8,500, shall bear interest at
the rate provided for in the contracts of mortgage from the dates of last
payments until full paid; and that Gabriel and Carmen Garchitorena
shall render an accounting of the income derived by them from the
house between the date the minors were ejected from it and the date it
was placed under receivership.
Whatever action Carmen Garchitorena may have against Perfecto
Gabriel growing out of the annullment of the sale by Gabriel to
Garchitorena is hereby left open for determination in a separate suit.
With the modification above indicated, the judgment is affirmed.
Perfecto Gabriel and Carmen Garchitorena shall pay to plaintiff the
costs of both instances.
From that decision Perfecto Gabriel and Carmen Garchitorena separately
appealed to this Court by certiorari.
The facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On July 1, 1992, Asuncion Jarata mortgaged the property in question to Perfecto
Gabriel to secure a loan of P6,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum. Less
than two years and a half later, she died, leaving eight minor children by her
husband Celerino Gatchalian. Two days before her death she execute a will,
prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, whereby she devised the said property to her
eight minor children and named Perfecto Gabriel as their guardian and her
husband Celerino Gatchalian as the executor of the will. On December 24, 1924,
Perfecto Gabriel, as attorney for Celerino Gatchalian, filed the will in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for probate. On September 15, 1925, after the will had
been admitted to probate, Gabriel presented a project of partition in which
Gatchalian waived his usufructuary right over his wife's estate in favor of his
children. The court thereupon entered an order declaring the estate closed and
relieving Gatchalian of all responsibility as executor. On September 23, 1925,
Gabriel, upon his own application, was appointed guardian of the persons and
property of the minor children of Gatchalian. In his application Gabriel
acknowledged having received the only property of his wards consisting of the
house and lot above mentioned. But he did not inform the court that said
property was mortgaged to him. For nearly six years during which said
mortgage subsisted, Gabriel acted as guardian and at the same time creditor of
said minors; it was only on March 23, 1931, the he relinquished the
guardianship in favor of Gatchalian, whom the court appointed guardian upon
Gabriel's petition.
In the meantime the finances of the wards had deteriorated considerably.
Gabriel's last accounts as guardian showed a deficit of P3,730.10 as found by
this Court in G. R. No. 42528. Aside from said deficit Gabriel as guardian had
executed a second mortgage on the property of his wards in favor of the Santa
Clara Monastery, of which he was the attorney in fact, to secure the payment of
an additional loan of P2,500, with interest at 10 per cent per annum. That
amount was paid to Fernandez Hermanos on account of a larger sum
misappropriated by Gatchalian.
After assuming the guardianship of the persons and property of his children,
Celerino Gatchalian desired to raise capital with which to engage in business
and told Gabriel that one Navarro was willing to give him a loan of P12,000 on
the house and lot in question. Gabriel suggested taking the house out of the
court's custody as the most feasible way to "make a transaction" on it. In order
to do that Gabriel would sue Gatchalian, bid for the property, and resell it to the
latter. That scheme was agreed to by Gatchalian, and in pursuance thereof
Gabriel, on October 13, 1931, instituted an action of foreclosure of mortgage
against Gatchalian as guardian of his minor children (civil case No. 40614 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila), alleging that the defendant had failed to pay
to him the principal of the mortgage debt and the interest from August to
October, 1931, amounting to P150. On the same date, October 13, 1931,
Gatchalian filed an answer to the complaint of Gabriel, admitting each and every
one of the allegations thereof. On the following day, October 14, 1931, Gabriel,
as attorney for the Santa Clara Monastery, filed a complaint in intervention with
a view to foreclosing its second mortgage of P2,500, alleging that the defendant
had failed to pay both the principal and the interest at the rate of P20.33 a
month, the total interest due being P208. Together with that complaint in
intervention, Gatchalian's answer was filed, a pleading prepared either by
Perfecto Gabriel himself or by one of his assistants, in which Gatchalian
admitted each and every one of the allegations thereof and prayed that
judgment be rendered accordingly. On October 16, 1931, judgment was
rendered sentencing Celerino Gatchalian to pay to Perfecto Gabriel P6,000, with
interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum from August 1, 1931, and the Santa
Clara Monastery P2,500, with interest at 10 per cent per annum from November
1, 1931, until fully paid, plus an additional amount of P208 as accumulated
interest from January 1 to October 31, 1931.
On February 13, 1932, pursuant to said judgment, the sheriff sold the
mortgaged property to Perfecto Gabriel as the highest bidder for the sum of
P9,600, in "complete satisfaction of the mortgage credit." On February 13, 1932,
pursuant to said judgment, the sheriff sold the mortgaged property to Perfecto
Gabriel as the highest bidder for the sum of P9,600, in "complete satisfaction of
the mortgage credit." On February 17, before the sale was approved by the
court, Gabriel agreed to sell the property to Carmen Garchitorena, who then and
there indorsed and delivered to Gabriel a check for P1,000 issued by Co Leco
and Company, on account of the purchase price. On the same date Gabriel wrote
to Gatchalian as follows:
MANILA, Feb. 1, 1932
Sr. CELERINO GATCHALIAN
CELERINO:
Te remito copia del recibo de P1,000 hecho por Da. Carmen, de modo
que se pretendes quedarte con la finca puedes acudir a un abogado
para que gestione lo conveniente a tus interes.
(Fdo.) PERFECTO GABRIEL
To quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals:
Gatchalian was taken aback and hurriedly went to see Gabriel but did
not find him in his house. He found only Ranoa, Gabriel's assistant, to
whom he related his troubles. Ranoa said he knew nothing about the
case beyond that the motion to confirm the sale was to be heard the
next day. Ranoa advised Gatchalian to file a motion for postponement of
Gabriel's motion to confirm the sale, and wrote a draft of such motion
for Gatchalian to sign. Gatchalian copied the draft at the Canal de
Panama grocery store, signed the clean hearing of the petition for the
confirmation of the sale was continued in accordance with Gatchalian's
motion. Then Gatchalian engaged Attorney Ernesto Zaragoza whose
intervention was cut short by Gatchalian's agreeing to the approval of
the sale. According to Gatchalian, the reason why he withdraw his
position was because Gabriel renewed his promise to resell the
property to him. He added that, relying on his promise, he looked for a
broker and found one Velilla who said he could get a loan of P11,000 on
the house. Gatchalian with Velilla and the prospective lender, a Chinese,
went to Gabriel's law office and Ranoa drew a document of sale in
Gatchalian's favor. But after that document was finished Ranoa
remarked that it would be improper for Gatchalian to appear as the
purchaser, he being the children's guardian in which observation
Gabriel concurred. The money lender upon this turn of affairs receded,
whereupon Velilla said that he would bring another `capitalist' within
twenty-four hours and suggested that the sale be made in favor of the
minor's maternal grandmother. The next day Velilla and Gatchalian
with another Chinese went to Gabriel's office but found Carmen
Garchitorena there already signing a mortgage deed. Gatchalian also
testified that Jose Machuca wanted to but the house for P18,000, of
which P12,000 was to be paid down and the rest in sixty days. Pedro
Cantero, Machuca's representative, declared that he was told by Gabriel
to come back after three or four days but that before that time expired
he was informed by Gatchalian that the house had been sold. Velilla and
Navarro gave evidence to corroborate Gatchalian's testimony in those
particulars in connection with which their names were mentioned.
On March 12, 1932, the sale was approved by the court. On March 16,
Perfecto Gabriel executed a deed conveying the property for the alleged
sum of P10,367 to Carmen Garchitorena. Simultaneously Carmen
Garchitorena executed a deed mortgaging the same property to the
Santa Clara Monastery to secure the payment of a loan of P9,000 with
interest at 8 per cent per annum, subject to the condition that the said
property shall not be sold nor encumbered without the previous
authority in writing of the mortgage creditor. It was at this stage that
Vicente Sotelo complained of Gabriel to the judge handling the
guardianship proceedings, and was appointed guardian of the minors
in substitution of Gatchalian so that this action might be commenced.
On October 11, 1932, more than four months after this action was
commenced, Antonio V. Rocha, Garchitorena's son-in-law, presented to
Jesus Pellon for his signature two deeds, one of which purported to be
an absolute deed of conveyance of the questioned property by Carmen
Garchitorena in favor of Jesus Pellon for P12,000, subject to the
mortgage in favor of the Santa Clara Monastery, and the other a deed of
sale by Pellon to the children of Carmen Garchitorena. Gabriel, as
attorney in fact of the Santa Clara Monastery, gave his conformity to the
conveyance to Pellon but withheld his consent to the sale by Pellon to
Carmen Garchitorena's children until one year later. New certificates of
title were successively issued to Gabriel, Garchitorena, and Pellon, but
the register of deeds refused to recognize the right of Garchitorena's
children to have a new certificate made in their name, and he was
sustained by the Court of First Instance on appeal.
The property in question was assessed for tax purposes at P14,829, and
according to the receivers' report filed on January 31, 1936, produced
an income of P254 a month in rents.
The Court of Appeals found the parties in disagreement regarding the
circumstances under which Gabriel foreclosed the mortgage and
Gatchalian confessed judgment and later gave his conformity to the sale
of the mortgaged property. But in this connection the court said: "The
question is one of credibility and the trial judge, weighing probabilities,
gave credence to Gatchalian and other plaintiff's witnesses. Our
independent opinion is that these witnesses told the truth. Their story
has the characteristic ring of verity and is the only hypothesis
compatible with the circumstances.
Upon the foregoing facts the Court of Appeals based its confirmatory judgment.
We cannot review and reverse those findings of fact. Consequently all the
assignments of error discussed by the petitioners in their respective briefs,
endeavoring to establish a different factual foundation, must be deemed
overruled. We can only review the conclusions of law arrived at by the Court of
Appeals, and shall proceed now to do so.
First. Were the facts proven sufficient to establish collusion between Gabriel
and Gatchalian in the foreclosure suit instituted by the former against the
latter? The Court of Appeals found as a fact that Gabriel and Gatchalian agreed
to take the property of the minors from the custody of the court by foreclosing
the mortgage on it so that Gabriel could buy the property at the sheriff's sale
and later resell it to Gatchalian. Pursuant to that agreement Gatchalian entered
a confession of judgment to the complaints files by Gabriel in his own behalf and
in that of his principal, the Santa Clara Monastery; and it was in virtue of that
confession of judgment that the court, unaware of the agreement behind it
between the former and the actual guardians, granted the prayers of the
complaints of the two mortgagees, Perfecto Gabriel and the Santa Clara
Monastery.
It is insisted by petitioner Gabriel that Gatchalian had no defense anyway
against the complaints of foreclosure of mortgage and that his confession of
judgment was not only proper but commendable in the interest of a prompt
administration of justice. But Gatchalian was not sued in his personal capacity;
he was sued as guardian of the property of his wards. And Gabriel, who sued
him was his predecessor as guardian and was the one who executed the Santa
Clara mortgage on behalf of the minors. It had been his duty to preserve the
estate of his wards. Moreover, he was formerly the employer and legal
counselor of Gatchalian. As the Court of Appeals said, "that relation has exerted
a predominating influence in Gatchalian's mind." In no relation, except perhaps
that of parent and child or husband and wife, are the elements of the confidence
on one side and active good faith on the other more essential than in the
relation of guardian and ward. The Government itself is in a sense the supreme
guardian whom the individual guardian represents in its solicitude for the
welfare of the wards. (25 Am. Jur., Guardian and Ward, sec. 205, p. 128.) If
Gabriel wanted to collect his mortgage and the minors had no defense against
its foreclosure, so that a court action and a sheriff's sale would only entail
unnecessary expense, honesty and fidelity to his trust required of the guardian
that he inform the court of the situation so that it could authorize the sale of the
property to best advantage and save something for the minors.
Under these circumstances, the agreement and the conduct of Gabriel and
Gatchalian in connection with the foreclosure proceeding cannot but be
considered a collusion between them to induce the court into entering
judgment in favor of Gabriel without any trial and without giving the minors
affected an opportunity to protect their interests.
Perfecto Gabriel's position in relation to the minors and the property in
question is indefensible. He held a mortgage on said property since July 1, 1992.
Yet when he prepared the will of the mortgagor devising said property to the
minors, he allowed himself to be name guardian of their persons and property
and, what is worse, he subsequently applied to the court for his appointment as
such guardian without informing the court that he held a mortgage on the only
property of said minors. As a lawyer of long experience, he knew or should have
known that he could not serve antagonistic interests, and that if the court had
been apprised that he was creditor and mortgagee of the estate of said minors,
it would not have appointed him guardian. He not only failed to disclose to the
court that he was mortgagee but deliberately misinformed the court in the
guardianship proceeding that the first mortgagee was not he but the Santa Clara
Monastery. Neither did he inform the court that he was the attorney-in-fact and
the administrator of the funds of that institution.
No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and love
the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other." The
truth of this Divine doctrine is exemplified in the guardianship of the
Gatchalian minors, wherein Perfecto Gabriel undertook to serve two
masters; Perfecto Gabriel or the Santa Clara Monastery as mortgagee
and the said minors as mortgagors. Of course, the latter were
"despised" and had to institute a series of litigations lasting now over
ten years to secure redress.
Second. Were the minors prejudiced by the foreclosure of the mortgage? It is
contended by the petitioners that they were not, because, after all, the mortgage
obligation was due and payable and the price at which the sheriff sold the
mortgaged property to Gabriel was not unreasonably low. In this connection the
petitioners vigorously assail the finding of fact made by the Court of Appeals
that Jose Machuca was anxious to buy the property for P18,000, while Navarro
and others were willing to give on it a loan more than sufficient to cover the
obligation in favor of Gabriel and the Santa Clara Monastery.
It is an undisputed fact, however, that Gabriel bought the property at P9,600
and immediately sold it to Garchitorena for P10,367, thereby enriching himself
at the expense of his former wards. Regardless of the Machuca offer to buy, or
the Navarro offer to loan on, the property in question, and assuming that the
sale by Gabriel to Garchitorena was genuine as contended by the petitioners,
and not a mere scheme to frustrate the minors' recovery of said property as
contended by the respondent, Gabriel's attempt to profit, however little, at the
expense of the minors cannot be sanctioned by the Court. It was a breach of
trust which the law condemns under any and all circumstances.
Third. The collusive conduct of the parties in the foreclosure suit constituted an
extrinsic or collateral fraud by reason of which the judgment rendered therein
may be annulled in this separate action. (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil.,
29.) Aside from the Anuran-Aquino case, innumerable authorities from other
jurisdictions may be cited in support of the annulment. But were there not any
precedent to guide us, reason and justice would compel us to lay down such
doctrine for the first time.
Petitioners rely upon the decisions of this Court in G. R. No. 40658, Perfecto
Gabriel vs. Vicente Sotelo and Hon. Pedro Ma. Sison, promulgated December 13,
1933, and G. R. No. 42528, Vicente Sotelo vs. Perfecto Gabriel, promulgated
March 31. 1938, as a bar against the present action.
The first of said cases (G. R. No. 40658) was an outcrop of the foreclosure suit
(civil case No. 40614 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) that arose
subsequent to the commencement of the present action, in the following
manner: On September 20, 1933, that is to say, more than a year after this
action was commenced, the herein respondent filed a motion in said civil case
No. 40614 praying that the order approving the sale of the mortgaged property
by the sheriff to Gabriel be reconsidered and set aside. Upon that motion Judge
Sison, on September 29, 1933, entered the following order:
Apareciedo por los affidavits de los seores Celerino Gatchalian y el
abogado Ernesto Zaragoza, y por las alegaciones de la demanda
enmendada unida a dicha mocion y marcada Exhibit A, que existe
motivo de accion contra los demandados en la cause civil No. 42092, y
siendo como son bienes de menores los que se discuten en ella, pr la
presente se recosidera el Auto de este Juzgado de fecha 12 de marzo de
1932 dejandolo sin valor ni efecto legal, como se pide por el nuevo
tutor Vicente Sotelo en su escrito de fecha 20 del actual. (Pages 157-
158, brief for petitioner Perfecto Gabriel.)
Gabriel moved to reconsider said order, and that motion was resolved by the
same judge as follows:
Constando en autos que el tutor Vicente Sotelo, de los menores
llamados Celerino Gatchalian y otros ha incoado una accion
reividicatoria de la finca No. 97 de la Calle Santa Potenciana de la
propriedad de los menores cuyo objeto es anular la venta de la misma,
NO HA LUGAR a proveer por ahora las mociones presentadas por la
representacion de Perfecto Gabriel, Carmen Garchitorena y su esposo
Joaquin Perez de fech 7 y 10 de octurbre, 1933, y se suspended toda la
tranmitacion de este asunto hasta que se falle en definitiva dicha accion
reivindicatoria. Asi se ordena. (Pages 158-159, id.)
Thereupon Gabriel by certiorari sought from this Court the annulment of said
orders, and this Court granted his petition on the ground that eighteen months
having elapsed after the approval of the sheriff's sale, the court lacked
jurisdiction to reopen the case.
The very fact that the order of Judge Sison had been entered without
jurisdiction, for which reason it was annulled, is sufficient to show that neither
said order nor the judgment of this Court annulling it can be invoked as a basis
for the plea of res judicata. As a matter of fact the last order of Judge Sison
merely held the matter in abeyance pending the final result of this action. The
holding of this Court that the foreclosure proceeding could not be reopened
after the lapse of the six months' period provided by section 113 of Act No. 190,
does not imply that said proceeding cannot be assailed and annulled in a
separate action on the ground of extrinsic fraud practiced upon the court. The
Anuran-Aquino case above cited was instituted after a similar attempt under
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure had failed in the administration
proceedings wherein the order assailed was entered; and this Court held that
since the application for relief under section 113 was denied for lack of
jurisdiction, such denial could not be relied upon to sustain the contention that
the question of the validity and legality of the original order was res adjudicata.
The second case (G. R. No. 42528) was an incident in the guardianship
proceeding that arose also subsequent to the commencement of this action in
the following manner: On October 4, 1933, that is to say, one year and four
months after the present action was commenced, the herein respondent
questioned the accounts presented by the petitioner Perfecto Gabriel as former
guardian, and the court sustained him and ordered the ex-guardian to
reimburse to the minors the sum of P7,013.02. From that order Gabriel
appealed to this Court, which found that the accounts of the guardian, instead of
showing a superavit of P7,013.02, showed a deficit of P3,730.12. In that
accounting incident, the present guardian claimed that the principal of the loan
of P6,000 had been partly paid and reduced to P3,000. To rebut that contention
Gabriel invoked the confession of judgment made by Gatchalian in the
foreclosure suit, but Sotelo alleged that that confession of judgment was made
pursuant to a collusion between Gabriel and Gatchalian. This Court said that
such collusion seemed to be untrue (parece inverosimil) and refused to consider
it for the purpose of indirectly attacking the validity of the judgment entered in
the foreclosure suit. Thus this court said: "La supuesta nulidad de dicha
sentencia no puede ser discutida ni siquiera considerada a menos que se haya
incoado una accion directamente encaminada a tal fin." It is clear, therefore, that
this Court did not and could not in said incident pass upon the nullity of the
judgment entered in the foreclosure proceeding. That being so, the validity of
said judgment is not res adjudicata. Indeed, how can the plea of res
adjudicataprosper in the absence of identity both of the subject matter and of
the cause of action?
Petitioners vehemently invoke reasons of public policy which favor the stability
of judicial decisions. Suffice it for us to say that such reasons are mute in the
presence of fraud, which the law abhors.
The annulment of the judgment entered in the foreclosure suit necessarily
carries with it the annulment of the sale made by the sheriff pursuant to said
judgment as well as the annulment of the order of the court approving that sale.
The limbs cannot survive after the trunk has perished.
Fourth. It only remains for us to determine whether or not the sale by Gabriel to
Gatchitorena was valid. The trial court found that sale fictitious, and the Court of
Appeals said that that conclusion was not without sufficient evidence to support
it. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals did not base its judgment upon the finding
that the sale was simulated. It held that even assuming that the sale was
genuine, Garchitorena was not a purchaser in good faith because "she was fully
aware of the history of the present case and of the house she bought"; that she
could not ignore Gatchalian's solicitude and eagerness to keep the said house
for his children; but that when Gatchalian and others met her in Gabriel's law
office on march 16, 1932, and Gatchalian told her that he was coming back to
talk to her about the matter, she told Gatchalian not to come because, she said,
she was leaving for Camarines that afternoon.
On the other hand, petitioner Garchitorena maintains that she is an innocent
purchaser for value and invokes the Torrens system on the theory that she has a
Torrens title to the property in question. It will be remembered, however, that
she agreed to buy the property from Perfecto Gabriel before the latter had
secured a Torrens title thereto in his name. In other words, she did not rely
upon Gabriel's Torrens title but merely upon the sheriff's certificate of sale,
which had not yet even been approved by the court at the time she agreed to
buy the property from Gabriel.
As a matter of act, Garchitorena has completely divested herself of the title to
the property in question, which now stands in the name of Jesus Pellon, who did
not appeal and thereby acquiesced in the judgment ordering the cancellation of
said title. Garchitorena's conduct in simulating the transfer of the property in
question to Jesus Pellon after the commencement of this action was inconsistent
with honesty and good faith.
After considering all the facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to disturb
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Garchitorena was not an innocent
purchaser. We note further that Garchitorena has not filed any cross-complaint
against her co-defendant Gabriel to recover what she claims to have paid to him
together with damages which she could properly have done. If such omission
was voluntary, it would tend to strengthen the theory that she had acted merely
as Gabriel's dummy. But let us give her the benefit of the doubt, as the Court of
Appeals apparently did my making the prudent reservation in the appealed
decision to the effect that whatever action Carmen Garchitorena may have
against Perfecto Gabriel to her is left open for determination in a separate suit.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So
ordered.