ATUN v. NUEZ GR No.

L-8018, October
26, 1955 87 PHIL 762 FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the
plaintiffs, her nieces and nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to
Silvestra Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the
Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio
Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the
produce. The defendant turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with
the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration,
however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.
ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?
HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania
Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania
Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother
Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action
arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status
as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.


LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938 66 PHIL 547
FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana
Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as
compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and
because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted
and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such
court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in
favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the
sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights
of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio. ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum
promised by her father from her grandfather's estate?


HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who
died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the
Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his
grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for
the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is
received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received
from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their
father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did
not inherit anything.


USON v. DEL ROSARIO GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953 92 PHIL 530
FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the
petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by
defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant
presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an
statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any
inheritance from Faustino.

The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new
Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they
shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code). ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants
correct? HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson
(Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore,
the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested. The claim of the
defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of her expressed
renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in
the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. Nor does the contention that
the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive effect. Article 2253 above
referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this
is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As
already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the
imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of
the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966 17 SCRA 418
FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of
Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition
before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The
petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's
estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?
HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time
and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed
by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

CHAVEZ v. IAC GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990
FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6 children,
while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each their share to
private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed
with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire property to one of the
siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel
which was denied by the trail court but which later

decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has
left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.
ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede that of
the partition inter-vivos?
HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be
executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be
in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx
The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract
perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave
her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid. It
would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she
herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a
simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the
property she had received in the partition inter vivos.

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757 90 PHIL 757
FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of
P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to file a
claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate
has not yet been properly probated. ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against
the estate of the debtor's deceased parent?

HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that
the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which
pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and
when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased
must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a
creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought
in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The foregoing pronouncements are
perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin
Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before
the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.

CONDE v. ABAYA GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909 13 PHIL 249
FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-
appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the
deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the
deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the
decedent's natural children. ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for
the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to
receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father. HELD: The right of action that devolves upon
the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment
of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of
a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two
cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the
discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or
mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter. But such action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his
descendants, or his ascendants.

DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ
GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat; the latter
then assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino transferred 1/2 of his
rights to the property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2 of the consideratioin paid by her to the
mortgagees Magat. Severino later died leaving the defendants as heirs. Honoria also died, with the
plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement and distribution of the estate
of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in question which was adjudicated, after proper
proceedings in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the
lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in their favor
after all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of the deceased
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of the estate of the deceased;
so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the defendants are presumed to be
free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up in the complaint should have been
interposed during the pendency and progress of Special Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done
so, she cannot now bring this action against the defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendants upon which plaintiff can predicate her action against the
present defendants.\



ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-
Appellant
. [GR L-8437. Nov. 28, 1956.] J. REYES en banc

Luzon Surety Co. filed a claim against the Estate based on 20 different indemnity agreements, or
counterbonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety
solidaryguarantor.Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the 20
bonds it executed inconsideration of the counterbonds, and asked for judgment for the unpaid
premiums and documentarystamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 % interest thereon. CFI dismissed the
claims of Luzon Surety Co.,on failure to state the cause of action.
ISSUE
: what obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent claimschargeable
against the estate?Under the present Civil Code (Art. 1311),
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law
.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannotexceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these
heirssucceed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 &
776,NCC,provides, thereby confirming Art. 1311.
ART. 774.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law. ART. 776.
The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person which are not extinguished by his death.

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in
ourRules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before
theresidue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is made from
theestate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in
factdiminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.The gene
ral rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.The rule is
a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties.
Of the 3 exceptions fixed by Art 1311, the nature of obligation of the surety or guarantor does not
warrantthe conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement
for thecontract.Creditor Luzon Surety Co. expects from Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in
thecounterbonds was the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to
disburse onaccount of the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a
sum of money,resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that
thereimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as
themoney was paid to it.The 2
nd
exception of Art. 1311, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional andcontrary
to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be expresslyestablished,
or at the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text ofthe
agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.The 3
rd
exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Art.
1311 exists when they are nottransmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference
to those cases where the lawexpresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death: legal
support, parental authority,usufruct, contracts for a piece of work, partnership & agency. By contract,
the articles of the Civil Code

that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Art 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty
isextinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.The contracts of suretyship entered into by
Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being renderedintransmissible due to the nature of the
undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves,nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs.The contracts give rise to contingent
claims provable against his estate under sec. 5, Rule 87.
The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as
surety
or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the
suretyhas no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction
uponthe obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the
right tocompel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed something to
thepayment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of
actionagainst anybody

no claim that could be reduced to judgment.Our conclusion is that the
solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such
event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement.Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded
to the court oforigin. Costs against the Administratrix-
Appellee
.