Take for example, the law that requires presiding officers at each polling station to hand

over signed copies of statements of count (Form XIV and XV) to the agents of each
contestant The !!! complained after the "##$ elections that the presiding officers did
not put their original signatures on the statements so that these couldn%t &e used as
evidence in courts The complaint was redressed and the rules amended requiring the
presiding officers to also put their thum& impressions on the statements
The rule was made watertight &ut the pro&lem has persisted in all later elections The
'lection (ommission of !akistan ('(!) had to issue a directive, one month after the
polling in )$"*, asking the returning officers to make the forms pu&licl+ availa&le ,ut
this was simpl+ not followed in man+ cases
-aking the rules impregna&le is onl+ half the .o& done/ it is the other half 0 their
implementation 0 that is where the real pro&lems lie There are two ma.or drags on the
'(!%s resolve and capacit+ to implement the law and deliver credi&le and non1
controversial elections
First is the '(!%s relationship with the .udiciar+ (onducting elections is first and last an
administrative .o&, and those who are .udges &+ training and description do not qualif+ to
perform it The misconception a&out their proficienc+ pro&a&l+ originates from the
constitutional provision that calls for appointing retired .udges as election commissioners
The underl+ing sense is that since .udges are perceived as non1partisan, elections under
their leadership will &e non1controversial
Former president 2hulam Ishaq 3han improvised upon this to hand over constituenc+1
level duties to .udicial officers as well, in the "#44 elections 5ince then, seven elections
have &een held practicall+ &+ the .udiciar+ under the same scheme &ut ironicall+ none
escaped &eing tainted The writing on the wall is that the experiment has failed/ and this
must &e acknowledged and corrected
The administration of elections &+ the .udiciar+ also forms a clear case of conflict of
interest &ecause as an institution, it administers these and then itself ad.udicates upon
conflicts arising out of their administration 6cknowledging this, the 7ational 8udicial
!olic+ -aking (ommittee had in )$$# decided not to lend its personnel to the '(! &ut
retracted its decision &efore the )$"* elections in the 9larger national interest%
The involvement of the .udiciar+ in elections has confused two separate constitutional
spaces reserved for two different constitutional &odies It has made the elections appear
like an auxiliar+ function of the .udiciar+ while the .o& of the '(! has &een reduced to
issuing notifications, directives and statements
In this confusion, the 'lection (ommission has lost its freedom to make decisions and
act The two functions not onl+ need to &e separated from each other, the '(! also needs
some kind of immunit+ from .udicial intervention 'lections are a time1&ound exercise
and their administrators need a&ilit+, agilit+ and creativit+ in order to &e a&le to respond
to an+ unpredicta&le situation at an+ hour If solutions are to &e su&.ected to long
procedural dela+s, the+ are &ound to prove useless
The second most important area where the '(! needs to &e empowered is its control over
the civil administration It needs the services of an arm+ of government emplo+ees to
perform duties at the polling station level It needs to wean these seconded personnel off
an+ political affiliations, guard them against threats of violence from vested interest
groups, check an+ negligence on their part and make them work efficientl+
:eveloping other stakes in civil administration is important as peace and order in societ+
are a prerequisite for elections The '(! also needs the support of all government
departments, including the law1enforcement agencies to ensure that the (ode of (onduct
for pre1election campaigns is strictl+ followed, that voters are not &ri&ed or coerced, and
that there is a level pla+ing field for all contestants
The '(! has not &een a&le to ensure all of this to the satisfaction of the parties ;ne
likel+ reason is that this area too is contested &+ two constitutional &odies, the '(! and
the caretaker government The+ are &oth entrusted with the same responsi&ilit+ of
ensuring neutralit+ in government This duplication not onl+ creates confusion &ut also
works as a disincentive for the '(! to take the initiative, &esides allowing the two to
&lame failures on each other
Interim set1ups have traditionall+ served as a constitutional window for the esta&lishment
to intervene in the electoral process The s+stem of appointment was changed
su&stantiall+ through the "4th 6mendment &ut caretaker set1ups too have failed to meet
expectations
The '(! thus needs a new legal framework for its engagement with the civil
administration There is no harm in taking a leaf from the Indian experience where no
caretakers are appointed and the election commission virtuall+ takes over the entire state
machiner+, as soon as the election process &egins and until the results are announced
The 'lectoral <eforms (ommittee will have to avoid indulging in rephrasing old laws
and show some creativit+ <eaders should &e reminded that !akistan achieved an
important milestone in its first1ever democratic transition, from one elected government
to the next, in )$"* The su&sequent milestone should not &e the next transition &ut
electoral reforms as onl+ these can take polls and democrac+ a qualitative step forward
The writer works with Punjab Lok Sujag, a research and advocacy group.
Published in Dawn, July 2th, 2!"#
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