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1
The Problem
of
Representation in Deleuze's
Reading
of
Leibniz:
To forget
the
Transcendental
Phillip Gillham
A
thesis
submitted
in
partial
fulfilment
of
the
requirements of
the
University
of
Sunderland for
the
degree
of
Doctor
of
Philosophy
September
2005
BEST COPY
AVAILABLE
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print quality
2
Abstract
The
critique of representation and
the
project
to think
difference in
a non-
representational
fashion has been
one of
the
defining factors
of modem continental
philosophy.
And
yet
how
a
thought
of pure
difference
can
be
used
in
a practical or
interventionist
sense
is
also one of
its
most obscure aspects.
We
shall examine
this
through
an exploration of one of
the
main
figures
of modem continental philosophy,
Gilles Deleuze,
with reference
to
his
use of
the
seventeenth century philosopher
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The importance
of
Leibniz
to
Deleuze lies in
two
main
features:
the
infinitesimal
calculus and
his logic
of events.
While
the
infinitesimal
calculus remains
indispensable
to Deleuze's
use of
transcendental
principles
he
will
take
issue
with
Leibniz's logic
of
the
event
in
order
to
produce
his
own
theory
(most
specifically
in
the
1969
text
The Logic
of
Sense). Deleuze's
criticism of
Leibniz is
first
set
forth in Difference
and
Repetition (1968)
where
he
argues
that
Leibniz limits
his
theory
of
the
event
to the
extent
that
it is based
on
the
belief
of a
God
who
produces
the
best
of all possible worlds.
As
such although
difference is
taken to the
infinite
through the
infinitesimal
calculus
Deleuze
concludes
that
we remain within
the
realms of representation
through the
convergence of events
in
the
ultimate
identity
of
God. To
express a non-representational
form
of
difference Deleuze's
solution
is
to
construct a
divergent
theory
of
the
event.
Although
this
approach
remains constant
throughout
all
his
works when we
turn to
The Fold: Leibniz
and
the
Baroque (1988)
the
accusation of representation
is
withdrawn
leaving
simply
the
criticism of convergence.
The
reason
for
this
is
that
Deleuze
will
find
an entirely
different form
of
logic
at work
in Leibniz's deduction
of
the
individual
or monad.
It
is
the
contention of
this thesis that this
alternative
logic
also undermines
Deleuze's
own
theory
of
the
event.
We investigate
this
by
tracing
Leibniz's logic
of
the
event
back
to
its
roots
in
scholastic philosophy.
Here
we propose
that
for Leibniz, in
opposition
to
Deleuze,
an event
is
constituted
by
the
individual
or monad
itself. We
also
draw
on
the
fact
that
Leibniz
stated
that the
infinitesimal
calculus was only
the
first
step
in his
mathematical
logic
and
that
he
always envisioned a geometric
calculus, a calculus
that
would position
individuals in
relation
to
God. In
order
to
access
the
logic behind
such a calculus we
turn to the
ancient
Greek
term
of
tolma
or
audacity
in
neo-Platonism
and gnosticism.
This is
a
logic
that
has
recently
been
revived
by Frangois Laruelle. Through
the
construction of a
tolma
logic
we argue
that
thinking
difference in itself is
an
irresolvable
abstraction and
finally
turn to
Jorge
Luis Borges
to
present a solution
in
terms
of a geometry of place and a
theory
of
proximate
individuals. The
originality of
this thesis
lies in
that this
research provides
the
first defence
of
Leibniz
against
Deleuze's
interpretation
to
be found in
contemporary studies.
I
also
formulate
a reading of
Leibniz's
philosophy
that
provides a unique position on
debates in
philosophy
today.
3
Acknowledgements
The
original
ideas for
this
project
first
came
together
nearly
ten
years ago.
There
are a
lot
of people who
have
provided
help
over
this time.
First I
would
like
to thank the
people without whom
this thesis
would not
be finished: Dad, Hazel, Janet, David,
Alan,
and my
late
granddad who will
be
much missed.
I
would also
like
to thank
Stuart Sim,
my second
director
of studies
for
taking
on
the
project at such a
late
stage.
For
encouragement
throughout the
project
I
would
like
to thank
Malcolm,
John, David, Paul, Bella
and
Tony. Finally I
would
like
to thank
John Mullarkey,
my
first director
of studies
for
giving me
the
opportunity
to
begin
this thesis.
4
Contents
Introduction
6
1. Simulacra: A Study in the Platonic Dialectic
15
2. The Logic
of
the Event 45
3. The Art
of
Leibniz 103
4. The Position
of
Philosophy 167
Conclusion 210
Bibliography
212
5
`So,
my
friend,
after
the
example of
the
Phoenicians,
you charted your course
by
the
stars?
T 'No, '
said
Menippus, `it
was among
the
stars
themselves
I journeyed. '
Baudrillard
Introduction
7
PhilosoiDhv. Contemporary Philosophy...
Philosophy
as science, as serious,
rigorous, indeed
apodictically rigorous
science
-
the
dream is
over.
'
What
place
does
philosophy
have in
the
world
today?
Where
once
it
was
the
cornerstone of all
knowledge it has
now
become
sidelined
by
empirical science.
If
one wants
to
seek
knowledge
then
one
becomes
a scientist rather
than
a philosopher
etc....
Metaphysics is left
to
quantum physics.
How
strange
to think that
science was
once an occult practice; now
it is
the
norm and
is invoked
should any
discussion
of
`supernatural'
phenomena ever
threaten to
be
taken
seriously.
Even
worse,
phenomena of
this
nature are
demoted
to
`psychological' investigation
and are
left
floundering before
the
monolithic questions
`Is it
real?
'
and
`Can
we measure
it? '
One
only needs
to turn to
Albert Einstein's
rebuttal
to
Henri Bergson
to
confirm
this:
`There is
...
no philosopher's
time; there
is
only a psychological
time that
differs
from
the time
of
the
physicist.
'2 This is
a pathology of
the
real.
At
what point
did
empiricism
become
the
science of
the
obvious or
the
self-evident,
this
conflation of
sight and
touch: the
confirmation and
the
conformation of
the
senses?
That is,
the
science of
the
convenient; not only can
I touch the
world out
there
but I
can see
myself
touching
it,
ergo,
it
must
be
real.
On
the
other
hand, if
we
turn to the
work of
the
neuroscientist
Karl Pribram
or
the
physicist
David Bohm
their
ideas fundamentally
question our notion of
`reality. ' Pribram
will argue
that the
brain functions holographically,
that
is, it
expresses non-localised energy waves
in
so called
`space-time'
co-ordinates?
Bohm
will use quantum physics
to
extend
this
notion
to the
nature of
the
world
itself.
"
Such
theories
challenge our notions of reality rather
than take
it
as given.
Suffice
to
say
science
has
always
had its dogmas in
the
same way as
they
are
to
be found in
'
Edmund Husserl (1970) The Crisis
of
European Science
and
Transcendental Philosophy,
trans.
D.
Carr. Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
p.
389,
quoted
by Robin Durie (2002) "Does
rhenomenology
have
a
future? " Radical Philosophy, 113,
p.
37
Henri Bergson (1999,
orig.
1922) Duration
and
Simultaneity: Bergson
and
the
Einsteinian Universe,
edited and with an
introduction by Robin Durie, trans.
L. Jacobson, trans.
of supplementary material
M. Lewis
and
IL Durie. Manchester: Clinamen Press,
p.
159
3
Daniel Goleman (1979) "Holographic
Memory: Karl Pribram interviewed by Daniel Goleman, "
Psychology Today, 12: 9,
pp.
71-76
4
David Bohm (1980) Wholeness
and
the
Implicate Order. London: Routledge
8
philosophy.
Of
course empirical scientific rationalism
thrives
very well
in
a
techno-
capitalist
`democracy. ' It is
all
the
more
ironic
that
at
the
dark heart
of empiricism we
find
the
doctrine
of scepticism.
The doctrine
of scepticism can really only
be
taken
as a matter of
degrees
of
scepticism
-a
complete sceptic would
believe in
nothing and as such would not even
have
the
means
to
assert such a position.
In this
sense scepticism
is
the
first
moment
of all philosophy, one must put one's assumptions
to
one side.
In
this,
philosophy
has
changed very
little down
the
ages,
from Plato's dialectic
to
Nietzsche's
total
critique.
However,
the
nature of scepticism
has
changed.
The
main protagonist of our
thesis,
the
French
philosopher
Gilles Deleuze,
provides us with
the
following brief
delineation
of scepticism:
In
opposition
to
ancient scepticism which rests on
the
variability of
sensible appearance and on
the
errors of
the
senses, modem scepticism
rests on
the
status of relations and on
their
exteriority.
The first
act of
modem scepticism was
the
discovery
of
belief in
the
foundations
of
knowledge,
that
is,
the
naturalization of
belief (positivism). Starting from
this
point,
its
second act was
the
denunciation
of
illegitimate beliefs,
that
is,
of
beliefs
which
do
not obey
the
rules which result
in
effective
knowledge (probabilism,
calculus of probabilities).
-'
With
modern scepticism a move
is
made
from
the
sensible
to the
cognitive.
It is
no
longer
the
case
that the
world out
there
may not
be
what
it
seems
but
a matter of
how
we constitute
the
world
through
mental associations.
From
the
position of modem
scepticism we may
take two
possible
directions. First,
we may construct practical
knowledge from
the
world we
do
experience
(science). Or
second, we may
investigate how
we constitute
the
world.
And
as
Constantin Boundas
will write
in his
translator's
introduction
to
Deleuze's book
on
Hume, the
world as a construct of
the
mind
is
effectively
little
more
than
a
fiction:
The
world abides as a
fiction
of
the
imagination,
and also
fiction
s
Gilles Deleuze (1991,
orig.
1953) Empiricism
and
Subjectivity: An Essay
on
Hume's
theory of
Human Nature,
trans. Constantin Boundas. New York: Columbia,
p.
19, hereafter denoted
as
Hume.
This
passage
is
taken from Boundas' introduction, `Deleuze, Empiricism,
and
the
struggle
for
Subjectivity, '
taken
from
Gilles Deleuze,
`Hume, '
chapter
in F. Chatelet
et at.
(eds. X 1979) La
Philosophie. Verviers: Marabout,
Vol. 2,
p.
232, translation
Boundas.
9
becomes
a principle of
human
nature;
the
world never
turns
into
an object
of
the
understanding.
It
remains as an
idea, but
the
idea is
not
constitutive;
it
constitutes a
fiction.
6
With
the
Humean `turn' it is
not
just
the
case
that
our perception of
the
world
is
a
representation
but
that the
representation
is itself
arbitrary.
Neither
can
it be
maintained
that
science
is
simply a neutral phenomenon
-
science,
like
any other
knowledge, is
a production.
Jean Baudrillard
alerts us
to the
original meaning of
this
term,
production
(pro-ducere]:
to
make visible.
7
What is,
and what
is
not visible
is
never a
disinterested
phenomenon.
This
type
of scepticism
has
also
taken
a
further
turn
over
the
past century, which
Stuart Sim has
recently called
`super-scepticism. '8
The linguistic
turn
in
philosophy and
the
developments
of structuralism and post-
structuralism provide
further
means of
taking
our conceptions apart.
Theory. Postmodern Theory...
Say: This is
real,
the
world
is
real,
the
real exists
(I have
met
it)
-
no one
laughs. Say:
this
is
a simulacrum, you are merely a simulacrum,
this
war
is
a simulacrum
-
everyone
bursts
out
laughing. With forced,
condescending
laughter,
or uncontrollable mirth, as
though
at a childish
joke
or an obscene proposition.
Everything to
do
with
the
simulacrum
is
taboo
or obscene, as
is
everything relating
to
sex or
death. Yet it is
much
rather reality and obviousness which are obscene.
It is
the truth
we should
laugh
at.
9
As
a construct
theory
can no
longer lay
claim
to
an external referent.
The
world can
no
longer be
used as
justification, foundation
or guarantor and conceptually
is little
more
than
an
illusion,
a phantasm, or
better
yet, an enchantment.
We
can no
longer
de-cipher,
only cipher
the
world.
This has lead
to
several related common concerns
in
post-structuralist
theory. The first is
that
of
immanence
-
this
directly follows
as a
consequence of
there being
no external referent,
for if
there
can
be
no claim
to
an
6
`Deleuze, Empiricism,
and
the
struggle
for Subjectivity, '
p.
18
7
Jean Baudrillard (1987,
orig.
1978) Forget Foucault, trans. N. Dufresne. New York: Semiotext(e),
21
Stuart Sim (2000) Contemporary
Continental Philosophy: The New Scepticism. Aldershot: Ashgate,
1-2
gJean
Baudrillard (1996,
orig.
1995) The Perfect Crime,
trans.
C. Turner. London: Verso,
pp.
95-6
10
outside
then theory
must
justify itself from
within, or
immanently. A
second concern
is
that
of
difference (or identity)
-
defining
something
in itself in
terms
of what
it is
not
(a
reference
to
an outside) would re-introduce
transcendence
into
the
system.
As
such
to
maintain
immanence
any
`identity'
must
be
constituted
differentially
within
the
system
itself. A third
concern
is
a
thorough
critique of representation.
Identity is
not
the
only way
in
which a
thought
of
difference
may
be
compromised.
That is, in
order
to think
difference in itself it
must not
be
mediated
through
anything else.
Of
course
it
may
be
argued, as
does Baudrillard, that defining
the
rules of
the
simulacrum
does
not
in
any way
help
one
to
escape
the
reality principle:
`What
are
we
to
do
then?
...
When
everything conforms,
beyond
even our wildest
hopes,
to the
ironic,
critical, alternative, catastrophic model?
"
Deleuze's
response
to
problems
such as
these
has
consistently
been
to
pre-configure
the
rules of
the
game
through the
history
of philosophy, as we
have
already seen
in Deleuze's
presentation of
Hume's
scepticism.
Likewise, Deleuze
will elaborate a
theory
of
difference in his
early works
on
Hume, Bergson
and
Nietzsche
that
essentially
bypasses
so-called
'post-
structuralism.
' It is in
this
sense
that
Boundas
will use
the
following
quotation
from
Derrida in
relation
to
Deleuze's
project:
It is
the
dream
of a purely
heterological thought
at
its
source.
A
pure
thought
of pure
difference. Empiricism
is its
philosophical name,
its
metaphysical pretention or modesty.
We
say
the
dream because it
must
vanish at
daybreak,
as soon as
language
awakens.
But
then
perhaps one
will object
that
it is language
which
is
sleeping.
Doubtless, but
then
one
must,
in
a certain way,
become
classical once more, and again
find
other
grounds
for
the
divorce between
speech and
thought.
"
Unlike
many of
his
contemporaries who were working
from
the
phenomenological-
existential
tradition
Deleuze
will
trace
a
different
philosophical
lineage.
'
The Perfect Crime,
pp.
101-2
"
Jacques Derrida (1978) Writing
and
Difference,
trans.
A Bass. London: Routledge,
p.
151,
quoted
in
Hume,
p.
3. Dcrrida
originally
made these
remarks
in
relation
to
Levinas.
11
Deleuze's Trajectory
The
themes
of
immanence, difference,
and
the
critique of representation will all
be
locked into
place at an early stage
in Deleuze's
philosophy:
1) On immanence
Deleuze
will
first
turn to
Lucretius
and
Nietzsche
and
then
find its
ultimate
form in
Spinoza. The
tone
of
this
is
set
in
the
essay
`Lucretius
and
Naturalism: ' `The first
philosopher
is
a naturalist:
he
speaks about nature, rather
than
speaking about
the
gods.
His
condition
is
that
his discourse
shall not
introduce into
philosophy new
myths....
912 That is,
philosophy must not
turn to
a
higher law for
explanation
but
to
the things themselves. 2) On difference Deleuze
will
turn to
Bergson
and
Leibniz. As
Deleuze
will say
in
the
essay
'Bergson's
conception of
difference: ' `...
to
do
philosophy
is
precisely to
start with
difference [... ] It is difference
which explicates
the thing
and not
its
causes.
'13 Essential
to this
notion of
difference is Leibniz's
differential
calculus.
The
calculus provides a way
to
conceive of
difference
as a
differential
-
something
different in itself. 3) On
the
critique of representation
Deleuze
will write
his
own
book
on
the
matter,
Difference
and
Repetition,
which
brings
together
all
the themes
of
his
earlier studies.
Here Deleuze
sets
forth his
own
critique of representation:
Representation
is
a site of
transcendental
illusion. This illusion
comes
in
several
forms, four interrelated forms
which correspond particularly to
thought,
sensibility, the
Idea
and
being. [The first illusion]
...
consists of
representing
difference
through the
identity
of
the
concept and
the
thinking
subject.
The
second
illusion
concerns
the
subordination
of
difference
to
resemblance
[... ] The
third
illusion
concerns
the
negative
and
the
manner
in
which
it
subordinates
difference
to
itself, in
the
form
of
both limitation
and opposition
[... ] Finally,
the
fourth illusion
concerns
the
subordination
of
difference
to the
analogy of
judgement.
14
12
Gilles Deleuze (1961) 'Lucnce
et
la
naturalisme'
Etude
philosophiques,
1,
translated
as
`Lucretius
and
Naturalism, ' in Gilles Deleuze (1990
orig.
1969) The Logic
of
Sense,
trans. M. Lester
with
C.
Stivale. London: Athlone,
p.
278
13
Gilles Deleuze (1956)
`La
conception
de la difference
chez
Bergson' Les
Etudes
Bergsoniennes, IV,
trans. M. Mcmahon
as
'Bergson's
Conception
of
Difference' in J. Mullarkey (ed. )(1999) The New
Bergsonism. Manchester:
University
Press,
p.
62
14
Gilles Deleuze (1994,
orig.
1968) Difference
and
Repetition,
trans. P. Patton. London: Athlone,
pp.
265-69
12
The Problem
However,
while
Leibniz's differential
calculus
is fundamental
to
Deleuze's
study
he
will argue
that
Leibniz's
metaphysics
does
not escape
the
hold
of representation:
...
infinite
representation
does
not
free itself
from
the
principle of
identity
as presupposition
of representation....
Infinite
representation
invokes
a
foundation.
While
this
foundation is
not
the
identical itself, it is
nevertheless a way of
taking the
principle of representation particularly
seriously, giving
it
an
infinite
value and rendering
it
coextensive with
the
whole, and
in
this
manner allowing
it
to
reign over existence
itself.
'-5
That is,
although
Leibniz
takes the
notion of
difference into
the
infinitely
small
through the
calculus
he
will still use
this
as a
limit
to
difference. On
the
other
hand
when we
turn to
Deleuze's later
work
The Fold: Leibniz
and
the
Baroque,
we
find
the
following
statement:
Leibniz draws identity into infinity:
the
Identical is
an auto-position of
the
infinite,
without which
identity
would remain
hypothetical.... The
principle of
identity
-
or rather, of contradiction
-
is
only
the
cry of
the
Identicals. It
cannot
be
an abstraction.
It is
a Signal
.
16
In fact in The Fold
there
will
be
no reference
to
Deleuze's
earlier criticism of
Leibniz. There
are
two
possible ways
to
interpret
this.
Either Deleuze
recognises
that
his
original criticism
was
invalid
or perhaps
Deleuze
now
holds
the
view
that there
is
a use
for
representation.
If
the
former
case
is
correct
then
in
what way
do identity
and
contradiction play a part
in difference
or
if
the
latter
case
is
correct
then
would
this
compromise
Deleuze's
approach
to
difference.
's
Gilles Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
49
16
Gilles Deleuze (1993,
orig.
1988) The Fold.
-
Leibniz
and the
Baroque, trans.
T. Conley.
Minneapolis: University
of
Minnesota
Press,
p.
43-44
13
The Thesis
In
this thesis
we will
be
exploring
this
discrepancy between Deleuze's
early and
late
works on
Leibniz. The
thesis
we will present
is
that
in Deleuze's later
reading
he
does
recognise a
deeper logic in Leibniz
that
invalidates his
earlier reading.
However,
we will also present
the
view
that
Deleuze does
not appreciate
the
full
consequences
that this
new
logic has in
terms
of
his
own philosophy.
In
order
to
do
this
we shall
first
explore
the logic
and method
Deleuze develops in
producing
his
theory
of
difference in his
early philosophy.
To
this
effect
in Chapter One
we will explicate
and analyse
how Deleuze
uses
the
idea
of
the
simulacrum
to
provide a space
for
a
philosophy of pure
difference. In Chapter Two
we shall see
how
the
philosophy of
difference is
realised
in Deleuze's
theory
of
the
event.
Having
elaborated
the
basic
structure of
Deleuze's
early philosophy we will
then
be
able
to turn to
Deleuze's later
reading of
Leibniz. This
will
be done in Chapter Three
where we shall also
identify
a
logic in Leibniz
that
requires us
to
re-evaluate
Deleuze's
philosophy.
Finally Chapter
Four
will
be
concerned
with a construction of
this
logic
and
the
consequences
this
has for
the
overall position of
Deleuze's
philosophy.
14
Some
short notes on
three tvnes
of
infinite logic
Throughout
this thesis
we shall make use of and
discuss
many
different
types
of
infinite logic. It
will
therefore
be
useful
to
outline
the three
most common
forms
these
will
take:
1) Infinity Logic. Essentially based
on a
logic
of spatiality.
Takes
the
form
that
in
order
for
something
to
be
everything
it
must
be
nothing.
An
essential component of
Baudrillard's
theories,
for
example, simulation
is
everywhere
because it has
no
reality,
i.
e.
it doesn't
exist.
Also
used
by
the
Kabbalists in
their
ideas
of
God but
they
modify
the
logic
to
say
that
God is
no-thing rather
than
nothing.
2) Transcendental
or
Differential Logic. Made
possible
by Leibniz's invention
of
the
mathematical calculus.
Has
scientific as well as philosophical uses, e. g. use of
the
Fourier
transform
in holography. Takes
a similar
form
to
infinity logic
except now
the
nothing part of
the
logic is
treated
as a
limit. This important
modification allows
two
different
orders
to
be
related
in
the
form
of one
being
an
immanent
condition of
the
other without re-introducing
transcendence.
Plays
an
important
role
in Deleuze's
philosophy.
3) Unilateral Duality Logic. Recently
single-handedly re-introduced
into
philosophy
by Francois Laruelle, he describes it
as
the
only methodological way
to think
without
presuppositions.
Arguably first
used
in
neo-platonic,
Gnostic
and perhaps even
Kabbalistic
thought. It is
similar
in form
to
differential logic: A is
an
immanent
condition of
B, but
unlike
transcendental
logic
where
A
and
B
are co-conditions of
each other so
that
conditioning
takes
place
in both directions, in
unilateral
duality
logic A
conditions
B but B has
no effect on
A. To
provide an example
from
neo-
Platonism
the
world
is
an expression or outpouring of
God but has
no effect on
God
at all.
The interesting
result of
this
logic is
that
one can only
think
from
the
side of
the
conditioned,
the
world
-
one cannot pass over
the
abyss
to the
other side.
As
such
the
condition
(God) is
totally indifferent
to the
conditioned.
15
Chapter 1
Simulacra:
A Study in
the
Platonic Dialectic
16
Introduction
We
shall
begin
our study of
Deleuze's
early philosophy
by
exploring
how Deleuze
develops
the
notion of
the
simulacrum via
the
critique of
Platonism. This
will
be
carried out
in
the
f
rst section of
this
chapter.
The
second section of
this
chapter will
develop
a response
to
Deleuze's
critique which
is
already
to
be found in the
Platonic
Dialogues.
It is
perhaps not a coincidence
that the
concept of
the
simulacrum
has been developed
in
contemporary continental philosophy at
the
same
time
as science and science
fiction has
grappled with
the
idea
of virtual reality.
Of
course,
the
notion
that the
world
is just
an appearance can
be
traced
back
to
ancient
Greek
and
Eastern
thought
(and
many other
traditions).
However,
the
modern conception of
the
simulacrum
is
not
just
concerned with
the
opposition
between
reality and appearance as
is
generally
thought to
be found in Parmenides, Plato
and
Lucretius but
when
the
reference
to
a
notion of reality
is
also
dissolved. To
this
extent
the
modern conception of
the
simulacrum may
be
traced
back
to
Nietzsche
and
his
project
to
overturn
the
essence/appearance
divide in
terms
of
the
concept of sense or value.
As Deleuze
will
note
this
project
is
no
less
an overturning of philosophy
itself in
the
form
of an anti-
Platonism.
"
However
overturning
Platonism
is
not simply
`the
abolition of
the
world
of essences and of
the
world of appearances'
but
also
the
dissolution
of
the
constituting
thought that
sets up
this
division.
' 8
In
contemporary continental philosophy
the
simulacrum
is
associated with
two theorists
in
particular:
Jean Baudrillard
and
Gilles Deleuze. Certainly
the
simulacrum
is
not solely exclusive
to these two theorist
as
the
simulacrum
foreshadows
all
`postmodern'
theory to
some extent
but
what
they
do
present us with
is
two
very
different
approaches one may
take to the
simulacrum.
For Baudrillard
the
simulacrum
is
the
avatar of
the
complete
loss
of reference
to
a real world.
More
than
17
`... the task
of modem philosophy
has been defined: to
overturn
Platonism, ' Gilles Deleuze (1994,
orig.
1968) Difference
and
Repetition,
trans. P. Patton. London: Athlone,
p.
59
"
Gilles Deleuze `Plato
and the Simulacrum, '
originally
`Reversing Platonism, ' Revue de
Metaphyisiques
et
de Morale, 1967,
reproduced
in Gilles Deleuze (1990
orig.
1969) The Logic
of
Sense, trans. M. Lester
with
C. Stivale. London: Athlone,
p.
253
17
this
simulation
is like
a
black hole
with no possibility of escape.
In his
study
Baudrillard
and
Signs: Signification Ablaze, Gary Genosko
will
trace the
lineage
of
Baudrillard's
conception of
the
simulacrum via
Michel Foucault, Pierre Klossowski,
and
Georges Bataille back
to
Descartes' idea
of an evil
demon
producing
the
world
as a
deception.
19
This is
an
idea
that
can ultimately
be
traced
back
to
gnostic
Manicheism: `A Manichee
thinks
in
radically
dualistic terms
and posits
the
co-
existence of
two
irreconcilable
principles
(Good
and
Evil... ). The
source of
Evil is
not
the
Good, but
rather, a
Demon. '20 For Baudrillard the
evil
demon
was
triumphant
and
in
this
sense
the
simulacrum
is
treated
as purely negative
in his
work.
Deleuze
also
treats the
simulacrum as a
loss
of reference
but in
what may
be
seen as a proto-
Derridean
manoeuvre
he
posits
that there
was really no
true
reference
to
begin
with.
For Deleuze
reality
has
always
been
a simulacrum,
a virtual reality, and
the
real
is
what
is
constructed or selected.
In
this
endeavour
Deleuze's lineage is
very
different
from Baudrillard
as notions of
this type
of virtuality are already
to
be found in
Bergson
and
Leibniz. Again,
contra
Baudrillard,
Deleuze finds
the
simulacrum
to
be
a positive notion
in
that
it
allows
the
possibility
to
produce an anti-Platonic
philosophy
that
affirms
difference
rather
than the
identity
of essence.
We
shall now
turn to
an
in-depth
study of
Deleuze's
anti-Platonism
and
his
notion of
the
simulacrum
to
explore
his
project
to
produce a philosophy of pure
difference.
19
Gary Genosko (1994) Baudrillard
and
Signs: Signification Ablaze. London: Routledge,
pp.
29-34
20
ibid.
18
1. Deleuze's
anti-Platonism
First
we must
determine
what exactly
is
entailed
in Deleuze's
anti-Platonism.
Paul
Patton's
essay,
`Anti-Platonism
and
Art, ' draws
our attention
to the
fact
that the
precise
French
term that
Deleuze
uses
to
express
his
anti-Platonism
is
renverser.
21
This
term
can
have
the
meaning of reversing, overturning, or overthrowing.
Patton
proposes
that
Deleuze's
strategy
is
an
`overcoming that
proceeds
by inverting
certain
aspects of
Platonism. '22 A
similar stance
is
also
taken
up
by James Brusseau:
`Reversed Platonism is
not
the
opposite of
Platonism,
and
it is
not another version of
Platonism. It is
a
different
philosophy
that twists
out of
Platonism.
23
Deleuze's
own
position would seem quite clear,
for
example
in `Plato
and
the
Simulacrum' he
speaks of
`the
most
innocent
of all
destructions, the
destruction
of
Platonism. '24
However, Deleuze's
position
has
come under scrutiny
in
recent scholarship on
the
philosophy of
the
event.
For instance, Alain Badiou
argues
that
Deleuze has
produced a re-accentuated
Platonism:
"Platonism" is
the
great
fallacious
construction
of modernity and post-
modernity alike.
It
serves as a
type
of general negative prop:
it
only exists
to
legitimate
the
"new"
under
the
heading
of an anti-Platonism.
Certainly,
the
anti-Platonism proposed
by Deleuze
is
the
most generous and
the
most progressive,
the
least inclined
to
evoke a
destining
agency and
the
most open
to
contemporary creations.
All that
Deleuze lacked
was
to
finish
with anti-Platonism
itself.
25
Another French
philosopher,
Francois Laruelle
states:
`Nietzsche
and
Deleuze
empty
Platonism
of
its intermediary hybrids
and
identify the
extremes.
'26 The
point we must
investigate is
whether
Deleuze
actually succeeds
in his
project
to
overturn
Platonism
21
Paul Patton (1994) `Anti-Platonism
and
Art, '
chapter
in C. Boundas
and
D. Olkowski (eds. ) Gilles
Deleuze
and
the
Theatre
of
Philosophy. London: Routledge,
p.
143, Cf. `the task
of modem
Vhilosophy
has been defined:
to
overturn
[renverser] Platonism, ' Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
59
Paul Patton (1994) `Anti-Platonism
and
Art, '
p.
143
23
James Brusseau (1998) Isolated Experiences: Gilles Del
eure and
the
Solitudes
of
Reversed
Platonism. New York: SUNY Press,
p.
3
u
'Plato
and
the
Simulacrum, '
p.
266
's
Alain Badiou (2000,
orig.
1997) Deleuze: The Clamor
of
Being, trans.
L. Burchill. Minneapolis:
University
of
Minnesota Press,
p.
101
'6
Francois Laruelle (1999) `Identity
and
Event, ' trans.
R. Brassier, transcript of paper presented at
Thinking
the
Event
conference,
Coventry: Warwick University, June,
p.
3
19
or whether
Platonic
elements still remain.
To do
this
we must
first determine Plato's
doctrines
and
then
explore
how Deleuze develops his
own philosophy
through them.
The Trial
of
Socrates' Witness
Determining
Plato's
philosophy
is
a complex
issue. As John Sallis
points out
`Plato
himself
wrote no
treatises
expounding
"his
philosophy.
"'27 On
the
whole,
Plato's
writing
is in
the
form
of
dialogues. Points
of view are put
forward,
arguments
proffered
for
their
refutation and provisional positions reached.
Although
certain
theories are consistently argued
throughout the
dialogues,
as we shall see
later,
not
even
the
Platonic doctrine
of
the
Forms is
as straight-forward as
it
seems.
All
of
this
is
presented as
being
under
the
aegis of
Plato's
master,
Socrates. Plato does
not
`speak' in the
dialogues
at all.
28
Furthermore Plato's
comments
in
the
seventh
letter
seem
to
only confuse matters
further. Here he
tells
us
that
he has
written no work on
philosophy or
intends
to
do
so
(341c),
after which
he
continues:
I know,
that
if
there
were
to
be
a
treatise
or a
lecture
on
this
subject,
I
could
do it best. I
am also sure
for
that
matter
that
I
should
be
very sorry
to
see such a
treatise
poorly written.
If I
thought
it
possible
to
deal
adequately with
the
subject
in
a
treatise
or
in
a
lecture for
the
general
public, what
finer
achievement would
there
have been in
my
life
than to
write a work of great
benefit
to
mankind and
to
bring
the
nature of
things
to
light for
all men?
I do
not,
however,
think the
attempt
to tell
mankind
of
these
matters a good
thing,
except
in
the
case of some
few
who are
capable of
discovering
the truth
for
themselves
with a
little
guidance.
29
One
may wonder whether any relevant conclusions could
be drawn
about
the
Dialogues in
respect of
the
seventh
letter. At
one extreme one could posit
that the
Dialogues
are simply a record of
the teachings
of
Socrates
while at
the
other extreme
one could paint
the
picture of
Plato
as
the
wily philosopher who admits
to
nothing
and
bequeaths it
to
a
`few
people' to
find
their
own path
to the
`higher
philosophy.
'
27
John Sallis (1996,
orig.
1975) Being
and
Logos: Reading
the
Platonic Dialogues. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press,
p.
1
28
Plato
plays
the
part of a witness
in
the Phaedo
29
Plato, Letter VI1,341d-e,
p.
1589. All
references to Plato
are
from Plato (1961) The Collected
Dialogues
of
Plato including
the
Letters,
edited
by E. Hamilton
and
H. Cairns. New York: Pantheon
20
Investigations
generally
divide
the
Dialogues into
three
not necessarily
exclusive
topics.
First
there
is
the
role played
by Socrates,
and
to
what extent
the
dialogues
are an accurate rendering of
Socrates
and
his
teaching.
Second,
there
is
the
author
himself, Plato,
and
the
intentions he had in
mind
in
writing
the
dialogues,
including
whether or not
he intended
to
be
critical of
Socrates. Finally,
there
is
the
interpretation
of
the
dialogues
through
history: Platonism. In Deleuze's
early writings
he is
specifically critical of
Socrates
and
Platonism
while
finding inspiration in
an
`original' Plato. For instance, in Proust
and
Signs Deleuze
states:
Proust is
a
Platonist, but
not
in
the
vague sense, not
because he invokes
essences or
ideas.... Plato
offers us an
image
of
thought
under
the
sign of
encounters and violences.
In
a passage of
the
Republic [VU, 523b-525b],
Plato distinguishes
two
kinds
of
things
in
the
world:
those
which
leave
the
mind
inactive,
or give
it
only
the
pretext of an appearance of activity;
and
those
which
lead it
to think,
which
force
us
to think
[
...
] But
the
Socratic demon, irony,
consists
in
anticipating
the
encounters.
In
Socrates,
the
intelligence
still comes
before
the
encounters;
it
provokes
them,
it instigates
and organizes
them.
Proust's humor is
of another
nature:
Jewish humor
as opposed
to
Greek irony. One
must
be
endowed
for
the
signs, ready
to
encounter
them,
one must open oneself
to their
violence.
The intelligence
always comes after,
it is
good when
it
comes
after,
it is
good only when
it
comes after.
We have
seen
how
this
difference from Platonism involved
many more.
30
In his
early writings
Deleuze
will
identify Plato
with
those
positive aspects of
the
Platonic dialogues
which
he
wishes
to
utilise
for his
own philosophy and against
Platonism. However, in his later
writings
the
figure
of
Plato
will also come under
suspicion and
is
similarly accused of
the
original offence:
...
Plato
teaches the
opposite of what
he does: he
creates concepts
but
needs
to
set
them
up as representing the
uncreated
that
precedes
them....
Thus,
on
the
Platonic
plane,
truth
is
posed as presupposition, as already
there.
This is
the
Idea. In
the
Platonic
concept of
the
Idea, first
takes
on a
precise sense.
31
30
Gilles Deleuze (1972,
orig.
1964) Proust
and
Signs,
trans.
R. Howard. New York: George Braziller,
pp.
165-7
31Gilles
Deleuze & Felix Guattari (1994,
orig.
1991) What is Philosophy?, trans.
G. Burchell
and
H.
Tomlinson. London: Verso,
p.
29
21
So
we may see
that
Deleuze's
main target
in
the
Platonic Dialogues is
the theory
of
Ideas
or
Forms
whether
this
is
attributed
to
Socrates, Plato,
or
Platonism. We
shall
next
turn to
an elaboration of
this
doctrine.
What is Platonism?
`Platonism'
comprises
both
a
theory
and a method, namely
the theory
of
Forms
or
Ideas
and
the
`Socratic
method' or
`dialectic. ' The basic
metaphysics of
the theory
of
Ideas is
most clearly alluded
to
by Timaeus in
the
dialogue
of
the
same name:
First
then,
in
my
judgement,
we must make a
distinction
and ask, what
is
that
which always
is
and
has
no
becoming,
and what
is
that
which
is
always
becoming
and never
is? That
which
is
apprehended
by
intelligence
and reason
is
always
in
the
same state,
but
that
which
is
conceived
by
opinion with
the
help
of sensation and without reason
is
always
in
a process of
becoming
and perishing and never really
is....
32
Here Timaeus distinguishes between
a sensible world which
is
always
in flux
and a
realm of reason
through
which we comprehend
the
world.
This
account
is
extended
to
knowledge by Socrates in
the
Cratylus: `Nor
can we reasonably say,
Cratylus,
that
there
is knowledge
at all,
if
everything
is in
a state of
transition and
there
is
nothing
abiding.
For knowledge
too
cannot continue
to
be knowledge
unless continuing
always
to
abide and exist.
'33 The
mental realm encompasses
both
reason and opinion
but
as we are
told
in
the
Timaeus for
true
knowledge
to
exist
it
must
find its
foundation in
an
`extra-mental'
reality,
that
is it
cannot
be
a sensible construct
(opinion)
otherwise
it
would not
be
eternal.
34This
extra-mental reality acts as a
model
from
which
the
physical world
is derived
as a copy.
35
So
the
aim of reason
is
to
attain
these
Forms.
The Socratic
method
is harder
to
define
as
it is drawn from
the
very
form
of
the
Platonic Dialogues. As
a
tool
of
instruction
we also need
to take
into
account
how the
Dialogues
are utilised as a method of
teaching.
Consequently,
readings range
32
Plato, Timaeus, 27d-28a,
p.
1161
33
Plato, Cratylus, 44th b,
p.
473
34
Plato, Timaeus, 29a,
p.
1162
35
ibid. 30c-31 b,
p.
1163
22
from
the
`generous' to the
`narrow. ' An
example of a generous reading
is
provided
by David Burrell: `Dialectic is
not a
direct knowing
of a
higher
sort
...
but
rather a
critical reflection on
the
accounts we
do
give.
Such
a reflection remarks
the
inadequacies
of each account, yet recognises
that the
deficiencies
of one may well
be
complemented
by
another.
'36 From
this
viewpoint
the
criticism of
`accounts' is
fundamental to
Socratic
method and
is
part of what
Burrell
calls
the `journey
plotted
by both "teacher"
and
"student, " by
appropriate
disagreement. '
37
On
the
other
hand
some readings of
the
Socratic
method
do
take
it
to
be
a
`knowing
of a
higher
sort.
'
For instance
the
following
account
is
given
by Richard Robinson in The Concise
Encyclopaedia
of
Western Philosophy
and
Philosophers:
His [Socrates]
conversation takes the
form
of putting questions
to
a
single respondent.
The first
question,
being
a request
for
a
definition,
does
not admit
the
answers yes and no and
is
a matter of
doubt. The
subsequent questions,
however, demand
the
answer yes or no.
Having
obtained a number of apparently
disconnected
answers
in
this
way,
Socrates "syllogizes"
them,
as
Aristotle
says, and shows
that they
refute
his
respondent's answer
to the
first
question.
He
then
asks
the
respondent
to
find
another answer
to the
first
question, and
treats that
in
the
same
way.
The
effect
is
to
show
that the
answerer
is
contradicting
himself,
and
does
not
know
what
he
thought
he knew. Socrates does
not,
however,
claim
to
understand
the
matter
himself. On
the contrary,
he denies
all
knowledge
of
it. He
even
denies
that
he intended
to
convict
his
answerer
of
ignorance [... ] He
says that
his
questions might
for
all
he knew
beforehand, have led
to the
establishment
instead
of
the
refutation of
the
answer given.
This latter denial is, however, impossible to
believe. Hence
his
victims
tend to
call
him "sly",
as pretending
that
he knows less
than
they
do
when actually
he knows
more.
The Greek for
slyness
is
"
ny....
38
The difference between
these two types
of reading can
be located in
the
relation
between the theory
of
Forms
and
the Socratic
method assumed
in
each.
In
the
generous reading
the
Socratic
method
is
given
in its
own right,
independent
of
the
Forms. However,
this
is
not
the
case
in
the
narrow reading.
Here
the
method
is
applied with a prior aim
in
mind.
We have
already seen
how Deleuze holds
this
latter
36
David Burrell (1973) Analogy
and
Philosophical
Language. London: Yale University Press,
p.
66
"
ibid.
p.
38
38
R. Robinson `Socrates, '
entry
in J. Urnison
and
J. Ree (eds. X1989) The Concise Encyclopaedia
of
Western Philosophy
and
Philosophers.
London:
Routledge,
p.
299
23
view as
demonstrated in
the
quotation
from Proust
and
Signs
above
('In Socrates,
the
intelligence
still comes
before
the
encounters....
Prousts humor is
of another nature:
Jewish humor
as opposed
to
Greek irony. ')
as
is
also
in
evidence
in Deleuze's later
approach
to
Plato. Let
us now
look
at
Deleuze's
critique of
Platonism in
more
detail.
Deleuze's
critique of
Platonism
One
of
the
fundamental
tenets
of
Platonism is
that the
sensible world
is
produced as a
copy of
the
Forms. Deleuze
criticises this through
an analysis of
the
Sophist. In
the
Sophist
two
different
types
of entity are
distinguished in
relation
to the
Forms:
good
copies
('images')
and
bad
copies
('semblances'
or
'simulacra' ).
39
This is
also
in
evidence
in
the
definition
of
the
user,
the
producer and
the
imitator in The Republic.
40
The
user
is
that
which
has
the Idea (or Form)
of an object.
The
producer produces
the
object according
to this
Idea. The imitator however does
not
have
the
Idea
of
the
object and
hence
can only produce
it
according
to
external resemblances or
through
external
instruction. Here
we may see
that the
process of production occurs according
to
an
internal
relation
to the
Idea
or as
Genosko
obversely notes
`[t]he
art of
the
imitator is
thrice
removed
from
true
knowledge. '41
Deleuze
criticises
the
Forms from
two
different
angles.
Firstly, it is
stated
in
The Republic
that
only
the
user
is
able
to
judge between
good and
bad
copies.
It is for
this
reason
that
Deleuze
makes
the
point
that
Platonic Ideas
are a way
to
evaluate and
select claimants or pretenders
to the
ideal Form: `What
needs a
foundation, in fact, is
always a pretension or a claim.
It is
the
pretender who appeals
to
a
foundation,
whose
claim may
be judged
well-founded,
ill-founded,
or unfounded.
'42 But
what
is
the
criterion upon which pretenders are
judged? Deleuze
argues
that this
criterion
is
based
upon sameness and similitude
as opposed
to
difference:
The Platonic
model
is
the
Same, in
the
sense
that
Plato
says
that
Justice is
nothing more
than
just, Courage
nothing other
than
courageous, etc.
-
the
39
Plato, Sophist, 236a-b,
pp.
978-9
40
Plato, The Republic, Book X, 601 d-602c,
pp.
826-827
41
Genosko, Baudrlllard
and
Signs,
p.
29
42
De1euae, `Plato
and
the Simulacrum, '
p.
255
24
abstract
determination
of
the
foundation
as
that
which possesses
in
a
primary way.
The Platonic
copy
is
the
Similar:
the
pretender who
possesses
in
a secondary way.
To
the
pure
identity
of
the
model or
original
there
corresponds an exemplary similitude....
43
Deleuze tells
us
that to this
extent
Platonism
presents us with a particular
`moral
vision of
the
world,
'
a vision
based
on
identity
rather
than
difference:
...
with
Plato,
a philosophical
decision
of
the
utmost
importance
was
taken: that
of subordinating
difference
to the
supposedly
initial
powers of
the
Same
and
the
Similar,
that
of
declaring difference
unthinkable
in
itself
and sending
it,
along with
the
simulacra,
back
to the
bottomless
ocean.
44
The
second
issue Deleuze
takes
up
is
the
difference between
copies and simulacra.
He
states:
`If
we say of
the
simulacrum
that
it is
a copy of a copy, an
infinitely
degraded icon,
an
infinitely loose
resemblance, we
then
miss
the
essential,
that
is,
the
difference in
nature
between
simulacrum and copy....
'45 Whereas Deleuze identifies
Ideas
as
being based
on sameness, simulacra are
based
on
`pure becoming'
and
he
argues
further
that
`[p]ure becoming,
the
unlimited,
is
the
matter of
the
simulacrum
insofar
as
it
eludes
the
action of
the
Idea
and
insofar
as
it
contests
both
model and
copy at once.
'46 To demonstrate
this
Deleuze
points
to
how
the
simulacrum
is
described in
the
Sophist in
relation
to the
image. The dialogue
proceeds as
follows:
Stranger:
...
The
perfect example of
this
[the
making of
images]
consists
in
creating a copy
that
conforms
to the
proportions of
the
original
in
all
three
dimensions....
Theaetetus: Why, is
not
that
what all
imitators
try to
do?
Stranger: Not
those
sculptors or painters whose works are of colossal
size.
If
they
were
to
reproduce the true
proportions of a well-made
figure,
as you
know,
the
upper parts would
look
too
small, and
the
lower
too
large, because
we see
the
one at a
distance,
the
other close at
hand [... ] So
artists,
leaving
the truth to take
care of
itself do in fact
put
into
the
images
they
make, not
the
real proportions...
4'
43
ibid.
p.
259
44
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
127
'3
Deleuze, `Plato
and the
Simulacrum,
'
p.
257
46
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
2
47
Plato, Sophist, 235d-236a,
p.
978
25
Deleuze
provides
the
following
comments on
this
issue:
...
the
simulacrum
implies huge dimensions, depths,
and
distances
that the
observer cannot master.
It is
precisely
because he
cannot master
them that
he
experiences an
impression
of resemblance.
This
simulacrum
includes
the
differential
point of view; and
the
observer
becomes
a part of
the
simulacrum
itself,
which
is
transformed
and
deformed by his
point of
view.
In
short,
there
is in
the
simulacrum a
becoming-mad,
or a
becoming
unlimited....
48
While images
are produced according
to
an
internal
relation of similarity
to the
Idea,
Deleuze
proposes
that the
simulacrum
is
produced entirely
by
external
forces (in
the
Nietzschean
sense),
that
is,
the
becoming
of
the
world.
It is for
this
reason
that the
simulacrum evades
the
model of
Idea
and copy and
for
that
matter any model
whatsoever.
As Deleuze
says:
`It is
not even enough
to
invoke
a model of
the
Other,
for
no model can resist
the
vertigo of
the
simulacrum.
'49 Basically, the
simulacrum
is
of an
`order' different
to
any
form
of
identity
and
from
this
switched viewpoint
`...
the
identity
of
the
model and
the
resemblance of
the
copy
become
errors,
the
same and
the
similar no more
than the
illusions born
of
the
functioning
of simulacra....
Simulacra function by
themselves....
'
S0
So, Deleuze
argues
that
...
"`to
reverse
Platonism"
means
to
make
the
simulacra rise and
to
affirm
their
rights among
icons
and copies.
'5' But how does Deleuze justify
this
in
the
context of
the
Sophist? To
this
end
Deleuze draws
on
the
ending of
the
Sophist
where
in
the
final description
of
the
sophist
the
Eleatic
stranger
tells
us
that
he `...
uses short arguments
in
private and
forces
others
to
contradict
themselves in
conversation.
'
52
From
this
Deleuze deduces
that:
...
it
may
be
that the
end of
the
Sophist
contains
the
most extraordinary
adventure of
Platonism:
as a consequence of searching
in
the
direction
of
the
simulacrum and of
leaning
over
its
abyss,
Plato discovers, in
the
flash
of an
instant,
that the
simulacrum
is
not simply a
false
copy,
but
that
it
places
in
question the
very notations of copy and model.
The final
Deleuze, `Plato
and
the
Simulacrum,
'
p.
258
ibid.
p.
262
S0
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
128
s'
Deleuze, `Plato
and
the
Simulacrum,
'
p.
262
52
Plato, Sophist, 268b,
p.
1016
26
definition
of
the
sophist
leads
us
to the
point where we can no
longer
distinguish him from Socrates himself
-
the
ironist
working
in
private
by
means of
brief
arguments.
53
Analysis
of
Deleuze's
critique
The description
of
the
sophist at
the
end of
the
Sophist does indeed
sound
like
Socrates,
and
Deleuze is
not
the
only commentator
to
point
this
out.
54
However, is
there
recourse
in
the
Sophist
to
deflect
this
position?
We
may recall
that the
aim of
the
Sophist is
to
distinguish between
the true
philosopher and
the
false
philosopher or
sophist.
Such
a question would not
be
relevant
if
the
sophist acted
in
a way
significantly
different from
the
philosopher.
It is because
the
sophist acts
in
a way
similar
to the
philosopher
that the two
need
distinguishing in
the
first
place.
The
Sophist
suggests
that the
sophist can
be identified because his
arguments only appear
true
from
a perspective
that
distorts
the
real
dimensions
of
the true.
The
philosopher
on
the
other
hand
would
be
able
to
reveal
these true
dimensions. This latter
argument
is based
on
the
definition
of good and
bad
copies as
different by degree. Deleuze's
definition
of
the
simulacrum
however does
not
let
such a
distinction
stand.
As
we
have
seen,
the
basis
of
Deleuze's
argument
lies in
the
notion
that there
is
a
difference
in kind between Ideas
and simulacra.
He
tells
us what
this
difference
entails:
Let
us consider
the two
formulas: "only
that
which resembles
differs"
and
"only differences
can resemble each other.
" These
are
two
distinct
readings of
the
world: one
invites
us
to think
difference from
the
standpoint of a previous similitude or
identity;
whereas
the
other
invites
us
to think
similitude and even
identity
as
the
product of a
deep disparity.
The first
reading precisely
defines
the
world of copies or
representations....
The
second, contrary
to the
first, defines
the
world of
55
simulacra....
Deleuze's
strategy
has been
to
show
how
the
order of
Ideas, based
on
the
principle of
identity does
not
take
into
account
how it is
constituted
by difference. As
such
it
collapses
into
the
order of
difference.
However, if Ideas
and simulacra really are
53
Deleuze, `Plato
and
the
Simulacrum,
'
p.
256
'4
For
example,
Sallis, Being
and
Logos: Reading
the
Platonic Dialogues,
p.
532
53
Deleuze, `Plato
and the Simulacrum,
'
pp.
261-2
27
different in kind
then
how
can either one
be
reduced
to the
other?
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
order of
Ideas is
constituted
by difference
then
how
can
it be
maintained
that
there
is
a
difference in kind between ideas
and simulacra?
From
this
standpoint we
must also ask whether
Deleuze has
really confronted
the
order of
identity in
the
Idea.
In
this
we assume
that
for
there to
be
a real
difference in kind between Ideas
and
simulacra
the two terms
must
be
mutually exclusive.
We
shall now explore whether
this
is
really
the
level
on which
Deleuze's
argument rests.
Zealous Orders
Brusseau
notes
that the
order of simulacra
is based
on
the
demonstration
of a
`counter-example, '
an example of an experience
that
lies beyond
the
remit of
the
order of
Ideas. He
goes on
to
use
this
model as a
basis for his
own arguments:
When Deleuze
wrote
that the task
of contemporary philosophy was
to
reverse
Platonism, he
gave
himself
and
his
students one central charge:
find
experiences
beyond
the
pervasive resemblance undergirding
Socrates'
metaphysics.
The demand is
simple:
locate
an example.
In
the
end,
Deleuze's
project, as set up
in his keystone texts,
Nietzsche
and
Philosophy, Difference
and
Repetition, The Logic
of
Sense,
stands or
falls
on
the
basis
of an example, actually a counter-example,
a single counter-
example
[... ] I
need
to
convince you
that there
exists at
least
one
substantial case....
If I
succeed,
then
we can claim
that
Platonism has
been
again reversed.
56
As
a
first
remark we may notice a certain similarity
between how Brusseau
uses
the
notion of a
`single
counter-example'
and
Karl Poppers theory
of
falsification.
57
The
basis
of
this
is
that
a
theory
will
be invalidated if just
a single piece of
data is
shown
to
be beyond
a
theories
remit.
But
we should note
that
Popper
uses
this
criterion as
the
definition
of a scientific
theory. How
appropriate
is it
to
apply
this to
Deleuze's
theories?
It is
perhaps surprising that Brusseau
should
frame his
study
in
such a way.
Brusseau
will specifically use
the
writings of
Isabelle Eberhardt
to
provide an
'
Btusseau, Isolated Experiences,
pp.
179-80
57
Karl Popper (1959,
orig.
1934) The Logic
ofScient(c
Discovery. London: Hutchinson
28
example of what
he
sees as
the
completely alien nature of
the
simulacrum.
58
However, Brusseau's
use of
Eberhardt
seems
less
a counter-example
than
a change of
paradigm
in
the
first
place:
Eberhardt
wallows
in
the
solitude of
difference...: "I
sit
here
all
by
myself,
looking
at
the
grey expanse of murmuring sea
...
I
am utterly
alone on earth, and always will
be in
this
Universe
....
"59
Above
all,
Eberhardt's
solitude
is
not a
loss, it is
not a condition of
being
denied
a real
love
or real other.
True,
sometimes she
had
no real
love
or
real other,
but
those
facts
made no sense
to
her. Because
of
her
origin
in
difference, Eberhardt
recognised no state of existence and no existence
beyond her
own self-imposed
limits.
60
Perhaps framing Deleuze's logic
of
the
simulacrum
in
terms
of a
Kuhnian
paradigm
shift
is
a more proximate way of understanding
Deleuze's
argument, as
for instance
we could compare
the
way
in
which
Newtonian
physics
became
an
inaccurate
subset
of
Einstein's
theory
of relativity with
how Deleuze
envisions
identity
as
being
an
illusion
of
the
simulacrum.
This is
to
say
that
Deleuze's
theory
of
the
simulacrum
is
a
higher
order argument.
That is, Deleuze
proposes
that the
order of
the
simulacrum
provides us with a
higher level
of analysis.
But how
can
this to
be
verified?
Whether
counter-example or paradigm shift
this
is
still operating within a scientific
frame
of
reference.
With
a scientific
theory
we can compare
it
to
how
well
it
predicts
the
physical world.
Philosophical
theories
do
not
have
the
same criterion.
Indeed, Popper
argues
that
philosophical
theories
are essentially
irrefutable.
61
However, he
posits
that theories
can
be
criticised
in
terms
of
how
adequate
they
are
in
providing
solutions
to the
philosophical problems they
pose.
62
The
main criterion of any
theory
is
parsimony.
It is
common
in
the
history
of philosophy
for
a
`higher-order'
theory to
be
put
forward
that
provides an explanation of previous
disparate
theories.
Can
39
[sabelle Eberhardt lived
as a nomad
in North Africa
and
died
at
the
age of
27 in 1904. Our
purpose
here is
not
to
examine
Brusseau's
reading of
Eberhardt but
the
context
he
puts
this
interpretation in
teens of
Deleuze's
simulacrum.
19
Beisseau, Isolated Experiences,
p.
191
60
ibid.
p.
194
61
Karl Popper (1985) `Metaphysics
and
Criticisibility,
' in Popper Selections,
ed.
D. Miller. New
Jersey: Princeton University Press
I
ibid.
p.
217, later in Chapter 2
we shall see
how Deleuze has his
own
theory of problems and
solutions.
29
Deleuze's theory
of simulacra
be
entirely characterised
in
this
manner?
Is it
simply
the
case
that the theory
of
Forms
excludes pure
difference from
which a position can
be derived
to
re-include
it? Here
we can
turn
back
to
our
treatment
of
Brusseau's
presentation
of
the
problem.
To
what extent can a
`counter-experience'be
said
to
be
outside
the
remit of
Ideas? We
are once again
in
the
realm of
determining
a
difference in kind. Yet,
to
be
sure,
Brusseau
takes
his lead from Deleuze himself
who
has
made a point of using
`counter-experiences'
such as nomadism, schizophrenia
and
drug
use as new rhythms
in his
philosophy.
63
We
shall now
turn to
how Deleuze
produces
his higher-order
argument.
The Transcendental
Deleuze's
order of simulacra makes use of
differential
or
transcendental
logic. In
Difference
and
Repetition, Deleuze
will
describe
this project as producing a
`transcendental
empiricism:
'
Empiricism
truly
becomes
transcendental
...
only when we apprehend
directly in
the
sensible
that
which can only
be
sensed,
the
very
being
of
the
sensible:
difference,
potential
difference
and
difference
in intensity
as
the
reason
behind
qualitative
diversity. It is in difference that
movement
is
produced as an
`effect',
that
phenomena
flash
their meaning
like
signs
[simulacra]. The intense
world of
differences, in
which we
find
the
reason
behind
qualities and
the
being
of
the
sensible,
is
precisely
the
object of a superior empiricism.
"
The first facet
of a
transcendental
empiricism
is derived from Deleuze's
study of
Kant. Deleuze tells
us:
`Kant:
of all philosophers,
Kant is
the
one who
discovers
the
prodigious
domain
of
the transcendental. '65 In terms
of
Kant's doctrine
of
the
63
`... transversal relations
...
ensure
that
any effects produced
in
some particular way
(through
homosexuality,
drugs,
and so on) can always
be
produced
by
other means,
' 'Letter to
a
Harsh Critic, '
in Gilles Deleuu (1995
orig.
1990) Negotiations,
trans. M. Joughin. New York: Columbia University
Press,
p.
I1
'
Deleuze, Di8erence
and
Repetition,
pp.
56-7
63
Before his
critical
turn Kant
expounded
a
Leibnizian
philosophy, such as
in Kant (1756)
Metaphysicae
cum geometrica
iunctae
Usus
in
philosophia natural
I,
cuius specimen
I,
continet
monadologiam physicanr.
Kant's
transcendental logic,
while still a
derivation
of
Leibniz's
differential
logic,
sets
limits
on
the
metaphysical validity
of
Leibniz's
calculus
in
terms of
the
limits
of
the
faculties,
see
Ivor Leclerc (1972) The Nature
of
Physical Existence. London:
George Allen & Unwin
30
faculties
the
role of
the transcendental
is
given
in
terms
of a method
to
determine
the
internal
or
immanent
conditions of
the
respective
faculty. The
transcendental
is in
turn
contrasted
to the transcendent. The
transcendent
entails
the
external relations
to
the
faculty. Why
are
the transcendental
internal
relations essential
for Deleuze
while
the transcendent external relations erroneous?
The first
reason
is
to
be found in
Kant's
own critical project:
`In
what
he
called
the
Critical
revolution.
Kant
set out
to
discover
criteria
that
were
immanent
to
knowledge
so as
to
distinguish
a
legitimate
and
illegitimate
use of
the
syntheses of consciousness.
'66 That is
a use of a concept
would only
be legitimate in
terms
of
its
own
faculty, for
example, a concept of
the
faculty
of understanding would not
be
applicable
in
relation
to the
faculty
of
desire.
67
A
second reason
is
to
be found in
that,
as
Michael Hardt
suggests,
Deleuze is
utilising an ontological
distinction
to
be found in Scholasticism:
For being
to
be
necessary,
the
fundamental
ontological
cause must
be
internal
to
its
effect.
This internal
cause
is
the
efficient cause
that
plays
the
central role
in Scholastic
ontological
foundations. Furthermore, it is
only
the
efficient cause, precisely
because
of
its internal
nature,
that
can
sustain
being
as substance, as causa sui.
"
This is
to
say
that
an external cause
is
essentially seen as an accident, peripheral
to
being,
and
hence being
would not
be
necessary.
This
second reason
is important
to
Deleuze
as
it
precludes
the
Hegelian dialectic
that
finds
a purpose
for
the
transcendent
function in
terms
of a negative and
limitative form
of
difference.
69
The
second
facet
of
Deleuze's
transcendental empiricism
is developed
through
Bergson
and
the
method of
intuition:
...
intuition
presents
itself
as a method of
difference
or
division.... This
method
is
something other
than
a spatial analysis, more
than
a
description
Ltd,
pp.
276-295
66
Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (1972) Capitalisme
et
Scizophrenie Tome 1. L'Anti-Oedipus. Paris:
Minuit, translation
from Ray Brassier (2001) Alien Theory The Decline
of
Materialism in the
Name
of
Matter, PhD
thesis,
University
of
Warwick,
p.
54
67
Gilles Deleuze (1984,
orig.
1963) Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine
of
the
Faculties,
trans.
H. Tomlinson
and
B. Habberjam. London: Athlone,
especially chapter
1,
pp.
1-10, hereafter denoted
Kant
6"
Michael Hardt (1993) Gilles Deleuze:
An Apprenticeship
in
Philosophy. London: UCL Press,
p.
5
69
ibid.
pp.
1-25
31
of experience and
less (in
appearance)
than
a
transcendental analysis
[... ]
We
must not raise ourselves
to the
level
of conditions as conditions of all
possible experience,
but
as conditions of real experience
...
they
are no
broader
than the
conditioned,
because the
concept
they
form is identical
to
its
object.
70
For Deleuze
a
transcendental
condition must
have
the
same
`reality'
as
that
which
it
conditions and as such
it is
not a
`possible'
which
has
potentially
more reality
than
the thing
in
which
it is finally
manifested
but
a
`virtual. ' From
this
perspective
possibility
introduces
transcendence
into
the transcendental.
With Bergson's
method
of
intuition
we also come
to the
precise meaning of
`difference
in kind. ' A difference
in kind is
not only a
distinction between
two
phenomena, such as
Ideas
and
simulacra,
but designates
one side of
the
distinction itself: `Difference
of nature
is
...
no
longer between
two things
or rather
two tendencies,
difference
of nature
is itself
a
thing,
one
tendency
opposing
itself
to the
other.
"That
which
is different in kind
differs in itself
qualitatively.
From
this
perspective our notion of a
higher-order
argument
is
aimed solely
between
the two
orders at
this
stage.
More Transcendence
In
the
essay
`Deleuze's Theory
of
Sensation: Overcoming the
Kantian Duality, '
Daniel Smith
provides us with
three
further differences between Deleuze's
and
Kant's
transcendentalism:
...
the
elements of sensation must
be found in
the
sign
[simulacrum],
and
not
the
qualities of a recognizable object;
the
sign
[simulacrum] is
the
limit-object
of
the
faculty
of sensibility,
beyond the
postulates of
recognition and common sense;
the
Idea
of sensibility
is
constituted
by
differential
relations and
differences in intensity....
72
We
are
told the
problem with
Kant is
that
he
relates
the
faculty
of sensibility
to
an
'
Gilles Deleuze, G. (1956) `La
conception
de la diffb'rence
chez
Bergson in
Etudes
Bergsoniennes,
IV,
pp.
77-112,
trans.
M. Mcmahon
as
'Bergson's Conception
of
Difference' in John Mullarkey
(1999) The New Bergsonism. Manchester:
University Press,
p.
46
"
ibid.
p.
48
n
Daniel Smith (1996) `Deleuze's Theory
of
Sensation: Overcoming
the
Kantian Duality, ' in Patton,
P. (ed. ) Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Oxford:
Blackwell,
p.
39
32
external object
that
is
already pre-constituted
in
thought
as a
`common
sense' or
`recognition. ' As
such,
Deleuze
accuses
Kant
of psychologism.
73
Instead, Deleuze
locates the
simulacrum as a
limit-object (or differential)
within
thought.
What
we
have
previously called
`counter-experiences' (and Brusseau
counter-examples) are
in
no sense external
to thought,
but
are
implicit
or
immanent
to
it. That is, Deleuze's
higher-order
argument
is
posited as
internal
to the
order
it
criticises.
However,
what
distinctions is Deleuze
using
here in
relation
to
what
he
calls a
`common
sense'?
In The Logic
of
Sense Deleuze
tells
us
that
common sense
is
the
`assignation
of
fixed identities. '74 Deleuze
explains
further in Difference
and
Repetition:
...
thought
has
as
its implicit
presupposition a pre-philosophical and
natural
Image
of
thought,
borrowed from
the
pure element of common
sense.
According
to this
image,
thought has
an affinity with
the true;
it
formally
possesses
the true
and materially wants
the true.
75
The
notion of common sense
is based
on
the
model-copy
distinction. Common
sense
provides us with a model of
truth to the
extent
that
we can ask:
Which is
the true
recognition?
Which is
the
false
recognition?
In
the
same way
there
is
a
difference in
order
between identity
and
difference
we
find in Deleuze's transcendental empiricism
a
difference in
order
between
the transcendent (or
external) and
the transcendental
(or
internal). There is
another parallel
in how
the
same way
Deleuze
posits
identity
to
be
the
effect of
difference,
the transcendent is
an effect of
the transcendental.
For
Deleuze,
the
problem with common sense
is
again
that
it introduces
the transcendent
into
the transcendental.
Here however
we can apply
the
same argument as
developed
earlier:
if
common sense
is
already a compromised notion
then there
cannot
be
a
difference in
order
distinction
operating
here.
Is
there
recourse
to
solve this
problem
in
terms of
the
structure of a
higher-
order argument?
If
we simply consider
the two
arguments
in
relation
to
each other
then there
does
seem
to
be
a
difference
in
order:
the two
arguments each
have
their
own
frame
of reference or
`paradigm.
' However, in the
sense
that the
lower-order
argument
is
already compromised there is
also an overlap with
the
higher-order
73
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
pp.
135-7
74
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
3
71
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
131
33
argument.
This
points
to the
idea
that there
is
a point of commonality
between
them.
As Kant
will
himself
tell
us:
`Now it is
quite clear
that there
must
be
some
third
thing,
which on
the
one
hand is homogeneous
with
the
category, and with
the
appearance on
the
other, and so makes
the
application of
the
former
to the
latter
possible.
'76 Deleuze
places
his
version of
the transcendental
argument solely on one
side of
the
original schema.
We
shall now examine
how
this
plays out with
further
analysis of
Plato's
theory
of
Forms. Perhaps
what
is
surprising
is
the
prescient way
in
which
these
issues
are actually
treated
in Plato's Sophist.
76
Immanuel Kant (1993,
orig.
1934) Critique
of
Pure Reason,
trans.
JMD Meiklejohn,
ed.
V. Politfis.
London: Everyman,
p.
143
34
2. Return
to the Forms
In
this
section we will
discuss identity
and
difference
through the
problematic of
the
theory
of
the
Forms. The Plato
scholar
Francis Pelletier distinguishes between
an
early
theory of
Forms
and a
later
theory
of
Forms
or
`Kinds' in
the
Platonic
Dialogues.
77
As Pelletier
notes
this
later development is
characterised
by
an
intriguing
remark
by
the
Eleatic
stranger
in
the
Sophist: `Any discourse
we can
have
owes
its
existence
to the
interweaving
of
the
forms
with one another.
'78 First
we shall
turn to the
context
in
which
this
later
theory
is
set
forth.
The
task
set up
in
the
Sophist is
to
distinguish between the
philosopher and
the
sophist.
How
can
the true
friend
of
knowledge be
told
apart
from
the
imitator? In
order
to
do
this
a notion of
falsehood is
required,
but
as
the
Eleatic
stranger states,
this
is itself
problematic:
`It is
extremely
hard, Theaetetus, to
find
correct
terms
in
which one may say or
think that
falsehoods have
a real existence, without
being
caught
in
a contradiction
by
the
mere utterance of such words.
'79 Here
we are once
again reminded of what
has been
said
in
the
Cratylus: `... knowledge
too
cannot
continue
to
be knowledge
unless continuing always
to
abide and exist.
' Truth is
associated with permanence and
falsity
with
flux.
BO
In
the
Sophist this
distinction is
set up
in
terms
of a problem attributed
to
Parmenides,
that
is, if falsity is
flux, how is
it
even possible
to
identify
the
false
since
by definition
we
do
not
know
the
false?
8'
It
is
this
`unknowable'
position
that the
Eleatic
stranger
identifies
with
the
sophist:
`...
the
Sophist
...
had denied
the
very existence of
falsity;
no one could either
think
or say
`what is
not,
' because
what
is
not never
has
any sort of
being. 'g2 In
order
to
work
through the
problematic of
flux
and permanence,
the
Eleatic
stranger
instigates
a
debate between `Gods' (or `friends
of
the
forms')
and
`Giants' (or `sons
of
the
earth').
The
solution
to
`Parmenides
problem'
is
provided
by
the
friends
of
the
forms
so we shall
deal
with
this
side of
the
debate first.
"
Francis J. Pelletier (1990) Parmenides, Plato,
and
the
semantics of not-being.
Chicago: University
Press,
p.
31
n
Plato, Sophist, 260a,
p.
1007, Pelletier's (1990)
translation,
p.
8
79
Plato, Sophist, 237a,
p.
979
'0
Plato, Cratylus, 440a-b,
p.
474
Cf. Sophist, 237a; 241d; 242c; 258c
`
Plato, Sophist, 260d,
p.
1007
35
Friends
of
the
Forms
The Eleatic
stranger
begins by introducing
three
Forms
or
Kinds:
motion, rest, and
existence.
From 250a
to
250d in
the
Sophist
the
stranger ascertains
that
motion and
rest must
be
two
separate
things
(if
something
is in
motion
then
obviously
it is
not at
rest).
However, if
we
take
motion and rest
to
be
two
real aspects of existence
then
what are
their
relation
to
existence?
Neither
motion nor rest can
be
the
same as
existence as
this
would mean
that
existence would
be both in
motion and rest at
the
same
time,
which
is impossible.
Hence
existence must
be
a
third
Kind
separate
from
motion
and rest
but in
some way connected
to them;
sometimes
in
motion,
sometimes at rest.
Having determined
this the
Eleatic
stranger
then
applies
the
possible viewpoints of
the
friends
of
the
forms
to
see
how
they
deal
with
these three
entities:
Are
we not
to
attach existence
to
motion and rest, nor anything else
to
anything else,
but
rather
to treat them
in
our
discourse
as
incapable
of any
blending
or participation
in
one another?
Or
are we
to
lump
them
all
together
as capable of association with one another?
Or
shall we say
that
this
is
true
of some and not of others?
83
As Pelletier
notes,
there
are
three
viewpoints
to
be distinguished
here:
(1)
the
view
that
allows no
"mixing"
or
"blending"
or
"communion"
among any of
their
forms;
(2)
the
view which
insists
that
every one of
their
forms "blends, " "mixes, "
et cetera with every other
form;
and
(3)
the
view which
holds
that
some
forms "blend, " "mix, "
et cetera, with
some other
forms,
and some
forms do
not
"blend, " "mix, "
et cetera with
some other
forms.
The Eleatic
stranger
dismisses
the
first
viewpoint
because if `...
nothing
has
the
capacity
for
combination with anything
else
for
any purpose.
Then
movement and
rest will
have
no part
in
existence.
'" The
stranger similarly
dismisses
the
second
viewpoint
because `...
then
movement
itself
would come
to
a complete standstill, and
13
ibid. 251d-e, 996-7
Pelletier (1990),
p.
35
Plato, Sophist, 252a,
p.
997
36
again rest
itself
would
be in
movement,
if
each were
to
supervene upon
the
other.
'86
This leaves
us with
the third
viewpoint
-
some
forms blend,
others
do
not.
To
solve
the
relation
between
motion, rest, and existence,
the
stranger
introduces
two
new
aspects
for
consideration: sameness and
difference. From 254d
to
255e in
the
Sophist, the
Eleatic
stranger
first
argues
that
motion, rest, and existence must
be
the
same
in
themselves,
but
they
cannot
be
the
same as one another otherwise
this
would
lead
to
contradiction.
Consequently,
sameness
in itself is
posited as a
fourth kind.
Secondly, it is
argued
that
motion, rest, and existence must
be different from
one
another
but
they
cannot
be different in
themselves
otherwise
this
would again
lead
to
contradiction.
Therefore, difference,
as
in different from
something else,
is
posited as
a
fifth kind.
We
are now able
to
determine
the
`hierarchy'
of
blending between
the
kinds:
sameness and
difference blend
with all
the
forms;
existence
blends
with motion and
rest; motion and rest
however, do
not
blend. With
this
in
mind
the
stranger goes on
to
offer a solution
to
`Parmenides
problem:
'
When
we speak of
`that
which
is
not,
' it
seems
that
we
do
not mean
something contrary
to
what exists
but
only something
that
is different
[... ] In
the
same way
that
when
for
example, we speak of something as
`not tall,
'
we may
just
as well mean
by
that
phrase
`what is
equal' as
`what
is
short'
[... ] So,
when
it is
asserted
that
a negative signifies a
contrary, we shall not agree,
but
admit no more
than this
-
that the
prefix
87
`not' indicates
something
different from
the
words
that
follow....
Hence
a notion of
falsity is
obtained
through the
notion
that
something
is different
from
something else,
that
is,
to
say
that
something
is
not-A
is
really saying
that
it is
something else, e. g.
B. So far
this theory
of
the
blending
of
the
Forms is
still open
to
Deleuze's
criticism
that
difference is being
thought
of
in
the
image
of
identity,
since
firstly, difference is different from
something-else
(model
of
the
same) and secondly
difference itself is
exactly
treated
as a
Form. However
we
have
yet
to
come
to Plato's
own solution
to
Parmenides
problem and perhaps more
importantly, how Plato
actually sets up
`Parmenides'
problem.
'
"
ibid. 252d,
p.
997-8
87
ibid. 257b, 1003-4
37
`Parmenides'
problem'
It is important
to
note
that
what
has been
termed
`Parmenides'
problem'
is
exactly a
problem
that
has been
set up
in the
Platonic dialogues. The
problem
is
situated
between
two
`opposing' doctrines. Socrates
tells
us of
these two
doctrines in
the
Theaetetus. The first doctrine is
one of
flux:
It declares
that
nothing
is
one
thing
just by itself.... All
the things
...
are
in
process of
becoming,
as a result of movement and change and of
blending
one with another....
In
this
matter
let
us
take
it
that
...
the
whole
series of philosophers agree
-
Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles.
89
The
second
doctrine is
one of permanence:
...
[it]
teaches
just
the
opposite
-
that
reality
"is
one,
immovable, being is
the
name of
the
all,
"
and much else
that
men
like Mellissus
and
Parmenides
maintain
in
opposition
to
all
those
people,
telling
us
that
all
things
are a unity which stays still within
itself, having
no room
to
move
in
89
However,
a
line
of modern scholarship completely
disagrees
with
this
polarised
account of
Heraclitus
and
Parmenides. The
main argument put
forth is
that
Plato
overemphasised
the
differences between Heraclitus
and
Parmenides.
90
As Martin
Heidegger
will
tell
us:
Even if
we could suppose we were
instructed
about
the
essence of
truth
as
the
Greeks
thought
it by
taking the
doctrines
of
Plato
and
Aristotle
as a
norm, we would already
be
on a
false
track that
will never, on
its
own,
lead back
to
what
the
early
thinkers
experienced when
they
gave a name
to that
which we signify
by "truth. 1191
"
Plato, Theaetatus, 152d,
p.
857
"9
ibid. 180d-e,
p.
885
90
See R. A. Prier (1976) Archaic Logic: Symbol
and
Structure in Heraclitus, Parmenides
and
Empedocles. The Hague: Mouton,
pp.
90-95, for
a review of
the
literature. Heidegger has
also
had
a
major
influence
on studies of
the
pre-Socratics,
see
K. Maly
and
P. Emad (eds. X 1986) Heidegger
on
Heraclitus:
a new reading.
New York: Edwin Mellen
Press
91
Martin Heidegger (1992,
orig.
1982)
Parmenides,
trans. A. Schuwer
and
R. Itojcewicz.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
p.
10
38
So how
exact
is `Parmenides'
problem'
in
relation
to
Parmenides'
own writings?
Parmenides'
poem
is his
only extant work and charts
the
path
to
a
true
way of
enquiry guided
by
the
figure
of a goddess.
92
The
goddess says
that there
are
two
possible routes
to take.
Either
through
what
`is' (being, the
immutable,
the
one) or
through
what
`is
not'
(becoming). She identifies
the
former
way as
the true
way.
This
may seem a simple
determination but
as
the
pre-Socratic scholar
P. A. Meijer
tells
us,
this
causes a number of
interpretational
problems:
Even if...
one could
fathom
what
Being
was
for Parmenides,
then
how is
the
relation of
this
Being
to
what
is
the
not-being?
Is
not-being
the
so-
called
Doxa [opinion], Parmenides' description
of
the
world around us?
What is
the
value of
the
"Doxa", is it
a
faithful description
of
this
world?
Or is it,
as not-being,
but
a
detector
of
lies,
a model of error, a scale
by
means of which one
is
able
to
determine immediately the
basic
error of
every system which may explain our world?
93
This
raises
the
question of whether
there
can
be
a certain
`use'
of opinion or
simulacra, an approach exemplified
by Parmenides
use of
divine
and cosmological
imagery in his
poem.
Meijer
goes on
to
argue
that
Plato has
essentially misinterpreted
Parmenides by
associating
Parmenidean Being
with
the
copula:
As
soon as
I
recognized
that
existence
is
not
the
focus
of
Parmenides
interest, I
was able
to
keep
the
Doxa free from
the
idea
of non-existence.
For
what
is
not
in
the
absolute sense
-
and
the
Doxa is
not
in
the
absolute
sense
-
may nevertheless exist
if
existence
is
not
the
basic
meaning of
is.
It is
amazing
to
discover
that
unlike
for Plato,
who connected
Being
and
Doxa by
means of
the
participation of
the
particulars of our world
in
the
Ideas,
absolute
Being for Parmenides
seems
to
have
nothing
to
do
with
our world.
94
Neither does Meijer
stand alone
in
this
interpretation. For
example, another ancient
Greek
scholar
Jean Beaufret
tells
us:
`...
the
doxa
of
Parmenides has
a
totally
different
quality
from
that
of
Plato. This doxa
can actually pursue
the
illusion in
the
midst of a
92
A. H. Coxon 0 986) The Fragments
of
Parmenides,
a critical
text
with
introduction,
translation, the
ancient
testimonia and a commentary. Assen/Maastricht:
Van Gorcum
'3
P. A. Meijer (1997) Parmenides beyond
the Gates: The Divine Revelation
on
Being Thinking
and
the
Doxa. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben,
p.
1
94
ibid.
p.
2
39
clearing which
is in itself
not an
illusion.... '
95
What
this
entails
for Plato's `solution'
to
his
own rendering of
`Parmenides'
problem'
is
that
in
terms
of
Parmenidean Being
he has
collapsed
being
and not-being on
the
plane of existence
(that is, being
as
existence).
The
significance of
this
is
that
we
have
argued
Deleuze
associates
Platonism
with pure
identity, but
to
what extent are
Forms
already compromised or
contaminated with existence?
In
order
to
explore
this
we can set up what a
theory
of
Forms based
on pure
identity
might
look like.
The Proximate Bornes
In Jorge Luis Borges
short story
`Funs
the
Memorious' he
presents us with
the
nightmare of a world perceived
through
pure
identity.
6
This
story
tells the tale
of a
young man,
Ireneo Funes,
who can only experience
life
through
particularity:
He
was,
let
us not
forget,
almost
incapable
of
Ideas
of a general,
Platonic
sort.
Not
only was
it difficult for him
to
comprehend
that the
generic
symbol
dog
embraces so many unlike
individuals
of
diverse
size and
form; it bothered him
that the
dog
at
three
fourteen (seen from
the
side)
should
have
the
same name as
the
dog
at
three
fifteen (seen from
the
f-ont).
97
We
should
first
note
that this
example
is
perhaps
in fact
not one of pure
identity but
exactly
the
opposite:
infinite difference. For Funes
everything
is different
and
subsequently
has its
own
identity. But
while
these
identities
are
totally
heterogeneous,
the
differences he
experiences are completely
homogeneous. That is,
the
difference between for
example, a cat and a
dog,
would
be
exactly
the
same as
the
difference between
say soup and
fish,
or
for
that
matter any other conceivable
difference. What
we
have here is difference
treated
as a pure
identical Form,
pure
metonymy.
In
contrast,
if
we now
turn to the
`structure'
of
the
Forms
then
we may
see
that
a
heterogeneous
rather than
homogenous difference is being implicitly
used.
That is,
the
difference between
a
dog
and a cat
is
not
the
same
difference
as
that
J. Beaufret, `Heraclitus
and
Parmenides,
' in Maly
and
Emad (1986),
p.
81
Jorge Luis Borges (1970) `Funs
the Memorious,
' in Labyrinths,
eds.
D. A. Yates
and
J. E. Irby.
London: Penguin
97
ibid.
pp.
93-4
40
between
soup and
fish. We have
already seen
how Deleuze tells
us
that
difference is
subordinated
to
identity in
the
Forms but
this
is
precisely a conceptual
difference. He
does
not consider
to
what extent
difference is
already
implicit in
the
system of
Forms. But is
not
Deleuze's
strategy
to
show
that
difference is
already
implied in
the
system?
Indeed, but he
already also assumes
that the
Forms
are
based
on pure
identity. From
this
position
the
demonstration
of
implicit difference
suits
his
purpose
that
identity is just
an effect of
difference. However,
our argument
is
that
implicit
difference
shows
that the
Ideas
are not
based
on pure
identity
and as such
there
cannot
be
a pure
difference
in
order
between Ideas
and simulacra.
More
than this,
the
compromised state of
the
Forms is
already
to
be found in
the
Sophist.
The
sons of
the
earth
We
shall now come
back
to the
debate between
the
friends
of
the
Forms
and
the
sons
of
the
earth
in
the
Sophist. Turning
to the
position upheld
by
the
sons of
the
earth
the
Eleatic
stranger
tells
us:
...
[they] drag
everything
down
to
earth out of
heaven
and
the
unseen,
literally
grasping rocks and
trees
in
their
hands, for
they
lay hold
upon
every stock and stone and strenuously affirm
that
real existence
belongs
only
to that
which can
be handled
and offers resistance
to touch.
They
define
reality as
the
same
thing
as
body....
"'
He identifies
them
as
`sensualists' in
the
very strong sense of
the
word:
they
refuse
to
justify
their
position
through
rational
discourse (246c-d). However, in
order
to
assess
their
position
the
Eleatic
stranger constructs a
`reformed'
version
in
order
to
compare
them
with
the
friends
of
the
Forms. To do
this the
Eleatic
stranger
identifies
a
`mark'
of reality:
...
anything
has
real
being
that
is
so constituted as
to
possess any sort of
power either
to
affect anything
else or
to
be
affected,
in however
small a
degree, by
the
most
insignificant
agent,
though
it
only
be
once.
I
am
proposing as a mark
to distinguish
real
things that they
are nothing
but
"
Plato, Sophist, 246a-b,
p.
990
41
power.
By
using
this
idea
of a mark of reality
the
Eleatic
stranger exploit's a weakness
in
the
position of
the
friends
of
the Forms for
whom power
is
not a mark of reality
but
a
mark of
becoming:
...
they
[the friends
of
the
forms]
reply
that
a power of acting and
being
acted upon
belongs
to
becoming, but
neither of
these
powers
is
compatible with real
being [... ] Do
they
acknowledge
further
that the
soul
knows
and real
being is known? [... ] They
would
have
to
say
this.
If
knowing is
to
be
acting on something,
it follows
that
what
is known
must
be
acted upon
by it,
and so, on
this
showing, reality when
it is being
known by
the
act of
knowledge
must,
in
so
far
as
it is known, be
changed
owing
to
be
so acted upon
-
and
that,
we say, cannot
happen
to the
changeless
[... ] if
all
things
are unchangeable, no
intelligence
can really
exist anywhere
in
anything
in
regard
to
any object.
1
The
consequence of
this
argument
is
that
it
can no
longer be
maintained
that the
Forms
are
immutable
and will
lead
to the
ending of
the
Sophist
where
the
philosopher
is indistinguishable from
the
sophist.
We have
already seen
how Deleuze
will
interpret
this
as meaning
that the
order of
Ideas
collapses
into
the
order of
simulacra,
however,
there
also seems
to
be
another way
to
interpret
this: to
accept
it
as an already compromised position.
Proposition:
The
method of compromised position
does
not
take
a phenomenon and
then show
how it is
compromised
by
another principle
but
starts
from
the
supposition
that the
phenomenon
is
already compromised.
It is
not
the
case
that the
Forms
were
`pure' in
the
first
place as
if
a
drop
of
black
paint will
forever
turn
white paint
into
a shade of grey.
More
precisely
the
contamination operates
in both directions. If
the
philosopher cannot
be distinguished
from
the
sophist
then
neither can
the
sophist
be distinguished from
the
philosopher.
Moreover, the
ancient
Greek scholar
Jacques Brunschwig
points
to the
fact
that
Plato
was precisely aware
that
in
order
to
reach
a position where
the
arguments of
the
"
ibid.
P.
247d-e,
p.
992
100
ibid. 248c-249b,
pp.
993-4
42
friends
of
the
Forms
and
the
sons of
the
earth can
be
compared
he
was working with
a reformed or compromised position:
...
the
point of synthesis was only reached at
the
cost of proposing or
imposing
a number of corrections
for
the
antithetical
doctrines,
corrections
to
which
Plato himself draws
attention with an openness and
honesty
not always
detectable in
philosophical operations of
this
kind.
101
101
Jacques Brunschwig (1994)
'The Stoic
Theory
of the
Supreme Genus
and
Platonic Ontology, ' in
Papers in Hellenistic
philosophy, trans. J. Lloyd. Cambridge: University Press,
p.
119
43
Conclusions
In
this
chapter we
have
seen
how Deleuze
claims
to
overturn
the
order of
the
Idea in
favour
of
the
order of
the
simulacrum.
This
procedure would not
be
problematic were
it
not
for
the
fact
that
Deleuze
claims
there
is
a
difference in
order
between Ideas
and
simulacra.
We have
argued
that the
order of
Ideas is
always already of
the
order of
difference. From
this
perspective we may concur with
the
comments of
Badiou
and
Laruelle that
Deleuze has
produced a
`re-accentuated'
or
`extreme' Platonism. On
the
other
hand
we could say
that the
simulacrum presents us with
the `pure'
order of
difference
whereas
the Idea does
not.
To
the
extent
that
we could still pose pure
identity
to
Deleuze's
pure
difference (being
to
not-being) perhaps we may say
that
what
Deleuze has
produced
is in fact
a
Parmenideism. The
original
target
of
Deleuze's
studies
is
the
order of pure
identity
of
the
Ideas but
we may question
whether
this
order
has been
addressed at all.
Or
more precisely,
it has
not
been
addressed
in
the
context of
the
Ideas because Plato distorted
the
original
Parmenidean
problem
in
the
first
place.
From
this
obverse position we may agree
that
Deleuze has
to
some extent
`overturned' Platonism by dint
of
the
fact he
never confronted
Platonism but instead
the
original
Parmenidean
problem of
the
relation
between
not-
being
and not-existence.
This
will
in fact be
the
same subject on which
the
Stoics
will present
their
own anti-Platonic philosophy.
102
Shortly in Chapter 2
we shall
examine
how Deleuze develops
the
notion of
the
simulacrum
through the
concept of
Event by drawing
on
the
Stoics.
How does
this
effect
Deleuze's
overall project
to
produce a philosophy of
difference? Todd May, in his
essay
"Difference
and
Unity in Gilles Deleuze, "
claims
to
do
a
deconstruction
of
Deleuze's
philosophy.
103
He
tells
us:
`There
can
be
no
thought that takes
difference
seriously
-
and
indeed
we
live in
an age
that
desperately
needs a
thought that
does
so
-
that
can avoid
the
unity
that
attaches
itself
to
such a
project of
thought.
Difference, in
short, must
be
thought
alongside unity, or not at
102
`Stoicism
...
succeeded
in
toppling Platonism
more subtly and more completely
than
it is
usually
credited with
doing.... ' Brunschwig
(1994)
p.
119
103
Todd May `Difference
and
Unity in Gilles Deleuze,
'
chapter
in Boundas
and
Olkowski (1994)
p.
34. This
chapter
is
expanded
in Todd
May (1997)
Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrlda,
Levinas,
and
Deleuze. Pennsylvania:
University
Press,
pp.
182-3
44
all.
'
104
However, May does
not seem
to
go
far
enough.
For,
to turn
one of
Deleuze's
arguments on
its head,
we
have
only ever
thought
in
the
image
of
identity
and
hence
we require a
thought that
not only
takes
difference
seriously,
but
also
identity,
or
more precisely,
how
these terms
are used.
To borrow
a phrase
from Alfred North
Whitehead, identity
and
difference
are exactly
`ideal
opposites,
'
and
ideals
cannot
be
used as presuppositions
but
must
themselves
be
explained.
It is interesting
to
note
Whitehead's
comments on
how
these two
notions
have been
used
in
metaphysics:
...
we
find in
the
first
two
lines
of a
famous hymn
a
full
expression of
the
union of
the two
notions
in
one
integral
experience:
Abide
with me;
Fast falls
the
eventide.
Here
the
first line
expresses
the
permanences,
`abide, ' `me'
and
the
`Being'
addressed; and
the
second
line
sets
these
permanences amid
the
inescapable flux. Here
at
length
we
find formulated the
complete problem
of metaphysics.
Those
philosophers who start with
the
first line have
given us
the
metaphysics of
`substance';
and
those
who start with
the
second
line have developed
the
metaphysics of
`flux. ' But, in
truth, the
two
lines
cannot
be
torn
apart
in
this
way; and we
find
that
a wavering
balance between
the two
is
characteristic of
the
greater number of
philosophers.
105
Identity
and
difference
are part of an
irresolvable
antinomy.
What is
required
is
a
counter-point
from
which
both
the terms
can
be laid
out on
the
same plane prior
to
the
actual manifestation of
these
phenomena.
In
this
chapter we
have
tried to
enact a
destabilisation
of
Deleuze's
philosophy of
difference by
analysing
the
compromised
nature of
his
concepts.
In
some sense
this
could
be
termed
a
deconstruction but it
would perhaps
be
more correct
to
say
that this
is
simply an extension of
the
method
of
Platonic dialectic.
10'
ibid.
P.
47;
p.
201
103
Alfred North Whitehead (1978,
orig.
1929)
Process
and
Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. New
York: Free Press,
p.
209
45
Chapter 2
The Logic
of
the
Event
46
Introduction
In
this
chapter we shall explore
how Deleuze develops
the
notion of
the
simulacrum
into the theory
of
the
event
through the
Stoic
reaction
to
Platonism. This
chapter will
be divided in
the
following
way: part
1
will elaborate
the
Stoic background,
parts
2
and
3
will
focus
on
Deleuze's
text
The Logic
of
Sense, looking
at
the theories
of
sense and nonsense respectively, part
4
will analyse
the
structure of
the
event.
Deleuze first deploys
the
concept of event
in
a systematic
fashion in The Logic
of
Sense. The Logic
of
Sense is itself
an extension of many of
the
issues
played out
in
Difference
and
Repetition. These
two
works are, amongst other
things,
Deleuze's
response
to the
pervasive
hold
of
the
phenomenology of
his
time;
Difference
and
Repetition is
a study of
difference
and
time through a neo-Kantian reclamation of
Nietzsche,
contra
Heidegger;
106
the
Logic
of
Sense is
a study of sense
through
Lewis
Carroll
and
the
Stoics,
contra
Husserl.
107
The
method common
to
both
of
these
books
is Deleuze's
use of
Leibnizian differential logic
and adherence
to
Lacanian
structuralism.
This
adherence
to
structuralist method will
be
swept aside
in Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism
and
Schizophrenia,
written
in
collaboration with
Felix
Guattari.
108
On
the
other
hand,
as
Deleuze
will note
in
the
preface
to
Difference
and
Repetition
written
in 1994,
all
the
other
themes
covered
in
these two
books
remain a
constant
force
throughout
all
his
works.
Yet,
as we shall see,
it is Deleuze's
use of
structuralism and most especially
its
relation
to
Stoic
philosophy
that
is
one of
the
most
interesting
aspects of
the
Logic
of
Sense.
i) Sense
and
Simulacra
In
the
preface of
the
Logic
of
Sense Deleuze
outlines
the
reasons
behind his
approach
to
his
study of sense:
16
Deleuze, Dgerence
and
Repetition,
see pp.
64{(
107
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
see pp.
101-3
'a$
Gilles Deleuu & Felix Guattari (19$4,
orig.
1972)
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism
and
Schizophrenia,
trans.
R. Hurley, M. Seem
and
H. Lane. London:
Athlone
47
The
privileged place assigned
to
Lewis Carroll is due
to
his having
provided
the
first
great account,
the
first
great raise en scene of
the
paradoxes of sense
-
sometimes collecting, sometimes renewing,
sometimes
inventing,
and sometimes preparing
them.
The
privileged
place assigned
to the Stoics is due
to their
having been
the
initiators
of a
new
image
of
the
philosopher which
broke
away
from
the
pre-Socratics,
Socratic
philosophy and
Platonism. This
new
image is
already closely
linked
to the
paradoxical constitution of
the theory
of sense.
1 09
The
relevance of
Lewis Carroll
may
be
seen
in
that throughout
Alice's
adventures,
growing smaller/larger
for
example,
there
is
a certain operation
taking
place
that
is
without measure.
Deleuze's
purpose will
be
to
use
this
operation
to
link
the
simulacrum
to
sense.
In
terms
of
the
Stoics in
relation
to
sense,
Jean-Jacques
Lecercle
will note
that `[w]hat Deleuze is doing is, in fact, by-passing
centuries of
reflection on meaning, and going
back
to the
very
beginning,
exploring a
long
neglected
dead-end,
the
logic
and
theory
of meaning of
the
Stoics. '
10
From
this
one
may conclude
that there
is
almost a conventional
history
of philosophy argument
being
made
here. On
the
other
hand, Deleuze
puts
the
Stoics in line
with
the
Nietzschean
project of overturning
Platonism
and
Deleuze's interpretation
of sense
as an effect of physical causes
has
a
decidedly Nietzschean
aroma
to
it in
terms
of
the
Nietzschean
concept of value.
This `wilful
re-organisation' of
the
history
of
philosophy
in Deleuze's
thought
is
one of
the
fundamental
aspects of
his
philosophy,
as
he
tells us
in Difference
and
Repetition:
The
time
is
coming when
it
will
hardly be
possible
to
write a
book
of
philosophy as
it has been done for
so
long: `Ah! The
old style...
'
...
In
the
history
of philosophy a commentary should act as a veritable
double
and
bear
the
maximal modification appropriate
to
a
double.
' 11
To
this
effect
he draws
on
Borges's
short story
`Pierre Menard, Author
of
the
Quixote. ' In this
story
the
character of
the title,
Menard
sets
himself
the task
of
're-
writing'
Cervantes' Quixote. But
this
is
not
the
case of writing a new version,
but
of
writing
the
Quixote
as
if it had
never existed
before. Borges
tells
us
that
Menard
109
ibid
pp. xiii-xiv
"o
Jean Jacques Lecercle (1985) Philosophy
through
the
looking-glass. Tiptree: Open Court,
p.
92
111
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p. xxi
48
succeeded
in
writing several
fragments
and compares
them to
Cervantes'
original
text.
For
example,
the
original reads:
...
truth,
whose mother
is history,
rival of
time,
depository
of
deeds,
witness of
the
past, exemplar and advisor
to the
present, and
the
future's
counsellor.
' 12
Instead, Menard's
version reads:
...
truth,
whose mother
is history,
rival of
time,
depository
of
deeds,
witness of
the
past, exemplar and advisor
to the
present, and
the
future's
counsellor.
' 13
Borges
comments
that `the Cervantes
text
and
the
Menard
text
are verbally
identical,
but
the
second
is
almost
infinitely
richer.
'"4 This
argument
is based
on
the
Heraclitean
notion
that
no
two
moments can ever
be
the
same.
Therefore
the
chances
that two
disparate
moments can produce something completely
identical
are
practically
infinite. Deleuze interprets
this
as meaning
`the
most strict repetition
has
as
its
correlate
the
maximum of
difference. '" Deleuze
will carry
this
idea into
the
very
form
that the
Logic
of
Sense is
written
by
structuring
it in
terms
of series rather
than
chapters.
This
use of
`series' is
at once
both
mathematical and structuralist
in
nature and
belies
an organisational principle of
the
event:
`As
on a pure surface,
certain points of one
figure in
a series refer
to the
points of another
figure:
an entire
galaxy of problems
...
a complex place; a
"convoluted
story.
"'
116
ii) Sense
and
Event
The Logic
of
Sense
combines
its
study of sense with
the
elaboration of
the
event
to
the
extent
that
Deleuze
sees a
fundamental
link between
them: `Sense
and
the
event
I"
Jorge Luis Borges (1999) `Pierre Menard,
Author
of
the
Quixote, ' in Collected Fictions, trans. A
Hurley. London: Penguin,
p.
94
113
ibid.
ibid.
"s
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p. xxii
116
Delouze,
The Logic
of
Sense,
p. xiv
49
are
the
same
thing...
't
17
One
aspect
that
links
sense and
the
event
is
the
impossibility
of speaking of either without entering
into
an
infinite
regress.
If
we
first
take the
case
of
the
event
Deleuze
will
first define
the
event
in
the
essay
`Lucretius
and
Naturalism: ' `the
event expresses
...
what
is happening,
without
destroying
the
nature
of
the thing.
'"g Here
we can
distinguish
two
relations:
i)
the
relation of
the
event
to
the
`happening'
of
the
world,
ii)
the
relation of
the
event
to the
language in
which we
speak of
the
event.
To
the
extent
that the
language in
which we speak of
the
event
is
itself
a
`happening'
we are using an event
to
speak of an event.
To
speak of
this
overall event would
then
constitute another event, and so on.
Speaking
of sense
presents us with similar problems.
One is
not able
to
speak of sense without adding a
further
sense
in how
we speak about
it. In
many ways we may consider sense as
primary
to the
event
to the
extent
that the
word
`event' is
part of a
language
that
has
sense
for
us.
This
provides us with a strange
dualism. It is
not
to
deny
the
problematic of
the
event of sense
but
presents us with a method of access via
the
opposite
direction
of
the
sense of
the
event.
It is
through this
method
that
Deleuze
will navigate a path
through the
Logic
of
Sense.
"'
ibid.
p.
165
"'
Doleuze, `Lucrti: tius
and
Naturalism,
' ibid,
p.
277
50
1. The Stoic Heritage
Before
we consider
how Deleuze
utilizes
the
Stoics it
will
be
useful
to
elaborate
some
basic
points of
their
philosophical system.
The Stoic
scholar
Jacques
Brunschwig tells
us
that the
Stoics
accepted
the
following four
theses:
1 Something is
an existent
if
and only
if it is
a
body. By
the
same
token,
something
is
a
`non-existent' if
and only
if it is
not a
body.
2 The
term incorporeal
applies, not
to
any and every nameable
item
which
is
not a
body, but
only
to
a
limited
and
determined
group of such
items,
namely
the
void, place,
time
and
the
lekta... [hereafter I
shall
follow Brunschwig's
nomenclature and refer
to these
as
the
`canonical
incorporeals'].
3 Only bodies
and canonical
incorporeals
may
be
called something.
4 The
term
not something
denotes
the
ontological status of concepts.
' 19
The Stoics distinguish between
two
different
sorts of
things:
bodies
and
`non-bodily'
or
`incorporeal'
entities.
For
the
Stoics
only
bodies
are existent.
Another
scholar
David Hahm
provides us with a possible syllogism
for
this:
`Whatever
exists either
acts or
is
acted upon.
Nothing
can act or
be
acted upon without
body. Therefore,
only
bodies
exist.
'
120
We
may recall
from Chapter 1
that
Brunschwig
traces this
mark of
reality
back to
Plato's Sophist: `...
anything
has
real
being
that
is
so constituted as
to
possess any sort of power either
to
affect anything else or
to
be
affected
...
I
am
proposing as a mark
to
distinguish
real
things that they
are nothing
but
power.
'
12'
Bodies
are
themselves
composed of mixtures.
In
the
first
place
they
are a mixture of
elements
(that is,
the
archetypal elements of
fire,
air, water and earth) and second a
mixture of
bodies
themselves. To be
sure
the
Stoics
espoused a materialism that
would seem unwieldy
today
for
they
saw
the
soul
to
be
a
body
as well as qualities of
the
soul such as
knowledge,
virtues and vices.
Basically,
anything
that
has
the
power
to
affect
is
a
body.
The Stoics
propose
that these
mixtures of
bodies
with
their
actions and
passions
have
a particular relation to
each other.
The
ancient
Greek
commentator
119
Bnmschwig (1994),
p.
92,
paraphrased
'20
David Hahm (1977) The Origins
of
Stoic Cosmology.
Ohio: Ohio State University Press,
p.
1Z
121
Plato, Sophist, 247d-e,
p.
992
51
Sextus Empiricus
states
that
`[e]very
cause
is
a
body
which
is
the
cause
to
a
body
of
something
happening
to
it. '122 Deleuze
elaborates
this
further in
saying:
`There
are no
causes and effects among
bodies. Rather,
all
bodies
are causes
-
causes
in
relation
to
each other and
for
each other.
'
123
The important
phrase
here is
that
a cause
is
a cause
in
relation
to
another cause.
The Stoics
proposed
that the
cosmos was
itself
a
body
and so all
bodies
exist
in
relation
to this
limit-body. Only
the
cosmos could
be
considered as a
true
independent
cause while
bodies
always
involve
a multiplicity of
relative causes.
As Deleuze
states:
They
refer causes
to
causes and place a
bond
of causes
between
them....
They
refer effects
to
effects and pose certain
bonds
of effects
between
them.
But
these two
operations are not accomplished
in
the
same manner.
Incorporeal
effects are never
themselves
causes
in
relation
to
each other;
rather,
they
are only
"quasi-causes" following laws
which perhaps
express
in
each case
the
relative unity or mixture of
bodies
on which
they
depend for
their
real causes.
' 24
For
a
better
comprehension of
this
idea
we may note
that the
Stoic
conception of
causes
has
remarkable resonances with notions of causality
in
quantum physics.
For
instance,
the
physicist
David Bohm in
explaining
his
own
interpretation
of quantum
physics asks us
to
imagine
a
fish
moving
through
an aquarium.
'25
The fish is
observed
from
two
independent
sources,
head-on
and
from
the
side,
by
observers
who
do
not
know
what
they
are observing.
The
observers, not
knowing
that they
are
in fact looking
at
the
same thing
would conclude
that there
was some
form
of
relationship
between
their
observations.
In
the
Stoic
context
the
fish
and
the
aquarium would always
form
an aggregate of
bodies. The
two
observational sources
would record
the
motions or effects of
this
aggregate.
These
two
effects would
behave in
what would appear
to
be
a causal manner when
they
were really
just
exhibiting a quasi-causal effect of
the
situation.
But in
this
situation what
is left
of
effects?
On
the
relation
between
the
Stoic
conception of cause and effect
Deleuze
tells
122
Quoted in S. Sambursky (1959) Physics
of the Stoics. London: Hutchinson,
p.
53
123
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
4
'2'
ibid,
p.
6
'"
David Bohm (1987) `Hidden Variables
and the Implicate Order, ' in B. Hiley
and
F. Peat. (eds. )
Quantum Implications. London: Routledge,
p.
38
52
us
`[t]hey
are
in
the
process of
bringing
about,
first,
an entirely new cleavage of
the
causal relation.
They dismember
this
relation, even at
the
risk of recreating a unity on
each side.
"26
Another
recent
Stoic
commentator
S. Sambursky,
elaborates
further:
Here
we
have
a radically new approach
to
causality as against
Aristotle
and all
the
precursors of
the
Stoics. Instead
of
the
vague
formulation "A is
the
cause of
B" (in
the
language
of
today), the
Stoic definition
elaborates
thus:
A is
the
cause of
the
effect
E being
wrought on
B. According
to this
statement
the
Stoics
saw an effect as a process originating
in
a
body A
and
leading
to
a change
in
a
body B.
"7
If
we go
back
to the
original
Stoic
theses
we
find
that
effects are not
bodies,
they
are
incorporeal,
and
for
the
Stoics
they
are not existent.
However,
neither are
they
nothing and
the
Stoics
use
the term `something'
to
designate bodies
and
incorporeals
alike.
As Brunschwig
notes,
`something' is
the
supreme genus of
Stoic
metaphysics.
128
In
speaking of
these
incorporeals Sextus Empiricus
gives us
examples of
flesh `being
cut' and wood
`being burnt. ' Deleuze
quotes
from
the
Stoic
scholar
Emile Brehier
on
this
point:
When
the
scalpel cuts
through the
flesh,
the
first body
produces upon
the
second not a new property
but
a new attribute,
that
of
being
cut.
The
attribute
...
does
not
designate
any real quality...,
it is,
to the
contrary,
always expressed
by
the
verb, which means
that
it is
not a
being, but
a
way of
being.... This
way of
being finds itself
somehow at
the
limit,
at
the
surface of
being,
the
nature of which
it is
not able
to
change:
it is, in
fact
neither active nor passive,
for
passivity would presuppose a
corporeal nature which undergoes an action.
It is
purely and simply a
129
result, or an effect which
is
not
to
be
classified among
beings....
To
provide an example of
this `way
of
being' Josiah Gould draws
on
Chrysippus'
discussion
of
time.
Chrysippus
tells
us
that time
`subsists' in bodies `just
as
predicates exist only when
the
acts
(named by
them)
are
taking
place;
for
example,
walking exists
for
me when
I
am walking,
but does
not exist when
I
am
lying down
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
6
Sambursky (1959),
p.
53
Btunschwig (1994)
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
5,
quotation taken from Emile Brehier (1957) La Morie des
Incorporels dann L'ancien Stoicisme.
Paris: Vrin
53
or seated.
''
30
The
Qualification of
'not-something'
The Stoic
conception of causes and effects also provides us with a
better
appreciation
of
how
the
Stoics
criticised
the Platonic Ideas. Deleuze
tells
us:
...
if bodies
with
their
states, qualities, and quantities, assume all
the
characteristics of substance and cause, conversely,
the
characteristics of
the
Idea
are relegated
to the
other side,
that
is
to this
impassive
extra-
Being
which
is
sterile,
inefficacious,
and on
the
surface of
things: the
ideational
or
the incorporeal
can no
longer be
anything other
than
an
"effect. "031
Gould
notes
that
`Chrysippus'
affirmation of
the
corporeal nature of causes
is
a
flat
rejection of
the
incorporeal
causes of
Plato (the Ideas). '
1 32
But,
as
Brunschwig
tells
us
`...
the
irreality
of
Ideas does
not condemn
Plato's
statements
to
absurdity....
'
133
For indeed
the
Stoics
make use of effects
themselves
in
the
form
of
the
canonical
incorporeals. A different
criterion
is
required.
The Stoics find
this
criterion
through
a
test
of particularity
(or
more precisely,
individual
particularity).
This is
elaborated
in
a paradox
brought
to
us
by Simplicius (another
ancient
Greek
commentator on
the
Stoics): `if
someone
is in Athens, he is
not
in Megara;
now man
is
present
in Athens;
so man
is
not present
in Megare. '
134
The
point of
this
paradox
is
that the term
`someone'
cannot
be
substituted
by
a universal
term
without creating a contradiction.
This
statement
does
work
for
particular
things though.
For
example,
Brunschwig
uses
the
example of
Socrates: if Socrates is in Athens, he is
not
in Megare.
' 35
However,
as
Brunschwig
points out,
this
paradox
is
not a
test
of corporeality
but
a
determination
of something
from
not something.
Brunschwig
uses
two
special examples to
demonstrate
this.
Firstly, he
uses
the
`mass-term'
water
(a
mass-term
is
a
term that
10
Quoted in Josiah Gould (1970) The Philosophy
of
Chrysippus. Albany: State University
of
New
York,
p.
108
13'
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
7
132
Gould (1970),
p.
108
'"
Brunschwig (1994),
p.
127
134
ibid,
p.
131
135
ibid.
54
applies equally
to the
whole as
to
its
parts).
Water is
corporeal
but if
water
is in
Athens it doesn't
necessarily mean
it isn't in Magary Secondly, he
uses
the
incorporeal
of
the
place of
Socrates. Now
this
does
satisfy
the test:
if
the
place of
Socrates is in Athens
then
it
cannot
be in Megara. So,
this
paradox allows
the
Stoics
to
distinguish
two
ontological categories under non-existence.
First,
there
is
that
which
is both
not existent and not something.
This
applies
to
universal notions such
as
'man'
which
is
the
category
that they
locate Platonic Ideas. Texts
attributed
to
Zeno tell
us
that
he
considered
Platonic Ideas
to
be
no more
than
`figments
of
thought,
'
or
`empty
movements of
the
imagination.
" 36
Second,
there
is
that
which
is
not existent
but is
something,
the
category of
the
canonical
incorporeals.
In
the
first instance
the
Stoic's
choice of
the
canonical
incorporeals
-
void,
place,
time
and
lekta (the
sayable) seems somewhat arbitrary.
This
category would
seem
to
be
nothing more
than
a repository of
terms that
do
not
fit
neatly within
Stoic
physics
in
general.
On
the
other
hand
what
the
Stoics
seem
to
be
enacting
through the
category of
the
incorporeals is
some
form
of originary epoche.
It is
not as severe as
the
Husserlian
phenomenological epoche which
brackets
phenomena so as
to
rule
metaphysical considerations out of court; what
it does do is
provide a space where
diverse
phenomena
have
the
same ontological
(if
not
logical)
value.
For
example,
the
concept of void
is
ubiquitous
throughout
ancient
Greek
cosmologies
(and
many other
traditions).
By
giving
it
the
same ontological status as
the
other
incorporeals
this
allows
for
new
forms
of relations
between
them
which
had hitherto
not
been
conceived.
From
this
viewpoint the
diversity
of
the
canonical
incorporeals is
not a
weakness
but
a strength.
Deleuzian interventions.
In
the
Logic
of
Sense Deleuze's
overt
interest lies in
the
incorporeals
of
time
and
lekta. We
shall now
investigate how Deleuze's interpretation
of
these
incorporeals
diverge from
that
of
the
Stoics. Let
us
first
turn to
how Deleuze interprets
the
Stoic
theory
of
time,
he
tells
us:
16
ibid,
p.
147
55
...
time
must
be
grasped
twice,
in
two
complementary
though
mutually
exclusive
fashions. First, it
must
be
grasped entirely as
the
living
present
in bodies
which act and are acted upon.
Second, it
must
be
grasped
entirely as an entity
infinitely divisible into
past and
future,
and
into
the
incorporeal
effects which results
from bodies,
their
actions and
their
passions.
Only
the
present exists
in
time
and gathers
together
or absorbs
the
past and
future. But
only
the
past and
future inhere in
time
and
divide
each present
infinitely. These
are not
three
successive
dimensions, but
two
simultaneous readings.
' 37
First there
is
the time
of
the
present,
Chronos,
and second
there
is
the time
of
becoming, Aion. In
examining
Deleuze's
reading of
Stoic
time
we shall
turn to two
important
considerations:
i) Deleuze's
own
theory
of
time
as presented
in Difference
and
Repetition,
and
ii) Deleuze's
use of
the
work of
the
modem
Stoic
scholar
Victor
Goldschmidt
and
the
subsequent reception of
his ideas in
recent
Stoic debate.
i) The
eternal return.
When
considering
the
Stoic
theory
of
time
in
relation
to
Deleuze's
theory
of
time
in
Difference
and
Repetition it is difficult
not
to
draw
a
direct
comparison
between
them.
The Stoic
theory
of
time
is
most succinctly put
forward by Chrysippus, he
defines
time
as
`interval
of movement
in
the
sense
in
which
it is
sometimes called
measure of swiftness and slowness, or
the
interval
proper
to the
movement of
the
cosmos, and
it is in Time
that
everything moves and exists.
'
1 38
In
this
passage we
may
discern
three
distinct
moments.
The first
moment
is
the
definition
of
time
as a
measure of movement.
This is
so
far
what we
have
commonly called
the
present.
However the
Stoics
also attribute
this
measure of movement
to the
cosmos as a
whole
from its
originary contraction
to
eventual conflagration.
As Deleuze
states:
`At
the
limit,
there
is
a unity of all
bodies in
virtue of a primordial
fire into
which
they
become
absorbed and
from
which they
develop
according
to their
respective
tensions
...
a cosmic present embraces the
entire universe.
'
139
This is
the
second moment of
"'
Dcleuze, The Logic
of
Senfe,
P.
5
'31
Quoted from Brunschwig (1994),
p.
145
'"
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
4
56
the
Stoic
theory
of
time.
Both
of
these two
moments
fit
within a reading of
time
as
Chronos. The
third
moment occurs
in
what almost seems
to
be
an afterthought:
`and
it is in Time that
everything exists.
' Is
this
phrase simply a qualification of a cosmic
present as
in
everything
happens
within
the
cosmic present?
On
the
other
hand, if
everything
happens
within
Time
then time
would no
longer be
a measure of
movement
but
constitutive of
it. It is in
this
way
that
Deleuze
would
define
this third
moment as
Aion,
or as
he
often repeats
-
time
out of
joint.
If
we now
turn to
Deleuze's
theory
of
time
in Difference
and
Repetition
we
may see
that this
is
also composed of
three
moments or what
Deleuze
will call,
following Kant, 'syntheses. '
140
However,
on
the
contrary,
it is
not
Kant
who
Deleuze
first
turns to
for his
exposition on
time
but Hume. Fundamental
to the
empirical
approach
is
the
factor
of repetition
-
associations
in
the
mind occur
through
orderly
repetition.
But in
what
form does
repetition
itself
exist?
Deleuze
states:
`Repetition
changes nothing
in
the
object repeated,
but does
change something
in
the
mind which
contemplates
it.,
141
The
point
to
be
made
here is
not
that
repetition
is
purely
subjective
but
that
a principle of repetition cannot
be drawn from
a ready given
object:
In
considering repetition
in
the
object, we remain within
the
conditions
which make possible an
idea
of repetition.
But in
considering
the
change
in
the
subject, we are already
beyond
these
conditions, confronting
the
general
form
of
difference.
142
...
one can speak of repetition only
by
virtue of
the
change or
difference
that
it introduces into
the
mind which contemplates
it....
143
In
order
to
understand
the
idea behind
this
we shall
first
turn to
repetition
in
the
object.
Let
us consider a series of cases of
the
form A, A, A, A,
...,
where each case
is
taken to
be
an object of
the
understanding.
If
we consider
the
first
two
cases
then
we may say
that the
second case of
A is
a repetition of
the
first
case.
Here
the
10
Kant defines
synthesis as
`the
process of
joining
different
representations to
each other, and of
comprehending
their
multiplicity
in
one act of
knowledge,
' Kant (1993,
orig.
1934),
p.
84
14'
Deleuu, Di9"erence
and
Repetition,
p.
70
142
ibld,
p.
71
143
ibid,
p.
70
57
criterion of repetition
is
similarity.
However,
this
leads
to
a paradox
in
that
when we
consider
the two
cases
in
relation
to
each other we no
longer have
two
separate
instances
of
A but
a single
instance
of
the
form (A
-
A) but
as such
there
is
no
longer
a criterion with which
to
judge
the
repetition.
We
could
then
introduce
a
third
case of
A,
but in
relation
to the
other
two
cases
this
would
then
form
an
instance
of
the type
(A
-A-
A)
and so on
to
infinity. Effectively
a criterion of repetition can only
be
found
within
the
general
form
of repetition
itself. Deleuze demonstrates
this
by
turning to
Hume's
example of
the
series
AB, AB, AB, A....
14
The
point of
this
is
that
when one sees
the
case
A
one expects
the
case
B
to
follow. From
this
Deleuze
draws
the
conclusion
that the
first
principle of repetition
is
contraction.
Essentially,
an association
is
a contraction
of cases or
instants. For Deleuze,
this
also
forms
the
first
synthesis of
time
where,
in
simple
terms, the
case
A
could
be
substituted
for
the
past and
the
case
B
could
be
substituted
for
the
future in
the
latter
series:
Time is
constituted only
in
the
originary synthesis which operates on
the
repetition of
instants, This
synthesis contracts
the
successive
independent
instants into
one another,
thereby
constituting
the
lived,
or
living,
present...
The
past and
the
future do
not
designate instants distinct from
a
supposed present
instant, but
rather
the
dimensions
of
the
present
in
so
far
as
it is
a contraction of
instants. The
present
does
not
have
to
go
outside
itself in
order
to
pass
from
past
to
future.
145
The first
synthesis of
time is
that
of
habit,
a
habit
of
the
mind.
It is
passive
to the
extent
that
`it is
not carried out
by
the
mind,
but
occurs
in the
mind....
"46
However,
time
constituted as
the
present
is
only a
first
step.
It
provides us with an
internal
criterion of repetition
but does
not show
how
the
repetition
between instants
or
presents
is
constituted,
that is,
of
the type
(A
-
B)(A
-
B). Whereas Deleuze
turned
to
Hume for
the
first
synthesis of
time
for
the
second synthesis
he
will
turn to
Bergson.
The
paradox of
the
present
is
that
it
passes, or more precisely,
it is
not able
to
constitute
the
principle of
its
passing,
or as
Deleuze
states
`to
constitute time
while
passing
in
the time
constituted.
'
147
This leads
to the
conclusion
`that
there
must
be
"4
ibid.
143
ibid,
pp.
70-71
146
ibid,
p.
71
147
ibid,
p.
79
58
another
time
in
which
the
first
synthesis of
time
can occur.
'
148
In
the
same way
that
a
principle of repetition cannot
be derived from
ready given objects neither can a
principle of passing
be derived from
ready given presents.
The
principle of passing
involves three
main elements: contemporaneity, coexistence and pre-existence.
First,
a principle of passing must
be
contemporaneous with each present otherwise
`no
present would ever pass were
it
not past
"at
the
same
time"
as
it is
present.
'
149
Second, to the
extent
that the
past
is
contemporaneous with each present,
that
is
each
present
is
already past,
the
whole of
the
past co-exists with each present.
Third,
contemporaneity and coexistence poses
the
past as presupposition of
the
present and
in
this
sense
it
pre-exists
the
present:
...
the
past,
far from being
a
dimension
of
time,
is
the
synthesis of all
time
of which
the
present and
the
future
are only
dimensions. We
cannot say
that
it
was.
It
no
longer
exists,
it does
not exist,
but it insists, it
consists,
it
is
...
It is
the
in-itself
of
time
as
the
final
ground of
the
passage of
time.
In
this
sense
it forms
a pure, general, a priori element of all
time.
' 50
The
second synthesis of
time
is
that
of memory.
Like habit it is based
on contraction
but in
this
case
the
material
that
is
contracted
is
the
past.
Whereas habit
contracted a
finite
number of
instants into
the
present, memory contracts
the totality
of
instants.
From
this
viewpoint contraction
in itself is
not enough
to
distinguish
one present
from
another as
the
present
-
all presents are equally present
to the
past.
For
this
purpose
Bergson
poses
that there
cannot
be
contraction without
the
complementary
principle
of relaxation, or more precisely,
degree
of contraction
(which is inversely
related
to
degree
of relaxation).
'51
The living
present will now
be
constituted as
the
past
in its
most contracted state.
For Deleuze,
memory,
like habit, is
part of a passive
synthesis.
We
may see
that
passive synthesis
has
another meaning rather
than
just
the
intuitive idea
that
habit
and memory are
involuntary
processes of
the
mind,
that
is, in
terms
of a principle of repetition
a certain preconceived
idea
of repetition
is
still
in
operation
in
terms
of
how
passive synthesis
does
not go
beyond its
original
14*
ibid.
149
ibid,
p.
81
10
ibid,
p.
82
151
Henri Bergson (1988
orig.
1896) Matter
and
Memory,
trans. N. M. Paul & W. S. Palmer. London:
Zone,
p.
105-6
59
conditions, as
Deleuze
states:
The
shortcoming of
the
ground
is
to
remain relative
to
what
it
grounds,
to
borrow
the
characteristics of what
it
grounds, and
to
be
proved
by
these
...
so
the
second synthesis of
time
points
beyond itself in
the
direction
of
a
third
which
denounces
the
illusion
of
the
in-itself
as still a correlate of
representation.
The in-itself
of
the
past
...
constitute[s] a
kind
of
`effect, '
like
an optical effect
...
of memory
itself.
152
That is,
the
general
form
or
`in-itself
of
time
(it
passes) or repetition
(it
repeats)
is
not sufficient
to
provide us with a constitutive principle.
This leads
to the
conclusion
that there
is
a
third
moment of
time.
For
this
purpose
Deleuze turns to
Nietzsche. The
third
synthesis of
time
is
that
of
the
eternal return.
Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's doctrine
of
the
eternal return as an expression
of
becoming
or
difference. In
this
sense
that
which returns or repeats cannot
be
thought of
in
terms
of
the
identical
or
the
same.
It is
a case of
the
`being
of
becoming'
rather
than the `becoming
of
being: '
The
eternal return
is
...
an answer
to the
problem of passage...
It is
not
being
that
returns
but
rather
the
returning
itself
that
constitutes
being
insofar
as
it is
affirmed of
becoming
and of
that
which passes...
In
other
words,
identity in
the
eternal return
does
not
describe
the
nature of
that
which returns
but,
on
the
contrary,
the
fact
of returning
for
that
which
differs. This is
why
the
eternal return must
be
thought
of as a synthesis; a
synthesis of
time
and
its dimensions....
153
Time
as eternal return overturns the
original conditions of
the
first
two
syntheses of
time.
First, it
unhinges
the
notion of
time
as a repetition of
instants. Deleuze
describes
the
eternal return as an
`empty form
of
time'
in
the
sense
that time
is
no
longer
subordinated
to the
measurement of movement.
That is,
time
as eternal return
unfolds and constitutes
the
ordering of
instants
as opposed
to the
other way round.
Second, it
unhinges
the
contemplating
mind which contracts
these
instants. In
the
first
two
syntheses of
time the
mind contracts
instants into
a unity
but
the
operation
of
the
eternal return shatters the
possibility
of unity.
In
this
way
Deleuze describes
152
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
88
1$3
Gilles Dekan (1483
orig.
1962) Nietzsche
and
philosophy,
trans. H. Tomlinson.
London: Athlone,
p.
48
60
the
mind as a
`fractured I; '
time
is
experienced as
the
differential
created
through this
fracture. Deleuze
will sum
these
points up:
Eternal
return affects only
the
new
...
it
causes neither
the
condition nor
the
agent
to
return: on
the
contrary
it
repudiates
these
and expels
them
with all
its
centrifugal
force.... It is
repetition
by
excess which
leaves
nothing of
the
default
or
the
becoming-equal. It is itself
the
new,
complete novelty....
It
allows only
the
plebian
to
return,
the
man without
a name.
1 54
Obviously
there
are
both
similarities and
differences between
the
Deleuzian
and
Stoic
conceptions of
time.
The
most pertinent
factor is
where
the third
moment of
Stoic
time
fits
within
the
Deleuzian
syntheses.
On
the
one
hand incorporeal
time
could
be
associated with
the
second synthesis
to the
extent
that
it
subsists
in
the
present of
bodies
and acts effectively as a
transcendental
field. On
the
other
hand,
incorporeal
time,
by dint
of
being incorporeal is by definition
an empty
form
and
could
therefore
be
associated with
the third
synthesis.
However, the
issue
that the
latter
possibility raises
is how
can an
incorporeal,
which
is
an effect, act as an active
constitutive principle?
ii) The
empty
form
of
time.
Deleuze's interpretation
of
the
Stoic
theory of
time
as
Chronos
and
Aion draws
heavily
upon
the
work of
Victor Goldschmidt,
as
Deleuze
will
himself
state
in
one of
the
footnotes
of
the
Logic
of
Sense: `Among the
commentators of
Stoic
thought,
Victor Goldschmidt in
particular
has
analysed
the
coexistence of
these two
conceptions of
time: the
first
of variable presents;
the
second, of unlimited
subdivision
into
past and
future.
"55
However, Goldschmidt's
work
has
come under
scrutiny
in
terms
of
how his interpretation
of
time
draws
on a
feature
of
the
other
incorporeals
of void and place:
..,
in
the temporal
domain,
there
exists no concept
-
or at
least
no
term
-
Deteuze, D fference
and
Repetition,
pp.
90-91
iss
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
340n. 3
61
which stands
in
the
same relation
to total
and
infinite
time
as place
does
to the
void.
It is
true that
one can
try to
re-establish
the
symmetry, as
Goldschmidt does, by
appealing
to the
following
analogy: what
the
infinite
void
is
to
a place
limited by
the
body
which occupies
it,
total
and
infinite
time
...
is
to time
limited by
the
action which occupies
it,
that
is
to
say
the
present.
But
this
analogy seems
to
me
to
be flawed by
several
differences: in
the
first
place,
the
limited
parts of
time
are not necessarily
determined by
an action
in
the
present
('last
year';
`the day
after
tomorrow');
and secondly, there
is
no such
thing
as
`empty' time
which
is
beyond the
limits
of
the time
occupied
by
the
movements of
the
world.
156
What is
this
relation of place
to the
void?
As Brunschwig
points out,
the
void could
be
called
`the incorporeal'
par excellence
in
that
it is by definition `a desert devoid
of
bodies. ' Incorporeals do
not
`exist'
and
hence
are necessarily
`empty' by
nature.
I57
But how
could such a
term
even
be
called something?
The Stoics believed
that the
cosmos was
finite
and required something
in
order
to
accommodate
its
periodic
conflagrations and contractions:
the
infinite
void.
From this
perspective
the
void
is
indeed
a
definite
place,
but
this
ability
to
accommodate
the
cosmos
is its
only
defining feature. As
a
definite
place
the
void can
indeed be
considered as something.
This is
qualified
in
that the
void can
in
no sense
be
considered
to
be in
the
cosmos.
For
the
place
in
the
void
that the
cosmos occupies
is
no
longer
void
but body. As
Brunschwig
puts
it,
the
cosmos
`... limits it [the
void]
internally just
as a
hole limits
the
continuity of a
Gruyere
cheese.
"58
If
we now
turn to Bnuischwig's
criticisms of
Goldschmidt's interpretation
of
Stoic time
we may agree with
the
idea
that there
is in
no sense what could
be
called a
`place'
of
time, that
is,
there
is
no
`outside'
of
time
in
the
same way as
the
void
is
outside
bodies. However,
the
cases
Brunshwig
uses
to
support
this
are not well
chosen.
Firstly,
although
the
present can
be
seen as a
limited
part of
time this
is
not
to
say
that
it isn't
also variable according
to the
extension of
the
acting
body.
Brunschwig's
examples of
`last
year' and
the
`day
after
tomorrow'
could effectively
be defined
as
bodies if
they
were exerting power on
the
present.
The
ancient
Greek
commentator
Plutarch
would even state:
156
B
wig
(1994),
pp.
140-1
's'
ibid,
p.
138
'-"
ibid,
p.
139
62
The Stoics do
not admit
the
existence of a shortest element of
time,
nor
do
they
concede
that the
`now' is indivisible, but
that
which someone
might assume and
think
of as present
is
according
to them
partly
future
and partly past.
Thus
nothing remains of
the
Now,
nor
is
there
left
any
part of
the
present,
but
what
is
said
to
exist
is
partly spread over
the
future
and partly over
the
past.
1'9
Second, Brunschwig's
objection
that there
is
no such
thing
as
`empty'
time
needs
qualifying
for it
can
be
argued
that time
as an
incorporeal is
precisely empty.
More
exactly,
this
qualification
is
also required
for
the
`outside'
argument used
to
describe
the
void as strictly speaking
the
void as an
incorporeal does
not exist outside of
bodies
any more
than time
can.
What
we may see
taking
place
here in
terms
of
time
and void are
two
different
types
of
logical
argument
-
incorporeal
time
is
related
differentially
or
transcendentally to
bodies
while
the
incorporeal
void
is
related
unilaterally
to
bodies.
Deleuze's
second main
interest in
the
Stoic incorporeals is
that
of
lei
to and
the
relation
this
has
to
verbs or
`predicates. ' Lecercle
tells
us about
this
basic
theory:
On
most accounts,
Stoic logic
makes a
threefold
distinction between
the
sign
(which
signifies),
the
referent
(which
exists) and
the
significate
(which
is
signified).
Both
the
referent and
the
sign
(the
word as sound)
are
bodies
...
but
the
significate
is incorporeal. It is
not a
thought,
however, but
rather
`the
actual entity
indicated
or revealed
by
the
sound,
which we apprehend as subsisting
together with our
thought'
[... ]
the
lekton is
the
predicate
in
a proposition:
the
incorporeal
predicate
expresses
the
equally
incorporeal
event.
It is
neither an
individual (a
noun) nor a concept
(a
noun or adjective)
but
an attribute
(a
verb).
160
In this
way we may see
how Deleuze links lekta directly
with a
language
of
becoming
Mixtures in
general
determine
the
quantitative and qualitative states of
affairs:
the
dimensions
of an ensemble
-
the
red of
iron,
the
green of a
tree.
But
what we mean
by "to
grow,
" "to diminish, " "to become
red,
" "to
become
green,
" "to
cut,
"
and
"to be
cut,
"
etc.,
is
something entirely
'"Quoted
in Btunschwig (1994),
P.
145
160
L,
ecercle
(1985),
p.
99
63
different. These
are no
longer
states of affairs
-
mixtures
deep inside
bodies
-
but incorporeal
events at
the
surface which are
the
results of
mixtures.
The
tree
,
greens,,,
....
16'
However,
as
Brunschwig
notes,
for
the
Stoics
the
position of
lekta is
not so clear cut.
A
predicate without a subject such as
`...
walks'
is
termed
an
incomplete lekton by
the
Stoics.
162
When
this
subject
is filled
such as
`Socrates
walks' or
`Plato
walks'
these
are
known
as complete
lekta. This is
an
important
nuance.
Deleuze's
method
has been
to
interpret
the
incorporeals
as an order of
becoming, but for
the
Stoics
this
is
only
true to the
extent
that
an
incorporeal is first
qualified as a
`something'
as
opposed
to
a
`not-something' (as
we saw
in Simplicius'
paradox).
However,
as we
noted earlier at
the
beginning
of
the
chapter
it is
not
Deleuze's
purpose
to
produce a
strict
interpretation
of
the Stoics but
a repetition.
On
the
other
hand,
evaluating
Deleuze's interpretation in
terms
of
the
original
Stoic
theses
would seem
to
be
a valid
point
if Deleuze's interpretation
were
to
fall foul
of what
the
Stoics
were criticising
in
the
first
place.
To
explore
this
further let
us
turn to
Deleuze's
theory
of sense.
161
Deleuu, The Logic
of
Sense,
pp.
5.6
162
Bnmschwig (1994),
p.
135
64
2. The Theory
of
Sense
From Simulacra
to
Events
Deleuze begins
the
Logic
of
Sense
with
the
sentence:
`Alice
and
Through
the
Looking-Glass
involve
a category of very special
things:
events, pure events.
'
163
Deleuze introduces
us
to
one of
the
fundamental
aspects of
the
event
through the
theme
of
becoming
and uses
this to
show
how it disrupts
our notion of sense, or more
precisely,
how it disrupts
what
Deleuze
classifies as a
`good'
sense and a
`common'
sense.
Deleuze first
turns to the
disruption
of good sense:
When I
say
"Alice becomes larger, " I
mean
that
she
becomes larger
than
she was.
By
the
same
token,
however,
she
becomes
smaller
than
she
is
now.
Certainly,
she
is
not
bigger
and smaller at
the
same
time.
She is
larger
now; she was smaller
before. But it is
at
the
same moment
that
one
becomes larger
than
one was and smaller
than
one
becomes. This is
the
simultaneity of a
becoming
whose characteristic
is
to
elude
the
present.
''
For Deleuze
good sense
is
rooted
in
a
thought
of
the
present and a
distribution
of
time that
moves
from
past
to
future in
accordance with
the
present.
For
example, a
glass of
hot
water
is
commonly seen
to
cool over
time, that
is, its difference from
the
norm
is
cancelled out or
homogenized. But
this
is
a presentation of
the
present or
the
`now: '
now
it is hot,
now
it is
cool.
From
the
viewpoint of
becoming
the
situation
is
very
different,
as
Deleuze
will quote
from Plato: "`hotter"'
never stops where
it is but
is
always going a point
further,
and
the
same applies
to
"colder"
...
`but
they
can
never
finally become
so;
if
they
did
they
would no
longer be becoming, but
would
be
so
'
165
Pure becoming is
too
quick
for
the
present and as such removes
the
criterion
that
enables us
to
judge
whether
time
is
moving
forwards
or
backwards. This is
the
paradox
becoming
produces
in
relation
to
good sense.
To be
sure we
have
not yet come
to
events
themselves
yet
but
are still
in
the
realm of simulacra
for it is
the
simulacrum
which
is `without
measure.
' To
this
extent
163
ibid,
p.
1
"
ibid.
165
ibid,
p.
2
65
Deleuze takes
us
back
to the
organisation of
the
simulacrum:
Plato invites
us
to
distinguish between
two
dimensions: (1)
that
of
limited
and measured
things,
of
fixed
qualities, permanent or
temporary
which
always presuppose pauses and rests,
the
fixing
of presents and
the
assignation of subjects
(for
example, a particular subject
having
a
particular
largeness
or a particular smallness at a particular moment); and
(2)
a pure
becoming
without measure, a veritable
becoming-mad,
which
never rests.
1 66
`Becoming-mad'
is
the
matter of
the
simulacrum
but for Deleuze
this
does
not
form
a
dualism in
simple opposition
to
Platonic ideas but
occurs within
things themselves:
It is
not at all
the
dualism
of
the
intelligible
and
the
sensible, of
Idea
and
matter, or of
Ideas
and
bodies. It is
a more profound and secret
dualism
hidden in
sensible and material
bodies
themselves.
It is
a subterranean
dualism between
that
which receives
the
action of
the
Idea
and
that
which
eludes
the
action
...
Limited
things
lie beneath the
Ideas; but
even
beneath
things,
is
there
not still
this
mad element which subsists and
occurs on
the
other side of
the
order
that
Ideas impose
and
things
receive?
167
The
simulacrum occurs on
the
sensible side of
things
and
functions in
a similar
manner
to
a
Kantian
sublime
-
it
occurs at
the
limit
point of
the
faculties.
168
Having
delved
to the
bottom
of
things to
find
the
simulacrum
as
the
unlimited
Deleuze
will
now reverse
his
approach
to
see
how
the
unlimited affects our perception and
thought
of
the
limited by
turning to
language:
Sometimes Plato
wonders whether
this
pure
becoming
might not
have
a
very peculiar relation
to
language [... ] Could
this
relation
be,
perhaps,
essential
to
language,
as
in
the
case of a
"flow"
of speech, or a wild
discourse
which would
incessantly
slide over
its
referent, without ever
stopping?
Or
might
there
not
be
two
languages
and
two
sorts of
"names, "
one
designating
the
pauses and rests which receive
the
action of
the Idea,
the
other expressing
the
movements
or rebel
becomings? Or further
still,
is it
not possible
that there
are
two
distinct dimensions internal
to
'"
ibid,
pp.
1-2
167
ibid,
p.
2
'"
Gilles Deleuze (1984,
orig.
1963)
Kants Critical
Philosophy: The Doctrine
of
the
Faculties, U=.
H. Tomlinson
and
B. Habberjam. London:
Athlone,
p. xi
66
language in
general
-
one always concealed
by
the
other, yet continuously
coming
to the
aid of, or subsisting under,
the
other?
169
We have
already seen
that the
language
of good sense
is
rooted
in
the `now'
and
consequently constitutes a very specific way of
thinking
-
one of
linear
homogenisation. On
the
other
hand,
through the
concept of
becoming, it is
at
least
possible
to
conceive of a
language
or substantially, a way of
thinking, that
could
be
very
different. Of
course one may
find it
paradoxical
that
names could
in
some way
designate
becomings, but here Deleuze is
alluding
to the
difference between
nouns or
adjectives, and verbs.
Verbs
express actions and
happenings
and so
for Deleuze have
a relation
to
becoming: `...
the
names of pause and rest are carried away
by
the
verbs
of pure
becoming.... '
170
Neither is Deleuze
the
first
to
postulate such a
language, for
example,
Borges, in his
short story
`Tlon, Uqbar, Orbius Tertius, '
creates an
imaginary language
where a sentence such as
`the
moon rose above
the
river' would
be
approximately
translated
as
`upward, behind
the
onstreaming
it
Mooned.,
171
In
such a
language `there
are no nouns...:
there
are
impersonal
verbs, modified
by
mono-syllabic suffixes
(or
prefixes)
functioning
as adverbs.
" 72
It is
now
Deleuze's
purpose
to turn to the transformation
of nouns or
fixed identities by bringing
together
the
becoming
within good sense with
the
becoming
within
language:
The
paradox of
...
pure
becoming,
with
its
capacity
to
elude
the
present,
is
the
paradox of
infinite identity.... It is language
which
fixes
the
limits
(the
moment,
for
example, at which
the
excess
begins), but it is language
as well which
transcends the
limits
and restores
them to the
infinite
equivalence of an unlimited
becoming....
' 73
For Deleuze this
is
the
paradox that
becoming
produces
in
relation
to
common
sense.
Deleuze defines
common sense as
...
the
norm of
identity from
the
point of
view of
the
pure
Self
and
the
form
of
the
unspecified object which corresponds to
it.,
174
From the
point of view of
language it is
expressed
in
nouns and adjectives as
""
ibid.
170
ibid,
p.
3
Borges, `Tlon, Ugber, Orbius Tertius,
' in Collected Writings,
p.
73
m
ibid.
"'
Deleu=e, The Logic
of
Sense,
Pp.
2-3
"
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
133
67
the
`assignation
of
fixed identities. '
15
The
paradox comes about as a result of
the
destruction
of good sense and
the
disruption
of
the
`now. ' Without
a now
to
order
thought the
before
and after are equally affirmed
in becoming
and produce an
infinite
identity
of
both
senses
(or directions)
at
the
same
time,
as
Deleuze draws
on
Lewis
Carroll:
"which
way, which way?
"
asks
Alice,
sensing
that
it is
always
in both
directions
at
the
same
time,
so
that
for
once she stays,
through
an optical
illusion;
the
reversal of
the
day before
and
the
day
after,
the
present
always
being
eluded
-
"jam
tomorrow
and
jam
yesterday
-
but
never
jam
to-day.
9476
What happens
to
nouns and adjectives
in
this
situation?
For Deleuze,
through the
paradox of common sense we now arrive at
the
realm of events:
When
the
names of pause and rest are carried away
by
the
verbs of pure
becoming
and slide
into
the
language
of events, all
identity disappears
from
the
self,
the
world, and
God. This is
the test
of savoir....
It is
as
if
events enjoyed an
irreality
which
is
communicated
through
language
to
the
savoir and
to
persons.
For
personal uncertainty
is
not a
doubt foreign
to
what
is happening, but
rather an objective structure of
the
event
itself,
insofar
as
it
moves
in
two
directions
at once, and
insofar
as
it fragments
the
subject
following
this double direction.
"?
The
event splits
the
very notion of
there
being
a conception of
identity
or
the
self.
We
are perhaps now
in
a
better
position
to
determine
why
Deleuze
turns to
Lewis Carroll
-
for Deleuze, Alice is
a cipher of
the
event:
`All these
reversals as
they
appear
in
infinite identity have
one consequence:
the
contesting of
Alice's
personal
identity
and
the
loss
of
her
proper name.
The loss
of
the
proper name
is
the
adventure that
is
repeated
throughout
all of
Alice's
adventure's.
9178
173
Deleuu, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
3
16
ibid.
'n
ibid.
178
ibid.
68
The Proposition
Deleuze
states:
`It is
the
characteristic of events
to
be
expressed or expressible,
uttered or utterable,
in
propositions
that
are at
least
possible.
'
179
In
the third
series of
The Logic
of
Sense Deleuze determines
the
relation of
his
notion of
the
event
to
sense
and
language. He does
this
by first
setting out a certain model of
the
proposition.
Deleuze begins by
specifying
three
distinct
relations within
the
proposition:
denotation,
manifestation and signification.
i) Denotation. Deleuze
states
that
denotation:
...
is
the
relation of
the
proposition
to
an external state of affairs
(datum).
The
state of affairs
is individuated; it includes
particular
bodies,
mixtures
of
bodies,
qualities, quantities, and relations.
Denotation functions
through the
association of
the
words
themselves with particular
images
which ought
to
"represent"
the
state of affairs.
"*
The
operation of
denotation is
the
`naming'
of states of affairs.
To
construct
this
in
Stoic
terms this
would
be
the
relation
between
the
body
that
is
the
word
(the
utterance)
and
the
body
of
the
state of affairs which
it
represents.
Deleuze
tells
us
that
denotation
provides us with
the
logical
criterion of
true
and
false: "`True"
signifies
that
a
denotation is
effectively
filled by
the
state of affairs....
"False"
signifies
that
the
denotation is
not
filled,
either as an result of a
defect in
the
selected
images
or as
a result of
the
radical
impossibility
of producing an
image
which can
be
associated
with
the
words-'181
This
criterion
fits in
with
the
basic Stoic definition
of
the
proposition as we
find it in Diogenes Laertius: `A
proposition
is
that
which
is
true
or
false,
or a complete state of affairs which, as
far
as
itself is
concerned, can
be
asserted, as
Chrysippus
says
in his Dialectical definitions. '
182
ii) Manifestation. This is `the
relation of
the
proposition
to the
person who
179
ibid,
p.
12
180
ibid.
"ibid.
p.
13
'82
Diogenes Laertius, 7.65, in A. Long
and
D. Sedley
(1987) The Hellenistic Philosophers,
Vol. 1:
Translations
of
the
principal sources,
with philosophical
commentary.
Cambridge:
University Press,
p.
202
69
speaks and expresses
himself. '
183
It is
the
relation of
the
speaker
to the
external state
of affairs.
This
relation
is
of a
different kind
to
a strict
denotation. Deleuze
says:
Manifestation
...
is
presented as a statement of
desires
and
beliefs
which
correspond
to the
proposition.
Desires
and
beliefs
are causal
inferences,
not associations.
Desire is
the
internal
causality of an
image
with respect
to the
existence of
the
object or
the
corresponding state of affairs
[... ]
Hume had
seen
this
clearly:
in
the
association of cause and effect,
it is
"inference
according
to the
relation" which precedes
the
relation
itself.
184
In
the
Stoic
context
this
would
be
the
relation of
the
soul
(the 'commanding-faculty')
to the
external world.
What is
the
relation of manifestation
to
denotation? Deleuze
says
`inferences form
a systematic unity
from
which associations
derive. ''
85
It is
the
speaking person who makes
denotations
according
to the
prior relation of
manifestation.
Moving from denotation
to
manifestation we
likewise have
a change
in logical
principle,
it is `no longer
the true
and
the
false, but
veracity and
illusion.
" 86
The
possibility of
true
and
false is
grounded
in
a
judgement.
iii) Signification. This has
a complex relation
in
the
proposition
in
that
it
doesn't
conform
to the
strict
distinction between
the
proposition and an external state
of affairs.
Deleuze
tells
us
that
signification:
...
is
a question of
the
word
to
universal or general concepts, and of
syntactical connections to the
implications
of
the
concept.
From
the
standpoint of signification, we always consider
the
elements of
the
proposition as
"signifying"
conceptual
implications
capable of referring
to
other propositions, which serve as premises of
the
first. Signification is
defined by
this
order of conceptual
implication
where
the
proposition
under consideration
intervenes
only as an element of a
"demonstration, "
in
the
most general sense of
the
word,
that
is,
either as premise or as
conclusion.
Thus, "implies"
and
"therefore"
are essentially
linguistic
signifiers.
"Implication" is
the
sign which
defines
the
relation
between
premises and conclusion;
"therefore" is
the
sign of assertion, which
defines
the
possibility of affirming
the
conclusion
itself
as
the
outcome of
implications.
187
113
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Seise,
p.
13
184
ibid.
'15
ibid.
16
ibid,
p.
14
1"
ibid.
70
These ideas
are more
intelligible
through the
use of examples.
Deleuze draws
on
two
distinctions that
Descartes
made: a)
the
determination
of
the
Cogito,
and
b)
the
definition
of man as a rational animal.
' 88
Here
we
have
the two
`types'
of
signification.
In
the
first
case, whenever
`I'
speak,
the
Cogito,
the
`I'
think,
is
always
implicit in
the
I (as
a
hypothesis
at
least). In
the
second case,
`man
therefore
rational
animal'
is
an assertion and
is
not
true
in
the
same sense as a
denotation. It
requires an
actual
demonstration for it
to
be
true, that
is,
a man acting as a rational animal.
From
this
we would require a
further demonstration
of rational and animal, and so on.
These determinations
also
have
resonance
in Stoic
thought,
as
Benson Mates
states:
According to
Sextus,
the term
"signal" has
two
senses, a common sense
and a special sense.
In its
common usage
the
word refers
to
anything
which, as
it
were, serves
to
"reveal"
something else which
has
previously
been
observed
in
conjunction with
it. In
the
special sense
it
means
that
which
is indicative
of something non evident
[for
example,
the
soul].
189
With
signification we
have
another change
in logical form. Deleuze
argues
that the
logical
criterion of signification
is `the
condition of
the true, the
aggregate of
conditions under which
the
proposition
"would be"
true.
' Deleuze
elaborates
further:
The
conditioned or concluded proposition may
be false, insofar
as
it
actually
denotes
a nonexisting state of affairs or
is
not
directly
verified.
Signification does
not establish
the truth
without also establishing
the
possibility of error.
For
this
reason,
the
condition of
truth
is
not opposed
to the
false, but
to the
absurd:
that
which
is
without signification or
that
which
may
be
neither
true
nor
false.
190
This is
to
say
that
signification
forms
a
'model
of
truth'
upon which
truth
can
be
judged.
What is
the
relation of signification to
manifestation and
denotation? We have
ibid.
I$9
Benson Mates (1973) Stoic Logic. Berkeley:
University
of
California Press,
p.
13
190
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
pp.
14-15
71
already seen
that
manifestation
is `prior'
to
denotation. Deleuze
posits
that
manifestation
is
also prior
to
signification
but
this
is
only
the
case
from
a certain
point of view:
`... from
the
standpoint of speech
(parole)
...
the
I is
primary, not only
in
relation
to
all possible
denotations
which are
founded
upon
it, but
also
in
relation
to the
signification which
it
envelops.
'
19'
However,
this
viewpoint
has
specific
implications for
the
notion of signification and
Deleuze
continues:
`...
precisely
from
this
standpoint, conceptual significations are neither valid nor
deployed for
themselves: they
are only
implied (though
not expressed)
by
the
I,
presenting
itself
as
having
signification which
is immediately
understood and
identical
to
its
own
manifestation.
"92
And
as we are
told
by Galen:
...
Chrysippus
wrote about
the
word ego
("P') in
the
first
of
his books On
the
soul,
in
a
discussion
of
the
commanding-faculty....
We
say ego
...
in
this
way, pointing
to
ourselves at
the
place
in
which we
declare
thought
to
be,
since
the
demonstrative
reference
is
conveyed
there
naturally and
appropriately.
1 93
From this
Deleuze infers
that the
`I'
of manifestation
is based
on a conceptual
signification.
He
asks
is
there
a
domain in
which conceptual significations are
developed for
themselves?
He
posits
that this
domain is
that
of
language (langue). It
is in language that
`a
proposition
is
able
to
appear only as premise or a conclusion,
signifying
concepts
before
manifesting a subject, or even
before denoting
a state of
affairs.
''94 We
should note
here how Deleuze is drawing
on structuralism
to
ground
this
assertion:
...
Benveniste has
shown
that the
relation
between
the
word
(or
rather
its
own acoustic
image)
and
the
concept was alone necessary, and not
arbitrary.
Only
the
relation
between
the
word and
the
concept enjoys a
necessity which
the
other relations
[denotation
and manifestation]
do
not
have. The latter
remain arbitrary
insofar
as we consider
them
directly
and
escape
the
arbitrary only
insofar
as we connect
them to this
primary
relation.
Thus,
the
possibility
of causing particular
images
associated
with
the
word
to
vary, of substituting
one
image for
another
in
the
form
19'
ibid,
p.
15
92
ibid.
Galen, OR Hippocrates'
and
Plato's doctrines,
2.2.9-11, in Long
and
Sedley (1987),
p.
204-5
''
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
15
72
"this is
not
that,
it's
that,
"
can
be
explained only
by
the
constancy of
the
signified concept.
9S
There is
perhaps an
intuitive link between
structuralism and
the
Stoics in
the
way
that
the
word
(the
acoustic
image) is
treated
as a material
determination in
structuralism.
However, the
position and role of
language in Stoic
thought
is
complex and
problematic
to
re-construct.
Diogenes Laertius
tells
us:
`Utterance
and speech are
different, because
vocal sound
is
also an utterance
but
only articulated
in
speech.
And
speech
is different from language, because language is
always significant,
but
speech
can
lack
signification, e. g.
blituri,
whereas
language is
not so at all.
"96
We have
already seen
that the
utterance and
the
external state of affairs are
bodies
while
the
proposition,
or
`complete
sayable'
is incorporeal. As Gould
says:
`the
proposition
is
identical
neither with
the
words which express
it
nor with
the
fact
which
it
expresses.
'
197
Where does language fit into
this
schema?
To be
sure
language does
not
fit into
this
schema at all
for
each element
in
the
schema
is
a particular and as
Deleuze has himself
pointed out, signification
involves
a relation
to
universal or
general concepts.
However, despite
the
Stoic
critique of
Platonic Ideas
as universals
this
does
not rule out
the
use of universals per se.
Stobaeus
states
`[t]he Stoic
philosophers
say
that there
are no
Ideas,
and
that
what we
`participate in' is
the
concepts.
"98
Concepts
are universals
but
as
Long
and
Sedley
point out
`if it is
asked
what makes someone's common quality count as
`man, '
not
`horse, '
the
answer will
no
doubt be
that
it
matches
the
universal concept called
`man'
...
But
any resultant
metaphysical problems are problems
for
concepts, not
for
common qualities
themselves.
"
For
the
Stoics,
concepts and what
the
structuralists call
langue (the
rules of
language)
are what
they
would
term
`not-somethings. ' As
such
they
do
not
play an ontological role
but
perhaps a practical one
-
one according to
association.
Let
us now summarise the
relationships
between
the
dimensions
of
the
proposition.
From
the
viewpoint of
language
signification
is
the
primary relation.
However, Deleuze identifies
that this
is itself
problematic.
For
signification only
'"
ibid,
pp.
15-16
'%
Diogenes L,
eaertius,
7.57, in Long
and
Sedley
(1987),
p.
33
Gould (1970),
p.
70
Stobaeus, 1.136,21-137,6, in Long
and
Sedley
(1987),
p.
179
Long
and
Sedley (1987),
p.
183
73
provides us with
the
condition of
the true,
not a particular
truth.
That is,
signification
lacks
a referent or more precisely,
it lacks denotation: `implication
never succeeds
in
grounding
denotation
except
by
giving
itself
a ready-made
denotation,
once
in
the
premises and again
in
the
conclusion.
'200 In
the
proposition signification
is
reliant on
denotation, but
we
have
already seen
that
denotation is itself
reliant on manifestation,
which
is
where we started
in
the
first
place.
Problematic
of
the Proposition
Having
now set up
the
problematic of
the
proposition
Deleuze
asks whether
it
would
be
pertinent
to
posit sense as a
fourth dimension
of
the
proposition
in
order
to
resolve
this
problematic.
Deleuze
tackles this
possibility
from
two
different
angles: as a
question of
fact
and a question
de jure. The
question of
fact is
one of whether sense
can already
be found in
one of
the
dimensions
of
the
proposition.
Of
the
question
de
jure Deleuze
states:
It is
not
that
we must construct an a posteriori model corresponding to
previous
dimensions, but
rather
the
model
itself
must
have
the
aptitude
to
function
a priori
from
within, were
it forced
to
introduce
a supplementary
dimension
which,
because
of
its
evanescence, could not
have been
recognized
in
experience
from
outside
201
As
a question of
fact Deleuze
tells
us
that
sense cannot
be found in denotation in
that
sense cannot
be founded in
that
which
is
true
or
false:
true
and
false both have
a
sense of
their
own.
Manifestation
provides us with a more
intuitive
possibility
in
terms
of
how
the
I
makes sense of
the
world.
But, in Deleuze's
structuralist model of
the
proposition
the
I is itself
a signification and
hence
cannot
be
the
ultimate
foundation. Likewise
signification cannot act as
the
ultimate
dimension
of sense as
it
presupposes an
`irreducible denotation. '202 Signification
always
fails because `there
is
a circularity
between
ground and grounded.
'203 Nevertheless Deleuze
posits
that
200
Deleu=e, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
16
m'
ibid,
p.
17
202
ibid,
p.
18
203
ibid.
74
this
provides us with a certain model
for
the
understanding of sense
in how
this
circularity
is based in
the
logical
criterion of signification.
Deleuze
states:
In discussing
the
conditions of
truth,
we raise ourselves above
the true
and
the
false,
since a
false
proposition also
has
a sense or signification.
But
at
the
same
time,
we
define
this
superior condition solely as
the
possibility
for
the
proposition
to
be
true.
This
possibility
is
nothing other
than the
form
of possibility of
the
proposition
itself [... ] Here [in
signification] one rises
to
a
foundation, but
that
which
is founded
remains
what
it
was,
independently
of
the
operation which
founded it
and
unaffected
by it.
204
In
this
way, with signification,
the
conditioned
is itself
used
to
form
the
condition of
possibility producing
the
circularity we
have
seen.
At this
point we come
to the
question of sense
de jure. Deleuze
argues
that the condition of
truth:
...
ought
to
have
something unconditioned capable of assuring a real
genesis of
denotation
and of
the
other
dimensions
of
the
proposition.
Thus
the
condition of
truth
would
be defined
no
longer
as
the
form
of
conceptual possibility,
but
rather as
ideational
material or
"stratum, "
that
is
to
say, no
longer
as signification,
but
rather as sense.
2os
Now, how does
sense operate
in
the
proposition?
Sense `... does
not exist
outside
the
proposition which expresses
it;
what
is
expressed
does
not exist outside
its
expression.
This is
why we cannot say
that
sense exists,
but
rather
that
it inheres
or subsists.
'206 However, `[w]hat is
expressed
has
no resemblance whatsoever to the
expression.
'207 Sense is
not
the
attribute of
the
proposition
but is `rather
the
attribute
of
the thing
or state of affairs.
'208 Nevertheless, the
proposition
does have
an
attribute, a predicate which
is
attributed
to the
subject.
At the
same
time
`the
attribute
of
the thing
...
the
verb:
to
green,
for
example, or rather
the
event expressed
by
the
verb
...
is
attributed
to the thing
denoted by
the
subject, or
to the
state of affairs
denoted by
the
entire proposition.
'
209
However, `[t]his
attribute
does
not exist outside
204
ibid.
ms
ibid,
p.
19
ibid,
p.
21
207
ibid.
20S
ibid.
209
ibid.
75
of
the
proposition which expresses
it in denoting
the thing.
Here
we return
to
our
point of
departure:
sense
does
not exist outside of
the
proposition.
...,
2 10
The
dimension
of sense would appear
to
have
a circularity all of
its
own
but
this
is
not
necessarily
the
case.
Deleuze
tells
us:
Sense is both
the
expressible or
the
expressed of
the
proposition, and
the
attribute of
the
state of affairs.
It
turns
one side
towards things
and one
side
towards
propositions.
But it does
not merge with
the
proposition
which expresses
it
any more
than
with
the
state of affairs or
the
quality
which
the
proposition
denotes. It is
exactly
the
boundary between
propositions and
things.
1
The Stoics
also
determine
a
`realm'
of sense.
We
may see
this
in
the
famous
paradox
of
Chrysippus: `If
you say something,
it
passes
through
your
lips;
so,
if
you say
"chariot, "
a chariot passes
through
your
lips. '212 The
utterance
`chariot'
and
the thing,
chariot, are
both bodies, but
to
avoid
the
paradox
the
`sayable'
chariot must
have
a
sense which merges with neither of
these
bodies. Nevertheless,
the
sayable
is
the
relation of
these two
bodies
and moreover,
the
sayable
is
a particular, a particular
`something.
' This is
where
Deleuze's
reading of sense
deviates from
the
Stoics.
Deleuze
tells
us
`[w]e
will not ask
therefore
what
is
the
sense of
the
event:
the
event
is
sense
itself. The
event
belongs
essentially
to
language; it has
an essential
relationship
to
language [where
the
event
is
expressed
by
the
infinitive
verb].
9213 We
must explore
to
what extent sense, as
based
on
the
condition of
language
partakes
in
the
universality of signification.
The
point
is
to
what extent sense partakes
in
the
economy of
that
which
it
engenders,
that
is,
of
language
as a not-something.
This is
the
problem of
transcendental
conditions
in
general.
From
this
perspective we must
consider
Deleuze's
conjunction of sense with
the
event and
determine
to
what extent
these
are
logical
rather
than
ontological notions.
In
order
to
explore
these
problems
we must
first
examine
how Deleuze
qualifies
his
notion of sense.
210
ibid.
211
ibid,
p.
22
212
ibid,
p.
8
23
ibid,
p.
22
76
3. The Theory
of
Nonsense
Deleuze's
strategy
in his
theory
of sense so
far has been
to
elaborate a number of
dualities. The first duality,
and perhaps
the
most
fundamental, is
the
Stoic distinction
between
causes and effects, corporeal
`things'
and
incorporeal `events. ' Deleuze's
consideration of
the
proposition
leads
to the
next
duality. He
states
`... insofar
as
events-effects
do
not exist outside
the
propositions which express
them, this
duality
is
prolonged
in
the
duality
of
things
and propositions, of
bodies
and
language. '214
With Deleuze's
elaboration of
the
notion of sense we arrive at a
third
set of
dualities.
Although
sense
is described
as a
dimension
of
the
proposition and
`... does
not exist
outside of
the
proposition which expresses
it, it is
nevertheless
the
attribute of states
of affairs and not
the
attribute of
the
proposition.
The
event subsists
in language, but
it happens
to things.
'215 Subsequently,
a
duality is
to
be found in both
things
and
propositions:
On
the
side of
the thing, there
are physical qualities and real relations
which constitute
the
state of affairs;
there
are also
ideational logical
attributes which
indicate incorporeal
events.
And
on
the
side of
the
proposition,
there
are names and adjectives which
denote
the
state of
affairs; and also
there
are verbs which express events or
logical
attributes.
216
The
relation
between denotation
and expression
in
the
proposition
is
not simply one
between `names
of stasis and names of
becoming;
rather,
it is between
two
dimensions
of
the
proposition....
i217 Moving from denotation
to
expression
is
to
move
from
the
conditioned
to the
condition.
But Deleuze
argues
that this
condition
cannot
be in
the
`image'
of
the
conditioned and
is
of an entirely
different
nature;
it is
an
`unconditioned'
element.
Just
as
in Through
the
Looking-Glass Deleuze
states
`it
is like
the two
sides of a mirror, only what
is
on one side
has
no resemblance
to the
other....
'Z'
8
But
what
is
the
precise nature of
this
relation?
Deleuze
sketches out a
2'4
ibid,
p.
23
25
ibid,
p.
24
X16
ibid.
217
ibid,
p.
25
218
ibid.
77
first
explanation of
their
connection
through
an episode
from Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland
where
the
Mouse
tells
his
story:
"...
the
patriotic archbishop of
Canterbury found it
advisable,
" "Found
what?
"
asked
the
Duck. "Found it, "
the
Mouse
replied rather crossly:
"of
course you
know
what
`it'
means.
" "I know
what
`It'
means well enough,
when
I find
a
thing,
"
said
the
Duck: "it's
generally a
frog,
or a worm.
The
question
is,
what
did
the
archbishop
fmd?:
219
Deleuze interprets
this
passage
in
the
following
way:
the
duck
understands
the
word
`it'
as a general
term
of
denotation; for
the
mouse
however, `it'
refers
to the
sense of
a previous proposition.
Deleuze
states
`[t]he
equivocation of
"it" is
therefore
distributed in
accordance with
the
duality
of
denotation
and expression.
The
two
dimensions
of
the
proposition are organized
in
two
series which converge
asymptotically,
in
a
term
as ambiguous as
"it, "
since
they
meet one another only at
the
frontier
which
they
continually stretch.
'220 However, Deleuze
wants
to
use
it in
a
very specific way.
He
tells
us
`[t]hese
two
dimensions [denotation
and expression]
converge only
in
an esoteric word,
in
a non-identifiable aliquid
[something]
u'
The
use of
`esoteric'
words
in Lewis Carroll is
a subject we shall
turn to
shortly.
The first
thing
we must
determine is how
sense operates
in
these
dualities.
The dual
nature of
Sense
At
the
beginning
of
the
fifth
series
Deleuze
states:
Sense is
never only one of
the two terms
of
the
duality
which contrasts
things
and propositions, substantives and verbs,
denotations
and
expressions;
it is
also
the
frontier,
the
cutting edge, or
the
articulation
of
the
difference between
the two terms,
since
it has
at
its disposal
an
impenetrability
which
is its
own and within which
it is
reflected.
For
these
reasons, sense must
be develord for its
own sake
in
a new series of
paradoxes, which are now
internal.
2 2
219
Lewis Carroll (1994,
orig.
1865) Alice's Adventures
in Wonderland. London: Penguin,
p.
32
22"
Deleuze, Logic
of
Sense,
p.
26
22'
ibid.
"2
ibid,
p.
28
78
Deleuze develops his
notion of sense
through
four basic
paradoxes.
1) The
paradox of regress.
This
paradox concerns
the
impossibility
of saying
the
sense of
that
which
is
said.
In
order
to
speak of
this
sense we must produce
another sentence which
likewise does
not say
its
own sense.
Deleuze
says:
`... I
never
state
the
sense of what
I
am saying.
But
on
the
other
hand, I
can always
take the
sense
of what
I
say as
the
object of another proposition whose sense,
in
turn, I
cannot state.
I
thus
enter
into
the
infinite
regress of
that
which
is
presupposed.
'223 In
this
way
`one
is
established
"from
the
outset" within sense'
in
the things
we say.
Deleuze
notes
that
this
is Frege's
paradox.
If
a proposition
is denoted by
a name
(ni),
the
sense of
this
name
is denoted by
a second name
(n2),
the
sense of
the
second name
is denoted by
a
third name
(n3),
and so on
to
infinity. This
paradox
is
also
to
be found in Lewis
Carroll
in
many
different forms. Deleuze is
most
interested by
the
form
presented
in
the
announcement of
the title
of
the
Knight's
song
in Through
the
Looking Glass:
"The
name of
the
song
is
called
`Haddock's Eyes' " "Oh,
that's the
name
of
the
song,
is it? " Alice
said,
trying to
feel interested. "No,
you
don't
understand,
"
the
Knight
said,
looking
a
little
vexed.
"That's
what
the
name of
the
song
is
called.
The
name really
is `The Aged Aged Man. ' "
"Then I
ought
to
have
said
`That's
what
the
song
is
called'?
" Alice
corrected
herself. "No,
you oughtn't:
that's
quite another
thing! The
song
is
called
`Ways
and
Means': but
that's
only what
it's
called, you
know! "
"Well,
what
is the
song
then?
"
said
Alice,
who was
by
this time
completely
bewildered. "I
was coming
to that,
"
the
Knight
said.
"The
song really
is `A-sitting
on a
Gate!... "224
This
passage
presents us with
four
names:
nI:
The
song
is `A-sitting
on a gate.
'
n2:
The
song
is
called
`Ways
and
Means. '
n3:
The
name of
the
song
is `The Aged Aged Man. '
n4:
The
name of
the
song
is
called
`Haddock's Eyes. '
Deleuze tells
of
the
development in
this
regress of naming:
223
ibid.
224
Lewis Carroll (1994,
orig.
1872) Through
the Looking
Glass. London: Penguin,
pp.
137-8
79
...
there
is
the
name of what
the
song really
is [n1];
the
name
denoting
this
reality, which
thus
denotes
the
song or represents what
the
song
is
called
[n2]; the
sense of
this
name, which
forms
a new name or a new reality
[n3];
and
the
name which
denotes
this
reality, which
thus
denotes
the
sense of
the
name of
the
song, or represents what
the
song
is
called
[n4],
225
Deleuze
notes
two things
here. Firstly,
although
Carroll
presents us with only a
finite
regress
this
is
perhaps arbitrary
because
this
regress could
be
carried on
(the
name of
the
name of
the
song, etc.
). Secondly,
this
regress
is different in
nature
from
the
strict
n1, n2,
...,
nfl paradox
in
that
Carroll
presents us with a progression of
`couplets. ' In
the
strict sense only n2
(the denotation
of
the
song) and na
(the
name of
the
sense of
that
denotation)
conform
to the
paradox.
Deleuze
argues
that
n, and n3
form
part of a
different
series
in
that
with n, we
have
the
song
(the
thing
itself)
as a name and n3
takes the
second name as a
thing
itself.
226
Deleuze
continues:
`Carroll forms
therefore
the
regress with
four
nominal entities which are
displaced
ad
infinitum. That is
to
say,
he decomposes
each couplet and
freezes it, in
order
to
draw from it
a
supplementary
couplet.
j227 This
strategy of
`freezing'
is developed further in
Deleuze's
second paradox of sense.
2) The
paradox of sterile
division. Deleuze
states
`[t]here is indeed
a way of
avoiding
this
infinite
regress.
It is
to
fix
the
proposition,
to
immobilize it, just long
enough
to
extract
from it its
sense
-
the thin
film
at
the
limit
of
things
and
words.
'228 This
theoretical
operation
is
perhaps central
to
Deleuze's
theory
of sense.
He describes this
process as akin
to the
breaking
open of a
Moebius
strip
to
reveal
the
dimension
of sense within.
In
this `unfolded'
state sense,
like
the
Stoic
incorporeals
is
sterile;
it
neither acts nor
is
acted upon.
For Deleuze
sense as
extracted
from denotation has
no relation
to truth.
It is
simply expressed
by
the
infinitive
verb.
This leads
to the third
paradox.
3) The
paradox of neutrality.
Deleuze
specifies
that
`if
sense as
the
double
of
the
proposition
is indifferent
to
affirmation and negation,
if it is
no more passive
than
"s
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
30
226
That is,
the
form
of each couplet
is [thing
-
sense] or more precisely
[thing (sense)
-
sense
(thing)].
221
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
30
2n
ibid,
p.
31
80
active,
then
no mode of
the
proposition
is
able
to
affect
it. '229 Deleuze's
notion of
sense
is
neutral.
From
the
point of view of quality contrary statements such as
`God
is'
or
`God is
not'
have
the
same sense
in
that
sense
has
nothing
to
do
with actual
existence
(denotation). We have
already encountered
how
neutrality operates
in
terms
of relations:
becoming larger
or smaller operates along
the
same axis
that
produces a
double
sense at
the
same
time.
Or
as
Deleuze
tells
us:
`five
nights are
five
times
hotter than
a single one,
"but
they
must
be five
times
as cold
for
the
same reason.
9t9230
But if
sense
has
no relation
to
existence
then
what
is its
relation
to
modality
in
general?
Deleuze
states:
`[t]he
event,
for its
part, must
have
one and
the
same
modality,
in both future
and past,
in line
with which
it divides its
presence ad
infinitum. If
the
event
is
possible
in
the
future
and real
in
the
past,
it is
necessary
that
it be both
at once....
'231 The
question
here is
one of whether sense or
the
event
is
necessary.
But
as
Deleuze
points out
`[t]he hypothesis
of necessity
...
rests on
the
application
of
the
principle of contradiction
to the
proposition which announces a
future. '232 He
continues:
`... the
principle of contradiction concerns
the
impossibility
of
the
realization
of
denotation
and, also,
the
minimal condition of signification.
'233
That is,
this
involves
a condition of possibility which
Deleuze has
already attributed
to the
operation of signification.
He
posits
that
sense or
the
event
is
of another order:
`...
neither possible, nor real, nor necessary.
'234 This idea becomes
clearer when we
turn to the
fourth
paradox of sense.
4) The
paradox of
the
absurd, or of
impossible
objects.
The
paradox we
face
here is
that
`the
propositions which
designate
contradictory
objects
themselves
have
a
sense.
9235 This
concerns contradictory notions such as square circles or matter
without extension.
With
these things
we
find
that
`[t]heir
denotation
...
cannot at all
be fulfilled;
nor
do
they
have
a signification, which would
define
the type
of
possibility
for
such a
fulfilment. '236 It is in
this
way
that these
notions are absurd
although
they
are not nonsense
in
that they
do have
a sense.
In defining
this
sense
229
ibid,
p.
32
o
ibid,
p.
3
231
bid,
p.
33
232
bid.
733
ibid,
p.
34
234
ibid.
235
ibid,
p.
35
236
ibid.
81
Deleuze
states:
If
we
distinguish
two
sorts of
beings,
the
being
of
the
real as
the
matter of
denotation
and
the
being
of
the
possible as
the
form
of significations, we
must yet add
this
extra-being which
defines
a minimum common
to the
real,
the
possible and
the
impossible. For
the
principle of contradiction
is
applied
to the
possible and
to the
real,
but
not
to the
impossible.
237
To
say
that
sense or
the
event
is in
some way
impossible
means
for Deleuze
that
there
is
an
`excess'
of sense or
the
event
that
is `unable to
be
realized
in
a state of
affairs.
'238 This
phenomenon
is
what
Deleuze
will
later
call
the
eventum
tantum.
239
The
notion of an
`excess' is developed further in
the
sixth series.
For Deleuze's
method
the
paradox of
infinite
regress, or more precisely,
Carroll's
derivation
of
it is
the
most
important. The
series of regress
that
is
provided
by
the
`straight'
paradox gives us a
homogeneous
series of
terms
(nj,
n2, n3,
...,
nn).
Here
we
have
a synthesis of
the
homogeneous in
that
each successive
term
is
superior
to the
previous one and supersedes
it. However, Carroll's derivation
provides us with a
different
form
of series.
In
this
case
two
heterogeneous
series are produced
in
that
an
object
is
taken
in its
sense which
is
then
itself
taken
as an object.
This
gives us
two
simultaneous
series of
terms:
object of sense
(n1,
n3, n5,
...
),
sense of object
(n2,
n4,
n6,
...
). In this
way sense
is
presented
twice,
as
Deleuze
says:
`it is
presented once
in
the
proposition
in
which
it
subsists, and again
in
the
state of affairs where
it
crops up
at
the
surface.
9240 This brings
us
back
to the
paradoxes of
duality. We have
already
seen
that a
duality
exists
between
things
and propositions, states of affairs and events,
denotations
and expressions.
The
question
that
Deleuze
now poses
is
what
is
the
relation
between the
heterogeneous
and
the
homogeneous forms
of series?
From
one
point of view
the
homogeneous form
subsumes
the two
heterogeneous
series under
it.
However,
if
we
take two
homogenous
series
(such
as
two
series of events or
things
or
expressions,
etc.
) do
they
have
a relation
to the
heterogeneous form
or are
they
23'
ibid.
238
ibid.
239
ibid,
p.
151
20
ibid,
p.
34
82
simply arbitrary?
To
tackle this
Deleuze draws
a
distinction from
the
original
dualities
and
defines
two
new
terms:
The law
governing
two
simultaneous series
is
that they
are never equal.
One
represents
the
signifier,
the
other
the
signified
[... ] We
call
"signifier"
any sign which presents
in itself
an aspect of sense; we call
"signified, "
on
the
contrary,
that
which serves as
the
correlative to this
aspect of sense,
that
is,
that
which
is defined in
a
duality
relative
to this
aspect.
What is
signified
therefore
is
never sense
itself [... ] Thus,
the
signifier
is
primarily
the
event as
the
ideal logical
attribute of a state of
affairs, and
the
signified
is
the
state of affairs
together
with
its
qualities
and real relations.
24'
Here
we see
the
influence
of
Jacques Lacan
on
Deleuze's
thought
for he is
utilizing
the
Lacanian idea
that the
signified
is
an essential
lack (in
this
case, of sense) while
the
signifier
is
the
excess
to
cover
this
lack. However,
as we shall soon see,
Deleuze
uses
this
idea in
a novel
fashion. Deleuze's
present strategy
is
to
apply
the
signifier/signified
distinction
to the
homogeneous form
of series.
In
this task
Deleuze
draws
our attention
to
Edgar Allan Poe's
short story
The Purloined Letter.
242
This
story presents us with
two
series which
Deleuze
summarizes as
follows:
First
series:
the
king
who
does
not see
the
compromising
letter
received
by his
wife;
the
queen who
is
relieved
to
have hidden it
so cleverly
by
leaving it
out
in
the
open;
the
minister who sees everything and
takes
possession of
the
letter. Second
series:
the
police who
find
nothing at
the
minister's
hotel;
the
minister who
thought
of
leaving
the
letter in
the
open
in
order
better
to
hide it; Dupin
who sees everything and
takes back
possession of
the
letter.
243
With
reference
to this
story
Deleuze identifies
three
basic
characteristics
of
the
homogeneous form
of series.
First,
there
is
a
displacement between
the two
series:
the
minister who steals
the
letter in
the
first
series
has
the
letter
stolen
from him in
the
second series;
the
minister
realizes the
obfuscation
in
the
first
series while
Dupin
does
so
in
the
second, etc.
In
this Deleuze
says
there
is `...
a
double
sliding of one
series over or under
the
other, which constitutes
both, in
a perpetual
disequilibrium
"
ibid,
pp.
37-38
242
Edgar Allan Poe (1994) Selected
Tales. London:
Penguin,
pp.
337-356
243
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
38
83
vis--vis each other.
'244 Secondly, Deleuze
argues
that
`this disequilibrium
must
itself
be
oriented.
'245 This
orientation
is
provided
by
the
signifier/signified relationship.
The
signifying series presents us with an excess of meaning over
the
signified series.
In
the
story
the
second series
is
the
signifying series
in
that
it is Dupin
who resolves
the
puzzle of
the
purloined
letter
and gives meaning
to the
story.
Through
this
Deleuze
argues
that two
seemingly
homogeneous
series are
in fact determined
as
heterogeneous
through the
signifier/signified relation.
The
third
and most
important
characteristic of series
is
what
Deleuze
calls
the
`paradoxical
entity.
' This
entity
`...
ensures
the
relative
displacement
of
the two
series,
the
excess of one over
the
other, without
being
reducible
to
any of
the terms
of
the
series or any relation
between
these terms.
1,246 In Poe's
story
this
role
is
played
by
the
letter. It
positions all
the
characters
in both
series and orders
their
respective signifier/signified
relationship.
In
this task the
paradoxical entity
has
particular characteristics of
its
own:
`It
circulates without end
in both
series and,
for
this
reason, assures
their
communication.
It is
a
two-sided
entity, equally present
in
the
signifying and
the
signified series.
It is
the
mirror.
Thus, it is
at once word and
thing,
name and object,
sense and
denotatum,
expression and
designation,
etc.
'247 In
order
for
the
paradoxical
entity
to
circulate
in
the two
series
`it behooves it
...
to
be in
excess
in
the
one series
which
it
constitutes as signifying, and
lacking in
the
other which
it
constitutes as
signified: split apart,
incomplete by
nature or
in
relation
to
itself. Its
excess always
refers
to
its
own
lack,
and conversely,
its lack
always refers
to
its
excess.
5248 For
Deleuze, this
relation of excess/lack operates
in
an almost contradictory
fashion. He
finds its
principle
in
an episode
from Through
the
Looking Glass
when
Alice is in
the
Sheep's
shop.
Here,
when
Alice looks
at any shelf
it
always seems
to
be
empty while
all
the
other shelves are as
full
as possible.
Deleuze
tells
us
`...
that
which
is in
excess
in
one case
is
nothing
but
an extremely mobile emptyplace; and
that
which
is lacking
in
another case
is
a rapidly moving object, an occupant without a place always
Z"
ibid,
p.
40
245
ibid.
2A6
ibid.
247
ibid.
248
ibid,
p.
40
84
supernumerary
and
displaced-'249 When
we apply
this
characteristic of
the
paradoxical entity
to the
signifying/signified series we
find
that
what circulates
in
the
signifying series
is
an
`empty
place without a word' while
in
the
signified series we
have
an
`object
without a place.
' The
notion of an
`object
without a place'
is
perhaps
easy
to
understand as we see
it in
the
form
of
Poe's letter;
a
letter
without a place,
but
what
is
the
correlative
`place
without word' or what
Deleuze
calls a
`blank
word'?
We find
that this
blank
word
is denoted by `esoteric'
words.
Deleuze
elaborates
Carroll's
use of esoteric words
in
the
seventh series of
The Logic
of
Sense.
The
esoteric word
Carroll
uses esoteric words and paradoxical entities
in
general
to
construct a number
of
different kinds
of series.
Deleuze identifies
one
kind
of series as
`two
series of
propositions
(or
rather
...
one series of pure expressions and one series of
denotations)
...
regulated
by
means of an esoteric Word.
9250 Deleuze
tells
us
here
we
find
the
esoteric word
falls into
two
different
types.
First,
there
are
`contracting'
words such as
`y'reince' in Sylvie
and
Bruno
which stands
for `your
royal
Highness. '
Deleuze
states
`[t]his
contraction aims at
the
extraction of
the
global sense of
the
entire proposition
in
order
to
name
it
with a single syllable
-
or an
"Unpronounceable
Monosyllable, "'251 We
should note
that this
operation only comes
to
bear
on
the
signifying series of
the
paradoxical entity.
The
word
`y'reince' is
the
denotation
of
the
blank
word.
These
words
`perform
a synthesis of succession over a single series'
and
Deleuze
calls
this
operation
'connection. '252 Second,
there
are
`circulating'
words.
These
approximate closest
to the
paradoxical entity
described
previously.
We
find
them
in
words such as
`Snark' (from The Hunting
of
the
Shark), `Phlizz' (from
Sylvie
and
Bruno)
or
the
Mouse's `it. ' These
words
denote
the
blank
word
in
the
signifying series while are absent objects
in
the
signified series
-
the
Snark is
an
invisible
animal,
the
Phlizz is
a
fruit
without
taste,
and
for
the
duck `it' is
a
term
without
denotation. These
words
`perform
a synthesis of coexistence and
249
ibid.
u0
ibid,
p.
43
251
ibid.
252
ibid,
p.
47
85
coordination
between
two
heterogeneous
series' and
Deleuze
calls
this
operation
`conjunction. '
253
Another formation
of series
to
be found in Lewis Carroll
concerns
`...
greatly
ramified series
being
regulated
by
portmanteau words....
'2M Portmanteau
words are
esoteric words of a
third
kind. They denote
the
`disjunction'
of series.
Examples
of
this
operation are provided
in
the
preface of
Carroll's The Hunting
of
the
Shark:
Supposing that,
when
Pistol
uttered
the
well-known words
"under
which
king, Bezonian? Speak
or
die! " Justice Shallow had felt
certain
that
it
was either
William
or
Richard, but had
not
been
able
to
settle which, so
that
he
could not possibly say either name
before
the
other, can
it be
doubted
that,
rather
than
die, he
would
have
gasped out
"Rilchiam! "255
The
name
`Rilchiam' is
the
contraction of
Richard
and
William
and as such
denotes
the two
series
in
a portmanteau word
(unlike
connecting words which
just
contract a
single series).
However,
the
situation
is
more complex
than this
when we consider a
portmanteau word such as
`frumious' (fuming
and
furious). Carroll
states:
`If
your
thoughts
incline
ever so
little
towards `fuming, '
you will say
`fuming-furious; if
they
turn,
even
by
a
hair's breadth,
towards `furious, '
you will say
`furious-fuming'; but if
you
have
that
rarest of gifts, a perfectly
balanced
mind, you will say
`frumious. "256
And Deleuze
comments
`...
the
necessary
disjunction is
not
between fuming
and
furious, for
one may
indeed be both
at once; rather,
it is between fuming-and-furious
on one and
furious-and-fuming
on
the
other.
'257 In
principle
the
ramification of series
occurs
from
within
the
series
itself
and
the
disjunctive
word co-ordinates
this
divergence. Deleuze
tells
us
that
with
disjunctive
words we come
to
a
different
order
of esoteric words.
This is because
while connecting and conjunctive words
denote
aspects of
the
paradoxical entity
(blank
word/invisible object),
the
portmanteau
word
denotes
the
esoteric word
itself: it
names
the
divergence
of series
in
a new use of
connection and conjunction.
233
ibid.
u4
ibid,
p.
44
255
Lewis Carroll (1939) The Complete
Works
of
Lewis Carroll. London: Nonesuch Press,
p.
678
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
46
237
ibid.
86
The Theory
We have
reached a point where we may
turn to the
elaboration of
Deleuze's
theory
of
sense.
Conjunctive
words and
disjunctive
words present us with
two
special cases.
1) Conjunctive
words.
In
the
paradoxical entity
the
blank
word
denotes
the
object without place and
this
blank
word
is itself denoted by
a conjunctive word.
Deleuze
states:
...
both the
blank
word
denoting it [the
object without place] and
the
esoteric word
denoting
the
blank
word
have
the
function
to
express
the
thing.
It is
a word
that
denotes
exactly what
it
expresses and expresses
what
it denotes. It
expresses
its denotatum
and
designates its
own sense.
It
says something,
but
at
the
same
time
it
says
the
sense of what
it
says:
it
says
its
own sense.
It is
therefore
completely abnormal
[... ] The
name
saying
its
own sense can only
be
nonsense
(N).
258
We
may
find
this
principle of nonsense
in
the
mouse's
`it. ' Deleuze has
previously
specified
that this
`it' lacks denotation. However, it is
precisely
because `it' has
no
denotation that
it is
capable of engendering all possible
denotation. In
the
paradox of
infinite
regress
the
sense of each
term
is denoted by
another
term
but
a
term that
designates its
own
denotation `says its
own sense.
' In
this
way
the term
effectively
expresses
a
`non-sense. ' We
shall see shortly what
this
word entails
for Deleuze.
2) Disjunctive
words.
The
portmanteau word presents us with
two
alternate
terms
such as
fuming-furious
or
furious-fuming. However,
under
the
form
of
the
portmanteau
word
(frumious)
that
which
is
expressed
in
one
term
is
the
same as
that
which
is denoted by
the
other.
That is,
the
portmanteau word also expresses
its
own
sense and
is hence `non-sense. ' So
we see
that
`non-sense'
also
`... has
two
sides, one
corresponding
to the
regressive synthesis,
the
other
to the
disjunctive
synthesis.
'259
Deleuze's
notion of sense
is
essentially a structuralist notion and our
description
of
the
Mouse's `it'
requires clarification
from
this
perspective.
As Deleuze
says:
258
ibid,
p.
67
259
ibid.
87
The
play on words would
be
to
say
that
nonsense
has
a sense,
the
sense
being
precisely
that
it hasn't
any.
This is
not our
hypothesis
at all.
When
we assume
that
nonsense says
its
own sense, we wish
to
indicate,
on
the
contrary,
that
sense and nonsense
have
a specific relation which can not
copy
that
of
the true
and
false,
that
is,
which can not
be
conceived simply
on
the
basis
of a relation of exclusion
[... ] The logic
of sense
is
necessarily
determined
to
posit
between
sense and nonsense an original
type
of
intrinsic
relation, a mode of co-presence
260
Deleuze's
hypothesis is
that
`...
nonsense
does
not
have
any particular sense,
but is
opposed
to the
absence of sense rather
than to the
sense
that
it
produces
in
excess.
1261
From this
point of view nonsense
has
a certain value within a structure even
if
this
value
is
zero
-
Deleuze
compares nonsense
to
Jakobson's `phoneme
zero' which
determines
phonetic value
from
a zero point within
the
structure.
262
In
effect,
nonsense
is
the
empty place or
blank
word within series and as such
has
a special
function
within a structure:
Inside the
series, each
term
has
sense only
by
virtue of
its
position
relative
to
every other
term.
But
this
relative position
itself depends
on
the
absolute position of each
term
relative
to the
instance=x [paradoxical
entity].
The latter is determined
as nonsense and circulates endlessly
throughout the
series.
Sense is
actually produced
by
this
circulation as
sense which affects
both
the
signifier and
the
signified.
In
short, sense
is
always an effect.
263
This is
to
say
that
sense
is
the
effect of a structure, as
Deleuze
tells
us
`[s]tructure is
'2
in fact
a machine
for
the
production of
incorporeal
sense....
M
Now how
are we
to
evaluate
Deleuze's
notion of sense?
We have
already
drawn
out
the
distinction between
the
Stoic `something'
and
`not
something.
' A
something
is
always a particular something while a not-something
is
simply a
conception.
We have
seen
that
Deleuze's
notion of sense
is
neutral or sterile
in
relation
to the
proposition:
`It is indifferent
to the
universal and
to the
singular,
to the
general and
to the
particular,
to the
personal and
to the
collective;
it is
also
indifferent
7b0
ibid,
p.
68
261
ibid,
p.
71
262
ibid.
263
ibid,
p.
70
2"
ibid,
p.
71
88
to
affirmation and negation, etc.
In
short,
it is indifferent
to
all opposites.
'265 From
this
perspective
Deleuzian
sense would appear
to
have
the
value of a not-something.
In describing
the
neutrality of sense
Deleuze
quotes
from Husserl's Ideas 1: `the
stratum of expression
-
and
this
constitutes
its
peculiarity
-
apart
from
the
fact
that
it
lends
expression
to
all other
intentionalities, is
not productive.
Or if
one prefers:
its
productivity,
its
noematic service, exhausts
itself in
expressing.
9266 However does
this
mean
that
it
completely
disappears
or
that
it is left
as a
dead
matter on
the
transcendental
field,
extraneous
to
its
purpose?
As Baudrillard
will say:
`Disappearance
is
something completely
different from death. Dying doesn't do
any
good.
You
still
have
to
disappear.,
267
To investigate
this
we will
turn
in
the
final
section
to
Deleuze's
use of structure.
2
ibid,
p.
35
266
Quoted in Deleuze, ibid,
p.
152
267
Baudri11ard, Forget Foucault,
p.
21
89
4. The Structure
of
the
Event
Our
use of
the term
`structure' in
understanding
Deleuze's
theory
of sense or
the
event
falls into
two
not necessarily exclusive categories.
First,
there
is
the
structure
in
terms of
Deleuze's
use of structuralism.
Although Deleuze
will
later
reject
the
explicit structuralist elements of
the
Logic
of
Sense
we still
find features
of
this
event
(the
excess of
the
event,
the
eventum
tantum)
present
in his later
work.
Although
these
concepts
have been
reworked we still
find
the
common element of
the
transcendental
field,
that
is
the
moment of anti-production.
What is
this
second
meaning of structure presupposed
by
the transcendental
field? Structure is
perhaps
the
wrong
term
here for
what
is
at stake
is
a certain order or ordering.
The
way
in
which
the transcendental
field is determined
through
Deleuze's
theory
of sense
in
not
insignificant. Our
critique of
Deleuze's
theory
of sense
has
relied on
the
Stoic
distinction
of something
(bodies
and
incorporeals) from
not-something.
Deleuze
extracts
the
stratum of sense
from
the
proposition which
he
then
sets up as
the
transcendental
field
of
bodies/incorporeals. We have
argued
that this
notion of sense
is
a not-something and
fu
thermore,
as a production,
it does
not
lead
us
back
to
bodies/incorporeals
but
creates
its
own production of
them.
That is, Deleuze has
produced a
'not-something'
theory
of
bodies/incorporeals. To investigate
this
we will
analyse
three
related
topics:
Deleuze's
explicit structuralism,
Deleuze's Stoic inspired
development
of structuralism, and
the
order of
the transcendental
field.
Deleuze's
essay
`How do
we recognize structuralism?
'
originally published
in
1967 is both
a
historically interesting
and complex piece.
268
Written
at a
time
before
the term
`structuralism' became
a
defined
movement
Deleuze
provides us with what
Charles Stivale (the
translator
of
this
essay
into English)
calls
`an idiosyncratic
conceptualisation
of
"structuralism. "'269 Our interest in
this
essay
lies in
that
in
Deleuze's
version of structuralism
we
find
the
initial
roots of what will
become his
`transcendental
empiricism' of
Difference
and
Repetition
and
the theory
of
the
event
in The Logic
of
Sense. Let
us consider
the
following
passage:
2"
Gilles Deleuze (1998,
orig.
1967) `How do
we recognise
Structuralism? '
trans.
in Charles Stivale,
The
two-fold thought of
Deleuze
and
Guattari:
intersections
and animations.
New York: Guildford
Press,
pp.
258-82
269
Stivale (1998),
p.
251
90
The
elements of a structure
have
neither extrinsic
designation
nor
intrinsic
signification.
Then
what
is left? As Levi-Strauss
recalls
rigorously,
they
have
nothing other
than
a sense: a sense
that
is
necessarily and uniquely
"positional. " It is
not a matter of a
location in
a
real spatial expanse, nor of sites
in imaginary
extensions,
but
rather of
places and sites
in
a properly structural space,
that
is,
a
topological
space.
Space is
what
is
structural,
but
an unextended, preextensive space, pure
spatium constituted
bit by bit
as an order of proximity,
in
which
the
notion of proximity
first
of all
has
precisely an ordinal sense and not a
signification
in
extension.
27
We have
already seen
in
our study of
the
Logic
of
Sense how
sense
is
treated
as an
effect.
In `How do
we recognize structuralism?
' Deleuze
tells
us
`...
sense
is
always a
result, an effect: not merely an effect
like
a product,
but
an optical effect, a
language
effect, a positional effect.
1271 And
this
notion of sense
is
reiterated
in The Logic
of
Sense: '... [sense is]
a surface effect, a position effect and a
language
effect.
9272
Through the
development
of
the
Logic
of
Sense
we
find
that
sense
is
primarily
the
effect of
bodies
and secondly
the
effect of
the
paradoxical entity
(nonsense).
However, the
paradoxical entity
is
not a cause
in itself in
that
it is
part of
the
signifier/signified system;
it is
a quasi-cause
in
relation
to the
system.
In
this
way
sense
is itself
a quasi-effect or quasi-product.
As
a preliminary remark we must note
that
a certain physics
is
at work
here,
as
Deleuze himself
says:
...
the
requirement of a
double
causality
is
manifest, even
from
the
point
of view of a pure physics of surfaces.
The
events of a
liquid
surface refer
to the
inter-molecular
modifications on which
they
depend
as
their
real
cause,
but
also
to the
variations of a surface
tension
on which
they
depend
as
their
(ideational
or
"fictive")
quasi-cause.
273
Further
on
Deleuze
states:
...
to the
physics of surfaces a metaphysical surface necessarily
corresponds.
Metaphysical
surface
(transcendental field) is
the
name
that
270
De1euze, `How do
we recognise
Structuralism?,
p.
262
271
ibid,
p.
263
272
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
70
273
ibid,
pp.
94-5
91
will
be
given
to the
frontier
established, on one
hand, between bodies
taken together
as a whole and
inside
the
limits
which envelop
them,
and
on
the
other, propositions
in
general.
274
What is
the
demarcation between
physics and metaphysics at work
here? To
some
extent
Michel Foucault
seems
to
capture
this
point.
In Foucault's `Theatrum
Philosophicum, '
a commentary on
Difference
and
Repetition
and
The Logic
of
Sense,
he
states:
...
The Logic
of
Sense
should
be
read as
the
boldest
and most
insolent
of
metaphysical
treatises
-
on
the
basic
condition
that
instead
of
denouncing
metaphysics as
the
neglect of
being,
we
force it
to
speak of extra-being.
Physics: discourse dealing
with
the
ideal
structure of
bodies,
mixtures,
reactions,
internal
and external mechanisms; metaphysics:
discourse
dealing
with
the
materiality of
incorporeal
things
-
phantasms,
idols,
and
simulacra.
[... ] Physics
concerns causes,
but
events, which arise as
its
effects, no
longer belong
to
it. Let
us
imagine
a stitched causality: as
bodies
collide, mingle, and suffer,
they
create events on
their
surfaces,
events
that
are without
thickness,
mixture, or passion;
for
this
reason,
they
can no
longer be
causes.
They form,
among
themselves,
another
kind
of succession whose
links derive from
a quasi-physics of
incorporeals
-
in
short,
from
metaphysics.
275
This is
a peculiar situation.
Deleuze's distinctions
are
based
on
Stoic
physics
but
this
physics
is itself
not
devoid
of metaphysical notions,
that
is,
of cause and effect.
Here
cause and effect may
define
two
different
orders
but
there
is
still a primary causality
that
constitutes
the
`surface'
of effects
('there is
...
an entire physics of surfaces as
the
effect of
deep
mixtures').
276
Moreover, if
our sense of
the
world
is derived from
the
paradoxical entity,
that
is,
the
quasi-cause, and
let
us remember
this
brings
about
`the
reversal of cause and effect,
'
then
would not such a notion problematise
the
very
idea
of cause and effect?
Here
we
find
a central
tension
in The Logic
of
Sense:
metaphysics
defines
the transcendental field
of a physics of surfaces
but
the
transcendental
field itself
requires a general physics.
The
question remains of
how
this
structural or
topological
space
is determined in
the
first
place.
We
shall soon see
274
ibid,
p.
125
275
Michel Foucault (1977) `Theatrum Philosophicum,
'
chapter
in Language, Counter-Memory,
Practice: Selected Essays
and
Interviews,
trans D. F. Bouchard. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
pp.
172-3
276
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
125

92
that
Deleuze's
answer
to this
lies in his
reading of
the
Stoic incorporeals. Before
we
can move onto
this
we need
to
determine
the
general organization of
the
transcendental
field.
Let
us
first
turn to
Deleuze's definition
of a structure
in The Logic
of
Sense.
First, there
must
be
two
heterogeneous
series one of which
is
signifying and
the
other
signified.
As
we
have
seen previously
the
signifying series
is
characterized
by
the
excess of a place without object while
the
signified series
is
characterized
by
the
lack
of a place
for
an object
(here Deleuze is
using
the
disjunction
of void and place).
Second,
each series consists of
terms
which are related
differentially
to
each other.
In
`How do
we recognize structuralism?
'
and
Difference
and
Repetition Deleuze
explains
this
explicitly
in
terms
of
differential
calculus.
In
the
former
text
we are
told
this
relationship
...
is
established
between
elements
that
have
no
determined
value
themselves,
and
that
nevertheless
determine
each other reciprocally
in
the
relation:
thus
yd.
+
xdx =
0,
or
dy/dx
=
-x/y.
Such
relationships are
symbolic, and
the
corresponding elements are
held in
a
differential
relationship.
Dy is
totally
undetermined
in
relation
to
y,
dc is
totally
undetermined
in
relation
to
x: each one
has
neither existence, nor value,
nor signification.
And
yet
the
relation
dy/dx is
totally
determined,
the two
elements
determine
each other reciprocally
in
the
relation.
277
This differential
nature
leads Deleuze
to
a correlative
feature
of
the
structure.
He
posits
that
corresponding to these
differentials
are very particular events or
`singularities. ' Again Deleuze
alludes
to
differential
calculus
to
explain
this
and once
again
this
reference
is
most explicit
in `How do
we recognize structuralism?
'
Corresponding
to the
determination
of
differential
relations are
singularities,
distributions
of singular points
that
characterize curves or
figures (a
triangle,
for
example,
has
three
singular points)
[... ] Every
structure presents
the
following
two
aspects: a system of
differential
relations according
to
which
the
symbolic elements
determine
themselves
reciprocally, and a system of singularities corresponding to these
relations and
tracing the
space of
the
structure.
277
Jleuze, `How do
we recognise
Structuralism?
'
p.
265
93
In
a
footnote in The Logic
of
Sense Deleuze
reminds us
that to
begin
with
he defined
sense and
the
event as neutral
to
all modes of
the
proposition.
But
now
he
states
that
the
event
is
singular
to the
extent
that
it is `punctual. ' That is,
events are
defined
as
positional within a structure.
278
This involves
a certain
temporal
formation
of
the
topological
surface.
We have
already encountered
this
notion of
time
earlier
in
the
form
of a pure
becoming
where
`each
present
is divided into
past and
future,
ad
infinitum. '279 Here
we
find Deleuze's
employment of
the
Stoic incorporeals. On
the
surface organization of events
Deleuze
tells
us:
Each
event
is
the
smallest
time,
smaller
than the
minimum of continuous
thinkable time,
because it is divided into
proximate past and
imminent
future [Chronos]. But it is
also
the
longest
time,
longer
than the
maximum of continuous thinkable time,
because it is
endlessly
subdivided
by
the Aion
which renders
it
equal
to
its
own unlimited
line
[... ] This is
the
secret of
the
event:
it
exists on
the
line
of
Aion,
and yet
it
does
not
fill it. How
could an
incorporeal fill
up
the
incorporeal
...
?
280
But
which
incorporeals
are
being
used
here? Deleuze
states
that `the
event
is
the
identity
of
form
and void.
281
Events `communicate in
the
void which constitutes
their
substance.
'282 The
event
is
the
place of a
temporal
becoming in
the
void.
However,
this
is
a conflation of a
differential
and unidirectional unilateral
logic.
That is
to
say a unilateral operation
is being
made on
the transcendental field itself.
The transcendental
field
of singularities
can
but be
a not-something.
But
what
is left
of
its
organizing principle?
For
this
purpose we must
turn
back
to the
nature of
singularity.
What is
a
Sinaularity?
Deleuze
tells
us
that they
are special or
`sensitive'
points:
`Singularities
are
turning
points and points of
inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers,
and centers; points of
fusion,
condensation, and
boiling;
points of
tears
and
joy,
sickness and
health, hope
279
De1euze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
339n. 1
279
ibid,
p.
62
20
ibid,
pp.
63-4
281
ibid.
p.
136
282
ibid,
paraphrased
94
and anxiety....
'283 They
are
ideal in
relation
to the
world:
`[t]he distinction
...
is
between
the
event, which
is ideal by
nature, and
its
spatio-temporal realization
in
a
state of affairs
.
"284 To
provide an example we may consider
Poe's `The Purloined
Letter'
once again.
Here
we
find
three
singularities: concealing a
letter,
not
discovering the
letter,
and
finding
the
letter. These
singularities are
in
turn
expressed
through the
characters which may
be
considered
the
differential
points of
the
structure;
in
the
first
series queen-king-minister and
in
the
second series, minister-
police-Dupin.
As
we
have
seen previously,
this
whole structure
is
organized
in
terms
of
the
paradoxical entity
(in
this
case,
the
letter). The
paradoxical entity
is
the third
characteristic of a structure
in
general.
It is
an
`object=x'
which
is
mobile
in both
series
but
at
the
same
time
fixes
the
elements of
both
series
in
an absolute
`distance'
from itself. That is, it is
their
`differentiator. ' However, this
is just
one aspect of
its
role.
When
the
paradoxical entity
is
considered
from
the
point of view of
the
quasi-
cause
it has
a productive role
in
terms
of
the
`actualisation'
or
`realization'
of
singularities.
Deleuze draws
on
the
psycho-biologist
Gilbert Simondon
to
argue
that
singularities
have
a potential energy
in
relation
to the
quasi-cause whereupon
they
are
held in
a metastable state.
285
As Deleuze
tells
us about
this
surface
topology:
`Being
a
pure effect,
it is
nevertheless
the
locus
of a quasi-cause, since a surface energy,
without even
being
of
the
surface,
is due
to every surface
formation;
and
from it
a
fictitious
surface
tension
arises as a
force
exerting
itself
on
the
plane of
the
surface.
'286 Accordingly,
singularities are actualised
in
a state of affairs
in
a process
based
on
integral
calculus.
As
we are
told
in `How do
we recognize structuralism?
':
We
must
...
distinguish between
the total
structure of a
domain
as an
ensemble of virtual coexistence, and
the
substructures
that
correspond
to
diverse
actualisation
in
the
domain. Of
the
structure as virtuality, we
must say
that
it is
still undifferenciated, even
though
it is
totally
and
completely
differentiated. Of
structures
that
are embodied
in
a particular
actual
form (present
or past), we must say
that they
are
differenciated,
and
that
for
them to
be
actualised
is
precisely
to
be differenciated. The
structure
is inseparable from
this
double
aspect, or
from
this
complex
that
283
ibid,
p.
52
'B4
ibid,
p.
53
295
ibid,
p.
103
286
ibid,
pp.
124-5
95
one can
designate
under
the
name
different/ciation....
287
Differenciation involves
a
localized integration
of
the
structure,
that
is,
an
integration
within
limits. In
this
phenomenon we encounter
the
definitions
of problems and
solutions.
How
are we
to
determine
the
limits
within which something
is integrated?
To the
extent
that
mathematical problems provide certain conditions
for
the
finding
of solutions
Deleuze
considers
this
an essential part
for
the
understanding of
the
transcendental
field.
Problems
and
Solutions
Deleuze's theory
of problems and solutions
is derived from Henri Bergson
and
Albert Lautman. In Bergsonism Deleuze
takes the
following
quotation
from
Bergson's The Creative Mind:
The
truth
is
that
in
philosophy and even elsewhere
it is
a question of
finding
the
problem and consequently of positing
it,
even more
than
of
solving
it. For
a speculative problem
is
solved as soon as
it is
properly
stated
[... ] Already in
mathematics, and still more
in
metaphysics, the
effort of
invention
consists most often
in
raising
the
problem,
in
creating
the terms
in
which
it
will
be
stated.
The
stating and solving of
the
problem are
here
very close
to
being
equivalent:
The
truly
great problems
are set
forth
only when
they
are solved.
288
Commenting
on
this
Deleuze
says
`...
the
problem always
has
the
solution
it
deserves, in
terms
of
the
way
in
which
it is
stated
(i.
e.,
the
conditions under which
it
is determined
as a problem)....
'289 In The Logic
of
Sense Deleuze
applies
this
notion
to the
event:
`The
mode of
the
event
is
the
problematic.
One
must not say
that there
are problematic events,
but
that
events
bear
exclusively upon problems and
define
their
conditions.
1290 Here Deleuze draws
on
Lautman
to
argue
that
a problem
is
determined by
a set of singular points or events which provide us with
the
conditions
287
Deleuze, `How do
we recognise
Structuralism?
'
p.
268
Zag
Gilles Deleuze (1988
orig.
1966) Bergsonism,
trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam. New York:
Zone Books,
p. p.
15-16,
quotation of
Henri Bergson (1946
orig.
1941) The Creative Mind,
trans M. L.
Adison. New Jersey: Citadel Press,
pp.
58-9
Z"
Deleuze, Bergsonism,
p.
16
290
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
54
96
of
the
problem.
Deleuze
continues
`...
singularities preside over
the
genesis of
the
solutions of
the
equation.
Nonetheless, it is
still
the
case, as
Lautman
said,
that the
instance-problem
and
the
instance-solution differ in
nature
-
as
they
represent
respectively
the
ideal
event and
its
spatio-temporal realization.
'
291
Now
we must
turn
to the
issue
of
how
that
which
is
actualised
is determined
to
do
so.
For Deleuze
this
process
is
regulated
by
the
paradoxical entity.
The
paradoxical entity
defines `the
locus
of a question'
in
which
the
field
of problems
is distributed.
292
As
such all
events communicate
in
a single
Event
that
is
the
question-event.
For Deleuze
the
paradoxical entity
takes
on
the
form
of an
`aleatory'
point.
He
explains
this through
the
use of
the
notion of an
`ideal
game'
in
the tenth
series of
The Logic
of
Sense.
The Game
In
order
to
elaborate
the
principles of
the
ideal
game we must
first
turn to the
principles of what we normally consider
to
be
games
in
general
(for
example, cricket,
chess, poker,
Russian
roulette, etc.
). Deleuze
tells
us
that
games
have four basic
characteristics.
293
1) Rules
pre-exist
the
game and provide
the
`conditions' for
the
game.
2) Hypotheses
are
derived from
these
rules
in
accord with which chance
is
distributed in
the
game.
3) These hypotheses
arrange
the
game
into
a number of
turns
or
`plurality
of
throws,
which are really and numerically
distinct. '294 4) The
objective
of
the
game
is
to
win rather
than
lose. Deleuze
argues
that
games such as
these
are
really only partial games
in
two
respects.
First,
these
games naturally
limit
the
activity at
hand. Second,
chance only occurs at certain
defined
points
in
the
game.
295
In
contrast
to these types
of game
Deleuze
searches
for
a
`pure'
game which
he finds
in Borges' description
of
the Babylonian lottery:
...
if
the
lottery is
an
intensification
of chance, a periodic
infusion
of
chaos
into
the
cosmos, would
it
not
be desirable for
chance to
intervene
at all stages of
the
lottery
and not merely
in
the
drawing?
Is it
not
2"
ibid.
292
ibid.
293
see
ibid,
pp.
58-65
294
ibid,
pp.
58-9
295
ibid,
p.
59
97
ridiculous
for
chance
to
dictate
the
death
of someone while
the
circumstances of
his death
-
its
silent reserve or publicity,
the time
limit
of one
hour
or one century
-
should remain
immune
to
hazard? [... ] In
reality,
The
number of
drawings is infinite. No decision is final,
all
diverge into
others.
The ignorant
suppose
that
an
infinite
number of
drawings
requires an
infinite
amount of
time;
in
reality,
it
suffices
that
time
be infinitely divisible,
as
is
the
case
in
the
famous
parable of
the
Tortoise
and
the
Hare.
96
In
such a game
Deleuze determines four
alternate principles.
1) There
are no rules
that
pre-exist
the
game.
The
game
is its
own rule.
2) Chance is
affirmed at every
`point'
in
the
game.
3) To
the
extent
that the turns
or
throws
are
infinite (endlessly
ramified)
they
`...
are qualitatively
distinct, but
are
the
qualitative
forms
of a single
cast which
is
ontologically one.
'297 That is,
each
turn
or
throw
corresponds
to
a
problematic
distribution
of singularities which
`...
are successive
in
relation
to
one
another, yet simultaneous
in
relation
to this
point
[the
paradoxical entity or aleatory
point] which always changes
the
rule, or coordinates and ramifies
the
corresponding
series as
it insinuates
chance over
the
entire
length
of each series.
'298 4) Such
a game
has
neither winners or
losers. At
this
point
Deleuze
reaches
the
game as
`nonsense. '
He
states:
`The ideal
game
...
can only
be
thought
as nonsense.
But
precisely
for
this
reason,
it is
the
reality of
thought itself
and
the
unconscious of pure
thought
[... ] For
only
thought
finds it
possible
to
affirm all chance and
to
make chance
into
an object
of affirmation.
299
However, from
this
perspective chance
is
effectively
being
treated
as a
`zero
point'
thereby transforming
it into
a physical principle.
As Baudrillard
notes
in
some comments on
The Logic
of
Sense: `The
very
idea
that
games can
be
intensified
by
the
acceleration of chance
(as
though
one were speaking of
the
acidic
content of a chemical solution),
the
idea
that
becoming
can
thereby
be
extended
exponentially,
turns
chance
into
an energizing
function.... But
this
is
not chance.
'300
Moreover
at
the
zero-point of chance, wouldn't
this
point
be
paradoxically
an
originary
convergence
from
which
infinite divergence
springs
from?
I
ibid,
p.
61,
quotation
from Borges, Labyrinths,
p.
59
297
ibid,
p.
59
1
ibid.
2"
ibid,
p.
60
300
Jean Baudrillard
(1990,
orig.
1979) Seduction,
trans, B. Singer. New York: St Martins Press,
p.
145
98
Conclusion
Deleuze's
conception of singularities and events are
in
a precarious position.
As
a
metaphysics
they
exist at
the
whim of an unresolved physics.
They
are precisely part
of a
`quasi-physics.
' If
we
turn to the
general method of
Deleuze's determination
of
the transcendental
field
then
we notice
that,
as we saw
in
chapter
1,
a
higher-order
logic is involved. Deleuze derives
this
method
from Bergson. Indeed,
one can
but
notice
how
the
qualitative continuity of
the
Aion is
actualised
in
the
quantitative
discontinuity
of
Chronos (c. f. Bergson's duration
and space).
Bergson's
general
critique of philosophy
is
that
phenomena are
treated
as
different in degree
when
they
are really
different in kind. Consequently
one stage of method
is
to
determine
true
difference
in kind, for
example,
duration
and space.
This
provides us with certain
dualisms. But,
as
Deleuze
tells
us
in his description
of
the
Bergsonian
method
in
Bergsonism, the
next stage of method
is
to
put
the
dualism `back
together
again:
'
`Dualism
is
...
only a moment, which must
lead
to the
re-formation of a monism.
'30'
How is
this
performed?
A
plane
is
traced
whereupon
the two
`lines'
of
the
difference
in kind intersect in
a point.
Deleuze describes
this
process
thus:
...
when we
have followed
each of
the
"lines" beyond
the turn
in
experience,
we must also rediscover
the
point at which
they
intersect
again, where
the
directions
cross and where
the tendencies that
differ in
kind link
together
again
to
give rise
to the thing
as we
know it. It
might
be
thought that
nothing
is
easier, and
that
experience
itself has
already
given us
this
point.
But it is
not as simple as
that.
After
we
have followed
the
lines
of
divergence beyond
the turn, these
lines
must
intersect
again,
not at
the
point at which we started,
but
rather at a virtual point, at a
virtual
image
of
the
point of
departure,
which
is itself located beyond
the
turn
in
experience....
302
We
can now
locate
the
source of
the
higher-order logic. It is
to
be found in
the
transcendental
field
of
the
virtual
(which
provides
the
conditions of actual
experience).
This is
where
the
problem
lies. For
the
virtual point
(or
paradoxical
entity)
is
also
located
on
the transcendental field from
which
it derives its
principle.
301
Deleuze,
Bergsonisni,
p.
29
302
ibid,
p.
28
99
That is,
the
paradoxical entity
is itself
treated
as part of
the
higher
order
logic
and
indeed,
constitutes
it. Could
a method
be
constructed
that
doesn't
make
this
error?
There is
one aspect of
the
Bergsonian
method
that
requires
further
explication:
problems and solutions.
Let
us
begin by
providing an example as
this
will aid us
in
our
discussion. Bergson
tells
us
that the
eye
is
the
solution
to the
problem of
light.
303
The
solution-problem
has its
own
limits
or
flame. for
example,
the
speed of
light,
eyes
in different
species such as mammalian or
insect. However,
within
its limits
this
solution-problem
seems perfect
to the
extent
that
both
the
problem and solution are
organised
on
the
same plane.
How
could
the
eye
be
anything
but
the
solution of
light? However, the
problem remains of
how
problems
themselves
are organised
in
general.
We have
seen
that
Deleuze locates
problems
in
terms
of
the
ideal
game;
they
are organised
in
terms
of
the
question posed
by
the
paradoxical entity.
Let
us
turn
once more
to
Baudrillard's
critique of
the
ideal
game:
Games
are not
to
be
confused with
"becoming".... They
are
characterised,
even when games of chance,
by
their
capacity
to
reproduce
a given arbitrary constellation
in
the
same
terms
an
indefinite
number of
times.
Their
true
form is
cyclical or recurrent.
And
as such
they,
and
they
alone, put a
definite
stop
to
causality and
its
principle
-
not
by
the
massive
introduction
of random series
(which
results only
in
the
dispersal
of causality,
its
reduction
to
scattered
fragments,
and not
its
overcoming)
-
but by
the
potential return
(the
eternal return
if
one will)
to
an orderly,
conventional
situation
[... ]
the
eternal return of a ritual
form [... ] it is
the
willed
recurrence, as
in
games, of an arbitrary and non-causal
configuration
of signs, where each sign seeks out
the
next relentlessly, as
in
the
course of a ceremonial.
34
Baudrillard's
main point
is
that
he
views games as
being
of a ritual
form
as opposed
to
Deleuze's
aleatory
form. There
are many
issues
at stake
here. In Difference
and
Repetition
Deleuze
defined
the true
eternal return as
the
return of
the
different,
or
more precisely,
repetition as
the
being
of
becoming. He
tells
us
that
what
is
essential
"3
Henri Bergson (1983
orig.
1911) Creative Evolution,
trans.
A. Mitchell. Lanham, MD: University
Press
of
America,
see pp.
53-62
304
Jean Baudrillard
(1990,
orig.
1979) Seduction,
trans, B. Singer. New York: St Martins Press,
pp.
146-7. Does the
ritual
form
entail some
form
of mysticism?
It is
perhaps
true that
in
mystical
experience
the
ritual
form is
encountered
in
a particularly pure state
but
mysticism
does
not constitute
the ritual
form. It is
simply
the
case
that
mysticism
is
already
based
around ritual
(a
ceremonial).
100
to
heterogeneous
series
is
not
the
repetition of sameness or
identity but
of
differences
whether small or
large. In
the
preface of
Difference
and
Repetition Deleuze found it's
exemplary
form in Borges'
short story
Pierre Menard, Author
of
the
Quixote. Let
us
return
to this
story once more.
In
this
story we are
told that the
character
Menard
sets
himself
the task
of writing
the
Quixote. But
this
is
not a case of re-writing
Cervantes'
Quixote in
the
context of
the twentieth
century
but
of actually writing
The Quixote.
Menard
succeeds
in
writing several
fragments. To
make a comparison
between
them
Cervantes'
original
text
reads:
...
truth,
whose mother
is history,
rival of
time,
depository
of
deeds,
witness of
the
past, exemplar and advisor
to the
present, and
the
future's
counsellor.
305
Instead, Menard's
version reads:
...
truth,
whose mother
is history,
rival of
time,
depository
of
deeds,
witness of
the
past, exemplar and advisor
to the
present, and
the
future's
counsellor.
306
The
narrator
tells
us
that
when
he
read
these
fragments,
although
they
were exactly
the
same as
Cervantes'
text, their
meaning seemed
infinitely different
and
`richer. '
Deleuze takes this to
mean
that
repetition presents us with a
`maximum
of
difference. ' But Deleuze
seems
to
have
missed another possible explanation
here.
The
reason a
difference is
perceived
in
the two
books is because both Quixote's
are
original compositions.
To
understand this
we must
turn to
how Menard
composes
his
work.
He first decides
to
`become' Cervantes: `Know Spanish
well, recover
the
Catholic faith, fight
against the Moors
or
the
Turk, forget
the
history
of
Europe
between
the
years
1602
and
1918.... '307 But
this
method proves unsatisfactory,
it is
not a case of actualising
the `singularities'
of
Cervantes. Instead he
turns to
a strange
ritual method:
`He
multiplied
draft
upon
draft,
revised
tenaciously
and
tore
up
305
Jorge Luis Borges (1999) `Pierre Menard, Author
of
the Quixote, ' in Collected Fictions,
trans.
A
Hurley. London: Penguin,
p.
94
306
ibid.
307
Borges, Labyrinths,
p.
66
101
thousands
of manuscript pages.
'308 Through
this
method
he
produces several
fragments
of
the
Quixote. This
process
is
very similar
in
nature
to
Bergson's
example
of
the
eye
developing
as a solution
to the
problem of
light
although
following
very
different
evolutionary paths.
The
same unique solution exists
for
the
same unique
problem.
This
could
be
called a
`ritual
series.
'
Definition: Singularity
is
the
repetition of
the
same unique solution
for
the
same
unique problem
How does
this
definition
of singularity relate
to
Deleuze's
notion?
For
after all
Deleuzian
singularity
is
also a composition of uniqueness.
However
when we
turn to
problems and solutions
in Deleuze
we
find
they
are regulated
by
the
paradoxical
entity.
However, in
our
definition
above
there
is
no need
for
any mediation
because
the two
are
in
parallel.
In fact
any
form
of constituting
factor between
them
would
simply add something extraneous to the
process.
Perhaps
the
most
fundamental
problem-solution
involves
the thematic
of
individuation:
the
individual is
the
problem of
the
world.
We find
that
on
the
contrary
in The Logic
of
Sense, Deleuze defines
the
individual
as
the
actualisation of
a specific set of singularities.
From
this
he derives
a
theatre
of
the
individual. The
individual
may will
their
singularities
well or
badly. Here Deleuze's
own
theory
of
disappearance (or becoming imperceptible)
comes
into
play.
The
person who wills
their
singularities
in
such a way as
to
embody
them
performs a
`counter-
actualisation.
' They
will
their
own
destiny:
amorfati.
But it
seems
that this
has
still
not reached
the
eternal return of
the
ritual
form. All
ritual
is
theatre
but
not all
theatre
is
ritual.
From
the
point of view of
the
ritual
form it
matters neither way whether one
acts well or
badly (psychological
types), it is
all part of
the
ritual.
This involves
a
critique of
Deleuze's
conception
of singularity.
As
soon as one submits
singularities
to
a
theory
of energetics, the
ritual
form
of singularity
is lost. Moreover, is
not
the
type
of organisation required not already
hinted
at
by Simplicius'
paradox
-
the
unilateral organisational principle
of place
is
abolished
in
the determination
of an
308
ibid.
p.
70
102
individual
as something rather
than
not-something.
Of
course
the
next philosopher
who will
define
singularity as
individual
uniqueness and
in
terms
of position will
be
Leibniz.
103
Chapter 3
The Art
of
Leibniz
104
Introduction
The Thesis
In
this
chapter we will argue
that
due
to
his
commitment
to
materialism
Deleuze fails
to
grasp
the theory
of singularity
in Leibniz's fundamental
concept of
the
monad.
In
this
we oppose
Deleuze's
association of matter with a physical principle
to
a ritual
theatre
of matter.
However
this task
is
made all
the
more
difficult in
that
we will also
argue
that
Deleuze's
reading of
Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz
and
the
Baroque is
one
of
the
most contemporary and
inclusive
to
date
that
re-establishes
the
scope of
Leibniz's
work as
The Renaissance
philosopher.
As Deleuze
will state at
the
end of
his
study:
`we
all remain
Leibnizian.... '309 To
attempt
this task
it
will
first be
beneficial
to
gain an orientation on
Deleuze's
study within
the
context of
his
own
philosophy and
then
within
the
context of current
Leibniz
research.
The Problem
In
the
first instance Deleuze's later
work on
Leibniz
seems
to
be
a capitulation on
his
project of a philosophy of
difference. For in Difference
and
Repetition Deleuze
will
criticise
Leibniz for drawing
representation
into
the
infinite:
...
infinite
representation
does
not
free itself
from
the
principle of
identity
as presupposition of representation....
Infinite
representation
invokes
a
foundation. While
this
foundation is
not
the
identical itself, it is
nevertheless a way of
taking the
principle of representation particularly
seriously, giving
it
an
infinite
value and rendering
it
coextensive with
the
whole, and
in
this
manner allowing
it
to
reign over existence
itself.
310
However, in The Fold
this
criticism
is
not
to
be found
and
instead Deleuze
states
the
following:
Leibniz draws identity into infinity:
the
Identical is
an auto-position of
309
Deleuze, The Fold.
"
Leibniz
and the Baroque,
p.
137
310
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
49
105
the
infinite,
without which
identity
would remain
hypothetical.... The
principle of
identity
-
or rather, of contradiction
-
is
only
the
cry of
the
Identicals. It
cannot
be
an abstraction.
It is
a signal.
Identicals
are
undefinables
in
themselves
and exist perhaps
beyond
our
ken;
they
have,
no
less,
a criterion
that the
principle makes us aware of or able
to
here.
31
Has
there
been
a re-evaluation
in Deleuze's
position on
Leibniz? In Lang Baker's
recent study
`The Cry
of
the
Identicals: The
problem of
inclusion in Deleuze's
reading of
Leibniz, ' he
argues
this
in
the
negative
in
that the
original criticism
has
not
been
withdrawn
but has been
tackled
in
a new way.
312
However,
while we agree with
Baker's basic
approach
there
also seems
to
be
another
difference in Deleuze's later
work:
if
the
criticism of representation against
Leibniz's
philosophy of
difference is
withdrawn
it is because Deleuze has himself found
a new use
for
the
concept of
representation, or
just
as
importantly,
representation never
functioned in Leibniz's
philosophy as was originally portrayed
in Difference
and
Repetition. We
shall argue
that the
reason
behind Deleuze's later
approach
is
not wholly
based
on a
developed
notion of
inclusion in
the
monad, as
Baker
presents
the
issue, but is based
on
the
more
fundamental idea
that Deleuze is
no
longer
treating
Leibniz's
philosophy as a
metaphysics,
but
as an art.
Our
perspective on
this
issue,
while not specifically
addressed
in
recent
Deleuze
scholarship
is
perhaps not as contentious as
it first
seems
when we consider
the
actual
title
of
Deleuze's
work:
The Fold.
-
Leibniz
and
the
Baroque. Of
course
this
also
leads
to
one of
the
main problems of reading
The Fold:
while some of
its
statements
may
be in
the
register of an art, other statements may
well
be in
the
register of a philosophy.
In
this
way what
Deleuze
will say of
Leibniz
in
one of
his lectures
at
Vincennes
can also
be
applied
to
his
own
text:
I'd
say
that
his
system
is
rather
like
a pyramid.
Leibniz's
great system
has
several
levels. None
of
these
levels is false,
these
levels
symbolise each
other, and
Leibniz is
the
first
great philosopher
to
conceive of activity
and
thought
as a vast symbolisation.
Thus
all
these
levels
symbolise,
but
they
are more or
less
close to
what we could provisionally
call
the
absolute
[... ] It's
complicated
because, in
my opinion, one can never rely
on a
Leibniz
text
if
one
has
not
first discerned
the
system
level
to
which
311
Deleuze, The Fold,
pp.
43-44
312
Lang Baker (1995) `The Cry
of the Identicals:
The
problem of
inclusion in Deleuze's
reading of
Leibniz, ' Philosophy Today, Summer,
p.
199
106
this text
corresponds,
313
Let
us now
turn to
how
the
position of an art
is developed in Deleuze in
more
detail.
The Art
of
Deleuze
To be
sure a re-evaluation of representation
is
already
to
be found in The Logic
of
Sense:
There is
...
a
"use"
of representation, without which representation would
remain
lifeless
and senseless
[... ]
such use
is
not
defined
through
a
function
of representation
in
relation
to the
represented, nor even
through
representativeness as
the
form
of possibility
[... ]
use
is in
the
relation
between
representation and something extra-representative, a non-
represented and merely expressed entity.
314
The idea
of a
`use'
of representation
has
certain echoes with
the
Parmenidean doxa
which can
follow
the
path of not-being
(which
we
touched
on
in Chapter 1). Deleuze
will
himself
see
this
as a
link between
representation and
the
event,
that
is,
there
can
be
a representation or symbolisation of
the
event although
this
will ultimately
be
part
of a unifying
logic. In
this
sense
Deleuze
will
describe Leibniz
as
being `[t]he first
theoretician
of alogical
incompatibilities,
and
for
this
reason
the
first important
theoretician
of
the
event....
'315 The logics
of such systems
is
akin
to the
correspondences of astrology.
316
However
these ideas do
not
in
themselves
signify a shift
in Deleuze's
association of representation
with
identity. The
place where we
do find
a
fundamental
change
in his
ontological
position
is in his
re-working of
the
process of
realisation
into
the theory
of expression:
`The
world
is
a virtuality
that
is
actualised
in
monads or souls,
but
also a possibility that
must
be
realised
in
matter or
in bodies. '317
In
contrast we may
look
at
the
position originally presented
in Difference
and
313
Gilles Deleuze (1980) `Leibniz Lecture 1, '
trans. C. J. Stivale,
p.
4,
available
from
www. webdeleuze. com
314
Deleuze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
146
315
ibid.
p.
171
316
ibid.,
we may also add the
correspondence
systems of
the Hermetics, Raymon Lull
and
the
Kabbalists to this
list,
which we will
be
coming to
shortly.
317
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
107
107
Repetition:
...
to the
extent
that the
possible
is
open
to
`realisation, ' it is
understood
as an
image
of
the
real, while
the
real
is
supposed
to
resemble
the
possible....
Any hesitation between
the
virtual and
the
possible
...
is
disastrous,
since
it
abolishes
the
reality of
the
virtual
[... ] This hesitation
between the
possible and
the
virtual explains why no one
has
gone
further
than
Leibniz in
the
exploration of sufficient reason, and why,
nevertheless, no one
has
maintained
the
illusion
of a subordination of
that
sufficient reason
to the
identical.
318
Perhaps
a case may
be
made
that
Deleuze is just
expressing
Leibniz's
views and not
his
own
in
the
former
quotation
from The Fold. However
what we
do find in
Deleuze's
work
from
the time
of
Francis Bacon: The Logic
of
Sensation
via
the
Cinema
books
up
to
What is Philosophy? is
a an approach
to
art
that
precisely relies
on
this
revised notion of possibility.
319
We find
an explication of
this theory
in What
is
Philosophy?
where
Deleuze
and
Guattari
propose
that thought
confronts
the
infinite in
three
different
ways:
i) in
philosophy
through the
concept,
ii) in
science
through
the
function,
and
iii) in
art
through the
percept.
We
shall
turn to the
concept
and
the
function in
the
next chapter
but let
us now examine
the
percept.
What is
a
Percent?
For Deleuze
and
Guattari
the
percept
is
connected
to the
work of art:
What is
preserved
-
the thing
or
the
work of art
-
is
a
bloc
of sensations,
that
is to
say, a compound of percepts and affects.
Percepts
are no
longer
perceptions;
they
are
independent
of a state of
those
who experience
them.
Affects
are no
longer feelings
or affections;
they
go
beyond
the
strength of
those
who undergo
them.
Sensations,
percepts, and affects are
beings
whose validity
lies in
themselves
and exceeds any
lived [... ] The
318
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
pp.
212-3
31
Gilles Deleuze (2001
orig.
1981) Francis Bacon: The Logic
of
Sensation,
translated
with an
introduction by Daniel W. Smith Minneapolis: University if Minnesota Press; Gilles Deleuze (1992
orig.
1983) Cinema 1: The Movement Image,
trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam. London: Athlone;
Gilles Deleuze (1989
orig.
1985) Cinema H: The Time Image,
trans. H. Tomlinson
and
R. Galeta.
London: Athlone; Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (1994,
orig.
1991) What is Philosophy?, trans.
G.
Burchell
and
H. Tomlinson. London: Verso
108
work of art
is
a
being
of sensation and nothing else;
it
exists
in itself.
320
From
a materialist perspective
the
work of an
has
the
same
being
as any other
thing,
organic or
inorganic: `They
could
be
said
to
exist
in
the
absence of man....
'
32'
However this
gives art a very special characteristic: possibility.
In
the
sense
that the
work of art
is `dormant' it is
not a virtuality
that
has
the
same reality
in its
actualisation
but is
open
to
realisation:
These
universes are neither virtual or actual;
they
are possible,
the
possible as aesthetic category...,
the
existence of
the
possible, whereas
events are
the
reality of
the
virtual,
forms
of a
thought-Nature that
survey
322
every possible universe
...
a sensation exists
in its
possible universe....
How does
one create a possible universe?
It is
a wresting of
the
percept
`from
perceptions of objects and
the
state of
the
perceiving subject' resulting
in
the
framing
of a
bloc
of sensation.
323
Percepts
are
`nonhuman landscapes
of nature.
'
324
The idea
of
flaming
takes
on an
important
meaning
for Deleuze
and
Guattari
not only
in
terms
of
the
`frame'
of
the
work of art
but
also
in
terms
of a constructive process.
Sensations
are pure
becomings
that
are
framed in
the
work of art
in
the
sense of a
framework
or
house. The framework
or
house is itself
a construction on a plane of
composition
that
relates
it back
to the
becoming
of
the
universe.
325
In
this
way
Deleuze
and
Guattari
propose
that
`[a]rt begins
...
with
the
house. That is
why
architecture
is
the
first
of
the
arts.
326
On
the
method of construction of
the
frame
Deleuze
and
Guattari
tell
us:
The
artist creates
blocs
of percepts and affects,
but
the
only
law
of
creation
is
that the
compound must stand up on
its
own.
The
artist's
greatest
difficulty is
to
make
it
stand up on
its
own.
Sometimes
this
requires what
is, from
the
viewpoint of an
implicit
model,
from
the
viewpoint of
lived
perceptions and affections, great geometrical
320
Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?,
p.
164
321
ibid.
322
ibid.
p.
177-8
"
ibid.
p.
167
324
ibid.
p.
169
'u
ibid.
pp.
179-180
326
ibid.
p.
186
109
improbability,
physical
imperfection,
and organic abnormality.
327
In its
extraction
from
perception
the
work of art must
be built in
an entirely contrary
fashion in
order
to
give
it individual
existence.
In
order
for it
to
be
enduring
construction
takes
on a very
literal
sense:
it is
a
'monument.
328
Another
component
of
this
construction
is
resemblance
(even in
abstract expressionism where
the
house
becomes landscape)
although
it is
not an
imitation,
an analogy or an
identification,
but instead
a
`produced
resemblance'329 or monumental resemblance.
The
resemblance
functions
not
between
the
work of art and
the
becomings it
extracts
but
between the
house
and
the
universe and
in
this
sense
the
work of art may
be
considered
to
be
a symbol of
the
world or as
Deleuze
will
likewise
say of
Leibniz's
philosophy:
`... Leibniz's
philosophy must
be
conceived as
the
allegory of
the
world,
the
signature of
the
world....
1,330 We
shall now explore
how Deleuze's
approach
to
Leibniz
fits in
with current
Leibniz
studies.
The Leibniz Literature
The General Science is
simply
the
science of what
is
universally
thinkable
in
so
far
as
it is
such.
This includes
not only what
has hitherto
been
regarded as
logic, but
also
the
art of
discovery,
together
with
method or
the
means of arrangement, synthesis and analysis,
didactics,
or
the
science of
teaching,
Gnostologica (the
so-called
Noologia),
the
art of
reminiscence or mnemonics,
the
art of characters or of symbols,
The Art
of
Combination,
the
Art
of
Subtlety,
and philosophical grammar;
the
Art
of
Lull,
the
Cabbala
of
the
wise, and natural magic.
Perhaps it
also
331
includes
ontology....
During the twentieth
century
there
was a picture painted of
Leibniz in
which
his
metaphysics was seen as a
direct
consequence of
his logic. This
enduring
image
was
first
set
forth in
the
influential
studies of
Bertrand Russell
and
Louis Couturat.
332
327
ibid.
p.
164
328
ibid.
329
ibid.
p.
173
330
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
127
331
Leibniz (1679) An Introduction
to
a
Secret Encyclopaedia, in Leibniz, G. W. (1995,
orig.
1934)
Philosophical
Writings,
ed.
G. H. R. Parkinson,
trans. M. Morris
and
G. H. R. Parkinson. London:
Everyman,
p.
5, hereafter denoted
as
Philosophical
Writings.
332
Bertrand Russell (1992,
orig.
1900) A Critical
Exposition
of
the
Philosophy
of
Leibniz,
with an
110
However
as
the
Leibniz
archives at
Leipzig have been
progressively catalogued and
made available
this
point of view
has been
progressively challenged.
Or
more
precise,
Leibniz's
metaphysics may
be based
on
his logic but
this
logic is
certainly
not of
the
sterile analytic
interpretation
often associated with
Aristotelian 'subject-
predicate'
logic.
One
of
the
first
studies
to
directly
challenge
this
view
is Frances Yates'
study
The Art
of
Memory.
333
Yates
places
Leibniz
at
the
end of a
lineage
that transmitted
the
`art
of memory'
from
the
mediaevalist
Raymon Lull (a
contemporary of
Aquinas)
by
way of
the
Renaissance heretic Giordano Bruno.
334
The
art of memory originates
in
pre-Socratic
Greece
with
the
poet
Simonides
of
Ceos
who
is
reported
to
remember
the
places of
the
guests at a
banquet
whom are crushed when
the
roof
falls in.
335
It is
the technique
of using places
(such
as a
house
or a
theatre)
and
images (mnemonics)
to
aid memory.
As David Stevenson
sums up
this
practice:
In its
most common
forms,
the
art of memory
had
an architectural
framework. To
memorise a speech,
the
practitioner created
in his
mind a
complex
building
with many rooms,
furnished
with
images
or symbols
in
set
locations. He
then
moved mentally
through this
building
on a
fixed
route, assigning each
idea in his
speech
in
turn to
one of
the
images...
"336
This
technique
was
transformed
by Raymon Lull
when
he
used
it
as
the
basis
of a
neo-Platonic combinatory system
for
the
Names
of
God.
337
The
occult
Renaissance
was
finally brought
to
fruition by Giordano Bruno
who combined
Lullism
with
Hermeticism338:
appendix of
leading
passages.
London: Routledge,
p.
ix; Louis Couturat (1994,
orig.
1902) `On
Leibniz's Metaphysics, ' in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Critical Assessments,
ed,
R. S. Woolhouse.
London: Routledge, Vol. I,
p.
1,
translation
of
`Sur la
m8taphysique
de Leibniz, ' Revue de
metaphysique et
de
morale,
1902,10
333
Francis Yates (1966) The Art
of
Memory. London: Routledge
and
Kegan Paul
334
ibid.
pp.
379-89
33s
ibid.
pp.
1-2
336
D. Stevenson (1988) The First Freemasons:
Scotland's Early Lodges
and
Their Members.
Aberdeen: University Press,
p.
291
"'
Yates (1966)
pp.
173-198
338
The Hermetic
writings are
Platonic
mystico-religious texts
usually
dated
around
200AD,
originating
in Egypt,
and attributed to the God Hermes Trismegistus. Plotinus' teacher Ammonius
Saccas
is
reported
to
have
taught Hermeticism,
see
Walter Scott (a
and
trans.
X1993) Hermetica.
Boston: Shambhala,
pp.
1-16
111
Mediaeval
man was allowed
to
use
his low faculty
of
imagination
to
form
corporeal similitudes
to
help his
memory;
it
was a concession
to
his
weakness.
Renaissance Hermetic
man
believes
that
he has divine
powers;
he
can
form
a magic memory
through
which
he
grasps
the
world,
reflecting
the
divine
macrocosm
in
the
microcosm of
his divine
mens.
339
Recent
scholarship
has
questioned whether
there
is
a
direct link between Leibniz
and
Bruno.
340
Nevertheless,
what
is
certain
is
that
Yates brought
attention
to the
fact
that
Leibniz's
philosophy attempted a synthesis of many
different
streams of
thought
which
would
be
missed
if
one simply
tried to
find
the
motivation of
his
system
in his
logic. Subsequently there
have been
many
different
studies over
the
past
twenty
years
that
have
examined
the
historical
context
in
which
his
philosophy was produced:
Laurence
McCullough, J. A. Cover,
and
John O'Leary-Hawthorne have
studied
the
influence
of
the
Scholastics
on
Leibniz's
university
dissertation
thesis
Disputatio
Metaphysica
de Principio Individui
and
its
continued presence
in his later
philosophy;
341
Christia Mercer has
examined
the
influence
of a
Christian-orientated
Platonism
pervasive
during Leibniz's
university years at
Leipzig;
342
Catherine
Wilson
has
explored
the
associations
between Leibniz
and
the
pansophics
J. H.
Alsted
and
John Bisterfield
who expounded
Lullism
and also
the
Cambridge
Platonists
Henry More, Ralph Cudworth
and
Anne Conway, for
whom all
had
a
theory of monads
in
common;
343
Stuart Brown
and
Allison Coudert have
similarly
studied
Leibniz's
associations with
the
Christian Kabbalists Francis Mercury
van
Helmont
and
Christian Knorr
von
Rosenroth.
3'"
We
shall
be
utilising
the
ideas
of
many of
these
scholars
throughout this
chapter.
However,
while
the
aim all
these
studies
is
to
restore a
`true'
picture of
the
historical
Leibniz there
is
a certain sense
in
which
the
relevance of
Leibniz's
339
Yates (1966),
p.
172
30
Allison
Coudert (1998) `Leibniz
and
the
Kabbalah, ' in Leibniz, Mysticism
and
Religion,
eds.
A.
Coudert, R. Popkin
and
G. Weiner. London: Kluwer,
p.
72
341
Lawrence
McCullough (1996) Leibniz
on
Individuals
and
Individuation. London: Kluwer
Academic
Publishers; J. A. Cover
and
J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (1999) Substance
and
Individuation in
Leibniz.
Cambridge: University Press
342
Christia Mercer (2001) Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins
and
Development. Cambridge:
University
Press
343
Catherine
Wilson (1989) Leibniz's Metaphysics: A historical
and comparative study.
Manchester:
University
Press
344
Stuart Brown (1998) `Some Occult Influences
on
Leibniz's Monadology, ' in Leibniz, Mysticism
and
Religion,
pp.
1-21; Coudert, A. P. (1995) Leibniz
and
the
Kabbalah. London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers
112
philosophy
is
still rooted
in
the
past.
As Russell
stated:
`I felt
-
as many others
have
felt
-
that the
Monadology
was a
kind
of
fantastic fairy
tale,
coherent perhaps,
but
wholly arbitrary.
'345 In fact
perhaps
the
only recent philosophical advocate of
Leibniz
in
the
English
speaking world
is Alfred North Whitehead
whose work
is
probably
even
less
well
known
than that
of
Leibniz. This
situation
however is
very
different in
French
philosophy
in
the twentieth
century where
Leibniz's ideas
played a prominent
role
in
the
pan-psychic and
bio-philosophical
approach of
Raymond Ruyer
and more
recently
in
the
mathematical
and scientific writings of
Michel Serres.
3'
It is
these
authors who provide precedence
for Deleuze's The Fold.
The Great Experiment
One
may only
hint
at
the
relish
in
which
Deleuze
tackles the
philosophy of
Leibniz in
The Fold, his last
monograph on a
figure in
the
`history
of philosophy.
' In Deleuze's
Leibniz lecture
series at
Vincennes in 1980 he
will state:
`I
want
to
present
this
author
[Leibniz]
and
have
you
love him.... 9347 Or
at
the
end of
The Fold Deleuze
will
finish
with
the
sentence
`...
we all remain
Leibnizian because
what always matters
is
folding,
unfolding, refolding.
'348 Deleuze
may call
Spinoza
the
`prince'
or
`Christ'
of
philosophers
but Leibniz is
the
great experimenter.
It
was perhaps only
in
the
Renaissance
mind of
Leibniz
where art, philosophy, science,
logic
and mathematics
could all come
together
in
equal measures.
As
such
The Fold
could
be
seen as an
experiment
in Deleuze's
philosophy
preceding
the
concatenation of art, philosophy,
science and
logic in What
is Philosophy?. The key
to
Deleuze's
experiment
is
the
notion of
the
fold. The fold is itself
presented as a
key
to
explore
the
notion of
the
Baroque. The Baroque is in
turn the figure
of
the
labyrinth
where
thought
confronts
the
infinite. As
we
have been
arguing
the
way
in
which we must approach
The Fold
is
not
in
terms
of
the
concept
but in
terms
of
the
percept.
The fold is
the
fundamental
percept of
the
Baroque. In
this
our approach
is
somewhat
different
to
another recent
345
Russell (1992)
p. xvii
346
Cf. R. Ruyer (1950) La
conscience
et
le
corps.
Paris: PUF; R. Ruyer (1952) Neofinalisme. Paris:
PUF; R. Ruyer (1958) La
genese
des formes
vivante.
Paris: Flammarion;
and
M. Serres (1982) Le
Systeme de Leibniz
et ses
Modeles
Mathematiques.
Paris: PUF
34'
Deleuze, `Leibniz Lecture
1, '
p.
1
343
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
137
113
study of
The Fold: Alain Badiou's `Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz
and
the
Baroque. '349 Badiou
will
take
Deleuze's
approach
to the
fold
and apply
it
to
Deleuze's
philosophy
itself:
Deleuze
wants and creates a philosophy
"of'
nature, or rather a
philosophy as nature.
This
can
be
understood as a
description in thought
of
the
life
of
the
world, such
that the
life
thus
described
might
include,
as
one of
its living
gestures,
the
description itself. I do
not use
lightly
the
word
life. The
concepts of
flux, desire, fold,
are captors of
life,
descriptive
traps that thought
sets
for
the
living
world and
the
present
world.
350
Badiou's interpretation
seems nothing
less
than
a confusion
between
the
percept and
the
concept.
The
percept as a resemblance or symbol of
the
world certainly
has
the
descriptive
ability
that Badiou
suggests
but
the
concept
is
not a possibility open
to
realisation and
has
no properties of resemblance as
Deleuze
will
define it. One
may
question whether
Deleuze
actually achieves
this
but
this
is
not a
fault
of
his
method
per se.
On
the
other
hand
the
criticism we may
follow
up
is
whether
the
percept
undermines
his
philosophy.
That is, does
the
re-introduction of possibility alert us
to
an originary
disequilibrium
in Deleuze's
system?
Have
all
the
faults
of representation
that
were unceremoniously
jettisoned in Difference in Repetition been
re-conceded
in
an
innocuous form? Or
will
the
simulacrum return, rise up and
take
its
revenge?
349
Alain Badiou (1994) 'Gilles Deleuze, The Fold.
"
Leibniz
and
the
Baroque, '
trans.
T. Sowley, in C.
Boundas
and
D. Olkowski (eds. ) Gilles Deleuze
and the
Theatre
of
Philosophy. London: Routiedge,
pp.
51-69
iSo
ibid. p.
63
114
1. Three Great Points
This
section
is divided
into
two
parts.
In
the
first
part we shall
follow Deleuze 's
progression
to
Leibniz 's
concept of
the
monad.
In
the
second part we shall explore
the
constitution of
the
monad
in
more
detail.
The New Ate
The Baroque
refers not
to
an essence
but
rather
to
an operative
function,
to
a
trait.
It
endlessly produces
folds. It does
not
invent
things: there
are
all
kinds
of
folds
coming
from
the
East, Greek, Roman, Romanesque,
Gothic, Classical folds.... Yet
the
Baroque trait twists
and
turns
its folds,
pushing
them to
infinity, fold
over
fold,
one upon
the
other.
The Baroque
fold
unfurls all
the
way
to
infinity.
35'
For Deleuze
the
Baroque fold is
the
alliance of art and mathematics.
It
comes about
through two
new
innovations:
a new model of perception and
the
mathematical
calculus.
Firstly
the
Baroque
notion of perception rejects
the
standard
Platonic
or
Cartesian idea
that truth
and objects are perceived
through
illumination, by
shining
light
on
the
matter:
`Contrary
to
Descartes, Leibniz begins in darkness. '352 Instead
of
the
light
of
the
sun
the
Baroque begins
with a
dark
seething mass
from
which
forms
and objects are abstracted or projected.
Deleuze
will
liken
this
process
to
film
noir
-
figures
emerging
from
the
shadows
-
an art
that
can
be
seen
in
recent
times
in
the
films
of
David Lynch.
353
The Baroque
model of perception
leads
to
an obvious
but
quite startling conclusion:
`Every
perception
is hallucinatory because
perception
has
no object.
'354 Perception is
very much a construction and a
habituation. Secondly,
the
Leibnizian
calculus provides
the Baroque
understanding with a new conception of
the
infinite. The first
thing to
understand about
the
infinite is
that
spatially speaking
it
not only applies
to that
which
is larger
than
is
conceivable
but
equally applies
to that
which
is
also smaller
than
is
conceivable.
These
two
aspects of
the
infinite
can
be
331
Deleuze, The Fo14
p.
3
352
ibid,
p.
90
35'
Especially in
the
film Lost Highway
where the
first
segment plays out
in
either shifting near
darkness
or under
the
surveillance
of
light. The highway
sequences are also strongly reminiscent of
Deleuze's theories
in The Fold: `the
sealed car speeding
down
the
dark highway, '
p.
137
354
ibid,
p.
93
115
seen
in
the thought
of
Nicholas
of
Cusa
and
Zeno's
paradoxes respectively.
Nicholas
of
Cusa
will use
the
idea
of an
infinitely
expanded circle
to
demonstrate
the
nature of
God. If
the
radius of a circle were expanded
infinitely
then the
curvature of
the
circle
would
flatten
out
to the
limit
point of a straight
line. In
this
way
Nicholas
of
Cusa
will argue
that
everything
is
enfolded within
the
straight
line
of
God. In
contrast
Zeno's infamous
paradox of
Achilles
and
the tortoise
will show
the
effect of an
infinitely divisible
matter.
If
the tortoise
starts
the
race at point
A
ahead of
Achilles,
then
for Achilles
to
catch up with
the tortoise
he
must
first
reach point
A, but by
this
time the tortoise
will
have
moved
to
point
B, by
the time
Achilles has
reached point
B
the tortoise
will
have
reached point
C. In fact Achilles
will never
be
able
to
catch
up with
the tortoise
and
the tortoise
acts as a
limit
point which
Achilles
will
draw
closer and closer
to
but
never reach.
For
the
first
time the
calculus provided a
concrete way
to
conceive of
the
infinite
as a
limit in
the
form
of a
tangent
or rate of
change
(the
relation of
two
objects whose velocities are uniformly variable).
Deleuze
will utilise
these
new conceptions
to
explore
the
percept of
the
fold. The fold is itself
framed by
the
notion of a
Baroque house.
The Baroque House
The basis
of
the
Baroque house is
to
be found in
the
differentiation between building
and
landscape
which
is
embodied
in
the
structure of
the
Baroque house itself. The
Baroque house is
composed of
two
floors. The
top
floor is
an enclosed chamber
filled
with
the
`folds
of
the
soul' and approximates most closely with
Leibniz's idea
of
the
monad
-
without windows.
The
ground
floor however is
more mysterious still,
it
consists of rooms with windows
but
the
windows
do
not provide an opening
from
the
inside
to the
outside
but from
an exterior onto another exterior.
These
are
the
pleats
of matter.
Matter
and soul
form
two
very
different
types
of
labyrinth.
For Leibniz
matter
has
the
characteristic of
infinite divisibility:
Every
portion of matter can
be
thought
of as a garden
full
of plants, or as
a pond
full
of
fish. But
every
branch
of
the
plant, every part of
the
animal, and every
drop
of
its
vital
fluids, is
another such garden, or
another such pond.
And
although the
earth and
the
air
in between
the
plants
in
the
garden, and
the
water
in between
the
fish in
the
pond, are not
116
themselves
plants or
fish,
they
do
nevertheless contain others,
though
usually
they
are so
tiny
as
to
be imperceptible
to
us.
355
The
unit of
division is
the
fold. As
we may see
in
the
above quotation, matter
is
enfolded
like
a series of caverns, cavern within cavern.
From
a perceptual viewpoint
it is
as
if
at
the
hypothetical last
cavern one may
found
a
`quale'
of colour
itself.
Leibniz
will say
that
matter
is
organised
through two
forces. In
the
first instance
although matter
is infinitely divisible
this
is
according
to
a
logic
of
the
fold. That is,
it
cannot
be infinitely divisible in itself
or
by
the
atom as
it
would
have
no cohesion
or continuity:
...
we should
think
of space as
full
of matter which
is initially fluid,
capable of every sort of
division
and
indeed
actually
divided
and
subdivided
to
infinity; but
with
this
difference,
that
how it is divisible
and
divided
varies
from
place
to
place,
because
of variations
in
the
extent
to
which
the
movements
in it
are more or
less harmonious. That is
what
brings it
about
that
matter
has
everywhere some
degree
of rigidity as well
as
fluidity,
and
that
no
body is
either
hard
or
fluid in
the
ultimate
degree
-
we
find in it
no
invincibly hard
atoms and no mass
that
can
be divided
as
356
easily
in
any manner as
in
any other.
Neither fluid
nor rigid
the
first
principle of
the
fold is `elasticity'
and
in
this
way
both
the
problems of cohesion and continuity are solved.
In
the
second
instance
although
for Leibniz the
elastic
force
of matter
furnishes
us with
the
mechanical
laws
of nature
it is
not
itself
enough
to
explain
the
organisation of organic matter:
`...
the
laws
of
mechanism
by
themselves
could not
form
an animal where
there
is
nothing already
organised.
'357 Here Leibniz is dealing
with a common
debate in
seventeenth century
philosophy:
the
relation
between
soul and
body. His
position on
this
debate is
immediately
against
the Cartesians for
whom matter
is
simply mechanical.
358
1s5
Leibniz (1714), Monadology, 67-68, in G. W. Leibniz (1998) Philosophical Texts,
trans.
and ed.
R. S. Woolhouse
and
R. Francks. Oxford: University Press,
p.
277, hereafter denoted
as
Philosophical
Texts.
356
G. W. Leibniz (1996,
orig.
1704) New Essays
on
Human Understanding,
eds.
P. Remnant
and
J.
Bennett. Cambridge: University Press,
p.
59-60
33'
Leibniz (1969,
orig.
1705) Considerations
on
vital Principles
and
Plastic Natures, by
the author of
the
System
ofPre-established
Harmony, in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1969) Philosophical Papers
and
Letters,
a selection
trans.
and ed., with an
Introduction by L. E. Loemker. Dordrecht: Reidel,
p.
589, hereafter denoted
as
Philosophical
Papers
358
See
especially
the
article
Nature
Itself,
" or,
The Inherent Force
and
Activity
of
Created Things
-
117
However,
as
Deleuze
points out
Leibniz's
problem with
the
Cartesians is
not
for
espousing mechanism
but for
not
being
mechanical enough:
...
it is
not
because living
matter exceeds mechanical processes,
but
because
mechanisms are not sufficient
to
be
machines.
A
mechanism
is
faulty
not
for being
too
artificial
to
account
for living
matter,
but for
not
being
mechanical enough,
for
not
being
adequately machined.
Our
mechanisms are
in fact
organised
into
parts
that
are not
in
themselves
machines, while
the
organism
is infinitely
machined, a machine whose
every part or piece
is
a machine
....
359
Leibniz
expresses
the
idea
that
organisms are organised according
to
a second
principle of
the
fold:
plasticity.
It is important
to
distinguish here between Leibniz's
use of plastic natures and
those
presented
in
the
work of
his
contemporaries
More,
Cudworth,
and von
Helmont
who used plastic natures as an
immaterial
principle
360
For Leibniz,
the
immaterial,
that
is,
the
monad, can
have
no affect on or
be
affected
by
matter and
hence
plastic
forces
are solely a material phenomenon:
...
if
matter
is
arranged
by divine
wisdom,
it
must
be
essentially organised
throughout
and
that there
must
be
machines
in
the
parts of
the
natural
machine
into infinity,
so many enveloping structures and so many organic
bodies
enveloped, one within
the
other,
that
one can never produce any
organic
body
entirely anew and without any preformation, nor any more
destroy
entirely an animal which already exists
...
this
preformation and
this
infinitely
complex organism provide me with material plastic
361
natures....
The
organism always exists
in
some
form
whether
this
be
a seed or egg which
unfolds
in life
and enfolds again
in death
362
To be
sure
Leibniz's
approach
to
matter
is
preset
by his
response
to the
soul/body
debate in
the
form
of
his
theory
of pre-
established
harmony
as set out
in
the
New System
of
the
Nature
of
Substances
and
363
their
Communication,
and of
the
Union
which
Exists between
the
Soul
and
Body.
Confirming
and
Illustrating
the
Author's Dynamics, in Philosophical Texts,
pp.
209-222
's9
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
8
360
See Wilson (1989),
especially
Chapter 5,
pp.
159-202
36'
Leibniz (1705) Considerations
on
Vital Principles
and
Plastic Natures, in Philosophical Papers,
p.
589
It is
tempting to
use
DNA
as a
limited
example of such an
idea.
363
Leibniz
(1694) in Philosophical Texts,
pp.
143-152
118
That is, Leibniz
sees soul and
body
as
being
completely separate
but
they
both
progress
in harmony
as
if
governed
by
the
same clock.
However, if
soul and
body
are
completely separate
then
how does
one progress
from
the
labyrinth
of matter
to the
labyrinth
of
the
soul?
Leibniz
will say
that
due
to the
`infinite'
nature of
God he
can
but
choose and create
the
best
possible world,
that
is
continuity
in
the
folds
of matter
that
fills
up
the
most space without gaps and absolute
freedom in
the
folds
of
the
soul.
To
move
from
one
to the
other we shall require a
further
explication of
the
notion of a
limit
and
the
mathematics of
the
fold.
Calculus
of
the Fold
Martial Gueroult
tells
us
in his
study
`Space, Point,
and
Void in Leibniz's
Philosophy'
that
Leibniz distinguishes between
three
different kinds
of points.
364
He
summarises
these
as
follows:
(i)
the
metaphysical point, which
is
unextended substance;
it is
exact and
real;
(ii)
the
mathematical point, which
is
the
point of view
from
which
each substance expresses
the
universe;
it is
exact,
but
unreal
-
it is
a
modality or an aspect of real
terms;
and
(iii)
the
physical point, which
is
the
restriction of
the
parts of corporeal substances such
that they
appear
as a point
-
this
latter is
not rigorously a point,
but
an
infinitely
small
extension;
it is
real,
but inexact.
365
In The Fold Deleuze
will use
the
same
distinctions
as
Gueroult. The
physical point
is
the
elastic or plastic point
fold
which
is inexact
or perhaps
`non-local'
as
it
can
be
infinitely divided. The
mathematical point
is
exact
to the
extent
that
it
acts as a
limit
(as in
the
extremum of a
line)
and
defines
position or point of view
but is
nevertheless an
ideal determination
of a
body. The
metaphysical point
is
that
which
occupies point of view.
Deleuze
will
term these
`the
point of
inflection,
the
point of
position, and
the
point of
inclusion'
respectively.
366
It is
the
mathematics
of
the
fold
that
links
these
points
together.
164
M. Gueroult (1982,
orig.
1946) `Space, Point,
and
Void in Leibniz's Philosophy' in Hooker, M.
Leibniz: Critical
and
Interpretive
essays.
Manchester:
University Press,
pp.
284-301
365
ibid,
p.
290
366
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
23
119
Deleuze begins
with
the
physical point of
inflection: `Inflection is
the
ideal
genetic element of
the
variable curve or
fold. Inflection is
the
authentic atom,
the
elastic point.
' So
what
is
an
inflection? Here
we are
lead back
to the
notion of
singularity
and perhaps where we
find
the theory
of singularity
in its `purest' form
as
Deleuze
will present
it in his Leibniz lectures:
[The]
...
great mathematical
discovery is
that
singularity
is
no
longer
thought
in
relation
to the
universal,
but is
thought
rather
in
relation
to the
ordinary or
to the
regular.
The
singular
is
what exceeds
the
ordinary and
the
regular.
And
saying
that
already
takes
us a great
distance
since saying
it indicates
that,
henceforth,
we wish
to
make singularity
into
a
philosophical concept.
367
To demonstrate the
idea
of singularity
Deleuze
provides
the
example of a square.
The
square
has four
singular points
(its
comers or vertices) as opposed
to the
regular
points which we could
imagine
compose
its
sides.
However,
the
square
is
really a
continuous
figure. The
vertices are
its `extreme. ' The
square
is
a rectilinear
figure for
which
it is
easy
to
identify its
extrema or singularities.
But determining
the
singularities
of curves
is
more
difficult. For
this
we need
to
make use of
differential
calculus.
Let
us consider a simple curve:

The
singularity or extremum of
this
figure
will
be
the
point
A-
the
unique point of
the
curve where
dy/dx
or
the
rate of change changes sign.
That is,
this
is
where
the
curve
`inflects. ' In
the
Leibniz lectures Deleuze
provides
the
following formula for
mathematical
singularity:
...
a singularity
is
a
distinct
or
determined
point on a curve,
it's
a point
in
the
neighbourhood of which the
differential
relation changes
its
sign, and
36'
Gilles Deleuze (1980) `Leibniz Lecture 2, '
trans.
C. J. Stivale,
p.
5,
available
from
www. webdeleuze. com
120
the
singular point's characteristic
is
to
extend
[prolonger] itself into
the
whole series of ordinary points
that
depend
on
it
all
the
way
to the
neighbourhood of subsequent singularities.
So I
maintain
that the theory
of singularities
is inseparable from
a
theory
of an activity of extension
[prolongemont].
368
In The Fold Deleuze draws
on
the
mathematician
Bernard Cache
to
describe
three
mathematical
transformations
of
the
fold:
vectorial, projective and variable.
369
Tie
first
transformation
changes
the
`direction'
of
the
inflected line
producing at
two
possible extremes symmetrical
folds. The
second
transformation
projects
the
inflection
onto a plane
thereby
producing
`exterior'
folds from
the
now original
interior folds. The
third transformation
submits
the
inflected line
to the
form
of an
infinitely
variable curve
(most famously known
through
Mandelbrot's fractals)
multiplying
levels into
a vortical
form. At this
point
the
inflection is
no
longer
vectorial or projective
but is infinitely
variable or
fluctuated. In
this
way
Deleuze
will
define
the
inflection
as
infinite
variation.
How do
modern
ideas
about
inflection
relate
to
Leibniz's
conception?
It
was
Nicholas
of
Cusa
who
first introduced
the
idea
that
if
the
radius of a circle was
extended
to
infinity
then
it
would
be
a straight
line. That is,
the `reason'
of
the
curve
is
to
be found in
the
straight
line
of
God. Both Leibniz
and
Deleuze dispute
the
mathematical validity of
this
idea in
that
a straight
line has
a uniform variability.
The
situation
is different
when we consider
irrational
numbers
(such
as n) or
the
differential
quotient.
As Deleuze
states:
`The irrational
number
is
the
common
limit
of
the
relation
between
two
convergent series, of which one
has
no maximum and
the
other no minimum.
The differential
quotient
is
the
common
limit
of
the
relation
between two
quantities
that
are vanishing.
'370 In both
these
cases a straight
line,
the
asymptote
and
the tangent,
acts a simple
limit
and
does
not give
the
reason of
the
curved
line. That is, it does
not explain variability.
Michel Serres
suggests
Leibniz
provides
the
following
solution:
Instead
of seeking
the
unique straight
tangent
in
a unique point
for
a
M
ibid,
p.
50
369
Deleuze, The Fold,
pp.
15-17
370
ibid,
p.
17
121
given curve, we can go about seeking
the tangent
curve
in
an
infinity
of
points with an
infinity
of curves;
the
curve
is
not
touched,
it is
touching,
the tangent
no
longer
either straight, unique, or
touching,
but
now
being
curvilinear, an
infinite,
touched
family.
371
Such
a
`curvilinear tangent'
of
the
world would
have
a
`single
and unique variability'
which provides
the
reason
for
the
fold. The fold
presents us with a new conception of
the
object, or as
Deleuze
terms
it
an
`objectile, '
as a modulation of matter.
372
With
the transformation
of
the
object
there
is
also a
transformation
of
the
subject as a point
of view on variation:
We
move
from inflection
or
from
variable curvature
to
vectors of
curvature
that
go
in
the
direction
of concavity.
Moving from
a
branching
of
inflection,
we
distinguish
a point
that
is
no
longer
what runs along
inflection,
nor
is it
the
point of
inflection itself; it is
the
one
in
which
lines
perpendicular
to tangents
meet
in
a state of variation.
It is
not
exactly a point
but
a place..
373
To describe
this
diagrammatically:
0
A
Pout
of
view
On
any concave curve
there
are a potentially
infinite
number of points of view.
It is
perhaps only with
the
mathematical point
that
Deleuze's interpretation
of
Leibniz
will
differ from
the
distinctions
set up
by Gueroult. In Gueroult's distinctions
the
mathematical point
is
exact and unreal,
that
is, it is
exact
in ideal
mathematical terms.
However
for Deleuze
the
mathematical point
loses
exactitude
in becoming
a place or
site of a
differential
viewpoint.
The
point of view
does become
exact
in
the
special
case of a closed curve or circle
but in
this
special case we are no
longer dealing
with
"'
ibid,
pp.
18-19, Serres (1982),
p.
197
3n
ibid,
p.
19
373
ibid.
122
the
mathematical point
but
that
which
takes
up point of view
-
the
metaphysical point
or monad.
On
the
level
of
the
monad we
find
a
`condition
of closure' whereupon
the
monad
is
the
locus
of a convergent series.
Deleuze's
trajectory
of
the
calculus of
the
fold has
taken
us
`from inflection
to
inclusion. '374
Deleuze's Thesis
Having
elaborated
the
mathematics of
the
fold Deleuze
will
first
raise
his
materialist
thesis
on
Leibniz. This is
posed
in
terms
of where
the
principle of
the
fold is located:
God
produces
the
world
"before"
creating souls since
he
creates
them
for
this
world
that
he invests in
them.
In
this
way
the
law
of
infinite
seriality,
the
"law
of curvatures,
"
no
longer
resides
in
the
soul, although seriality
may
be
the
soul, and although curvatures may
be it.
375
The
point at stake
is
that
if
the
monad can
be deduced from
a mathematical
materialism
then
can
it be
maintained
that
it is fore-closed
to the
outside when
it is
from
the
outside we
find
the
origin of
its
principle.
To
explore
this
further
we will
next
turn to
Deleuze's
elaboration of
the
metaphysical constitution of
the
monad.
Metaphysics
of
the
Monad
So far
we
have
seen
the
physical and mathematical application of
the
fold but
the
question now arises of
how
this
relates
to the
folds in
the
soul,
that
is,
the
monad.
Leibniz's
own
formulation
of
this
is
well
known: `...
the
nature of an
individual
substance or of a complete
being is
to
have
a notion so complete
that
it is
sufficient
to
include,
and
to
allow
the
deduction
of, all
the
predicates of
the
subject
to
which
that
notion
is
attributed.
'376 The logical form
of
this
principle
is
that the
predicate
is
included in
the
subject.
We have
already seen
how Deleuze's
calculus of
the
fold
leads from inflection
to
inclusion
and
Deleuze
will now apply this to the
metaphysics
of
the
fold:
374
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
22
375
ibid,
p.
25
376
Leibniz (1686) Discourse
on
Metaphysics, 8, in Philosophical
Texts,
p.
60
123
Inflection
is
the
event
that
happens
to the
line
or
to the
point.
Inclusion is
the
predication
that
places
inflection in
the
concept of
the
line
or
the
point,
that
is, in
this
other point
that
will
be
called metaphysical.
We
go
from inflection
to
inclusion just
as we move
from
the
event of
the thing
to the
predicate of
the
notion, or
from "seeing" to
"reading. " What
we see
on
the thing
we read
in its
concept or notion
[... ] Sufficient
reason
is
inclusion; in
other words,
the
identity
of
the
event and
the
predicate.
Sufficient
reason proclaims,
"Everything has
a concept!
"37
For Leibniz
sufficient reason
is
the
philosophical principle
that there
is `nothing
without
a reason' and can
be
seen as correlative with
the
complete notion concept
-
for
an
individual
substance
to
be
complete
it
can neither
be
affected
by influx
or
accidents
and already
have its
predicates pre-established.
On
the
metaphysical
level
Deleuze
will use sufficient reason as
the
principle of
the
fold: `If
an event
is
called
what
happens to
a
thing,
whether
it
undergoes
the
event or makes
it happen, it
can
be
said
that
sufficient reason
is
what
includes
the
event as one of
its
predicates:
the
concept
of
the thing,
or
the
notion.
'378 Shortly
we shall embark on an analysis of
Deleuze's
deduction
of
the
monad
through
sufficient reason
however it
will
first be
useful
to
set
Deleuze's
approach on
this
matter within other recent studies on
Leibniz.
Reason
and
Harmony
We
may already see
that
Deleuze
takes
subject-predicate
logic
to
be
an
important
part
of
his interpretation
of
Leibniz. In
this
we may see
that this
part of
his
study
falls
very
much
within
the
Couturat-Russell
tradition
of
Leibniz
studies
(although
setting
this
within
the
elaboration of
the
fold
will provide
for
a
deeper level
of analysis).
However,
as we outlined
in
the
introduction
to this
chapter
the
Couturat-Russell
tradition
has been increasingly
coming under attack
in
the
Leibniz literature.
Two
particularly
pertinent studies
here
are
those
by Mercer
and
Wilson. Mercer
argues
that the main motivation of
Leibniz's
philosophy
is
to
be found in
a neo-Platonic
377
Deleuze,
The Fold,
p.
41
373
ibid,
p.
42
124
theory
of emanation.
379
From
this
perspective
the
subject-predicate
logic is
operating
from
the
position of a re-Platonised
Aristotle. Wilson focuses
on
the
fact
that the
subject-predicate
logic is from Leibniz's
mid-period writings and
is hence
erroneous
to
apply
it
to
his later
writings which operate according
to
`an
ontology of
individuals
conceived of as a collection' rather
than
`an
ontology of events conceived of as a
series.
'
380
We
shall now
investigate
these
matters
further by
turning to
Louis
Couturat's
central
thesis
on sufficient reason.
In
the
1902
essay
`On Leibniz's Metaphysics' Couturat draws
support
for his
thesis that
sufficient reason
is derived from
the
subject-predicate
logic by
using
the
then
recently
discovered Leibnizian document
which
has
come
to
be
called
First
Truths.
381
In
this
document Leibniz
proceeds
to the
principle of sufficient reason
in
the
following
manner.
He begins by defining
truth
in
terms
of a principle of
identity:
`First
truths are
those
which predicate something of
itself
or
deny
the
opposite of
its
opposite.
For
example,
A is A,
or
A is
not non-A....
082
Leibniz
then
goes on
to
say:
`All
other
truths
are reduced
to
first
truths
with
the
aid of
definitions
or
by
the
analysis of concepts;
in
this
consists proof a priori....
9383 That
is, all
`derived'
or
`secondary' truths
can
be
reduced
through
analysis
into
their
component parts or
identities. From
this
procedure
Leibniz
concludes:
`The
predicate or consequent
therefore
inheres in
the
subject or antecedent
[... ] In identities
this
connection and
the
inclusion
of
the
predicate
in
the
subject are explicit;
in
all other propositions
they
are
implied
and must
be
revealed
through the
analysis of concepts.
384
This is in
turn
a principle of sufficient reason:
These
matters
have
not
been
adequately considered
because
they
are
too
easy,
but
there
follow from
them
many
things
of great
importance. At
once
they
give rise
to the
accepted axiom
that there
is
nothing without a
reason, or no effect without a cause.
Otherwise there
would
be
no
truth
which could
be
proved a priori or resolved
into identities
-
contrary to the
379
Mercer (2001),
especially
Chapter 5,
pp.
173-205
380
Wilson (1989),
p.
70
381
An
undated piece named after the
opening words primae veratates, generally considered
to
be
written
circa
1680-84, Philosophical Papers,
pp.
267-271; Philosophical Writings,
pp.
87-92
382
Philosophical Papers,
p.
267
383
ibid.
384
ibid,
pp.
267-8
125
nature of
truth,
which
is
always either expressly or
implicitly identical.
385
Couturat
comments on
these
matters:
`The
principle of
identity
states: every
identity
(analytic)
proposition
is
true.
The
principle of reason affirms, on
the
contrary, every
true
proposition
is
an
identity (analytic). Its
effect
is
to
subordinate all
truths to the
principle of
identity. '386 While
the
material
in First Truths does
seem
to
affirm
Couturat's thesis, two
qualifications need
to
be
taken
into
account.
First,
as
the
translator
Leroy Loemker
notes
`the
paper moves
by
means of
definitions from
an
abstract principle of
identity
to
more complete concepts and more concrete
principles.
Many
of
these
definitions
are
basically
metaphysical
in
character.
'387 That
is,
truth
and
the
principle of
identity
are
themselves not
devoid
of metaphysical
content.
The
second qualification
is
somewhat paradoxical
to the
first. To
the
extent
that truth
is treated
as a
logical determination
can
the
case
be
made
that
sufficient
reason
is
essentially
tautological? The
tautological
character of sufficient reason
is
most clearly
to
be
seen
in Leibniz's
writings of
the
1670's. Recent
studies
by Wilson
and another modem
Leibniz
scholar
Robert Merrihew Adams
remark
that these
early
writings provide a
further
problem
for Couturat's thesis
in
that
Leibniz discusses
sufficient reason without recourse
to the
subject-predicate
logic.
388
In
these
early
writings sufficient reason
is discussed in
terms
of
two
different but
not exclusive
ways:
logic
and
the
harmony
of
God.
In
the
work
Demonstratio Propositionum Primarum from
the
early
1670's
(dated 1671-2) Leibniz devised
a proof
for
the
principle of sufficient reason which
proceeds as
follows:
385
ibid. 268
386
Coururat (1994),
p.
2
387
Philosophical Papers,
p.
267
388
Wilson (1989),
p.
70; Adams, R. M. (1994)
Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford:
University Press,
pp.
67-71
126
Proposition:
Nothing is
without a reason,
or whatever
is has
a sufficient reason.
Definition 1. A
sufficient reason
is
that
which
is
such
that
if it is
posited
the thing
is.
Definition 2. A
requirement
is
that
which
is
such
that
if it is
not posited
the thing
is
not.
Demonstration:
Whatever is, has
all
[its]
requirements.
For if
one
[of
them]
is
not posited
the thing
is
not
by def. 2.
If
all
[its]
requirements are posited,
the thing
is.
For if it is
not,
it
will
be kept from being by
the
lack
of
something,
that
is,
a requirement.
Therefore
all
the
Requirements
are a sufficient reason
by def. 1.
Therefore
whatever
is has
a sufficient reason.
Q. E. D.
389
In the
contemporary
literature R. C. Sleigh's
study
`Leibniz
on
the
Two Great
Principles
of all our
Reasonings'
seems
to
have been
the
first
to
discuss
this
proof.
39'
Sleigh
states:
`A difficulty
with
the
argument stares one
in
the
face. Note
that the
reason given
for
the
second step
-
i.
e.,
the
collection of all
the
requisites of a
thing
constitutes a sufficient condition of
it
-
is
not a consequence of either
definition [... ]
the
aroma of question
begging fills
the
air.
s391 However, Adams does
not seem
to
consider
this
a problem when
he
says:
`The
crucial premise of
the
proof
is
that
nothing can
fail
to
exist except
for lack
of a requirement
(i.
e., a necessary condition)
of
its
existence.
'392 The important
point
here is
the
interpretation
of a
`requirement. '
How does Leibniz define
this
concept?
In
the
Letter
to
Magnus Wedderhopf (May,
1671) Leibniz
will
discuss
sufficient reason
in
terms
of
God's harmony
and
perfection.
393
In
the
letter Leibniz
states:
`Since God is
the
most perfect mind
...
it is
impossible for him
not
to
be
affected
by
the
most perfect
harmony. '394 By 1676
the
notion of
God's
perfection will
be
posited
in
a more extant
form
as an
`ens
I"
Adams (1994),
p.
68,
trans. Adams
390
R. C. Sleigh (1983) `Leibniz
on
the Two Great principles
of all our
Reasonings, '
reprinted
in
Woolhouse
(1994),
pp.
31-57
391
ibid,
p.
43
392
Adams (1994),
p.
68
393
Leibniz (1671) Letter
to
Magnus Wedderhopf in philosophical papers,
pp.
146-7
394
ibid,
p.
146
127
perfectissimum.
' An
ens perfectisimum or
`most
perfect
being' is
a
`subject
of all
perfections' where a perfection
is `every
simple quality which
is
positive and
absolute or which expresses whatever
it
expresses without
limits.
""
In
turn
Leibniz
calls
the
divine
perfections
the
"`first
requirements" of
things.
396
These
matters
become
clearer when we consider
the
following
passage:
...
now
it
seems
to
be
proved,
further,
that
a
Being
of
this
sort, which
is
most perfect,
is
necessary.
For it
cannot
be
unless
it has
a reason
for
existing
from itself
or
from
something else.
It
cannot
have it from
something else,
because
everything
that
can
be
understood
in
something
else can already
be
understood
in it
-
that
is, because
we conceive
it
through
itself,
or
because it has
no requirements outside
itself.
397
Given the
qualification
that
a requirement
is
a perfection conceived through God,
Sleigh's
objection
is
perhaps unjustified:
Leibniz
could
have
simply
fashioned his
proof
better
through the
elaboration of more
definitions.
At this
point we may see
that Leibniz's
early notion of sufficient reason
is
a
mixture of
inclusion (God is
the
subject of all perfections) and a certain causal
principle which
has
a
Spinozistic flavour.
Here
we may
bring
to
mind
the
first
and
third
definitions
of
Spinoza's Ethics:
`By
cause of
itself I
understand that
whose
essence
involves
existence, or
that
whose nature cannot
be
conceived except as
existing' and
`By
substance
I
understand that
which
is in itself
and conceived
through
itself. '398 On
this
point
Adams
raises
a more pertinent objection
to
Leibniz's
proof of
sufficient reason:
...
anyone who
denies
the Principle
of
Sufficient Reason
will suppose that
when all
the
necessary conditions
of a
thing's
existence are given, there
might still remain
both
a possibility
of
its
existing and a possibility
of
its
not existing
-
unless
trivially
necessary conditions
(such
as a
thing's
existence
itself)
are
included
here
among
its
requirements....
3
395
Leibniz (1676) Two Notations for Discussion
with
Spinoza, in Philosophical
Papers,
p.
167
396
Adams (1994),
p.
117
"'
Leibniz (1676) Paris Notes, trans. Adams
(1994),
p.
151
38
B. de Spinoza (1994) A Spinoza
Reader.
The
Ethics
and
Other Works,
ed. and
trans.
E. Curley.
Princeton: University Press,
p.
85
399
Adams (1994),
p.
68
128
That is, if
existence were
included in
essence
then the
principle of sufficient reason
would
lead
to
Spinozism: individuals
would
be
nothing more
than
modalities of
the
infinite
substance of
God. To be
sure
Leibniz
also recognised
this
point and
he
tells
us
in
the
paper
On Freedom:
For
my part,
I
used
to
consider
that
nothing
happens by
chance or
by
accident, except with respect
to
certain particular substances
...
and
that
nothing exists unless
its individual
requisites are given, and
that
from
all
these taken together
it follows
that the thing
exists.
So I
was not
far from
the
view of
those
who
think that
all
things
are absolutely necessary
[a
reference
to
Spinoza] [... ] But I
was
dragged back from
this
precipice
by
a consideration of
those
possibles which neither
do
exist, nor will exist,
nor
have
existed.
400
Towards
the
end of
his life Leibniz
will
famously
say
Spinoza `would be
right
if
there
were no monads.
'401 How does
this
affect
Leibniz's
version of
the
principle of
sufficient reason?
In
the
early version of sufficient reason we
have
seen
that
Leibniz
applied
it
as a strong
logical
principle even
in
relation
to
his
notion of
God. In
the
Letter
to
Magnus Wedderhopf he
states:
...
it is
necessary
to
refer everything
to
some reason, and we cannot stop
until we
have
arrived at a
first
cause
-
or
it
must
be
admitted
that
something can exist without a sufficient reason
for its
existence, and
this
admission
destroys
the
demonstration
of
the
existence of
God
and of
many philosophical
theorems [... J What
then
is
the
reason
for
the
divine
intellect? The harmony
of
things.
What
the
reason
for
the
harmony
of
things?
Nothing.
402
Here
we
find
that the
first
cause
is
the
harmony
of
things
which cannot
be
analysed
further. The harmony
of
things
is
synonymous with
the
most perfect
being but
the
perfections
of
God
are
themselves
derived
through
analysis.
In Leibniz's later
views
he
will specifically
deny
this
final
point.
This is
most clearly seen
in Leibniz's
rebuttal of
Spinoza. Adams
notes:
400
Leibniz
(1689) On Freedom, in Philosophical
writings,
p.
106
411
Leibniz
(1714) Letter
to
Louis Bourguet, in Philosophical Papers,
p.
663
402
Leibniz
(1671) Letter
to
Magnus Wedderhopf in Philosophical Papers,
p.
146
129
...
whereas on
15 April 1676 he [Leibniz]
wrote
that ' God
...
is
everything.
Creatures
are somethings,
' he
wrote
to
Eckhard
on
the
28`h
of
the
following April
that 'it
seems
to
be impossible for
there to
be
a
Being
that
is
everything;
for it
could
be
said of such a
Being
that
it is
you and
it
is
also me....
3
Likewise,
later in 1678 Leibniz
objects
to the third
definition
of
the
Ethics
('By
substance
I
understand
that
which
is in itself
and
is
conceived
through
itself): `...
on
the
contrary,
it
seems rather
that there
are some
things that
are
in
themselves
even
if
they
are not conceived through themselves.
And
that
is how
people commonly
conceive of substance.
'404 To
make
this
distinction
clearer
Leibniz
will state
in
the
paper
On
the
Abstract
and
the
Concrete: `...
the
reality of creatures
is
not
that
very
reality
that
in God is
absolute,
but
a
limited
reality,
for
that
is
of
the
essence of a
creature.
'405 Adams
remarks on
this
quotation:
`...
the
limited
and
the
absolute or
unlimited reality are
different, indeed
incompatible,
attributes and
hence
are not
present
in
the
same subject.
'
This is
to
say
that the
requirements of
God
are not
the
same as
the
requirements of
limited
substances.
Leibniz
will now call
these
`limited'
requirements
`constituents. '407 So
we
find
that the
strong
logical form
of
the
principle
of sufficient reason can no
longer be
applied
to the
requirements of
God. In
this
we
find
a certain
theory
of
truth
which
Leibniz
elaborates
in An Introduction
to
a
Secret
Encyclopaedia:
An
analysis of concepts
by
which we are enabled
to
arrive at primitive
notions,
i.
e. at
those
which are conceived
through themselves,
does
not
seem
to
be in
the
power of man.
But
the
analysis of
truths
is
more
in
human
power,
for
we can
demonstrate
many
truths
absolutely and reduce
them to
primitive
indemonstrable
truth
....
408
The
important
point
to
note
is
that there
are
two
different
versions of sufficient
reason.
We
may see
that
one of
these
versions
is derived from
subject-predicate
logic
and
is directly
connected to
Leibniz's
theory
of
truth.
However,
there
is
also a second
403
Adams (1994),
pp.
130-1
404
Leibniz (1678) On
the
Ethics
of
Benedict de Spinoza,
trans.
Adams (1994),
p.
131; Philosophical
Papers, 196
405
Leibniz (1688) On
the Abstract
and
the Concrete,
trans. Adams (1994),
p.
133
406
Adams (1994),
p.
133
407
ibid.
40S
Leibniz (1679) An Introduction
to
a
Secret Encyclopaedia, in Philosophical Writings,
p.
8
130
version of sufficient reason
that
results
from
the
pre-established
harmony
of
God's
perfection.
We
shall now examine
how
effective
Deleuze is in drawing
these two
variations
together
in his deduction
of
the
monad.
Preliminaries
As
a preliminary
to
his
analysis
Deleuze
raises
the
problem of whether
the
concept
(or individual
notion) as
defined by
predicates-as-events
holds for
every
inclusion.
Here Deleuze is
taking
his lead from 8
of
the
Discourse
on
Metaphysics
where
Leibniz
states:
`It
is
certainly
true that
when several predicates are attributed
to the
same
subject, and
this
subject
is
not attributed
to
any other,
it is
called an
individual
substance.
But
that
is
not enough, and such an explanation
is
only nominal.
It is
necessary,
therefore, to
consider what
it is
to
be
truly
attributed
to
a certain subject.
'`
In
response
to this
demand
Deleuze introduces
the
Leibnizian distinction between
necessary
truths
(of
essence) and contingent
truths
(of
existence):
...
we encounter
the
distinction
of
two
great
types
of
inclusion
or analysis,
analysis
being
the
operation
that
discovers
a predicate
in
a notion
taken
as
a subject, or a subject
for
an event
taken
as a predicate.
Leibniz
seems
to
be
saying
that
in
the
case of necessary propositions or
truths
of essence
("2
plus
2
equals
4"),
the
predicate
is
expressly
included in
the
notion,
while,
for
contingent existences
("Adam
sins,
" "Caesar
crosses
the
Rubicon"), inclusion is
only
implicit
or virtual.
410
In
terms
of
this
designation Deleuze
asks whether we are
to
understand
that
analysis
is finite in
the
case of necessary
truths
and
indefinite in
the
case of contingent truths.
For
if
this
were so
then
finite
analysis would
be
contrary
to the
infinite
nature of
God's
essence, and similarly,
indefinite
analysis would
be
contrary
to the
infinite
existence of
the
world
in
God's
understanding.
To
see
this
is
not
the
case
Deleuze
turns to the
nature of
definition itself. Deleuze
states:
`A definition
posits
the
identity
I
Leibniz (1686) Discourse
on
Metaphysics, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
59
410
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
42
131
of one
term
(the defined)
with at
least
two
other
terms
(definers
or reasons).
4"
Here
we may see
there
is
a reciprocal relation
between the
defined
and
its definers. An
example
Deleuze
provides
is
that
3 is defined by 2
and
1. Deleuze
makes
four
remarks on
this
operation.
First, definitions
are genetic and
determine
the
possibility
of
the
defined. That is, before
we can
define 3 (2
and
1)
we must
define
what
2 is;
before
we can
define 2
we must
define
what
1 is,
etc.
Second, definitions
are purely
functional,
as
Deleuze
says:
`definitions
of
this
kind
never operate
by
genre and
difference. They
solicit neither
the
comprehension,
the
extension of a concept,
abstraction,
nor generality
that
would, moreover, go
back
to
nominal
definitions. '412
Or to
go
back
to the
mathematical analogy all numbers are
defined
as a
function
of
the
number
1. Third,
analysis provides us with a chain or series of reciprocal
inclusions,
as we see
in
the
definition
of
3
as
2
and
1
above.
Fourth, the
definers
of a
definition
precede
the
definition
as
the
condition of possibility
for
the
defined.
If
we now return
to the
matter of
the
nature of analysis we may see
that the
reason
truths
of essence would seem
to
be finite is because if
we were
to
continue
along a chain of
definitions
we can posit
that
we would eventually arrive at original
definers. That is,
reasons
that
have
no other
definers
and would consequently
be
`undefinable.
' However
this
positing
is
a matter of setting an artificial
limit
to
analysis and stopping
the
chain
to
define
a
definition
as a
definer. On
the
other
hand
an analysis of contingent existencies would seem
to
be indefinite
as one would never
be
able
to
find
an appropriate place
to
stop
in
the
chain
(e.
g.
in
the
infinite
series of
causes
that
lead Caesar
to
cross
the
Rubicon). But in
this
case unless one was
to
consider
the
infinite
series of causes of
the
world
in
any situation one would end up
with only nominal rather
than
real
definitions
anyway.
413
The
purpose
behind Deleuze's
preliminary
discussion
on
the
nature of
analysis
is
a matter of
determining
where
to
start
in
the
deduction
of
the
monad.
Obviously,
in
order
to
provide a genetic account of
the
monad one must
first
start
with a real
definition. We have
seen
that theoretically at
least
any chain of
definitions
must start with
definers
or undefinable notions.
Although it
may not
be
possible
to
411
ibid,
p.
43
412
ibid.
413
see
ibid,
pp.
51-2
132
know
what
these
are
it is
possible
to
infer
their
nature:
These
undefinables are obviously not reciprocal
inclusions, like
definitions, but
they
are auto-inclusions:
they
are
Identicals in
the
pure
state, each of which
includes itself
and
includes
only
itself,
each only
capable of
being identical
to
itself. Leibniz draws identity into infinity:
the
Identical is
an auto-position of
the
infinite,
without which
identity
would remain
hypothetical (if A is,
then
A is A... ) [... ] The
principle of
identity
or, rather,
the
principle of contradiction
...
makes us
become
aware of a class of
beings,
that
of
the
Identicals,
which are complete
beings. The
principle of
identity
-
or rather, of contradiction
-
is
only
the
cry of
the
Identicals. It
cannot
be
an abstraction.
It is
a signal.
Identicals
are undefinables
in
themselves
and exist perhaps
beyond
our
ken;
they
have
no
less,
a criterion
that the
principle makes us aware of or able
to
hear.
414
Having
gained
the
starting point
for
a real
definition Deleuze
will now
turn to the
deduction
of
the
monad
itself.
Deduction
of
the Monad
Deleuze
progresses
through the
deduction
of
the
monad
through
four different
stages.
Each
of
these
stages
is defined by
a specific ordering of
infinity: `the infinite
sum of
primitive
forms (= God); infinite
series without
limits; infinite
series with
intrinsic
limits; infinite
series with extrinsic
limits
that
restore an
infinite
whole
(= World). '415
Deleuze has
already given us
the
beginning
of
the
deduction in
the
form
of
the
Identicals. These
are
the
infinite
perfections of
God,
the Alphabet,
or what
the
Kabbalists
would call
the Names
of
God, from
which everything else
is
composed.
In
themselves they
form
the
infinite
sum of
God. God is
a sum
because His
perfections
are absolute
in
themselves:
Each
one,
being included in itself
and
including
only
itself,
not
being
a
whole and
having
no parts,
has
strictly no relation with an other.
These
are pure
"disparities, " diverse
absolutes
that
cannot
be
contradicted
since
no element exists
that
one can affirm or
the
other can
deny. They
are, as
Blanchot
would say,
in
a
"nonrelation. " And
this is just
what
the
414
ibid,
pp.
43-44
415
ibid,
p.
51
133
principle of contradiction states:
it
states
that
since
two
distinct Identicals
cannot
be
contradicted
by
each other,
they
surely
form
a categorya
i6
However, if Identicals
are purely
disparate how is it
possible
for
them to
become
the
definers
of other
things?
This is because
the
`infinite infinite' is itself
the
limit
of a
second
type
of
infinity. Unlike His
perfections
God is
the `whole infinite. ' This
gives
way
to
a
derived form
of
the
infinite in
terms
of an
infinite
series
that
does
not
form
a
whole
in itself
although
its
constituents
form
a reciprocal relation of wholes and parts
within
the
series:
They
enter
into
relations
that
define
wholes and parts
to
infinity,
and are
themselves
in
reciprocal
inclusion
with
the
definers, in
accord with
the
double
antecedence.
Here
we
have
entered
into "sufficient
reason,
"
simply
because
the
definers in
their
relation are
in
each
instance
the
reason of
the
defined. Were
a relation
to
be defined,
we would say
that
it
is
the
unity of
the
nonrelation with matters of wholes-and-parts.
1
With this
derived infinity
we
have
reached
the
Combinatory
order of reality although
it
must
be
specified
that
it is God
who combines
the
Alphabet
and
this
is
no simple
combination
but
the
`unity
of a nonrelation.
' Logically
speaking we may see
that
Identicals
shape
the
derived infinity
as a
lateral
condition without entering
into
the
series,
however
this does
not explain
how
a relation can
be born
out of a non-relation.
In the
first instance
this
can
be
alleviated
by
the
idea
that
God
must
be
able
to
conceive of all possible series or worlds
before being
able
to
choose
the
best
possible
series.
Hence Deleuze
will associate
the
derivation
out of a non-relation
in
terms
of
possibility and realisation and
for
this
purpose
he
turns to the
notion of a vinculum
418
In his later
writings
Leibniz
will use
the
idea
of a vinculum or substantial
bond
to
explain
the
organisation of monads realised
in
matter.
419
Here Deleuze
will use
it
to
show
the
combination of
Identicals. The
vinculum
has
the
dual
purpose of acting
like
a wall or partition
between Identicals
while at
the
same
time
forming
substantial
bonds between
them
forming
them
into
a chain.
As
such
Identicals become
the
definers
of
definitions in
the
derived infinity.
416
ibid,
p.
44
a"
ibid,
p.
46
41$
A `vinculum' is literally
a connective
`bond. '
419
see
Leibniz (1709-15) Correspondence
with
Des Bosses, in Philosophical Papers,
pp.
601-7
134
With
the
derived infinity
we may also see
that
it forms
the
basis
of
Leibniz's
notion of matter,
that
is, it has
parts which are
themselves
wholes
but
contain
further
parts, ad
infinitum. But
what of qualities
that
fill
matter?
Here
we move
to the third
ordering of
the
infinite: infinite
series
that
`are
convergent and
tend toward
a
limit. '420 In
this
case
the
limit is
meant as an
internal limit, it is
that
which
is different
in itself:
the
differential (dy/dx). We
are no
longer dealing
with wholes and parts
but
that
which
happens
across parts
that
act as
localisable limits,
that
is, intensities
and
characteristics.
At
this
stage
the
nature of
definition
changes as
the third type
of
infinity
constitutes what could
be
called unilateral
inclusion. That is
characteristics
operate not
by
wholes and parts
but by degrees
of
intensity
and so are not able
to
act
as
definers in
a reciprocal
definition. As Deleuze
notes, sufficient reason now
becomes
a
true
principle.
421
Whereas
we
found
the
initial
starting point of sufficient
reason
in
the
undefinables we
find its `upper' limit in
the third type
of
infinity
which
will
be
called
the
Characteristic.
Finally
we come
to the
fourth
type
of
infinity
and
the
constitution of
the
monad
itself. To
the
extent
that the
monad
includes
the
world
it includes both
extension and characters,
that
is it forms
a
further
convergent series of
both
wholes
and parts and
degrees
of
intensity. This
time the
limit
of
the
convergent series
is
not
internal but
conforms
to the
original
infinity
of
God Himself. However, being
an
envelopment
of
the
infinite it is
related
to God
reciprocally.
As Deleuze
puts
it, if
the
formula for God
could
be
considered
to
be
oo/l
then the
formula for
the
monad would
be 1/00
422So
now
the
limit
of
the
infinite
series
is
to
be found
external
to the
monad
in
the
form
of
the totality
of monads.
As
such
inclusion in
the
monad
is
again of
the
unilateral
type
but
since
the
limit
of
the
series
is
outside
the
monad
inclusion is
not
localised
as
it
was with
intensions,
that
is,
the
monad can only express a portion of
the
infinite
series.
420
The Fold,
p.
47
421
ibid.
422
ibid.
p.
149
135
Analysis
of
the Deduction
We
are perhaps now
in
a position
to
see
how Deleuze
constructs
his Baroque house.
The
monad
is
the
house itself. On
the
lower floor
the
Combinatory defines
the
layout
of
its labyrinthine
rooms.
The Characteristic
provides
doors
and windows
that
give
the
illusion
of an outside when really
it is
the
lower floor
that
is
outside.
On its
walls
are
indecipherable
markings
that
signal
the
Alphabet. One
thing
we may notice
in
Deleuze's deduction is
that
it is
almost as
if
everything
takes
place or
is derived from
the
lower floor. Even
when
he
moves
from
the
Perfections
of
God
to
matter as
wholes and parts
this
is done
through the
logical invocation
of
the
vinculum.
However,
there
is
a
long line
of
Leibniz
scholarship
that
questions
if Leibniz
ever
held
the
notion of
the
vinculum
in
the
first
place.
423
For
the
most part
Leibniz's
discussion
of
the
vinculum
is
only
to
be found in his
correspondence with
the
Jesuit
teacher
of
theology
Bartholomew Des Bosses,
and
this
only occurs
towards the
very
end of
his life
when
he
already
had his
primary principles of philosophy
in
place
many years
before.
424
Russell
concludes
the
following interpretation from
this:
`He
was extremely anxious
to
persuade
Catholics
that they
might, without
heresy, believe
in his doctrine
of monads.
Thus
the
vinculum substantiale
is
rather
the
concession of
a
diplomatist
than the
creed of a philosopher.
'425 More
recently
Wilson
argues
that
the theory
of
the
vinculum was
introduced into his
philosophy as a response
to the
criticism
that
his
philosophy resulted
in
phenomenalism, a
theory that
he finally
rejects
to the
detriment
to
his
explanation of corporeal
bodies.
426
However it is
doubtful that
Leibniz
saw phenomenalism as a serious
threat to
his
system as
although
for Leibniz
the
world
is
simply phenomenal
God
produces
the
best
possible
world,
that
is,
the
one
that
is
the
most
full (without
gaps), well-founded, and
the
most
manifest.
This
will place
Leibniz
strongly within
the
neo-Platonic and
Gnostic
traditions, a
fact
that
he
never
disputes. Perhaps
the
most considered viewpoint on
this
matter
is
put
forward by Adams
who postulates
that
Leibniz did indeed
entertain
the
notion of a vinculum.
For
the
idea
of a substantial
bond in
matter
does
not
`'
See Adams (1994),
pp.
299-307 for
a review of
this
literature.
424
Leibniz died 14/11/1716,
aged
70,
the
correspondence took
place
1709-1715.
au
Russell (1992),
p.
152
426
Wilson (1989),
pp.
192-3
136
necessarily compromise
his
notion of monads as
the
only
true
substance
but
would
correspond
to
God's
organisation of
the
monads as a
totality
and would
in
this
sense
be
a
further
extension of pre-established
harmony. However Adams
also points out
that these
deliberations
only arose
in
the theological
context of
Leibniz discussing his
philosophy
in
terms
of
the transubstantiation
of
the
Eucharist
and
the
incarnation
of
God in
the
Christ. In
this
sense
Leibniz
only
introduced
the
notion of
the
vinculum
to
explain
for
these
`supernatural'
occurrences
in
terms
of
his
monadology.
Hence
Adams
argues
it
would
be fair
to
conclude
that
while
the
notion of
the
vinculum
is
not out of place
in Leibniz's
philosophy
it
never played a role of central
importance
in
the
formation
of
his
philosophy.
427
This is
most clearly seen
in
the
following
passage
from
the
correspondence with
Des Bosses:
...
a substantial chain or a substantial addition
to the
monads, which
formally
constitutes
the
compound substance and reifies
the
phenomena,
can
be
changed while
the
monads
themselves
remain,
because
as
I have
said,
the
soul of
the
little
worm
is
not of
the
substance of
the
body
which
contains
the
worm....
A
substantial chain superadded
to the
monads
is in
my opinion something absolute
...
it
can nevertheless
be independent
of
the
monads
in
a supernatural sense and can
be
removed and adapted
to
other monads while
its former
monads remain.
428
It is
perhaps
ironic (but
entirely consistent with
his
point of view)
that
Leibniz
considers
the
idea
of a real substantial matter
to
be
a supernatural phenomenon.
And
it is in
this
sense
that the
vinculum comes
into
play.
Leibniz
poses a correspondence
between the
monad and
the
superadded vinculum
but
whereas
the
monad
is
immutable the
vinculum
is
not,
that
is,
the
vinculum
is
a substantial
Accident. In fact
it is
only when matter
is
considered
in itself
and
for itself, independent
of substance,
that the
vinculum
is
required at all
-
the
monad cannot
be deducted from it. In
what
position
does
this
leave Deleuze's
analysis?
The first
thing
we may note
is
that
for Leibniz
the
vinculum was never meant
to
show
the
link between
the
perfections of
God
and
his
creations as
this
was already
dealt
with
by his
theory
of pre-established
harmony. As Mercer identifies,
pre-
427
See Adams (1994),
pp,
303-7 for
these
arguments.
428
Leibniz
(1709-15) Correspondence
with
Des Bosses, in Philosophical Papers,
p.
608
137
established
harmony functions in
two
ways
429
First
there
is
an emanative
harmony
that
exists
between God
and
the totality
of monads
that
He
creates.
Second
there
is
a
reflective
harmony
which also operates
in
two
different
ways:
i) between
the
monads
themselves,
and
ii) between
the
monad and
the
world.
In
this
way
both
the
world and
the totality
of all monads
is
reflected
in
a single monad.
In The Fold
we will
find
that
Deleuze
will specifically criticise
Leibniz's ideas
on pre-established
harmony. So
could an
independent
case
be
made
for
the
vinculum after all?
Let
us
first
turn to the
nature of
Deleuze's
critique.
Deleuze leads
up
to
his
criticism
by first focusing
on
the
convergent series of
the
Characteristic. To
the
extent
that the
same world
is
expressed
in
every monad
they
form
a common nature of
the
monads
in
terms
of
how
the
same characters are
prolonged
throughout
all
the
monads
430
Here Leibniz's
notion of compossibility
comes
into
play.
God
could
have
chosen
to
create
from
any number of possible
worlds
(such
as
the
world where
Adam doesn't
sin or where
Caesar doesn't
cross
the
Rubicon) but
the
world
he does
create
is
com-possible with all monads.
It is
conceivable
that Adam didn't
sin or
that
Caesar
never crossed
the
Rubicon but
these
worlds are
incompossible
with our own.
From
this
Deleuze draws
the
notion of an
antecedence
to the
world.
God did
not create
Adam the
sinner
but
the
world
in
which
Adam
Sins.
431
Here Deleuze draws
a parallel with
the
fourth
stage of
the
monadic
deduction
-
although
the
monad
includes
the
world
it does
not contain
the
law
of
its
nature432
Of
course
if
one where
to
change
this
law
then the
nature of
the
monad
would also change and
this
is
what
Deleuze
will
do. For
the
infinite
perfection of
God Deleuze
will substitute matter and
the
Nietzschean dice-throw. The dice-throw
will no
longer
affirm convergence
but
the
divergence
of series:
...
when
the
monad
is in
tune
with
divergent
series
that
belong
to
incompossible
monads
...
it
could
be
said
that the
monad, astraddle over
several worlds,
is kept half
open as
if by
pliers.
To
the
degree
that the
world
is
now made up of
divergent
series
(the
chaosmos),
or
that
crapshooting replaces
the
game of
Plenitude,
the
monad
is
now unable
to
429
See Mercer (2001),
pp.
184-196
43
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
50
431
ibid,
p.
60
432
ibid,
p.
50
138
contain
the
entire world...
433
However, Deleuze's
manoeuvre
does
not seem entirely convincing as a criticism of
Leibniz
as
it
seems
to
be little
more
than
an
isomorphism
of
Leibniz's
system, which
is
what one would expect
if
one started
from
the
viewpoint of matter rather
than
individual
substance.
What is
more
Deleuze's
criticisms seem
to
be
entirely
focused
on
the
reflective aspect of pre-established
harmony
and
does
not engage with
the
aspect of emanative
harmony. Of
course, one way
that
Deleuze does
engage with
emanative
harmony is in
the
form
of
the
vinculum.
As
we shall see
later434 Deleuze
certainly seems
to
formulate
emanative
harmony in
the
correct way as a
`relation
of a
nonrelation'435
That is, in
terms
of an object of
knowledge it is
the
relation of
two
terms that
are
fundamentally incomprehensible. However,
the true
emanative relation
seems
to
be
not
between
the
unknowable undefinables of
God but between God
and
that
which
he
creates, which
by definition
would
be
as
incomprehensible
as
He is. As
Leibniz tells
us:
Would that the
attribute of
incomprehensibility did belong
to
God
alone;
our
hope
of
knowing
nature would
then
be
greater.
But it is
all
too true
that there
is
no part of nature which we can understand perfectly; the
very
interdependence
of
things
proves
this.
No
creature,
however
excellent,
can at once
distinctly
perceive or comprehend
the
infinite;
on
the
contrary,
indeed,
whoever were
to
understand a single part of matter
would understand
the
whole universe...
436
Deleuze's
solution
to this
problem
in
the
form
of
the
vinculum seems to
be
simply a
shortcut.
Deleuze's
solution also presents us with a more pressing problem.
As
outlined previously,
Leibniz's
adherence
to
a monadology
left him
open
to
accusations of phenomenalism even
if
these
were not well-founded.
Since Deleuze
adheres
to the
vinculum and
the
substantial accident
then
would
he
not
be
open
to the
inverse
criticism,
that
is, he has
no principle of
individuation
unless something
is
`superadded' to
it. We
shall analyse
this
possibility
in
the
next part of
this
chapter.
433
ibid,
p.
137
434
see
Chapter 4.
435
Deleuze, The Fold,
p.
44
"'
Leibniz (1709-15) Correspondence
with
Des Bosses, in Philosophical Papers,
p.
599
139
2. Individual Substance in Leibniz
In
this
part of
the
chapter we shall argue
that the
position
Leibniz holds in his first
philosophical wort;
the
Disputatio,
explicitly criticises
Deleuze's
position.
This
will
proceed
in
three
parts,
first
we will present a
detailed
study of
the
Disputatio,
second
we shall present
how
these
ideas
shape
Leibniz's later
philosophy and
third,
we will
explore
how
this
produces a critique of
Deleuze's
position.
Introduction
The fact
that
a
detailed
study of
Leibniz's first
philosophical work,
his baccalaureate
thesis
Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui
of
1661, has
only
been
published as recently as
1996 (in McCullough's Leibniz
on
Individuals
and
Individuation)
could
be
considered
to
be
something of an oversight
by Leibnizian
scholars.
437
For
the
most
interesting feature
of
the
Disputatio is
that
Leibniz defends
the thesis that
an
`individual is individuated by its
whole entity.
438
This has
obvious
resonance with
Leibniz's later
concept of
individual
substance.
To
take
one pertinent
example
Leibniz
will say
in his
correspondence with
Amauld:
...
I
maintain as axiomatic
this
identical
proposition, whose
differentiation
can only
be
marked
by
the
accentuation
-
namely,
that that
which
is
not
truly
one entity
is
not
truly
one entity either.
It has
always
been held
that
unity and entity are reciprocal
things.
An
entity
is
one
thing,
entities are quite another
thing:
but
the
plural presupposes the
singular, and where
there
is
no entity still
less
are
there
several entities
439
That
is for
an entity
to truly
be
an entity
it
must
be
a complete entity.
Given
such an
important
connection why
has
the Disputatio been ignored
to
such an extent?
Perhaps
one may attribute
it
to the
pervasive opinion of
Leibniz
scholars that Leibniz
437
Leibniz
(1661) Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui,
trans. McCullough (1996), hereafter
denoted
as
Disputatio. McCullough
spreads the translation throughout the
chapters of
his book
and
presents
the
philosophical
background
to Leibniz's
arguments as well as critical comment.
438
ibid.
section
4,
p.
100
439
Leibniz (1686-7) Correspondence
with
Arnauld, in Philosophical Writings,
p.
67
140
only arrives at a coherent metaphysical system
in
the
mid-1680's.
440
Or
perhaps one
may consider
the
Disputatio,
written when
Leibniz
was only
17,
to
be little
more
than
a youthful essay
influenced by
the
reformed
Aristotelianism
of
his
teacher
and
thesis
supervisor
Jacob Thomasius
and
hence
only worthy of
biographical
significance.
44 '
Leibniz has himself
provoked much speculation and
debate
over
his
own account of
his intellectual development in his letter
to
Nicholas Remond
of
1714:
I discovered Aristotle
as a
lad,
and even
then the
Scholastics did
not repel
me; even now
I do
not regret
this.
But
then
Plato
too,
and
Plotinus,
gave
me some satisfaction, not
to
mention other ancient
thinkers
whom
I
consulted
later. After having finished
the trivial
schools,
I fell
upon
the
modems, and
I
recall walking
in
a grove on
the
outskirts of
Leipzig
called
the
Rosental,
at
the
age of
fifteen,
and
deliberating
whether
to
preserve
substantial
forms
or not.
Mechanism finally
prevailed and
led
me
to
apply
myself
to
mathematics
[... ] But
when
I looked for
the
ultimate reason
for
mechanism, and even
the
laws
of motion,
I
was greatly surprised
to
see
that they
could not
be found in
mathematics
but
that
I
should
have
to
return
to
metaphysics
442
The
most
important factor
to
recognise
is
that
even as
Russell
admits
`Leibniz
was
educated
in
the
scholastic
tradition. ''" On
the
general coherence of
Leibniz's life-
work,
Benson Mates
tells
us:
`...
talk
of
"question begging"
and
"vicious
circles"
in
proofs and
definitions has
no clear application
to
Leibnizian
philosophy, since
those
terms
acquire sense only
in
relation
to
some
deductive
system explicitly or
implicitly
indicated. '` That is, it is
on
the
grounds of
the
implicit
assumptions of
Leibniz's
later
notion of
individual
substance that
we may
find
these
assumptions
in
a more
explicit
form in his
early work.
Putting
across
this
point more
forcefully
Cover
and
0' Leary-Hawthorne
state:
`...
consider
the
question
"what is it for
something to
be
the
very
individual it is? " The
question
is
too
easily answered
if
one suspects, as
many
(in
the
grip of
the Discourse
on
Metaphysics)
wrongly
have,
that
given
Leibniz's
complete-concept
doctrine,
a substance
is individuated
by
a complete
list
of
Such is
the
viewpoint
taken
up
by Russell (1992),
p.
7
"'
Of
course
Mercer (2001)
will argue
it is
precisely
this
version of
Platonised
Aristotelianism
that
will shape
the
course of
his
philosophy.
442
Leibniz (1714
-1715)
Letters
to
Nicolas Remond, in Philosophical
Papers,
pp.
654-5
443
Russell (1992),
p.
6
4"
Benson Mates (1986) The Philosophy
of
Leibniz: Metaphysics
and
Language. Oxford: University
Press,
p.
4
141
all
its
properties.
445
That is, Leibniz's
early
theory
of
individuation
cannot simply
be
read
through
his later
theories
without
first
obtaining an appreciation of
the
implicit
scholastic context.
The Disputatio is
relevant
to
our own study of
Deleuze's
interpretation
of
Leibniz in
two
ways:
1) in
terms
of
the
scholastic assumptions
Leibniz
uses
in his definition
of
the
individual
and
2) in
terms
of
the theories
of
the
individual
which
Leibniz
rejects.
Before
we
turn to
an analysis of
the
salient points of
the
Disputatio,
some
background information is
required on
the
basic features
of
scholastic
theories
of
the
individual.
The Individual in the
Disnutatio
Preliminaries
The first
place
to
start
for
an understanding of
the
notions of
individuation
and
the
individual
in Scholastic
philosophy
is
the
logic
of
Aristotle.
446
Aristotle distinguished
between two
different
aspects of
being,
substances and accidents.
Each
of
these
is
further distinguished into
universals
(species
and genera) and
individuals. This
can
be
summarised as
follows:
Substance
Individual Substance
Specific Substance
General Substance
Accident
Individual Accident
Specific Accident
General Accident
Amongst these
classes
two types
of predication operate.
The first
type,
essential
predication,
operates within substances and accidents respectively.
This functions
from
genera
to
species and
from
species
to
individuals. As McCullough
explains:
Something
is
said as a predicate of a subject
if
and only
if
the
subject
falls
under
the
predicate
because it is determined,
made
the thing it is, by
5
J. Cover,
and
J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (1999),
p.
4
"6
see
Aristotle, Categories, 1-5,
source used
Aristotle (1995) Selections, Trans.
with
Introduction,
Notes
and
Glossary, by T. Irwin
and
G. Fine. Cambridge: Hackett
142
the
former. Thus, `animal' is
said of
`man', because
man
is
of
the
kind,
animal, and
`man' is
said of
`Plato' because Plato is
of
the
kind,
man.
`Colour' is
said of
`white', because
white
is
of
the
kind,
colour, and
`white' is
said of
`this
white',
because
this
white
in Plato is
of
the
kind,
white
47
From this
we may see
that
individual
substances and accidents are privileged
logically
in
that they
cannot
be `said
of anything
but
themselves. The
second
type
of
predication,
known
as accidental predication,
is
where an accident
is
present
in
a
substance.
An
example of
this
is
also
in
the
above quotation
in
that
`this
white'
is
present
in Plato. An
accident can only
be
present
in
something else
(a
substance).
Here
we may
determine
that
individual
substance
holds
the
most
important
position
in
that
unlike an
individual
accident
it
cannot
be
predicated of anything else.
As
Aristotle
states
in
the
Categories: `What is
called substance most
fully,
primarily,
and most of all,
is
what
is
neither said of any subject nor
in
any subject....
'448
These ideas form
the
basis
of
Scholastic theories
of
the
individual. However,
many
different
schools of
thought
sprang up about what really constitutes
the
nature
of
the
individual
even on
the
point of whether
it
actually exists.
To
give a
background
to the
context
that
Leibniz
was working
in, McCullough
points
to
Jorge Gracia's
study
Introduction to the
Problem
of
Individuation in
the
Early Middle Ages.
449
In
this
book Gracia
provides a classification of
the
various schemas of scholastic
individuals.
These
are set out on
the
next page.
7
McCullough
(1996),
p.
25
4"
Aristotle
(1995), 2a,
p.
4
49
Jorge Gracia (1988) Introduction
to the
Problem
of
Individuation in
the
Early Middle Ages.
Munchen:
Philosophia Verlag
143
Classification
of
Scholastic Individuals
1) Intension:
indivisibility
distinction
2) Extension:
no existents
individual,
or
all existents
individual,
or
some existents
but
not all existents
individual
3) Ontological Status:
the
individual
and
its
nature are
the
same, or
the
individual
and
its
nature are
different,
Based
on:
real
distinction,
or
mental
distinction,
or
other
distinction
The
general
thematic
of scholastic
theories
of
the
individual is
concerned with
the
`nature'
of
the
individual,
that
is, its individual
character or
individuality. Three
important
aspects of
the
nature of
individuals
that
Gracia identifies
are
1)
the
intension
of
the
individual, 2)
the
extension of
the
individual,
and
3)
the
ontological
status of
individuality in
the
individual
and
its
relation
to the
individual's
nature
450
On
the
first feature
of
intension Gracia
will
tell
us
that
it `is
what
characterizes
an
individual
as
individual. To
ask,
therefore,
about
the
intension
of
individuality
is
to
ask about what
it is
to
be
an
individual
as opposed to
something
else.
'45' The intensional
aspect
is itself
characterised
by
a number of
factors. One
of
these
is indivisibility. McCullough
states
that this
is `the impossibility
of an
individual being divided
or somehow
broken
up
into individuals
of
the
same species
as
the
original
individual. '432 For
example, a
human
cannot
be divided
up
into further
450
Gracia (1988),
p.
21
451
bid,
p.
22
452
McCullough (1996),
p.
28
144
humans. A
second
intensional
characteristic
is distinction. As Gracia
puts
it:
`Socrates
is
a
distinct being
apart
from
the
dog he
owns
...
Socrates
may move,
change position,
become
senile and even
die
and nothing of
the
kind
may
happen
to
his dog. '453 An important
term
used
for
this
purpose
is `numerical difference. '
Numerical
difference is
used
to
describe
two
distinct individuals
where
there
is
`some
feature
or
features [but
not all]
in
which
they
differ. 'asa Th
e second
feature
of
extension concerns whether
individuals
really exist.
Obviously
one can
hold
the
view
either
in
the
affirmative or
to the
negative
(for
example everything
involves
accidents) or a mixture of
these
views.
On
the third
feature
of
the
ontological status
of
individuality Gracia identifies it
as
involving
the
following issues: `(a)
whether
it
is
the
case
for
all natural
beings
that
an
individual,
considered as
individual, is
distinguished
by
some
feature
or
features from its
nature;
(b)
the
nature of
this
distinction, that
is,
whether
it is
real, conceptual, or otherwise.
'455 That is,
whether
there
is
a
difference between
the
individual
and
the
nature
(or
substance)
through
which
it is individuated
and whether
the
solution provided
to this
problem
is based
on real, mental or other
distinctions. As Gracia
notes
these three
aspects of
individuality
are not necessarily
independent
and can produce many complex and
seemingly
contradictory configurations
depending
on ones viewpoint.
We
shall
turn
to
Leibniz's Disputatio
to
see
how he
navigates
these
matters.
The Disoutatio
The Disputatio is
an ambitious attempt
by
the
young
Leibniz
to
defend his
own
theory of
the
individual
against
the
prominent scholastic
theories
of
his day. In
the
second section of
the
Disputatio Leibniz
sets
forth
the
`state
of
the
question' and
his
own approach
to the
subject matter at
hand:
We
are,
then, to treat
of
the
principle of
the
individual.
Now, both
`principle'
and
`individual'
are understood
in
various ways
...
we note
that
`individual'
may mean
"according
to the thing"
(in
re), or
"according
453
Gracia (1988),
p.
26
434
ibid.
455
ibid,
p.
34
145
to the
concept"
(in
conceptu), or as some say, respectively,
"fundamentally"
or
"formally" [... ] Too, `principle' is
used
to
mean
the
principle of
knowing
and of
being [... ] Wherefore,
to
summarise
the
foregoing,
we
treat
of something real and what
is
called a
"physical
principle,
"
which would serve as
the
foundation for
the
formal
notion
in
the
mind of
`individual, '
understood either as
individuation
or numerical
difference.
456
The
principle of
the
individual
may
be
understood either ontologically
-
according
to
the
fundamental thing
-
as a principle of
being,
or epistemologically
-
according
to
the
formal
concept
-
as a principle of
knowing. Leibniz tells
us
that
his
approach will
be
ontological.
His first
concern
is
with a
`physical
principle,
'
that
is,
a principle
outside or
independent
of
the
mind.
Here
we
find Leibniz's
adherence
to
a
form
of
nominalism.
Leibniz
tells
us what
this
entails
in
the
Preface
to
an edition ofNizolius:
`Nominalists
are
those
who
believe
that
all
things
except
individual
substances are
mere names;
they therefore
deny
the
reality of abstract
terms
and universals
forthright. '457 That is,
nominalists reject any
type
of conceptual category and accept
that
only real
things
can
be individuals. We
shall see
the
position
that
Leibniz
takes
on
this
doctrine
as we progress
through
our
discussion
of
the
Disputatio. Leibniz
next
outlines
the
possible candidates
for
the
individuating
principle of
the
individual:
The
principle of
individuation is
taken to
be
either
the
whole entity
(1),
or
not
the
whole entity.
Less-than-whole
entity
is
expressed either
by
negation
(2),
or
by
something positive.
Concerning
the
positive sense of
less-than-whole
entity, one may
take
one of
two
views:
(3)
there
is
a
physical part of
the
individual
that terminates
its
essence, existence; or
(4)
a metaphysical part
that terminates
species,
haecceity.
459
Of
course
Leibniz
will
take
up
the
first
point of view,
however it
will
be
useful
to
elaborate
the theories
he
rejects
in
order
to
highlight his
own position.
The first
principle of
individuation
that
Leibniz
rejects
is
negation.
Leibniz
describes the
principle
thus:
From
the
summum genus
through
differences determined
by
the
4
Disputatio,
section
2, McCullough (1996),
pp.
22-3
asp
Leery (1670) Preface
to
an edition ofNizolius,
in Philosophical Papers,
p.
128
458
Disputatio,
section
3, McCullough (1996),
p.
23
146
subaltern, one should
descend
to the infima
species.
But
there
you cannot
[descend] further
and
the
negation of
further descent
would
be
the
formal, intrinsic [principle]
of
the
individual [... ] The first
negation,
that
of
division, is,
as
it
were,
the
[principle]
of a general
individual. But
the
other negation,
that
of
identity
with another, would make
this
individual
truly
distinct from
another.
459
The
main
focus
of a negation
theory
is
on
the
intensional features
of
the
individual
and
for
this
reason requires
two
negations.
First, in
order
for
an
individual
to
be
individual
and not
be divided further it
must
involve
a negation of
division. The
nature
of
being is divided
up
from
the
summum genus
(the least determination
of
being
after
being itself
which
is
not a genus)
to the infima
species
(the
greatest
determination
of
being before individuals)
that
is
common
to
`individuals. ' As
such
this
is
not enough
to
determine
the
individual
though.
For
the
individual
to
be
distinct,
for its
nature
to
be
a
`this, '
a second negation
is
required
-
the
negation of
identity
with another
(that is, indistinction). Leibniz
presents
the
following
argument
against
this
viewpoint:
...
the
individual is
constituted
by
negations, either outside
the
mind or
in
the
mind.
If
the
latter,
their
answer
has
nothing
to
do
with
the
issue in
question.
If
the
former, how
can positive
being be
constituted
by
negative
being? {... ] let
there
be
two
individuals
-
Socrates
and
Plato. Then
the
principle of
Socrates
will
be
the
negation of
Plato
and
the
principle of
Plato
will
be
the
negation of
Socrates. In
either case
there
will
be
something positive on which you can stand.
46
Leibniz's
argument against
the
negative principle
is
that
it is
not capable of
establishing
anything positive,
that
is,
the
way
it distinguishes
one
individual from
another
does
not provide
for
the
specific
individuality
of an
individual. Or
as
McCullough
explains:
`... double
negation
is
the
same
in
each
individual. It
cannot
therefore, make a particular substance
"this"
rather
than
"that" individual.
Negation
as
the principle of
individuation fails
to
establish
the
ground
in
re
for
distinction....
9461
The
second principle of
individuation
that
Leibniz
rejects
is
existence.
The
459
ibid,
section
11,
p.
37
460
ibid,
section
2,
pp.
37-8
461
McCullough
(1996),
p.
41
147
argument
for
existence
is based
on
the
distinction between
existence and essence.
For
example, an
imaginary
animal may
have
an essence
but it does
not necessarily exist.
Some
scholastics argued
that the
`actualisation'
of essence was accounted
for by
an
act of
God
and
it is
through this
act
that the
individual is individuated. McCullough
draws
on
the
scholastic
Paulus Soncinas
to
summarise
this
viewpoint:
Any
essence
has
two
respects
[relations]
to the
first
cause
[God]. One is
the
respect of a copy
to
examplar
[or
model]....
The
other respect
is
the
relation of an effect
to
its
producing cause, which respect
indeed
things
do
not
have before
they
exist
but
only after
they
are produced.
But
the
terminus
[of
the
producing agent],
the
esse
[of
existence], signifies nature
with
that
respect.
Therefore,
the thing,
inasmuch
as
it does
not exist,
is
indeed
called
`essence' but it is
not said
`to be, ' because it does
not
[yet]
have
this
[second]
respect.
462
On
one
hand
the
argument
for
existence
is
external
to
individual
substance since
it is
based
on an act of
God, but
on
the
other
hand,
this
is
an
intrinsic
principle
because
existence
does
not add a
determining (or
extra)
difference
to the
essence
but is
a
`perfection'
of
it. As McCullough
notes,
here `perfection' is
used
`in
the
sense
that
"to be" is
more perfect
than "not to
be. "'463 In
this
sense
individual
essence
is less-
than-whole entity and
the
act of existence produces
the
whole entity.
Leibniz begins
his discussion
of
this
principle
by detailing how
essence and existence are
distinguished:
...
this
[position]
can
be
taken
in
two
ways.
In
one way, existence might
be
some real mode,
intrinsically individuating the thing
and
distinct
a
parte rei
from its
essence.
If
this
is
the
case,
it
can
by
no means
be
defended.... But, if [existence] differs
only mentally
from
essence,
[this
position] agrees uncommonly well with us.
464
Leibniz tells
us
that
if
essence and existence are only mentally
distinct,
that
is
they
are really
inseparable,
then
it
would
be
similar
to
his
own viewpoint.
That is,
this
would not conflict with
Leibniz's
whole entity principle
because
existence and
"2
Paulus Soncinas (1967) Quaestiones Metaphysicales Acutissimae. Frankfurt: Minerva,
p.
20b
translation
by McCullough (1996),
pp.
44-5
40
McCullough
(1996),
p.
45
4"
Disputatio,
section
14,
p.
46
148
essence would only
be
mentally
distinguished
aspects of
the
same whole entity.
So
Leibniz's
refutation
is
only
focussed
on really
distinct
existence.
He
argues
this
as
follows: `If
essence and existence are
the
same a parte rei,
then
it follows
that
existence
...
is
not
the
principle of
individuation [... ] Whatever
things
really
differ
can,
by
turns,
be
separated.
But
essence and existence cannot
be
separated.
'465
Leibniz's
reasoning
for
this
is
outlined
in
the
next section of
the
Disputatio
where
he
considers
the
consequences
if
essence and existence were really separable:
Essence,
once existence
is
taken
away,
is
either a real
thing
or nothing.
If
nothing: either
it
was not
in
creatures, which
is
absurd; or
it
was not
distinct from
existence, which
is
what
I
maintain.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
[essence] is
a real
being, it is
either purely potential or actual
being.
Without doubt [it
must
be]
the
former, for it
cannot
be
actual except
through
existence which,
however,
we
have
supposed
to
be
separated.
If,
therefore,
essence
is
purely potential, all essences are prime matter
[... ]
If,
therefore,
essences are not
different from
matter,
it follows
that
matter
alone would
be
the
essential part and
things
do
not
differ by
species....
'
In the
first instance if
creatures
had
no essence
they
would
be
merely accidents or
automatons while
in
the
second
instance if
essence was not
different from
matter
there
would
be
no need
for it
anyway.
The third
and
final
principle
that
Leibniz
refutes
is haecceity. This
principle
was originally
formulated by John Duns Scotus. We
shall
first identify
the
nature of
this
concept.
467
For Scotus
an existing
individual thing
is
a composite of
`common
nature' and
`haecceity'
which
individuates
primary matter.
The
existing
individual
has
numerical unity,
that
is, it is
numerically one,
however Scotus
makes a specific
use of non-numerical unity
in
the
process of
this
constitution.
As R. Kilcullen
states:
`he
orders unities
from individual,
to
specific,
to
generic,
to
categorical.
468
The
individual has
perfect unity while
the
following
classes
have
a progressively
lesser
degree
of unity.
Further,
each class
has
actuality
in
relation
to the
class
it immediately
precedes which conversely
has
a potential or
is determinable in
relation
it. For
4"
ibid,
p.
47
""
ibid,
section
15,
p.
47
'167 Scotus' ideas
are to
be found in John Duns Scotus (1996) Ordinatio, II, dist. 3,
pars
1,168-211,
trans.
by R Kilcu11en,
available at www.
humanities.
mq. edu. au/Ockham/mjds.
html
'"
R. Kilcullen (1996) Scotus
on
Universals, Lecture 6,
available at
www.
humanities.
mq. edu. au/Ockham/z3606.
htm1,
p.
9
149
example,
the
genus
has
potentiality
in
relation
to the
species and
is
actualised
through
specific
difference
as an actual species, and so on.
So,
the
individual is
actualised
through a series of
determining diffferences. However, there
are
two types
of
determining differences. The first
type
determines being
up
to the
species.
This is
the
common nature of
the thing.
In
traditional
Aristotelian terminology the
common
nature corresponds
to the
form,
essence or quiddity of
the thing.
For Scotus
the
nature of a
thing
is
not enough
to
individuate it
and
has less
than
numerical unity.
Numerical
unity
is
conferred on
the thing through the
individuating difference
or
haecceity
which actualises
the thing
as an existing
individual. Scotus
proposes
that
distinctions
within
this theory,
between
classes
themselves
and
between
classes and
their
determining
entities, are made
through
a
formal distinction. We
may recall
that
the
Scholastics distinguished between two
fundamental distinctions,
the
real
distinction
-
between
really separable
things,
and
the
mental
distinction
-
between
mentally separable concepts
that
are not really separable.
To
this
Scotus
adds
the
formal distinction. This is
a
distinction between things that
are metaphysically
separable
but
are not really
distinct, but do
act as a
foundation for
mental
distinctions. To
summarise,
for Scotus
the
numerical
individual is
a combination of
common
nature and
haecceity
which are
formally distinct
and each
have less
than
numerical unity.
Leibniz's
own analysis of
Scotus begins
with
the
following
passage:
Now, it
was
known
that
Scotus
was an extreme realist,
because he held
that
universals
have
true
reality outside
the
mind....
But
so
that
he
would
not adopt
the
view attributed
by Aristotle to
Plato, he
contrived
the
"formal distinction"
to
hide his
error.
Indeed, this
distinction is
supposed
to
obtain
before
the
operation of
the
intellect
and yet
he
says
that
it holds
with respect
to the
intellect.... [B]ecause he
supposed universals
to
be
something real
...
it
was necessary
that
singulars originate
from
a
universal with something added.
469
The first
thing to
note
in
this
passage
is
the
position attributed
to
Plato. Kilcullen
tells
us
that the
Scholastics
considered
Plato
to
be
an extreme realist
because he held
that
the
Forms had
reality outside
the
mind.
470
Likewise, Leibniz
attributes this
position
to
469
Disputatio,
section
17,
p.
56
40
R. Kilcullen (1996) Ockham
on
Universals, Lecture 8,
available at
www.
humanities.
mq. edu. au/Ockham/z3608.
html,
p.
7
150
Scotus for holding
that
universals exist outside
the
mind.
Technically
speaking, as
McCullough
points out,
Scotist
common nature
isn't
a universal
but
specific
to
an
individual.
47
However, Leibniz's
views on
Scotus
are also
based
on a critique of
the
Scotist formal distinction
and as
he
tells
us:
`If
there
is
no
formal distinction,
haecceity falls. '472 If
the
formal distinction
was shown
to
be
no more
than
a mental
distinction
then the
common nature/haecceity composite would
be
a mental or
universal concept.
Leibniz
continues:
...
for
the
formal
concept
is founded
properly
in
the
objective concept.
If,
therefore, the
objective concept
[is
also
founded] in
the
formal,
there
will
be
a circle and, while each
[does
the
founding],
neither
is founded
and
each would vanish
[... ] Therefore,
nothing could still exist
for
the
distinction
aparte rei.
473
The
argument
that
Leibniz
articulates
here is
originally
to
be found in William
of
Ockham. Kilcullen
summarises
this
argument as
follows: `If
a quasi-real
distinction
between inseparable formalities is
admitted,
then there
will
be
no way of establishing
any
fuller distinction. No
real
distinction
will
be
any more
than
formal,
or
(vice
versa) every
formal distinction
will
be
as real as any
distinction
ever
is. '474 The
point
here is
that
if
there
is
a
formal distinction before
the
operation of
the
intellect
then
it
would not
be
possible
for
the
mind
to
distinguish it from
the
real
distinction
which
is
also
before
the
operation of
the
intellect. As
such
the
formal distinction is
either a
distinction
with real parts or
it is
simply a mental
distinction. Leibniz
rejects
the
former
option
because
the
formal distinction is
supposed
to
pertain prior
to the
operation of
the
intellect. Moreover, if haecceity is
mentally
distinct it
cannot supply
us with an ontological principle of
individuation. We
shall now move onto
the
principle of
individuation
that
Leibniz
proposes.
471
McCullough (1996),
p.
56-57
472
Disputatio,
section
24,
p.
65
473
ibid,
section
25,
p.
66
1
KilcuIIen, OCkliam
on
Universals,
p.
3
151
Leibniz's Principle
In the
Disputatio Leibniz defends
the thesis that
an
`individual is individuated by its
whole entity.
' Here
a
distinction
can
be
made
between
the
nature of
the thing
(its
whole entity) and
how
this
individuates
the
individual. What
this
entails can
be
seen
when we compare
this theory
with
that
held by William
of
Ockham.
475
Ockham
took
the
extreme view
that the
individual is
already
individuated. As
such
the
nature of
the
individual
and
the
individual itself
are synonymous, and
the
principle of
individuation is
the
individual itself. The
problem
that
Ockham
now
faced
was
that
if
individual
natures are not
distinguishable from
the
individual
then
how
can
these
natures
be known by
the
mind.
Ockham
will say
that
individual
natures are concepts
which are
the
result of an act of
the
intellect,
that
is,
they
are mentally
distinct. We
may see
that
Leibniz's
position
differs from
this
in
two
ways.
First,
the
nature of
the
individual is
not
the
same as
the
individual,
and second,
the
nature of
the
individual
is
more
than
just
a mental phenomenon.
McCullough
notes
that
Leibniz follows
another scholastic
thinker
in
these
matters:
Francis Suarez.
76
The fundamental
doctrine
that
Leibniz
will
take
from Suarez is
that there
are
two
different kinds
of
mental
distinction. Suarez defines
these
distinctions in
the
following
way:
One,
which
has
no
foundation in
reality,
is
called a
distinction
of
the
reasoning reason
(distinctio
rationis ratiocinantis),
since
it
arises entirely
from
the
reflection and activity of
the
intellect. The
other, which
has
a
foundation in
reality,
is
called
by
many a
distinction
of
the
reasoned
reason
(distinctio
rationis ratiocinatae).
This kind
of mental
distinction
can
be
understood as pre-existing
in
reality,
before
the
discriminating
operation of
the
intellect,
and only requires
the
intellect
to
recognise
it,
but
not
to
constitute
it... [I]t does
not arise entirely
from
the
mere
operation of
the
intellect, but
rather
from
the
occasion offered
by
the
thing
itself,
on which
the
mind
is
reflecting.
4n
The
distinction
of
the
reasoning reason
is
the traditional
mental
distinction in
scholastic
philosophy.
On
the
other
hand
the
distinction
of
the
reasoned reason
ass
William
of
Ockham's ideas
are
to
be found in William
of
Ockham (1996) Ordinatio, I, dist. 2,
q.
6,
trans.
by R. Kilcullen,
available at www.
humanities.
mq. edu. au/wockord.
html
476
McCullough (1996),
p.
91
477
Francis Suarez (1947) On
the
Various Kinds
of
Distinction, trans. C. Vollert. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press,
p.
18
152
allows
the
mind
to
make correct metaphysical
distinctions
according
to
a
foundation
in
reality.
If
this
is
the
case
then
could
the
Scotist formal distinction be
considered
to
be
a
distinction
of
the
reasoned reason?
This is
not
the
case
because
a
distinction
of
the
reasoned reason
is
a
`well-founded'
mental
distinction
and
is
not
based
on a prior
metaphysical
distinction in
reality.
478
Of
course
the
question
is
what exactly
does
the
reasoned reason recognise as pre-existing
in
reality.
On
this
point
McCullough
tells
us:
...
aspects of an
individual
can move
the
mind,
in
an act of
the
reasoned
reason,
to
distinguish different
concepts
that
pertain
to the
individual.
Individuated
nature moves
the
mind
to
recognise, not create
de
novo,
the
concept of what
is
the
same among
individuals
that
in
reality are at most
similar....
Individuated
nature moves
the
mind
to
recognise, not create
de
novo,
the
basic intentional
aspects of
individuality, indivisibility,
and
to
derive from it
the
proprium of
individuality, distinction.
479
These
ideas
can again
be
understood more clearly
in
comparison with
Ockham.
Ockham's
position
is
that the
mind recognises universal concepts according
to
similarities
between individuals. In
truth
Ockham's
version of
the
mental
distinction
is
more akin
to
an act of
the
reasoned reason,
for
the
Ockhamite
mental
distinction is
not simply arbitrary
but is formed `in
the
mind as object
known. 9480 As
such
the
only
objection
that
Ockham
would
have
with
the
above passage
is
that
it is
not
through
individuated
nature
(either
emphasis)
that
something
is
recognised
but
through the
individual itself. So
whereas
Ockham
would
hold
that the
individual individuates its
own nature,
Leibniz
will argue
that
it is individual
nature or
the
`whole
entity'
that
individuates the
individual. This is
the
main
line
of argument
in
the
Disputatio:
That by
means of which something
is, by
means of
it
that
something
is
one
in
number.
But
any
thing
is by
means of
its
entity.
Therefore, [any
thing
is
one
in
number
by
reason of
its
entity].
The
major
is
proved
in
that
one adds nothing real
beyond being.
48'
478
McCullough (1996),
pp.
96-7
479
ibid,
p.
96
480
R Kilcullen (1996) Ockham
on
Universals, Lecture 8,
available at
www.
humanities.
mq. edu. au/Ockham/z3608.
htm1
4t
Disputatio,
section
5,
p.
101
153
The
crucial point
in
this
principle of
individuation is
the
final line `one
adds nothing
real
beyond being. ' This
matter concerns what
is `added' to the
whole entity or nature
to
make
it individual. What Leibniz
means
here is
that
numerical unity adds nothing
real
to
individuated
nature, or more precisely,
the
individual's
entity and
the
numerical
individual
are
distinct by
the
reasoned reason.
To
put
this
more clearly
the
entity or nature of a
thing
is
particular
to that thing.
As
such
it is
not common
to
any
other
thing.
In `becoming' individual
the
intensional
aspects of
indivisibility
and
distinction
are conferred or
`added'
to the
whole entity.
As McCullough tells
us:
-something
real,
the
principle of
individuality,
must
be distinguishable
from
nature or else
Leibniz
could not meaningfully
hold
that there
is
such
an entity as
individuated
nature,
in
the
sense of
that
aspect of an
individual
that
accounts
for
the
operation of
the
reasoned reason
that
recognises similarity among
individuals
and abstracts
from
that
similarity
a concept of
the
nature
that
is in
mente only, common
to them
or
the
same
in
them.
482
To
make sense of
this
let
us recall
that
Leibniz's
purpose
in
the
Disputatio is
to
provide an ontological principle of
individuation internal to the
individual
thing.
One
of
the
most promising candidates
for
such an enterprise would seem
to
be
the
position
held by William
of
Ockham
-
every real
individual is individual by
virtue of
itself. However, the
consequence of
this
position
is
that the
individual has
no
internal
nature
or content.
Indeed, for Ockham
what we
know
of an
individual is determined
externally.
As
an external principle
this
position
does
not even count as a candidate
for
consideration
in
the
Disputatio. Instead Leibniz
proposes
the
whole entity
doctrine
-
an
individual is individuated by its
whole nature.
In
the
next section we
shall
look into
the
relevance of
this
doctrine in
the
context of
Leibniz's
metaphysics
of
the
monad, which
in
turn
will enable us
to
make a comparison with
Deleuze's
interpretation
of
Leibniz.
McCullough
(1996),
p.
117
154
Leibniz's
later
metanhvsics
One disparity between
the
Disputatio
and
Leibniz's later
philosophy
that
can
be
immediately
highlighted is
that
he
will
talk
of
both immaterial
and physical
substances
as
individuals in
the
Disputatio
483
Leibniz's
own philosophical
development
will
take
a
detour
when
in
the
mid
1660's he
rejects
the
obscure
arguments
of
the
Scholastics
and
turns to
mechanism:
After having finished
the trivial
schools,
I fell
upon
the
modems, and
I
recall walking
in
a grove on
the
outskirts of
Leipzig
called
the
Rosental,
at
the
age of
fifteen,
and
deliberating
whether
to
preserve substantial
forms
or not.
Mechanism finally
prevailed and
led
me
to
apply myself
to
mathematics.
484
However,
even
during
these
years
Leibniz
was still concerned with
the
subject of
individuation.
This
can
be
seen
in
the
Confessio Philosophi
of
1672
where
Leibniz's
spokesperson
in
the
dialogue
tells
us:
There
you
have it,
what amazes you,
the
principle of
individuation,
outside
the thing
itself. For
among
these
eggs no
difference
can
be
assigned either
by
an angel or,
I have
the
audacity
to
say,
by God (given
the
hypothesis
of
the
greatest similarity possible) other
than that
at
the
present
time this
one
is
at place
A, the
other at place
B [... ]
souls, or as
I
prefer
to
call
them,
minds are also
individuated,
or, as
it
were,
become
these,
by
place and
time.
485
Nevertheless
Leibniz
will return
to
a metaphysical
theory
of
individuation from
the
late 1670's
resulting
in his
reacceptance of substantial
forms in
a
Platonised fashion.
This is
what
Mercer
will call
his
metaphysics of
divinity.
486
Here his
concern will
be
with
immaterial
substances solely.
In
elaborating
the
development
of
the themes
of
the
Disputatio there
are perhaps
three
main areas we can
focus
on:
1)
only
U3
Disputatio,
section
2,
p.
22-23
4"
Leibniz
(1714-15) Letters
to
Nicolas Remond, in Philosophical Papers,
p.
655,
see
Christia Mercer
(1997) `Mechanising Aristotle: Leibniz
and
Reformed Philosophy, ' in M. A. Stewart, Studies in
Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy. Oxford: Clarenden Press,
pp.
117-152 for
the
debate
about
the
year
when
Leibniz's
walk
took
place.
40
Leibniz
(1672) Confessio Philosophi,
quoted
in Cover, J. A.
and
O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. (1999),
6
P.
60-1
Mercer (2001),
chapter
5
155
individuals
are real and exist,
2)
there
is
no common nature
between
substances, and
3)
substances are
individuated by
their
whole entity.
The idea
that
only
individuals
are real
is
common
to
both
the
Disputatio
and
Leibniz's
later
philosophy.
As he
tells
us
in
the
Monadology: `monads
are
the
true
atoms of nature;
in
a word,
the
elements of
things.
'487 A
more precise statement
is
to
be found in
the
New System
of
the
Nature
of
Substances
and
their
Communication: `It is
only metaphysical or substantial points
(constituted by forms
or souls) which are
both indivisible
and real, and without
them there
would
be
nothing real, since without
true
unities
there
would
be
no multiplicity.
'488 In
the
latter
quotation we are also
brought back
to the
intensional
aspects of
the
individual:
indivisibility
and numerical
distinction. These
aspects are
to
be found in
exactly
the
same
form in
the
later
philosophy:
1)
the
monad
is indivisible,
as
Leibniz
will
tells
us
in
the
Monadology:
`The
monad, of which we will
be
speaking
here, is
nothing
but
a simple substance,
which enters
into
composites; simple, meaning without parts
...
that
which
has
no
parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor
divisibility is
possible.
'489
2)
the
monad
is
numerically
distinct,
as
Leibniz
tells
us
in
the
New
Essays:
In
addition
to the
difference
of
time
and place
[an
external principle]
there must always
be
an
internal
principle of
distinction [... ] The
`principle
of
individuation'
reduces,
in
the
case of
individuals,
to the
principle of
distinction
of which
I have just been
speaking.
If
two
individuals
were perfectly similar and equal,
in
short,
indistinguishable in
themselves,
there
would
be
no principle of
individuation. I
would even
venture
to
say
that
in
such a case
there
would
be
no
individual
distinctness,
no separate
individuals.
490
With the
intensional
aspects of
individual
substance we may also
discern
why
Leibniz
rejects material substances
in favour
of
immaterial
substances.
That is,
material
things
are physically
divisible
and so cannot
furnish
a principle of unity.
"'
Leibniz
(1714) Monadology,
section
3, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
19
`"
Leibniz
(1695) New System
of
the
Nature
of
Substances
and
their
Communication,
section
11, in
Philosophical
Texts,
p.
149
4"
Leibniz (1714) Monadology,
sections
1
and
3, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
19
1
Leibniz,
New Essays,
pp.
229-30
156
However,
a second and perhaps more
fundamental
argument
is
also
to
be found in
Leibniz's
later
writings.
As Coudert
notes
this
will
be based in
the
neo-Platonic and
gnostic
idea
that
matter
is
not real
but is in
some sense a privation or
limitation
of
`spirit. -)491 Leibniz himself draws
attention
to this
in
the
Refutation
of
Spinoza
of
1708:
The
cabalists seem
to
say
that
matter, on account of
the
vileness of
its
essence, can neither
be
created nor can exist;
hence,
that there
is
absolutely no matter, or
that
spirit and matter, as
Henry More
maintains
in his
cabalistic
theses,
are one and
the
same
thing
[... ] There is
some
truth
in
these
words,
but I
think
it is
not sufficiently understood
[... ]
Merely
passive matter
is
something very
low,
that
is,
wanting
in
all
force,
but
such a
thing
consists only
in
the
incomplete
or
in
abstraction.
192
Leibniz
will say
that
`actions
and passions properly
belong
to
individual
substances'
as early as
the
Discourse
on
Metaphysics.
493
Leibniz's
discussion
of
this
principle
is
most prominent
in
the
Specimen Dynamicum
of
1695:
Active
force (which
some not unreasonably call power)
is
of
two
kinds.
There
is
primitive active
force,
which
is inherent in
all corporeal
substance
as such
...
and
there
is derivative
active
[passive] force,
which
is
as
it
were
the
limitation
of primitive
force brought
about
by
the
collision of
bodies
with each other....
Primitive
force
-
which
is
none
other
than the
first
entelechy
-
corresponds
to the
soul or substantial
form; but for
that
very reason
it
relates only
to
general causes, which are
not enough
to
explain phenomena
[... ] Passive
force is
similarly of
two
kinds,
primitive and
derivative. The
primitive
force
of
being
acted upon
or of resistance constitutes what,
if
properly understood,
the
Scholastics
call primary matter.
It is
what explains why
bodies
cannot
interpenetrate,
but
present an obstacle
to
one another....
The derivative force
of
being
acted upon
therefore
shows
itself in
various ways
in
secondary matter
[that is,
composites]
494
Here
we see
that
active
force is
the
entelechy associated with
the
soul or substantial
form
of
individual
substance whereas passive or
derived force is
associated with
matter.
However there
seem
to
be
two
inconsistencies in
this
account.
First,
primitive
491
Allison Coudert (1995),
pp.
87-94
492
Leibniz
(1708) Refutation
of
Spinoza, in Philosophical Papers,
pp.
486-7
493
Leibniz (1686) Discourse
on
Metaphysics,
section
8, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
59
494
Leibniz
(1695) Specimen Dynamicum,
sections
6-7, in Philosophical Tarts,
pp.
155-6
157
active
force is
also associated with corporeal substance,
that
is,
material
bodies.
Second, this
description
would seem
to
fit into
the traditional
Aristotelian
account of
individual
substance where a substantial
form
actualises
the
potential of primary
matter.
To
see
this
is
not correct
for
either case we must
determine
the
exact relation
between
active and passive
force. In
the
Specimen Dynamicum
a
distinction is
made
between
a metaphysics of active
force
and a physics of passive
force
or primary
matter.
More information
on
this
subject
is
to
be found in Leibniz's letters
to
de
Voider
and
Bernoulli:
I distinguish
...
(1)
the
primitive
Entelechy
or
Soul, (2) Matter, i.
e.
primary matter, or primitive passive power,
(3) the
Monad
completed
by
these two...
495
When I
say
that
primary matter
is
that
which
is
merely passive and
separated
from
souls or
forms, I
said
the
same
thing twice,
for it
would
be
the
same
if I had
said
that
it is
merely passive and separate
from
all
activity.
Forms
are
for
me nothing
but
activities or entelechies, and
substantial
forms
are
the
primary entelechies.
I have
preferred
to
say
that
the
active
is
incomplete
without
the
passive, and
the
passive without
the
active, rather
than to
speak of matter without
form
and
form
without
matter...
496
We
saw
in
the
passage
from
the
Refutation
of
Spinoza
above
that Leibniz
termed
passive matter as
incomplete
or an abstraction.
We
also see
this
in
the
quotations
above
but
we also
find here
that the
active
force
of
the
monad
is
also
termed
as
incomplete. What
this
seems
to
point
to
is
that
speaking of
the
monad as either
completely
passive,
i.
e. as matter, or completely active,
i.
e. spirit,
is
an abstraction.
Leibniz tells
us
the
reason
he
uses
these terms
is
so as not
to
be
confused with an
Aristotelian
distinction. The
way
in
which
Leibniz is
using
this terminology
can
be
seen
in
the
Reflections
on
the
Doctrine
of a
Single Universal Spirit:
It is
...
known
that there
are
degrees in
all
things.
There is
an
infinity
of
degrees between
motions of any
kind
whatever and perfect rest,
between
hardness
and perfect
fluidity
without resistance,
between
God
and
nothing.
Thus
there
is likewise
an
infinity
of
degrees between
an active
4"
Leibniz (1699-1706) Correspondence
with
de Voider, in Philosophical Papers,
p.
530
496
Leibniz (1698-9) Correspondence
with
Bernoulli, in Philosophical Papers,
pp.
511-2
158
being
as great as
it
can
be
and pure passivity.
It is
unreasonable,
therefore, to
recognise only a single active
being,
that
is,
a universal
spirit, and a single passive one,
that
is
matter.
497
Here
we see
that the
relation
between
pure activity and pure passivity
is
one of
degree
rather
than
of
kind
-
there
is
an
infinite
order of
limitations between
activity
and passivity.
However
there
are
two
axes along which
limitations
occur:
first,
between God
and created
things,
and second, on
the
level
of created
things. What
Leibniz
seems
to
be
arguing
here is
that there
are
both degrees
of perfection and
degrees
of
imperfection,
as
he
states
in
the
Monadology: `...
created
things
have
their
perfections
from
the
influence
of
God, but
they
have
their
imperfections from
their
own natures, which are necessarily
bounded. '498 That
is,
this
is
part of an emanative
relation where
God
confers
his
perfections on created
things,
but
at
the
level
of
created
things their
degree
of perfection
is
not a relation
to
God, but
amongst other
created
things.
In
this
way
Leibniz
argues
that the
idea
that
individual
souls are
produced
from
a universal spirit or
`world-soul' is
erroneoUS.
499
Universal
spirit
is
an
abstraction
formed
on
the
level
of created
things
rather
than
being
a relation
to
God.
So far in
our
discussion
we
have
seen
how
some of
the
basic ideas
used
in
the
Disputatio
inform Leibniz's later
metaphysics of
the
monad.
We
may also see
that
the
way
in
which
they
are
developed further is
through
a
theory
of emanation.
This is
further
confirmed with
the theme that there
is
no common nature
between
substances.
This
notion occurs
in
the
later Leibniz in its
most
famous form in
the Monadology
with
the
formula
that
monads
have `no
windows'
through
which
`anything
could
come
in
or go out
...
neither substance nor accident can come
into
a monad
from
outside.
'-'w It is found in
a more complex context
in
the
earlier work
A Specimen
of
Discoveries
of
1686:
From
the
notion of an
individual
substance
it
...
follows in
metaphysical
rigour
that
all
the
operations of substances,
both
actions and passions,
are
spontaneous, and
that
with
the
exception of
the
dependence
of creatures
497
Leibniz (1702) Reflections
on
the
Doctrine
of a
Single Universal Spirit, in Philosophical Papers,
p.
559
`99
Leibniz (1714) Monadology,
section
42, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
273
499
ibid,
p.
555
500
Leibniz (1714) Monadology,
section
7, in Philosophical
Texts,
p.
269
159
on
God,
no real
influx from
one
to the
other
is intelligible. For
whatever
happens
to
each one of
them
would
flow from its
nature and
its
notion
even
if
the
rest were supposed
to
be
absent.
50'
That is
every monad
has its
own unique nature and
has
no
influence
on
the
nature of
any other monad.
The
way
in
which
Leibniz further develops
this
idea in his later
philosophy
is
through the
notion of pre-established
harmony. That is, God
pre-
establishes
the
nature of
the
monad
(emanative harmony)
so
that
it's
actions and
passions are not only
in harmony
with all other monads
but
also with
the
physical
world
(reflective harmony).
Further
confirmation of
Leibniz's
use of emanation
is
provided when we
turn
to the third theme that
substance
is individuated by its
whole entity.
To
give an
example of
how
the
whole entity
theory
is
manifest
in Leibniz's later
philosophy we
may
turn to the
Discourse
on
Metaphysics:
The
nature of an
individual
substance or of a complete
being is
to
have
a
notion so complete
that
it is
sufficient
to
contain and
to
allow us
to
deduce from it
all
the
predicates of
the
subject
to
which
the
notion
is
attributed
[... ] God,
who sees
the
individual
notion or
haecceity
...
sees
in it
at
the
same
time the
foundation
and
the
reason
for
all
the
predicates
which can
truly
be
said
to
belong
to
it....
502
Here
we may see
the
whole entity
theory
in its `pure' form
as
`a
notion so complete'
and also
the
uses
it is
put
to
in
terms
of
the
complete-concept
theory
of
the
monad.
We
may also see
that there
are
in fact
two
different
approaches
to the
complete-
concept
doctrine. First,
as
it is
commonly accepted
by
commentators, the
complete
concept of an
individual is defined
as containing all
its
predicates.
Leibniz
will say
that predicates are contained
in-esse
or virtually
in
the
concept of substance.
503
As
we
have
seen
this
is
the
basis
of
the
Couturat-Russell `inclusion' interpretation
of
Leibniz
commentary and
takes
up a
fundamental
role
in Deleuze's deduction
of
the
monad.
However the
passage above also suggests a second path
in
terms
of
the
complete
concept
being in
the
mind of
God in
that:
`... God's
understanding
is
the
so'
Leibniz
(1686) A Specimen
of
Discoveries, in philosophical Writings,
p.
79
302
Leibniz (1686) Discourse
on
Metaphysics,
section
8, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
60
503
ibid,
p.
59
160
realm of eternal
truths,
or of
the
ideas
on which
they
depend
....
'S04 In
this
sense
the
monad
is in
a relation of compossibility with
God
rather
than
one of
inclusion, for
God
chooses
the
best
possible world.
Here
we
find
a
theory
of emanation
that
is
comparable
to
Plotinus:
...
determined life is Intellectual-Principle
...
the
Life in
the
Supreme
was
collectivity of power;
the
vision
taking
place
There
was
the
potentiality of
all;
Intellectual-Principle, thus
arising,
is
manifested as
this
universe of
Being. It
stands over
the
Beings
not as
itself
requiring
base but
that
it
may
serve
them
as
base
through
its
vision of
that
Form
of
the
Firsts,
the
Formless Form
...
whenever
Intellectual-Principle becomes
the
determinant
of soul
it
shapes
it into Reasoning
soul,
by
communicating a
trace
of what
itself has
come
to
possess.
505
So in
accordance with
the two
approaches
to the
complete concept
doctrine
we may
identify
two
different logics
-
the
sufficient reason of
inclusion
and
the
sufficient
reason of emanative
harmony
and
it is
the
latter
which
is
ontologically prior, as
Leibniz
states
in
the
Monadology:
...
souls
in
general are
living
mirrors or
images
of
the
universe of created
things,
but
minds are also
images
of
the
divinity itself,
or of
the
very
creator of nature.
They
are capable of
knowing
the
system of
the
universe, and of
imitating it in
part
through their
own samples of
architectonic endeavour, each soul
being like
a
little divinity
within
its
own sphere.
At this
point we
have
elaborated
the
main
factors in Leibniz's
theory
of
individuation
so
let
us now return
to
how
these
relate
to
Deleuze's interpretation.
Deleuzian
Critique
Leibniz
makes a most pertinent comment
in
the
Disputatio
when
he describes Scotus
as an
`extreme
realist'
in
that,
as we shall soon see, such an accusation could also
be
S04
Leibniz (1714) Monadology,
section
43, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
273
505
Plotinus (1991) The Enneads,
trans. S. MacKenna,
abridged with an
introduction
and notes,
J.
Dillon. London: Penguin, VI, 7,17,
pp.
487-8
Leibniz (1714) Monadology,
section
83, in Philosophical Texts,
p.
280
161
levelled
against
Deleuze's
position.
In
order
to
see
how
this
applies we shall
first
provide a summary of
this
argument.
This
will
then
allow us
to
make a comparison
with
Deleuze's interpretation
of
Leibniz.
By describing Scotus
as
being
an extreme realist
Leibniz is
effectively
accusing
him
of a certain
Platonism
whereupon universals
have
existence outside
the
mind.
Certainly
this
determination
goes
beyond Scotus'
own
intention for he
argues
that the
individual is
composed of
formally distinct
parts which
do
not really exist
outside
the
individual. However, Leibniz's
assertion
is based
on a critique of
Scotus'
assumptions which we
have
outlined previously
in
the
chapter.
To
reiterate
the
main
line
of
this
critique,
Leibniz
sees
the
most problematic aspect of
Scotus'
theory
of
individuation
as
being Scotus' formulation
of
the
formal distinction. Let
us recall
that
the
Scholastics
utilised
two
common
distinctions: the
real
distinction between
separable
things,
and a
distinction
of reason
between
mental concepts created
by
an
activity of
the
mind.
However,
the
Scholastics
were also
interested in
the
problem of
how
a
distinction
of reason could
have
a
foundation in
reality and so provide a
basis
for
epistemology.
Scotus'
solution
to this
problem
is
the
formal distinction
-a
distinction
within reality which
the
mind
is
able
to
recognise.
Leibniz
outlines
two
arguments against
this
in
the
Disputatio. The first is Ockham's
argument
that
if
the
formal distinction is
accepted
then there
is
no way
in
which
to
determine
a
`fuller'
real
distinction. The
second argument
is
via a more nuanced criticism
by Suarez.
Suarez
accepts
the
idea
of a well-founded
distinction
of reason, which
he
calls
the
reasoned reason,
but
argues
that
such a
distinction is
to
be found in
the
constitution
of
the
intellect
rather
than the
constitution of
the
individual. This has important
implications
for
the
ontological constitution of
the
individual. For Scotus
the
individual is
constituted
by its
quiddity or
formal
specific
difference,
which
has less
than
numerical unity, which
is
then
actualised as a numerically singular
individual by
its haecceity
or
formal individuating difference. In
this
sense something
`real' has
to
be
added
to
quiddity
in
order
to
make a real numerically singular
individual. On
the
other
hand, for Suarez
and
Leibniz
the
individuating
entity
is
already numerically
singular.
If
we now return
to Leibniz's labelling
of
Scotus
as an extreme realist we
may see
that
his
reasoning
is based
on
the
idea
that the
formal distinction does
not
have
any
foundation in
reality and as such
formalities
are simply mental abstractions
162
or universals.
From Leibniz's
perspective
Deleuze's
position would appear
to
be
even more
extreme.
Deleuze takes
up
the
defence
of
the
formal distinction
and redeploys
it
at a
pivotal point
in his
own philosophy.
Let
us
first
turn to
Deleuze's description
of
the
formal distinction. In Expressionism
and
Philosophy: Spinoza, Deleuze
states:
Formal distinction is definitely
a real
distinction,
expressing as
it does
the
different layers
of reality
that
form
or constitute a
being. Thus it is
called
formalis
a parte rei or actualis ex nature rel.
But it is
a minimally real
distinction because
the two
really
distinct
quiddities are coordinate,
together
making a single
being. Real
and yet not numerical, such
is
the
status of
formal distinction.
507
Here Deleuze
stays relatively close
to
Scotus. The formal distinction is
a
`real'
distinction
but
this
is
not a
distinction between
separable
things.
As
mentioned
previously,
it is
a
distinction
within
the
real so
that
it is `minimally
real'
in
the
sense
that
it
would specify
the true
internal distinctions in Being. Deleuze
presents
his
own
position
further in Difference
and
Repetition:
We
can conceive
that
names or propositions
do
not
have
the
same sense
even while
they
designate
exactly
the
same
thing
(as in
the
case of
the
celebrated examples: morning star
-
evening star,
Israel
-
Jacob,
plan
-
blanc). The distinction between
these
senses
is indeed
a real
distinction,
but
there
is
nothing numerical
-
much
less
ontological
-
about
it: it is
a
formal,
qualitative or semiological
distinction.
508
In this
passage
Deleuze's
relation
to
Scotus
concerning
the
ontological status of
the
formal distinction is
more complex.
For Scotus the
formal distinction is in
the
first
place a way
to
distinguish
the
attributes of
God. God is formally diverse but
ontologically
one.
In
this
respect
there
is
no ontological
distinction between God's
attributes.
On the
other
hand
the
formal distinction does
seem
to
have
an ontological
role
in
the
constitution of
the
individual. For Scotus
the
individual is
composed of
different
degrees
of
formal
unity.
In
the
final instance for
the
individual
to
become
a
real
individual
something real
has
to
be
added
to
formal
unity
in
order
to
produce a
'107
Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza,
p.
64
30"
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
35
163
numerically
singular
individual. However, Deleuze
will argue
that the
ontological
factor
at work
here is
not
the
formal distinction but Scotus'
use of another
important
concept: univocity.
Scotus formulated
the
concept of univocity against
the
negative
theologians who argued
that
God
could only
be known
through
what
he is
not,
that
is,
our
knowledge
of
God has
a negative
foundation. Instead, Scotus
proposed
that
God
could
be known
positively
because He is known in
the
same sense,
that
is,
univocally,
in both Himself
and
His
creations.
Nevertheless Deleuze
tells
us
that
Scotus
did
not
draw
on
the
full
consequences
of univocity
(which
would
be
immanence)
and only uses
it in
an analogical manner as can
be
seen
in
the
analogical
levels
of reality
in
the
individual. For
this
reason
Deleuze
states
that
Scotus
only ever
conceived
of univocity abstractly
(it is interesting to
note
that
from
this
perspective
Deleuze
also effectively posits
Scotus
to
be
an extreme realist:
Scotus' formalities
are abstractions).
To draw
the
full
consequences
of univocity
Deleuze
will say
that
it
is haecceity
or singularity
that
is formally distinct
and
forms
true
non-numerical
individuals.
From Leibniz's
position we may see
Deleuze
is
even
`more'
of an extreme
realist
than
Scotus
was.
For
whereas
Scotus
used
the
formal distinction
to
compose a
numerical
individual Deleuze does
even accept
there
is
such a
thing:
The
notion of unity appears only when
there
is
a power
takeover
in
the
multiplicity
by
the
signifier or a corresponding subjectification
proceeding....
Unity
always operates
in
an empty
dimension
supplementary
to that
of
the
system considered
(overcoding). The
point
is
that
a rhizome or multiplicity never allows
itself
to
be
overcoded, never
has
available a supplementary
dimension
over and above
its
number of
lines
....
509
To
counter
Deleuze's
philosophy
Leibniz has
three criticisms at
his disposal. First,
the
formal distinction
only constitutes an abstraction, second
he has
no
theory
of
individuation to
account
for
numerical
individuals,
and
third,
whatever
theory
of
individuals this
system
does
propose would
have
a common nature
in
terms
of
how
they
are constituted
by
a principle outside of
themselves.
We
shall now
turn to
how
Deleuze does
treats these
potential criticisms.
51
Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus,
pp.
8-9
164
Deleuzian
Manoeuvres
What
we
fmd in Deleuze's
system
is
not a refutation of
these
criticisms
but
a
philosophy
that
is based
on
them.
In
the
first instance Ockham
will argue
that
if
we
accept
the
formal distinction then there
is
no way
in
which a
further
real
distinction
can
be
made.
For Deleuze however
there
is
no such
thing
as a real
distinction. Due
to
his
adherence
to
immanence there
can only
be formal distinctions
as a real
distinction
would
be
something separate
from immanence
and
hence
compromise
it. In
the
second
instance Deleuze
will argue
that
it is in fact
the
advocacy of real numerically
distinct individuals that
consigns philosophy
to
abstraction:
What is
common
to
metaphysics and
transcendental philosophy
is,
above
all,
this
alternative which
they
both impose
on us: either an
undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness,
formless
nonbeing, or an abyss
without
differences
and without properties, or a supremely
individuated
Being
and an
intensely
personalised
Form. Without Being
or
this
Form
you will
have
only chaos
[... ] In
other words, metaphysics and
transcendental philosophy reach an agreement
to think
about
those
determinable
singularities only which are already
imprisoned inside
a
supreme
Self
or a superior
L51
From this
perspective
the
constitution of
individual
selves
is
not an ontological
phenomenon.
This
can
be
seen
in The Logic
of
Sense
where
the
self
is logically
deduced
as a series of
incompossible
singularities.
5 1
What
this
entails
becomes
clear
when we
turn to
Deleuze's later
philosophy.
The
self comes about as
the
realisation
of a possibility,
that
is,
the
constitution of
the
self
is
a matter of
the
percept rather
than the
concept.
Like
the
work of art,
the
self must
be
able
to
stand up on
its
own.
In
the third
instance
we may see
that the
idea
of a common nature of
the
self
is
fundamental to the
percept.
The
self as
the
incompossibility
of
divergent
series of
singularities
is
the thing that
gives
the
self
its
absolute
freedom. There is
an art of
the
self
that
wills
infinite
chance
in
the
Nietzschean
dice-throw. So
we may see
that
Deleuze's
interpretation
meets
the
Scholastic demands
of
Leibniz's
philosophy
by
a
somewhat
inverse
route.
It is
almost as
if Deleuze
gives us a vision of
Leibniz if he
"0
Deie
,
The Logic
of
Sense,
pp.
105-6
s11
ibid,
pp.
118-126
165
had
chosen
to
stay on
the
path of mechanism rather
than the
metaphysics
he
eventually chose.
But how
are we
to
choose
between
these two
philosophies except
for
ones own predilection
for
either numerical or non-numerical singularity?
However,
we may
identify
two
possible
inconsistencies in Deleuze's
interpretation. The first inconsistency involves Deleuze's
own
determination
of
the
self,
that
is, if
the
self
is
constituted according
to
possibility and realisation
then
how
can
immanence be
maintained
in his
system.
To
philosophise
from
the
point of view
of
the
self would already entail an external relation
to
immanence. The
second
inconsistency
is
to
be found in Deleuze's
criticism of pre-established
harmony.
Deleuze
will replace
the
convergence of pre-established
harmony
with
the
divergence
of
the
Nietzschean dice-throw. However, if
two
series
diverge
then
it
would mean
that they
have
come
from
a previous convergence.
Moreover,
to the
extent
that
Deleuze's
philosophy
is based
on
divergence
and
hence
a previous convergence
then
we see
in
a very real sense
how his
work assumes
this
originary connection.
In
this
chapter we
have
seen
this
in
the
form
of
the
vinculum and
the
dice-throw but
one
may also
determine
many other similar concepts such as
habituation in Hume,
and
contraction
in Bergson. In fact
the
only way
in
which
two
lines
will never cross
is if
they
are
in
parallel.
There
are
two
points
to
raise
here. First,
on a metaphysical
level,
because the
monad,
the
world and
the totality
of all monads are
in
complete
correspondence
it
would mean
that they
are not convergent
but
are
indeed in
parallel.
Second,
we
have
seen
how Deleuze
uses
Leibniz's
differential
calculus
to
show
how
the mathematical
deduction
of
the
monad moves
from inflection
to
inclusion.
However,
four
years after
Leibniz invented
the
differential
calculus
he
expresses
the
idea that there
is
actually a more
fundamental
calculus:
The
ancients
had
another
kind
of analysis,
different from
algebra,
which
was concerned rather with considering situation.
It deals
with
data
and
with
the
positions of unknown entities or
their
loci [... ] The
true
analysis
of situation
is
therefore
still
to
be
supplied
[... ] Furthermore,
this
point of
view, which offers such
facility in demonstrating
truths
which
have been
proved only with
difficulty by
other methods, also opens up a new
type
of
calculus
to
us which
is far different from
the
algebraic calculus and
is
new
both in its
symbols and
in
the
application
it
makes of
them
or
in its
operations.
I like
to
call
it Analysis Situs, because it
explains situation
directly
and
immediately,
so
that,
even
if
the
figures
are not
drawn,
they
166
are portrayed
to the
mind
through
symbols....
512
Deleuze
will
link `analysis
situs' with
the
projected point of view
in
the
body but
Loemker
will also
link it
to
pieces such as
the
On
the
True Theologia Mystica
where
Leibniz
will
translate
his
philosophy
into
theological terms.
513
We
may also see
this
in
the
Refutation
of
Spinoza
where
Leibniz links God
and
His
creatures
through
an
idea
of position:
I think that
everything
is in God,
not as
the
part
in
the
whole, nor as an
accident
in
a subject,
but
as place, yet a place spiritual and enduring and
not one measured or
divided, is in
that
which
is
placed, namely,
just
as
God is immense
or everywhere;
the
world
is
present
to
him.
514
Here
we are
taken
back
to the
idea
we expressed at
the
end of part
1
of
this
chapter
that the
monad needs
to
be
understood
in
terms
of a
theory
of emanation.
Theories
of
emanation
is
one of
the themes
we will
turn to
in
the
next chapter.
We
shall also
investigate the
effects
these
ideas have for Deleuze's
philosophy.
512
Leibniz (1679) Two Studies in
the Logical Calculus, in Philosophical Papers,
pp.
254-257
s"
ibid,
p.
247
s"
Leibniz (1708) Refutation
of
Spinoza, in P. Wiener (ed. X1951) Selections. New York: Charles
Scribner,
p.
489
167
Chapter 4
The Position
of
Philosophy
168
The Philosophy
of
Shock
`What
gives you a
hard-on
theoreticians
is
the
coldness of
the
clear and
distinct. '
Lyotard
How is it
possible
for
philosophy
to
be
anything other
than
mere mental
masturbation?
Or
more precisely,
how is it
possible
for
a philosophical
`discourse'
to
create or affect something
`real'? Or
more precise still,
how
can a philosophical
discourse
not
fail
to
affect something, although
its
affections may
be ineffectual
and
unaffected?
How
one
thinks
would seem
to
be fundamental
to
how
one
lives
yet
philosophy rarely ventures out of
the
academy
indulging instead in
noodling515 and
petty squalling.
Perhaps
the
diminishing
of philosophy may
be
attributed
to
its
tendency to
lapse into
stultifying scholasticism.
516
At
what point
did
thought,
like
Baudrillard's God become
too tired to
intervene in
the
world?
5' 7
Deleuze
will specifically portray
his
philosophy as
`creative'
or
`revolutionary' in
the
sense
that
a philosophy of
the
event
is designed
to
produce a
shock
to thought;
a
bolt
of
lightning
to
shock
thought
into
thinking. To
this
effect
Deleuze draws
on
Heidegger
and quotes
from him
the
following
passage:
`Man
can
think
in
the
sense
that
he
possesses
the
possibility
to
do
so.
This
possibility alone
however, is
no guarantee
to
us
that
we are capable of
thinking.
'518 To
what extent can
it be
said
that
Deleuze has
taught
us
to think
again?
Certainly
two
of
Deleuze's
most
prominent contemporaries,
Michel Foucault
and
Jacques Derrida
attest
to this
aspect
of
his
work.
In
this
respect
Foucault
will write:
`...
a
lightning
storm was produced
which will, one
day, be
given
the
name of
Deleuze:
new
thought
is
possible:
thought
is
again possible.
'519 For Foucault, Deleuze has fined
a
thought
of
difference from its
515
Noodling is
the
pastime of catching
fish
with your
hands.
516
l)eleuze
will
likewise describe his
thought
as originating
in
a similar environment: `I belong
to
a
generation, one of
the
last
generations, that
was more or
less bludgeoned
to
death
with the
history
of
philosophy.
' M. Cressole (1973) `Letter
to
a
Harsh Critic' in Gilles Deleuze (1995
orig.
1990)
Negotiations, trans. M. Joughin.
New York: Columbia University Press,
p.
5.
517
Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies,
pp.
144-164. Baudrillard
makes
the
point that God has
grown
too
tired to
intervene in
the
destiny
of
the
world
in
response
to
a
theologian
who said
God had
grown
tired
of gambling which
Baudrillard
takes to
mean
God has
grown
tired
of chance.
sag
Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time Image,
p.
56.
511
Foucault, M. (1977),
p.
196.
169
philosophical presuppositions:
The
conditions
for
thinking
of
difference
and repetition, as we
have
seen,
have
undergone a progressive expansion.
First, it
was necessary, along
with
Aristotle,
to
abandon
the
identity
of
the
concept,
to
reject
resemblance within representation, and simultaneously
to
free
ourselves
from
the
philosophy of representation; and
finally, it
was necessary
to
free
ourselves
from Hegel
-
from
the
opposition of predicates,
from
contradiction and negation,
from
all off
dialectics. But
there
is
yet a
fourth
condition and
it is
even more
formidable
than the
others....
Difference
can only
be liberated
through the
invention
of an acategorical
thought.
52o
As Deleuze
will
himself
say:
`Life
will no
longer be
made
to
appear
before
the
categories of
thought; thought
will
be
thrown
into
the
categories of
life. 'S2' It is in
this
sense
that
Foucault
remarks
`perhaps
one
day,
this
century will
be known
as
Deleuzian. '522 For his
part
Deleuze
takes this to
mean
that
of
his
generation
it is he
who
has
worked most closely with
the
pure concepts of philosophy.
523
He
also
recognizes
that
staying precisely within
the
remit of
thinking
difference
philosophically
is
perhaps not
in itself
enough
to
induce
thinking:
`Everyone knows
that,
if
an art necessarily
imposed
the
shock or vibration,
the
world would
have
changed
long
ago, and men would
have been
thinking
for
a
long
time.
'
524
Derrida
carries
these
issues further forward in his
eulogy
to
Deleuze: `Deleuze
the thinker
is
the thinker
of
the
event....
From
the
very
beginning,
all of
his books
...
have been for
me
...
strong provocations to think....
9525
and adds
the
following
qualification:
Yes,
we will
have
all
loved
philosophy, who can
deny it? But, it is
true
-
he
said
it
-
Deleuze
was
the
one among all of
this
"generation"
who
"was
doing"
philosophy
the
most gaily,
the
most
innocently. I don't
think
he
would
have liked
me using
the
word
"thinker"
earlier.
He
would
have
preferred
"philosopher. " In
this
regard
he
was making
himself
out
to
be
"the
most
innocent"
(the least
guilty)
"of doing
philosophy.
"
52
ibid.
p.
186
521
Cinema II,
p.
189
522
Foucault (1977),
p.
165
523
Deleuze, Negotiations,
pp.
88-89.
su
Deleuze, Cinema II,
p.
157
su
Jacques Derrida (1998) `I'm
going
to
have
to
wander all alone,
'
trans. L. Lawlor, Philosophy
Today, Spring 1998,
p.
3.
170
Undoubtedly, this
was
the
necessary condition
in
order
to
leave
on
the
philosophy of
this
century
the
incomparably deep
mark
that
will always
be his. The
mark of a great philosopher and a great professor.
526
So
what
is
the
difference between
a
"thinker"
and a
"philosopher"? Certainly
a
philosopher will create a
template
or assemblage which
distributes
thinking
in
a
certain way
but
what
is
the
originary mode of
thought
or experience
that
leads
to this
in
the
first
place?
This
chapter will
be
concerned with
the
place of
thought
within
Deleuze's
philosophy.
In
the
first
part of
this
chapter we will
trace the
position of
thought
in
terms
of
the
historical
trajectory
of
Deleuze's
philosophical
development.
The
second part of
this
chapter will explore
the
consequences
that this
position of
thought
has for his
philosophy.
526
bid,
p.
4
171
What is left
of
thinking?
The
role of
thought
in Deleuze's
philosophy
is inextricably linked
to
his
own
philosophical position.
First
we will provide a
basic
outline of
this
position
through
his
early work on
Hume, Bergson
and
Nietzsche. This in
turn
provides
the
basis
of
Deleuze's
approach
to
a
theory
of expression.
Second
we shall analyse
Deleuze's
theory
of expression
in his
early and
late
works.
Finally
we shall
turn to the
organisation of a
logic
of expression.
Eariv Develoi
meat
The first figure
of major philosophical
import
to
Deleuze is Hume. As
we outlined
in
the
Introduction
the
first
and perhaps
foremost factor in Deleuze's
philosophy
is
that
thought
and philosophy are constructions.
The
question
then
is
with what
they
are
constructed.
Deleuze
explicitly
turns to this
matter
in
the
preface
he
wrote
for
the
English
edition of
Dialogues: `I have
always
felt
that
I
am an empiricist,
that
is,
a
pluralist.
'527 For Deleuze
experience can't
be
understood
through
ready-made
concepts
but
must
first be
taken
as
it is, in its
undiluted multiplicity:
Empiricism
starts with
...
analysing states of
things,
in
such a way
that
non-pre-existent concepts can
be
extracted
from
them.
States
of
things
are neither unities nor
totalities,
but
multiplicities....
The
essential
thing,
from
the
point of view of empiricism,
is
the
noun multiplicity....
In
a
multiplicity what counts are not
the terms
or elements,
but
what
there
is
`between, '
the
between,
a set of relations which are not separable
from
each other.
529
Deleuze's
use of
the
`between, ' like
multiplicity,
is
to
be
understood as a noun.
Objects, like
concepts, are also not ready made
but
are part of a
differential field. But
how
are we
to
make sense of
the `multiplicity'
of
the
`differential field? ' For
this
purpose
Deleuze
turns to
Bergson.
In Bergson
we
find
some very precise answers
to these
points.
Firstly, in
527
Gilles Deleuze & Clare Parnet (1987
orig.
1977) Dialogues,
trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam.
London: Athlone,
p. vii
523
bid,
pp. vii-viii
172
order
to think
in
terms
of a multiplicity requires an open as opposed
to
a closed
system of
thought.
Here
the
concept of an open
thought
is based
on
the
notion
that
a
multiplicity
is
not a completed whole or
totality,
as
Deleuze
tells
us
in Cinema 1:
According to
Bergson
the
whole
is
neither given nor giveable....
Many
philosophers
had
already said
that the
whole was neither given nor
giveable:
they
simply concluded
from
this that the
whole was a
meaningless notion.
Bergson's
conclusion
is
very
different: if
the
whole
is
not giveable
it is because it is
the
Open,
and
because its
nature
is
to
change constantly, or
to
give rise
to
something new,
in
short,
to
endure.
529
This
gives rise
to
a new possibility
for
thought,
for
an open
thought
would
itself
encapsulate
the
movement of multiplicity:
`...
one must
be
capable of
thinking the
production of
the
new,
that
is,
the
remarkable and
the
singular
...
this
is
a complete
conversion of philosophy.
'530 Bergson
will
describe
the
process of
this
new way of
thinking
in The Creative Mind:
It [our
mind] can
be installed in
the
mobile reality, adopt
its
ceaselessly
changing
direction, in
short, grasp
it intuitively. But
to
do
that,
it
must
do
itself
violence, reverse
the
direction
of
the
operation
by
which
it
ordinarily
thinks,
continually upsetting
its
categories, or rather, recasting
them.
In
so
doing it
will arrive at
fluid
concepts, capable of
following
reality
in
all
its
windings and of adopting
the
very movement of
the
inner
life
of
things
[... ] To
philosophise means
to
reverse
the
normal
direction
of
the
workings of
thought.
531
There
are
two
points
to
be drawn from
this
passage.
The first
point
is
that
as
Deleuze
notes
in Bergsonism
the
idea
of
intuition is
not an
ill-defined
concept
but forms
the
very method of
Bergson's
philosophy.
532
It is
through
intuition
that
we
discern
differences
in kind (duration
or qualitative multiplicity) as opposed
to
differences in
degree (space
or quantitative multiplicity).
The
second point
is
that
if in
order
`think'
in
terms
of qualitative multiplicity one must
`reverse the
natural
direction
of
thought'
I"
Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image,
p.
9
530
ibid. p.
7
531
Henri Bergson (1946
orig.
1941) The Creative Mind,
trans
M. L. Adison. New Jersey: Citadel
Press,
p.
190
532
Gilles Deleuze (1988
orig.
1966) Bergsonism,
trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habbeijam. New York:
Zone Books,
pp.
13-35
173
then
what position
does
this
ascribe
to thought.
To
examine
this
further
we shall
turn
to
Bergson's Matter
and
Memory.
In Matter
and
Memory Bergson
starts
from
the
supposition
that
we
experience
the
world
through
`images. ' The idea
of
images
concerns not only
the
world
`out there'
but
also
the
body
which
is
considered as another
image in
the
world.
However the
body is
provided a special status
to the
extent
that
it is
not only
experienced
through
perception
but
also
from `within' through
affections.
533
Bergson
argues
that
perception
is
a
faculty
that
presents our actions
in
the
world:
My body,
an object
destined
to move other objects,
is
...
a centre of
action;
it
cannot give
birth
to
a representation
[... ] I
call matter
the
aggregate of
images,
and perception
of matter
these
same
images
referred
to the
eventual action of one particular
image,
my
body.
534
The
fundamental image in
this
schema
is
the
brain: `...
the
brain
appears
to
us
to
be
an
instrument
of analysis
in
regard
to the
movement
received and an
instrument
of
selection
in
regard
to the
movement executed.
'535 The brain
or
thought
has both
a
passive and an active aspect.
It is
passive
in
the
sense
that
it forms
a
`zone
of
indetermination'
as not all
thoughts
are executed as actions.
536
In
this
way
thought
exists
in
a
form
of
delayed
time
which
Bergson
will call
`virtual
action.
'137 On
the
other
hand it is
active
in how
this
virtuality
is brought
to
real action.
As Bergson
notes
this
is
not
done by
adding something
to the
virtual action
but by
taking
away
those
aspect which
do
not
interest it. We find
a comparison of
this
in
the
consideration of
the
active perception of an object:
To
obtain
this
conversion
from
the
virtual
to the
actual,
it
would
be
necessary, not
to throw
more
light
on
the
object,
but,
on
the
contrary,
to
obscure some of
its
aspects,
to
diminish it by
the
greater part of
itself,
so
that the
remainder,
instead
of
being
encased
in its
surroundings as a
thing, should
detach itself
as a picture.
538
533
Bergson, Matter
and
Memory,
p.
17
"
ibid.
pp.
20-22
533
ibid.
p.
30
s
ibid.
p.
32
537
ibid.
p.
50
538
ibid.
p.
36
174
As
such
the
brain is
an organ of attention
to
life
and selects or contracts actions
according
to
its interests. So
we may see
that thought
is
essentially passive
but
becomes
active
through
selection.
With
this
formulation
we
have
already come
to
some of
the
main points
that
Deleuze
will
further develop
through
Nietzsche.
With Nietzsche it
would appear
that
Deleuze's
early studies reach a state of
completion.
Instead
of
Bergson's duree
or
duration Deleuze
turns to the
Nietzschean
eternal return which affirms
the
being
of
becoming; instead
of
the
elan vital or
creative effort
there
is force
and
the
will
to
power;
instead
of contraction
there
is
the
dice
throw
which affirms all chance
in its
selection of multiplicity.
In
terms
of
Nietzsche's
approach
to
multiplicity
he is
not concerned with questions of
the
sort
`what is it? ' but
of
the type
`which
one
is it? ':
According
to Nietzsche
the
question
"which
one?
"
means
this:
what are
the
forces
which
take
hold
of a
thing,
what
is
the
will
that
possesses
it?
Which
one
is
expressed, manifested and even
hidden in it? We
are
led
to
essence only
by
the
question: which one?
For
essence
is
merely
the
sense
and value of
the thing....
Moreover,
when we ask
the
question
"what is
it? "
we not only
fall into
the
worst metaphysics
but in fact
we merely ask
the
question
"which
one?
" in
a
blind,
unconscious and confused way.
The
question
"what is it? " is
a way of establishing a sense seen
from
another point of view.
Essence, being, is
a perspectival reality and
presupposes a plurality.
539
In
a similar way as we saw
in Bergson's
method of
intuition
earlier
Nietzsche's
method of
`which
one'
(genealogy)
essentially
constitutes a
typology
and
form
of
distribution. This is
anchored
in
a metaphysics of
force:
We
will never
find
the
sense of something
(of
a
human,
a
biological
or
even a physical phenomenon)
if
we
do
not
know
the
force
which
appropriates
the thing,
which exploits
it,
which
takes
possession of
it
or
is
expressed
in it. A
phenomenon
is
not an appearance or even an
apparition
but
a sign, a symptom which
finds its
meaning
in
an existing
force. The
whole of philosophy
is
a symptomatology, and a semeiology
[... ] All force is
appropriation,
domination,
exploitation of a quantity of
reality.
540
539
Deleuze, Nietzsche
and
Philosophy,
pp.
76-77
xo
ibid.
p.
3
175
Nietzsche's basic
metaphysical approach
is
not
dissimilar
to that
of
the
Stoics
except
instead
of mixtures
it is force
that
plays
the
primary role and effects are entirely
subjugated
to
it. This
accords
the
following
position
to
consciousness and
thought:
To
remind consciousness of
its
necessary modesty
is
to take
it for
what
it
is:
a symptom; nothing
but
the
symptom of a
deeper
transformation
of
entirely non-spiritual
forces. "Perhaps the
body is
the
only
factor in
all
spiritual
development" [... ]
the
servility of consciousness
...
merely
testifies to the
"formation
of a superior
body. )9541
It is
only
through the
Nietzschean dice-throw
and
the
will
to
power
that thought
frees
itself from
this
subjugation.
Or
as we
have
already quoted
from Deleuze's idea
of
the
ideal
game
in Chapter 2: `...
only
thought
finds it
possible
to
affirm all chance and
to
make chance
into
an object of affrmation.
'S42 And it is in
this
sense
that
we may see
why
Deleuze
considers
his
work as a work of philosophy rather
than
a work of
thought:
a non-subjugated
thought
is
no
longer thought
as such
but
a map of
singularities.
However,
as we argued
in Chapter 2, Deleuze's
affirmation of chance
introduces
an unresolved physical principle
into his
philosophy.
We
shall now
examine
how
this
plays out
in his
theories
of expression
in
general.
What is
a
Logic
of
Expression?
In its
most general sense a
logic
of expression
is
a metaphysical
distinction
of
different
orders of
`reality'
where one order
is
manifested or expressed
in
another
order.
One
may
trace this type
of
thought
all
the
way
back
to
Parmenides
and
Plato
where
the
world of
forms is
expressed
in
the
world of appearances.
For Deleuze
however
expression
finds its
most rigorous
formulation in
the
work of
Spinoza.
543
Spinoza's
philosophy
is
characterized
by
two
main
factors: immanence
and
univocity.
First God is immanent
to that
which
he
produces which
is
to
say
that
God
is
equally expressed
in himself
as
he is in
that
which
he
expresses.
Second God is
expressed univocally
in his
expressions which
is
to
say
that
all expressions
have
the
54'
ibid.
p.
39
342
Delenze, The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
60
543
Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy.
Spinoza,
pp.
13-22
176
same sense or value
in
relation
to
God. Spinoza deduces
these
points
from his
theory
of
the
infinite. For
the
infinite
to
be
truly
infinite
there
can
be
nothing outside
it
and
so
God
as
the
absolute
infinite is implicated in
the
internal
production of
his
expressions,
that
is,
the
world
is
enfolded
in God. A
similar
idea had
previously
been
taken
up
by Nicholas
of
Cusa
who used
the
metaphor
that
any
finite figure
can
be
reduced
to,
or
deduced from,
the
infinite line
of
God. The
question we shall pursue
is
how
a
theory
of
immanence
operates
in Deleuze's
philosophy and
the
distribution
of
thought
and metaphysics
that this
produces.
First
we shall
identify
some of
the
issues
we need
to
consider
to
investigate
this
matter.
In Deleuze's formative
work we may already see a
logic
of expression
developing in
terms
of
the
metaphysics already present
in Bergson
and
Nietzsche.
Returning to
a previous quotation
Bergson
will state
that
`to
philosophise means
to
reverse
the
normal
direction
of
the
workings of
thought.
544
As
such
the
`natural'
direction
of
thought
is from
the
virtual
to the
actual
(from
virtual action
to
real
actualisation).
For Bergson
the
aim of philosophy
is
to
move
in
the
opposite
direction
from
the
actual
to the
virtual
in
order
to
elaborate
the
`reality' from
which
thought
and
the
world
is
constituted.
Bergson's
approach
is itself influenced by
one of
the
greatest advances of modem
thought,
Leibniz's
infinitesimal
calculus:
`The
most
powerful method of
investigation known
to the mind,
infinitesimal
calculus, was
born
of
that
very reversal.
'-545 Leibniz's invention
of
the
infinitesimal
calculus
provides an apparently concrete way
in
which
to
conceive
the
world as a process of
expression.
The
mathematical processes of
differentiation
and
integration
themselves
are
the
operations of
determining
the tangent to
a curve and
the
area
between limits
on a curve.
This in itself
may not seem particularly
fundamental but
calculus stands
as
the
cornerstone of modem physics, or more precisely,
the
Newtonian-Einsteinian
derivation
of modem physics.
An innovation
with more philosophical
implications is
Dennis Gabor's invention
of
the
hologram
which utilized calculus
in
the
form
of
Fourier's
mathematical
theorem:
The Fourier
theorem
states
that
any pattern of organisation can
be
54'
Bergson, The Creative Mind,
p.
190
545
ibid.
177
analysed
into,
and represented
by,
a series of regular waveforms of
different
amplitudes and
frequencies. These
regular waveforms can
in
turn
be
superimposed, convolved, with one another and,
by
way of
the
inverse Fourier
procedure, can
be
retransformed
to
obtain
the
original
space-time configuration
[... ] Dennis Gabor
...
the
inventor
of
the
hologram, based his discovery
on
the
fact
that
one can store
interference
patterns of waveforms produced
by
the
reflection or refraction of
light
from
an object on a photographic
film
and reconstruct
from
such a
film
the
image
of
the
object.
The description
of
the
enfolded organisation of
the
stored potential
for
reconstruction
is
related
to the
unfolded space-
time
description
of
the
object
by
a
Fourier
transform....
The idea
of an enfolded and an unfolded organisation of reality
leads
to the
simple
intuition
that the
world we
inhabit is
an
integration
of a
`deeper'
reality and
that
we
can access
this
order
through
its inverse
process of
differentiation. However,
this
simple
intuition does
not resolve
the
metaphysics of
the
calculus and poses a number
of problems of
its
own.
The first
problem
is
that there
is
always a
tendency to
reify
differential
and
integral
orders.
That is, do differentiation
and
integration lead
to
differential
and
integral
orders of reality or should
they
be
conceived as completely
processual?
The distinction being
made
here is
whether
there
are end products of
differentiation
and
integration
or whether
differential
and
integral
orders occur
in
process.
The
second problem
is
that
whether
these
orders are static or processual
there
is
still
the
question of
the
`matter'
of
that
which
is differentiated/differentiating
and
its
relation
to
a originary principle of
differentiation. The
third
problem
is
the
general organisational structure of
the theory
of expression or schema of calculus.
That is how it is
conceived as either
immanent
or
transcendent
and
the
number of
transformations
used
to
constitute reality.
Of
course,
these three
issues
are not
entirely exclusive of each other.
With
these
points
in
mind we shall now
turn to
Deleuze's theories
of expression.
Delenze's
early expression
Deleuze's
first
complete
theory
of expression
is
to
be found in Difference
and
Repetition. However
the
form
this
will
take
is
already present
in Nietzsche
and
546
Karl Pribram (1986) "'Rte Cognitive Revolution
and
Mind/Brain Issues, " American Psychologist,
May,
p.
515
178
Philosophy
where
he
will
interpret Nietzsche's
philosophy as essentially a
differential
philosophy:
The
will
to
power
is
...
added
to
force
as
the
differential
and genetic
element, as
the
internal
element of
its
production
[... ] More
precisely,
it
is
added
to
force
as
the
internal
principle of
the
determination
of
its
quality
in
a relation
(x+dx)
and as
the
internal
principle of
the
quantitative
determination
of
this
relation
itself (dy/dx). The
will
to
power must
be described
as
the
genealogical element of
force
and of
forces.
547
This
approach culminates
in Difference
and
Repetition
where
Deleuze
resituates
his
reading of
Nietzsche
within a
Kantian
theory
of
Ideas, that
is,
a
differential
theory
of
Ideas:
Ideas
...
present
three
moments: undetermined with regard
to their
object,
determinable
with regards
to
objects of experience, and
bearing
the
ideal
of an
infinite determination
with regards concepts of
the
understanding
[... ] The
principle of a general
differential
philosophy must
be
the
object
of a rigorous exposition...
The
symbol
dx
appears as simultaneously
undetermined,
determinable
and
determination. Three
principles which
together
form
a sufficient reason correspond
to these three
aspects: a
principle of
determinability
corresponds
to the
undetermined as such
(dx,
dy);
a principle of reciprocal
determination
corresponds
to the
really
determinable (dy/dx);
a principle of complete
determination
corresponds
to the
effectively
determined (values
of
dy/dx). In
short,
dx is
the
54s
Idea....
In
order
to
understand
this
we must return
to the
Nietzschean
thematic
of a
field
of
forces. The first
phase of
the
Idea is
as a
determinable force
which
has `some'
quantity
but
this
force is
undetermined
in
relation
to
other
forces. The
second phase
of
the
idea is
the
determination
of
forces
via a
differential
relation which provides us
with
the
quality of reciprocal
forces. The final
phase
involves
the
complete
determination
of
force
as singular values.
Here Deleuze is
providing us with a genetic
account of
differentiation
which results
in
the
complete
determination
of a
field
of
singularities.
This
process
is
also a
determination
of
force
and as such
the
differential
347
Deleuze, Nietzsche
and
Philosophy,
p.
51
I"
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
pp.
169-71
179
field is
associated with a potential or
intensity
which precipitates
Deleuze's
account
of
integration. The
potential of
the
differential field
provides
the
conditions
for
singularities
to
`cancel' their
difference
of
intensity:
Intensity is
the
uncancellable
in difference
of quantity,
but
this
difference
of quantity
is
cancelled
by
extension, extension
being
precisely
the
process
by
which
intensive difference is
turned
inside
out and
distributed
in
such a way as
to
be dispelled,
compensated, equalised and suppressed
in
the
extensity which
it
creates.
M9
For Deleuze,
this
constitutes
the
process of
integration (which he
will also
term
actualisation or
`differentiation'). Integration
occurs as a
depotentialisation
across
the
intensive
gradients of singularities akin
to
lightning flashes. As
such singularities
or events are actualised
to
form
extension.
Let
us now
turn to the
composition of
this theory
of expression.
The
differential field is
transcendental to
extension
but
what
is
the
constitution of
the
differential field itself? For
this
purpose
Deleuze turns to
a static ontological genesis
in
terms
of
the
will
to
power
(we have
already seen
in Chapter 2
that the
aleatory
point plays
the
same role
in The Logic
of
Sense). The
will
to
power constitutes
the
differential
order
from
the
pure
becoming
of
forces
which
Deleuze
will
term
a
`groundless
ground.
'
or
`dark
precursor.
'55 This is,
as
it
were,
the
`medium'
of
the
differential field. In
this
schema one may see
that the
order of
the
actual
is
most
definitely
a processual order
in
that
it
occurs
between
singular
intensities. However,
the
position of
the
virtual
is
not so clear.
The formation
of singularities across
the
medium of a pure
becoming
would certainly point
towards
a processual order
but
the
added organisational
factor
of
the
will
to
power provides
for
a much more
complicated
composition:
The
will
to
power combines
two
univocal moments
in
the
form
of
the
Nietzschean dice
throw.
55'
The first
moment
is
the
affirmation of chance
in
the throw
of
the
dice
to
which
Deleuze
attributes
the
power of
differentiation.
The
second moment
is
the
affirmation of
the
eternal return as
the
return of
the
different in
the
combination which
the
dice
produces,
to
which
Deleuze
attributes the
power of
-`9
ibid.
p.
233
33
Deleuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
227
551
Deleuze, Nietzsche
and
Philosophy,
pp.
25-29
180
differenciation. In
this
sense
Deleuze's interpretation
of
the
will
to
power
is
a
mediation of pure
becoming. It is
the
will
to
power
that
is in
the
first
place
in
process,
that
which
happens `between, '
and produces
the
differential field
as a
`static'
order.
Is
the
will
to
power perhaps an extraneous principle
to the
extent
that
it is
a process
of a process
(of
pure
becoming)? Deleuze
will
himself
recognise
that
his
theories
of
expression pre-Anti-Oedipus are
influenced by Lacanian
structuralism where
his
theory
of
the
will
to
power
in Difference
and
Repetition
and
the
`object=x'
of
the
aleatory point
in The Logic
of
Sense
may
be
seen
to
play
the
part of a primary
signifier.
Deleuze
will
later
see
this
as
introducing
an element of
transcendence
into
the theory
of expression:
`Is
there
a
"best"
plane
that
would not
hand
over
immanence
to
Something=x
and
that
would no
longer
mimic anything
transcendent?
'552 We
shall now explore
this through
Deleuze's
theory
of expression
in his later
work.
Deleuze's late
expression
`We
require
just
a
little
order
to
protect us
from
chaos.
'553
The
main
difference between Deleuze's
early and
late
theories
of expression
is
that
whereas
in
the
early
theories
we
find
a static order of
differentiation being
produced
by
a secondary principle of movement
it
will now
be
movement
that
plays
the
primary principle of
the
system.
To
explore
this
we will
turn to
Deleuze's final
statement on a
theory
of expression
to
be found in
what also
turned
out
to
be his final
book
with
Felix Guattari: What is Philosophy?
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze
and
Guattari begin
their theory
of expression
with
the
notion of a virtual chaos, a chaotic
flux
of
infinite
movement:
Chaos is defined
not so much
by its disorder
as
by
the
infinite
speed with
which every
form
taking
shape
in it
vanishes.
It is
a void
that
is
not a
nothingness
but
a virtual, containing all possible particles and
drawing
out all possible
forms,
which spring up only
to
disappear immediately,
552
De1euze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?,
p.
59
sss
ibid.
p.
201
181
without consistency or reference, without consequence.
Chaos is
an
s-14
infinite
speed of
birth
and
disappearance.
The
virtual chaos produces a state of affairs
through
what
is described
as a process of
`slowing down. ' The basic intuition
of a slowing
down
of
the
infinite
would seem
to
lead
to the
notion
that
a
form
of
differentiation is
taking
place
here,
that
is,
a
loss
of
(mathematical)
power.
However this
seems
less
clear cut
to the
extent
that
Deleuze
posits
that the
virtual chaos
is
specifically actualised
in
a state of affairs.
Deleuze
attributes
this
operation
to
a
function
of science as opposed
to
a concept of
philosophy:
...
by
relinquishing
the
infinite,
science gives a reference
to the
virtual,
which actualises
it
through
functions [... ] It is
a
fantastic
slowing
down,
and
it is by
slowing
down
that
matter, as well as
the
scientific
thought
able
to
penetrate
it
with prepositions,
is
actualised.
A function is
a
Slow-
motion
[... ] To
slow
down is
to
set a
limit in
chaos
to
which all speeds
are subject, so
that they
form
a variable
determined
as abscissa, at
the
same
time
as
the
limit forms
a universal constant
that
cannot
be
gone
beyond
....
555
A
state of affairs
`sections'
the
virtual chaos via a plane of reference
that
acts as a
lateral
or
transcendental
condition.
Here
we may see
that
actualisation
is
not
synonymous with
integration. It is
a
drop in
potential
in
the
form
of a plane of
reference
(limit)
that
gives actualisation
the
power
to
proceed:
...
an operation of
depotentialization has been
carried out
that
makes
possible
the
comparison of
distinct
powers starting
from
which a
thing
or
a
body
may well
develop (integration). In
general, a state of affairs
does
not actualise a chaotic virtual without
taking
from it
a potential
that
is
distributed in
the
system of ordinates.
5g
The
state of affairs
is
a mixture or mass of
independent
variables.
557
To
the
extent
that
it is
potentialised
from
the
virtual chaos
it is
already
in
relation to
a
differential
gradient
but
the
determination
of relations of
independent
variables
in
turn
s4
ibid.
p.
118
553
ibid.
s56
ibid. p.
122
557
ibid. p.
153
182
distinguish
singularities
in
the
differential
gradient.
However
this
movement
in
the
`opposite'
direction from
the
actual
to the
virtual
is
no
longer
according
to
a
scientific
function, but
to
a philosophical concept.
The
concept
finds its
place
in
the
virtual rather
than the
actual:
The
concept
is
an
incorporeal,
even
though
it is incarnated
or effectuated
in bodies. But, in fact, it is
not mixed up with
the
state of affairs
in
which
it is
effectuated.
It does
not
have
spatiotemporal coordinates, only
intensive
ordinates.
It has
no energy, only
intensities; it is
anenergetic....
The
concept speaks
the
event, not
the
essence or
the thing
-
pure
Event,
a
hecceity,
an entity....
558
However,
if
the
concept
is
virtual
then
what relation
does it have
with
the
virtual
chaos?
How is it
possible
to
reach
the
concept?
Deleuze tells
us on
this
point:
...
if
we go
back
up
in
the
opposite
direction, from
states of affairs
to the
virtual,
the
line is
not
the
same
because it is
not
the
same virtual...
The
virtual
is
no
longer
the
chaotic virtual
but
rather virtuality
that
has
become
consistent,
that
has become
an entity
formed
on a plane of
immanence
that
sections
the
chaos.
This is
what we call
the
Event,
or
the
part
that
eludes
its
own actualisation
in
everything
that
happens. The
Event is
not
the
state of affairs.
It is
actualised
in
a state of affairs,
in
a
body, in
a
lived, but it has
a shadowy and secret part
that
is
continually
subtracted
from
or added
to
its
actualisation:
in
contrast with
the
state of
affairs,
it
neither
begins
nor ends
but has
gained or
kept
the
infinite
movement
to
which
it
gives consistency.
559
Unlike the
function
which operates according
to
a plane of reference,
the
concept/event
operates according
to
a plane of
immanence. The
concept/event
is
defined
not
by
the
process of
`slowing down'
whereby
the
function is
actualised
according
to
a
limit but
according
to
a configuring of
the
virtual chaos.
That is, it has
endo-consistency
instead
of exo-consistency.
Thereby it
maintains
the
pure
becoming
of
the
virtual chaos
but finds its finitude in
the
relative
form
of
the
consistent plane
it
forms:
0
The
concept
is
...
both
absolute and relative:
it is
relative
to
its
own
538
ibid.
p.
22
559
ibid. p.
156
183
components,
to
other concepts,
to the
plane on which
it is defined,
and
to
the
problems
it is
supposed
to
resolve;
but it is
absolute
through the
condensation
it
carries out,
the
site
it
occupies on
the
plane, and
the
conditions
it
assigns
to the
problem.
As
whole
it is
absolute,
but insofar
as
it is fragmentary it is
relative.
It is infinite through its
survey or
its
speed
but finite
through
its
movement
that traces the
contour of
its
components.
5
In terms
of
the
overall structure of
this theory
of expression
Deleuze
will state:
`Concepts
and
functions
...
appear as
two types
of multiplicities or varieties whose
natures are
different. '-561 From this
point of view
both
the
actual and
the
consistent
virtual occur as processual orders;
they
are
both `between. ' So far
we
have
provided
a
brief
outline of
Deleuze's
theories
of expression
in his
early and
late
work, shortly
we shall
turn to
a
deeper
exploration of
the
general organisation of
the
`expressional
schema.
' First however,
we shall examine
the
nature of
that
which
is
differentiated/integrated.
The transcendental
In both Deleuze's
early and
late
theories
of expression we
find
the
idea
that the
virtual
is
governed
by
a
transcendental
energy which
Deleuze
will
term
`intensity. '
As
we
have
seen
Deleuze
stresses
how
this transcendental
energy
is different in kind
to
what
is
commonly considered
to
be
physical energy.
Intensity is
of
the
form
of
the
unequal which gives way
to
a equalising process
in
the
form
of an extensity or state
of affairs.
However, for
a condition
to
be
truly transcendental
can
its
nature
have
any
relation
to that
which
it
produces at all?
Deleuze
will
himself
state
in The Logic
of
Sense:
We
seek
to
determine
an
impersonal
and pre-individual
transcendental
field,
which
does
not resemble
the
corresponding empirical
fields,
and
which nevertheless
is
not confused with an undifferentiated
depth.
-562
In defining
a
transcendental
field it
cannot
borrow
the
characteristics
of
that
which
it
360
bid.
p.
21
'6'
ibid.
p.
127
W
The Logic
of
Sense,
p.
102
184
constitutes.
This however
seems
to
be
what
is happening
when
Deleuze
speaks of
the
virtual
in
terms
of
the
unequal or
in
terms
of a
`potential. ' More
precisely,
in
designating
an
intensity
of
the
virtual
Deleuze is
speaking of
the
virtual
from
an
exterior perspective.
This in itself does
not necessarily pose a problem unless
the
descriptive is
then
used as a principle of
the
virtual
itself. However Deleuze does
posit
becoming (the
essence of
the
unequal) as
the
fundamental
principle of
the
virtual.
We
saw
this
earlier
in
the
process whereby
the
event
is
actualised
in
a state of
affairs where
there
is
a part of
the
event
that
remains
immune
to
actualisation.
In
this
way
there
is
an excess or reserve of
the
event which
is
part of
the
function
of
it being
defined
as
the
unequal
in itself. As
such
it
would seem
that
Deleuze's
theories
of
expression are a
form
of
transcendental
idealism, that
is,
a realism
is being inherently
ascribed
to the transcendental.
We
shall now place
this
assertion
in
more context
by
turning to
an analysis of
the
schema of expression
that
Deleuze
utilises.
Schemas
of
Expression
In
terms
of a
theory
of calculus one of
the
simplest
forms
that
a schema of expression
can
take
is
the
following:
Primary
medium
-+
Differentiation
-+
Integration
We
shall
term this the
classical schema.
In
our explication of
Deleuze's
theories
of
expression we may see
that the
schema
in Difference
and
Repetition is
a variant of
this
form:
(Dark Precursor
-*Da`0f)
Differential field
->o'
'a`O'
Actualisation
The
main
difference being
that the
dark
precursor
is
transcendentally deduced from
the
differential field
rather
than
being
posited
from
the
outset.
However in
terms
of
general schemas
there
is
another equally simple
form
that
its
organisation
can
take:
Differentiation
F--
Primary Medium
-+
Integration
185
We
shall
term this the
split-schema of expression.
Obviously
whereas
the
classical
schema
is
uni-directional
the
split schema
is bi-directional. We have
already seen
that
Deleuze's theory
of expression
in What is philosophy? has
a
bi-directional
character:
Virtual Chaos
Consistent Virtual'-
I
-->""
State
of
Affairs
So
can
it be
said
that the type
of expression operating
here is
of
the
split-schema
variety?
In Deleuze's
early
theory
of expression
the
differential field
always mediates
between
primary chaos and actualisation
but here
there
is
a
direct
connection
from
the
chaotic virtual
to the
state of affairs.
So has
the
actual organisation of
the theory
of expression
been
re-evaluated?
In
the
last instance
this
would appear not
to
be
the
case as even
though
actualisation operates
directly from
the
chaotic virtual
to the
actual
this
is
still accompanied
by
a
drop in
potential even
though this
may not
be
directly
accessible
by
the
concept.
In
this
way
Deleuze's later
schema continues
along a uni-directional
theme:
->
Plane
of
Reference
Chaotic Virtual
-+
(Consistent Virtual
I
State
of
Affairs)
Plane
of
Immanence
4--
By
placing
the
primary principle
`at
the
end of
the
line' (functional)
differentiation
continues
to
play a mediating
factor
of
the
primary principle
in
the
overall schema.
We have
argued
that Deleuze's
theories
of expression
are organised according
to the
classical schema
but is
there
any reason why
the
split-schema
of expression
should automatically
be
rejected?
Working from
an entirely
different
(infinite) logic
186
of expression perhaps
the
first
philosopher of
the
split-schema was
Spinoza
whom
Deleuze
called
the
`prince
of philosophers'
because
of
his
adherence
to
immanence.
563
Although
strictly speaking
Spinoza
proposed a multi-schema rather
than
a split-schema of expression
because God
as
the
absolute
infinite
produces
infinite
attributes.
However,
only
two
of
these
attributes are
known,
thought
and
extension:
Thought
E-
God
or primary substance
-+
Extension
As
such
thought
and extension
develop in
parallel or
in
correspondence with each
other.
In Deleuze's
own study of
Spinoza he
will state:
`What interested
me most
in
Spinoza
wasn't
his Substance, but
the
composition of
finite
modes
[... ] That is:
the
hope
of making substance
turn
on
finite
modes.
'
For Spinoza
the
attributes of
God
in
turn
produce
infinite
modes
-
particular
thoughts
and objects.
Unlike Spinoza
though
who started with
the
absolute
infinite idea
of
God, Deleuze's derivation is
to
start with
the
modes and work
back
through a materialist
deduction. But is
the
positing of a primary substance necessary
for
the
split-schema?
Another
philosopher
who makes use of
the
split-schema
in
a completely
different
manner
is Frangois
Laruelle.
Laruelle
utilises
the
split-schema as an analytic
to
subvert
the
practice of
philosophy
itself. He
posits
that
all philosophy
functions
according
to
a self-
legitimising
presupposition.
He
terms this
presupposition
the `Principle
of
Sufficient
Philosophy'
and
this
is based
on a
fundamental
philosophical
`Decision. ' In Ray
Brassiers' PhD
thesis
on
Laruelle he
explains
the
nature of
Decision
as
follows:
All
philosophising,
Lamelle insists, begins
with a
Decision,
with a
division
traced
between
an empirical
(but
not necessarily perceptual)
datum
and an a priori
(but
not necessarily rational)
faktum, both
of which
are posited as given
in
and through
a synthetic unity wherein empirical
and a priori,
datum
and
faktum,
are conjoined.
Thus,
the
philosopher
posits a structure of articulation which
is
simultaneously epistemological
and ontological, one which
immediately binds
and
distinguishes
a given
'
Deleuze, Expressionism
in Philosophy:
Spinoza,
p.
11
564
ibid.
187
empirical
datum,
whether
it be
perceptual, phenomenological,
linguistic,
social, or
historical;
and an a priori
intelligible faktum
through
which
that
datum is
given: e. g.
Sensibility, Subjectivity, Language, Society,
or
History.
565
From
a philosophical point of view
Laruelle's
project may
be
seen as a radicalisation
or
total
critique of
Kant's
own
designation
of
the transcendental
doctrine. Kant
will
define
the transcendental
doctrine in
the
following
manner:
In
all subsumptions of an object under a concept,
the
representation of
the
object must
be homogeneous
with
the
concept....
But
our objects of
the
understanding, when compared with empirical
intuitions,
or even with
sensible
intuitions in
general, are quite
heterogeneous,
and can never
be
discovered in
any
intuition. How
then
is
the
subsumption of
the
latter
under
the
former,
and consequently
the
application of
the
categories
to
appearances, possible?
[... ] Now it is
quite clear
that there
must
be
some
third thing,
which on
the
one
hand is homogeneous
with
the
category, and
with appearance on
the
other, and so makes
the
application of
the
former
to the
latter
possible.
This
mediating representation must
be
pure
(without
empirical content), and yet must on
the
one
hand be intellectual,
on
the
other sensible.
Such
a representation
is
the transcendental
schema
.w
For Laruelle
the true transcendental
cannot
be
contaminated with
the
vestiges of
the
sensible or
the
intelligible,
that
is,
the
mode
in
which
it is
given cannot
be
predetermined.
As
such
the true transcendental cannot
be designated
through
a
philosophical
determination
at all.
In
turn
Lamelle deduces
a non-substantial, non-
ontological,
that
is
to
say, non-philosophical notion of
the transcendental
which
he
terms the
`One'
and posits
this
as
`Real'
presupposition of philosophy:
What do
we mean
by
a
`transcendental function' if
the
former is
not
to
be
understood
in
a
Kantian
sense?
The Real
or
One is
given without an
operation of givenness, manifested without an operation of manifestation.
It is
not split
in
two,
divided
and represented
by itself,
posited
by itself,
cause of
itself
or passive effect of
itself. This
suffices
to
ensure
its
universality,
that
is
to
say,
to
ensure
that
it
allows philosophy
itself
to
be
given also, and
to
give
it
according
to
its
own mode which
is
that
of
the
I
Ray Brassier (2001) Alien Theory: The Decline
of
Materialism in the Name
of
Matter, PhD
thesis,
Coventry. University
of
Warwick,
p.
114
"I
Kant (1993),
pp.
143-144
188
`without-givenness. ' There is
a givenness of philosophy,
but it is
a self-
givenness which
has
no effect on
that
being-given
which
the
Real
as such
is. On
the
other
hand
the
Real
gives according
to
its
own mode of
being-
given philosophy's self-givenness.
Yet, inasmuch
as
the
Real brings forth
nothing, and particularly not philosophy,
but
that
it brings its
own
being-
given
(without-givenness)
to the
latter,
or
better
still,
brings forth
philosophy according
to the
mode of
this
being-given,
where
the
former
would otherwise remain given according
to
its
own mode,
then the
Real
immediately fulfils
a
transcendental
function
vis a vis philosophy as
such.
567
Essentially Laruelle's
non-philosophy operates according
to
a non-relational
unilateral
logic (which Laruelle
calls unilateral
duality). The One
or
the
Real
conditions
the
Philosophical Decision but
there
is
no
inverse
operation
to
go
in
the
opposite
direction. The One is foreclosed
to
philosophy and cannot
be directly
accessed.
As
such one cannot
think the One but
only according
to
it. It is
thought
as a
henotypology. The
material on which
this type
of
`thinking'
operates
is
philosophy
itself
enlarging
the
possibilities
for
thought
where philosophical presuppositions
had
previously
been. So has Laruelle fulfilled
the
prophecy of a split-schema
thought?
We
shall explore
this
by
taking
a closer
look
at
the
nature of
the
philosophical
Decision.
In
the
article
`Axiomatic heresy: The
non-philosophy of
Francois Laruelle'
Brassier
will
define
the
structure of
the
philosophical
Decision in
the
following
manner:
It is basically
a
fractional
structure comprising
two
differentiated
terms
and
their
difference
as a
third term that
is
simultaneously
intrinsic
and
extrinsic,
immanent
and
transcendent to those two terms.
Thus, for
any
philosophical
distinction
or
dyad,
such as
transcendental/empirical,
subject/substance,
being/beings, diff6rance/presence, the distinction is
simultaneously
intrinsic
and
immanent
to the
distinguished
terms
and
extrinsic and
transcendent
in
so
far
as
it is
supposed
to
remain
constitutive of
the
difference between
the terms themselves. For
the
division is inseparable from
a moment of
immanent indivision
guaranteeing
the
unity-in-differentiation of
the
dyadic
coupling.
56s
567
Francois Laruelle (2000) `Identity
and
Event, '
conference
transcript, trans. R Brassier, Thinking
the
Event, Coventry: Warwick,
p.
9,
reproduced
in Pli: The Warwick Journal
of
Philosophy, Vol. 9.
'
Ray Brassier (2003) `Axiomatic heresy: The
non-philosophy of
Francoise Laruelle, ' Radical
Philosophy, 121:
p.
26
189
How does
this
relate
to the
general
form
of
the
split-schema elaborated above?
To
provide an example,
if
we posit
that thought
operates on
the
differentiating
side of
the
schema and perception operates on
the
integrating
side of
the
schema and
examine
this
in
terms
of
the
philosophical
Decision
then
we may see
that thought
not
only conditions what we perceive
but
also regulates
the
difference between
the two.
In
some ways
it
would seem
that thought
has
not even reached
its
target
and
subsumes
both
perception and
its
mediation within
the
differentiating
side of
the
schema.
Does
this
mean
that the
differential
split-schema
is
already compromised as
an analytic?
This does
not necessarily need
to
be
the
case
if both
the
differentiating
and
integrating
sides are mediated
by
a non-relation
in
the
first
place.
On
the
other
hand
to the
extent
that
Laruelle
places
the
philosophical
Decision firmly in
the
differentiating
side of
the
schema
is he
not proceeding
from
a position
that
is in
some
sense already precisely compromised?
Is
not
the
content of
thought
being
reduced to
an
invariant form
of
thought?
Of
course
the
philosophical
Decision
cannot affect
the
One in
any way which
is
without
determination but it
will
influence how
the
One is
positioned
in
relation
to
how it is
posited we
think
according to the One. There is
no
injunction
against
thinking the
`other
side' so
long
as one
knows from
where one
thinks
and perhaps
determining
the
position of
thought
would provide
its
own
absolute presupposition:
Someone
proposed a regressive method:
To locate book A,
consult
first
a
book B
which
indicates A's
position;
to
locate book B,
consult
first
a
book C,
and so on
to
infinity.... In
adventures such as
these,
I have
squandered and wasted my years.
It does
not seem unlikely to
me
that
there
is
a
total
book
on some shelf of
the
universe.
569
To
explore
this
further
we shall now
turn to the
nature of philosophy
itself.
369
Borges, `The Library
of
Babel, ' Labyrinths,
p.
94
190
What is left
of
Philosophy?
`... it
makes no sense
to
`take
the
side' of
becoming,
assuming
it
exists
-
no more
than that
of chance, or
desire. For
one
has
no choice:
"To
take
the
side of
the
primary process
is
still a consequence of secondary
processes.
"'
Baudrillard57
Return to Plato
In Deleuze
and
Guattari's
account of
the
birth
of philosophy
in
ancient
Greece
they
propose
that this
was made possible
through three
conditions:
...
a pure sociability as milieu of
immanence,
the
"intrinsic
nature of
association,
"
which
is
opposed
to
imperial
sovereignty and
implies
no
prior
interest because,
on
the
contrary, competing
interests
presuppose
it;
a certain pleasure
in forming
associations, which constitute
friendship,
but
also a pleasure
in breaking
up
the
association, which constitutes
rivalry...; and a
taste
for
opinion
inconceivable in
an empire, a
taste
for
the
exchange of views,
for
conversation.
571
For Deleuze
and
Guattari, `immanence, friendship,
opinion' are
the
conditions of
the
specifically
Greek
territory
of philosophy.
sn
And
philosophy remains
Greek
to the
extent
that they
were precursors
to
a plane of
immanence
and
the
philosophical
concept:
...
the
originality of
the
Greeks
should
...
be
sought
in
the
relation
between
the
relative and
the
absolute.
When
relative
deterritorialisation is
itself horizontal,
or
immanent, it
combines with
the
absolute
deterritorialisation
of
the
plane of
immanence
that
carries
the
movements
of relative
deterritorialisation
to
infinity,
pushes
them to the
absolute,
by
transforming them (milieu, friend,
opinion).
Immanence is
redoubled.
This is
where one
thinks
no
longer
with
figures but
with concepts.
It is
the
concept
that
comes
to
populate
the
plane of
immanence.
573
570
Baudrillard, Seduction,
p.
145
s"
Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?,
pp.
87-8
sn
ibid.
573
bid.
p.
90
191
From Deleuze
and
Guattari's
point of view
the
essential
factor is
that the
Greeks
divorced
thought
from
a wisdom-thought or religious way of
thinking.
They
argue
that
religion
thinks
in
terms
of
`figures'
which project
transcendence
onto
the
plane
of
immanence. The Greek innovation
was
to
discover
a
`Being-thought'
or
'Nature-
thought'
which
took thought
for itself.
574
This
new way of
thinking
installs
the
philosopher as
the
friend
of wisdom as opposed
to the
sage,
the
possessor of wisdom.
Nevertheless, for Deleuze
and
Guattari
the
Greeks
only achieved a relative
deterritorialisation
which manifests
itself in
their
milieu
in
terms
of rival opinions
which
lay
claim
to
be
the
friend
of wisdom.
In
contrast,
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
philosophy
lays
claim
to
an absolute
deterritorialisation
where
the
philosopher
is
the
creator of concepts, shared amongst
friends (nomads),
who
have
no
time
for
opinion
or conversation; philosophy
is
what one enacts rather
than
ones
taste
for
opinion.
However,
even
if
we accept
the
general
form
of
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
version of
Greek
thought their
account
is
not entirely satisfactory.
For instance,
are
the
Platonic discussions
of
the
Good in
the
Republic
and
the
One in
the
Parmenides
signs of philosophical concepts or still evidence of a religious
figure-thought? What
is
certain
is
that the
Neoplatonists interpreted
the
Platonic dialogues in
terms
of
the
latter
-
as part of a perennial philosophy or wisdom-knowledge.
In her
recent study
Reading Neoplatonism, Sara Rappe
tells
us
that the
Neoplatonist Proclus
distinguished between four different
types
of mystico-religious
texts: `...
the
great
theologians
fall into four distinct
types:
Orpheus
uses
images, Pythagoras
employs
symbols,
the
Chaldean
are
inspired,
and
Plato is
scientific.
'575 While Proclus
primarily views
the
Platonic dialogues
as scientific or
dialectical in
nature
he
also
identifies imaginative,
symbolic and
inspired
aspects
in
them
as well.
576
Such
a
reading of
Plato
would not appear at
first impression
to
challenge
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
account of
the
beginnings
of philosophy
in
that the
Neoplatonists
precisely
held
on
to
a religious
figure-thought
which would preclude
them
from
the
philosophical concept.
However,
to the
extent
that
Deleuze
specifically
develops his
notion of
immanence in
opposition to
Neoplatonism in Expressionism
in Philosophy:
574
ibid.
p.
88
sn
Sera Kappe (2000) Reading Neoplatonism. Cambridge: University Press,
p.
159
576
ibid.
192
Spinoza
we shall now examine
this
feature further.
Immanence
and
Emanence
In Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza Deleuze
sets up an encounter
between
the
immanent
cause of
Spinoza
and
the
emanent cause of
the
Neoplatonists.
577
Deleuze
states
that there
are
both
similarities and
differences between
these two
notions of
causality.
The
main similarity
being
that the
Neoplatonic One
and
the
Spinozist
Absolute
do
not
diminish
as
they
produce,
that
is,
the
cause remains
in itself. On
the
other
hand,
the
main
difference is
that
whereas
the
Spinozist Absolute
produces
its
effects
inside
of
itself immanently,
the
Neoplatonic One
produces
its
effects outside
of
itself
emanently so
that
its
effects are a
diminishing
of
the
One. In
accordance with
Deleuze's
notion of
difference Neoplatonic
metaphysics
falls
short of a pure concept
of
difference because it introduces
transcendence
into Being in
the
form
of a negative
theology
where
the
One is determined by
what
it is
not
(its diminished
nature).
578
However,
recent scholarship
in Neoplatonism
has
raised
the
issue
that the
label
of
`negative theology'
is
a very poor approximation
of what
is
at work
in Neoplatonic
metaphysics.
For
example, studies
by Sara Rappe
and
Michael Sells
point out
the
provisional nature of
Neoplatonic
metaphysics and
the
critique of philosophical
language that this
implies.
579
With Plotinus `negative theology'
is
not simply a way
of
defining
the
One
through
what
it is
not
but
of negating
both
what
it is
and what
it
is
not.
580
This involves
a critique of predication
itself:
But
given
that
we must
incorrectly
employ predications
for
the
sake of
enquiry,
then
let it be
said once again
that they
are not
being
spoken
correctly, since a
duality
must never
be
posited, not even
for
the
sake of
obtaining a notion.
We
use
these
names now
for
the
sake of persuasion
and
in doing
so we
depart from
strict accuracy.
581
This
method peculiar
to
Neoplatonism
reached
its highest level
of sophistication
in
sn
Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza,
pp.
169-186
578
ibid.
pp.
172-3
"'
S. Rappe (2000); M. Sells (1994) Mystical Languages
of
Unsaying. Chicago: University Press
s"0
Sells, Mystical Languages,
p.
20: `it is
neither
X
nor not
X'
581
Plotinus The Enneads, 6.8.13 1-9,
trans. M. Sells, Mystical Languages,
p.
24
193
the
final
scholarch of
the
Neoplatonic
school,
Damascius,
who gives a more precise
description
of
this
method of
`apophasis: '
In
one way,
"The Ineffable" is
apophatic.
By
this
I do
not mean
that the
term
designates
anything positive at all,
but
that this term
is
not even a
negation:
it is
complete removal.
It is
not merely not-a-thing
(since
what
is
not-a-thing
is
still something)
but it
absolutely
has
no reality.
So
we
define
this term,
"ineffable, " in
such a way
that
it is
not even a
term.
S82
For Damascius
the
method of apophasis
involves
a complete
`reversal
of
thscourse 9583 In
this
respect negations
do
not
`lead
us closer'
to the Ineffable but
only
serve
to
delimit
our
discourse. We
may note
in
this
passage
that
Damascius
uses
the
term
`Ineffable'
as opposed
to the
`One. ' The
reason
for
this
is
that
Damascius
identified
a
fundamental
contradiction
in Neoplatonic
metaphysics
involving how
anything can
be
produced
by
the
One. That is, Damascius
wished
to
criticise
the
accuracy of
this
metaphysic.
Rappe
states
the
basic
contradiction of
the
One
thus: `If
all
things
come
from
the
absolute,
then the
absolute
is
a principle or a cause of other
things.
But if
the
absolute
is
a cause,
it is
no
longer
the
absolute, since
it
then
exists
in
relation
to
others.
SM
That is,
most pertinently
for
our
investigation, Damascius
provides a critique of
the
emanative cause.
Damascius begins his Doubts
and
Solutions Concerning First Principles by
posing
the
question:
`is
that
which
is designated
as
the
one principle of all
things
beyond
all
things
or
is it
one among all
things, the
summit of everything
that
proceeds
from it? '585 He
then
goes on
to
dispute both
possibilities.
In
terms
of
the
first hypothesis he
states:
The
term
"all
things"
[refers] in
the
strict sense
to that
from
which
nothing
is
absent.
But [now
we are supposing]
the
principle
itself is
missing.
Therefore
that
which comes after
the
first
principle
is
not
in
the
strict sense all
things,
but
rather all
things
except
the
first
principle.
586
m
Damascius (1986-91) Doubts
and
Solutions Concerning First Principles, 3 Volumes,
eds.
J.
Combes
and
L. G. Westerink. Paris, I,
chap.
42,
quoted
in Reading Neoplatonism,
p.
209
m
Reading Neoplatonism,
p.
200
584
ibid.
s05
Damascius, Doubts
and
Solutions, 1.1,
quoted
in Reading Neoplatonism,
p.
204
m
Damascius, Doubts
and
Solutions, I1.1-5,
quoted
in Reading Neoplatonism,
p.
206
194
If
the
first
principle
is
outside all
things then
we are no
longer dealing
with
`all
things.
' Hence the
principle of all
things
cannot
be beyond
all
things.
On
the
other
hand if
the
principle of all
things
is
amongst all
things then the `cause
must
be
ranked
among
the
effects.
""
In
terms
of
this
hypothesis Damascius
states:
...
if
all
things
are
together
with
the
first
principle,
there
cannot
be
a
principle
for
all
things,
since on
the
supposition
that the
principle can
be
subsumed
by
all
things, there
would
be
no principle
[i.
e. no
beginning,
no
cause]
for
all
things.
Therefore [let
us say
that] the
single coordinated
disposition
of all
things
(which
we
designate by
the term
`all
things')
is
without a
first
principle and uncaused,
lest
we
[continue
the
search] ad
infinitum.
588
If
a cause were
to
be found
amongst
its
effects
then the
first
principle would
have
to
produce
both its
effects and
itself
as an effect.
As
an effect
the
first
principle would
then
no
longer be
a
first
principle.
However,
as
John Dillon
tells
us
in his
essay
`Damascius
on
the Ineffable, ' Damascius' intention here is
not
to
deny
that there
is
a
`first
principle'
but
to
dispute
that
it
can
be
accounted
for in
a
dogmatic
metaphysics
of causation.
589
Within
this
context
the
first
principle can neither
be
completely
transcendent
or
immanent.
From
this
perspective
Deleuze's interpretation
of
Neoplatonism
seems
to
be
based
on a common misconception of
Neoplatonic
emanence.
His
position on
Neoplatonism is
that:
`emanation, in its
pure
form,
always
involves
a system of
the
One-above-being;
the
first hypothesis
of
the
Parmenides dominates
all
Neoplatonism. '590 First
we may question whether
there
is
such a
thing
as a
`pure
form'
of emanence
in Neoplatonism in
a strictly philosophical sense, and second,
Damascius
brings
to
bear
the
full force
of
the
negative
hypotheses (if
there
is
not a
One... )
of
Plato's Parmenides
on
Neoplatonic
metaphysics.
The issue
at
hand
however is in
what sense
Damascius'
critique of
the
emanative cause applies
to
Deleuze's
philosophy.
Damscius'
specific
target
is
the
Plotinian doctrine
of
how
an
effect
differs from its
cause.
As Rappe
summarises
this
doctrine: `Plotinus
argued
587
ibid.
sN
Damascius, Doubts
and
Solutions,
12.9-12, ibid.
5"
J. Dillon (1997) `Damascius
and the Ineffable, '
article
in The Great Tradition: Further Studies in
the
Development
of
Platonism
and
Early Christianity. Aldershot: Ashgate, XX1,
p.
125
30
Deleuze, Expressionism
in Philosophy,
p.
172
195
that the
full
nature of
the
cause was available
for
transmission to the
effect.
It
was
only
the
inferior
capacity of
the
effect
to
express
the
qualities of
the
cause that
introduced
the
difference between
cause and effect.
591
This
appears
to
be
very
different
terrain
from Deleuze
who argues,
following
the
Stoics,
that
an
`effect'
subsists
in its
cause.
Or
more precisely, as we
find in Nietzsche
and
Philosophy,
`cause'
and
`effect'
are really
two
moments of
the
same univocal expression.
592
How
are
these two
moments
to
be distinguished? For this
purpose
Deleuze
will
turn
in
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza
to the
Scotist formal distinction
-a
distinction
within
the
real
that
occurs
`outside'
the
mind.
In
the
last
chapter we
have
already
seen a critique of
the
formal distinction
via
Suarez
and
Leibniz, but
now with
Damascius
we may approach
this
from
a completely new angle.
In Expressionism
in
Philosophy: Spinoza Deleuze
emphasises
how Scotus devised
the
formal distinction
as part of a positive
theology
of
how God
may
be defined formally by His
positive
attributes as opposed
to the
negative
theology
of what
he is
not.
593
However, from
Damascius'
point of view neither a positive nor a negative rendering of
the Absolute
is
sufficient, and at
best
provides a provisional position
to
be
corrected or at worst a
reified
dogmatic
metaphysics.
Nevertheless,
even
if Damascius'
position undermines
Deleuze's
philosophy
do
we
face
the
same situation as earlier with a mystico-
religious
thought
ultimately
diametrically
opposed
to
Deleuze? A
philosophy of
Being
and
the
One (a
philosophy of predication) as opposed to
a philosophy of
becoming (or
a philosophy as
becoming)? To finally
escape
this
aporia we shall
turn
to
another recent study on
Neoplatonism, N. Joseph Torcia's Plotinus, Tolma,
and
the
Descent
of
Being.
594
Tolm Lanauaae
Torchia's
study provides us with an opening
to
consider
the
beginnings
of philosophy
from
a new perspective
through
an examination of
`tolma language' in Classical
Reading Neoplatonism,
p.
207
Nietzsche
and
Philosophy,
p.
25
593
Expressionism in Philosophy:
Spinoza,
pp.
63-4
5`
N. J. Torchia (1993) Plotinus, Tohga,
and
the Descent
of
Being: An Exposition
and
Analysis. New
York: Peter Lang
196
literature. The
translation
of
the
Greek
word
tolma
is
audacity.
595
Torchia
notes
that
in
early
Greek
writings
this term
had both
positive and negative connotations.
On
the
one
hand Homer
emphasised audacity
in
the
form
of
brave
and
heroic
acts
in
the
face
of
insurmountable
odds.
On
the
other
hand Greek
tragedy
saw any attempt
to
rise
above one's station as reckless and arrogant and an
impiety
against
the
commandments of
the
Gods.
596
In
philosophy one of
the
first direct
uses of
this type
of
thought
is
to
be found in Plato. For
example,
in
the
Theaetatus
we read:
Socrates:
...
doesn't it
strike you as shameless
to
explain what
knowing is
like,
when we
don't know
what
knowledge is? [... ]
Theaetatus: Well, but how
are you going
to
carry on a
discussion...?
Socrates: I
cannot,
being
the
man
I
am,
though
I
might
if I
were an expert
in debate [... ] As
we are such
bunglers,
then,
shall
I be
so
bold
as
to
describe
what
knowing is like?
597
Here
we see
both
the
characterisation
to
speak of what one
does
not
know
as
shameless and a
boldness
to
actually attempt
the task.
In
the
centuries after
Plato
tolma
language
played a pivotal role
in
the
cosmogonies of
the
Neopythagorean,
Alexandrian, Hermetic
and
Gnostic
traditions.
598
More
precisely, tolma is
the
pivot
around which
this traditions
hang. For
example,
in
the Gnostic Sophia
myth
especially prevalent
in Valentinian
gnosticism,
Sophia,
the
youngest of
the
aeons
that
constitute
the
spiritual pleroma
had
an audacious will
to
understand the
divine
nature.
In
so
doing
she goes
'beyond'
the
divine
and
`falls, '
thereby
producing
the
realm of
matter.
599
Although Plotinus
criticises
the
Gnostics for
their `undisciplined
multiplication of spiritual entities'600
(the
aeons),
tolma
language
plays a similarly
fundamental
role
in Neoplatonism. Plotinus
will say
that
due
to the
nature of
the
one
(its `goodness') it
necessarily
diffuses
this
nature
through
an
`overflowing'
or
`radiation. '601 This is
also
the
beginning
of
the
second
hypostasis
of
Nous. The
outpouring
forms
an
indefinite dyad
which contemplates
the
One
and
in
so
doing
595
ibid.
p.
12
596
ibid.
"'
Plato, Theaetatus, 196d-197a,
p.
903
5"
Plotinus, Tolma,
and the Descent
of
Being,
p.
11
As
reported
by Irenaeus, in Plotinus, (1991) The Enneads,
trans. S. MacKenna,
abridged with an
introduction
and notes,
J. Dillon. London: Penguin,
p.
121
600
Plotinus, Enneads, 11.9,
pp.
108-132
601
ibid, VI. 7,18,
pp.
488; V. 1,7,
p.
355
y
197
forms Nous.
602
However,
this
process
involves
a separation
from
the
One
and comes
about
from
a
desire for
otherness
in
the
diffusion
of
the
One. As Torchia
states,
although
the
diffusion
of
the
One is
treated
as purely positive, a
tension
arises
in
Plotinus'
account when
he describes Nous
as
desiring
an
independent
existence as
part of a choice or volition.
603
Torchia's thesis
is
that
it is
an act of
tolma that
separates
Nous from
the
One (and
also
Soul,
the third
hypostasis, from Nous).
604
To
see
how
the
concept of
tolma
assists our
investigation
of
Neoplatonic
emanation we
must
take
a closer
look
at
how
this
concept operates.
The first
thing
we may notice
is
that tolma
does
not operate
from
the
perspective of
the
One but from
that
which
is
already
descended from
the
One. And
yet
the
`positive'
nature of
the
One's diffusion is (inversely)
correlative
to the
separation of
its
products.
Certainly in Plotinus'
system a positive audacity cannot
be
attributed
to the
One
which
lacks
nothing,
but
the
descendence
of
the
One is
precisely
dependent
on an
`overflowing' `outside' the
One. What
this
points
to is
that
the
position
from
which one speaks
in the
first
place
is
already
from `outside'
the
One. To
say
that the
One
produces something
outside of
itself is
only a
figurative
way of speaking
(a
ciphering)
from
the
point of view of
Nous. From
the
point of view
of
the
One
the terms
`inside'
and
`outside'
would
be
completely meaningless.
One
may object
that
if
the
One is
posited as an absolute
limit
point
from
the
position of
thought then this
would seem
to
completely
relativise metaphysics and reveal
its
nature as essentially provisional.
However, this
is
only valid
if
one
takes
metaphysics
as a reification of
its
object.
If
we
take
a closer
look
at
Plotinus'
procession of
the
One (One
-
Nous
-
Soul)
we may see
that
all
these terms
are regulated
by
place:
Nous
has
a place
in
relation
to the
One,
and
Soul has
a place
in
relation
to
Nous. Place is
regulated
by
tolma
language. In
terms
of place we may say
that Nous is `outside'
of
the
One but
this
does
not prevent
its
connection
to
it. The
concept of place opens up a
way of
thinking
where
both
the
One
and
thought
can
be
related on
the
same plane.
Thought
and
the
One
are not
immanent but
neither are
they transcendent.
More
precisely,
to think the
concept of place
is
to think
on a plane of uncommon natures.
02
ibid. V. 2,1,
pp.
361-2
603
Plotinus, Tolma,
and
the Descent
of
Being,
p.
41
6"
ibid.
p.
52
198
The
audacity of youth
Interestingly, in Deleuze's
preface
to
Difference
and
Repetition he
will
himself
align
his book in
terms
of a
form
of audacity:
A book
of philosophy should
be in
part a very particular species of
detective
novel,
in
part a
kind
of science
fiction. By detective
novel we
mean
that
concepts, with
their
zones of presence, should
intervene
to
resolve
local
situations
[... ] They
must
have
a coherence among
themselves,
but
that
coherence must not come
from
themselves.
They
must receive
their
coherence
from
elsewhere.
This is
the
secret of
empiricism.
Empiricism is by
no means a reaction against concepts, nor a
simple appeal
to
lived
experience.
On
the
contrary,
it
undertakes
the
most
insane
creation of concepts ever seen or
heard. Empiricism is
a mysticism
and a mathematicism of concepts....
Science fiction in
yet another sense,
one
in
which
the
weaknesses
become
manifest.
How
else can one write
but
of
those things
which one
doesn't know,
or
knows badly? It is
precisely
there that
we
imagine having
something
to
say.
We
write only
at
the
frontiers
of our
knowledge....
605
How
are we
to
interpret
this
early statement of
Deleuze's
position on philosophy
when compared
to the
following
statement
in What is Philosophy?: `Philosophy is
a
constructivism, and constructivism
has
two
qualitatively
different
complementary
aspects:
the
creation of concepts and
the
laying
out of a plane
[of immanence].
'
In
contrast
Deleuze
and
Guattari
will consider
What is Philosophy?
to
be
a sober work
of old age.
607
One
may certainly
identify
a
tension
in Deleuze's
early writings
in
the
form
of
the turn
from Bergson
to
Nietzsche.
Deleuze's
text
on
Bergson, Bergsonism,
was published
in 1966. However,
although
it
was published after
his
work on
Nietzsche, Nietzsche
and
Philosophy
(1962), it is
widely seen as
the
completion of
Deleuze's
earlier studies on
Bergson,
such as
the
essay
'Bergson's
conception of
Difference'
written
in 1956.608 In
Bergsonism we fmd
a passage
that
is
somewhat at odds with
Deleuze's
philosophical
perspective:
60
De1euze, Difference
and
Repetition,
pp. xx-xxi
'
De1euze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?,
pp.
35-36.
607
ibid.
pp.
1-2
"I
Hardt (1993),
pp.
124-5,
n.
5
199
...
the
great souls
-
to
a greater extent
than
philosophers
-
are
those
of
artists and mystics
(at least
those
of a
Christian
mysticism
that
Bergson
describes
as
being
completely superabundant activity, action, creation).
At
the
limit, it is
the
mystic who plays with
the
whole of creation, who
invents
an expression of
it
whose adequacy
increases
with
its dynamism.
Servant
of an open and
finite God (such
are
the
characteristics of
the
Elan
Vital),
the
mystical soul actively plays
the
whole of
the
universe, and
reproduces
the
opening of a
Whole in
which
there
is
nothing
to
see or
to
contemplate.
609
This
passage
is
not entirely
disparate from
the
one previously quoted
from Difference
and
Repetition in
that
an empiricism pushed
to
its limits is
not necessarily
incommensurable
with mysticism.
We
also
find in
the
later Deleuze
a return
to
Bergson
and
the
notion of
the
`open
whole.
' However, in Deleuze's
turn to
Nietzsche
there
is
a
definite
movement
in Deleuze's
approach
from
that
of
`spirit'
to that
of
`matter':
To
remind consciousness of
its
necessary modesty
is
to take
it for
what
it
is:
a symptom; nothing
but
the
symptom of a
deeper
transformation
of
entirely non-spiritual
forces. "Perhaps the
body is
the
only
factor in
all
spiritual
development" [... ]
the
servility of consciousness
...
merely
testifies to the
"formation
of a superior
body. 9-61
This
turn
constitutes a move
from
a
Bergsonian to
a
Nietzschean form
of audacity.
Undoubtedly, Deleuze
could not
be
content with
Bergson's
notion
that
it is
the
mystic soul which connects with a
`... Being Who
transcends tangible
reality as
He
transcends
human
consciousness.
...
'611 Nor
could
Deleuze be
content with
the
downplaying
of philosophy
this
implies: `In
philosophy
itself,
there
is
still
too
much
alleged contemplation:
Everything happens
as
if intelligence
were already
imbued
with emotion,
thus
with
intuition, but
not so
for
creating
in
conformity
to this
emotion.
'612 Bergsonism
constitutes an audacity
in
the
form
of
the
mystic soul
that
acts
in
accordance
to the
One
through
creative emotion,
however, Nietzschean
6'
De1euze, Bergsonism,
p.
112
610
De1euze, Nietzsche
and
Philosophy,
p.
39
611
Henri Bergson (1977) The Two Sources
of
Morality
and
Religion,
trans. R A. Audra
and
C.
Brereton
with assistance
from W. Horsfall Carter. Indiana: University
of
Notre Dame Press,
p.
262
612
Deleuze, Bergsonism,
p.
112
200
philosophy
is
perhaps a greater audacity yet
in
that the
most audacious act
is
not
to
speak
from
the
viewpoint of
the
One, but from
exactly where one
is. Deleuze's
position on
the
`mystical' Bergson is
perhaps most
forcefully
put
in
the
`Afterword'
to
Bergsonism,
written
in 1988,
where
he
states
the
Bergsonian
method of
intuition
must not
be
seen as
`an
appeal
to the
ineffable. '613
Becoming
or
the
One?
Nevertheless Bergson
played a profound
influence
on
Deleuze's
work and
his
interpretation
of
Bergson is
an extrapolation of
the
materialist aspects of
Bergson's
philosophy.
Indeed Deleuze's
own
turn to
a
Nietzschean
philosophy of
becoming is
in
some sense already precipitated
by Bergson: `...
philosophy
is
not only
the turning
of
the
mind
homeward,
the
coincidence of
human
consciousness with
the
living
principle whence
it
emanates, a contact with
the
creative effort:
it is
the
study of
becoming in
general....
9614 There is
also
the
prospect of
Deleuze's
return
to
Bergson
in his later
work.
However, Bergson
accommodated
both
the
One
and
becoming in
his
philosophy.
On
the
other
hand Deleuze
sees any capitulation
to the
One
as
the
introduction
of
transcendence. However, Alain Badiou in his
recent
book Deleuze:
The Clamor
of
Being,
argues
that
despite Deleuze's
claims
to the
contrary
he has in
fact
produced a philosophy of
the
One.
615
This
argument would seem somewhat
contentious
in
terms
of
the
vehemence
in
which
Deleuze
and
Guattari
reject
the
One
or any
form
of unifying principle:
`We do
not
have
units of measure, only
multiplicities or varieties of measurement.
The
notion of unity appears only when
there
is
a power
takeover
in
the
Multiplicity
....
9616 Deleuze
gives a
different
formulation
of
this
idea in The Fold: Leibniz
and
the
Baroque:
Events
are produced
in
a chaos,
in
a chaotic multiplicity,
but
only under
the
condition
that
a sort of screen
intervenes. Chaos does
not exist;
it is
an abstraction
because it is inseparable from
a screen that
makes
something
-
something rather
than
nothing
-
emerge
from it. Chaos
would
613
ibid.
p.
115
6'4
Bergson, Creative Evolution,
pp.
369-370
61s
Badiou (2000),
p.
17
616
De1e= & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism
and
Schizophrenia,
p.
8
201
be
a pure
Many,
a purely
disjunctive diversity,
while
the
something
is
a
One,
not a pregiven unit,
but instead
the
indefinite
article
that
designates
a certain singularity.
617
The indefinite
event or singularity
is formed
on a plane of consistency
in
relation
to
the
plane of
immanence. As
we saw earlier with
the
concept, consistency carries
the
absolute speed of
the
chaotic virtual
but
as a
finite `something' it is
also relative
to
the
plane of
immanence. What is
the
nature of
this
relation?
Of THE
plane of
immanence Deleuze
and
Guattari
tell
us:
Is
there
a
`best'
plane
that
would not
hand
over
immanence
to
Something=x
and
that
would no
longer
mimic anything
transcendent?
We
will say
that
THE
plane of
immanence is,
at
the
same
time, that
which must
be
thought
and
that
which cannot
be
thought.
It is
the
nonthought within
thought.
It is
the
base
of all planes,
immanent
to
every
thinkable
plane
that
does
not succeed
in
thinking
it [... ] Perhaps
this
is
the
supreme act of philosophy: not so much
to think
THE
plane of
immanence
as
to
show
that
it is
there.
618
Here
we see
Deleuze
and
Guattari
treating
THE
plane of
immanence in
the
form
of a
non-relation, a relation
to
a non-thought or
to
a non-philosophy:
`Philosophy
needs a
nonphilosophy
that
comprehends
it.... '619 But
what
do Deleuze
and
Guattari
mean
by
nonphilosophy?
The first
thing
we may
be
certain
is
that they
do
not mean
that
nonphilosophy
is
to
be
understood
from
an aesthetic or scientific perspective
-
in
What is Philosophy?
they
set up philosophy, art and science as
three
independent
ways
in
which
the
virtual chaos
is
confronted
in
thought
620
And
each of
these
ways
of
thinking
finds its limit (or `non' form) in
this
confrontation so
that they
are not
complementary:
`.. just
as art needs nonart and science needs nonscience.
i62'
Instead,
can
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
nonphilosophy
be
considered
to
be
influenced by Laruelle? During the 1980's the
proposition of
Laruelle's
own specific
non-philosophy was coming
to
full fruition
and often
this
was
in direct
confrontation
617
Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz
and
the
Baroque,
p.
76
618
Deleuze & Guattari, What is Philosophy?,
p.
59
6'9
ibid. p.
218
62"
ibid.
p.
208
621
ibid.
p.
218
202
to
Deleuze
and
Guattari's ideas.
622
Although Laruelle is
not mentioned
in
the
main
text
of
What is Philosophy? he is
referred
to
in
the
notes.
623
Perhaps it
may
be
posited
that
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
use of
the term
`nonphilosophy' is in
some sense a re-
appropriation of philosophical ground even
if
the
Laruellian
critique
is
not
considered
to
be
a major
threat.
For
of course
Deleuze
and
Guattari
pose a non-
ontological
becoming
as opposed
to
a non-ontological
One
as
the
basis
of
their
nonphilosophy.
However
this
being
the
case
there
seems
to
be
a certain similarity
between Laruelle's
and
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
overall philosophical organisation
around
the transcendental
function. For
ultimately multiplicity
is
circumscribed
by
THE
plane of
immanence. Effectively THE
plane of
immanence
acts as
the
limit
point of a
One-All
within which multiplicity
is
thought.
In this
sense
Laruelle's
and
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
thought
seem
to
be
asymmetric
-
whereas
Laruelle
places
the
One
on
the
other side of
the transcendental,
Deleuze
and
Guattari
place
it
on
this
side
where
thought
already operates.
More interestingly this
overall schema seems
to
be
directly
related
to the
project
to think the
absolute.
The Real
In
respect of
Deleuze
and
Laruelle
we
have
seen
that the
consequences of
thinking
the
absolute produces
both
a
One
and a non-relational residue.
Of
course
both
Deleuze
and
Laruelle
use
this to their
advantage.
It is due
to
a residue
that
for
Laruelle
philosophy can
be
thought
according
to the
One `in
the
last instance'
or
for
Deleuze the
Event
will
be
a pure reserve
for
the
creation of concepts.
It
should not
be
downplayed
that
both
of
these
philosophers
have
created completely new registers
for
thinking
philosophically.
In
many ways
Laruelle
seems
the
most
`traditional'
of
the two
philosophers
in how he lays
claim
to
a real presupposition of
thought
62A
On
the
other
hand for Deleuze
the
real
is
that
which
is
constructed rather
than that
which
is
given.
As Jean-Luc Nancy
states:
622
Alien Theory,
pp.
53-95
623
Latuelle is
mentioned twice,
p.
220,
n.
5;
p.
234,
n.
16
624
`I lay
claim
to the
abstract
-
the Real
or
the
One
-
rather
than
to
abstraction,,
'Identity
and
Event, '
P.
11
203
...
Deleuze does
not attempt
to
speak about
the
real as an exterior referent
(the
thing,
man,
history,
what
is). He
effectuates a philosophical real.
Philosophical
activity
is
this
effectuation.
For him,
to
create a concept
is
not
to
draw
the
empirical under a category:
but
to
construct a universe of
its
own, an autonomous universe, an ordo et connexio which
does
not
imitate
the
other, which
does
not represent
it
or signify
it, but
which
effectuates
it in its
own way.
625
From
this
perspective we must admit
that
our critique of
the
content of
Deleuze's
`doctrines' is
somewhat philosophically
`average' to the
extent
that
what
Deleuze has
produced
is
not
in
the
register of metaphysics
but in
the
register of para-physics626
-
the
constructed real.
In
a similar
fashion Laruelle
writes
in
the
register of
henology
-
the
science of
the One. From
a purely metaphysical perspective we
have
argued that
a
thinking
of
the
Absolute
produces a structure of
the
One
and a residue which
is
to
say
that
a pure
thought
of
the
Absolute is
not possible as
it
will always
be
compromised.
Of
course one can always argue
from
the
position of
the Absolute
as
if it
were real or
even a constructed real
but
there
is
also another option:
to take the
notion as precisely
compromised.
However,
what effect
does
this
have
on
the
notion of place we were
developing
earlier?
If
the
idea
of
the
absolute cannot
be
relied upon
then this
would
seem
to take the tolma
relation out of position.
To investigate further let
us return
once again
to the
schema
introduced by Bergson in Matter
and
Memory. Bergson
argues
that
perception cannot
be
a representation.
For if
we consider
the
world
composed of
by `images'
there
is
nothing
the
image
can
be
represented to
as
the
individual is just
another
image
amongst
images. This formulation
has
some
interesting
consequences.
First
perception
is
an action
but
cannot
be located `in'
the
individual, that
is, it is
as much
in `things'
themselves
as
it is in
the
individual.
Of
course within
this
schema
the
image
of
the
brain has
a special position or
locus
point
in
terms
of which all other
images
are
located. Thought is
portrayed as
being
a
`virtual
action'
for
the
selection of
images. For Bergson
the
virtual plays a
fundamental
role
in his distinction between
matter and spirit.
Matter
or perception
(the
actual)
is
the
most contracted state of spirit or pure memory
(the
virtual).
It is
a
625
Nancy, J-L. `T'he Deleuzian Fold
of
Thought, '
chapter
in Patton, P. (ed. X1996)
Deleuze: A Critical
Reader. Oxford: Blackwell,
p.
110
616
Paraphysics
-
perhaps a more
formal
version of
Alfred Jarry's
pataphysics.
204
fundamental
part of
Bergson's
metaphysics
that
he defines
perception and memory as
being different in kind: `...
memory
is
something other
than
a
.
/unction
of
the
brain,
and
there
is
not merely a
difference in degree, but
of
kind, between
perception and
recollection.
'
627
How does
position operate within
Bergson's
philosophy?
In
regards
to
perception
there
is
a non-dualysing use of place
but
this
is
set within a
dualysing
metaphysics overall.
If
we were
to
collapse
this
dualysing
aspect
from
a
`relative
position' aspect
then
perception would not
be
actual as such
but
provide a map of
virtual positions within
`memory. ' This function
would
in fact be
no
different
than
the
role
that thought
plays.
This is
the
dream
of a world of
indivision.
Taking
this
a step
further
we may argue
that
from
the
aspect of
thought,
it
too
is
as much
in
things themselves
as
it is in
the
individual. It is
perhaps
Baudrillard
who
has
taken this
hypothesis
the
furthest: `The
object
is
never
innocent, it
exists and
takes
revenge.
'628 For Baudrillard
the
world
is
reversible and
fatal (fateful). Due
to
the
nature of
the
object as
totally
alien/other
it
completely submits
to
rational analysis
(only too
well) while at
the
same
time
following its
own
inconvertible destiny:
Consider
the
story of
the
soldier who meets
Death
at a crossing
in
the
marketplace, and
believes he
saw
him
make a menacing gesture
in his
direction. He
rushes
to the
king's
palace and asks
the
king for his best
horse in
order
that
he
might
flee during
the
night
far from Death,
as
far
as
Samarkand. Upon
which
the
king
summons
Death
to the
palace and
reproaches
him for having frightened
one of
his best
servants.
But Death,
astonished, replies:
"I didn't
mean
to
frighten him. It
was
just
that
I
was
surprised
to
see
this
soldier
here,
when we
had
a rendez-vous
tomorrow
in Samarkand. 9629
This is
the
object's principle of seduction.
Is it
possible
to `think'
as an object?
Baudrillard
will somewhat controversially posit
that there
was once an absolute
bond
between thought
and object
in `savage'
societies
but
this
has been irrevocably lost
with
the
advent of
the
subject and resultant
loss
of reference
in
thought: `The
absolute rule of
thought
is
to
return
the
world as we received
it:
unintelligible.
And if
627
Bergson, Matter
and
Memory,
p.
136
628
Jean Baudrillard (1990,
orig.
1983) Fatal Strategies. London: Semiotext(e),
p.
93
6"
Baudrillard, Seduction,
p.
72
205
it is
possible,
to
return
it
a
bit
more unintelligible.
A little bit
more enigmatic.
630
The
question at stake
is
where
the
division
of
the
world
began. Baudrillard's
own project
is built
upon
the
acceptance of
the
subject/object
divide
and
the
full
consequences
this
implies. Is
there
a way of
thinking
indivision
without
turning to
a metaphysics of
the
absolute?
Or
perhaps more precisely
is it
possible
to think
an absolute without
residue?
With
this
in
mind we
turn
once again
to
Bergson
and
the
idea
of an
incomplete
whole.
Mirror Repair
On
the
issue
of
the
relation
between
the
individual
and
the
world
in Bergson, Deleuze
will state
the
following
It is
widely
known
that
Bergson initially discovered duration
as
identical
to
consciousness.
But further
study of consciousness
led him
to
demonstrate
that
it
only existed
in
so
far
as
it
opened
itself
upon a whole,
by
coinciding with
the
opening up of a whole
...
if
the
living being is
a
whole and,
therefore,
comparable
to the
whole of
the
universe,
this
is
not
because it is
a microcosm as closed as
the
whole
is
assumed
to
be, but
on
the
contrary,
because it is
open upon a world, and
the
world,
the
universe,
is itself
the
Open.
63'
For Deleuze
an open world creates
the
possibility of open
individuals.
However
this
can
be interpreted in
two
different
ways.
The first
way
is
that the
aim of philosophy
is
to trace the
movement of
thought
back from
the
individual
through
its immanent
opening on
the
world
to the
open world
itself. This is
the
option
Deleuze
and
Guattari
appear
to take
when
they trace
everything
to
a plane of
immanence
or chaotic
virtuality.
The
second
interpretation is
that
even
if
we conceive an open world as
creating open
individuals
this
does
not mean
that
individuals
are reducible
to the
world.
Contrary
to their
intentions it
would appear
that
Deleuze
and
Guattari
are
posing
that the
world
is
coextensive
to the
individual. That is
the
individual is
reducible
to
a common nature of
becomings
and singularities.
For Bergson
on
the
other
hand, duration
provides a point or pivot
between
world and
individual
rather
6'0
Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime,
p.
105
631
Deleuze, Cinema 1,
pp.
9-10
206
than
a plane.
This is
perhaps
key
to
how Bergson
practices philosophy:
Now
there
is
another method of composition, more ambitious,
less
certain, which cannot
tell
when
it
will succeed or even
if it
will succeed
at all.
It
consists
in
working
back from
the
intellectual
and social plane
to
a point
in
the
soul
from
which
there
springs an
imperative demand for
creation.
The
soul within which
this
demand dwells
may
indeed have felt
it fully
only once
in its lifetime, but it is
always
there,
a unique emotion,
an
impulse,
an
impetus
received
from
the
very
depths
of
things.
To
obey
it
completely new words would
have
to
be
coined, new
ideas
would
have
to
be
created,
but
this
would no
longer be
communicating something,
it
would not
be
writing.
632
To
the
extent
that the
individual
cannot
be
reduced
to the
world
the two
can
be
considered as
two
uncommon natures related
in
the
opening of an
incomplete
whole,
this
may perhaps
be
represented
thus:
individual `X
world
To
think
from
the
uncommon nature of
the
individual
to the
uncommon nature of
the
world
is
a
tolma
relation
but
the
notion of an
incomplete
whole would seem
to
be
anathema
to
how
tolma
operates
-
between
an absolute and
its
residue.
However, it
would
be
conceivable to think the
opening of an
incomplete
whole
if first
one works
from
the
perspective that the
Absolute is
precisely compromised and second
if
one
posits not one
but
two Absolutes,
one on
`either
side' of
the
open.
Likewise
there
would also
be
two
residues.
If
the two
residues cancelled
themselves
out we would
then
be left
with
the
coincidence of
two
incomplete
wholes
thinkable
on
the
same
plane.
We
shall
term this the inverse
tolma
relation.
However, for
this to
work
the
two
absolutes would need
to
be
complete mirrors of each other
in
order
to
have
inverse
residues.
How
can such a positioning of
thought
be
achieved?
We
may
hypothesise
that
it
would
function
as a
type
of mirror
thought, that
is,
to think
any
object one must at
the
same
time locate its
mirror.
Of
course one could posit any
number of correspondences
between
uncommon natures
(individual/world,
632
Bergson, The Two Sources
of
Morality
and
Religion,
p.
254
207
problems/solutions,
individuals/stellar
phenomena,
the
left
and right sides of
living
creatures, male/female, etc...
). However,
there
is
the
strange phenomenon
that
one
would not
know
that two
uncommon natures
had been brought into
equilibrium until
one actually achieves
this, that
is, it is
only at
this
point
that they
would actually
operate according
to
a mirror
function. To
explore
this
further
we shall
bring
together
the theories
we
have developed
earlier
in
the thesis.
Proximity Theory
In Chapter One
we presented
the
proposition of compromised position which
postulates
that
any position one
takes
on philosophy will already
be
compromised.
This
was
transformed
into
the
idea in Chapter Three
of a relation of a non-relation.
That is,
the
prospect of
determining
the
relation
between
two
unknown
things.
Finally in
this
chapter we presented a solution
to this
in
terms
of
the inverse
tolma
relation.
The inverse
tolma
relation gives us an
`absolute'
solution
to this
problem
but how
realistic or practical
is it? To investigate this
we shall
turn to
Borges'
short
story
`The Approach
to
This
work
is
perhaps
Leibnizian in
character.
It
tells the
story of a
Bombay
attorney who writes a
book
about an
unnamed
law
student who
has
renounced
his Muslim faith. The
man
finds himself
caught up
in
a riot where
he
thinks
he has killed
a man
(a Hindu). He
consequently
flees
the
marauding
hordes
whereupon
his journey
starts.
Borges
will summarise
the
main plot:
A
man
(the
unbelieving,
fleeing law
student we
have
met)
falls
among
people of
the
lowest,
vilest sort and accommodates
himself
to them,
in
a
kind
of
test
of
iniquity. Suddenly
-
with
the
miraculous shock of
Crusoe
when
he
sees
that
human footprint in
the
sand
-
the
law
student perceives
some mitigation of
the
evil: a moment of
tenderness,
of exaltation, of
silence,
in
one of
the
abominable men.
"It
was as
though
a more complex
interlocutor had
spoken.
" He knows
that the
wretch with whom
he is
conversing
is incapable
of
that
momentary
decency;
thus the
law
student
hypothesises
that the
vile man
before him has
reflected a
friend,
or
the
friend
of a
friend. Rethinking
the
problem,
he
comes
to
a mysterious
conclusion:
Somewhere
in
the
world
there
is
a man
from
whom
this
633
Borges, Collected Fictions,
pp.
82-87
208
clarity,
this
brightness
emanates; somewhere
in
the
world
there
is
a man
equal
to this
brightness. The law
student resolves
to
devote his life
to
searching out
this
man.
634
The
man proceeds
The insatiable
search
for
a soul
by
means of
the
delicate
glimmerings or
reflections
this
soul
has left in
others
-
at
first,
the
faint
trace
of a smile or
a word;
toward the
last,
the
varied and growing splendours of
intelligence,
and goodness.
The
more closely
the
men
interrogated by
the
law
student
have known Al-Mu'tasim, the
greater
is
their
portion of
divinity, but
the
reader
knows
that they themselves
are
but
mirrors
...
The
person
immediately
preceding
Al-Mu'tasim
is
a
Persian bookseller
of great courtesy and
felicity;
the
man preceding
the
bookseller is
a
Slnt.
635
The
narrator
Borges
will complain
that
he
only
has
a
later
edition of
the
book
where
the
man's
journey has been
turned
into
allegory:
The
etymological meaning of
"Al-Mu'tasim" (the
name of
that
eighth
Abbasid king
who won eight
battles,
engendered eight sons and eight
daughters, left
eight
thousand
slaves, and reigned
for
a period of eight
years, eight moons and eight
days) is "He
who goes
in
quest of aid.
" In
the
1932
version of
the
novel,
the
fact
that the
object of
the
pilgrimage
was
himself
a pilgrim cleverly
justifies
the
difficulty
of
finding
Al-
Mu'tasim; in
the
1934
edition,
that
fact leads
to the
extravagant
theology
I have described
636
It
can clearly
be
seen
in
this
story
that
Leibniz's idea
of
the
monads
that
mirror all
other monads
is
present
in
the
story.
However, the
important
point we wish
to
raise
is
the
nature of
the
journey
or series
itself
-
it
starts
from
an unsure
beginning
and
moves
towards
an uncertain end via proximate
individuals. Here
we may also
bring
in
our
definition
of singularity
from Chapter 2. The idea
of a perfect singularly
unique
individual is
perhaps as absolute an
idea
as
inverse
tolma.
For
a perfectly
unique
individual
would exactly mirror
the
world and would
be
analogous to
Leibniz's idea
of
God. However, if
the inverse tolma
relation
is less
than
absolute
'1'
ibid,
p.
84
635
bid,
p.
85
636
ibid,
p.
85-6
209
and
the
individual is
not perfectly singular
then
one would
have
a monad
that
is
passive as well as active and a world
that
would not perfectly mirror
the
monad
but
would refract
it infinitely. Hence
we may see
how
the theories
we
have developed in
this
chapter give a greater understanding
to Leibniz's
philosophy
from
the
point of
view of emanation.
However
there
is
also another
factor
which we need
to
consider
next.
Positional Theory
If
the
inverse
tolma
relation operates
in
one
direction
to
proximate or position
the
individual in
relation
to
perfect singularity
then the
obverse side of
this, that
is
the
original
tolma
relation will operate
in
the
opposite
direction
to
position
the
activity of
monads
in
the
world.
Corresponding
to this
is
a
theory
of
knowledge
in
terms
of an
art of memory
based
on
the
`external'
positions of
the
monad.
And it
should
be
said
that to
exist
is
an act of
tolma;
it is
an act of audacity.
210
Conclusion
211
The End
of
Immanence
The
purpose of
this thesis
was
to
explore
the
problematic notion of representation
in
Deleuze's
reading of
Leibniz in his
early and
late
works.
In Chapter One
we
identified how
the
critique of representation
through
difference leads
to
its
own
form
of
idealism. In Chapter Two
we extended
this
line
of enquiry
to
show
how Deleuze's
transcendental
method required an added organisational principle.
These ideas lead
up
to the
work
in Chapter Three. Here
we presented
the thesis that
Deleuze's later
approach
to
Leibniz
would
indeed invalidate his
early accusations on
Leibniz for
subordinating
difference
to
representation.
For
the themes
Deleuze
criticised
Leibniz
on
in Difference
and
Repetition:
Any hesitation between
the
virtual and
the
possible,
the
order of
the
Idea
and
the
order of
the
concept,
is disastrous,
since
it
abolishes
the
reality of
the
virtual
[... ] This hesitation between the
possible and
the
virtual
explains why no one
has
gone
further
than
Leibniz in
the
exploration of
sufficient reason, and why, nevertheless, no one
has better
maintained
the
illusion
of a subordination of
that
sufficient reason
to the
identical
637
Theses
themes
now not only
form Deleuze's
main exposition of
Leibniz, for
example, on
the
matter of
the
Identicals, but
are also part of
his
own
ideas,
such as
the
notion of possibility
he
uses
in his ideas
on art.
However,
we also argue
that
Deleuze fails
to
engage with
the
fundamental logic in Leibniz's
work and
this
in
turn
highlights discrepancies in his
own philosophical system.
In both Deleuze's
early
essay on
Lucretius
and
his final
work with
Guattari, What is Philosophy? he
will
bring
up
the
idea
that
we must
think
at
infinite
speeds
in
order
to think the
event.
We
have
agued
in
this thesis that the
infinite is
only a
limit
or
the
immanent
condition of
a
transcendental.
Tolma
or audacity requires us
to think
faster
than the
infinite:
the
instant. The
originality of
this thesis
is
to
be found in
not only
the
interpretations
we
give of
Deleuze
and
Leibniz but
also
the
relevance we
find in
ancient philosophies
for
the
philosophical problems of
today.
637
Deteuze, Difference
and
Repetition,
p.
212-3
212
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