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1.1 INITIAL AXIOMATIZATION: THE FUNDAMENTAL POSTULATE.. 1
1.2 THE REAL AND REALITY....................................................................... 6
1.2.1 Levels oI Reality ................................................................................... 7
1.2.1.1 The Ontological Approach ............................................................ 8
1.2.1.2 The Physical Science Approach.................................................... 8
1.2.2 Contradiction, Counteraction or 'Countervalence.............................. 9
1.2.3 The Senses oI Reduction..................................................................... 10
1.3 LIR VERSUS STANDARD LOGICS: DEDUCTION.............................. 11
1.3.1 Bivalence: Logical Truth, Logical Constants and Logical
Consequence ................................................................................................ 12
1.3.2 Semantics ............................................................................................ 16
1.3.3 First-Order Predicate Logic (FOL) ..................................................... 19
1.4 NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS..................................................................... 20
1.4.1 Intuitionist, Paraconsistent and Paracomplete Logics ........................ 20
1.4.1.1 Intuitionist Logic and Paracompleteness..................................... 20
1.4.1.2 Paraconsistent Logic.................................................................... 21
1.4.2 Many-Valued and Fuzzy Logics ......................................................... 22
1.4.3 Modal Logic........................................................................................ 24
1.4.4 Relevance and Natural Logics ............................................................ 26
1.4.4.1 Relevance (or Relevant) Logics .................................................. 26
1.4.4.2 Natural Logic............................................................................... 27
1.4.5 The Metalogic, Imaginary Logic and Empirical Logic oI Vasiliyev.. 28
1.5 INDUCTIVE LOGIC AND ABDUCTIVE LOGIC: PROBABILITY ..... 30
1.5.1 InIerence and Abductive Logic........................................................... 33
1.6 QUANTUM LOGIC................................................................................... 34
1.6.1 The Quantum Formalism oI Aerts ...................................................... 35
1.7 THE FORMAL AXIOMATIZATION OF LIR......................................... 36
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2.1 THE NON-CLASSICAL CALCULUS OF LIR: IMPLICATION............ 41
2.2 TRUTH VALUES, CONTRADICTION AND REALITY VALUES ...... 43
2.2.1 Other Theories oI Truth ...................................................................... 46
!
Foreword......................................... xi
Acknowledgments.......................... xv
+#$,"67!$+"#33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333xvii
1. REALITY AND LOGIC.............................................................................xvii
2. THE OBJECTIVE AND PLAN OF 'LOGIC IN REALITY..................... xix
vi CONTENTS
2.2.2 VeriIicationism ................................................................................... 47
2.3 IMPLICATION BETWEEN THE LIMITS............................................... 49
2.3.1 The TransIinite.................................................................................... 50
2.3.2 Ortho-deductions................................................................................. 52
2.3.4 Operational Aspects oI the LIR Calculus: Logical Necessity ............ 54
2.4 CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION ................................................... 56
2.4.1 A ClassiIication Table Ior Connectives .............................................. 58
2.4.2 The Calculus oI Events and Relations ................................................ 60
8 )+, -& - 1",2-) "#$")"*.333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333 98
3.1 REALISM AND FORMAL ONTOLOGIES............................................. 63
3.2 THE LIR ONTOLOGICAL PREDICATES: DUALITY.......................... 65
3.3 THE DOMAIN OF ENTITIES: LEVELS OF REALITY......................... 66
3.3.1 Complexity Versus Levels oI Reality................................................. 67
3.4 LIR AS AN INTERPRETED FORMAL SYSTEM.................................. 67
3.5 THREE CRITICAL CONCEPTS .............................................................. 68
3.5.1 Dynamisms.......................................................................................... 68
3.5.2 Processes ............................................................................................. 69
3.5.3 Properties ............................................................................................ 69
3.5.3.1 Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Properties: Relations.......................... 72
3.6 SOME METALOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ....................................... 73
3.7 THE LOGIC OF BEING............................................................................ 75
3.7.1 Abstract, Non-real, Non-existent and Non-spatio-temporal Objects.. 78
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4.1 THE DEFINITION AND FUNCTION OF ONTOLOGY........................ 81
4.1.1 Formal and Material Categories.......................................................... 82
4.2 THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSTRUCTION OF CATEGORIES. 84
4.3 THE PHYSICS OF REALITY: THE FUNDAMENTAL DUALITIES... 85
4.4 THE CATEGORY OF ENERGY.............................................................. 87
4.4.1 The Duality oI Energy ........................................................................ 88
4.4.1.1 Intensity and Extensity ................................................................ 90
4.4.1.2 Identity and Diversity: Homogeneity and Heterogeneity ........... 92
4.4.1.3 Actuality and Potentiality............................................................ 93
4.4.1.4 Locality and Globality................................................................. 95
4.4.1.5 Energy Is Dual and Antagonistic ................................................ 96
4.4.2 The Fundamental Principle oI LIR..................................................... 97
4.5 THE CATEGORY AND SUB-CATEGORIES OF DYNAMIC
OPPOSITION................................................................................................... 99
4.5.1 Non-separability................................................................................ 100
4.5.2 Is There a Mathematical Physics oI LIR?......................................... 102
4.6 THE CATEGORY OF PROCESS: CHANGE........................................ 104
4.6.1 Three Current Views oI Process ....................................................... 104
2.3.3 Para-deductions................................................................................... 53
CONTENTS vii
4.7 THE CATEGORY OF T-STATES.......................................................... 106
4.7.1 The Duality oI Quantum Spin........................................................... 108
4.8.1 SelI and Other: SelI-ReIerence ......................................................... 112
4.9 LIR AS A FORMAL ONTOLOGY: NEO AND THE CATEGORY-
AXIOM FIT.................................................................................................... 113
4.9.1 A Check-List oI Principal Dynamic Relationships........................... 117
4.10 THE INTERPRETATION OF LIR........................................................ 119
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5.1 THE CORE THESIS OF LIR................................................................... 124
5.2 A TWO-LEVEL FRAMEWORK OF RELATIONAL ANALYSIS....... 126
5.2.1 Mereology ......................................................................................... 128
5.2.2 Inter- and Intra-theoretic Relationships ............................................ 129
5.3 ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS IN PARALLEL........................... 132
5.4 THE STRUCTURE OF REALITY IN LIR............................................. 135
5.4.1 The Categorial Structure oI Reality in LIR....................................... 136
5.4.1.1 Morphisms and Functors ........................................................... 136
5.4.2 The Structure oI the Domains oI Application: Set Theory............... 140
5.4.3 The Metaphysical Structure oI Reality in LIR.................................. 142
5.4.4 Figure Versus Ground: Gestalt Theory............................................. 144
5.4.5 Form Versus Matter: Catastrophe Theory ........................................ 145
5.5 WHAT IS AN EXPLANATION?............................................................ 150
5.5.1 Two General Failures oI Explanation............................................... 150
5.5.1.1 Both-at-Once`........................................................................... 150
5.5.1.2 Spontaneity................................................................................ 151
5.5.2 The LIR View oI Explanation........................................................... 153
5.5.3 Explanation and Metaphysics ........................................................... 155
5.6 THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION IN LIR....................... 156
5.6.1 The InIerential Role Description....................................................... 158
5.6.2 The Syntactic Semantic Distinction and Conjunction ................ 160
9 )+,@ 2%$-?:.&+!& -#6 ?:+)"&"?:.3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333 (98
6.1 INTRODUCTION: CAUSE AND DETERMINISM.............................. 163
6.2 CAUSALITY IN LIR............................................................................... 164
6.2.1 The Metaphysics oI Causation.......................................................... 167
6.2.2 Non-contradictory Causalities in Science and Philosophy............... 170
6.2.3 Finality .............................................................................................. 171
6.2.4 Dispositions and Powers ................................................................... 173
6.2.5 Probabilistic Causation ..................................................................... 175
6.2.6 Possibility, Potentiality and Probability............................................ 178
6.2.7 Actualism and Possibilism................................................................ 179
4.8 THE CATEGORIES OF SUBJECT, OBJECT
AND SUBJECT-OBJECT........................................................................109
5.4.1.2 Ontological Links ...................................................................... 139
viii CONTENTS
6.2.8.1 Intervention................................................................................ 182
6.2.8.2 Some Remarks on SelI-Organization........................................ 183
6.3 CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY................................................ 185
6.3.1 The Continuum Hypothesis .............................................................. 185
6.3.2 The Problem oI DiIIerential Calculus............................................... 186
6.3.3 Paracontinuity and Paradiscontinuity ............................................... 188
6.3.4 Smooth InIinitesimal Analysis (SIA) ............................................... 189
6.4 STATISM AND DYNAMISM................................................................ 192
6.5 DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM............................................ 194
6.5.1 A Philosophical Argument................................................................ 195
6.5.2 Contingency and Necessity: Bohmian Determinism........................ 196
6.6 REALISM AND EXPERIENCE ............................................................. 197
6.6.1 Generic Realism................................................................................ 198
6.6.2 ScientiIic Realism............................................................................. 199
6.6.3 Structural Realism............................................................................. 201
6.6.4 The LIR Extension: ScientiIic Structural Realism (SSR)................. 202
6.6.5 Semantic Realism.............................................................................. 206
6.7 THE PRINCIPLE OF DYNAMIC OPPOSITION AND LAWS OF
NATURE........................................................................................................ 208
6.7.1 Dynamic Opposition: Constitutive and Regulative .......................... 209
6.7.2 Dynamic Opposition as a ScientiIic Principle: Linking Physics and
Statistics ..................................................................................................... 210
6.7.3 Dynamic Opposition as a Law oI Nature.......................................... 211
6.7.4 Metaphysical Positions ..................................................................... 212
6.7.5 Laws oI Nature in Use ...................................................................... 213
6.8 FRIEDRICH HEGEL: IDEALISM AND/OR CONTRADICTION? ..... 216
6.9 THE LIR APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY............................................ 219
6.9.1 The Philosophy oI Mind ................................................................... 224
6.9.2 The Naturalization oI Phenomenology............................................. 225
7.1 TIME AND SPACE: PRELIMINARY REMARKS ............................... 229
7.2 THE LIR THEORY OF SPACE-TIME................................................... 231
7.2.1 The LIR Categories oI Time............................................................. 231
7.2.2 The LIR Categories oI Space............................................................ 233
7.2.3 Simultaneity and Succession............................................................. 234
7.2.3.1 Synchronic and Diachronic Logic............................................. 236
7.3 SOME ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF TIME............................................ 237
7.3.1 Time in Philosophy........................................................................... 237
7.3.2 Time in Phenomenology................................................................... 238
7.4 BEING AND BECOMING IN MODERN PHYSICS............................. 239
7.4.1 Tensers Versus Detensers ................................................................. 240
7.4.2 Being and Becoming Revisited......................................................... 241
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6.2.8 Potentiality and Micro-causation: Manipulability and Intervention.. 180

CONTENTS ix
7.5.1 Two Complementary Logics oI Complementarity ........................... 247
7.5.2 Relational Quantum Mechanics ........................................................ 252
7.5.3 Quantum Physics and Consciousness ............................................... 253
7.6 TOWARD A LOGICAL COSMOLOGY................................................ 255
7.6.1 Space-Time in General Relativity..................................................... 256
7.6.2 The Dual Role oI the Metric Field.................................................... 257
7.6.2.1 Simultaneity: A Comparison oI Dynamics ............................... 260
7.6.3 Structural Realism and the Metaphysics oI Relations ...................... 262
7.6.4 A Cyclic Model oI the Universe ....................................................... 264
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8.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 269
8.1.1 Emergence......................................................................................... 269
8.1.2 Opposition in the Physics and Chemistry oI Living Systems........... 271
8.2 THE LIR APPROACH TO EMERGENCE............................................. 273
8.2.1 The Category oI Emergence ............................................................. 273
8.2.2 Emergence and Dualism Under Attack............................................. 274
8.2.3 A Peircean Perspective...................................................................... 275
8.2.3.1 Virtual Logic and Organic Logic .............................................. 276
8.3 EMERGENCE IN PERSPECTIVE.......................................................... 277
8.3.1 Physical Emergence .......................................................................... 282
8.3.2 Normative Emergence....................................................................... 282
8.3.3 Catastrophe Theory and Emergence ................................................. 283
8.4 EXPLAINING EMERGENCE................................................................. 284
8.4.1 Emergence Is a Dogmatic Concept? ................................................. 285
8.4.2 The Emmeche Synthesis ................................................................... 286
8.4.3 Biosemiotics...................................................................................... 289
8.4.4 Quantum Morphogenesis .................................................................. 290
8.3.5 HalI oI the Story................................................................................ 291
8.5 CLOSURE IN LIVING SYSTEMS......................................................... 292
8.5.1 DeIining Closure ............................................................................... 292
8.5.2 The Category oI Closure................................................................... 293
8.5.3 Opening Up Closure.......................................................................... 294
8.6 DOWNWARD CAUSATION ................................................................. 295
8.6.1 The Category oI Downward Causation............................................. 295
8.6.2 Synchronic ReIlexive Downward Causation.................................... 296
8.7 EVOLUTION AND THE ORIGIN OF LIFE.......................................... 299
8.7.1 The Absence oI Logic in Biological Science.................................... 300
8.7.2 Natural Selection............................................................................... 301
8.7.3 The Epistemic Cut............................................................................. 302
8.7.4 Semantic Closure: The Matter-Symbol Problem.............................. 305
8.7.5 Code Duality: Bridging the Epistemic Cut ....................................... 306
8.7.6 A Systems Picture ............................................................................. 308
7.5 QUANTUM MECHANICS..................................................................... 246
x CONTENTS
8.7.7.1 Exclusion-Driven Potentialities................................................. 312
8.8 THE THERMODYNAMIC AND CYBERNETIC STANDPOINTS..... 313
8.8.1 Thermodynamics and Complexity.................................................... 314
8.8.2 Cybernetics and InIormation............................................................. 315
8.8.3 Teleonomy ........................................................................................ 318
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1. NEW DIRECTIONS .................................................................................. 325
2. A NEW SKEPTICISM............................................................................... 327
1. THE LOGIC OF FROZEN DIALECTICS................................................ 331
2. THE AXIOM OF CHOICE........................................................................ 334
1. THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF SYSTEMS IN REALITY.................. 337
1.1 The Relation oI Antagonism................................................................ 337
1.2 The Relation oI Contradiction ............................................................. 338
1.3 The Principle oI Antagonism Applied to Energy ................................ 339
2. CYBERNETICS AND SYSTEMS THEORY........................................... 340
2.1 Feedback .............................................................................................. 340
2.2 General Systems Theory...................................................................... 341
2.3 The Neuchtel Model........................................................................... 343
2.4 Systems Science and Complex Systems.............................................. 345
+FGHI 33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333 85A

8.7.7 Evolution as Context-Driven Actualization oI Potential .................. 310
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!"
!"#$%"#&
This book is both diI!cult and rewarding, aIIording a new perspective
on logic and reality, basically seen in terms oI change and stability, being and
becoming. Most importantly it exempliIies a mode oI doing philosophy oI
science that seems a welcome departure Irom the traditional Iocus on purely
analytic arguments. The author approaches ontology, metaphysics, and logic
as having oIIered a number oI ways oI constructing the description oI reality,
and aims at deepening their relationships in a new way. Going beyond the mere
abstract and Iormal aspects oI logical analysis, he oIIers a new architecture oI
logic that sees it as applied not only to the 'reasoning processes belonging to
the Iirst disciplinary group ontology but also directly concerned with enti-
ties, events, and phenomena studied by the second one metaphysics. It is the
task oI the book to elaborate such a constructive logic, both by oIIering a logi-
cal view oI the structure oI the reality in general and by proIIering a wealth oI
models able to encompass its implications Ior science.
In turning Irom the merely Iormal to the constructive account oI logic
Brenner overcomes the limitation oI logic to linguistic concepts so that it can
be not only a logic 'oI reality but also 'in that reality which is constitutively
characterized by a number oI Iundamental dualities (observer and observed,
selI and not-selI, internal and external, etc.): indeed the analysis oI 'contradic-
tion plays a central role in the book. In this perspective logic is also rooted in
physical reality, as conceived by modern physics: 'Accordingly, my logic is
not only a logic about theories of reality as conceptualized in philosophy and
metaphysics. It is also a scientific or quasi-scientific concept, to the extent
that, like symmetry for example, its principles are a reflection of the underly-
ing physical structure of the universe that is independent of human experience
that nevertheless derives from it.
Brenner has a great deal to say about aspects oI this logic oI/in reality
that relate it to standard logics as well as other disciplines: i) the centrality oI
axiomatics and the importance oI building open and uninterpreted Iormal
systems potentially able to account Ior real processes entities, properties, and
dynamisms (chapters 1 and 2): ii) the role oI a rigorous interpreted Iormal
ontology as a 'process ontology (chapter 3), and iii) its relationship to the
quantum-Iield equivalent oI energy (chapter 4). Chapters 6, 7, and 8 recon-
sider, in term oI both 'logic in reality and 'new energy ontology, the problems
oI !"#$%&$ and catastrophe theory, metaphysics (also the problem oI naturaliza-
tion oI phenomenology is IruitIully taken into account), and physics, where
!"" $%&'(%&)
rare in the current research in logic and epistemology: logic is grounded in many
ways, but most essentially, Ior Brenner, it derives its rational basis Irom its
participation in the most important achievements oI current culture and science.
It is this insight which drives the remainder oI the text, which includes numer-
ous examples oI successIul logical modelling; and within the context oI this
successIul practice, the author expands the traditional logical power oI logic in
a number oI signiIicant ways. He spends considerable time on the analysis oI
many non-classical logics, abduction, quantum and relativistic physics, Hege-
lian philosophy, non-standard analysis and traditionally debated philosophical
problems such as the analytic/synthetic distinction, determinism/indeterminism,
and the concepts oI 'causality and oI 'scientiIic explanation.
Brenner`s text is extremely complex; it is Iull oI inIormation about the
widest range oI issues relevant to his concerns. He has complex and critical
presentations oI various areas oI current Iields oI philosophical, cognitive, and
scientiIic knowledge. This presents one oI the major problems Ior the reader.
Since his argument is based on numerous examples oI partially successIul
cognitive strategies and sees their partial success as a justiIication Ior his pro-
ject, the book overwhelms the reader with reIerences. OI course, iI the reader
is appropriately grounded in the vast literature that Brenner aIIords in a bibli-
ography, the reIerence to particulars can be very deeply inIormative. The rest
oI us must rely on the sheer weight oI putative examples, still extremely in-
Iormative and epistemologically rewarding. Brenner oIIers such an account,
and it is the connection between the account and the examples that ultimately
gives his work its power in depicting a new perspective on 'reality. His con-
cern with the actual practice oI logic helps him to see the roots oI reality in the
manipulation oI the wide interdisciplinary interplay I have indicated above.
Brenner oIIers a truly novel contribution to the problem oI reality by looking
broadly to see its relational aspects within the entire context oI logic, set the-
ory, metaphysics, ontology, physics and biology, rather than narrowly as in the
traditional logical and analytic approaches.
This excellent and demanding book opens up the door to a deeply in-
Iormed attitude in logic and epistemology, requiring oI philosophers that they
do more than analyze concepts, demanding that they become Iamiliar with the
that classical identity cannot account Ior in the case oI quantum entities. But
more important Ior the reader is the structure oI his overall argumentation
strategy. Implicit in Brenner`s work is an interdisciplinary commitment very
a new relation between logic and space-time is suggested. To take another
example, a concept oI 'relative identity is presented to convey those Ieatures


Lorenzo Magnani
Department oI Philosophy,
University oI Pavia, Pavia, Italy

Department oI Philosophy,
Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, P.R.China

February 2008


"### FOREWORD
plines. This is not to substitute description Ior normativity, but rather recon-
ceptualizes what the grounds oI normativity are. The author has provided
a Iine contribution to the renaissance oI logical research aiming at directly
elucidating the ancient philosophical concept oI 'reality.
wealth oI actual knowledge gathering practices available in the special disci-
!"#$%&'()*+($,-
This book is the result oI my improbable encounter with the theoretical
physicist Basarab Nicolescu in 1998 Ior it is he who introduced me to the philoso-
phical logic oI Stephane Lupasco. I am most indebted to Nicolescu and the historian
oI art and the media Rene Berger, co-Iounders with Lupasco oI the International
Center Ior Transdisciplinary Research, Paris, Ior their personal recollections oI
Lupasco, as well as access to otherwise unavailable documents. The next stage in
the process was the encouragement I received to develop my interpretations oI
Lupasco into a book oI my own. At this initial stage, I received much support and
answers to my sometimes jejune questions Irom the ontologist Roberto Poli and
the logicians Jean-Yves Beziau and Graham Priest, which has continued to this
day. Since the inception oI the Iive-year gestation period oI this book, many oI my
most important exchanges have been with John Symons, ProIessor oI Philosophy
at the University oI Texas, El Paso. His pertinent critique oI an earlier version has
been an essential contribution to its current structure and emphasis. That gestation,
however, proved more diIIicult than expected, and is to Johanna Seibt, ProIessor
oI Philosophy at the University oI Aarhus, that I am most grateIul Ior the unselIish
collaboration on this project that lasted almost two years. During the completion
oI the manuscript, I beneIited in particular Irom many exchanges with logicians
and philosophers oI the Brazilian school Itala D`Ottaviano, Walter Carnielli,
Decio Krause and Otavio Bueno which were very useIul in the Iormalization oI
my system.
More inIormally, I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement
oI my Iamily and Iriends, including my proIessor oI chemistry at the University oI
Wisconsin, Eugene van Tamelen. He is in a unique position to appreciate the con-
ceptual distance between my thesis Ior him and the core thesis oI this book.
I wish also to thank Jean-Paul Bertrand, Iormer Editor oI Editions du
Rocher, Paris, Ior permission to reproduce the Iormulas oI Lupasco`s calculus
Irom those editions oI Lupasco`s works, and Decio Krause Ior permission to re-
produce citations Irom Niels Bohr`s work published in one oI his papers. Finally,
readers will note that I have made extensive use oI the articles in SYNTHESE and
entries in the Stanford Encvclopedia of Philosophv, and I would like express my
appreciation to the editors oI these authoritative synthetic` sources.








!"
!"#$%&'(#!%"
)* $,-.!#/ -"& .%0!(
scientiIic, philosophical, artistic and religious. These have been developed in an
attempt to explain and understand the phenomena oI existence in all their diversity
and complexity. Innumerable approaches, more or less Iormal, have been devel-
oped to try to organize and make sense out oI the processes, properties, relations,
structures, actions, thoughts, interactions, in a word the physical and mental enti-
ties that constitute reality in every day human existence and experience.It is possi-
ble to look at the subjects and objects oI knowledge and the methods Ior their
study as lying on a scale between reality itselI and the most abstract representations
that are made oI it, language and mathematics. All models oI reality, as models,
require a degree oI abstraction. II one excludes, Ior the time being, non-linguistic
representations oI reality such as art, all knowledge is constituted by sets oI state-
ments oI some kind. Starting Irom the side oI language, Iarthest removed Irom
reality, the statements consist oI propositions about abstract, ideal entities; de-
scriptions oI reality; and Iinally, descriptions oI reality based on experiment, the
domain oI science. Increases in knowledge related to statements or belieIs about
reality are involved in linguistic processes such as making arguments, inIerences
and judgments. Science involves increases in knowledge about reality itselI, the
states oI real physical and non-physical systems.
The purpose oI this book is to reexamine the relationships between the
diIIerent disciplines concerned with the description oI reality: (1) ontology, the
study oI being, what there is, as a systematic approach to the construction oI mod-
els oI reality; (2) metaphysics, which is concerned with the Iundamental structure
oI reality as a whole
1
; and (3) logic. Both ontology and metaphysics apply to all
knowledge and reasoning.
Logic, however, is considered to apply in a Iormal manner to the Iirst
group oI reasoning processes but not to the second, that is, as being limited essen-
tially to the linguistic and mathematical domains, not those oI entities, events or
phenomena studied by metaphysics and science. Despite the large number oI im-
portant practical applications oI standard logics, Ior example, in computer science

1
'Metaphysics is a universal discipline, in which everything, including the status and validity oI
ontology and metaphysics itselI, is a proper subject oI study (Lowe 2002).
scriptions or models oI reasoning processes; philosophical or metaphysical de-
This is a book about a theory oI reality about a theory oI change and
stability, being and becoming. Humans are unique in having the capacity oI experi-
encing reality and representing and recording it symbolically, and the recorded Iorms
oI symbolic representations constitute human knowledge organized into disciplines,
xvii
and artiIicial intelligence, the underlying body oI logic has not undergone major
modiIications in the direction oI a logical view oI the structure oI reality in general,
and its implications Ior science. The reasons Ior this are primarily historical: logic
has been thought oI as the study oI reasoning and the construction oI adequate,
Iormal descriptions oI the modes oI reasoning, e.g., deduction, induction and ab-
duction, and the logical operations, e.g. implication, that characterize it. Modern
logic was developed with the objective oI modeling mathematical reasoning in as
general a way as possible, without limitations as to what reality might be like. Due
to their complexity, diversity and appearance oI random or, at the very least, oI
chaotic behavior, phenomena as such have been generally considered outside the
purview oI logic.
In contrast to the abstractions that have constituted logic, real phenomena
reIer directlv to human observation and human ratiocination, and the introduction
oI logical considerations in the corresponding disciplines, phenomenology and
epistemology, has proven extremely complicated. The gap between reality real
entities and propositions about reality remains the source oI a large number oI
metaphysical problems. Talking about a logic oI/in reality might thus be consid-
ered either a contradiction or a vague metaphor, reIerring, but only inIormally, to
some oI the regularities in nature and science that one observes.
There is, however, no theoretical reason why this should be so. One the-
sis oI this book is that the limitation oI logic to linguistic concepts, which do not
and in Iact cannot apply to real entities, should be removed. The discussion can
also center, and perhaps should center, on the non-abstract and oIten conIlictual
changes characterizing real entities or phenomena as objects oI analysis, while re-
taining the advantages oI the Iormal structure, rigor and generality oI the logical
approach. An improved reIlection oI reality is, in a nutshell, what I claim my pro-
posed logic oI/in reality (LIR) may bring to the table.
I take a view oI reality that is neither idealist nor reductionist-materialist.
I will identiIy structures and principles in it that are not designed to analyze or in-
sure the truth-value or the pattern oI inIerence oI a set oI propositions but which
have, nevertheless, equivalent explanatory power and categorial authority. For ex-
ample, reality seems to be characterized and/or constituted by a number oI Iunda-
mental dualities: there is the reality that is and is not accessible to our senses; the
dualities oI observer and observed, selI and non-selI, internal and external and so
on. The principles oI the theory that I propose, that I consider logical principles,
nevertheless reIer, as directly as possible, to such dualities and the relations be-
tween them as providing a coherent picture oI reality, human experience and the
mechanisms oI change. I consider that the system oI thought or discipline that best
captures these principles is still a logic, a logic, however, that has its origin in the
characteristics oI physical reality, as conceived by modern physics, although it is
obviously dependent on human mental and linguistic processes to describe those
characteristics.
Accordingly, my logic is not only a logic about theories oI reality as con-
ceptualized in philosophy and metaphysics. It is also a scientiIic or quasi-scientiIic
concept, to the extent that, like symmetry Ior example, its principles are a reIlection
xviii INTRODUCTION
oI the underlying physical structure oI the universe that is independent oI human
also logical concepts should be compatible with, those oI Iundamental physics.
Thus, a logico-metaphysical concept that meets this criterion also implies a change
in the way one looks at the role which logic has had oI organizing our reasoning.
One must start by being sensitive to the biases that have been built into the analy-
sis oI reasoning due to the ubiquity oI the essentially classical principles oI stan-
dard predicate, intuitionist and paraconsistent logic.
1* #2, %34,(#!5, -"& 6.-" %7 8.%0!( !" $,-.!#/9
The title oI this book, 'Logic in Reality (LIR) is thus intended to imply
both (1) that the principle oI change according to which reality operates is a logi-
cal principle embedded in it, the logic in reality; and (2) that what logic really is
involves this same real physical-metaphysical but also logical principle. The Iirst
objective oI this book is, thereIore, is to construct such a logic oI and in reality.
Once this logic and its related ontology are in hand, I will show that they can pro-
vide some important insights into aspects oI reality that have remained at the level
oI intuition. In particular I will be in a position to deIine the basis and structure oI
a necessary relation between reality and appearance. I will also show that many
positions in philosophy and science have been blocked by classical logical de-
scriptions oI the domain oI these theories and the consequent classical ontologies,
that is, the categorizations that are made oI the domains.
I will begin Chapter 1 with an inIormal axiomatic characterization oI LIR
and some initial indications as to why these axioms have been selected. The
non-classical calculus to be used will be introduced. I will then brieIly review the
structure and major components oI standard logics, showing which components
can and cannot apply to LIR, or the signiIicant reinterpretations oI them that are
required. The major groups will appear in the Iollowing sequence: deductive;
paraconsistent; quantum; inductive probabilistic.
2
The chapter concludes with a
more Iormal axiomatization based on a model oI probabilistic logic. The diIIer-
ences between my logical system qua system with that oI both classical and non-
classical logics will quickly become apparent, but the parallels that remain will be
part oI the justiIication Ior the consideration oI LIR as a logic.
In Chapter 2, I discuss LIR as an uninterpreted Iormal system, including
details oI the non-classical calculus applied to the logical operations oI implication,

2
The sequence reIlects the place oI the logics on the line` mentioned in paragraph 1: each logic
has aspects that bring it, somewhat, closer to reality. LIR can thus be seen as continuing this
process.
2. THE OBJECTIVE AND PLAN OF 'LOGIC IN REALITY
the phvsical structure oI the world, I mean that all metaphysical, philosophical but
experience that nevertheless derives Irom it. Throughout this book, when I talk about
xix
conjunction and disjunction. In this theory, standard truth-values are replaced by
logical values that reIlect the state variables oI the phenomenon under study in a
novel way.
Chapter 3 develops LIR as a Iormal ontology and an interpreted Iormal
system, with deIinitions oI the critical concepts oI dynamics, process and property.
Ontological predicates are introduced to construct LIR as a process ontology, or
process-ontological model oI reality. An LIR approach to the question oI being in
relation to reality is compared with recent work grounding being in classical logic,
and the concept oI LIR as a metalogic is discussed.
Chapter 4 sets out the critical Ioundational notion oI LIR, namely, that its
Iundamental postulate is based on the existence oI energy, or better, its quantum
Iield-theoretic equivalent, as the unique material category. The properties and pro-
cesses associated with it as well as its most important Iormal categories are deve-
loped, recognizing that the domain oI entities involved is that oI all real, physical
phenomena, as well as oI non-real (imaginary or Iictional) entities qua their crea-
tion. The categorial approach insures that LIR, as an ontological theory, has the
necessary correlations to language and inIerence. The Iit between the axioms oI
LIR and the New Energy Ontology (NEO) I deIine accordingly concludes the Iirst
that sets Iorth the core thesis oI LIR and provides views oI key philosophical tools
necessary Ior its development. The task oI providing adequate structure to my
categorization oI reality is undertaken and compared with concepts Irom Gestalt
and catastrophe theory. The ontological recategorization that LIR makes possible
leads to reexamination oI some issues in ontology itselI. A basis Ior the links be-
tween LIR as metaphysics and LIR as ontology will be proposed.
Chapter 6 discusses the relation between the principles oI LIR and meta-
physics, and its application to the major philosophical issues oI causality, deter-
minism and realism in science. I will position LIR as a broad system, an axiomatic
metaphysics, Ior talking about both philosophical theories and real-world proc-
esses. The chapter concludes with a brieI discussion oI the application oI LIR to
issues in philosophy and the naturalization oI phenomenology. Chapter 7 develops
the relation between LIR and modern physics. I suggest that LIR can clariIy issues
oI complementarity, structural realism and metaphysical relations at macroscopic
as well as microscopic scales, and the correspondence oI LIR to some current con-
cepts oI space-time and cosmology is proposed. These three chapters suggest a
convergence oI metaphysics and physics, Ior which LIR provides a logical bridge.
Chapter 8 shows how the Iundamental principles oI LIR can deIine emer-
gence and be applied to emergent phenomena at the increasingly complex levels
oI liIe and evolution. The book concludes with some speculations about the poten-
tial consequences oI the applications oI LIR in philosophy and science and the
proposal oI a more challenging role Ior this extended logic in the development oI
knowledge.
xx I
part oI the book.
oI philosophical and scientiIic domains. Chapter 5 is a transition chapter
NTRODUCTION
The second part uses LIR and NEO re-examine problems in a number
Based on the metaphysical arguments to be developed in this book, many
Iundamental questions and assumptions may require a degree oI redeIinition, and
their origin in nature and their justiIication may be Iound elsewhere than is com-
monly suggested. I have made an eIIort to avoid reasoning according to the stan-
dard dichotomies, e.g., determinism vs. indeterminism. I thus ask the reader, even
iI he or she has strong views on speciIic issues (oI which determinism is a good
example), to take an attitude oI openness and tolerance toward what may be unex-
pected or unusual in my thesis. I say this Irom direct experience, since even the
discussion oI some Iorm oI contradiction or constitutive opposition as basic to na-
ture oIten encounters resistance that goes Iar beyond dispassionate and reasoned
debate. I undertake to do the same with regard to my inevitable critics. But it may
be considered a strength (or weakness?) oI my theory that it is one that explicates
and integrates its own potential critique.
I will naturally be comparing LIR with existing theories, but my intention
is not to prove that any particular theory is incorrect, except in the sense that its
domain oI application should be clearly limited to abstract systems. For theories,
views, approaches, etc. that are closer to LIR in spirit, my objective will be to
support their insights and intuitions and show how they might be improved or
generalized.
I will close this Introduction with a Iew words about the logical and
philosophical environment in which this book is appearing. In his Introduction to
a recent compendium that assesses current philosophy and logic (van Benthem
2006), the logician van Benthem argued Ior a natural and respectable process oI
growth oI logic, in line with that in other disciplines, and cautioned against arbi-
trary replacement or competition. The articles (which date back to 2002), reIlect
this: none go Iar outside established paradigms oI non-classical logics applied to
aspects oI truth, prooI, category theory and complementarity in physics, among
others. In philosophy on the other hand, three signiIicant representatives oI the
Anglophone analytical tradition take a less conservative attitude. Mulligan et al.
(2006) castigate analytical philosophy Ior its Iailure to accept the challenge oI
providing an adequate picture oI reality. Continental philosophy is also criticized
Ior its lack oI rigor and subordination to political agendas, which makes its use oI
scientiIic concepts anecdotal. Ladyman and Ross (2007) and their colleagues are
also critical oI any metaphysics or philosophy that relies on intuitions or concepts
that do not take into account the most recent advances in Iundamental physics. In
their 'naturalization oI metaphysics, they propose a picture oI the world that
raises the scientiIic standard Ior any theory that purports to describe and/or explain
aspects oI reality.
The theory in this book takes these various attitudes into account. Ac-
cordingly, much oI Chapter 1 is devoted to showing the principled relation to
standard non-classical logics oI the extension oI logic that Logic in Reality repre-
sents. Attention is paid to indications within standard logics that such extensions
might be envisaged. Thus, in making the novel moves oI extending logic to real-
ity, and in showing its linkage to metaphysics and science, I have tried to maintain
2. THE OBJECTIVE AND PLAN OF 'LOGIC IN REALITY xxi
a degree oI Iormal justiIication that members oI the analytical philosophy com-
munity could accept, in accordance with the Mulligan et al. critique.
!"#"$"%&"'
Ladyman, James and Don Ross. 2007. Everv Thing Must Go. Metaphvsics Naturali:ed. OxIord:
OxIord University Press.
Lowe, E. J. 2002. A Survev of Metaphvsics. OxIord: OxIord University Press.
Mulligan, Kevin, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. 2006. What`s Wrong with Contemporary Phi-
losophy? Topoi 25: 6367.
Van Benthem, Johan. 2006. Introduction: Alternative Logics and Classic Concerns. In The Age
of Alternative Logics, eds. J. van Benthem, G. Heinemann, M. Rebuschi and H. Visser.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
xxii INTRODUCTION