Geanacopulos v. Narconon: Plaintiffs Response To Motion To Dismiss

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Ryan A. Hamilton
NEVADA BAR NO. 11587
HAMILTON LAW
5125 S. Durango Dr., Ste. C
Las Vegas, NV 89113
(702) 818-1818
(702) 974-1139
ryan@hamiltonlawlasvegas.com

Attorney for the plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA

HARRY GEANACOPULOS, a Massachusetts
Citizen; LAUREN GEANACOPULOS, a
Massachusetts Citizen; and PETER
GEANACOPULOS, a Massachusetts Citizen,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

NARCONON FRESH START d/b/a RAINBOW
CANYON RETREAT; ASSOCIATION FOR
BETTER LIVING AND EDUCATION
INTERNATIONAL; NARCONON
INTERNATIONAL; and DOES 1-100, ROE
Corporations I X, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.:2:14-CV-00629-JCM-NJK

PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO ABLE AND NARCONON INTERNATIONALS
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FRCP RULE 12(b)(2) AND12(b)6

Plaintiffs, Harry Geanacopulos, Lauren Geanacopulos, and Peter Geanacopulos, by and
through their counsel of record, hereby answer Defendants Association for Better Living and
Education International and Narconon Internationals Motion under the authority of FRCP Rule
12(b)(2) [lack of personal jurisdiction] and 12(b)(6) [failure to state a claim] (hereinafter Motion
to Dismiss).
Case 2:14-cv-00629-JCM-NJK Document 17 Filed 07/24/14 Page 1 of 30

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This Response is based on factual evidence presently available to Plaintiffs, the Points and
Authorities which follow, the records, pleadings and files herein, together with any oral argument
the Court may entertain.
DATED this 24
th
day of July, 2014.
HAMILTON LAW

By:
RYAN A. HAMILTON, ESQ.
NV BAR NO. 11587
HAMILTON LAW
Las Vegas, NV 89113
(702) 818-1818
(702) 974-1139

Attorney for Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION
On at least seventeen distinct websites, Narconon International (hereafter NI) and
Association For Better Living and Education International (hereafter ABLE) (collectively
referred to as Defendants) have specifically directed advertisements for the Narconon treatment
program at Nevada residents. This number does not even include the ten websites Narconon Fresh
Start d/b/a Rainbow Canyon Retreat (hereafter Fresh Start) owns. But Defendants numerous
websites directed at Nevada are just the tip of the iceberg.
Defendants operations manuals for Fresh Start and other individual Narconon centers
reveal that Defendants control nearly every aspect of Fresh Starts business. In stark contrast to
the image of mere licensors Defendants seek to portray in their Motion to Dismiss, their own
documents show they control the day-to-day operations at Fresh Start. These documents

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demonstrate that Defendants have ultimate authority over all decisions related to Fresh Starts
hiring and firing, advertising, delivery of services, financial decisions, procedures, and general
operation.
Based on Defendants absolute control over Fresh Starts operations, their Internet
advertising campaign targeting Nevada, and their licensing of the Narconon program to Fresh
Start, they have purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in
Nevada. There is little question that Plaintiffs injuries stem directly from Defendants Nevada-
related activities. But for Defendants licensing the Narconon program for use at Fresh Start, Peter
Geanacopulos would not have gone there for treatment and sustained heart-related injuries. But for
NIs promotion of a false success rate and other false claims about the Narconon program,
Plaintiffs would not have been duped into paying for treatment services that Fresh Start was not
even capable of delivering.
Defendants operations manuals indicate such a high degree of control over and contact
with Fresh Start, Defendants could fairly be regarded as at home in Nevada.
Under any analysis, the Courts assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants is
proper. The Court should therefore deny Defendants Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
The Court should likewise deny Defendants Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state each of their claims. Plaintiffs may hold
Defendants liable on these claims as principals of Fresh Start or as Fresh Starts alter ego.
Plaintiffs also state claims for direct liability against Defendants.
II. DEFENDANTS CONTACTS WITH NEVADA
In addition to seven training manuals, NI publishes two detailed operations manuals for
individual Narconon centers such as Fresh Start. These operations manuals are titled Running An
Effective Narconon Center (hereafter the Running Manual) and Opening A Successful

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Narconon Center (hereafter the Opening Manual). Fresh Start has produced these manuals in a
related case also pending before this Court, Welch v. Narconon et al.,2:14-cv-0017-JCM-CWH.
These manuals indicate that NI and ABLE have authority over Fresh Starts hiring and firing,
advertising, delivery of services, financial decisions, procedures, and general operation. Relevant
portions of the Running Manual and the Opening Manual are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B,
respectively.
These manuals establish that NI and ABLE are intimately involved in the daily operations
of individual Narconon centers such as Fresh Start. The attached affidavit from a former Executive
Director of a Narconon center the highest position at such a center supports this conclusion.
Affidavit of Eric Tenorio, attached hereto as Exhibit C (Tenorio Affidavit). Mr. Tenorio worked
for Narconon over twelve years at five different facilities in various capacities. Tenorio Affidavit,
2.
A. Narconon International/ABLE have ultimate authority over Fresh Start
employees

The Running Manual indicates that a permanent staff member at Fresh Start cannot be
transferred, demoted, or dismissed without the approval of the Senior Director of Administration
at NI:
A permanent staff member staff member may not be demoted,
transferred or dismissed with a full justice proceeding known as a
Committee of Evidence. The Committee of Evidence must be
submitted to the Senior Director of Administration at Narconon
International and must be approved before a permanent staff
member is dismissed or demoted. (Running Manual, Exhibit A at
pg.118.)

NI likewise has ultimate authority over the hiring of staff at Fresh Start:

If there are current staff who do not meet any of the qualifications
but feel they are honestly contributing to the production of a
Narconon center, they may petition the Senior Director of
Administration Narconon International to remain on staff. The
petition is to have attached to it a production and ethics record,
attested as being correct by the local Director of Inspections and
Reports. (Id. at pg. 91.)

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Accordingly, the Director of Administration at NI has the final word over the hiring of any staff
member at Fresh Start facilities as well as other Narconon Centers. These excerpts from the NI
Manuals directly contradict the assertions made in Defendants Motion asserting they have no
oversight or control of the operations of Fresh Start.
B. Defendants serve Human Resources functions for Fresh Start
The Running Manual also indicates that NI conducts Human Resource functions for
individual Narconon centers such as Fresh Start. For example, if a staff member at a Narconon
center believes he or she has been given orders or directions or denied materials that make it hard
or impossible for the staff member to do his job, the staff member may file a Job Endangerment
Chit with Ethics at NI. (Id. at pg.177). On receiving the Job Endangerment Chit, NI will then
take action to resolve the staff members issue.
Further, the Running Manual imposes requirements to report misconduct and even
nonoptimum conduct to the Quality Control Supervisor at NI. The manual also requires that:
Fresh Start staff advise Narconon International of serious ethical
charges by submitting Knowledge Reports (Id. at pg. 169);

persons with knowledge of nonoptimum conduct by other group
members cannot be stopped from informing Narconon International
(Id.);

if anyone observes any out-ethics activities listed above, and they
are not being handled immediately by appropriate facility staff, they
are to report the matter to the Quality Control Supervisor Narconon
International (Id. at pg. 372).

NI then investigates matters contained in the reports and may take disciplinary action against staff
members at individual Narconon centers. (Tenorio Affidavit, Exhibit C at 6).
Defendants NI and ABLE have final say over the human resource decisions and
operational structure at the Fresh Start facility, allowing them to operate the facility as if they were
the immediate owners of record, in direct contradiction of Defendants Motion.

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C. Narconon International and ABLE Control Fresh Starts Advertising

The Running Manual also requires that Fresh Start must obtain approval as to its Internet
websites stating all internet websites need to be approved by Narconon International by the
trademark holders, Association for Better Living and Education International. (Id.at pg.239)
In addition, Fresh Start is required to send copies of all promotions to Narconon
International once it is produced. The Running Manual explains:
[Narconon International] will be able to help you promote your local
activities, help you maintain and improve the quality of your
promotion and help guarantee that the Narconon trademarks are
protected in your area and country. (Id.at pg.255).

According to the manual, NI not only checks promotional materials to ensure correct use
of the Narconon trademark, but also assists in promoting a Narconon center, and assists in
developing the content of promotional materials. (Id. at pg.230)
Further, the NI Director of Technology & Approval demands and ensures that there are
good photos of L. Ron Hubbard visible in every center and that materials are available to brief
students and staff on his work and contributions in the field of alcohol and drug rehabilitation
(Running Manual, Exhibit A at pg.558).
D. Narconon and ABLE monitor and control Fresh Starts finances and accounting
As stated in Clark Carrs Amended Affidavit, NI receives ten percent of Fresh Starts gross
income. The Running Manual indicates that individual centers also are required to maintain a
building fund account controlled by NI. The purpose of the building fund account is to set
aside weekly monies from the gross income which are used to purchase new premises, and also
as a cushion to salvage the organization in dire circumstances. (Running Manual, Exhibit A at pg.
333). The Running Manual further requires the precise manner in which Fresh Start is to conduct
its accounting.


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E. Defendants counter negative publicity for Fresh Start
As indicated in the Opening Manual, NI works with individual centers to combat negative
publicity, what NI refers to as Black PR. An example of this is seen in e-mail correspondence
from the Director of Legal Affairs for NI, Claudia Arcabascio, in which she advised the Narconon
Freedom Center in Albion, Michigan, on how to respond to a Better Business Bureau complaint.
(See Claudia Arcabascio Email, Exhibit D). Of relevance to the merits of the instant lawsuit, Ms.
Arcabascio advised the Center do not say we have 70% success (we do not have scientific
evidence of it). (Id).
F. Control over Fresh Starts delivery of services
Each Narconon center is required send detailed reports to NI every week. (Tenorio
Affidavit, at 11). These reports provide the centers statistics for the week which include the
number of students who started the program during the week, the amount of money received and
paid out, and 40 or so other statistics which are graphed. (Id.) The purpose of this is so that
Narconon International and ABLE can monitor the trends of the organizations statistics and then
order changes in the areas that are not doing well . (Id.)
Defendants micro-managing of facilities like Fresh Start extends all the way to the manner
in which the individual facilities run their bookstores. NI regularly publishes lists of the exact
materials authorized to be sold in facility book stores (Running Manual, Exhibit A at pg. 257).
G. Defendants Internet advertising directed at Nevada
Defendants activities related to Internet advertising directed at Nevada are far more
extensive than they let on in their Motion. There are at least seventeen websites advertising for
persons to attend the Narconon program in Nevada. This does not even include the ten websites
that Fresh Start has said it owns in response to Plaintiffs discovery requests in a related case. In
response to Plaintiffs interrogatories in another case pending before this Court, Defendant Fresh

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Start has said that it owns ten websites devoted to advertising the Fresh Start facility in Nevada.
See Exhibit E, Defendant Fresh Starts Interrogatory No. 6. These websites are:
WEBSITE
COPYRIGHT
OWNER
USE WITH
ABLES
PEMISSIO
N? YES
OR NO
TOLL
FREE
NUMBER
INCLUDE
D? YES
OR NO
1
www.drugrehab.tv Narconon of Nevada YES YES

2
http://www.narconon-
news.org/narconon/nevada-drug-rehab-
activities.html

Narconon

YES

YES
3
http://www.drugrehab.net/directory/nevada/ Narconon YES YES

4

http://www.rainbowcanyonretreat.org/
Narconon Southern
California dba Rainbow
Canyon Retreat

YES

YES

5
http://www.drugabusesolution.com/nevada-
drug-abuse-rehab
Narconon New Life
Retreat, Inc.
YES YES

6
http://pastthetippingpoint.net/tag/drug-rehab-
nevada/
Not Listed Not Listed NO

7
http://www.freedomdrugrehab.com/drug-
rehab/nevada-drug-rehab/
Not Listed Not Listed YES

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http://treatmentsolutionsonline.com/find-a-
drug-and-alcohol-treatment/narconon-fresh-
start-rehabilitation-programs-rainbow-
canyon-retreat/

Treatment Solutions Online

Not Listed

YES

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http://www.usdrugrehabcenters.com/drug-
rehab-centers/nevada-drug-rehab-
centers/rainbow-canyon-113917/

Not Listed

Not Listed

YES

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http://www.drug-detox-
rehab.org/states/archives/2006/nevada-
drug-rehab-
centers.org/states/archives/2006/nevada_dr
ug_detox_rehab_ info~Pioche.html

Narconon Drug Prevention
& Education, Inc.

YES

YES

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http://narconon-socal.org/rainbow-canyon-
retreat-addiction-recovery-in-nevada/
Narconon Socal. No YES

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http://narconon.wordpress.com/tag/drug-rehab/ Narconon International YES NO

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http://narcononlocations.com/locations/west-us/ Narconon Locations YES NO

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http://www.inhalant-
abuse.org/state_rehabs/nevada.htm
Narconon Louisiana New
Life Retreat, Inc.
YES YES

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http://www.about-drugs.org/catalog/Western-
United-States-Drug-Rehabilitation-Centers-sp-
32.html

Narconon International

YES

YES

16
http://narconon-
fresh.blogspot.com/2013/05/narconon-
locations.html

Not Listed

Not Listed

NO

17
http://www.narconon.org/drug-
rehab/nevada/las-vegas.html
Narconon International YES YES

Screen shots of these websites are attached hereto as Exhibit F. These sites clearly indicate
that they use the NI logo and trademark with ABLEs permission. The copyright holders of these
sites are a variety of different Narconon corporations. The sites
http://www.drugrehab.net/directory/nevada/ and http://www.narconon-news.org/narconon/nevada-
drug-rehab-activities.html simply indicate that Narconon is the copyright holder.
For example, the site www.drugrehab.tv. This site advertises Narconon of Nevada and
urges visitors to call an 800 number or enter their contact information and a brief description of
their situation into a prompt on the site. The site contains a photo of and a message from the
International spokesperson for NI, the actress Kirstie Alley. The bottom of the site indicates that
the Narconon logo and trademarks are owned by ABLE and used with its permission.
Likewise, the site http://www.drugrehab.net/directory/nevada/ is another example of
Defendants purposefully targeting Nevada with an interactive site for the Narconon Program. The

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site says Narconon across the top and displays the Narconon Jumping Man logo. The site
purports to provide information about Drug Rehab[s] in Nevada How to Get Help. Although
the site purports to provide information about a number of different rehabs, no matter what link a
visitor clicks on the site, the Narconon banner and information about the Narconon program
remain on the top of the screen. This site also directs visitors to call an 800 number to speak
with a Registered Addiction Specialist. The bottom of the site indicates that Narconon holds the
copyright for the site and that the Narconon trademarks on the site were used with ABLEs
permission.
Similarly, the site www.drugabusesolution.com/nevada-drug-abuse-rehab advertises
Nevadas Narconon Drug Abuse Rehabilitation. This site tells visitors that [i]ndividuals from
all over the state of Nevada enroll in our drug and substance abuse rehab specifically because of
our track record. The site is peppered with the word Nevada throughout, presumably so that
will come up when persons search for drug rehabilitation facilities in Nevada. Like the other sites,
this site directs visitors to call an 800 number or to enter their contact information so the visitor
can receive a call from a Rehab Specialist.
This is in stark contrast to Defendants claim that it does not advertise specifically in
Nevada and that Fresh Start merely is listed on its website as one of the many Narconon centers in
the world.
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over
Defendants. Pfister v. Selling Source, LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (D. Nev. 2013)
Where a motion to dismiss is based on written materials instead of an evidentiary hearing, a
plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction to survive the motion. Id.

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Nevada's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the extent
allowed by federal due process. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019
(9th Cir.2002) (citing Nev.Rev.Stat. 14.065 (2001)). As a result, the analysis before the Court
collapses into one: whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. Id.
Based on the above evidence, Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that jurisdiction is
proper.
B. Specific jurisdiction over Defendants is proper
The Ninth Circuit has established a three-prong test for analyzing an assertion of specific
personal jurisdiction: (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to
the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair
play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor
Co., 374 F.3d 797, at 802 (9th Cir.2004).
The central question in this case is going to be whether the nature and quality of
Defendants' contacts with the forum are sufficient to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction.
See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.1977). The
plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy
either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state. Schwarzenegger
374 F.3d 797(internal citations omitted). The purposeful availment prong of the minimum
contacts test requires a qualitative evaluation of the defendant's contact with the forum state, in
order to determine whether [the defendant's] conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there. See Harris
Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.2003)

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(internal quotations omitted). The Defendants should have reasonably anticipated being haled into
a Nevada court based on the control exerted through their Manuals, the active nature of their
websites, and the data gathered through their global network of facilities.
1. Defendants have purposefully directed their activities at Nevada
The conduct engaged in by NI in Nevada is sufficient to satisfy specific jurisdiction. NI
advertised in the state of Nevada, entered into a long-term arrangement with a licensed subsidiary
facility using its name, trademark, and materials with the expectation that the customers would
come from Nevada, sent representatives to Nevada to supervise whether the licensed rehabilitation
center was appropriately set up and using its materials, and had the expectations that its materials
would be used by customers in Nevada. NI had and continues to have ultimate control of hiring
and firing at their facilities and even controlled the bookstore at the Fresh Start Facility.
There is generally no jurisdiction if a corporations only activity is to post a passive home
page on a website that is read by a consumer in another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that advertising via the Internet is
solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature to . . . confer[] long-arm jurisdiction). But operating
even a passive website in conjunction with something more conduct directly targeting the
forum is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. (Id.). Here, Defendants conduct provides
that something more to confer personal jurisdiction several times over.
First, Defendants own website, www.narconon.org, is not merely a passive website that
merely lists the Fresh Start facility in Caliente, Nevada. Defendants actively solicit consumers in
Reno and Las Vegas to come to Fresh Start in Caliente for treatment. (See G, Screen Captures of
Defendants website at http://www.narconon.org/drug-rehab/nevada/reno.html and
http://www.narconon.org/drug-rehab/nevada/las-vegas.html.) For example, Defendants website
expressly advertises that it is a Drug Rehab for Reno, Nevada and tells visitors on the site that

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Fresh Start is only 429 miles from Reno This level of interaction clearly shows that
Defendants are not operating a passive website despite assertions made by them in Defendants
Motion.
Secondly, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997), provides useful and well-respected information about when a website can confer personal
jurisdiction on a company in the state in which the consumer receives the information. Zippo
involved a company based in California that had an interactive website. It entered into contracts
with providers to give services to Pennsylvania residents. The Zippo court found that the
California company made a conscious choice to conduct business in Pennsylvania, and was
subject to jurisdiction there. The court offered the following instructive analysis:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly
does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts
with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal
jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a
defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site
which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web
site that does little more than make information available to those
who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal
jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites
where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In
these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site.

(Id. at 1126.)

In this case, there was not just a passive home website; there was solicitation plus much
more. There was an express marketing campaign that included Nevada as one of NIs one
hundred drug rehabilitation centers. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Inter link, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019
21 (9th Cir. 2002). NIs main website is interactive, with a routing of customers from the main NI
website into geographically specific locations, including Nevada and includes repeated solicitation
of business through the individual website targeted toward Nevada consumers.

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The main Narconon website claims that it has 100 drug rehab centers and drug
prevention/education centers around the world, and we have helped millions of people. (See
http://www.narconon.org/.) This is the sort of solicitation of business that provides a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. W. Cmty. Ins. Co., 2:13-CV-1268-GMN-CWH,
2014 WL 1302100 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2014) (holding that even though an insurance company did
not have any owner or agents in Nevada, a defendant insurance company purposely availed itself
of the benefits of conducting business in Nevada through its policy's nationwide territorial
coverage clause).
NI admits that representatives of the national company visited the subsidiary in 2010
(allegedly for purposes of inspection to see if there was compliance with the license agreement).
There are continuous and systematic contacts between NI and its local facilities. It prescribes
the drug and alcohol program and dictates the reading material, which it claims results in the
successes. The success rates claimed by the local facilities are national success rates. NI regularly
promotes its subsidiary centers and claims their successes as its own. All of these connections can
create jurisdiction. See Weintraub v. Walt Disney World Co., 825 F. Supp. 717, 720-21 (E.D. Pa.
1993).
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, Defendants website alone provides purposeful availment.
But Defendants go much further. ABLE granted permission for the Narconon logo and
trademarks to be used on at least ten websites that advertise for the Narconon program in Nevada.
Narconon International appears to be the copyright owner of three websites that solicit business
for Narconon in Nevada. All in all, this evidence shows Defendants participation in a broad
marketing campaign for Narconon directed at Nevada with all Defendants benefiting from the
patients attending the Fresh Start Facility.
///
///

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a. The contacts of Fresh Start may be imputed to Defendants
under an alter ego theory since Defendants exercise so much
control over Fresh Start

For purposes of determining jurisdiction, if the parent and subsidiary are not really
separate entities, or one acts as an agent of the other, the local subsidiarys contacts with the forum
may be imputed to the foreign parent corporation. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926
(9th Cir. 2001). An alter ego or agency relationship is typified by parental control of the
subsidiary's internal affairs or daily operations. Id. Plaintiffs have provided ample evidence from
Defendants own documents that Defendants control nearly every detail of Fresh Starts
operations.
To show that a parent and subsidiary are alter egos, a plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing (1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities [of
the two entities] no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate identities] would
result in fraud or injustice. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir.2001). The
Unocal Court indicated that the first prong of this test may be alternately stated as requiring a
showing that the parent controls the subsidiary to such a degree as to render the latter the mere
instrumentality of the former. Id. at pg. 926. The foregoing evidence amply demonstrates that
Defendants control Fresh Start to such a high degree as to render it a mere instrumentality of
Defendants. Fresh Start cannot even transfer or demote staff members without approval from
Defendants.
With regard to the second prong of the alter ego test, failing to disregard the separate
corporate identities of Defendants and Fresh Start would result in severe fraud and injustice.
Defendants are the source of the false representations that were made to Plaintiffs in this case and
in a number of others. These include the false representations about the Narconon programs 76%
success rate, the false representations that Narconons sauna program has been scientifically

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shown to reduce or eliminate an addicts drug cravings, and the false representation that the
Narconon program is secular when, in fact, the entire Narconon program consists of Scientology
teachings and rituals.
Defendants use the Narconon program to introduce people to Scientology as part of
Scientologys plan to clear the planet. (To go clear is the ultimate spiritual goal for a
Scientologist, achieved after one goes up the Bridge to Total Freedom.) The document attached
hereto as Exhibit H, shows a Church of Scientology, or an Org as its known, with an arrow
directed at the Narconon Jumping Man logo. The document reads:
The question is not how to clear an individual, its how to clear a
civilization by making every one of our orgs a central
organization responsible for every sector of Scientology activities
across its [sic] entire geographic zone.

In other words, the Church of Scientology is supposed to direct Narconon to achieve Scientologys
spiritual goal of clearing the planet.
Returning the second prong of the alter ego doctrine, Defendants continue to direct
individual centers to make false claims about the Narconon program long after even their own
expert witnesses admit under oath the claims are untrue. For Defendants, representations about
Narconons sauna program being able to eliminate drug cravings are matters of faithbecause L.
Ron Hubbard developed this theory. More importantly, they are part of Defendants spiritual
mission. To that end, Defendants use the individual Narconon centers as shield from liability so
they can continue working to clear the planet. Allowing Defendants to hide behind Fresh Start
and not be held accountable for the fraud they originate works an injustice. The Ninth Circuit has
indicated that in such a situation , the second prong of alter ego is satisfied and piercing the veil is
appropriate. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 926 (where a parent uses subsidiary as market conduit and
attempts to shield self from liability, piercing the veil is appropriate).


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b. The contacts of Fresh Start may be imputed to Defendants
under an agency theory

The agency test is satisfied, where a subsidiary functions as the parent corporations
representative in that it performs services that are sufficiently important to the foreign
corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation's own officials
would undertake to perform substantially similar services. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915,
928 (9th Cir. 2001). By Defendants account, they do not provide rehabilitation services. Because
Fresh Start staff performs this service and without which there would be no Narconon patients to
sell the program, the agency test is satisfied here. This provides an alternate basis for the Court to
impute Fresh Starts contacts to Defendants.

2. Plaintiffs claims arise out Defendants contacts with Nevada

The second requirement for specific jurisdiction is that the plaintiffs claims arise out of
the defendants forum-related activities. See Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1322 (9th Cir. 1998). District Courts apply a but-for test to determine whether the second
requirement is satisfied. Id. That is, if the plaintiffs claims would not have arisen but for the
defendants activities directed at the forum, the second requirement is satisfied.
Plaintiffs easily satisfy this requirement. Plaintiffs claims arise directly out of the drug
rehabilitation program that ABLE based on the teachings of Scientology and then repackaged and
licensed to NI who then delivered to Nevada. NI granted Fresh Start a perpetual license to use its
materials and prescribed treatment methods. Plaintiff Peter Geanacopolus sustained heart-related
injuries while participating in the Narconon sauna program at Fresh Start. By Defendants own
account, they licensed the Narconon program to the Fresh Start facility in Nevada. But for
Defendants licensing the Narconon Program to Fresh Start and expressly controlling the
application of the Narconon Program at that facility, Peter would not have sustained injuries there.

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The Ninth Circuit approved of similar reasoning to satisfy the second requirement for
specific jurisdiction in Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). There, a class of
victims brought suit in California against an Austrian bank, Royal, for its alleged participation in a
Ponzi scheme. To satisfy the but for test under the second requirement, the class representative
plaintiff argued that if Royal had not done business in the United States, she would not have a
claim against it. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the second requirement was satisfied and
characterized the plaintiffs logic as sound. Id.

Further, ABLE granted permission for the Narconon trademarks and logo to be used on the
website to which Dan Carmichael referred Plaintiffs, www.rainbowcanyonretreat.org. The false
representations Carmichael made to Plaintiffs were also on this website. Plaintiffs fraud-based
claims arise, in part, from false statements made on this website. As mentioned, this website is one
of the many websites Defendants have used to target Nevada in their marketing of the Narconon
program.
Moreover, the false representations that Carmichael and the
www.rainbowcanyonretreat.org website made to Plaintiffs emanate from Defendants. For
example, the false success rates that Fresh Start and other Narconon centers tout to prospective
clients comes from NI. Individual Narconon centers do not conduct research on the success of the
program for Narconon students. (Tenorio Affidavit, Exhibit 1 at 10). And, consistent with the
evidence presented that NI controls Fresh Starts advertising, individual Narconon centers must
advertise that the sauna program can eliminate an addicts drug cravings by flushing out residual
toxins stored in the addicts fatty tissue. Id.
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs have satisfied the second requirement for specific
jurisdiction.


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3. The Courts exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants is reasonable
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants did not raise any argument that the Courts exercise
of personal jurisdiction over them would be unreasonable. In any case, such an argument would
fail. Defendants cannot carry the burden of presenting a compelling case against jurisdiction in
neighboring Nevada. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1995)
C. General jurisdiction over Defendants is proper
General jurisdiction exists where the business contacts with the forum state are so
substantial, continuous, and systematic that they approximate physical presence. See Bancroft&
Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Natl Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). General jurisdiction has
to be established through a physical manifestation of the business in a forum state. Simply
conducting commerce in a forum state does not approximate a physical presence on the soil of that
state. Id. at 1086. Plaintiffs currently, without even conducting discovery are able to show that
Defendants ABLE and NI have physically manifested operations on Nevada soil, by controlling
the curriculum, advertising, finances and human resource decisions of their Nevada alter ego Fresh
Start.
Plaintiff's case is distinguishable from the case law cited in Defendants Motion. The
Supreme Court recently clarified that the reach of general jurisdiction is narrower than had been
supposed in the lower courts for many years. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, at 755
(2014)(citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2836, 2851 (2011))
(noting that general jurisdiction lies not simply where a defendant has continuous and systematic
contacts with the forum state, but where those contacts are so pervasive as to render the defendant
essentially at home in the forum State). In Daimler, the facts are in stark contrasted to those of
the current case because the Daimler Plaintiffs named only one Defendant in the Complaint even
though the injuries occurred in a foreign country and that Defendant was a foreign Corporation not
residing in that country. Daimler was a clear example of forum shopping by the Plaintiffs because

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there was no actual nexus between the injuries, the defendants, and the jurisdiction in which it was
filed.
Moreover, Defendants have everything in Nevada that Defendants indicate in their Motion
confers general jurisdiction. MTD at 12. The operations manuals indicate Defendants are the
actual employers of Fresh Start staff, Defendants solicit business in Nevada, Defendants control
Fresh Starts building fund, and Fresh Start is Defendants general agent. Accordingly, the
Court may exercise general jurisdiction over Defendants.

D. At a minimum, jurisdictional discovery is warranted
If the above arguments are not sufficiently convincing, this Court should deny the motion
to dismiss and grant the Plaintiffs ninety days leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. When
there are factual issues relating to jurisdiction that are not reasonably available to the plaintiff,
limited discovery relevant to facts supporting the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate.
Jurisdictional discovery may be appropriately granted where pertinent facts bearing on the
question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is
necessary. See Minelab Americas, Inc. v. UKR Trade, Inc., 2:12-CV-00827-GMN, 2013 WL
1314991 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2013) (quoting Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.
2008)). Plaintiffs would use this limited discovery period to investigate specific instances of
Defendants control over Fresh Start as indicated by the Running Manual. Plaintiffs would also
seek to depose persons at ABLE and NI as to Defendants relationship with Fresh Start.
IV. DEFENDANTS 12(b)(6) MOTION
It is worth noting at the outset that almost all of Defendants arguments for dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) fail because they do not take into account that Plaintiffs have alleged
Defendants are alter egos of Fresh Start. Plaintiffs also allege Defendants are the principals of

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Fresh Start. Defendants operations manuals, discussed in detail above, show that Plaintiffs
allegations are well-grounded as Defendants control nearly every aspect of Fresh Start.
As set forth in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Fresh Start is a mere instrumentality
of Defendants. ABLEs influence on Fresh Start and NI extinguishes the separation between these
entities, as both exist simply as vehicles for ABLEs operations (ECF 4 6-8). Because of the
blurred distinction between these companies, Plaintiffs alleged that they are acting as alter-egos of
one another in an attempt to evade liability for their collective action. (Id. 53 - 57) As such, the
acts of one of the Defendants may be imputed to the others. Where the alter ego doctrine
applies, multiple corporations are treated as one for purposes of determining liability. M/V Am.
Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1490 (9th Cir. 1983).
Nevada looks to three elements to pierce the corporate veil and find that companies are
alter-egos of one another or their owners. To state a claim for alter ego, a plaintiff must allege 1)
the corporation is influenced and governed by the person asserted to be its alter ego; 2) there is
unity of interest and ownership such that one is inseparable from the other; and 3) the facts are
such that treating the companies as separate entities would, under the circumstances, promote
fraud or injustice. Truck Ins. Exchange v. Palmer J. Swanson, Inc., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 59, 189
P.3d 656, 660 (2008), quoting Ecklund v. Nevada Wholesale Lumber Co., 93 Nev. 196, 197, 562
P.2d 479, 479-480 (1977); Brown v. Kinross Gold USA, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240-1241.
The essence of the alter-ego doctrine is to do justice whenever it appears that the protections of
the corporate form will be abused. LFC Marketing Group v. Loomis, 116 Nev. 896, 903, 8 P.3d
841, 845-46 (2000). Alter-ego analysis is specialized and highly contextual; the circumstances and
facts of each case control its outcome, making it difficult to dispose of at the pleading stage. Id. at
847.

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Plaintiffs Complaint alleges all of these elements. In addition to outlining the means by
which ABLE controls Fresh Start and NI, the Complaint alleges that the three Defendants are
inseparable from one another in their conduct (ECF 4 2 9). ABLE completely controls
Narconon and NI. (Id. 4 9 ) All three companies have a unity of ownership, which Plaintiffs
allege is used for nefarious ends. Specifically, the three Defendants work together to offer sham
drug rehabilitation services, and defraud their customers by offering religious indoctrination in the
place of the promised treatment. (Id. at 24-52) If the corporate entities of these companies are not
disregarded, some or all of them may evade liability for their collective misconduct. (Id. 54
58) Thus, Plaintiffs complaint alleges the three elements necessary to allege an alter-ego theory of
liability.
A. Plaintiffs state a claim against Defendants for breach of contract under an alter ego
theory.
A plaintiff in a breach of contract action must show (1) the existence of a valid contract,
(2) a breach by the defendant, and (3) damage as a result of the breach. See Brown v. Kinross
Gold U.S.A., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (D. Nev. 2008). Defendants seek dismissal of tthis
claim on the ground that they were not parties the contract. The court in Brown concluded that
under Nevada law a party who was not a signatory to a contract could be held liable for its breach
under an alter ego theory. As made abundantly clear by Defendants operations manuals, and as
Plaintiffs alleged in the First Amended Complaint, Fresh Start is the alter ego of Defendants. As
such, Defendants request for dismissal of this claim should be denied.
B. Plaintiffs state claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiffs state claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress against Defendants under alter ego and agency theories.
1. Fraud

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Defendants seek dismissal of the fraud claim as to them because, in their view, Plaintiffs
"do not identify the role of Narconon International and ABLE" in the fraud. MTD at 20.
Defendants are incorrect. Plaintiffs expressly allege in their First Amended Complaint that Fresh
Start is Defendants' agent. FAC, 4 5, 8 9. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants control the time,
manner, and method of Fresh Start's business by "actively managing [Fresh Start's] daily
operations, including conducting inspections of Narconon centers and creating, licensing, and
approving their marketing materials." Id. at 8. Plaintiffs allege that ABLE "governs and controls
nearly every aspect" of Fresh Start's business activities. Id. at 55. (Defendants' operations
manuals show that Plaintiffs allegations were well-grounded.)
Under Nevada law, a principal may be liable for its agent's fraudulent or illegal acts if the
principal ratifies the acts or expressly authorizes the acts. See Cardinal v. C. H. Masland & Sons,
495 P.2d 364 (Nev. 1972)(affirming summary judgment against plaintiff who waited 21 months to
file suit after learning of business partner's forgery on ground plaintiff ratified partner's forgery).
The decision in Baroi v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 2:09-CV-00671-PMP, 2012 WL 2847926
(D. Nev. July 11, 2012), is instructive on this point. There, plaintiffs brought suit for fraud and
other claims against a condo development company and its parent corporation. The parent
corporation moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nevada law would not allow a parent
corporation to ratify its subsidiary fraudulent actions. Id. at *9 10. The Baroi Court rejected this
argument, noting that the Nevada Supreme held had expressly held in Cardinal that a principal
may ratify its agents illegal acts. Id. at *10. Consequently, the court denied summary judgment.
Id. As further support for its conclusion, the Court observed that Nevadas punitive damages
statutes, Nev.Rev.Stat. 42.007(1)(b), 42.005(1), provide for exemplary or punitive damages for
the fraudulent acts of employees if the employer "expressly authorized or ratified the wrongful act
of the employee for which the damages are awarded.

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The Ninth Circuit explained in Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9
th
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2009), that to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), allegations of
fraud simply need to be "specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct so
that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong."
After reading Plaintiffs fraud claim, Defendants are left with no question as to the particular
misconduct alleged.
Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs' failed to describe the circumstances constituting
the fraud and misrepresentation at issue in the First Amended Complaint with sufficient
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not satisfied Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standards with
respect to them and, therefore, the claim should be dismissed. Defendants argument fails. Rule
9(b)'s heightened pleading requirement does not apply to pleading matters of agency. By its
express terms, Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirement applies only to the "circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake." Plaintiffs state a fraud claim against Defendants based on their
agency relationship with Fresh Start.
Next, Carmichael was acting within the scope of his employment when he made the false
representations to Plaintiffs about the Fresh Start program. Defendants' Running Manual clearly
states that NI has ultimate authority over the hiring and firing of Fresh Start staff. Consequently,
NI is liable is to Plaintiffs for fraud under respondeat superior. Finally, Plaintiffs state a fraud
claim against Defendants under an alter ego theory of liability. "Where the alter ego doctrine
applies, ... the two corporations are treated as one for purposes of determining liability." See M/V
Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1490 (9th Cir.1983). For these
reasons, Defendants argument fails.
2. Negligent misrepresentation
The only argument Defendants make in support of dismissal of Plaintiffs negligent
misrepresentation claim is that Fresh Start is a separate company from Defendants. As discussed

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above, Plaintiffs allege with good reason that Fresh Start is merely an instrumentality of
Defendants. And, as the Nevada Supreme Court made clear in LFC Marketing Group v. Loomis,
903, 8 P.3d 841, 847 (Nev. 2000), analysis of whether a company is an alter ego of another is a
fact-intensive inquiry, and ordinarily is not decided is at the pleading stage.
At this stage, because Plaintiffs have alleged that Fresh Start is an alter ego of Defendants
and those allegations are taken as true, Defendants argument for dismissal fails.
3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Defendants argument for dismissal of this claim is yet another variation of Defendants
claim that Fresh Start is a separate company. Once again, such a fact-dependent argument about
alter ego cannot carry the day at the pleading stage. And, as noted above, Nevada law expressly
provides for liability of corporations where they authorize or ratify an employees wrongful acts.
C. Plaintiffs unquestionably have standing to bring their RICO claim based on the
money they paid Defendants.

Defendants urge dismissal of Plaintiffs RICO claim because, in their view, Plaintiffs have
not alleged that they were injured in [their] business or property. Defendants assert that
Plaintiffs allege only personal injury claims. Defendants are incorrect. Plaintiffs allege in their
First Amended Complaint that they lost $30,000.00 the money they paid to Defendants for
treatment at Fresh Start as a result of Defendants RICO violations. As Defendants point out,
Plaintiffs are required to show a concrete financial loss. Plaintiffs have made that required
showing at the pleading stage and Defendants argument fails.
D. Although plaintiffs did not bring a deceptive trade practices claim they allege
sufficient facts to state a claim.
Defendants have moved to dismiss a claim for deceptive trade practices although Plaintiffs
did not expressly make that claim in their First Amended Complaint. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs do
allege facts that a state claim against Defendants for violations of Nevadas Deceptive Trade

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Practices Act (NDTPA), N.R.S. 41.600. Nevadas legislature enacted NRS 41.600 to empower
victims of consumer fraud to bring claims against individuals and entities who engage in
fraudulent business practices under NRS 598.0915-25, inclusive. NRS 41.600(e). NRS 41.600
provides a private right of action under certain sections of that chapter, and provides an award of
reasonable attorneys fees and costs to a successful claimant. NRS 41.600(2)(e), (3). Because
claims under NRS 598.0915-25 sound in fraud, they must be pled to meet the standards of Rule
9(b). Montes v. Bank of Am. N.A., 2014 WL 1494234 at *14 (D. Nev. Apr. 15, 2014).
Of relevance here, under NRS 598.0915(5) and (9), it is a deceptive trade practice if a
defendant:

5. Knowingly makes a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses,
benefits, alterations or quantities of goods or services for sale or lease or a false
representation as to the sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection of a
person therewith. (emphasis added)

9. Advertises goods or services with intent not to sell or lease them as advertised.

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 598.0915 (West).

To state a claim under the NDTPA, a plaintiff must show that (1) an act of consumer fraud
(2) caused (3) damages to the plaintiff. Picus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 651, 658 (D.
Nev. 2009)(noting that the Supreme Court had not yet specified the elements of a claim under the
NDTPA). Plaintiffs here allege that Defendants, acting through their agent Dan Carmichael, on or
about November 27, 2013, made several false representations to them in convincing them to send
their son to Fresh Start for treatment. Plaintiffs allege that Carmichael knowingly made the
following the false representations: (a) that the Fresh Start program has a 76% success rate; (b)
that Peter would receive extensive counseling at Fresh Start; and (c) that there would be a licensed
physician on the premises. FAC, 13 17. Further, Plaintiffs allege that Carmichael referred
them to a website that falsely represented that Narconons sauna program, the New Life

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Detoxification Program, removes all drug residues in the body, which are the major causes of
cravings and relapse. Id. at 18 19. Finally, Plaintiffs contract falsely represents that the
Narconon Program is secular and does not include participation in any religious studies of any
kind. Id. at 23.
Plaintiffs allege in the First Amended Complaint the solid bases for believing these
representations. With regard to the claimed success rate, Plaintiffs quote deposition testimony
from Narconon Internationals own expert witness in a prior case admitted he was skeptical of the
success rate: I I hope its true, but, I mean, I would need convincing. Id. at 42. The same
expert admitted that there was no scientific basis to support Narconons claimed benefits for the
sauna program. Id. at 39.
With respect to Defendants false claim that the program is secular, Plaintiffs allege that
Narconon misrepresented the title of the L. Ron Hubbard the book that inspired the Narconon
programs founding to conceal the programs basis in the Scientology religion. Id. at 24 25.
Further, Plaintiffs allege that at Fresh Start Peter was made to study Scientology doctrines and
concepts and that Narconons sauna program is identical to a Scientology ritual known as the
Purification Rundown.
Defendants false representations about the secular nature of the treatment program, the
ability of the sauna program to eliminate drug cravings, and the success rate are false statements
about the characteristics, benefits, and quantities of Narconon. In addition, Defendants
representation that there would be a licensed physician at Fresh Start was an advertisement of
services with intent not to sell them as advertised.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs state a claim for deceptive trade practices and request leave to add
this claim formally to their Complaint.

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E. Plaintiffs state negligence claims against Defendants under both direct and alter ego
liability theories.

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs negligence claims because, in their view, Plaintiffs
cannot show that Defendants owed them a legal duty. Defendants position is untenable.
Defendants produce and license all materials and treatment methods for a putative drug treatment
program, Narconon. Defendants unquestionably had a legal duty to use to reasonable care to
ensure that their program is safe and effective for participants such as Plaintiff Peter
Geanacopulos. For breach of this duty, Defendants are directly liable.
In addition, as an alter ego of Fresh Start, Defendants had a duty to obtain a medical
license to engage in the treatment they were administering to Peter Geanacopulos.
Nevada law provides that violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se if the injured
party belongs to the class of persons whom the statute was intended to protect, and the injury
suffered is of the type the statute was intended to prevent. See Atkinson v. MGM Grand Hotel,
Inc., 120 Nev. 639, 98 P.3d 678, 680 (Nev. 2004); Mazzeo v. Gibbons, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1200 (D. Nev. 2009). Plaintiffs allege that NRS 630.160 created a duty for individuals desiring to
engage in the practice of medicine to be licensed.
Defendants, NI and ABLE had control over Fresh Start, no one on site at the Fresh Start
Facility had a medical license, nor were any certified drug counselors on-site. Still the staff of
Fresh Start, who have been shown to be under the control of Defendants NI and ABLE, practiced
medicine by requiring Plaintiff Peter Geanacopulos to discontinue his prescription medication and
subjecting him to the dangerous sauna and niacin regime. Vulnerable persons in need of medical
care like Peter Geanacopulos are exactly the type of persons the Nevada legislature intended to
protect under NRS 630.160 (see NRS 630.020), (all of Chapter 630 contemplates civil
enforcement of its provisions. See NRS 630.130).
.Once a duty has been established, actual negligence on the part of the defendant is an issue for
trial. Harrington v. Syufy Enters., 113 Nev. 246, 248, 931 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Ne.v 1997). All of

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the above duties were breached by Fresh Start, a facility under the absolute control of Defendants
NI and ABLE, with this many questions of material fact already showing, before any discovery
has been done, a dismissal of Plaintiffs negligence claims now would be extremely premature.
As such, Defendants request for dismissal of this claim should be denied.
F. Plaintiffs state a claim for civil conspiracy.
The essence of civil conspiracy is damages. Flowers v. Carville, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1245,
1249 (D. Nev. 2003). In Nevada, civil conspiracy requires the allegation of 1) a combination of
two or more persons, who 2) by some concerted action, 3) intend to accomplish some unlawful
objective for the purpose of harming another, and 4) cause damage. Furthermore, a claim for civil
conspiracy based on torts other than fraud must only meet the pleading standards of Rule 8(a).
Flowers, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1250-51; but see Goodwin v. Executive Tr. Servs., LLC, 680 F. Supp.
2d 1244, 1254 (D. Nev. 2010) (retreating from the Flowers courts position and requiring
heightened civil conspiracy pleading standard where underlying claim had heightened pleading
standard).
Plaintiffs Complaint states all four of Nevadas elements for this claim. Plaintiffs
articulate the acts Defendants took to come together and work in unison to harm Plaintiffs. The
Complaint alleges how A BLEd, NI, and Fresh Start work in unison to recruit and control
customers. (ECF 4 2-9). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants worked in unison to recruit Plaintiff
Peter Geanacopulos into Scientology under the guise of providing him treatment. (Id. 96 99).
In doing so, Defendants injured Peter. Accordingly, Plaintiffs properly pled their cause of action
for civil conspiracy.
I. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Honorable Court deny
Defendants Motion to Dismiss.

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DATED this 24
th
day of July, 2014.
HAMILTON LAW
By:
RYAN A. HAMILTON, ESQ.
NV BAR NO. 11587
Las Vegas, NV 89113
(702) 818-1818
(702) 974-1139

Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to FRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of HAMILTON LAWW, LLC, and that on
this 24th day of July, 2014, I did cause a true copy of PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO ABLE AND
NARCONON INTERNATIONALS MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FRCP RULE
12(b)(2) AND12(b)6 to be placed in the United States Mail, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, and addressed as follows:
S. Brent Vogel
Alayne M. Opie
LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP
6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Ste. 600
Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

Kenneth M. Webster
John F. Bemis
Kerry J. Doyle
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC
1160 North Town Center Drive, Suite 200
Las Vegas, NV 89144
By___________________________
An Employee of Hamilton Law, LLC


Geanacopulos v. Narconon: Plaintiffs Response To Motion To Dismiss

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Geanacopulos v. Narconon: Plaintiffs Response To Motion To Dismiss

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