THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ARTICLE XII

Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists,
entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and
craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology
and regulate its transfer for the national benefit.
Congress of the Philippines
Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session
28 of July, 2003

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this
Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate
JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by
the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.
OSCAR G. YABES Secretary of Senate ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General House of
Represenatives Approved: August 29, 2003GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President of the Philippines

In Re Arthur Castillo Reyes (1993)****

Residency
Residency Rule 138 Sec 2

Age
Residency Rule 138 Sec 2

Good Moral Character

Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, June 29, 1998

FACTS:
Mrs. Julieta Nunag filed several cases against his husband, Atty. Dominador Nunag, for his alleged affair
with Gina Espita who happens to be a former studentof the respondent back when Ms. Espita was a
first-year college student. Finally, inthe most recent case filed by Mrs. Nunag, the complainant had her
seven childrensign the appeal for disbarment of Atty. Nunag. Mrs. Nunag presented as evidencethe
pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita together, love letters, testimony of Mr. Charlie Espita, the
brother of Ms. Espita and the source of the mentioned pictures and love letters, and the testimony of
the children of Atty. And Mrs Nunag. In the proceedings, Atty. Nunag has been engaged in an affair with
Ms.Espita, and being live-in partners, have had two children with the latter. Atty. Nunag denied the
allegations by presenting
Argumentum ad Misericordia
ISSUE:
Should Atty. Nunag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against him?

RULING: Atty. Nunag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of evidence presented
against him, but instead, presented an argument to pity. He is, by order of the honorable court, being
disbarred by virtue of The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which provides:Rule 1.01

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.CANON 7

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.Rule 7.03

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects onhis fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998

JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a
lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or
her privilege to practice law.

On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against
her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2

The complainant narrated:

The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early
seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the
Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in
subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of
the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted
Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.

They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community, but which they
managed to from me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief
and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous
circumstances.

It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central
Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with
Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.

It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his
family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.] 3

This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 4

On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from complainant another
letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated
the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the
respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising
from extreme jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and
responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship
with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6
and a Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on
bar discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors 9 dismissed the
complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10

The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court 11 received another letter
12 from the complainant, with her seven
children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she
had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her. 14

In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with this Court's
Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be
affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had
voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing before the
investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she prepared the Motion to
Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof."

In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family to live
with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz:

What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive woman, and
every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in
every conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming
demands of her "loving" jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy
cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the
Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. 18

On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent to the
IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20

2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square meter of
land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant comes
from what she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more than education and
the higher and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.

3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love, forgiveness,
humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different
environment. Her value system is the very opposite.

4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years
of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love,
education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and
compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never
inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully
employed. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.

On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has been systematically
and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their family. Their marriage has
become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED,
BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the
Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.

For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his misfortune with
dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this is
not to be. The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In
fact, she became more fierce and predatory.

Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in sight. The
darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.

Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in
"Death and the Maiden", can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?

Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only obsession
now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great sorrow,
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . .

5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Respondent never
revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his
wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for
worse, in sickness and in health . . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything
derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.

On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells everyone, everywhere,
that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges and universities,
professional organizations, religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how
evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any
other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since when did love become
an instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life his good name, reputation and dignity?

Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her husband, employing every
unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly
disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been
mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. 21

To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as evidence the
following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita:

3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .

3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . .

3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . .

3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-
0083. . . .

3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED.

3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109.
DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (. . .).

3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by IBP
Board of Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .).

3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.

3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. . . . 22

In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:

I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .) are inadmissible in evidence as
enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996. (. . .).

xxx xxx xxx

II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the Saint
Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had
or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband
and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place.
He never begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other allegations of
Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly drove
respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home
many times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried
several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he
offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of
respondent Narag. . . .

IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive, scandalous, virulent
and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized,
tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally,
emotionally, and psychologically, . . .

V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28, 1996, to the
effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force
and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely
without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of
Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case
No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man a senior citizen of 63 years sickly, abandoned,
disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to
earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit
and unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical
certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent is
also suffering from hypertension. 23

On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, 24 recommending the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows:

Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the contending
parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:

a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent's own family
and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;

b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic
and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten
love letters, the due execution and contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for
being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and
offered proof to support otherwise.

Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the complaining
wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of
jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on
his sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the
adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate children, namely:
Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondent's denial that he is the father
of the two is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).

Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to disciplinary action as a
member of the legal profession. 25

In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating
commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent. 27 Subsequently the
complaint sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20,
1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.

After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties, we
find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct,
he may be suspended or disbarred. 29

Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 32

We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards."

Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina
Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34

Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie Espita, 36 Magdalena
Bautista, 37 Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr. Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and
Nieves F. Reyes. 42

Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainant's charge against
respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.

Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband
and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
xxx xxx xxx
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated his account that
his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. You
claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two
children and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my
moral values don't allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house?
A Yes, si[r].
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. 44

In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters
respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the
disbarment proceedings. 45

Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xx xxx xxx

Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and
wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir. 46

Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she learned from the
Narag children Randy, Bong and Rowena that their father left his family, that she and her husband
prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when
the respondent "went back to his woman," and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47

On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that
respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that
these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed
worthy of belief.

Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In
these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he
acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards that she
herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a
comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we
affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. 48 Besides, respondent
did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely
denied that he wrote them.

While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also
to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice.
Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished
profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of
the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49
This he failed to do.

Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same time, he
depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending," and as an "insanely and
pathologically jealous woman," whose only obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him as
shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his
allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. 51

We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he
maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue
practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had
abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them
testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from
either respondent himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good character
of his wife.

Respondent may have provided well for his family they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children
finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned
politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a
member of the noble profession of law.

We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support, educate and
instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he is also
obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and
support. 53

Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But the evidence
shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with her
paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a
good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must
have scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love.

Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father's moral frailties in his
testimony:

Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is
so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself,
I suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a
lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.
xx xxx xxx

COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst, hardened
criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this
point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also
suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones
are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are
saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you have
no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my
father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not?
But for sure, sir, you did not give me love. 54
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went
through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is
maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you?

A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially my
married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts
to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the
people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my
mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
Q In your wife's family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent
of scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial government, which my mother-in-law
hated him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father
has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic
and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor. 55

Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A
husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly
sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage."

In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he
had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court
declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a
member of the bar.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."

WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and
furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Paganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.


Olbes v Deciembre 457 SCRA 341

DIGEST

Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
AC-5365. April 27, 2005

Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. After
the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with
different maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against
the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre
with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.

Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A
lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he
has sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth
and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of
Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks
by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that
the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification
of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the
offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two
years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation
is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately.

Olbes v Deciembre 457 SCRA 341

D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of
respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those
checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were
meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses
Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged
respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment[2] on the Petition, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several
hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,[3] the parties were able to
present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties respective
formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners Memorandum,*4+ the case was considered submitted
for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated
January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution
No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts

In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central
Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and
Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]

Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans,
Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five
Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the
approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future.[6]

On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus
surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,[7] herein quoted as follows:

August 31, 1999

Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes
Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99*8+

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks
(Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of
maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.[9]

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-
Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein
that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached
him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241
and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-
Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15,
1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested
that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]

Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to
Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as
shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact
business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially
considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places.[12]

Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta
and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.[13]

In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any
truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their
commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had
allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to
ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already
been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given
them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with
them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.

Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in
any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly
private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations.
He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay
rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution
Office of Rizal respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN
A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and
then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their
business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES
E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with
cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by
them in their business venture.

The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony
before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two
separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct?

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.

Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that
correct?

A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two
checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).

COMM. DULAY:

Which are the first two checks?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and
46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241
and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?

A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.

Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?

A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Q. Is that your house?

A. No, its not my house?

Q. What is that, is that your law office?

A. That is my retainer client.

Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have
been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your client

COMM. DULAY:

The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What
building?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.

COMM. DULAY:

What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your
Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?

COMM. DULAY:

Your answer.

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.

Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and
0046244, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of
your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?

A. That is correct, sir.

Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As
between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more
credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction
involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt
on his version of the transaction with complainants.

Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also
obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public
prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.

Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a
loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon
appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in
Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid x x x.
Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction
between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that
they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them another
P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under the
circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of the previous
transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not
even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask
them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of
respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard
to the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is
clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed
as a result of respondents filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also
filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is
facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions.*15+

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[16] It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral
character.*17+ A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth
and justice, for which he *or she+ has sworn to be a fearless crusader.*18+

By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.[19] Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
publics faith in the legal profession.*20+

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.

x x x x x x x x x

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

x x x x x x x x x

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.[21] Such
conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private
lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor.[22]

The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree
of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must
be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in
their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be
officers of the court.[23]

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they
had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for
the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertion that
they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a
careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.

Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According
to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the
loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him,[24] he was not
able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in
him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him
with their blank checks.[25]

It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his
malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all
and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had
already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his
material gain.

And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the
temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to
have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist
on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months[26]
because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly
unbecoming, a member of the bar.

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is
equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous
ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Lawyers
must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any
artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied
by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.[33]

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended
by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for
employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to
the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.

In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make
it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious
inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the
SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of
herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners
and thereby caused the detention of one of them.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01
and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the
practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the
Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let
another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

In re: Argosino A.M No. 712 July 13, 1995
Digest
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.
Argosinowas previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was
sentenced withhomicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was
sentenced with 2 yearsimprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was
granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not
allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allowhim to take the attorneys oath of office
averring that his probation was already terminated. The court notethat he spent only 10
months of the probation period before it was terminated.ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath
of office.RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar
members, keeping inmind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and
the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Hence he was asked by the court to produceevidence that would certify that he has reformed
and have become a responsible member of thecommunity through sworn statements of
individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who haveactually known Mr. Argosino for
a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession.
The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to thefamily/relatives of
Raul Camaligan.

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him
in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of
such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence.
This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two
(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino
has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's
right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to
other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which
the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or
should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of
least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for
a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW
710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as
to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil
must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has
once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry
on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those
who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may
aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been
set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only
those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the
standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to
punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning,
is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect
the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to
be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may
not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law
unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal
learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold
of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and
that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a
benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a
Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained;
that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not
establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members
of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into
the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their
courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral
duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would
not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged
and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that
the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly,
at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show
to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

BM No 712 March 19, 1997
EN BANC
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
R E S O L U T I O N
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however
deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte
during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later
withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing
on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now
be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and
six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship
foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint
efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment
on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder
since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,
taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one
of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992,
literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him
that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his
law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar.
He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and
moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for
allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings
inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for
admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible
a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral
character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the
question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering
becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other
than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no
less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now
morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a
devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly
according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration
of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the
lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to
practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Education
ROC Rule 138 Sec 6

Republic Act No 7662 Legal Education Act

Rule 138 Sec 5-16

In re Telesforo Diao, A.C No 244 March 29 1963

ISSUE:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO VS. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ,
AC No. 244, March 29, 1963

FACTS:
Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar. Two years later,
Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying theinformation in his application for such Bar Examination.
Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and neitherdid
he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in 1941. Diao practically admits first
charge, but claims that he served the US army,and took the General Classification Test which, according
to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma, although he failed to submit certification for suchclaim
from any proper school officials. The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly
meritorious, as Diao did not obtain his AA degreefrom Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was
erroneously certified, and asserts that he obtained his AA from Arellano University in 1949. This
claimwas still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University in
April 1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948(second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he
would not have been permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that
Previousto the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education (AA) as required by the Department of
Private Education

ISSUE:
WON Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by
falsifying information. Admission under false pretensesthus give grounds for revoking his admission in
the Bar, as passing the Bar Exam is not the only requirement to become an attorney at law. Thus, the
nameTelesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is required to return his law diploma
within thirty days

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted
to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application
for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due
course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which
contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-
1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April,
1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd
semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not
have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact
that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And
the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

In re: Application of Adriano M Hernandez September 6, 1993********

n a Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 27, 1993 (Re: Application of Adriano M.
Hernandez to take the 1993 Bar Examinations), the Court allowed the applicant, a Filipino citizen who
obtained a Juris Doctor from Columbia University, New York and who has taken fourth year review
courses and other bar subjects at the Ateneo Law School, to take the 1993 Bar Examinations,
considering the fact that in the past, it had allowed Filipinos who have studied law in foreign law
schools from the strict requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 and allowed them to take the bar
examinations, but with the caveat that:

Beginning next year, the Court WILL NOT ALLOW GRADUATES OF FOREIGN LAW SCHOOLS TO TAKE THE
BAR EXAMINATIONS. An applicant who desires to take the bar examinations must not only have studied
law in a local law school but has to present the certifications required under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138
in order to take the bar examination. Since graduates of foreign law schools cannot submit said
certifications, they shall henceforth not be allowed to take the bar examinations (emphasis supplied).
Was Adriano M. Hernandez the last Filipino to graduate from a foreign law school who was allowed to
take the Bar Examinations?

No.

In Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar
Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010) the Supreme
Court once again allowed Filipino graduates of foreign law schools to take the Philippine Bar, subject to
certain conditions, and amended Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted to the examination, all applicants for
admission to the bar shall satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed
courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree in a law school or university officially
recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where
the degree has been granted.

Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be
admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing:
(a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b)
recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth
year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the
Philippine Government.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a
foreign law school must also present proof of completion of a separate bachelors degree.

Since the law course is designed to acquaint the law student with (hopefully) the whole spectrum of
Philippine law, those who obtain their law degrees from non-Philippine law schools have to work doubly
hard in preparing for the Bar Examinations, since they studied a different set of laws in law school. But if
they are up to the challenge, the Supreme Court, pursuant to Bar Matter No. 1153, is very much willing
to accommodate them.

And so what happened to Adriano M. Hernandez?

He passed the 1993 Bar Examinations and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1994, but passed away
in 2011 at the young age of 44.



Republic of the Phil Supreme

CourtManilaSirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated
March 9, 2010.
Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza ProposingReforms in the Bar Examinations
Through Amendments to Rule 138 of theRules of Court). The Court Resolved to
APPROVE
the proposed amendmentsto Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:SEC. 5. Additional requirement for
other applicants. Allapplicants for admission other than those referred to in the twopreceding sections
shall, before being admitted to the examination,satisfactorily show that they have successfully
completed all theprescribed courses for the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the
Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been
granted.No applicant who obtained the
Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he or shehas
satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the
government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics. A Filipino
citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon
submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the
degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the
proper authority; and (c)completion of all the fourth year subjects in the
Bachelor of Lawsacademic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government

Oath:
I___________ of ___________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.


RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Non-lawyers who may be authorized to appear in court:

Cases before the MTC: Party to the litigation, in person OR through an agent or friend or
appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC)

Non-Lawyers authorized to appear in court:

1. In cases before the MTC, a party may conduct his case or litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC).

Before any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally (Ibid)

In a criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available,
the judge may appoint a non-lawyer who is
resident of the province, and
of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense (Rule 116, Sec. 7, RRC)
A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law schools clinical education program approved
by the Supreme Court may appear before any court without compensation, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school. The student shall be under the direct supervision and
control of an IBP member duly accredited by the law school.
Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if (1) they
represent themselves, or if (2) they represent their organization or members thereof (Art. 222, PO 442,
as amended).
Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Act No.
2259, Sec. 9).
Any person appointed to appear for the government of the Phil. in accordance with law (Sec. 33 Rule
138).

RULE 115
Rights of Accused

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to
the following rights:

Prohibition from Practice

ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.


ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
other lower courts.cr

ARTICLE IX
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office
or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
Republic Act No. 7160
Section 90. Practice of Profession. -
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging
in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall
not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government
unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation
therefrom
Section 91. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. - (a) Officials and employees of local government units
shall file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, lists of relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service, financial and business interests, and
personnel data sheets as required by law.
Rule 148 Sec 35
Public Officials who cannot engage in the private practice of law in the Philippines:
1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Superior Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC).

People v Villanueva Gr no L-19450 may 27, 1965
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the
Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the
same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for
the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position
of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage
in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City
Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order
sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from
Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney
Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear
and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was
appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on
December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the
civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended
party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of
her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that
his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control
or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos,
Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the
duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in
this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case
had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or
a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing
the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910 Sec 1
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS, FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS HEREOF BY THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, AND TO REPEAL COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-
SIX
Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at least
twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a)
retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to
discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner
hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. And
when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years
and has rendered at least twenty-years' service in the Government, ten or more of which have been
continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to
retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the
salary which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no retiring
Justice during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any court in any
civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or
in any criminal case wherein and officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any administrative
proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to
any of its legally constituted officers.
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;