LILIA SHEVTSOVA

RUSSIA
BETWEEN
PAST AND
FUTURE
2014 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.
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v
ABOUT THE AUTHOR ix
WHAT THESE ESSAYS ARE ABOUT 11
CHAPTER 1
LIFE IN THE INTERREGNUM:
OR HOW THE WORLD
GOT LOST 13
CHAPTER 2
RUSSIA WAITING FOR GODOT 17
CHAPTER 3
THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION AS
A FOUNDATION OF PERSONALIZED
POWER 21
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 4
RUSSIA: THE TURNING POINTS THAT
SHAPE A COUNTRYS TRAJECTORY 25
CHAPTER 5
HOW TO BLOW OFF STEAM? 29
CHAPTER 6
HOW PUTIN IS SOLVING THE RUSSIAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY PROBLEM 35
CHAPTER 7
THINKING HISTORY:
THE IMPORTANCE OF 1991 39
CHAPTER 8
1993: RUSSIAS SMALL CIVIL WAR 43
CHAPTER 9
COULD LAVROV BE RIGHT ABOUT SPENGLER? 49
CHAPTER 10
THE NORTH CAUCASUS: THE BOMB
UNDER THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 51
CHAPTER 11
JUNE 12: INDEPENDENCE FROM ITSELF? 55
CHAPTER 12
THE EURASIAN UNION: BACK TO THE USSR,
OR THE UNION OF BLACKMAILERS? 59
CHAPTER 13
THE PUTIN DOCTRINE FOR URBI ET ORBI 65
vi
CHAPTER 14
OBAMA THE RETRENCHER AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WORLD 73
CHAPTER 15
UKRAINES CHOICE IS A TEST
FOR THE WEST (ABRIDGED) 79
CHAPTER 16
UKRAINE HAS NOT YET PERISHED
(ABRIDGED) 83
CHAPTER 17
AFTER YANUKOVYCH:
TEN CHALLENGES FOR UKRAINE 89
CHAPTER 18
THE UKRAINE CRISIS:
FALLING INTO PUTINS TRAP 93
ABOUT THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 105
i x
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lilia Shevtsova chairs the Russian Domestic Politics and Political
Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. She is the author
of Putins Russia, Lonely Power, Change or Decay: Russias Dilemma
and theWests Response (with Andrew Wood), A 21st Century Myth
Authoritarian Modernization in Russia and China (with Bobo Lo), and
Russia XXI: TeLogic of Suicide and Rebirth.
1 1
WHAT THESE ESSAYS
ARE ABOUT
Tese essays are about modern Russia and theprocesses that are related
toit. It is not another example ofpolitical microbiology, which scruti-
nizes specifc events or parses President Putins slightest move touncover
hidden meaning. Watching thenever-ending news cycle ofpolitical
hustle and bustle long ago lost its usefulness and appeal.
Tese essays are about themajor trends ofRussian reality, about its
hot-button issues, as well as thechallenges Russian society is facing.
Tey are about thetroubled time Russia has found itself inafter theend
ofthepolitical protests of20112012. Tis time can be described as
time out oftime, abreak between two eras. One era has already ended,
while theother has not yet begun. Living during this time is hard, and
it is also hard torefect onit and tofnd any signs ofrenewal. Tis is
atime ofconservatism; inits Russian incarnation that conservatism has
morphed into agloomy, almost medieval archaism.
In these essays, Ihave tried togive thereader some sense ofthis time
without atrajectory.
1 2 INTERREGNUM
You are going toread my thoughts onhow Russia is trying todefne
itself inthemodern world. Ialso discuss Russias perception ofits new
Constitution, its historical dates, and its problems. Ilook atthe Kremlins
eforts tosolve theproblem ofnational identity and tofnd away todeal
with theNorth Caucasus, which has become abomb planted beneath
theRussian Federation. Irefect onthenew Putin Doctrine, while also
thinking about how theObama presidency presented theold Russia with
room for maneuvering.
Finally, Iwrite about my impressions onUkraine, which poses chal-
lenges toboth Russia and Europe. Itry toexplain what themotivations
are behind theKremlins incursion into Ukraine and what Putins new
expansionism means for theworld.
In short, you are about toread adescription ofa time and place that
Iwould not wish anyone tofnd themselves in.
Special appreciation goes toeditor Daniel Kennelly for his commit-
ment toediting these essays.
I want tothank Leon Geyer for helping me toprepare themanuscript
for publication.
I would like tothank my colleagues atthe Carnegie Endowment, and
especially Veronica Lavrikova, for managing thepublication process.
1 3
As ofnowat thestart of2014there is no reason tobelieve that this
year will be any diferent from theprevious one. Social and political
trends tend tobe extremely inertial. It takes aconfuence ofseveral factors
unexpectedly exploding toshift momentum inanew direction.
Ten again, who expected theunexpected in2013? Among thesur-
prises were thedashed hopes for democratization inEgypt and thegrowth
ofAl Qaedas strain ofinternational terrorism. TeKremlin, too, had some
surprising international successes: inSyria, theUnited States accepted
Putins proposal toreduce thecrisis tothe technical issue ofeliminating
chemical weapons, and inthebattle over Ukraine, theEuropean Union was
left scratching its collective head inbefuddlement. Finally, who expected
Obamas domestic and global infuence toplummet? So let us not get ahead
ofourselves trying topredict what will happen in2014. Imerely want
torecord thetrends and moods that prevailed atthe start oftheyear.
Te famous Polish political philosopher and sociologist Zygmunt Bau-
man reintroduced into our political lexicon theterm interregnum, once
LIFE IN THE
INTERREGNUM:
OR HOW THE
WORLD GOT LOST
1
1 4 INTERREGNUM
used by theItalian Marxist Antonio Gramsci todescribe theearly 1930s.
Teterm means a time without atrajectory, or a time outside oftime,
when theold is dying of and thenew has not yet been born or is too
faint tonotice. It is atreacherous time for interpretations: is it just before
dawn, or just after dusk? No wonder that interregnum has once again
seeped into global discourse. Its not just Bauman who is using Gramscis
term, but awide array ofanalytical thinkers.
And theyre not wrong touse that word. Interregnum very accurate-
ly describes thetimes inwhich theworld fnds itself now: atime when
thecurrent forms ofsocietal organization have stopped working. Tis
breakdown has changed theworld order, old forms ofstatehood, thelib-
eral democracy model, and political and international relations concepts.
Meanwhile, new challenges have emerged, and neither theworld atlarge
nor theWestthe most progressive ofcivilizationshas been able tore-
spond tothem.
I would argue that theunderstanding that theworld now fnds itself
inaninterregnum is thekey legacy of2013. Intellectuals, and even
thepolitical community, have begun tofocus ontheenormous challenges
theworld is facing, as well as their own inability toface or toanswer
them. Iwould use another one ofBaumans metaphors for our time: not
only is no one fying theairplane, we dont even know if our destination
airport has been built yet.
Te interregnum manifests itself inthetide ofprotests incountries
ranging from Brazil and Turkey toBulgaria and Ukraine. Teprotestors
are fed up with theexisting political order, but theyre also frustrated by
thelack ofalternatives. Teemergence ofweak political leadersmen or
women whose rule is based onlargely vain eforts topreserve thestatus
quois another feature ofour time outside oftime. America is re-
trenching, theEuropean Union is paralyzed, and theleading democracies
are trying tosolve strategic problems reactively or by ignoring themas
inSyria. All ofthese things are signs ofour times.
No wonder that thegeopolitical and civilizational vacuum is being
flled by anew authoritarian tandem: Putins Russia and China. Teab-
surdity ofthesituation is that these two new sources ofpower and might
are both political phantoms, inaway. Tefrst is inanadvanced state
ofdecay, and thesecond is rapidly exhausting its stores ofresilience.
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 1 5
For me, thedramatic fate ofUkraine perfectly illustrates these times.
Tis one country has demonstrated each ofthetriad ofelements that
characterize theinterregnum: societys quest for dignity, theinability
oftheWest, and above all Europe, tounderstand this quest and help it
along, and thereturn oftraditional Russia, which is pulling Ukraine back
into its orbit and guaranteeing its leaders political survival inexchange
for his countrys independence. We should not be completely surprised
if thePutin-Yanukovych trade-of is silently endorsed by thepor-
tion oftheWestern political community that says it isnt ready totake
ontheUkrainian headache, and that justifes delay with theargument
that Ukrainians are not ready for reform.
One might also say that there are two more signs that we live inanin-
terregnum: thereturn ofPutins Russia as akey player ontheglobal
scene, and Chinas uncanny ability toremain thetarget ofmany coun-
tries pivoting actions. But intruth, all these signs show is that appear-
ances can be deceiving (at least inthecase ofRussia). Tat Western lead-
ers have avoided Putins Olympic games in2014 like theplague, and that
hundreds ofthousands ofUkrainians have taken tothe streets toprotest
theKremlins sufocating embrace could hardly be viewed as manifesta-
tions ofthetriumph ofPutins Russia.
Meanwhile, liberal civilization has not only failed tosolve its domestic
problems; it has also failed toformulate acoherent foreign policymuch
less prove that it still cares about theprinciples it claims toembody.
Tequestion is towhat extent theWest understands its own abysmal
failures, and whether it is ready tosearch for ameans ofovercoming its
paralysis. True, theWest succeeded twice inusing crises as aspur for
renewal and progress: inthe1930s and 1970s. However, one cannot
exclude thepossibility that todays malaise will have todeepen before it
becomes animpetus for change.
Te trends that will complicate theworlds future transformation
both intheWest and intheauthoritarian societiesare visible tous
today. IntheWest, we are witnessing therise ofleft- and right-wing pop-
ulist movements that will make it harder toimplement changes. Inau-
thoritarian societies, thedecaying regimes have co-opted and corrupted
thepolitical and intellectual elite, complicating theodds ofa transforma-
tion from thetop by means ofa pact between pragmatic reformers and
1 6 INTERREGNUM
theopposition. Such pacts made thegreat democratic transformations
ofthepast century possible. Today, system pragmatists are unlikely part-
ners inthestruggle for reform because oftheir involvement inthework-
ings oftheautocratic system. At thesame time, authoritarian regimes
are preventing theformation ofconstructive oppositions by eliminating
them intheir early phases.
What might come oftheautocrats frustration ofreform?
Tepossibility ofa destructive wave ofhatred and wrath that would
bring forth another messianic leader? If thetrends oftherecent past
continue further, this is avery real possibility for Russia.
Isnt there any good news? Isnt there anything onthepolitical land-
scape that we can view as anaccomplishment? you ask. Well, thefact
that interregnum has become abuzzword inthepolitical establishment
is already anachievement. It means that atleast we know that theair-
plane has no pilot. Now we only need tograb thestick and throttle and
look for aplace toland...
1 7
I wrote this comment atthe beginning of2014, when thespirits
oftheliberal community were low. Gone were theinitial joy and
excitement of20112012, which had been born from thesudden
tide ofstreet protests and theapparent readiness ofthedemonstrators
toresist therot and dread they saw all around them. Since those heady
days, thestate machine has done apretty efective job not only inmow-
ing thegrass but also inpaving over thefeld so that nothing will grow
again. Ihope themood offrustration and resignation ondisplay below
will pass, along with hopes for anew Leader who will have tosave
thenation. What follows is merely amental and psychological snapshot
ofa moment intime.
< < <
In his analysis oftherise and fall ofglobal civilizations, thegreat his-
torian Arnold Toynbee developed what he called Challenge-and-Response
theory. Tis theory holds civilizations rise as aresult ofsuccessful re-
RUSSI A
WAI TING FOR
GODOT
2
1 8 INTERREGNUM
sponses tochallenges (both internal and external) and fall when they fail
torespond creatively tothem.
Toynbees theory always occurs tome when Iobserve themounting
challenges Russia faces today. Tese challenges range from thephysi-
calthe deteriorating Soviet infrastructure onwhich Russia depends for
its survivalto thesocialthe decimation ofthehuman capital bound
up inpeoples physical, moral, and mental faculties. Teregime acts as if
it does not notice these challenges. Insome cases, it does try torespond
tothem, but does so only inaway that creates new challenges or that un-
dermines its ability todeal with them. For instance, in2013 Putin ofered
aconservative Doctrine as aresponse toRussias challenges. Containing
internal and external enemies (we all knew who he was talking about)
is themajor element ofthis Doctrine. Inturn, militarization and anew
arms race are essential elements ofthis containment. As Toynbee clearly
demonstrated, militarization and search for anenemy are aclear indica-
tion that acivilization is indecline and is ontheroad toself-destruction.
If Toynbee was infact right, then theKremlin has already embarked
onacourse ofsuicidal statecraft.
Te Russian intellectual and political community does not need
toread Toynbee tounderstand that theRussian system ofautocratic
rule has been exhausted. Teproblem is that society became so fxated
onlamenting and diagnosing themalady that it failed tocome up with
possible cures.
Time is oftheessence. Should thesystem and society continue
todegenerate, theprocess ofdecay may become irreversible, and society
will no longer be willing or able tochange. It is quite possible that this
process has already become irreversible inRussia, but incase it has not,
afull-blown undeniable crisis is its only salvation. Such acrisis will reveal
both thesystems impotence and theextent towhich thesociety is ready
tofght for change and resist thedegradation.
So far, many factors have helped totemporarily keep thesituation
from getting worse. Among them are inertial forces, theregimes ability
topay for public obedience, thetrivial task ofelite co-optation, thelack
ofan intellectual segment ofsociety that is ready toresist, social demor-
alization, and theabsence ofpolitical alternatives. But it is impossible
topredict whether theprocess ofsocial and political decay will become
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 1 9
permanent or whether it will result inanexplosion. Tere are no instru-
ments that can gauge thetemperature oftheprocesses that occur inside
thesocial fabric.
Unless there is acrisis that mobilizes Russian society, one should
expect neither anelite split nor theemergence ofleaders capable ofliv-
ing under new rules. Tedegenerative processes atwork, moreover, have
touched theelite so deeply that there may be no one left who could
accept anew civilizational model or, more importantly, struggle for its
attainment. Again, only acrisis and aprotest wave will reveal whether
it is indeed thecase. But will there be aprotest wave, and if so, when?
Also, what forces will it bring tothe fore? Tese questions have not been
answered yet.
As Russia creeps forward through theearly months of2014, there
are no overt signs that thesystems potential energy has been totally ex-
hausted, nor are there signs that thesystemic crisis has entered thecriti-
cal stage, when theprocesses brewing inside thesocial organism reveal
themselves ontheoutside. True, therot and degradation ofthesystem
is still proceeding apace, but there is no evidence that thedisparate in-
stances ofrot are about tocombine into anunmistakable trend leading
inevitably toward collapse. Most importantly, there are no convincing
signs that themost active segments ofthepopulation are ready torise
up against thecurrent rules ofthegame as their Ukrainian counterparts
did in2013. Or if there are signs, they are still weak and confusing.
So many times intherecent past we have thought: Aha! Heres thecri-
sis. Society cant go onlike this. It just cant tolerate this corruption and
rot anymore! One ofthemost brilliant Russian analysts has repeatedly
declared that Putin is leaving this year, or next year, or soon Putin,
meanwhile, continues todefy these predictions and enjoy his time
intheKremlin.
Gradually theintellectual and political class has begun toreturn toits
familiar feeling ofhelplessness. As before, this feeling ofhelplessness is
breeding adesire towait for change tocome from thetop. Teauthorities
cant rule like this anymore. Tey have tofeel that everything is disintegrat-
ing. Tey will start tolook for anexit solution. Tese are thefamiliar lyrics
sung by this group, even as its members audition for aspot ontheKrem-
lin choir, whose director, they hope, will hand down new songs tosing.
20 INTERREGNUM
Or maybe he wont, but atleast theyll have anice, comfortable spot
inthechoir, right?
Tus theintellectual and political class inRussia has returned toits
usual pastime: waiting for Godot, as per Samuel Becketts play. Teprin-
cipal actors (read: intellectuals and politicians) dont know who Godot
(read: areformer, from above or below) is, and they cant decide what
they should do while they wait. Tey have been sitting and waiting for
quite awhile with no sign ofGodot. Or someone like Putin comes along
and tries toplay thepart, but plays it inaway that we didnt expect.
Who knows? Perhaps anactual crisis in2014 could put anend toour
long wait for areformer from above. If potions and pills cannot cure
our system, maybe asurgeons tools will. Ten again, weve already been
waiting for asurgeon tocome and use those tools, and we all know what
came ofthat.
21
THE RUSSI AN
CONSTI TUTI ON AS
A FOUNDATI ON OF
PERSONALI ZED
POWER
3
Every year, onDecember 12, Russia celebrates theanniversary ofits
Constitution. Every year, then, Russians have anopportunity todeliber-
ate about what their Constitution means tothem. Tis is anopportunity
not only tolook back onthesituation inwhich it was adopted but also
toexamine thekind ofsystem and kind ofrelations between government
and society that it enshrines. Unfortunately, neither Russian elites nor
Russian society dwells onthese constitutional questions atthe moment.
But if they do not think about these questions, there is no reason that we
should not do so here.
Te Russian Constitution was approved after theexecutive authorities
headed by Boris Yeltsin used force tocrush theopposition rallied around
theSupreme Soviet onOctober 34, 1993. Tis set ofcircumstances
naturally tempted thevictors tocreate aConstitution that would afrm
their own monopoly onpower. Ido not dispute that this Constitution
does indeed give thepublic broad rights and freedoms. But atthe same
time, it all but removes thepossibility ofpolitical pluralism and asystem
22 INTERREGNUM
ofchecks and balances. Initself, this fact makes it difcult, if not impos-
sible, toguarantee declared rights and freedoms.
Yeltsins team drafted theConstitution inthefall of1993 after its
victory over its opponents intheSupreme Soviet. Yeltsin himself went
through thedraft, too. Inthesection that sets out theorganization
oftheRussian government, theYeltsin team concentrated all resources
inthepresidents hands and guaranteed his monopoly onpower.
TeConstitution thus places thepresident above thesociety. Tepresi-
dent is subordinate tono one and is answerable tonone. It is practically
impossible toremove thepresident from ofce.
Furthermore, theRussian presidents status makes it possible for him
toconstantly expand his powers. Astudy carried out by Mikhail Kras-
nov, one ofRussias best (probably thebest) constitutional law specialists,
showed that thethree Russian presidents inofce since theConstitution
was adopted (Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev) bestowed their own ofce
with 502 (!) new prerogatives. Whats more, themajority ofthese new
prerogatives do not accord with theConstitution itself. Tesystem that
theConstitution enshrines leans toward state control over society and
toward areproduction ofpersonalized power. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry
Medvedev demonstrated this tendency during their terms by repeatedly
expanding thepresidential monopoly onpower and restricting constitu-
tional rights that are supposed toguarantee citizens freedoms.
Te Constitution is thus both themain guarantor and main instru-
ment for keeping Russias authoritarian system inplace. For various
reasons, not only does theold Yeltsin team, which was responsible for
adopting theConstitution, fnd it very hard toadmit this fact; so too do
many liberals, who hope that thenext leader could resume thereform
process with theconstitutional monopoly onpower still inplace. Tese
liberals try toshow that theproblem is not theConstitution itself but
violations inherent intheway it is enforced. Tis is thesource offre-
quent disagreements Ihave with thedefenders oftheYeltsin Constitu-
tion. Iargue that these violations and theconstant efort tostrengthen
theKremlin bosss personal power arise naturally inasituation inwhich
theConstitution gives one group or person amonopoly onpower and
total control over asocietys resources and politics, both internal and
external. Insuch acontext, theruling group can simply ignore rights
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 23
and freedoms enshrined inother articles oftheConstitution. And this is
exactly what Russias presidents have been doing.
Tus appeals for honest elections and for achange ofleadership will
come tonaught as long as theYeltsin Constitution remains inplace.
Tere is no guarantee that honest politicians working inasystem that
ofers them total control over thestates resources, sans parliamentary
controls, will suddenly choose tolet free competition proceed apace, thus
threatening their own absolute hold onpower. Have you ever seen this
kind ofaltruism inpolitics?
Regrettably, theRussian opposition has thus far ignored theneed
tothink about how Yeltsins Constitution has been anobstacle tore-
form. Its members prefer todeliberate onthepower transfers and honest
elections rather than theneed toeliminate theframework that creates
absolutist power inthefrst place.
Russias reformers need tomake constitutional reform astrategic ob-
jective and togive thepublic honest information about theconstitutional
trap inwhich Russia fnds itself. Constitutional reform that will guar-
antee political competition should become thefoundation for political
reform ingeneral and for opening up Russias system ofgovernment.
Tus theConstitution is one ofRussias biggest problems, even if not
everyone wants toacknowledge it as such. Attitudes toward theConsti-
tution set thepolitical dividing lines. Tose who want tokeep its auto-
cratic and authoritarian elements inplace support personalized power,
even if they dont intend todo so. Tose who want tochange thecon-
stitutional principles that undergird theorganization ofgovernment are
thetrue reformers.
Te time will come when these dividing lines will be clarifed. When
this happens, political renewal will begin again, and society will start
tothink not just about changing thegovernment but also about chang-
ing therules ofthegame. Tis will inturn lead people tothe Consti-
tution, and toquestions about reforming theprovisions that endorse
absolutist power.
Today, however, things appear tobe headed intheopposite direction.
Members oftheruling United Russia party have prepared constitutional
changes that undermine therights and freedoms ofcitizens. Among these
possible changes are: removing theprovision that forbids state ideology;
24 INTERREGNUM
doing away with theinternational law priority for Russian law, and mak-
ing Orthodoxy thebasis oftheRussian identity. Tese proposals are all
signs that theKremlin is testing thewaters, trying tofgure out whether
it can continue its drive toward thecreation ofa totalitarian state. Even if
thepresident doesnt approve these constitutional changes anytime soon,
they give us asense oftheauthorities agenda.
Heres some helpful advice for Western observers: if you want toun-
derstand what thevarious political forces inRussia stand forif you
want tosee thedividing lines, and tounderstand who is infavor ofreal
transformationyou should ask everyone about their take ontheConsti-
tution. Tose who support theYeltsin Constitution are comfortable with
absolute power and dont want tochange therules ofthegame. Tose
who support constitutional reform are infavor ofreal transformation
oftheRussia authoritarian system.
25
RUSSI A:
THE TURNING
POINTS THAT SHAPE
A COUNTRY S
TRAJECTORY
4
Every countrys history has turning points that mark theend ofone
period and thebeginning ofanother. Inrecent Russian history, there were
three events that stand out as turning points inthecountrys post-com-
munist development.
Te frst turning point was theshelling oftheRussian parliament
inOctober 1993, which led tothe establishment ofthepersonalized
power system, refected intheadoption ofa Constitution that legitimized
top down rule. Infact, Putins one-man regime was born not when Yeltsin
gave him power but inOctober 1993, when thegrounds for political
struggle and political pluralism were liquidated.
Te second turning point came intheautumn of2003 with thearrest
and imprisonment ofMikhail Khodorkovsky. Tis event signaled Russias
turn toward state capitalism and themerger ofgovernment and owner-
ship rules, this time under thesecurity agencies control.
Finally, inMay 2012, thearrest ofordinary demonstrators who took
part inthepeaceful Bolotnaya Square protest, and thesubsequent riot
26 INTERREGNUM
charges pursued against them, signaled theauthorities shift toa new
stage. Observers underestimated theimportance ofthis event: it signaled
thereemergence inRussia ofthephenomenon ofpolitical prisoners. It
was also abenchmark signaling theshift from asoft authoritarianism that
tolerated limited dissent toa much more repressive style ofgovernment
with atendency togrow even more repressive over time.
In theBolotnaya case, theauthorities grabbed ahandful ofpeople
out ofthecrowd, or apprehended them afterward, and have been holding
them inprison for nearly ayear and ahalf without succeeding inproving
any case against them. Tepublic investigation oftheir cases, initiated
by theopposition Party RPR-PARNAS with theparticipation ofcivil so-
ciety organizations, proved that theprisoners are innocent and that they
neither provoked ariot nor took part inclashes with thepolice. Infact,
theindependent investigation proved that there were not riots atall, but
brutal attacks by thepolice ondemonstrators. Temajority ofthear-
restees infact received severe beatings atthe hands oftheriot police.
Intheend, even thepolice refused tosupport charges against thepris-
oners. None ofthis, however, had any infuence onthecourts decision
tokeep theaccused indetention.
Te authorities have made it clear that these people are their hostages
and will stay inprison, as if doing so were away totell thepublic that any
ofyou could be intheir place. Tecase is further confrmation oftheRus-
sian court systems degradation, as well as proof that thecourts, together
with theInvestigative Committee, have become akey tool ofrepression
inthestates hands. By taking ordinary people (not even political activists)
hostage, theauthorities have shown that they are ready touse state terror
against their own people inorder tokeep their grip onpower secure.
Over thepast twenty years, Russia has gone from being acountry
thinking about democracy and law toa country inwhich thegovernment
puts people inprison for attempting toassert their constitutional rights.
Russian society understands thefact that, twenty years after collapse
ofcommunism, there are once again political prisoners inRussia. InOc-
tober 2013, 45 percent ofRussians polled agreed that there are political
prisoners. Only 28 percent refused toadmit their existence. To be sure,
while society recognizes theproblem ofpolitical prisoners, it is not ready
todemand their releaseyet.
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 27
Te low level ofpublic protest against thereemergence ofpolitical
prisoners inRussia has led theauthorities toconclude that this tactic
works. No doubt, they will continue down this road. Once aregime be-
gins tofollow theLaw ofRepression, it cant stop. Tehope that Putins
regime might change course and pursue anopen society is achimera.
Why should it, if society does not protest?
What theauthorities did after theBolotnaya case proved that there
are no limits tothe degree ofrepression towhich they will subject soci-
ety, if necessary, and that no one should feel absolutely safe. Tecourt
system and law enforcement organs could distort theformal rules any
way they wish, so there are inefect no rules atall. Tis has inturn cre-
ated anew atmosphere inRussia. Teauthorities refusal toacknowledge
even thebasic rule oflaw has taught society tofollow thesame logic and
touse aggression unchecked by any legal or moral limits. Teauthori-
ties are teaching society thelaw ofthejunglethat one must use force
tosurvive.
True, after imprisoning innocents from thesummer of2012 through
December 2013, theauthorities let some (but only some!) ofthepolitical
prisoners out ofjail under anamnesty declared by Putin. TeKremlin,
apparently, decided that Russians had learned their lesson, and that even
angry people would think twice before taking tothe streets infuture.
Society returned toits previous passivity.
Tus Putin restored control over thecountry without having toesca-
late thedegree ofcoercion, atleast for themoment. Tewhip was placed
inacorneruntil its needed next time. TeSoviet Kremlin would also
declare amnesties and free people from prison, but these moves never
signaled achange inthenature oftheSoviet regime.
For this reason, one should not be deceived by theKremlins tactics,
which include imitation ofa political softening. Tesystem ofperson-
alized power cant stop theLaw ofRepression. To do so would cause it
tobe perceived as weak, and theweak are beaten, as President Putin
likes toremind everyone.
Besides theLaw ofRepression, we may soon see another law atwork:
theLaw ofVicious Circles. Violence from thetop may be answered with
violence from thebottom. Russia is entering aperiod when theauthori-
ties themselves are pushing thecountry toward amuch more aggressive,
28 INTERREGNUM
confrontational style ofbehaviornot just onthepart oftheauthori-
ties but also within society. Teauthorities succeeded inturning many
ofthecultivated and intelligent young people atBolotnaya into pris-
oners. But will they also succeed indealing with theangry mob that
is theinevitable result oftheway oflife and survival strategy they are
cultivating inRussia? Unjustifed repression always creates adesire for
revenge; this vicious circle is along-standing Russian political tradition,
and it continues today. Tat is why theKremlin is trying torestrain this
repressive machine, but themachine may acquire alogic ofits own
29
HOW TO
BLOW OFF
STEAM?
5
Tere is anaxiom well known toall authoritarian rulers: When it be-
comes increasingly difcult tokeep your country under control, you
should start tolook for ways toneutralize discontent or tochannel it
inasafe direction or, usually, both. Tere are myriad ways: you can fnd
anenemy and turn him into anobject ofpopular hatred; you can fo-
cus onplacating critical segments ofthepopulation; or you can co-opt
theopposition. TeKremlin is using every trick inthebook from Soviet
and pre-Soviet times. Tanks toRussian history, and toVladimir Putins
mentality and former career intheKGB, thefabrication ofan enemy
ofthepeople is aparticularly popular strategy intheKremlin. Teen-
emies ofchoice are usually theUnited States, theWest as awhole, and
theRussian liberals (this trick never fails!). Tese days, however, circum-
stances have bestowed theKremlin with anew choice for therole ofof-
fcial enemy: migrants.
Te Kremlin hadnt actually planned onmigrants playing this part.
InRussia today, migrants are key tomaintaining acheap labor force
30 INTERREGNUM
invarious economic areas. Tey are also akey corruption resource for
thesiloviki and thelocal authorities, thus providing animportant means
for thesystems survival. TeKremlin fears therise ofnationalism;
today nationalist sentiment is anti-migrant, but it could just as easily
turn against theauthorities ata moments notice. And inaddition toall
these reasons, themass anti-migrant campaign may hurt Putins plans
tocreate anew Soviet Union under therubric oftheEurasian Union.
Nevertheless, as other means toblow of steam have been played out,
and as social dissatisfaction and anger escalate beyond theregimes ability
tocontrol them, migrants have become convenient objects ofpublic
hatred. TeWest and America are along way away, and Russian liberals
present such amarginalized segment ofthesociety that they barely
register anymore. Tus, migrants, whose appearance and behavior are
diferent from themajority and who are increasingly visible inRussian
society, are becoming convenient objects for public animosity.
I repeat: anti-migrant hatred was not initially theKremlins plan
far from it! But therising tide ofethnic clashes between Slavs and
representatives ofother nationalities (not always migrants) intheregions
and inMoscow forced theauthorities tothink, frst, about how
toneutralize thetide and, second, about how touse it totheir advantage.
Iwould like toremind my readers that citizens ofSlavic descent clashed
mostly not with migrants but with Russian citizens from theNorthern
Caucasus: Chechens, Dagestani, and others. As Moscow Mayor Sergei
Sobyanin admitted inaninterview in2013, When theRussian citizens
demand tosolve theproblem with migration, they have inmind not
theforeigners, but our own citizens from thesouthern Russian republics
[the Northern Caucasus]. TeKremlin has attempted toshift thefocus
toCentral Asians and Azerbaijan natives as enemies. But why migrants
from Azerbaijan and Central Asia? Teir demonization intheRussian
media and political rhetoric are supposed toserve one clear purpose:
shifting thefocus away from theNorth Caucasus Russians.
Te palpable tension between local populations intheRussian
cities and kavkaztsy (Caucasus natives) is aresult ofthetwo brutal
wars that Moscow fought intheNorth Caucasus. TeKremlins
pacifcation policy inthat region has caused nothing but hatred toward
Russia among thepopulation oftheCaucasus, especially theyounger
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 31
generation. Russia has essentially lost theCaucasusor, more precisely,
it has lost its people.
Te Kremlin still has not conceded this defeat. (Indeed it couldnt
possibly do that, since thesecond Chechen war catapulted Putin into
power and legitimized his rule). So it is now trying tohold ontothe
Caucasus by letting thelocal sultans run it. Teimperial claims
supported through theKremlins payofs tothese sultanistic regimes has
nursed among theCaucasus natives (again, especially among theyounger
generations) asense ofpermissiveness and adesire for revenge against
theSlavs. Here, then, is theproblem: rising ethnic hostility inRussian
cities is inmany ways areaction tothe behavior oftheCaucasus
natives, which inturn is aproduct oftheKremlins policies regarding
theNorthern Caucasus.
Te Kremlin, however, has no desire toadmit thetrue reasons for
therising ethnic and racial hostilities. It does not want toacknowledge
theabsurdity ofRussias having become ahostage oftheruthless and
corrupt regimes oftheCaucasus. Instead it has searched for asafe outlet
for ethnic hatred, singling out submissive migrants from Central Asia,
Vietnam, or Azerbaijan as suitable replacements. Any pressure onor
attempts toapprehend thenatives from theNorthern Caucasus would
only increase thetensions inthat region, or it would provoke aterrorist
response. Tat is why theRussian authorities have tried toavoid coercive
measures against theNorth Caucasus natives, even when they commit
criminal acts.
I have afeeling that theKremlin authorities are ready toallow Russian
nationalist gangs toharass migrants, thus channeling theaggression that
is daily growing within society. Even pogroms, Isurmise, will be toler-
ated and used toachieve theKremlins tactical goals. Teauthorities will
do everything intheir power, however, toprevent theRussian nation-
alist movement from organizing itself and becoming apolitical force.
TeKremlin wants toguarantee that it alone retains theright toplay
thenationalist card.
Moreover, theregime apparently believes it loses nothing by making
enemies out ofthevarious migrants from Central Asia and other re-
gions. Any anti-migrant campaign will result inthedeportation ofafew
hundred Central Asian citizens; others will take their place as even more
32 INTERREGNUM
submissive slaves. Teir governments do not care how their citizens are
treated inRussia. TeKremlin apparently hopes that it can regulate
theprocess ofstoking ethnic hatred inaway that will not undermine its
imperial agenda and will not make thenationalist tide harder tocontrol.
Unfortunately, provoking ethnic hatred is anexpedient device for
political consolidation. It is currently being utilized by awide variety
ofpolitical forces, even including those who consider themselves part
oftheopposition. But those who are, for instance, calling for theintro-
duction ofa visa regime for Central Asians are merely playing theKrem-
lins game. True, Russia will have tointroduce avisa regime and create
meaningful borders with all ofthenewly independent states atsome
point, but it makes no sense todo it now, under theauspices ofthecur-
rent corrupt Russian state. If visa regimes are infact introduced, they
will do little more than provide another opportunity for graft, with
border guards and customs ofcials being foremost among thebenefcia-
ries. Erecting fences between Russia and Central Asia will not eliminate
theproblem ofethnic hatred, since its main source is thegrowing alien-
ation oftheNorth Caucasus from Russia. Tese problems wont be solved
with visas and border closings; rather, there needs tobe atransformation
oftheentire Russian state, aregime change, and aresolution oftheprob-
lem oftheNorth Caucasus.
Meanwhile, theRussian authorities have demonstrated that they have
no clue how todeal with thegrowing interethnic and racial hatreds.
TeKremlin decided tohand over all responsibility for interethnic rela-
tions tolocal and regional authorities, threatening tofre those who fail
toprevent theethnic conficts. Teefect ofthis remedy is clear: local
authorities will turn tothe means they know: violence and corruption.
In short, themechanism that theKremlin views as atool for blowing
of steam will instead produce another efect: that ofa boiling kettle with
its lid on. And inall likelihood theRussian kettle is already boiling...
Let us now see what thepolls are telling us about what Russians
ofSlavic origin are thinking about migrants and thekavkaztsy. According
toLevada polls inthefall of2013, when theinterethnic clashes reached
Moscow, 30 percent oftherespondents felt animosity toward repre-
sentatives oftheNorth Caucasus; 25 percent were annoyed by them,
and only 3 percent felt respect toward them. Only 19 percent rejected
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 33
theslogan Russia for Russians! And about 71 percent supported
theslogan Stop Feeding theCaucasus!, while 62 percent expected
bloody interethnic clashes intheir regions. Finally, 54 percent demanded
alimit tothenumber ofNorthern Caucasus natives allowed tomigrate
outside oftheir region, while 45 percent made asimilar demand regard-
ing citizens ofCentral Asian countries (that is, actual migrants).
Tese polls warn us that Russian society has undergone aserious
mood change. Interethnic hatred is becoming one ofthekey explosive
factors intodays Russia. At themoment, theKremlin is able tokeep
therising tide under control. But thegenie is out ofthebottle...
35
HOW PUTIN
I S SOLVING THE
RUSSI AN NATI ONAL
IDENTI TY PROBLEM
6
When acountry begins adebate onnational identity, one can be sure
that something is wrong. Either society is unhappy with how it is ruled,
or theelite doesnt know how tolead, or both. Anational identity crisis is
not just afeature oftransitional societies or ofsocieties lost intransition.
Look atEurope: you will hardly fnd anation today that is not thinking
about its identity, trying tosort it out intimes ofglobalization, disap-
pointment intheruling governments, and massive migration that sweeps
over thecontinent.
Russia is anexample ofa nation that has dwelled onits national iden-
tity for centuries, tothe point that it has become anelite hobby. Putin
returned tothe national identity issue in2012 and again atthe Valdai
Forum inSeptember 2013which just goes toshow that every time
Russian society faces aproblem, theKremlin embarks onanew campaign
insearch ofa national identity.
Te logic behind this move is transparent: its less threatening tothe
regime, theauthorities apparently believe, if society becomes consumed
36 INTERREGNUM
with anew discussion about Who are we? instead ofcriticizing theau-
thorities for corruption and feckless governance.
Unfortunately, thenew national identity that Putin is ofering
Russia is devastating for thecountry. Tenational identity concept
and themechanisms that ought tostrengthen it innormal societies are
usually aimed atconsolidating thenation, increasing feelings oftogeth-
erness among thepeople, and deepening horizontal social networks.
Vladimir Putins vision instead ofers Russia areturn tothe traditional
values that, inhis view, have been cemented inRussian civilization over
thecenturies.
So what exactly are these traditional values? Inshort, they are values
that justify theabsolute dominion ofthestate and state authorities and
theabsolute subordination oftheindividual tothe state. Tis, then, is
theRussian tradition. All notions offreedoms, rights, and privacy are alien
tothis tradition. For centuries theOrthodox Church has been atool for
promoting theidea oftheindividuals subordination tothe state and those
who symbolize it. It is natural, therefore, that ofcial Orthodox doctrine
has now become atraditional value as well. Regarding theinstitution
ofthefamily, theRussian tradition never really supported it, and one
can understand why: family, atraditional value inWestern conservatism,
means respect for theprivate life ofthehome. Inthis view thefamily is
aninstitution that functions independent ofstate infuence and control.
Tus theRussian state has never really tried tostrengthen theconcept
ofprivacy. One can see how Western conservatism and theWestern
understanding oftraditional values difer from theRussian versions.
TeRussian tradition tries toundermine any attempts topromote
horizontal communication and consolidation, and it seeks toblock
thecreation ofcells or entities that operate outside ofstate infuence.
Tere is anirony here inthat theSoviet Union allowed theexistence
ofatleast some oftheformer Russian intellectual traditions, such
as thecontinuity ofRussian spiritual and intellectual life refected
inliterature. True, it was distorted by Soviet norms. But Soviet society
still read Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky atschool. TeSoviet Kremlin tried
toco-opt thelegacy ofthegreat Russian writers and philosophers as
anendorsement oftheir eforts tocreate abetter communist future
and ajustifcation oftheOctober revolution of1917. Putins Kremlin,
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 37
however, doesnt have any use for theRussian spiritual legacy; it needs
mental vacuousness, as well as historical and cultural amnesia. Tis is
exactly what theRussian educational system cultivates: thecreation ofan
illiterate nation that doesnt even remember its own great writers.
Te Russian authorities are trying toturn anation into anartifcial
substance composed ofindividuals who have lost both theability and
thedesire tocreate social ties and communicate with each other. If
theSoviet nation was glued together by thelonging toreach thefuture
communist paradise, then thenation that Putins Kremlin is construct-
ing is a sand societya society ofatomized individuals who lack even
thebasic human longing for family as aninstitution and form oflife.
In this context, Putins ideal society is theopposite oftheideal Asian
society. As Francis Fukuyama wrote inhis brilliant essay Te Primacy
ofCulture, theAsian society has succeeded inpreserving a deeply
engrained moral code that is thebasis for strong social structures and
community life.
1
If Fukuyama is right, inAsia traditional authoritarian
regimes could be relatively easily jettisoned and replaced with avariety
ofpolitical institutional forms without causing thesociety tolose its
essential coherence.
Tis is not thecase inRussia, which, during theSoviet period, lost
social coherence. What Putins elite has tried toofer Russia today is not
traditional values, then, but their imitationssemblances ofthereal
thing that can only serve todiscredit thevalues offreedom, solidarity,
and mutual assistance that have begun totake root among some seg-
ments oftheRussian population. Putins Russian national identity has
aclear agenda: toundermine theprocess oftransforming individuals
into citizens, and toreturn thenation toward total submissiveness and
thestatus ofpoddanyethat is, state slaves. TeRussian authorities
try toprevent any popular consolidation onthehorizontal level that
could turn against theregime. We are dealing here with aconcerted efort
togrind down thenation into even further degradation. TeKremlin
team evidently believes that it would be easier torule over ademoralized
1 Francis Fukuyama, Te Primacy ofCulture, Journal ofDemocracy 6, no. 1 (Janu-
ary 1995).
38 INTERREGNUM
societyan amoral society even, as theRussian sociologist Lev Gudkov
called it. But theKremlin has forgotten asimple truth: asociety without
norms and taboos inevitably turns into aHobbesian society that follows
predatory instincts. Teauthorities can just as easily become victims
ofthese instincts as anyone else. TeOctober 1213, 2013, rioting
inMoscow against corrupt police, local authorities, and migrants under
banners ofnationalistic slogans was ademonstration ofhow theKremlin
variety ofnational identity works inpractice.
Tere is aglimpse ofoptimism and light atthe end ofthis tunnel.
Teprotest tide inRussia in2011 and 2012 has proved that atleast
apart oftheRussian population is ready tobuild its own civil identity
by opposing thestate. But developing anew identity code from below
when theauthorities atthe top are busily trying toundermine all so-
cial cohesiveness is adifcult process, indeed. Asian society could have
aneasier fate.
39
THINKING HI STORY:
THE IMPORTANCE
OF 1991
7
Every time theanniversary ofthe1991 August coup and thedefeat
ofthecommunist putsch rolls around, theevent provokes akind ofcon-
sternation inRussian society. TeRussian elite does its best toignore it
entirely, because when it is forced tocomment, it always stirs controversy.
Te August 1991 coup and its defeat is anambiguous date inRussian
history, and this perception is shared by both thepublic and theruling
class. Tere is no question that this series ofevents marked themoment
when civic engagement and democratic spirit reached apeak among
hundreds ofthousands ofpeople (albeit mostly inMoscow). Tese people
came out todefend theRussian White House, thebuilding that housed
theRussian Federations parliament, which they considered thelegitimate
authority. Tey rose up against thecommunist nomenklaturas attempts
todrag thecountry back into thepast. Tis was mass resistance against
theold system. Infact, it was aRussian Revolution against communism.
But also coloring peoples perceptions today is how this historical ep-
isode ended. Out oftheAugust revolution of1991, anew government
40 INTERREGNUM
emerged, based once again onpersonalized power, headed by Boris
Yeltsin. Teregime reproduced theold model, only this time without
thecommunist rhetoric and onasmaller geographic scale. TeSoviet
Unions collapse was theprice paid for keeping Russian authoritarian-
ism inplace.
Tus with every remembrance oftheAugust 1991 anniversary, people
are reminded that Russia has fallen into theold trap ofthepersonalized
leadership model. Back then people took tothe streets todemand dignity
and freedom, but intheend they handed over theresponsibility for
achieving these things toa leader, Boris Yeltsin, who betrayed them, as so
many Russian leaders have done throughout Russian history.
If you want tounderstand how perceptions ofAugust 1991 have
changed, consider this: today, as many as 10 percent ofRussians polled
register their support for thecommunists putsch, and only 11 percent
support Yeltsin. Terest fall somewhere along anambivalent spectrum.
Tese fgures show us how disoriented Russian society feels when it looks
atits own recent history and atthe roots ofthecurrent state. Tefact
that so few people support Yeltsin, theundisputed winner inthat confict
and anearly symbol offreedom, is quite revealing oftheevolution ofper-
ceptions inRussia over time. Society thinks that theAugust revolution,
with its slogans offreedom and democracy, brought them acorrupted
state and anew system ofpersonalized rule, and it pains them tobe re-
minded ofthis historical failure and their own crushed hopes.
Tis reluctance toface up tothe truth about August 1991 extends
tothe Russian elite as well. Tis is understandable. After all, it was
apopular revolt against ahated government. We can hardly expect Pu-
tins regime toapprove ofsuch anattitude toward theauthorities. More-
over, theKremlin nowadays sees theAugust 1991 collapse as adisaster
and looks back tothe Soviet past inanefort tobuild continuity. Even
Putin, who received his power directly from Yeltsins hands, doesnt think
ofhim as ahero.
Like most Russians, Putin apparently views his Godfather with
mixed feelings. Ontheone hand, he surely must be grateful tohim
for handing over such awonderful present. He shows his gratitude by
safeguarding Yeltsins family interests and security. Ontheother, Putin
has taken pains during his rule toreject any continuity with theYelt-
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 41
sin regime. He has attempted toforge his legacy by presenting himself
as theopposite ofeverything Yeltsin symbolized: weakness, reliance
ontheoligarchs, and inability tocope with opposition or build top-
down rule. Yeltsin is inextricably associated with thewild 1990s and
Russias rapid decline.
Tis explains why August 1991 inRussia is ananniversary that every-
one would rather just forget. Tetime will come when theKremlin will
create its own myth about August 1991. But not yet: too many people
remember what it was and how it ended
Russia hasnt yet learned how todistinguish thenoble surge ofcivic
spirit that thepeople showed in1991 from theway theauthorities used
that surge. Tefact that thepolitical class exploited theevents ofAugust
1991 inorder totake power for themselves does not inany way lessen
theachievements and heroism ofthose who ventured out into thestreets.
In commemorating this anniversary, Russians should also seek toun-
derstand thelesson it teaches: namely, that revolution ends invictory
for thepeople if thepeople take tothe streets todefend their inter-
estsbut not if they just hand them over toan ambitious leader seek-
ing personal power.
43
1993: RUSSI A S
SMALL CI VIL WAR
8
If you believe that 1991, theyear ofthecollapse oftheSoviet Union, was
thekey date inthehistory ofpost-communist Russia, you are wrong! In-
deed, Russia, as anew state was born inlate 1991 when theSoviet Union
went down. But theRussian system ofgovernance, theway Russia is ruled,
and therelationship between thestate and thesociety were built two years
laterin 1993. We Russians still try toskip over that year rather than
deliberate onthedramatic developments that preceded theemergence
ofthecurrent Russian political order. Iguess that we intentionally chose
1991 as thebenchmark inour modern, post-communist history simply
because it was aless ambivalent marker for understanding. After all, 1991
was theyear that marked thereal end oftheCold War and thebilateral
international system based ontheconfrontation between theSoviet Union
and theWest. Such aneasy date for understanding! It doesnt provoke any
headaches, and its accepted by theWest and, indeed, universally.
But reality is more complicated, and sometimes avoiding headaches
means avoiding thinking. Tecollapse oftheSoviet Union led tothe
44 INTERREGNUM
emergence ofa new state, Russia, but it did not lead immediately tothe
creation ofa new system inRussia. True, for two years thepolitical
struggle in1991 to1993 allowed us todraw theconclusion (or rather
gave us theillusion) that anew political reality was emerging inRussia,
and that Russian society was choosing its new trajectory. But thestruggle
soon ended, and it gradually became apparent that Russia had returned
tothe old pathto theold system ofpersonalized power.
Its easy tounderstand why we try toforget 1993. We dont want
todwell onviolent struggle, ontheshelling oftheparliament, and
onthebloodshed ofOctober 1993, especially when we still have not
decided who was wrong and who was right inthose turbulent times. But
until we decide what happened inthose days, why they happened, and
what they mean for Russia today, we cannot build anew Russian identity
and we cannot consolidate society. Spain became amodern nation when
Spaniards arrived ata shared truth about their civil war.
Russia still has toacknowledge that inOctober 1993 civil war broke
out inRussia. Yes, it was asmall civil war confned toone city, Mos-
cow, but it was nonetheless acivil war that determined thecurrent Rus-
sian landscape.
Te confrontation between theSupreme Soviet, theRussian legisla-
ture, and theexecutive power (President Yeltsin) was preceded by atwo-
year-long story ofpolitical deadlock. Some still believe that this dead-
lock was theresult ofthemutual animosity between Yeltsin and Ruslan
Khasbulatov, thehead oftheSupreme Soviet. Ten why would these two
people from thesame team that fought together with theSoviet Center
suddenly become enemies? Tere should be areason for their antipathy.
If you think that October 1993 was aconfrontation between reform-
ers and traditionalists, you dont understand thewhole truth. While
Yeltsins team included liberals and technocrats, it included apparatchiks
and traditionalists, too. And theSupreme Soviet, which had become
theheadquarters ofpopulist forces, also included democrats and people
who had their own ideas about how toreform Russia. Moreover, it was
thesoon-to-be dismantled Supreme Soviet itself that had approved Yelt-
sins emergency powers and economic reform plan.
Te confrontation between thetwo branches ofRussian govern-
ment had structural roots that made confict inevitable. Just consider:
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 45
theSupreme Soviet was aninstitution left over from theSoviet Union,
and it had one more bizarre featurethe nearly thousand-person-strong
Congress ofPeoples Deputies. According tothe old Constitution,
thelegislature was thekey power center. When Yeltsin was elected and
inNovember 1991 given (by theCongress) emergency powers for one
year, theconfrontation between thetwo branches became inevitable.
Both branches wanted tohave amonopoly onthelevers ofpower.
Tus mutual hostility was strengthened by themindsets ofboth sides
oftheRussian political class. Both teams were striving toguarantee for
themselves absolute control over state resources. Neither team was ready
tosit down and talk, or tolook for compromises; they were ready tofght
for power tothe bitter end, and with every means attheir disposal. Tere
was aneconomic motivation for thefght, too: theprivatization issue
and theattempts ofboth branches toobtain or control thecrown jewels,
state-owned properties.
Could there have been apeaceful exit from this deadlock? Teoretical-
ly, yes. Ihave inmind azero solution, which would have meant com-
ing toagreement onanew constitution. Tat constitution would have
become thebasis ofa new state and would have distributed thefunctions
ofgovernment, thus forestalling any clashes. Teparliament would have
voluntarily dissolved, and thepresident would have stepped down, fol-
lowed by new elections atthe end of1993. Indeed, this zero option
was discussed inMoscow. No one could agree toit, however; neither side
was ready toshare power. Its worth mentioning here one additional fact:
it was Yeltsin who had been desperately trying toliquidate theSupreme
Soviet and had even made anunsuccessful attempt todo so inthespring
of1993. It was also Yeltsin who, intheend, decided touse military
means toachieve this goal.
After failing todisband theSupreme Soviet inthespring of1993,
Yeltsin made anew attempt tobreak thedeadlock inSeptember ofthat
year by issuing Decree (Ukaz) No. 1400, which dissolved theparliament
infavor ofpresidential rule. TeSupreme Soviet decided toresist, with
well-known results: Yeltsin ordered theshelling oftheRussian White
House, thehome oftheparliament. Even today, however, we dont know
exactly how many people were killed onOctober 24 intheviolence
onMoscows streets and during theshelling oftheRussian White House.
46 INTERREGNUM
According toofcial sources, 147 were killed and 372 were injured, but
eyewitnesses speak ofhundreds and thousands killed and injured. Its
unlikely well know thetruth ofthis anytime soon: too many people wish
tokeep thetruth ofthematter inthedark.
Tis tragedy ended with theadoption ofa new Constitution that Yelt-
sin himself edited. Tis Constitution became thefoundation ofthenew
state and system. Init, thepresident was toremain well above thefray,
unaccountable toanyone, with every means ofpower concentrated inhis
hands, and infear ofno opponent or rival. Even Russian czars would
envy thepower ofthenew Russian monarch. We need such astrong
executive toproceed with thereforms, Yeltsins allies used tosay. Yet after
theadoption ofthenew Constitution, reforms inRussia stalled.
Looking back atthese events, Im less inclined toview them with any
ambivalence: inSeptemberOctober 1993, Boris Yeltsin and his team
performed acoup dtat that resulted inRussias return toan authoritar-
ian system ofgovernance.
True, during Yeltsins tenure Russia exhibited some elements ofpoliti-
cal pluralism and political struggle. However, these elements were not
theresult ofYeltsins democratic longings but rather natural consequences
ofhis losing public support and oftheweakness ofhis rule. He didnt
have thestrength toinstall areally strong rule. Yeltsin respected free
media and political pluralism, his fans would say. Iwould retort that
he hardly exhibited respect for freedoms and rights; whatever apparent
respect he showed tothese values was due more tohis inability tobuild
authoritarian rule onhis own. Yeltsin nevertheless had created apoten-
tially repressive political machine, one that his successor put tomuch
more efective use.
If 1991opened a variety of options for Russia, including apath
toward arule oflaw state and anopen society, then 1993 closed all
options except one. Tesole remaining option was anew system
ofpersonalized power with no checks, no balances, and no counterweight
tothe person sitting onthethrone intheKremlin. Tis outcome was
adirect result ofthetragic days ofOctober 1993.
How do Russians view these events today? Aplurality (about 30per-
cent) try toavoid thinking about who was right, who was wrong, and
who was responsible for bloodshed; instead they explain theconfron-
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 47
tation as alegacy ofthepast. Te past, intheir view, is thecollapse
oftheSoviet Union and Gorbachevs guilt! How Gorbachev could be
considered responsible for thedrama that took place three years after he
left theKremlin...this absurdity does not register with those who prefer
toleave thepast dead and buried.
What about therest? 19 percent say that it was Yeltsin who provoked
confrontation; 7 percent say it was thecommunist forces and extrem-
ists, and 10 percent blame theleaders oftheSupreme Soviet rebellion:
Vice President Alexander Rutskoi and head oftheSupreme Soviet Khas-
bulatov. Lastly, 35 percent today think that both forces were responsible
for theconfrontation.
Tere is one positive legacy ofthese events: amajority ofRussians
(54percent) think that Yeltsins use offorce was not justifed. Only
15percent believe that it was necessary.
It would be wrong toconclude that thecurrent Russian political
regime was built in1999, when Yeltsin ofered Russia toPutin; nor was
it built in2004, when Putin started toincrease his control; nor in2012,
when theKremlin manipulated theoutcome oftheelections. Putins
regime was built in1993, when, after shelling theSupreme Soviet,
Yeltsin installed thenew rules ofthegame and concentrated all resources
ofthestate where they have always beenin theKremlin. Teyears
19931999 were theperiod when all those rules lay inwait for anew
czar touse them.
49
COULD LAVROV
BE RI GHT ABOUT
SPENGLER?
9
In one ofhis essays, Russian Foreign Afairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, avery
talented interpreter ofPutins thoughts and phobias, invoked German his-
torian Oswald Spenglers idea ofdecay. Spengler lamented that theWestern
community atthe beginning ofthetwentieth century was losing its moral
stance and its desire todefend thehuman set ofvalues. Tere is no doubt
whose decay Lavrov had inmind by bringing up Spengler. He has specif-
cally told us that he was pointing tothe decay ofcontemporary Western
civilization, which, he says, has reached theextent ofits lifespan!
Usually Ido not fnd Lavrov convincing, although he is sometimes enter-
taining and sometimes helps one formulate ones thoughts, if only toop-
pose him. But this time he may be right. Syria ofers astark demonstration
ofhow theWestern community, including theideological states (the states
that declare themselves tobe thedefenders and proponents ofnormative
values), have tried toforget their self-proclaimed mission. By using chemi-
cal weapons against his own citizens, Assad has efectively helped theWest
divert international focus from his predatory regimethat is, from theroot
50 INTERREGNUM
cause oftheSyrian tragedy. Rather than deal with thecivilizational and po-
litical issues that created this situation, theWest has chosen instead totreat
it as asecurity problem and acredibility problem (meaning that theWestern
community needed toperform triage onits battered public image).
We cant prevent Assad from his killing his own people, theadvo-
cates oftheglobal P.R. approach would respond. Just Google Iraq and
see what happens if theWest tries tointervene, they advise. Western
leaders should give thanks indeed toGeorge W. Bush, for giving them
anall-purpose, ready-made justifcation for doing nothing about any par-
ticular human slaughter. But is such asee no evil, hear no evil approach
really helping theWest restore its reputation?
Meanwhile, thenext chapter intheWests manual onStraddling
theFence should be devoted toVladimir Putin, who deserves aspecial
place incontemporary history for helping Western leaders save face. For
two years, Putin torpedoed Security Council resolutions onjoint ac-
tions tostop Assad. TeWestern powers publicly expressed frustration
and even outrage over Putins spoiler role, but you didnt have todig too
deeply todiscover that privately they were glad they had apretext not
tobe dragged into aSyrian trap.
Suddenly (or was it really all that sudden?), Putin presented theWest,
and Obama personally, with away out: aplan for putting Assads chemical
weapons stockpiles under international control. Everybody understood that
this solution presents many technical challenges (assuming its feasible atall).
Everyone also understood that this agreement also does nothing toend Syrias
humanitarian catastrophe. But no matter; everyone was happy! Putins initia-
tive has saved political reputations intheWestern capitalsat least for now.
Who could have guessed afew years ago that Putin, aleader who uses
anti-Western sentiment inhis own country, would become theGuarantor
ofPeace who saved theWest from disgrace and internal dissention! Presi-
dent Obama really should give him his Nobel Prize. Viva Putin, Savior
oftheWest!
Does anyone ever ask themselves how many Syrians will be killed
while international inspectors are searching for Assads declared and
undeclared chemical weapons? Has anyone considered how theWests in-
ability todefend thevalues it declares will undermine them globally?
In theend, Lavrovs invocation ofSpengler may be absolutely justifed.
51
THE NORTH
CAUCASUS:
THE BOMB UNDER
THE RUSSI AN
FEDERATI ON
10
Imagine if Algeria were aprovince ofFrance. Now imagine that that
province is totally subsidized by theFrench budget. At thesame time,
imagine that it is ruled by alocal sultan whose praetorians are hostile
tothe French military. Moreover, these praetorians have aheadquarters
inParis from which they kill their enemies and operate acriminal racket.
Absurdity! Yet this very scenario exists inRussia. Iam talking, ofcourse,
about theNorth Caucasus, aregion that hosts anumber ofsultanistic re-
gimes, atleast one ofwhich, Ramzan Kadyrovs regime, is openly defant
toward Moscow.
Te existence oftheNorth Caucasus sultanates exemplifes
thecomplexities ofmodern Russia. Tecountry is ahalf-frozen, half-
disintegrated empire made up ofvastly diferent civilizational segments.
And theNorth Caucasus grows increasingly alien toRussia with each
passing year.
Russia is desperately trying tofgure out how tocontinue tosurvive
as theRussian Federation. All political forces, not just theKremlin, view
52 INTERREGNUM
with fear and dread theongoing interethnic hatreds and civil and mili-
tary confrontation that are unraveling theNorth Caucasus. Logic and
historical experience suggest that Russia must move toward thenation
state model. Doing this, however, would require further disintegration
and territorial contractions, neither ofwhich Russians are ready toaccept
or even tothink about. But while theshrinking ofan empire is painful
tocontemplate, it may be less painful than contemplating thelikely end
ofa half-frozen state with imperialistic longings.
And here we are: theKremlin is paying aheavy price topacify, accom-
modate, and appease theNorth Caucasus, which is evidence oftheRus-
sian states fragility. TeKremlins willingness tolet local sultans establish
despotic rules is asign that theprocess ofstate atrophy is underway.
Ramzan Kadyrovs ruthless rule inChechnya is aninvitation for other
North Caucasus republics tofollow suit. Chechen rule, infact, amounts
toa form ofKremlin-sanctioned anti-constitutional coup because ofone
thing: theChechen leader, playing by his own rules ofthegame,
ignores or rejects theRussian Constitution. It is hard tobelieve that
theRussian Federation, with such anti-constitutional implants, can
survive for long. Many observers fear that its disintegration is inevitable.
And what comes next?
At theend of2013 theRussian Duma approved alaw that criminaliz-
es attempts toundermine Russian territorial integrity. Prohibited are any
actions, including speech(!), that is directed atundermining theterrito-
rial integrity oftheRussian Federation. Tose convicted ofthese crimes
could be jailed for as long as three years. What this law shows is that
theauthorities are fearful ofcurrent trends and helpless toreact tothem.
Meanwhile, we may see dramatic developments, thenature ofwhich
one hesitates toeven consider. One could imagine several truly worrying
scenarios, including Kadyrovs praetorians taking part inthestruggle for
power not only intheregion but inMoscow.
Tere is another problem too, and it is no less dramatic: theNorth
Caucasus terrorism hotbed has morphed into aninternational network.
North Caucasus terrorists can strike inany Russian city. Indeed theun-
precedented emergency situation regime that theRussian authorities
were forced toadopt during theSochi Olympics inFebruary 2014
is proof oftheterrorists strength. Temajority ofthose who tuned
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 53
intowatch theWinter Games hardly knew that one ofthemost pow-
erful terrorist gangs, theone led by Doku Umarov from theNorthern
Caucasus, launched 2,200 terrorist attacks inside and outside theregion
that killed 1,800 police ofcers and 450 ordinary citizens from 2007
to2012 (thousands more were wounded). Tis is areal war that ter-
rorists are waging inRussia, but it doesnt get all that much attention
inthemainstream media.
Te North Caucasus is already becoming aninternational issue. Fight-
ers from theregion have shown up inSyria, and terrorists from all across
theglobe have also come tothe Caucasus. TeNorth Caucasus is not just
aRussian problem; it is theworlds problem.
55
JUNE 12:
INDEPENDENCE
FROM I TSELF?
11
Imagine that theUnited Kingdom chose tocelebrate theday it lost
theAmerican colonies, or theday it gave up Ireland or India. Or what
if Turkey decided tocelebrate thebreakup oftheOttoman Empire, or
France decided tocelebrate thedecolonization ofAlgeria? Bizarre? Schizo-
phrenic? Absolutely.
Tis is why its so strange that onJune 12 Russia tries tocelebrate its
sovereignty without raising theuncomfortable question: sovereignty from
whom? From theSoviet Union? But theSoviet Union was Russia, albeit
under adiferent name. From its former colonies (the Baltics, Central
Asia, theSouth Caucasus states, and Ukraine)? Teoddity with this an-
niversary inRussia is that, despite its celebrating Russian independence
from therest oftheSoviet Union, theKremlin today is trying tore-
embrace theleftovers. Tis makes theRussian Independence celebration
atruly singular event.
You might object. You might say, Come on! Tere are hundreds
ofhistorical paradoxes, inconsistencies, and historical myths. And you
56 INTERREGNUM
would be right. But theproblem with Russias Independence Day celebra-
tion is that it has become thefrst link inachain ofmystifcations that
have tied up Russia inone big Gordian knot! Let me mention only afew
ofthese chain links.
Russias declaration ofindependence and thedissolution oftheSo-
viet Union inreality helped theRussian system ofpersonalized power
tosurvive inanew incarnation, with Yeltsin as its embodiment. Usually
thecollapse ofan old state aids intheprocess ofestablishing both anew
regime and anew rule. IntheRussian case, it went theother way.
As for thedeclaration ofsovereignty, that was mainly intended by
theRussian political elite as ameans ofgetting rid ofGorbachev and tak-
ing over control oftheSoviet resources and instruments ofpower.
Heres another link inthechain. Russian independence helped
tofreeze theleftovers oftheSoviet empire into thenew form oftheRus-
sian Federation. Tecurrent Russian state is not anation state, nor is it
atrue empire. Rather it is something vague and amorphousa swamp
ofold habits, obsolete moods, and amentality stuck inaninterstitial
civilizational space. Tis ungainly construct can only survive by con-
stantly returning tothe past. Tis is what Putin is now doing by turning
torepression inorder toprolong theRussian Matrixthat is, personal-
ized power, amix ofpower with property, and superpower ambition.
Iwouldnt put all responsibility for this onPutin; he, too, is ahostage
ofthesystem that he created.
Disguising thecontinuity between theSoviet past and thenew regime
as arevolution gave birth tothe treacherous new Russiaa place where
liberals serve thepersonalized ruler, where reforms help tomonopolize
power and property, where democracy camoufages authoritarianism,
and where cooperation with theWest alternates with ananti-Western
consolidation ofthesociety, as circumstances dictate.
Lets look athow Russian society views its Independence Day.
According topolls, about 50 percent ofrespondents dont even know
what June 12 inRussia commemorates. But nearly half ofthepopulation
has avague idea ofwhat theday means. True, over thepast decade
Russians have begun toapprove ofRussian independence. Tat means
that they closed achapter ontheSoviet Union and have started toview
thenew Russia as their state. In1998 only 28 percent ofrespondents
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 57
considered theindependence ofRussia as apositive achievement,
whereas 57percent viewed it as negative. In2013 we see theopposite
trend: 53percent look atRussian independence as apositive, and only
22percent as anegative. But this doesnt mean that Russian society
has begun todebate its recent past or think about what thepast means
tothem.
In order tostart thinking onhow totransform theRussian swamp,
we Russians must, for starters, come toan understanding ofwhat
thebeginning ofthestory really was.
59
THE EURASI AN
UNI ON: BACK TO THE
USSR, OR THE UNI ON
OF BLACKMAILERS?
12
Many perceive theEurasian Union as athreatPutins attempt tore-
vive theSoviet Union and theCold War. Others say its not so great. So
which is it? Amyth or real integration project? If thelatter is true, then
what is thepurpose ofthis project?
Quite afew integration initiatives have been launched inthepost-So-
viet space. Telist includes theCSTO (Collective Security Treaty Orga-
nization ), theEurasian Economic Community , theCommon Economic
Space ofRussia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, theUnion State ofRussia and
Belarus, and lastly theCustoms Union. Inall cases, theintegration proj-
ects were initiated by theTroika: MoscowAstanaMinsk. But each at-
tempt was crushed under theweight ofa new and unwieldy bureaucracy.
Credit for theEurasian Union idea goes toKazakh President Nursul-
tan Nazarbayev, but Vladimir Putin made theidea of Eurasian integra-
tion his mission when he returned tothe Russian presidency in2012.
Perhaps Putin wants togo down inhistory as theunifer ofthepost-
Soviet space, unlike his predecessor, Yeltsin, who is credited with helping
60 INTERREGNUM
todestroy theSoviet Union. But Putin must also have amore prosaic
goal inmind: as theKremlins internal power reserves diminish, Putin
must fall back ontheexternal reserves ofRussian authoritarianism. One
ofthemain power sources is thenew imperial idea, which is apopular
notion for some inRussia.
At aDecember 24, 2013, Customs Union summit inMoscow attend-
ed by representatives from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, theTroika
announced that in2015 theCustoms Union would become theEurasian
Economic Union. Tecreators ofthis new integration project claimed
that this union would be like anEU for thepost-Soviet space and would
serve as abridge between Europe and Asia.
Tings arent that simple, ofcourse. As ofthis writing, theTroika
members have not agreed toa model for integration. Moscow is calling
for thecreation ofsupranational political bodies, which would result
inmember states losing some oftheir sovereignty. Apparently fearing
Russian control, Kazakhstans Nazarbayev argues that economic inte-
gration will sufce. State sovereignty is anaxiom, Nazarbayev says.
Another Troika member, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, has
suddenly turned into acritic ofthesovereignty concept, saying that it is
not anidol tobe worshipped.
Astana also believes that participation intheEurasian Union should
not preclude participation inother integration models. Tat is what
Nazarbayev, who dreams ofcreating aCentral Asian Union, insists on.
Lukashenko sees theEurasian Union as part ofEuropean integration.
Meanwhile, Moscow is sticking tocautious statements suggesting that
there would be cooperation with theEU. But therecent Moscow-Brus-
sels battle for Ukraine indicates that theKremlin considers theEurasian
project tobe analternative tothe EU. Tis is understandable: theidea
ofRussian Eurasianism, as it dates back tothe early twentieth century,
has always been directed against Europe and theWest. Today theRussian
elite view theEurasian idea as ajustifcation for restoring theSoviet space
under aRussian leadership (albeit inalimited form).
It is true that thecreation oftheCustoms Union has brought
economic benefts toits members. Inthefrst six months ofits exis-
tence, for instance, thetrade fow between thethree member countries
increased by one third. But there is no reason tobelieve that closer
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 61
integration would facilitate economic modernization ofthemember
states. After all, their current authoritarian regimes arent interested
intransparency or therule oflaw, which are both essential elements
ofeconomic modernization.
Te ability tocoordinate policies between authoritarian states is
another serious issue. Ordinarily, democratic states adopt integration
models that build relations around agreement onmutually benefcial
compromises. Relationships between authoritarian regimes, however, are
based onoppression and subordination. Terefore, Moscow would have
tocompensate other members for their participation intheEurasian
Union, lest their authoritarian leaders use it toadvance interests contrary
toRussias. Inshort, theEurasian integration model means support for
theKremlins great power aspirations inexchange for fnancial, eco-
nomic, and military payofs tofellow Eurasian Union members. Such is
thenature ofRussian relations with Belarus and Armenia, for instance.
Indeed threatening towithdraw from theintegration project has become
Lukashenkos most important resource for maintaining power. According
tosome analysts, theLukashenko regime costs Russia $7-12 billion dol-
lars annually. (Moscow recently promised Lukashenko $2 billion inlow-
interest loans.) What is more, accepting money from theKremlin doesnt
mean that theBelarusian leader has tomake any concessions toMoscow.
Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev has also demonstrated deft black-
mailing skills, demanding a$200 million loan from Moscow, inaddition
totrade and economic preferences. When he didnt get what he wanted,
Kyrgyzstan postponed joining theEurasian Union. Ukrainian President
Viktor Yanukovychs marriage with Russia has already cost Moscow
$15billion, as well as discounted gas prices.
Te Eurasian Union that Putin is trying tobuild can be pictured as
agalaxy, with Russia atthe center and themember states indiferent
orbits corresponding totheir varying degrees ofdependence. Tis
galaxy is unlikely tohold together, for several reasons. First, Russias
emaciated budget will not be able tocontinuously support Putins
dream ofbeing aunifer. Second, as thecases ofBelarus and Ukraine
demonstrate, national consciousness tends toform faster when astate is
dependent onRussia. People inthese states seek tofree themselves from
this dependence, personifed both by their own states regimes and by
62 INTERREGNUM
theregimes foreign sponsors. Tird, Russians may soon tire ofpaying
tosatisfy their elites imperial complexes.
For evidence ofthis, Iwill refer tothe study conducted by theEu-
ropean University inSt. Petersburg. InaDecember 2, 2013, Vedomosti
article, Te Customs Union: theSelfess Union, Professor Yulia Vy-
myatina, author ofthestudy inquestion, conclusively demonstrated that
Kazakhstan is being harmed by joining theCustoms Union (at least for
now!). Tecountry was forced toraise tarifs onimported goods, so local
consumers had tostart buying themore expensive and poorer quality
Russian goods instead ofthecheaper Chinese ones. Belarus, ontheother
hand, stands tobeneft handsomely from theCustoms Union intheshort
term, but theassistance Moscow provides toBelarus has held it back
from initiating economic reforms, thus worsening its overall decay. As for
Russia, theUnion only produces economic losses. According toProfes-
sor Vymyatina, Russia derives no economic benefts from thecreation
oftheCustoms Union, and none are insight. Infact, there are only
costs. Russia loses money directlyby supporting theCustoms Unions
bureaucratic apparatusand indirectlyby providing various conces-
sions and credits for thecurrent and potential Customs Union members.
TeCustoms Union caters tothe realization ofRussias imperial ambi-
tionsas usual, atthe peoples expense. As usual, no one asked them.
Iwould add that transforming theCustoms Union into aEurasian
economic, and subsequently political, union cannot possibly change
thesubstance ofthearrangement while thetrends behind its formation
remain thesame.
Yet, we can see that, as theKremlin comes closer toits goal ofcreating
theEurasian Union, it is increasingly employing its propaganda machine
todemonstrate tothe public theprojects great and noble purpose. Un-
fortunately, some serious political analysts have joined this propaganda
campaign. And since they cannot frankly admit that theKremlins plan
is toresuscitate its imperial aspirations atthe Russian taxpayers expense
and tomake its neighbors dependent onRussia, they resort toall sorts
ofrhetorical tricks. Tey try topersuade us that Russia is not trying
torestore theSoviet Unionnot atall! Tere is nothing inappropriate
about this project. It is wrong tothink otherwise. TeEurasian project,
they insist, is actually anattempt by Russia topromote its cultural,
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 63
civilizational, and historical area. But wait aminute! If what they are
saying is true, then what is stated intheofcial materials oftheEurasian
Economic Community is false! Inreality, it is not about economics, but
rather about promoting acivilizational area. But civilizational area for
Russia translates into imperial ambition and thesubmission ofthein-
dividual tothe state. Inother words, it is all about recreating theSoviet
value system inanother guise.
Tus, theEurasian project is nothing but achimera. It is apost-Soviet
authoritarian leaders Internationale ofsorts, inwhich autocrats use each
other topreserve their rules. TeKremlin plays its neo-imperial role
inthis project. For thesake ofmaintaining its great power image, it is
willing topay for thetwo-faced loyalty ofits integration partners even
as they shop around for anew sponsor. TeEurasian bubble will burst
sooner or later. Meanwhile, theintegration myth still works, sustaining
thepower ofcorrupt regimes. As thechimera lives on, thetwilight over-
shadowing thepost-Soviet space lasts longer.
65
THE PUTIN
DOCTRINE FOR
URBI ET ORBI
13
What aweird world we are living in. America was hiding behind Russias
back while looking for asolution tothe Syrian crisis and is now trying
not toirritate Moscow tokeep it from hindering Washingtons eforts
tosolve theIranian nuclear problem. It is thedeal with Iran that is sup-
posed tosave Obamas reputation athome and abroad.
Tings are just as strange inEurope. Having become themain player
inEurope, Germany is trying toprove that it is merely aregional state,
acting thepart ofa political dwarf. France and Great Britain, meanwhile,
have fed theworld stage altogether. True, Paris attempted totake theini-
tiative ontheSyrian issue, and it was even prepared togo towar against
Assad. But Washington quickly brought it toits senses. As for London,
its silence is deafening. It appears that, after Tony Blair, Great Britain has
decided not topursue anactive foreign policy.
Just as theother leading players were feeing theworld stage, Pu-
tin decided it was his moment toshine. Some mistakenly believe
theKremlin will be satisfed with savoring its short-lived principal role
66 INTERREGNUM
intheSyrian plan. Nothing could be further from thetruth! By theend
of2013 Vladimir Putin had announced that he had entered theworld
stage for thelong haul, and that he intends tochange theworld.
TeRussian president made this announcement atthe time when
theWest was paralyzed politically and ideologically, when it had lost its
strategic vector and sense ofmission, and when Western capitals were
flled with pragmatic leaders interested inpreserving thestatus quo and
avoiding any global responsibility. All ofthese factors certainly afected
Putins behavior.
Of course, thefavorable international climate was not theonly factor
enabling Putin toaspire toa global leadership role. Tere is adomestic
component that forces theKremlin toactively assert itself ontheworld
stage. Although Ihave written about it numerous times, let me once
again remind you ofthesurvival logic oftheRussian Matrix. While
other leaders focus oninternal matters, trying tosolve escalating domes-
tic problems (as President Obama has done), theRussian personalized
regime has adopted adiferent model ofsurvival. As arule, theKremlin
begins its search for away todistract people from hardship athome by
becoming more active intheinternational arena. Tat is exactly how
Vladimir Putin is acting today. He is trying toconsolidate his power
externally because theinternal resources for such aconsolidation (eco-
nomic, fnancial, administrative, and social) have begun toshrink.
Tis external focus is facilitated by thefact that popular support for
theKremlins actions abroad is still strong. (It has always been stronger
than thesupport for theKremlins domestic policies.) Tus, Putins turn
outward was predetermined by internal factors. Nevertheless, its success
defnitely resulted from theWests loss ofdrive and initiative.
Let us now examine major milestones ontheway toformulating aPu-
tin Doctrine for Urbi et Orbi. (Te Kremlin didnt articulate it all inone
go.) Iwould argue that its origins can be traced back to2004, theyear
ofUkraines Orange Revolution. Tat was when theKremlin frst ex-
pressed its concerns and irritation with theWest, as well as its suspicion
ofWestern sabotage inthepost-Soviet space. But only afew years later,
atthe Munich Security Conference in2007, Putin openly confessed
some aspects ofhis future doctrine, particularly when he unexpectedly
(that is, unexpectedly for theWestern and American audiences) attacked
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 67
American expansionism and accused theUnited States ofviolating
therules ofthegame.
Te reset period during Medvedevs interim presidency gave rise toil-
lusions oftheKremlins commitment tocooperation. Inreality, theRus-
sian administration continued topursue theapproach Putin laid out
inMunich, although it was not as obvious. After all, it is no coincidence
that Putin made sure todistance himself from thereset policy. As one can
see clearly now inhindsight, theKremlins participation inthereset was
dictated by its tactical agenda and, frst ofall, its expectation ofdeliver-
ables that intheKremlins view have never been delivered by theU.S.
side. President Medvedevs soft appearance and amiable looks deceived
quite afew people!
Te revision oftheForeign Policy Concept oftheRussian Federation,
made public inFebruary 2013, was thenext step intheKremlins calibra-
tion ofits external outlook and foreign policy objectives. TeConcept
refected thereinvented priorities previously articulated inlarge part
by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Lavrov elaborated onPutins
Munich course, adding apractical dimension toit. TeConcept formu-
lated theKremlins new outlook onthemodern world. First, theCon-
cept alludes tothe continued global fnancial and economic crisis and
thediminished ability oftheWest todominate theworld economy and
international politicsall signs theWests terminal decline, intheKrem-
lins view. Ten, it mentions thecreation ofa polycentric system ofin-
ternational relations. It also talks about global competition that takes
place onacivilizational level, whereby various values and models ofde-
velopment based ontheuniversal principles ofdemocracy and market
economy start toclash and compete against each other. Inaddition,
theConcept emphasizes unlawful use ofhuman rights concepts toexert
political pressure onsovereign states, interfere intheir internal afairs .
. . . Finally, it names further strengthening oftheCIS as being one
ofRussias priorities. Tis is how themain elements oftheinternational
strategy ofPutins Russia were formulated.
Sergey Lavrov set out toelaborate onthese elements. Inhis article,
Russias Foreign Policy Philosophy (International Afairs, Issue 3,
2013), Lavrov feshed out Russias main priorities and presented
theKremlins take onits own opportunities and theopportunities set
68 INTERREGNUM
out before therest oftheworld. Here is what he had tosay: Having
been freed from ideological blinders ofthepast, we, most probably,
understand better than others therealities oftheXXI century. He
is clearly talking about theliberal Western ideology and its represent-
atives. Lavrov maintains that theWestern world is doomed, since it
has rejected traditional values and has tried toabsolutize individual
rights and liberties, which is a recipe for losing any landmarks both
indomestic and foreign policy. Inother words, theKremlin made it
clear that Western democracies are bound toend up dead and buried
inapolitical graveyard.
Te presidents September 2013 Valdai speech and December 2013
Address tothe Federal Assembly further elaborated thePutin Doctrine.
At theannual Valdai International Club meeting, which attracts inter-
national experts and mostly retired politicians, Putin added afew fnal
touches and alleviated thesufering ofthose who had been dizzied by
theKremlins constant zigzagging. Is Russia with theWest or against it?
Is Putin turning torepression or again opening awindow for theop-
position? Hopefully, those who thought that theKremlin would keep
zigzagging and pursuing its tactical goals will no longer think so. Putin
has made matters abundantly clear, thus calling toa close theperiod
ofRussian history beginning in1991a period that includes part ofhis
own tenure inofce, known as Putin-lite. Tis period had been marked
by Russias agonizing search for ways tointegrate into Europe and forms
ofpartnership with theWest. Now Putin has abandoned this Lets
Pretend! game and openly turned Russia intheopposite direction.
Putin has efectively invoked thedoctrine ofcontainment oftheWest
as acivilization. He presented theKremlin with aversion ofChurchills
Fulton speech and Kennans Long Telegram along with this contain-
ment concept. Infact, Putins version ofcontainment goes well beyond
that ofhis predecessors inthis feld. He attempted tolegitimate his doc-
trine by appealing toGod. He tried tocome up with his own interpreta-
tion ofuniversal Christian values and tocritique thedegree towhich
theEuro-Atlantic community does or does not follow them. Putins
Doctrine not only echoes therefrain in thename ofGod, much cher-
ished by Mussolini and Peron; it also sounds like Ayatollah Khomeinis
refrain, in thename ofAllah, theMost Merciful and Compassionate.
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 69
Temere reference toGod insupport ofhis arguments leaves us with no
doubt as tothe path chosen by theRussian regime.
Here are themain premises ofthePutin Doctrine. First, he
announced thecreation ofa special state-civilization inRussia based
onareturn totraditional values and sealed by traditional religions.
Tis is where theIranian experience might come inhandy. What is
atthecore ofthis civilization? Of course, it is personalized power:
theindividuals submission tothe state. (True, thesubmission isnt total,
since anindividual is still allowed signifcant freedom inrealizing his
reproductive function.) Inshort, we are talking about thereturn toan
archaic, militant, fundamentalist autocracy, which now clearly sets itself
against theliberal democracies.
Second, Putin was humble enough todeclare that Russia is becom-
ing thechief defender ofChristianity and faith inGod. Putin claims
that Euro-Atlantic countries are efectively embarking onapath ofre-
nouncing their roots, including Christian values, which underlie Western
civilization. Iwonder if theKremlin is actually going tocoordinate its
Christianity protection campaign with Pope Francis, or if it is planning
toorganize acrusade topromote traditionalism. Perhaps we shouldnt
laugh atthis notion; President Putin made astrange surprise visit tothe
Vatican inlate 2013, which defnitely testifes tothe seriousness ofhis
search for partners for arid-the-world-of-flth campaign. Interestingly
enough, back intheday, theSoviet Union was also keen onspreading its
ideology around theworld. TeKremlin, however, intends todo more: it
will try toofer theworld its vision ofmoral values.
Tird, theKremlin announced thecreation ofits own galaxy
intheguise oftheEurasian Union, acollective intended tounify
thepost-Soviet space and become anindependent center ofglobal
development. TeKremlins struggle for Ukraine fully demonstrates its
seriousness inpursuit ofthis goal.
Never before has Putin chastised theWest, its ideology, its mental-
ity, and its way oflife so blatantly or emotionally. Apparently, he genu-
inely believes that theWest poses athreat toRussiaboth onthestate
level (that is, Russias external interests) and onthesocial level (that is,
theRussian way oflife). Putin said that theEuro-Atlantic countries are
renouncing their roots and negating moral principles. He spoke
70 INTERREGNUM
oftheWests attempts to somehow revive astandardized model ofauni-
polar world. (Was he really trying tomake us believe he was talking
about Obama, who is trying tohide from theoutside world?) TeEu-
ro-Atlantic countries, he continued topress home, are undermining
thefoundations ofhuman society!
It is important tonote that Putin didnt stop with critiquing West-
ern civilization. He stated that Russia is becoming theantithesis tothe
West: theAnti-West, thecounterbalance and opposing force tothe liberal
democracies. True, Putins set ofideas is not very aesthetically pleasing. It
resembles astew cooked with whatever thechef could get hold of: Soviet-
ism, nationalism, imperialism, and Russian Orthodox fundamentalism.
But one can nevertheless see that theessence ofthePutin Doctrine lies
not only inrejecting theWest but also incontaining itboth interms
ofthwarting liberal and democratic norms within Russia and inthwart-
ing Western political interests inthewider world. We can accuse thedoc-
trines author ofinconsistencies when it comes tohis recipes for Russias
state structure. But he is very clear and consistent inwhat he rejects. He
rejects theWest as asystem, as away ofthinking, and as away oflife.
In his December 12, 2013, Address tothe Federal Assembly, Putin
further developed thebasic principles ofthis new Russian conserva-
tism. It has become obvious that theKremlin is going toassert Russias
uniqueness as thedefender ofmoral values from thedecaying infuence
ofliberal democracies. Infact, it is not only Russia and its neighbors that
theKremlin is trying tosave from demoralization by theWest, but
theentire world, including theWest (!). Again, he hurled astern accusa-
tion atliberal democracies:
Today, many nations [Tere is no doubt whom he has inmind
L.Sh.] are revising their moral values and ethical norms, eroding ethnic
traditions and diferences between peoples and cultures. Society is now
required not only torecognize everyones right tothe freedom ofcon-
science, political views, and privacy, but also toaccept without question
theequality ofgood and evil . . . .
At thesame time, Putin was confdent that there are more and more
people intheworld who support our position ondefending traditional
values. Testatement clearly harkens back tothe Soviet practice ofad-
dressing theworld community tocreate aglobal base for support ofcom-
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 71
munist values. Tis time theKremlin wants tobecome aWorld Pillar
ofMorality!
You may laugh it all of by saying that stagnating and decaying Russia
cannot really aspire tobecome aglobal actor, let alone theworlds moral
and political standard-bearer. Idisagree. Inthecurrent atmosphere ofdis-
orientation, one may fnd quite afew individuals, even indeveloped de-
mocracies, who will say that Putin is right. Ontheone hand, Putin may
be supported from theleftthat is by those dissatisfed with capitalism.
Ontheother, his homophobic ideas may appeal tothe right, for instance,
toChristian fundamentalist voters.
Some might dismiss Putins statements as little more than empty
rhetoric. One might point tothe fact that theKremlin is stafed by
rational people who are not ready tocommit suicide through confronta-
tion with theWest. Tis is true, as far as it goes. But thefact ofthemat-
ter is that inthepast two years alot ofthis rhetoric has been translated
into concrete political and legislative form and has been refected inboth
Russias domestic and foreign policy. What is even more important is lack
ofclarity and certainty as tothe regimes intentions. Is it ready tolock
thecountry down and confront theworld? Tis state ofuncertainty
is far more dangerous that thesolid rules ofthegame that come with
anunderstanding ofwhat theKremlin regime is capable of. Confusion
and uncertainty disorient theworld and make theKremlins next lurch
impossible topredict. Even theKremlin rulers who deployed this logic
appear tohave become its hostages. Even they cant necessarily predict
where it will drive them.
Besides, when theglobal order grows unstable, principles no longer
matter, red lines get fuzzy, world leaders either lead from behind or just
plain hide from behind, and windows ofopportunity open up for alead-
er who can ignore rules and act as aspoiler. No one wants toirritate such
aleader. Putin is just such aleader, and his time is now. Iwould bet good
money that Beijing is carefully watching Putins global claims experiment
and is probably thinking ofhow it can write its own, more muscular, and
less rhetorical version ofthePutin Doctrine.
Tere are no guarantees that 2014 will be as successful for theKrem-
lin as theprevious year was. It is impossible toimitate power, might,
and right for long when one is playing with aweak hand. Teques-
72 INTERREGNUM
tion is how theKremlin will act when it will become clear that its ofer
tosave theworld has been rejected, when it is no longer treated as frst
among equals.
So, welcome tothe new world! TeKremlin has started toexperiment
with thenew doctrine inUkraine, which has brought theunravelling
ofthepost-Cold War settlement. TeKremlin has opened thedoor
tothe Hobbesian world. Techallenge that theWest is facing now could
be more serious than many intheWest are prepared toadmit.
73
OBAMA THE
RETRENCHER AND
WHAT I T MEANS
FOR THE WORLD
2
14
Barack Obama is thefrst American president inmodern times tocast of
American claims toglobal hegemony and avalues-based policy agenda,
thus closing of achapter inthemodern world history books. But if were
being absolutely fair, we would have tosay that Obama simply added
afew fnal touches toa process oferosion ofU.S. leadership that started
before he had any say inthematter. Facts ontheground make American
hegemony exceedingly difcult toachieve today, if not unattainable. How
can theUnited States aspire tobe theworlds leader when it is still reeling
from aneconomic downturn? How can it assume theleading role when
liberal civilization itself is incrisis? (American institutions are decaying,
as Francis Fukuyama says, while theEuropean Union is stricken with pa-
ralysis.) Finally, how can theUnited States lead theworld when thefabric
2 Lilia Shevtsova, Obama theRetrencher and What It Means for theWorld, To be
published inTe American Interest, (June 2014).
74 INTERREGNUM
ofthepost-Cold War order, which America was instrumental increating,
has efectively come unraveled?
Admittedly, theworld was already headed down adead-end road
onGeorge W. Bushs watch. It was steered inthis direction by Schrder
and Chirac, with spineless Brussels lending ahelping hand. Could
Obama have stopped this drift? Perhaps, but only if he had been able
tosummon thestrength ofcharacter ofthelikes ofRoosevelt, Adenauer,
De Gaulle, or other global titans. But Obama is no titan, so he opted
tofee from theworld stage. Flight is actually not theworst possible
choice. It would have been much worse, for instance, if Obama got it
into his head that he is omnipotent, and that theUnited States is still
theglobal arbiter, without having any idea how toresolve thegrowing
number ofglobal crises.
President Obamas refusal toenforce thenormative dimension
ofU.S. foreign policy will be one ofthemost prominent aspects ofhis
legacy. TeUnited States turned into anon-ideological power under
his watch, meaning that theleading liberal democracy did not simply
withdraw from its missionary role and democracy-promotion eforts
but also showed itself tobe unready toofer theworld acivilizational
alternative. It is precisely thenormative policy dimension exhibited by
liberal democracies that unites them even as it also separates them from
states that limit themselves togeopolitical balance-of-power games.
For thefrst time since theSecond World War, theUnited States has
stopped aspiring tobe anormative role model. Obama has thus fol-
lowed inthefootsteps oftheGerman leaders who turned pragmatism
and transactionalism into apolitical ideology ofconvenience. When
two leading liberal democracies reject themoral dimension as essential
totheir global outlook, we can start questioning thetrajectory ofWest-
ern society. Inmost cases, replacing ideology with atit-for-tat ideology
ofconvenience will only pay short-term dividends, leaving more serious,
long-term problems inwant ofa solution.
Obamas policy onRussia and thepost-Soviet states has clearly dem-
onstrated what thenon-ideological approach is all about, and what it
leads to. Tepremise ofthereset means that inorder toachieve its for-
eign policy goals theObama administration has decided toturn ablind
eye toRussias domestic developments, thus excusing itself from any need
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 75
toreact toRussian authoritarianism. Tereset did indeed bring some tac-
tical gains, but atwhat price? Tepolicy contributed tothe international
legitimation ofPutins rule and made it simpler for Russia torekindle its
great power ambitions. TeEurasian Union, Putins pet project, partly
serves theKremlins own needs, but it would have been impossible had
theUnited States not removed itself from thepost-Soviet space.
Te Russian elite interpreted thereset as weakness onthepart
oftheObama administration and aninvitation tobe more assertive
inthepost-Soviet space and beyond. Here is how theKremlin logic
works: Obama needs Russia more that it needs America; he cant get
toasolution ontheIranian and Syrian questions that will salvage his
reputation without our help. Moreover, theRussian ruling establish-
ment may sincerely believe that theWest, including its leading power,
theUnited States, is inirreversible decay. Putin declares that empha-
sis onrights and freedoms is therecipe for losing asense ofdirection
ininternal and external policies. Russian Foreign Afairs Minister Sergey
Lavrov tirelessly repeats his mantra about ideology that does not answer
thereality ofthetwenty-frst century, and applies Oswald Spenglers
early twentieth-century warning about European demise tothe present-
day West. When one constantly talks about Western decay and Americas
recession, one may even begin tobelieve inthem! Besides, Obamas
policy style, which seems premised ontheidea ofdoing everything
possible toavoid coming of as assertive, is asure sign ofimpotence for
theKremlin crowd.
Anyway, as it happens, thereset did not guarantee cooperation be-
tween Russia and theUnited States. It failed toprevent acrisis last year,
when inJuly 2013 President Obama was forced tocancel asummit with
Putin atwhich he would have been humiliated, or atthe very least made
tofeel uncomfortable.
Ironically, even as Washington has delinked domestic and foreign
politics, theKremlin has linked them. Its foreign policy has become
amajor instrument for advancing its domestic agenda, which is based
onstrengthening personalized power. Inabroader context, thereset
signaled Washingtons (perhaps unwitting) legitimation ofthepost-post-
Cold War order inEurope and Eurasia. Tis order rests ontheinformal
tandem ofGermany, theleading European actor, and Russia, which has
76 INTERREGNUM
begun toreassert its control over thegray zone that comprises most
ofthepost-Soviet space, as theWest looks theother way. Europes and
theKremlins tug ofwar over Ukraine, inwhich theleading European
powers have chosen tolimit themselves torhetoric, ended inEuropes de-
feat (at least so far), illustrating for all that thepost-post-Cold War order
intheregion has been established.
Te Obama-Putin deal onSyria is yet another indication ofAmericas
drift away from ideological precepts. Washington agreed toreduce
themost calamitous humanitarian and political crisis oftheday toa tech-
nical issue concerning theelimination ofchemical weapons. By doing so,
theUnited States relinquished its global responsibility and also implic-
itly accepted theconcept ofabsolute sovereignty, which has always been
promoted by authoritarian states. Tus Washington (!) contributed tothe
creation ofa precedent that enables authoritarian regimes topreserve
themselves by blackmailing theWest.
Te Faustian bargain that President Obama struck with Putin allowed
theRussian leader toride theglobal tide in2013. In1991, America
celebrated victory inaconfrontation oftwo nuclear superpowers, albeit
as aresult oftheSoviet Unions self-inficted demise. In2013, America
sufered defeat when, indealing with theworld, it renounced theprin-
ciples that defne theWest as acivilization. Of course, there is no rea-
son tobelieve that theAuthoritarian International (China, Russia, and
Iran)the Central Powers, as Walter Russell Mead calls themwill
succeed inflling thevoid left by theUnited States. But even short-lived
victories, coming as theresult ofeforts tochip away atweak spots, will
cost theWest dearly.
Te reset hasnt stopped theKremlin from trying toturn Russia into
theantithesis oftheWest, nor has it stopped it from trying tocontain
theUnited States. (Ten again, why should theKremlin have tocontain
theUnited States, when theAmerican President is already doing it
himself?) Putin has made traditional values analternative toWestern
values, not only within Russia, but globally as well! Why do you think
he rushed tosee Pope Francis inRome inNovember 2013? He wanted
anally inhis global crusade todefend thetraditional values that, he
says, are being ruined inmany countries from thetop. TeKremlin
has also revived expansionism by trying tocreate its own integration
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 77
project, theEurasian Union (in away, asmaller version oftheSoviet
Union, but without thecommunist accouterments). Skeptics call Putins
Were Back! project afantasy, pointing tothe advanced state ofdecay
ofthePutin regime and tothe enormous budget problems Russia faces.
Besides, how can Putin talk ofcontaining theWest when theRussian
elite keep their money inWestern banks? Its true that thecurrent Russian
political regime is losing ground, but it still controls thesituation and
Putins 65 percent approval rating is afgure Western leaders can only
dream of(even if its liable toplummet ata moments notice). True,
theEurasian Union is achimera. But so was communism, and it took
some time, along with atremendous waste ofhuman capital, before
humanity came tothis realization. Yes, Putins budget is abust, but he
will not retreat from theglobal stage totake care ofdomestic problems
as Obama did. Infact, theRussian authorities have always done
theopposite. Tey have turned outward tothe world as Russias internal
problems have mounted, trying toofset internal weaknesses with external
strength. Teworse things are athome, themore reckless theKremlin
will be intheinternational arena. Putin decided tonationalize theelite,
implying that atany given time he can tell theelite towithdraw their
funds from Western banks and sell of their Western properties, thus
making his regime less vulnerable toexternal pressure.
So here is another axiom for your consideration: vacillation and
indecision make ones adversary, however lightweight he might be,
relatively stronger and more confdent. Tus, toa large extent, Putin owes
his cockiness and macho style toObamas retrenchment and indiference
tothe world.
Some ofmy American colleagues tell me, We should ignore Russia
if it is too hard todeal with. But this approach will allow theKremlin
toengage inano-holds-barred fght. Is America ready for that fght?
On theother hand, those who fear theconsequences ofWestern
paralysis urge theUnited States toreturn toits former role ofmaximal
global responsibility. Its time torevive Atlanticism! they proclaim. Tey
want theAmerican president toshed his seeming aloofness and stop shy-
ing away from global problems. TeUnited States cannot ride into town
like John Wayne and save theworld again, for thesimple reason that
theworld has changed. Besides, if America aspired tobe aninternational
78 INTERREGNUM
arbiter and toreassume therole ofa great power, it would have toreclaim
its credibility and demonstrate that it has astrategy and knows where it
wants tolead theworld. Such areincarnation is not possible while Presi-
dent Obama is inofce. How can thepresident who fip-fopped onim-
portant issues so many times prove toeveryone that he would not change
his mind again and reverse course inafew months?
If, when theUnited States is under new leadership, it decides toreturn
toa leading role ontheworld stage, it will fnd amuch less forgiving
audience. TeUnited States will have toprove that its behavior is driven
by values and not just another tactical trade. Washington has imitated
theprocess ofstanding up for human rights, democracy, and reforms
far too often; thenext time around it will have togo togreat lengths
toprove that its new act isnt just arerun oftheold one.
If President Obama should suddenly start thinking ofhis place
inhistory, he may want tohelp Sweden, Poland, and Lithuania intheir
struggle toaid Ukraines European choice. Participating intheUkrain-
ian project will test Americas ability tooperate within anormative
framework, and it will also send amessage toan old and tired Europe. It
could be Obamas one big chance tochange his global image and legacy.
Will he give it ashot?
79
UKRAI NE S CHOI CE
I S A TEST FOR THE
WEST
3
( ABRI DGED)
15
Ukraine has found choosing its civilizational path tobe anagonizing
ordeal. TeUkrainian elitenot thesociety as awholehas presented
thebiggest problems inthis regard. By coming out ingreat numbers
tothe Maidan (Independence Square) in2004, Ukrainians proved that
they were ready todefend one ofthebackbone principles ofan open
society: thepeaceful transfer ofpower. But theUkrainian elite (primarily
its alleged reform segment) has shown itself tobe feckless when it comes
toguaranteeing thenew rules ofthegame for thewhole ofsociety.
Tis is not tosay that Ukraine could have ever had aneasy path;
from thebeginning it has faced structural obstacles inits choice oftra-
jectory. Ukraine became astate before becoming anation. Inorder
toshore up its national identityan essential ingredient for consoli-
3 Lilia Shevtsova, Ukraines Choice Is aTest for theWest, TeAmerican Interest
(October 31, 2013).
80 INTERREGNUM
dating societyUkraine frst has todevelop one. To do this, it must
extract itself from theimperial body that once consumed it. Tis
process ofdetachment from Russia is extremely painful. For Ukraine,
developing national identity means writing and rewriting its own past,
rejecting many ofthemental habits and characteristics it has shared
with Russia.
In this regard, Viktor Yushchenkootherwise atotally inefective
presidentaccomplished one very important thing for Ukraine: he
declared theHolodomor, thegreat Soviet-induced famine oftheearly
1930s, tobe aUkrainian national tragedy. By doing so, he essentially
started theprocess ofwriting thefrst independent history ofUkraine.
Tis process will force Ukrainians totake afresh look attheir historical
heroes and villains, and atthose who brought Ukraine into Russia and
those who fought against it. We Russians will have toaccept this revi-
sionism as anatural part offorming both anew state and anew national
identity ofa country that was once absorbed by Russia.
Te process offorming aUkrainian national identity will also unearth
another issue. Inorder tocompletely extract itself from Russias body,
Ukraine will have tofnd anew reference point. If it wants tomove to-
ward modernity, then its only viable reference point is Europe. But mov-
ing toward Europe will mean that Ukraine, whose national identity has
still not taken shape, must be prepared tohave that very national identity
dissolved into thegreater European identity
One thing is clear: Ukraine can no longer attempt tosit intwo chairs
simultaneously. Tedelicate line it has walked until now has implied
commitments toboth theEuropean trajectory and tospecial relations
with Russia. Leonid Kuchma was especially efective atimplement-
ing thetwo-chair policy. Viktor Yanukovich has tried tostick with it,
but what was possible even afew years back is out ofthequestion now.
TeKremlins own choiceto pursue theclaim that it is aunique
civilization and thus toreject integration with Europeis now forcing
Kiev tomake its own choice: Russia or Europe? Kiev can no longer share
abed with two partners. Tere is only one way that Ukraine can be allied
with Russia: it has toagree tobecome Russias satellite. As theBelarusian
example demonstrates, such relations are not without their compensa-
tionsnot least among them, aguarantee oftheruling elites hold
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 81
onpower. But theprice that thepolitical elite ofa satellite state must pay
theKremlin for these guarantees is steep
However, Ukraine can become aEuropean country only by becom-
ing ademocracy. Having started onits march toward this goal, Ukraine
will also help Russia by depriving it ofthetemptation topreserve its old
power matrix by dragging its neighbors down into atighter orbit.
Of course, losing Ukraine would strike aheavy blow against Putins
new model, which places Russia atthe center oftheEurasian Union.
Russias personalized power regime requires external support intheform
ofnew imperial claims. Tese claims provide theregime with additional
legitimacy, thesemblance ofgreater power, and more public support
from Russian society.
Why does Ukraine play such arole ofspecial importance for theself-
reproduction oftheRussian system? Because including Ukraine inRus-
sias orbit helps Russia tomaintain its European face. Besides, theRus-
sian political class still considers Ukraine, with Kiev as its capital, tobe
part oftheRussian communityRussias younger brother. Intheeyes
ofmany Russians, Kiev and Kievan Rus are cradles ofRussian Orthodoxy
and indispensable parts ofits origin story. To many, Kiev is as important
toRussia as Kosovo and thefourteenth-century Battle for Kosovo are
tothe Serbs. Tis is why theKremlin has tried so hard tosubstantiate its
claims that Kiev is where theRussian state and ofcial religion originated.
What will become ofPutins Eurasian Union without Ukraine? With
theyounger brother absent, it would clearly be adefective family. Tis
is precisely why theKremlin will continue looking for diferent ways
tokeep Ukraine inits grips
Will Europe have sufcient political will not only toprotect Ukraine
from theKremlins advances but also toofer some positive incentives
for Ukraines transformation? Or will Europe prefer toavert its eyes as
Ukraine falls back into theKremlins sufocating embrace? We will soon
know theanswer. Tere is no doubt that Brussels policies onUkraine
will testify tothe viability oftheidea ofa United Europe and toEuropes
ability tobreak free from its current paralysis.
83
UKRAI NE HAS
NOT YET PERI SHED
4

( ABRI DGED)
16
Over thepast year we have witnessed three global developments that
have demonstrated thelimits not only ofthecurrent world order but
also ofWestern civilizations ability toconfront challenges tothat order.
All three developmentsthe Syrian civil war, theIranian nuclear prob-
lem, and thenew Ukrainian rebellionhave demonstrated that atbest
theWest can ofer only partial solutions toglobal problems, if indeed it
chooses toface up tothose problems inthefrst place.
One might be tempted atfrst topick thefrst two ofthese three de-
velopments, Syria and Iran, as theones with thegreatest possible impact.
But infact, ofall three it is Ukraines destiny, thedestiny ofa European
nation of45 million people, that could hold thekey tothe future ofRus-
sia and other Eurasian states, which has tremendous civilizational im-
portance. What Imean by this is that Ukraine and its near- tomedium-
4 Lilia Shevtsova, Ukraine Has Not Yet Perished, TeAmerican Interest, (December
2, 2013).
84 INTERREGNUM
term future will give us answers not only tothe question ofwhether or
not Russia will continue tosee itself as anempire, but also tothe ques-
tions ofhow committed Europe is tothe values it espouses, and how far
theWest is prepared toexpand its infuence, if it is toexpand atall.
Te recent Eastern Partnership saga, culminating with Ukraines
decision toditch theAssociation Agreement (AA) with Europe atthe
Vilnius EU summit onNovember 29, is adramatic story with many plot
twists: desperate clinging topower, blufng, predatory instincts, attempts
tosurvive by bullying, navet, alack ofstrategic thinking, and thedrive
for dignity and freedom. Telessons ofthis saga must still be learned if
its disastrous repercussions are tobe avoided
To be sure, theKremlin has indeed been harassing Kiev. InAugust
2013, it even staged adress rehearsal ofwhat would have come if Ukraine
had signed thepact, blocking theexport ofUkrainian goods toRussia.
But were these tactics anything more than what everyone had already
expected ofPutin? Hardly. TeKremlin had made it abundantly clear
that Russia was ready topursue anew foreign policy doctrine: therevival
oftheSoviet foreign policy posturethe Brezhnev Doctrine, infact,
adapted for new times. Tis recycled Putin Doctrine seeks tocreate
for Russia agalaxy ofsatellite states. Establishing this galaxy is essen-
tial tothesurvival ofthepersonalized-power matrix; Ukraine, which
has always been thejewel intheRussian crown, would not be forgot-
ten. Beginning with theAugust (2013) trade war with Kiev, Moscow
has been showing theworld what tactics it will employ topromote this
doctrine. At any rate, there wasnt any confusion inMoscow about its
plans for Ukraine; both Kiev and Europe had plenty oftime toprepare
for theMoscow ofensive and toplan measures that could have atleast
neutralized theKremlins assertiveness.
Yanukovychs role is another factor that has impacted thesituation.
Naturally, he is trying toensure his re-election in2015. Tis motive,
more than Ukraines national interests, has guided his actions so far.
Just before Vilnius, Yanukovych concluded that European integration
would not guarantee his electoral victory and so decided tofall back
onPutins formula ofpreserving power by appealing totraditionalist
voters. Tis could have been his plan all along; his longstanding refusal
toendorse themost important laws from theEastern Partnership agen-
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 85
dathe ones that could have undermined his monopoly onpowersug-
gest this possibility. Traditionalist voters demand aunion with Russia and
retention oftheold rules ofthegame, including thepaternalistic state.
Inthis case, then, Yanukovychs preferences coincide with thepreferences
ofthis archaic segment oftheUkrainian electorate.
None ofthis is tosay that pressure from Moscow did not also play
arole. Moscow is pressuring me, Yanukovych complained toeveryone
inVilnius. Ukrainian FM Kozhara inour discussions confrms that
Ukraine has succumbed tosevere Russian economic pressure inpost-
poning EU agreement, tweeted Swedish Foreign Afairs Minister Carl
Bildt. Again, yes, there has been and there will be pressure from Moscow,
and cajoling too! But theKremlin simply helped Yanukovych tomake
thechoiceor rather tojustify thechoice he had already madethat was
most likely topreserve theregime. Inthis situation Putin has been instru-
mental inhelping Yanukovych toachieve his personal agenda.
If Yanukovych thinks that, after winning the2015 elections with
thehelp ofthepaternalistic base and theKremlins neutrality (or even sup-
port), he will have abroader feld for maneuvering and can turn toEurope,
then he is wrong. Will Europe be eager tosit down ata table with aman
who just gave it aslap intheface? Hardly. Will Putin be inclined tolet him
of thehook easily? Hardly. And will theUkrainian people give him breath-
ing room? Hardly. And with respect tothis last question inparticular,
Yanukovych has successfully provoked themost active part ofUkrainian
society, including even part oftheelite, torebel against his rule.
Finally, Vilnius has demonstrated theextent oftheWests paralysis
and loss ofmission. Yanukovychs behavior shocked theunprepared
Western capitals; this only shows how little they understand theprocess-
es underway inKiev (and inMoscow). Acouple ofweeks before Vilnius,
theWest was sure that its Ukrainian jewel was about tobe ensconced
intheEuropean crown. TeWest continued inits complacency even af-
ter Moscow began tointimidate Ukraine. If theWest wanted toembrace
Ukraine, and if it didnt want toready aneconomic package as asafety
net incase Moscow began totighten thenoose, then its leaders could
have atleast escalated their rhetoric indefense ofUkraine. Did Merkel
call Putin tosay Keep your hands of Ukraine!? Did U.S. leadersat
least Vice-President Bidenplace acall toYanukovych totalk him
86 INTERREGNUM
through his hesitations? One may doubt whether this would have had
any efect onMoscows position, since theKremlin is used toEuropes
inability (as theKremlin sees it) tomatch Russias skills athardball. But
it was atleast worth atry.
Berlin, aprincipal European actor immersed inits own problems,
proved unable toconsolidate theEuropean position or react tothe pres-
sure from Moscow. As amatter offact, it was thelack ofstrong German
support for therobust Eastern Partnership that made theproject vulner-
able from thevery beginning.
One more factor must be mentioned: inmany ways, Kievs behavior
was also theresult oftheabsence ofan unequivocal position inWash-
ington. TeAmerican reaction toKievs refusal tosign theagreements
was too little, too late, and it only reconfrmed Americas lack ofinterest
intheregion. TeUnited States made themistake ofceding toEurope
thetask oftrying tointegrate Ukraine into theWest.
Not only were Western leaders late inreacting tothe Ukrainian
developments; there is aneven more substantial problem: thesystemic
weakness oftheEastern Partnership project itself. TePolish and Swed-
ish initiative tocreate theEastern Partnership was no doubt apositive
step that proved that these two countries care about what is happening
intheeastern part ofEurope. But theprogram, atleast after it passed
through theBrussels pipeline, was structured with incompatible goals,
leading inevitably toparalysis. First, theEastern Partnership became
hostage tothe European Unions reluctance toirritate Russia. Second,
Brussels focused oncooperation with authoritarian and semi-authoritar-
ian governments, or with governments (like Ukraine) that have begun
tomove toward personalized rule. Tird, bureaucratic and technocratic
approaches prevailed. Fourth, thefree trade zone and visa facilitation
mechanisms have proved insufcient spurs for political liberalization. As
theexperiences ofAzerbaijan and Belarus showed, theEastern Partner-
ship program did not prevent member states from moving toward harsh
authoritarianism. Fifth, theEastern Partnership lumped six countries
together that had little incommon beyond thefact that they were post-
Soviet. Each is moving along its own path. Sixth, European leaders went
too far inmaking it clear that theEastern Partnership wasnt aguarantee
ofEU membership, which begs thequestion: what does it lead to?
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 87
Just as was thecase with theEU-Russia partnership, instead ofen-
couraging thenew rules ofthegame inthespheres ofadministration and
government, theEastern Partnership became asupport factor for theini-
tiatives spearheaded by increasingly undemocratic and illiberal regimes.
It has now become evident (regrettably, not evident for everyone!)
that one ofthemajor premises behind theEastern Partnership is wrong.
Ihave inmind thefact that many inEurope believe that theEastern
Partnership should serve as abridge between Europe and Russia. Tey
keep saying that thePartnership should not be treated as azero-sum
game, and that its members can be involved inalliances with Russia. But
is this driving two horses act possible when theKremlin has declared
that Russia has tobe aunique civilization, ready tocontain thede-
moralized Western system?! If this is thecase, then no matter how much
Brussels wants toavoid it, zero-sum politics with Russia is unavoidable.
We are dealing with two civilizations built onincompatible principles.
Moscow itself has put anend tothe ambiguity. Tat means that thenew
independent states can no longer play atbeing simultaneous partners
with both Moscow and Europe.
In truth, Iam not only talking about ageopolitical choice for Ukraine
and for other newly independent states, but also about acivilizational
choice. Europe, it appears, is not ready toframe thequestion insuch
terms. Doing so would have forced theEuropean Union toalter its ap-
proach toRussia, which it is not prepared todo.
In short, Europes error lies not inforcing Ukraine tomake achoice,
as some analysts have suggested. Europe, rather, has erred by failing
toconvince Ukraine tomake theright choice, and by failing toprovide
Kiev with additional incentives, including fnancial ones, tohelp its po-
litical leadership make this choice.
If Europe proceeds inits current bureaucratic mode, rejecting norma-
tive dimensions and trying tobe pragmatic, it is bound tolose toMos-
cow inthestruggle for infuence over thenewly independent states.
Moscow has learned toplay such games much more efectively. Tus,
Europe has tochoose anew strategy.
What will that strategy be? TeEuropean Union needs todiversify its
relations with theEastern Partnership member states (Azerbaijan and Be-
larus should be treated diferently from Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine;
88 INTERREGNUM
dealing with Armenia possibly requires yet another approach). Teprin-
ciple ofconditionality should be stressed (loans and assistance should be
granted as areward for accepting new rules ofthegame). TeEuropean
Union must engage inadialogue with civil society and assist inits devel-
opment. It should not limit itself todealing with thestate. Fortunately,
theKremlin is doing everything inits power toforce Brussels out ofits
political lethargy.
Ukrainians fghting for thechance tomake aEuropean turn are giv-
ing Europe achance torenew its mission and help Ukrainian society.
Temost important help Europe can give is toprevent confrontation and
violence and help Ukrainians fnd apeaceful road map out ofthecurrent
political crisis.
Moscow, ofcourse, is watching theUkrainian developments now
with dread and fear. In2004, theOrange Revolution forced theKremlin
toturn toopenly authoritarian rule. Today anew tide sweeping across
Ukraine could force theKremlin toramp up even more thecrackdown
inside its own borders and its assertiveness outside thecountry inorder
tostem thetide ofanti-Russian anger. But as theUkrainian example
shows, thesuicidal statecraft ofcorrupted regimes ends inthepeoples
anger sooner or later. Keeping these tides from growing into atsunami
ofviolence could be Europes new mission intheregion.
89
AFTER
YANUKOVYCH:
TEN CHALLENGES
FOR UKRAI NE
5

17
Te corrupted and criminal regime ofYanukovych collapsed. However,
it is too early tosay that Ukrainians fnally won. It isnt clear how long
theuncertainty over Ukraines new trajectory, new government, and new
system will last. True, thechallenges that thecountry is facing are more
obvious. Here are afew ofthemajor ones.
1. OntheUkrainian Revolution. So far, theUkrainian rebellion has
only caused theYanukovych regime tofall. Tere are grounds for concern
that therebellion will eventually result injust another regime change,
followed by thereturn oftheold clannish system. Teoligarchic groups
will again be represented by the2004 opposition (including Yulia Ti-
moshenko), which is responsible for establishing thecorrupt oligarchic
system inthecountry. Besides, theleftovers oftheYanukovych regime
5 Lilia Shevtsova, After Yanukovych: Ten Challenges for Ukraine, TeAmerican
Interest (February 27, 2014).
90 INTERREGNUM
represented by theParty ofRegions retain strong positions inthesouth
and east ofUkraine, preserving thethreat ofcounter-revolution.
2. OntheMaidan. One ofthegreat achievements oftheprotests was
theemergence ofa nationwide, grassroots political organization. Tenew
opposition, which bears no responsibility for thepast wrongs, is still not
infuential enough; thus theMaidan remains theonly force that can stop
thecountry and its political elite from reverting toits corrupt past. Calls
for disbanding theMaidan, issued by therepresentatives oftheforces
who took power, testify totheir intention tomake themselves unaccount-
able tothe public. Another scenarioco-opting theMaidan forces into
state structureswould also make it impossible for thepeople tocontrol
thegovernment, since there is still no strong opposition independent
ofoligarchic infuences.
3. Onthereforms. Apart from changing theruling team, Ukraine has
tochange therules ofthegame. Tereturn tothe 2004 Constitution does
not guarantee thecreation ofa rule-of-law state. Teparliamentary system
may become aconvenient tool for advancing theinterests oftheoligarchic
clans. It should come as no surprise, then, that thepro-Russian lobby sup-
ports this constitution. Only agovernment ofnational trust, one untar-
nished by past misdeeds, and one that includes people ready tosacrifce
their political ambitions, can implement painful reforms. Teinterim
government, formed with theapproval oftheMaidan, seems tobe anat-
tempt onthepart oftheopposition tocreate agovernment trusted by
thepeople. True, theresults ofthis experiment are unclear.
4. Ontheold regime. Some intheWest oppose theprosecution
ofmembers oftheYanukovych regime. Tenew regime is certain todis-
credit itself if it fails topurify itself and lets Yanukovychs accomplices
from theParty ofRegions join thenew authorities.
5. Onlegitimacy. Given thecollapse ofall other institutions,
theUkrainian ParliamentVerchovna Radahas naturally become
themain governing body. During theVelvet Revolution inPoland,
theOld Sejm also became thepolitical institution responsible for legiti-
mizing thetransition tothe new system. However, preserving theRada,
which served as atool oftherepressive old regime, will undermine
thenew regimes credibility. Tus, there is anurgent need for new parlia-
mentary elections within theshortest time period possible.
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 91
6. OntheWest. Western governments demonstrated alack ofcoor-
dination intheir policies toward Ukraine. Tey had no political will
todeal with Ukraines problems. Teparalysis oftheWest inmany ways
exacerbated thecrisis and prompted Yanukovych toturn torepressions.
Teagreement signed by theopposition and Yanukovych onFebruary
21, under pressure from theFrench, German, and Polish foreign min-
isters, further illustrates thefailure ofWestern policies. Teagreement,
which was toprolong Yanukovychs rule until theend of2014, was reject-
ed by theMaidan, bringing amuch swifter end tothe dictators regime.
Nevertheless, theWest continues toseek toreturn stability toUkraine
by supporting forces associated with theold system only because they
are known intheWest. TeWest is urging Ukrainians, inthewords
ofaNew York Times editorial, published onFebruary 24, 2014, toin-
clude Russia inthetransition, both toprevent theKremlin from under-
mining any rescue plan and toreassure Russian-speaking Ukrainians that
theWest is not promoting agovernment dominated by nationalists.
Including theKremlin inthetransition is asure-fre way toderail it!
7. OnRussia. Moscow remains themain foreign policy player
ontheUkrainian stage, and its intentions with respect toUkraine are
quite clear. As part ofits eforts tokeep Ukraine inits orbit, theKrem-
lin has proved that it is ready toundermine theintegrity ofthecoun-
try. We should give theKremlins political technologists their due.
TeKremlin is supporting Ukrainian separatism and making harsh pro-
nouncements, thus extorting theWest and theUkrainian regime with
thethreat ofdestructive possibilities inorder toforce them torecognize
theKremlins interests. Few would believe that Moscow would want
todeal with thepain associated with partitioning Ukraine and annexing
Crimea, whose Tatar natives could turn it into another Chechnya. Every
rational person would say that theturmoil inCrimea, clashes between
theCrimean Tatars and thepro-Russian activists intheCrimean capital,
Simferopol, and thereadiness oftheCrimean Tatars toform self-defense
units would turn thepeninsula into zone ofconfrontation and war. But
Moscow decided tocross thered line, de facto annexing Crimea and
trying todestabilize thesoutheastern regions ofUkraine. Tepost-Cold
War settlement has collapsed, which will have implications difcult
topredict.
92 INTERREGNUM
8. OnUkraines exit from thecrisis. Ukraine is juggling two conficting
goals: it needs toconstruct anew system while preserving theintegrity
ofthecountry. To accomplish both ofthese goals atthe same time, Kiev
will have tocompromise. But abandoning painful reforms toplease
thepaternalistic southeast will also undermine theintegrity ofthecoun-
try. Tenew government will have towin thetrust ofthepeople inits
southeastern regions.
9. Guarantees for Ukraine. Europe must reassure Ukraine ofits pro-
spective EU membership, provided Ukraine satisfes themembership
requirements. But theUkrainians need massive, internationally moni-
tored assistance right now tohelp them survive. Besides, thecountry
needs international guarantees ofits territorial integrity. Teeasiest way
is toreturn tothe Budapest agreement of1994which was signed by
Russia, Ukraine, theUK, and theUnited States, and which guaranteed
Ukraines security and territorial integrityand adapt it tothe new situ-
ation. Russia should participate inthis process. Tese discussions will not
be easybut thevery fact oftheir taking place would signify recognition
oftheproblem. Any Finlandization scenario for Ukraine would bring
thecountry back into thegray zone ofuncertainty that it has occupied
until now. Besides, theUkrainians will treat any negotiations oftheir
countrys fate between Russia and theWest without Ukraines participa-
tion as areplay ofthe1938 Munich Agreement.
10. Onthepost-Soviet model. Ukraine experienced acrisis ofthepost-
Soviet model, which is characteristic ofother post-Soviet states (except
for theBaltic countries). Tus, thepath Ukraine takes toovercome
this crisis will have implications for all ofthese states. If theUkrainian
revolution is aborted, it will not only be aresult oftheUkrainian elites
inability tothink strategically, or ofRussian interference, but also aresult
oftheWests inability tounderstand theneed for radical change inthis
country and tosupport it efectively. Inthis case, theUkrainians have
learned what they needed todo toexpress themselves by means ofpublic
protests. Hopefully theUkrainian elite now understands thehigh price
ofrepeating its old ways ofdoing thepeoples business.
93
THE UKRAI NE
CRI SI S: FALLI NG
I NTO PUTI N S TRAP
6

18
I never expected so many intelligent, perceptive, and infuential media
and political personalities tofall so easily into Vladimir Putins trap.
After theinitial shock tothe world, and especially tothe West, following
Moscows announcements about thepossible use ofRussian armed forces
inUkraine, and then after being forced toacknowledge that Russia has
already occupied Crimea, theWest breathed acollective sigh ofrelief
upon hearing Putins March 4 press conference, where he suggested
Russia doesnt have any plans toseize eastern Ukraine. Iintentionally
waited awhile tomake sure that this would indeed be theprevailing
Western reaction after thedust settledand it was. Western capitals felt
encouraged by Putin. IntheNew York Times, Peter Baker confrmed that
American ofcials took some solace after hearing Putins explanations.
6 Lilia Shevtsova, Te Ukraine Crisis: Falling Into Putins Trap, TeAmerican
Interest (Published onMarch 10 and updated onMarch 27, 2014).
One may suppose that theEuropeans, who are much more inclined
toforgive Putin than is Washington, have felt more than just relief, but
actual satisfaction, atthe news.
When it became apparent that Moscow was hurriedly attempting
toannex Crimea through areferendum scheduled for March 16
inthepresence ofthousands ofRussian troopssome intheWest have
grown nervous once again. Tey were wondering why theKremlin was
insuch ahurry, and why it was acting so crudely, without even pro forma
attempts toclothe its naked aggression. But they did not need towon-
der. By now its obvious that both Europe and theUnited States, unable
toreverse thecourse ofrecent events and unwilling topay theprice
for restraining Russia, are ready toparticipate inPutins gamble. Until
recently, stunned and appalled, theWestern capitals have been merely
reacting tothe Kremlins moves, however belatedly or inadequately. But
now theliberal democracies seem prepared toaccept thenew status
quothat is, torecognize theRussian annexation ofCrimea as afait ac-
compli, since they do not dare force Russia toback down. Tey are now
focused onstemming Russias expansion toUkraines eastern and south-
ern regions, apparently fearing that anything but acceptance ofthenew
geopolitical reality will result inamuch more dreadful outcome. Let us
clarify what this reality is all about.
First, it is about thedestruction ofthepost-Cold War world order.
Tis order was based onthepremise that Russia and theWest are not
inthebusiness ofcontaining each other anymore, and that both sup-
port theprinciple oftheterritorial sovereignty oftheindependent states
that emerged from thebreak-up oftheSoviet Union. Moscow began
todestroy that order as early as its 2008 war with Georgia, followed by
thevirtual annexation ofGeorgias breakaway territories, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. No less than President Nicolas Sarkozy, during Frances
term ofpresidency oftheEuropean Union, ratifed and legitimized
theRussian occupation ofGeorgias territories. And Moscows interfer-
ence inUkraines internal afairs and its use offorce indealing with Kiev
dates back tothe Kremlins trade war against Ukraine inAugust 2013. So
theres nothing new or strange intheWests inability tofnd aconvincing
way toreact toRussias moves. Moscow concluded some time ago that it
was free totake additional steps toward establishing thenew order.
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 95
Second, it is about more than just setting aprecedent allowing
theKremlins direct interference intheafairs ofa sovereign state. Not
only did its behavior validate thepresence ofRussias spheres ofinfuence,
thanks tothe lack ofmeaningful Western reaction, but theKremlin also
reintroduced thedoctrine ofinterference under thepretext ofprotecting
theRussian-speaking population. Since Russian speakers live inmost
ofthenewly independent states, this doctrine threatens thestability
oftheentire post-Soviet space. Even Russias willing partnersBelorussian
leader Lukashenko and Kazakh leader Nazarbayevunderstand
thelooming threat totheir countries territorial integrity, and so have
stubbornly refused tosupport theKremlin solution for Ukraine.
Tird, it is about paving theway for thesecond stage ofMoscows
plans, which is tobring southeastern Ukraine under Russian control.
Tis would make Ukraine afailed state and zone ofinstability, which will
serve as aninvitation toMoscow tostabilize it. One should even expect
there tobe Western supporters ofRussias moderating role. Indeed
some have already hinted that Moscow has its interests intheregions
that have tobe accommodated. And Moldova is likely thenext target.
Inshort, Eurasia is entering aperiod ofinstability.
I would argue that, so far, theWestern political community has dem-
onstrated arather simplistic understanding ofPutins psyche and goals,
and this has made it easier for theKremlin tocarry out its agenda.
Here is asampling ofWestern explanations for Putins mindset and
goals, profered by various politicians, analysts, and journalists:
Because Putin can.
Because ofPutins appetite for expansion.
Because its aland grab.
Because he wants Ukraine back.
(If these explanations are true, then why is he only trying this now?
And why was he interested inUkraine, specifcally, rather than, say,
Moldova?)
Because Putin is afraid ofNATO expansion.
(But NATO currently has no plans for expansion.)
To prevent clashes between thenationalists and thepro-Russian
population inCrimea and theEast.
(But there had been no such clashes, until Russia got involved.)
96 INTERREGNUM
To protect theRussian-speaking population.
(But why, then, hasnt Moscow shown any enthusiasm for protecting
theRussian speakers inCentral Asia, where their rights are genuinely
being violated? And why is Moscow so interested inthis groups fate
inUkraine atthis particular time?)
To recreate theSoviet Union.
To start aCold War with theWest.
(In my view Putin hardly looks thepart ofan insane person who
has totally lost contact with reality. He hardly wants torally theworld
against Russia tofulfll some sort ofbizarre dream ofgoing down
infames with his country. Besides, theCold War actually had some
rules that both belligerents observed; theKremlin has demonstrated that
it does not respect any rules.)
As you can see, there are major questions about most ofthepopular
explanations ofered toexplain therecent events inUkraine. Ido not
claim tohave amonopoly onthetruth onthis or other questions. We
political pundits have demonstrated how pathetic we are, not just when it
comes tomaking adequate forecasts ofdevelopments inUkraine, but also
when it comes toexplaining what is happening inreal time. We all could
use ahealthy dose ofhumility when discussing these developments. With
that inmind, Iwould suggest thefollowing explanation oftheKremlins
motives and its agenda regarding Ukraine.
Annexing Crimea is not anend initself for theKremlin, nor is
partitioning Ukraine. Tese are just means toa more ambitious end.
TeKremlins intervention inCrimea and involvement inthedestabiliza-
tion ofsoutheastern Ukraine exemplifes thePutin Doctrine, formulated
by theKremlin in2012 to2013. One ofthegoals ofthis doctrine is
tofnd ways toreproduce thetraditional Russian state and Putins regime,
and torespond tonew domestic and international challenges. Tis
doctrine is based onthree premises: Russia is aunique civilization and
must contain thedemoralized West; Russia can only exist as agalactic
center, around which orbit satellite-statelets; Russia is thecivilizational
pillar whose mission is todefend traditional values globally.
Many have viewed thePutin Doctrine as anexercise inempty rheto-
ric, but Putin has proved that it is thereal thing. He has also proved that
foreign policy is now thekey instrument serving his domestic agenda.
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 97
What alesson this has been for those Western politicians who believed
they could rest their Russia policy onthebasis ofde-linking domestic
and foreign afairs!
We need tokeep inmind that, even if anew imperialism and ahun-
ger for land are behind Russias recent actions, they do not fully account
for thebrashness oftheinvasion, nor for Moscows open rejection ofall
accepted norms and principles ofinternational order. Teinvasion
and destabilization ofUkraine are Moscows means ofpursuing not
just thegeopolitical goal ofguaranteeing infuence, but acivilizational
goal as well: eliminating thevery idea oftheMaidan as analternative
tothe Russian Matrix (namely, theRussian personalized power system
and theindividuals subjugation by thestate). IntheKremlins view,
theMaidan is theAbsolute Evil, which must be erased permanently
and utterly, with theutmost cruelty. TeKremlins Ukrainian campaign
is thus apreemptive strategy with theultimate goals ofreproducing
and preventing any threats tothe personalized power system inRussia
and thepost-Soviet space. Ialso think that thefagrant and aggressive
beating towhich Putin has subjected Ukraine has certain psychologi-
cal underpinnings. We might surmise that they also come from adesire
tohumiliate theUkrainian state and nation, toboth punish and ter-
rifypour encourager les autres, including Russians. Infact, Putin is
demonstrating thejudo style his coach once described: You have tohit
frst and whack down theopponent toscare thehell out ofhim, forcing
him toaccept your domination!
Actually, theKremlins tactics against Ukraine are thesame ones it
used against theBolotnaya protesters inRussia: thegovernment will use
both psychological and physical terror tactics toensure dominance and
guarantee obedienceboth here and over there. Tis is anup-to-date
version oftheBrezhnev Doctrine used in1968 against Czechoslovakia,
anaggression that was also meant as awarning toSoviet society.
Ukraine has long been Putins personal project. Tesite ofa sting-
ing rebuke during the2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine now presents
anopportunity for theKremlin toexact revenge for both past and pres-
ent Maidans, toteach therebellious Ukrainians alesson, and towarn
Russians about theprice ofinsubordination or attempts toescape
theRussian Matrix.
98 INTERREGNUM
Yet another angle: Russia is warning theWest, Dont meddlethis is
our playground!
But this is not theend for theKremlins agenda. Ukraine is supposed
totest theWests ability toaccept Putins rules ofthegame. Let us not
forget that this test has already been conducted once before, inGeorgia.
Moscows decision totake over Crimea indicates that Putin has con-
cluded that theWest is ready toaccept thePutin Doctrine, or that it
can be persuaded todo so. Techain ofrecent Kremlin statements and
stepsPutins March 4 press conference; various comments by Kremlin
ofcials, including Putins press secretary and theminister ofForeign
Afairs; Kremlin press releases summing up Putins talks with Western
leaders (and frst ofall with Obama)all signal thestart ofa new phase
inMoscows self-afrmation ofits civilization-state status. Tis new phase
will be characterized by acombination ofhot and cold tactics: con-
stant threats touse force beyond Russian borders, as well as awide range
ofadministrative, fnancial, and other pressure mechanisms.
Its ironic that theWestern leaders have been discussing face-saving
options for Putinmoves that would allow him tovoluntarily de-escalate
thecrisis. Escape valves are thelast things onhis mind: hes looking for
ways todestroy theWests reputation and toforce it toaccept his way
ofdealing with theworld. What theWest is treating as apause, perhaps
even as aprelude toretreat, is infact anew stage intheKremlins ofensive.
Just look atthe Kremlin rhetoric: athis press conference onMarch 4
theRussian president delivered anultimatum toboth Kiev and theWest.
But this ultimatum, which has been repeated by Russian ofcials non-
stop since Putin frst uttered it, is itself asafety valve for theWest
couched inrhetoric allowing Western leaders weary oftheUkrainian
headache toaccept it without completely embarrassing themselves.
Since March 4, Putin has repeated his former position onUkraine
more than once that thecurrent Kiev regime is not legitimate. But
he hasnt stopped there. He has also charged that Ukraine has been
supplanted by anew state whose legitimacy he has also called into
question. Moreover, he has listed several terms under which he is ready
todeal with Kiev. Tese terms go beyond adesire tocontrol Ukraines
foreign policy. Now Moscow is even telling Ukraine how tobuild its
state, by calling for aconstitutional change and areferendum, and by
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 99
calling onUkraine toaccept theFebruary 21 agreement, which would
return Yanukovych topower. Tese are thekinds ofdemands one would
issue toa protectorate or acolony.
Besides, Putin has openly referred tothe possibility ofa military
option if his demands are ignored. He has also reminded us that Russia
has other instruments for infuencing Ukraine athis disposal. When
Putin mentioned that Russia will not be sidelined if theRussian
speakers are persecuted, he alluded tothe infuence Russia wields over
gas prices and over Ukraines debt. Hes perfectly willing tocooperate
with thelegitimate Ukrainian regime, just as once he cooperated
with theTimoshenko governmentas long as this cooperation is
ontheKremlins terms.
In short, theRussian president made it clear that Russia will not
be satisfed with grabbing Crimea. (Who really cares about Crimea
intheKremlin?) Russia isnt about toloosen its grip onUkraine. He
has dangled possibilities infront oftheWests nose (for instance, he
wont send troops into Ukraine unless it is absolutely necessary!) inorder
toget it tobe more receptive tothe Kremlins other demands. Putin
has essentially asked theWest toturn ablind eye toany further moves
by Moscow toestablish its control over Ukraine. He even suggested
that theWest take part innormalizing thesituation inUkraine
inconjunction with Russia. It is quite possible that theKremlin believes
(or has grounds tobelieve) that theWest is ready for arepeat ofthe1938
Munich Agreement and theMolotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
According tothe press release theKremlin issued after thenearly
hour-long conversation between Putin and Obama onMarch 7, theRus-
sian President said, Tese relations should not be sacrifced todiferences
over individualeven though very importantinternational problems.
Translation: Whats done is done. Accept it, and were ready todiscuss
other problems. But you need tounderstand that theworld has changed.
Even theWests current goal for theUkraine crisis, tode-escalate
thesituation, is perceived inRussia not as ademand toreturn tothe
status quo ante, but as anefort tostop any further expansion by Russia.
Inother words, Moscow believes that theWest recognizes and tacitly ac-
cepts thenew situation. But if theWest is ready torecognize one altera-
tion tothe status quo, why not another?
1 00 INTERREGNUM
In his Address tothe Federal Assembly onMarch 18, Putin even
stated that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation(!) and we cant
live one without theother. Tis statement could only be interpreted as
therejection oftheright for Ukrainians tohave their own state.
Meanwhile, all thetalk intheWest about sanctioning theKremlin
has only served tostrengthen Putins belief that theWest will not dare
toreally hurt his regime. Tefrst round oftheWestern sanctions became
anobject for mockery intheKremlin and theRussian establishment. All
ofthese sanctionsfrom imposing visa restrictions tofreezing theas-
sets ofa limited number ofpeople intheRussian elitedont infict any
pain ontheRussian political class. Tevisa restrictions ontravel tothe
United States and Europe dont alarm most oftheelite. Many Russian of-
fcials, alerted earlier by thethreat oftheMagnitsky Act, have found ways
tosafeguard their assets.
Te second round ofU.S. sanctions, targeted atsome ofPutins
close loyalists and even their banks, have been amore serious warning
that theWest, or atleast theUnited States, is ready toinfict real pain
ontheRussian ruling team. However, Iwould argue that theRussian
elite would stand tolose more if key fgures ofPutins gang and oligarchs
were closed out ofWestern banks. But there are signs that this is not
going tohappenat least not any time soon. According toa government
briefng paper accidentally exposed tojournalists by UK ofcials, theUK
government should not support for now trade sanctions or close
Londons fnancial center toRussians. Similar briefng papers could just
have easily been exposed inother Western capitals. Western journalists
analyzing theissue confrm that Western fnancial centers are hardly
ready tolose access toRussian money. See Michel Weiss intheDaily
Beast, Ben Judah inPolitico, and Oliver Bullough intheNew Republic.
TeKremlin has nothing toworry about onthis score, then.
Moreover, theKremlin has opened adiscussion about freezing and
confscating Western assets inRussia, demonstrating its ability tolaunch
acounterstrike. So Moscow is trying tobolster thealready powerful
world business lobby, which protects theKremlins interests inorder
toguarantee its own interests inside Russia. TeGerman business com-
munity is currently acting as themost fervent defender oftheKremlins
interests. TeRussian regime will do everything inits power tomake sure
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 1 01
that therest ofthebusiness community inRussia, as well as infuential
Western lobby groups that serve theRussian regime, will become more
active indefending Russias interests. Tey will force Western leaders
toabandon their eforts tohurt Putin. Telatest rhetorical nuances show
that Western politicians are cautiously looking for compromise with
theKremlin onthebasis ofthenew status quo, hoping that its appetite
has been sated for thetime being.
Never before has theWest had such powerful mechanisms for infu-
encing Russia, thanks tothe Russian elites integration into Western soci-
ety. At thesame time, never before has theWest been so impotent when
it comes tousing those mechanisms, thanks tothe Russian (Ukrainian,
Kazakh) elites ability tocorrupt and demoralize theWestern political and
business establishment. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was right tosay that Rus-
sias exports tothe West are commodities and corruption.
What about other means ofpacifying Putin? Sailing anAmerican feet
into theBlack Sea? Doing this would only give theKremlin yet another
pretext toprove that theWest is athreat toRussia. Cutting investments
toRussia? Surely Putin has already anticipated this, and if hes willing
toaccept this risk, it means that thelogic oftheregimes survival is stron-
ger than theproblems presented by awithdrawal ofinvestments. An EU
gas boycott, then? Who really believes that could happen today?
But lets imagine what would happen if theWest decided tostart
dismantling themoney-laundering machine theRussian elite has built
with theassistance oftheWestern service lobby. Would that precipitate
amoment oftruth for theKremlin and theRussian ruling class? Im not so
sure. TeKremlin has prepared for this eventuality. Infact Putin, having
declared theneed for thenationalization oftheRussian elite (meaning
that theelite must repatriate its wealth back toRussia), is ready for anew
challenge along these lines. Moreover, if theWest were tocut of theRus-
sian elite, that could only help Putin tighten control over thepolitical and
business establishment. Tose members ofthepolitical class who come
home would become his political base; others would become thenew trai-
tors. One could conclude that Putin is fully prepared toclose of thecoun-
try and pay theprice ofincreased isolation inorder tostay inpower.
You might respond here by saying that Putin wants toremain amember
oftheWestern clubthe G8, theNATO-Russia Council, theWTO, and
1 02 INTERREGNUM
so forth. But Im not so certain ofthis either. Indeed, he would like topro-
long his stay inClub West, but only if he gets toset his own agenda. He
doesnt necessarily want toremove Russia from theinternational system;
he wants toalign thesystem with his wishes, and he wants anendorsement
ofhis right tobreak therules. If theWest isnt ready todo these things,
Putin would be ready toturn inhis club membership card. From now on,
hell be breaking theruleswith or without theWests consent!
In any event, Putin is inbobsled mode. He is hurtling down thetrack;
no one can stop him, and he can no longer reverse course. But themore
he acts topreserve his power, themore damage he will infict onhis
country. Angela Merkel was wrong saying that Putin is living inanother
world. He actually fts rather well into his system ofpower. Every new
step he takes along this course makes his departure from power even more
improbable, forcing him totake greater and greater risks.
Putin may be convinced that he is succeeding. He may think that
theWest is tamed, or that it is only capable ofwagging its fnger atRus-
sia. Berlin continues todefend Putin against thepossibility ofany serious
Western reaction. Obama is reluctant torisk precipitating another Euro-
pean headache. Russian society is applauding Putins actions. His approval
rating is skyrocketing: inMarch 2014 his approval rating rose to70per-
cent (compared to60 percent in2013). Amajority ofRussians support
theofcial view ofthemotives behind theUkrainian confict. InFebruary,
69 percent ofRussian respondents accused theUkrainian opposition and
theWest ofprovoking theconfict and theviolence. Tus, themajority
ofRussians are prepared toaccept theannexation ofCrimea and further
Russian action inUkraine.
Tus, once again Putin has thesupport ofa nation that only yester-
day seemed tobe so tired ofhim! He has regained control over theelites,
too. He has returned triumphantly tothe scene as aWar President and
as aTriumphalist. True, we know how War Presidents end up. But atthe
moment his strategy is tofocus onhis plans for this evening and try
tomake it last as long as possible.
Tus, nothing could have stopped Vladimir Putin from his current
course ofaction. He has become ahostage ofhis own logic and couldnt
even free himself if he wanted to. He cant leave power, and he can only
preserve theregime by showing might, strength, aggression, and reckless-
LILIA SHEVTSOVA 1 03
ness. Teonly strategy left tohim by political circumstances was tomo-
bilize Russia by resurrecting apolicy ofcontainment oftheWest and by
thesearch for new enemies. Teinexorable logic ofthis strategy has even
driven him todig up old slogans from World War II about liberating
theSoviet people from fascists and Nazis. Teres no stopping now; this
strategy dictates that Putin must press on. Temoment he stops, he is
politically dead; there are too many people waiting inthewings for their
chance toknock him down.
Having drawn Western leaders into his own trap, Putin has invented
aneven more interesting pastime for them: he has now called onthem
tonormalize thesituation inUkraine inpartnership with Russia.
TeKremlin has even ofered areform package, which it is ready toimple-
ment inUkraine, incooperation with Western leaders. Tis package
includes provisions tofederalize Ukraine (this way it will be easier for Rus-
sia togobble up one region ata time), aconstitutional referendum (voters
from theeastern regions can be bribed), and talks about Ukraines fate
under theauspices ofan EU-Ukraine-Russia framework. (Tey can even
invite Obama if he behaves himself.) Finally, Moscow must like Kissingers
idea ofUkraine becoming abridge between Europe and Russia, since
Moscow knows that this bridge will be guarded by Russian soldiers.
Does it mean that theWest is trapped? Does it mean that what-
ever it does, it will only help Putin inhis desperate gamble? TeWests
current tactics tocalm Putin downde-escalation and diplomatic
conclusions without defnite resolvewill only feed theKremlins sense
ofimpunity. However, if theWest were todevelop astrategy that had as
its goal infuencing thepart oftheRussian elite that will lose out most if
Russia turns into aset-in-stone state, it could cause asplit intheRus-
sian establishment, hopefully leading tothe emergence offorces inside
Russia that would break it out ofits trap. Not soon, but with time.
Current Western tactics, however, are only serving toconsolidate Russias
elites around their leader.
Te Kremlins moves have triggered thelaw ofunintended conse-
quences. Its tactical victory inUkraine will inevitably result inastrategic
defeat. TeKremlin may fortify thewalls ofits decaying fortress, but it
is undermining thefoundation. Teincursion into Crimea has already
brought onthecollapse oftheRussian ruble. TePutin Doctrine is turning
1 04 INTERREGNUM
thecountry into aperpetually mobilized command-economy statethe
same kind that in1991 brought about thecollapse oftheSoviet Union.
Te law ofunintended consequences is also atwork inUkraine.
TeKremlin did what no political force inUkraine had ever been able
todo. TeRussian invasion set of theconsolidation ofUkraines dispa-
rate political forcesliberals, nationalists, theLeft, oligarchs, commu-
nists, and even theParty ofRegions. It is possible that theonly lasting
result ofPutins actions will be tohelp strengthen Ukrainian national
identity onthebasis ofa struggle for national liberation.
Lets hope that thelaw ofunintended consequences will break
inapositive direction for theWest, too, consolidating its foreign policy
and forcing its leaders toacquire thepolitical will tosolve theconun-
drum Putin has created.
I hope that these things will happen, but we are not there yet.
1 05
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