MACARIOLA VS.

ASUNCION 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an appeal.


On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not signed by the
parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in
his order dated October 23, 1963.


One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A E. Dr. Arcadio
Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.


On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions
and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.


Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following provisions: Article 1491,
par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft
& Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.


On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.


Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.


Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be
more discreet in his private and business activities.


Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who earlier
purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of
the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The
said property was no longer the subject of litigation.


In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent. Upon the
sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from
the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political
laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.



Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot partake in any
business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on
January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not
benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance
from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January
9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon 25.











PEOPLE V. PERFECTO

G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any
person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," i s
still in force."
public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by
the inhabitants to the sovereign.

FACTS:

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate
investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect
that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of
certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the
editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.

The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUEs:
Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty
Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the
latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment
of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of
things.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with
the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a
Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said
article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of
government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.

"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its
terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the
people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they
are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect
and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an
official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."

DECISION:

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the j udgment
should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.









DE LEON VS ESGUERRA
G.R. No. 78059
153 SCRA 602
August 31, 1987

Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, et al.
Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra in his capacity as
OIC Governor in the province of Rizal, et al.

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided the designation of respondent Florentino
Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same
barangay and municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office
shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that respindent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace them as well as
designate successors.

Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their
positions.

ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was valid.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC Governor designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the provisional constitution must be
deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its ratification.

BELGECA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 208566 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-
sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel
to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from
two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by
Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.
Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to
ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of
Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate
as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as
CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but
only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a
violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs),
the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the
LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal
fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD
1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes
which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contempl ated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

MAGALLONA VS ERMITA

655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted the law is also known
as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the
national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of
our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of
islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty
and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls
when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription
and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046),
we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na.
mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 sq.
na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that
our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of
international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without ri sking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our
maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime
zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This
is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that
the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.


REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 155832)
FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any
property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the
Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec.
3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.

The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking
permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The
Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the
rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay
proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2
commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.

HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a
prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its
judgment for that of the PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no
evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-
judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show
how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court
cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan
has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the
claim of the Republic in another civil case.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they
filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged
that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the
1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift
the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the
initiative petitions.

Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to
the Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The
Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect,
failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of
stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid
initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.