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Popper's problem of an
empirical basis
Max Deutscher
a
a
Macquarie University
Published online: 18 Sep 2006.
To cite this article: Max Deutscher (1968) Popper's problem of an empirical basis,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46:3, 277-288, DOI: 10.1080/00048406812341221
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 46, No. 3; Dec.ember, 1968
MAx DEUTSCHER
POPPER' S PROBLEM OF AN EMPI RI CAL BASIS
I
I had pl anned this paper in two parts: t he first critical, the second an
outline of a solution t o Popper' s problem. However, it became apparent
t hat the second part required a full t reat ment which could be given onl y in
a separate paper. What follows, then, is the critical part of my exami nat i on
of the probl em of an empirical basis.
I. Popper's Problem
Popper cuts t he knot of the problem of i nduct i on i n an account of
science according t o which induction need never be used. His account ,
if successful, i mmedi at el y refutes any t ranscendent al argument used t o
prot ect induction f r om scepticism. It woul d also render unnecessary, t hough
not invalid, any positive solution t o the probl em of induction.
Popper draws an intuitively plausible distinction bet ween the possibility
of verifying and the possibility of falsifying a t he or y. Hi s distinction is
made i n terms of the deducibility of the negation of basic statements f r om
art empirical statement, and the non-deducibility of t he negation of a basic
statement from a metaphysical statement. A statement of an empirical
t heory in conj unct i on with basic statements of initial conditions, entails
basic statements not included in the set stating t he initial conditions. I f
one of these new basic statements is false, t hen the original conj unct i on
is false. Accordi ng t o Popper, scientists can proceed wi t hout believing in
either the t rut h or even t he probability of their theories. Scientific pro-
gress consists in the construction of speculative hypotheses, and t he con-
duct of experiments and observations of a sort which coul d falsify these
speculations. We may falsify an empirical st at ement if we can falsify
the negation-of-some-basic-statement deduced from it. Thus a st at ement
is empirical, or non-metaphysical, if it is falsifiable.
The problem of an empirical basis can now be stated: If we are t o
know t hat a t heor y is false, t hen we must know the t rut h of the state-
ments of initial conditions; to know t hat the conjunction of initial condi -
tions and t heory is false does not suffice f or knowledge of the falsity of t he
theory. Furt hermore, we must know t he t rut h value of the basic state-
ments which we deduced from t he statements of initial conditions and t he
theory. Even when we deduce the negation of basic statements from the
t heory alone, still we must be able to determine their t rut h value. It seems
277
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Max Deutscher
t o be generally accepted t hat Popper relies heavily on observation in his
expl anat i on of falsification, as distinct from mere falsifiability. Of course, as
is also well-known, he emphasizes t hat repeatable observation, and t hus the
establishment of a low-level generalization, is required for falsification.
A casual reading of The Logic ol Scientific Discovery can produce the
impression t hat Popper simply holds the commonsense view t hat by
observation we come to know t he truth-value of those basic statements
which we need in the testing of theories. Popper does not in fact hol d
this view. He leaves no logical room for the role played by observation in
science.
A basic statement is a singular impure existential statement of something
which may be ' observed' . The t erm ' i mpure existential' is mine. I coin
it on analogy with Popper' s ' pure existential' . A pure existential, such as
' A lion exists, somewhere, sometime' , has no falsifiers and is t hus ' meta-
physical' on Popper' s criterion of demarcation. An i mpure existential
woul d be ' A lion exists at place p, time t' . This is ' empirical' since it has
falsifiers, such as ' A tiger exists at place p, t i me t' . (We must suitably
restrict the range of ' t' and ' p' . ) Clearly, ' A lion exists' has no falsifiers,
since a falsifier must itself be a basic statement, and a basic statement
must be an existential statement. No st at ement t hat anyt hi ng other than
a lion exists at a part i cul ar time and place conflicts with the statement
t hat a l i on exists; neither does a statement t hat something other t han a
lion exists somewhere, sometime, conflict with ' A lion exists somewhere,
sometime' . Let us refresh our memor y about the verification and falsifica-
tion of pure and impure existentials. We may t hen see more clearly part
of the reason why Popper' s probl em of an empirical basis arises.
A pure negative existential ' No lions exist' is unverifiable, but falsifi-
able. It is falsifiable onl y because either a pure unfalsifiable existential
' A lion exists' or an impure existential ' A lion exists at t, p' is verifiable.
An impure negative existential ' No lion exists at t, p' is falsifiable so l ong
as the time, t, and the place, p, are suitably specified. It is not quite so
easy t o say whether the i mpure existential ' A lion exists at t, p' and the
i mpure negative existential ' No lion exists at t, p' are both verifiable.
What falsifies ' A lion exists at t, p' ? Certainly t o find t hat a tiger exists
at t, p is to falsify it, so l ong as the time, t, and the place, p, are precisely
enough speci fi ed. Thus, if i mpure existentials are verifiable, t hey may be
falsified with the same degree of certainty. The same poi nt must hol d
for the verification of ' No lion exists a t t, p' . Al l is well so long as
somet hi ng incompatible wi t h the existence of a lion is observed. What if
not hi ng at all is observed at t, p? If someone sees no lion at t, p, does
this conclusively falsify ' A lion exists at t, p' ? It is possible t o interpret
' So-and-so observed not hi ng lion-like at t, p' so t hat i t entails ' Nothing
lion-like existed at t, p' . However, is it really possible to observe so
much when we see so little? A person may not see something and yet
it may be there. To observe t hat there is not a lion at t, p must be t o do
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Poppers Problem of an Empirical Basis
mor e t han t o fail t o see it. I t i s t o l ook f or a l i on at t he cor r ect pl ace
and time, under t he best condi t i ons f or observat i on, t o pay close at t en-
tion, and still not t o see a lion. When we say t hat we have observed t hat
no lion is present , what we say entails t hat no l i on is present. Never -
theless, all t hat has happened is t hat we have done our best t o see a l i on
and have not succeeded. I n such ci rcumst ances i t woul d be i rrat i onal
but not impossible t o suspect t hat a l i on mi ght nevertheless be present .
It mi ght seem, t hen, t hat t he cert ai nt y with which our not seeing a l i on
rules out t he possibility of its presence is much less t han t he cert ai nt y
of its presence when we do see it.
However , as has been apt l y r emar ked 1, it is easier t o mistake a tiger
for a lion, t han a l i on f or a void. I f we have seen a lion, t hen a lion is
present. Equal l y, if we see t hat what ever is t here, it is not a lion, t hen no
lion is present. Ther e is, t o say t he least, no more possibility t hat what
l ooked not t o be a l i on ( but onl y a t abl e perhaps, or a vol ume of ai r )
was a lion, t han t hat what l ooked like a lion was not one. Fur t her mor e,
when we ask whet her an i mpur e existential may be falsified by fai l ure
to observe t he t hi ng i n question, we must realize t hat it is rel evant to ask
whi ch of t he senses is bei ng consi dered and also t o enqui r e about t he
nat ure of what is supposed t o be p e r c e i v e d . Al t hough merel y t o l ook
and fail t o percei ve a l i on ma y not always conclusively falsify ' A l i on
exists at t, p' , one may falsify t hat st at ement simply by walking f r om
one side of t he i ndi cat ed pl ace t o t he ot her. It is not a cert ai nt y t hat
y o u w o u l d feel t h e l i o n if y o u t o u c h e d h i m , a n d h e n c e y o u c a n n o t infer
by logic t hat since you fel t nothing, not hi ng was there. But you can i nfer
by logic t hat if you crossed a suitably rest ri ct ed area, t hen not hi ng wi t h
a lion' s body was in t he pat h. I f you crawl ed al ong a t unnel of lion-sized
cross-section, you woul d be bound t o be st opped by any l i on in it. Tha t
is, your senses of t ouch and sight i nform you t hat you have t raversed a
cert ai n area, and logic i nf or ms you t hat not hi ng of nor mal lion size was
in t hat area.
To sum up. Since pur e negat i ve existentials are falsifiable, pur e and
i mpure existentials are verifiable. Since i mpur e existentials are verifiable,
then, with due care and t he use of controls, negat i ve i mpure existentials
may also be verified. Thi s is t o say t hat i mpur e existentials ma y be
falsified. To show t hat an i mpur e existential was falsifiable, we had t o
t ake as a fact t hat i mpur e existentials wer e verifiable. Thus, t o deny t hat
i mpure existentials are verifiable is to be i nvol ved i n t he denial of t he
falsifiability of bot h pur e and i mpur e existentials. Popper is cor r ect in
thinking t hat general st at ement s may be falsifiable, t hough unverifiable.
He cannot be cor r ect in i mpl yi ng ( Logi c of Scientific Discovery, Hut chi n-
son, London 1959, her eaf t er L. Sc. D. , pp. 104- 105) t hat basi c st at ement s
themselves must also be t aken as unverifiable, t hough falsifiable.
1 By Keith Campbell, University of Sydney.
1 9 279
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Max Deutscher
The rel at i on bet ween t he falsifiability of a general st at ement and t he
verifiability of a basic st at ement is simple. ' Al l Xs and Ys' may be falsified
by t he verification of ' Thi s X is not a Y' , whi ch may be regarded as t he
j oi nt verification of t he i mpur e existential ' Ther e is an X at t, p' and
the falsification of t he i mpur e existential ' Ther e is a Y at t, p' . I t will
not do t o say t hat ' All Xs are Ys' is falsified mer el y if ' Thi s X is a Y'
is false. A t heor y is falsified onl y if we discover t hat it is false 2. I t is
not falsified merel y if it is false. To say t hat no basic st at ement is veri -
fiable is t o say t hat no general st at ement is falsifiable. We can cont r ast
t he falsifiability of ' All Xs ar e Ys' with its l ack of verifiability onl y on
t he grounds t hat not hi ng whi ch we can know by observat i on can falsify
it. I f we t hen pr et end t hat not hi ng can be verified by observat i on, we
have no grounds what soever f or maki ng a distinction bet ween t he veri -
fiability and falsifiability of a general statement. Gener al st at ement s woul d
be equal l y unverifiable and unfalsifiable, if no basic st at ement coul d be
verified. I n Conjectures and Retutations (loc. cit.) Popper insists t hat
the rel at i on bet ween ' All Xs ar e Ys' and ' Thi s X is not a Y' differs f r om
t hat bet ween ' All Xs are Ys' and ' Thi s X is a Y' . Thi s difference has
not hi ng t o do with t he pr obl em of an empi ri cal basis, I agree, but repl y
t hat the defect of this posi t i on is t hat nei t her falsifiability nor falsification
consists solely in a logical rel at i on bet ween statements.
What has Popper t o say about knowl edge of, or reasons t o believe, basic
st at ement s and t hei r negat i ons? We find t hat t hey have t he status of
theories, in t hat t hey are conj ect ures, t o be ' criticized' and ' tested' . Test ed
by means of what ? By t he deduct i on of pot ent i al falsifiers? And how
are their t rut h values known? They are not known at all. They, t oo,
are conj ect ures to be criticized and tested. Nor , apparent l y, can any
probabi l i t y be assigned t o basic statements. It is har dl y believable t hat
this is Popper ' s real position. Nevert hel ess in fact it is. For Popper it
woul d be a conj ect ure t hat conj ect ures were being made by scientists.
Ther e are conj ect ures but no refutations.
Thi s mi ght be t oo harsh. Popper woul d admi t t hat t here are ci rcum-
stances in which a conj ect ure is said t o be refut ed; namel y, when t here
has been agreement upon t he falsity of some st at ement deduced f r om t he
conj ect ure. But this is simply n o t what is meant by ' refut at i on' ; nor, if
it were i nt roduced as a meani ng f or ' refut at i on' , woul d it be strong enough
t o allow us t o i nfer t hat any ' refut ed' t heor y had been falsified.
Popper does not fall into this disastrous position by accident. Let us
fol l ow up his expl anat i on of vari ous key terms. He defines ' testable by
observat i on' as ' having pot ent i al falsifiers' . ' Havi ng pot ent i al falsifiers' is
defined as ' entailing t he negat i on of some basic statements' . The state-
ment s whose negat i on i s ent ai l ed are those singular ' i mpure' existentials
whi ch state t he existence of somet hi ng ' observabl e' (L.Sc.D., p. 102) .
2 It is this point which Popper appears to overlook in his censure of his critics
(Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1965, Second
Edition (revised), page 41, footnote 8).
280
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Popper's Problem of an Empirical Basis
Popper declines to define ' observable' (L.Sc.D., p. 103), but he does
warn us against t he error of ' psychologism' , which woul d have us t hi nk
t hat our perceptual experiences give us a justification for believing i n the
t rut h of an empirical basic statement. He does not mean merel y t hat
perceptual experience does not absolutely guarantee the t rut h of any basic
statement. A st at ement is no more justified by perceptual experience t han
it is by t humpi ng a table (p. 105). He has only a purel y conventionalist
answer (p. 109) t o the question: ' When shoul d we use a basic st at ement ?'
viz.: ' When it is agreed on' . If we were t o ask ' And how axe we t o know
when we have agreed upon any statement?' he could answer only: ' Use, as
a speculative hypothesis, the statement t hat we agree, deduce the negat i on
of basic statements from i t and test these severely' .
It seems t hat Popper' s not i on of a severe test reduces t o t hat of deducing
the negation of basic statements from theories or from basic statements.
We must send on its way any lingering i dea t hat the reason why it is
i mport ant t o deduce such statements is t hat we can thus find out whet her
a t heory is false. Popper does not explain why we should be more likely
t o know t hat a basic statement, rat her t han a t heory, was true. Popper
has not merely failed to define ' observable' ; he dismisses completely t he
relevance of percept ual experience and puts not hi ng in its place. Consi der
his suggestion t hat ' observable event' mi ght be expl ai ned as ' an event
involving position and movement of macroscopic physical bodies' (p.
103). As well as the pointless limitation t o ' position' and ' movement ' ,
there is a clear circularity in the not i on of ' macroscopic' . This word means
' of a size capable of being perceived' . Furt hermore, this account is in-
sufficient. We cannot falsify a t heory merel y by deducing something about
a macroscopic event. We must actually observe t hat event and find t hat
it was not as expected, or observe t hat it has not t aken place. If act ual l y
observing somet hi ng does not involve ' perceptual experience' t hen what
can Popper mean by t hat phrase?
At this point it should be clear t hat our problems are twofold: critical
and constructive. We must find out how a man with Popper' s scientific
out l ook has come t o find no place for perception in science. Then we
must try to say how we may know, or at least have very good reason
t o believe, t hat basic statements are true.
II ( a) The source of Popper's difficulty
The conclusion t hat we can neither know nor have reason to believe in,
the t rut h of any basic st at ement may be derived f r om the following prin-
ciples, which Popper explicitly adopts.
1. Statements can be justified onl y by statements.
Perceptual experiences have often been regarded as providing a
kind of justification for basic statements. It was hel d t hat these
statements are ' based on' these experiences; t hat their t rut h becomes
' manifest by i nspect i on' t hrough these experiences; or t hat it is made
281
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' evi dent ' by these experi ences, etc. Al l t hese expressions exhi bi t
t he perfect l y sound t endency t o emphasi ze t he close connect i on
bet ween the basic st at ement s and our per cept ual experiences. Yet
it was also rightly felt t hat statements can be logically /ustilied only
by statements. Thus the connect i on bet ween t he percept i ons and t he
st at ement s remai ned obscure, and was descri bed by correspondi ng
obscure expressions which el uci dat ed nothing, but sl urred over t he
difficulties or, at best, adumbr at ed t hem t hr ough met aphors. Her e
t oo a solution can be f ound, I believe, ff we clearly, separat e t he
psychol ogi cal f r om t he logical and met hodol ogi cal aspects of t he
probl em. We must distinguish between, on t he one hand, our sub-
iective experiences or our feelings of conviction whi ch can never
justify any st at ement ( t hough t hey can be made t he subject of psycho-
logical i nvest i gat i on), and on t he ot her hand, t he obiective logical
relations subsisting among t he various systems of scientific statements,
and within each of t hem.
( L. Sc. D. , p. 43. )
2. The onl y sort of relevance whi ch an experi ence can have t o a state-
ment is a causal one.
Per haps t he first proposi t i on by itself coul d al l ow t hat experi ence
constitutes a part i al justification. We might t ake it t o mean ' Onl y if we
had st at ement s as well as observat i ons coul d we justify a t heory' . How-
ever, t he second st at ement rules out any such hope. Popper thinks t hat
what causes a belief cannot justify it:
And finally, as to psychologism; I admit, again, t hat t he decision
t o accept a basic statement, and t o be satisfied with it, is causally
connect ed with our exper i ences- - especi al l y with our perceptual
experiences . . . . Exper i ences can mot i vat e a decision, and hence an
accept ance or a rej ect i on of a statement, but a basic st at ement can-
not be iustilied by t h e mmn o mor e t han by t humpi ng t he table.
(L. Sc. D. , p. 105. )
These t wo assumptions entail t he impossibility of any account of rat i onal
assent. We have al ready seen t hat falsification is onl y possible t o the
ext ent t hat basic statements and t hei r negat i ons are verifiable. However ,
st at ement s cannot veri fy statements, at best t hey can entail a given state-
ment. I f we cannot gain a basis f or rat i onal assent by observat i on, t hen
t here is no way of gaining t hat basis. Hence the assumpt i ons l ead t o a
br eakdown of t he ver y met aphysi cal -empi ri cal distinction f or which Popper
is justly famous.
If we hol d t hat onl y statements can justify our assent to statements, t hen
we are driven to accept one of t hree unt enabl e positions. Ei t her we fall
into scepticism, or we must embr ace a coherence t heor y of t rut h, or we
adopt some f or m of conventionalism.
282
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Popper' s Problem of an Empirical Basis
( i ) We arrive at scepticism if we mai nt ai n t hat consistency is not a
sufficient condi t i on of t rut h, since i n t hat case a proposi t i on may square
with ot her proposi t i ons and yet be false. But , on t he supposi t i on t hat onl y
propositions justify proposi t i ons, t he most t hat can be said of any col l ect i on
of proposi t i ons is t hat t hey f or m a consistent set, and not hi ng can be
known or justified.
(i i ) We can make a show of arriving at t r ut h by defining it in t erms of
consistency. Yet this definition leads t o inconsistency, since t here can be
self-consistent t heori es which are mut ual l y i ncompat i bl e. Two alternatives
t hen face such a definition of t rut h. Bot h t heori es may be said t o be t rue,
but t o say this is t o deny t hat consi st ency is a necessary condi t i on of
t rut h. Such a denial is absurd. Alternatively, it may be said t hat onl y
one t heor y is true. However , in t hat case it is confessed t hat consistency
is not a sufficient condi t i on of t r ut h aft er all. Per haps a new rule coul d
be creat ed t o pr ovi de t hat if t wo sets of proposi t i ons conflict, nei t her is
t o be accepted. But on this condi t i on we must not accept t he coherence
t heor y of t rut h itself, since it conflicts with any realist t heory.
(i i i ) Popper opt s f or a f or m of convent i onal i sm- - whi ch is itself a f or m
of scepticism, since i t declares t hat what we call knowl edge of basic pr o-
positions, can really be no mor e t han agreement about t hem. Thi s ma y
sound modest and at t ract i ve until we ask ourselves why any individual
should t hi nk t hat he agrees wi t h others. I f he has no r eason t o think this,
t hen Popper ' s suggestion collapses. But if he earl have some basis f or
thinking t hat he agrees wi t h others, t hen his basis f or belief in basi c
statements need not r educe t o t he f act ( conj ect ur e?) of his agreement
with others. I f he can have a basis for t he belief t hat he agrees wi t h
ot hers, it can deri ve onl y f r om his own observations. But i f this can be
an adequat e basis f or such a belief, t hen why c, an it not pr ovi de at l east
par t of his basis f or accept ance of some basic st at ement s? Indeed, bel i ef
t hat one agrees wi t h ot hers logically involves accept ance of some basi c
statements.
I f we at t empt t o br eak out of the t ri l emma by claiming t hat t here are
cert ai n special t ypes of proposi t i on whi ch ei t her need no justification, or
which are justified i n a compl et el y different way f r om all others, t hen
we still find ourselves in t roubl e. A proposi t i on whose own cont ent de-
t ermi nes i t s t rut h ( a logical t r ut h) requi res no justification. However , i t
is not one f r om whi ch scientific t heori es can be derived, nor is i t one whi ch
will falsify any falsifiable t heor y except an i nconsi st ent one. To say t hat
t her e ar e cont i ngent proposi t i ons whi ch are justified i n a way t ot al l y dis-
similar f r om all ot hers, is t o dodge t he issue by implicitly redefining t he
not i on of ' being justified' . To say t hat t here are contingent proposi t i ons
which requi re no justification is t o lapse i nt o convent i onal i sm. I t ma y be
t hat Austin, in Sense and Sensibilia ( Oxf or d Uni versi t y Press 1962, pp.
115- 119) , has r et r eat ed t o such a position. He rightly rej ect s t he idea t hat
1 9 , 283
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we must always have evi dence f or any cont i ngent belief. He also rejects
t he i dea t hat ever y cont i ngent bel i ef must be verified. However , this
rej ect i on is ambiguous. He may mean merel y t hat some of our beliefs are
al ready grounded, and t hat a process of verification is t herefore unneces-
sary. But I det ect in t he passage an insinuation t hat t he l ack of need f or
verification is t o be expl ai ned mer el y on t he ground t hat t he belief is
one whi ch any sane Oxf or d man woul d accept wi t hout question.
Next l et us consi der a consequence of t he denial t hat anything but
proposi t i ons can justify proposi t i ons. The falsification of a t heory requires
mor e t han t he concurrence of many reput abl e peopl e t o a st at ement whi ch
entails the falsity of the t heory. At least, some t rue st at ement needs t o
be made whi ch is i ncompat i bl e with t he t heory. Af t er all, t o say t hat a
true basic st at ement must be made whi ch is i ncompat i bl e with t he t heory,
is t o requi re more t han st at ement s f or the falsification of a t heory. Some-
thing must have occurred, or somet hi ng must have been in a cert ai n state,
etc., i f a basic st at ement is true. Thi s is shown by our react i on when
what we t hought t o falsify a t heor y turns out not .to have occurred. We
do not say ' The t heor y was falsified but, rejoice, it is unfalsified again!'
Rat her, we say ' The t heory was never really falsified.' The following con-
sideration shows t hat a t heory is not necessarily falsified by a true st at e,
ment which is incompatible wi t h it. I f we make a guess at somet hi ng which
is i ncompat i bl e with a t heor y bei ng tested, we cannot cl ai m t o have
falsified t he t heory, then, even i f later indications suggest we had been
correct . For a t heory t o be falsified, someone must come t o know, or
at t he ver y least believe cor r ect l y and have good reason t o believe, t hat
somet hi ng is the case which is i ncompat i bl e with the t heory. However ,
we have al ready seen t hat Popper ' s claim t hat onl y statements can justify
statements rules out any such possibility. I f it is not conceded t hat we gain
a basis f or belief f r om observat i on, how can we move f r om this impasse?
Popper mi ght prot est t hat h e is pr epar ed t o say t hat falsifying know-
ledge comes f r om observation. He mi ght insist t hat he distinguishes basic
st at ement s f r om met aphysi cal i mpure existentials, in t hat the f or mer are
about ' observabl e' or macroscopi c events. We mi ght easily suppose, t hen,
that Popper means t hat we may come t o know t hat a t heor y is false, by
observi ng t hat cert ai n mat t ers deduced f r om the t heor y are not so. Con-
sider Popper ' s r emar ks on knowl edge and observat i on. (Al l pur e existen-
tials are metaphysical, on Popper ' s criterion, but of course we must not
imagine t hat all impure existentials are empi ri cal . )
I readi l y admi t t hat onl y observat i on can give us ' knowl edge con-
cerni ng facts' , and t hat we can (as Ha hn says) ' become aware of
fact s onl y by observat i on' . But this awareness, this knowl edge of
ours, does not justify or establish the t r ut h of any statement. I do
not believe, t herefore, t hat t he quest i on which epi st emol ogy must
ask is, ' . . . on what does our knowledge rest? . . . or mor e exactly,
how can I, having had t he experience S, justify my description
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Poppers Problem of an Empirical Basis
of it, and defend it against doubt ?' Thi s will not do, even if we
change the t erm ,' experience' into ' protocol sentence' .
( L. Sc. D. , p. 98. )
Now, what significance has this concession t hat observation gives us
knowledge? Cl earl y Popper means onl y t hat observation gives us the
psychological assurance which ma ke s us say t hat we know. How else
can we square his ' admission' t hat knowledge is got by observation, wi t h
his denial t hat observation either establishes or supports the truth of any
statement? Furt hermore, at many points in his discussion of an empirical
basis, Popper speaks as if justification by percept i on is a mere mat t er of
appeal to our feelings of conviction (p. 99, para. 1, 2). Appeal t o per-
ception would be baseless if this were true. (Surely i t is i n virtue of our
perceiving what we do t hat we feel convinced. Our feelings are not called
upon t o justify anything. But I anticipate. )
I t is in the passage i mmedi at el y following t he one quot ed t hat he openl y
identifies the thesis t hat statements can be established by experience,
with the distorted view t hat scientific statements speak onl y of our ex-
periences. The first I t ake to be truistic. I agree wi t h Popper t hat t he
second is absurd.
Popper appears t o make a concession when he allows some sense t o
speaking of occurrences as falsifying a theory. What does this concession
amount to? He defines the occurrence---that it is t hunderi ng nowma s the
class of statements logically equivalent t o ' It is t hunderi ng now' . Thus,
t hat 'Pk' represents t he occurrence Pk, simply means 'Pk is a member of
t he class P' . I n this way, t he i dea of an actual occurrence falsifying a
t heory is replaced by the i dea of a class of equivalent statements which
are logically incompatible with the theory. He t hen introduces the i dea
of an event ( P) , as t he class of those ' occurrence' st at ement s Pk, P~ . . . .
which differ only i n their spatial and t emporal specifications.
Now, it is a crucial question for Popper whether or not actual occur-
rences could falsify a theory. By introducing technical definitions at this
point, he has simply avoided any discussion of the issue; nor does he
raise i t in other terms. He admits in a foot not e s t hat his account of
' occurrence' does not ' . . . adequat el y represent our usage or our i nt en-
tions' .
Popper knows as well as the next man t hat the occurrence of t hunder
is not a set of statements. He must really mean t hat strictly it is non-
sensical to speak of an occurrence falsifying a theory, Yet, because of
his definition, this i dea has been dismissed wi t hout discussion. Thi s
implicit dismissal is of a piece with his rejection of the possibility t hat
the sub-class of occurrences, perceptions, might justify anything. It is
not t hat t hey constitute inadequate justification; according t o Popper t hey
axe not the right sort of thing to funct i on as a justification at all.
s L.Sc.D., p. 88, footnote 1.
285
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To conclude this section in criticism of Popper's account of justification,
I wish to ask why singular impure existentials are so attractive as examples
of basic statements. Why does Popper choose to define 'basic statement'
in those terms? Surely he is influenced by the normal human conviction
that we may be able to determine by observation whether a singular
impure existential is true, whereas this cannot be possible for a non-basic
statement. Popper's good empirical sense leads him in the right direction,
but then his adherence to the dogma that only statements can justify
statements forces him to reject the idea of a basis for acceptance of basic
statements.
II (b) The reason ]or Popper' s rejection of observation as a basis f or
statements
When Popper speaks of knowledge by observation he seems to have
in mind only a sense-datum account of such knowledge. I grant that he
is combat t i ng this misconceived idea of how we gain knowledge by per-
ception. Yet , apparently, it has dominated his mind to such an extent
that he can think of no alternative account of perception, so that when
he attacks the idea that basic statements may be justified by perception,
he is in fact attacking the view that basic statements may be justified by
our 'perceptual experiences'. According to him, these axe unobservable;
statements about them do not form part of a testable theory. In short,
they seem to be those 'pictures on an inner mental screen' which have
no significance in the falsification of scientific theories. Similarly, he
thinks that the thesis of knowledge by observation is inextricably tied to
the theses of inductivism and positivism. This is revealed explicitly on
pages 94 and 95 ( L. Sc. D. ) where he says that Fries' resolution of his
famous trilemma founders on the problems of induction and universals.
Popper insists that any statement we make which is of any interest to
science goes much further than a statement of our mere immediate ex-
periences. This is certainly true: the fact that it merely appears to some-
one that an X is not a Y does not falsify the law that all Xs are Ys.
But this does not refute the eommonsense belief that to see that an X
is not a Y is to falsify the hypothesis that all Xs are Ys. To see that
something is the case is not merely to have a subjective experience.
In his attack, Popper does not distinguish the indefensible view that
perception gives us indubitable, incorrigible and unassailable knowledge,
from the claim that it gives us common-or-garden knowledge, or good
reason for belief. Why does he think that the implications of generality
in all scientifically useful statements show that perception does not give
us very good reason to accept such statements? Why is he so sure that
the man who says that we may get scientific knowledge by observation is
obliged to reduce his statements to the point where they lack generality,
and hence scientific interest?
286
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Poppers Problem o] .an Empirical Basis
Popper is in t wo minds about the faults of psychologism. In one mood,
the whole thesis is dismissed by logical fiat. Perceptual experiences are
simply the wrong sort of thing to justify anything. They are causes of
belief, not justifications of statements; t hey are ' thumpings on tables' ; t hey
are mere ' feelings of conviction' . Only statements can justify statements.
But, in another mood, his argument is t hat t hey are not good enough
reasons, because t hey are unable to support the weight of scientific state-
ments. This criticism suggests t hat what we need is really something of
the same type, but of higher quality. But he speculates no furt her i n t hat
direction.
Popper repeat edl y says t hat those who mai nt ai n t hat perception can
justify belief also t hi nk t hat all apparently objective statements refer merel y
to experiences. While it must be admitted t hat ma ny people do cl ut ch
these views closely together, I see no logical reason why t hey shoul d not
be separated. I n fact, their separation would form a key part of any
programme t o reconstruct the thesis t hat percept i on can justify belief.
The other mai n reason for Popper' s rejection of observation as a basis
for acceptance of statements is his correct appraisal t hat observations can
cause (the maki ng of, or the belief in) statements. Popper assumes t hat
what causes a belief cannot justify it. This is a widespread philosophical
view, often put forward as a truism. I consider t hat i t is a compl et e
mistake. Now, it is correct to mai nt ai n the following t hree propositions
- - whi ch are the commonl y stated bases for the position t hat what causes
a belief cannot j ust i fy it.
( 1) To say t hat something caused a belief is not thereby to say t hat
the belief is justified or unjustified;
( 2) To describe the causes of a belief need involve no j udgment what -
soever on t he rationality of the belief;
( 3) To say t hat something is a reason for belief is not t o say anyt hi ng
about the cause of a belief.
Yet these claims simply do not bear on the thesis, which I would defend,
t hat there is a causal condition which is logically necessary for rat i onal
belief. I would demonst rat e this fact by enunci at i ng the following Causal
condition for rat i onal belief, which is perfectly consistent with the t hree
propositions above:
' For a person t o be justified or reasonable in belief, it is not suffici-
ent t hat there is some good reason for t hat belief. He must believe
lot t hat reason (or lor some other good reason). A person believes
t hat q for the reason t hat p, only if either his bel i ef t hat p is part
of the cause of his belief t hat q, or his perception t hat p is part of
the cause of his belief t hat q.'
At anot her time I would defend this claim.
It is plain t hat Popper' s probl em can be solved onl y when we clarify
the sense in which an opinion may be grounded on observation. Popper
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is correct in supposing that a sense-datum theory of perception cannot
provide any such account. He is, I believe, in error in his general rejec-
tion of observation as justification for belief.
Elucidation of the idea of observation as grounds for belief must be
the task of a separate paper. However, I wish to conclude with a point
which is a little more than a negative criticism of Popper. In order to
show that we can conclusively falsify a theory by observation, we do not
need a neutral observation language, let alone that language lacking in
general terms which Popper claims would be required by Fries' 'psycho-
logistic' solution of the trilemma (L.Sc.D., pp. 94, 5). From the fact
that we describe the observation made in our severe tests of a theory in
the language of the theory itself, it does not follow that the theory becomes
self-preserving. Observation would cease to be an independent check on
theoretical speculation only if the theoretically expressed descriptions of
that observation were required to be consistent with the theory. This
cannot be the case. Any falsifiable theory must include the notion of
negation. Hence, wherever ' T (theory) and tl (theoretically expressed
initial observation statement)' entails 't~ (theoretically expressed predic-
tion)' , ',.~t~' must also be a statement within the theoretical framework
of 'T'.
Macquarie University.
288
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