Angel

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
Angel


Angel
PEOPLE v. DECENA
Angel

BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ART. 11 RPC SELF-DEFENSE
Facts:

On Christmas day, around 4pm, Luzviminda (14 y.o., daughter of the Jaime Ballesteros, victim), saw
Decena rushing towards her father with a long bladed weapon prompting her to warn her father.
Decena, however, stabbed him on the right chest causing his death.
Narration of the defense:
At about 4pm, the victim was drunk and for no apparent reason, he held the appellant by the neck and
poked a fork against it. A barangay tanod intervened and advised the appellant to go home. Appellant left
but was later followed by Jaime (victim).
Biala, uncle of the appellant, testified that he saw Jaime attacking the appellant with a balisong. Appellant
was able to parry the blow, and overpowering Jaime, thruste the knife into his body.
Issue: W/N the appellant acted in complete self-defense that in killing Jaime Ballesteros absolving him
from criminal liability.

Held: No.

Ratio:

In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecution which may rely on the strength of its evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. However, upon invoking self-defense, the accused admits that
he killed the victim and the burden of proof is upon him in proving that he really acted in self-defense.
Basic requirement for self-defense as a justifying circumstance is unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.
It must be shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the
accused in danger forcing him to inflict wounds upon his assailant
According to the defense, the unlawful aggression started when the victim started poking the appellant
with a fork
Elementary rule: when the aggressor leaves, the aggression ceases. It follows that when appellant and
Jaime heeded the advice of the barangay tanod, the unlawful aggression had ended. Since the
aggression no longer existed, appellant had no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
The defense failed to establish that the victim persisted in his design to attack the appellant
Defense: continuing aggression
Whenever the victim was drunk, he would look for trouble (refuted by the testimony of the wife)
Witnesses: Jaime was staggering or wobbling as he walked the victim could not have persisted in
attacking the appellant with his current state.
Testimony of the uncle: imaginative or coached witness

Angel
People vs. Dela Cruz
Angel

Facts: Daniel Macapagal, a married man, was living-in with a woman for about 2-3 years prior to the
womans cohabitation with another man, one Roberto dela Cruz. One night, when Roberto dela Cruz and
the woman were in the house of the latter, Macapagal arrived. The woman opened the door and
Macapagal barged in holding a gun while lookibg for someone. He then went to the closed bedroom
where dela Cruz was and banged at the door with his gun while yelling Come out. Come out. Dela Cruz
then opened the door but he was greeted by Macapagals gun. He thereby immediately closed the door,
retrieved his own gun, and reopened the door. Both men grappled for each others firearm and a few
moments later, four shots were heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor, his body sustaining all four
gunshot wounds.

Issue: Whether or not Macapagal acted in self-defense.

Held: No. Upon opening the door the first time, Macapagal was able to prevent at this stage harm to
himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he took his own revolver,
again opened the door and, brandishing his own firearm, confronted the victim. This encounter removes
the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

The first element, unlawful aggression, is not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude. It is an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person at the time the
defensive action was taken against the aggressor. The second element would demand that the means
employed to quell the unlawful aggression were reasonable and necessary. The number of wounds
sustained by the victim negates the existence of this element of self-defense. The third element was lost
when Macapagal drew his own gun and used it to challenge the initial aggressor.

Angel
People v. Jaurigue
Angel

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
vs
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue, defendants.
Avelina Jaurigue, appellant.


FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the
crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and
one day of prision mayorto thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum
of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of
preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for
Southern Luzon.
On September 20, 1942, at around 8oclock in the evening, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the
Seventh Day Adventists o attend religious services. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending religious services,
Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina
was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence,
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife
which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado
seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once
at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was
necessarily mortal.
Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and
herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to
admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him.
Then three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about
the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and
informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened

ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in (1) not holding said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense
of her honor, (2) in not finding in her favor additional mitigating circumstances, and (3) in holding that the
commission of the alleged offense attended by aggravating circumstance.


HELD:
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado
Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and
appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at
least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor.
Said chapel where the incident took place was lighted with electric lights and there were several people
inside; under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. The
means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and
circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.

The facts that the defendant and appellant (1) immediately, voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered
and admitted having stabbed the deceased, (2) had acted in the immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against her, (3) had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his
offending hand, be considered as mitigating circumstances.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment,
not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and
appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked
ordered confiscated.

Angel
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
Angel

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and
rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and
asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the
defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of
his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was
indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue,
the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to
Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership
into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property
rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up,
instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that
possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing was
disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all
since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender
and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because
treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately
chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning
or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due
to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the
provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of
incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has
already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.

Angel
Sabang v People
Angel

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 168818 : March 9, 2007]
NILO SABANG, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
On January 17, 1997, in the midst of a drinking spree on the eve of the fiesta in Liloan, Ormoc City, an
intoxicated Nicanor Butad uttered the ominous words "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang, to the horror of
young Sabang's father, Nilo, and the other onlookers. Within moments, Butad himself lay dead from four
gunshot wounds on his body. Nilo Sabang, petitioner herein, who was charged with and later convicted
for the homicide, admits to the killing of Butad, but claims
that the shooting was accidental and done as a means of defending his son. An array of witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense provides a competing set of particulars as to the shooting. Ultimately, the
prosecution's version, supported by the physical evidence, stands out as the truth.
This much is admitted. At around 6:30 p.m. on that fateful night, petitioner and Butad were having drinks
together with spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor outside the store of Melania Sombilon in Sitio Landing,
Barangay Liloan, Ormoc City.
1
Butad, a civilian agent with the Philippine National Police, was then armed
with a .38-caliber revolver which was tucked in his holster. In the midst of the drinking spree, Randy
Sabang suddenly and unexpectedly appeared before the group. His appearance triggered a negative
reaction from Butad, who then uttered the words "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang.
2

Certain circumstances attaching to this evident threat are disputed, as are the events that consequently
followed. What is certain is that shortly afterwards, Butad lay dead, having sustained four (4) gunshot
wounds from his own revolver. Petitioner appears to have fled but voluntarily surrendered thereafter,
turning over the revolver as he surrendered.
3

Photographs of Butad as he lay dead on the scene were presented in evidence,
4
as was the official report
on his autopsy, prepared by the City Health Office of Ormoc City. The autopsy report
5
indicated the
following findings:
GENERAL SURVEY:
Examined a fairly nourished/fairly developed male cadaver with approximate height of 165 cm & weight of
65 kg in state of rigor mortis.
FINDINGS:
1. Bullet wound 1.0 x 0.5 cm at anterior chest wall, 14 cm from midline, right, along 3rd intercostal space
anterior axillary line penetrating thoracic cavity lacerating upper lobe of right lung.
2. Bullet wound 0.7 x 0.5 cm at 4th intercostal space mid-axillary line, right, penetrating thoracic cavity
lacerating upper lobe of right lung.
3. Bullet wound 1.5 x 0.7 cm at distal 3rd lateral aspect of right arm injuring skin & muscles.
4. Bullet wound 0.7 cm x 0.7 cm at mid vertebral column fracturing spine of 8th thoracic vertebra.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Hypovolemia 2' to multiple bullet wound.
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded innocence, but during the presentation of the evidence for the
defense, he claimed to have acted in defense of a relative. Petitioner and four (4) other witnesses testified
for the defense. The following facts were sought to be established by petitioner:
By the time Butad had joined what was to be his last drinking spree, he was already in a belligerent
mood. Earlier that afternoon, he
had been chasing after Ramil Perez when the latter demanded payment for a bet Butad had lost over a
cockfight.
6

The chase was witnessed by Celso Pepito, who would testify for the defense.
7
As to the shooting itself,
testifying for the defense were petitioner himself, the storekeeper Sombilon, and an eyewitness, Laurito
Caparoso, who was situated right across the road when the shooting occurred.
Sombilon testified that when Butad told Randy Sabang, "I will shoot you," the deceased already had his
revolver aimed at Randy.
8
At this point, Andresa Villamor, a niece of the deceased, told Butad, "Please
don't[,] tiyo, he's the son of Nilo."
9
Petitioner and Caparoso also testified that at that time, Butad had his
revolver pointed at Randy.
10
Petitioner claimed that he then grabbed the arm of Butad, attempting to twist
it toward his body and away from his son. As they were grappling and the revolver was pointed towards
the body of
Butad, petitioner claimed he heard gunshots, and only after the shots were fired was he able to "take the
gun" from Butad.
11
Petitioner's account is substantially corroborated by Caparoso.
12

This version of the shooting, however, stands in sharp contrast to that presented by the prosecution.
Natividad Payud, an eyewitness to the incident, testified that while the group of the deceased Butad,
petitioner, and the spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor was having a drinking spree, Randy suddenly
entered the scene. Butad, appearing surprised, thrust a glass of Tanduay near Randy's mouth and
uttered the words, "I will shoot you." Payud is certain that at this point, Butad was not holding any
gun.
13
Andresa Villamor, another eyewitness to the incident, confirmed Payud's testimony that Butad was
holding a glass and not a gun when he uttered those words.
14

Petitioner reacted to Butad's statement saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I ll never fight for him
because he is a spoiled brat."
15
Andresa Villamor then chided Butad and said, "Do not say that tiyo[,]
because it's [sic] the son of Nilo Sabang."
16

Unexpectedly, a person appeared on the scene and punched Butad causing the latter to fall down lying
partially on his back. Petitioner, who was then sitting across Butad, stood up and pulled the gun tucked in
Butad's waist. He pointed the gun at Butad and fired a shot at the latter's chest.
17
Payud and Andresa
Villamor both saw petitioner fire two (2) more shots near Butad's chest.
18

In a Judgment
19
dated November 22, 1999, the trial court convicted petitioner principally on the strength
of the testimony of Dr. Edilberto P. Calipayan, the physician who conducted the post mortem examination
of Butad's body, to the effect that the absence of powder burns indicates that the gunshots were fired at a
distance of more than 10 inches from the victim's body and not close range as claimed by petitioner.
20

The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction in a Decision
21
dated August 16, 2004 and denied
reconsideration in a Resolution
22
dated July 6, 2005.
In this Petition,
23
petitioner prays for his acquittal contending that he acted in defense of his son, a
justifying circumstance under Art. 11
24
of the Revised Penal Code. He claims that Butad's act of aiming a
gun at his son while uttering the words "I will shoot you" was an aggression of the most imminent kind
which prompted him to try to wrestle the gun from Butad leading to the accidental firing of the fatal shots.
Petitioner theorizes that the fact that Butad was then fully clothed could have accounted for the absence
of powder burns on Butad's body. He disputes the trial court's finding that the wounds would have looked
oblique had the shots been fired during a struggle, claiming that round entrance wounds could likewise be
produced in near contact fire.
He further avers that Payud was not really an eyewitness to the event, pointing to the testimony of
Benjamin Mahusay that he and Payud were already out of Sitio Landing and were heading home when
they heard the gunshots. Likewise, Andresa Villamor's testimony is allegedly confined to seeing Butad
sprawled on the ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General insists on petitioner's conviction but asks that the award of moral
damages be reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
25

We shall first resolve the question of whether petitioner's insistence on the justifying circumstance of
defense of relative deserves merit.
In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the
person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation been given
by the relative attacked.
26
Unlawful aggression is a
primary and indispensable requisite without which defense of relative, whether complete or otherwise,
cannot be validly invoked.
27

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused has admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on
the deceased, it is incumbent upon him in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying
circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the
weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the
prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing."
Thus, petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that
he incurred no criminal liability therefor.
28

Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in
the testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner's
son as he uttered the words "I will shoot you." With this conflict emerges the question of whether
petitioner sensed an imminent threat to his son's life. Payud unequivocally testified that petitioner even
dismissed Butad's utterance saying, "Just try to shoot my child because I ll never fight for him because he
is a spoiled brat."
This indicates to us that petitioner did not consider Butad's words a threat at all.
These circumstances led the trial court to conclude that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Butad which could have precipitated petitioner's actions. This finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is
conclusive on the Court barring any showing of any arbitrariness or oversight of material facts that could
change the result.
29

Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad's body negates the claim that the killing
was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad who
initiated the attack, the fact that petitioner was able to wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression
which Butad had started already ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful aggressor when he continued to
shoot Butad even as he already lay defenseless on the ground.
30

On this point, the defense's own witness, Caparoso, said in his Counter Affidavit
31
and during direct
examination that after the first shot was fired, he saw petitioner take possession of the gun as Butad
released his hold of it. It was after petitioner already had the gun that Caparoso heard more
gunshots.
32
Even petitioner admitted that he had an easy time twisting the hand with which Butad was
supposedly holding his revolver because the latter was already very drunk having started drinking before
noon that day.
33

Another crucial point to consider is that the prosecution's theory is consistent with the physical evidence.
The distance from which a shot is fired affects the nature and extent of the injury caused on the victim. In
close range fire, the injury is not only due to the missile but also due to the pressure of the expanded
gases, flame and other solid products of combustion. In
contrast, distant fire usually produces the characteristic effect of the bullet alone.
34
A shot fired from a
distance of more than 60 cm or about two (2) feet does not produce the burning, smudging or tattooing
typically present in loose contact or near fire, short range fire and medium range fire.
35

Powder burns is a term commonly used by physicians whenever there is blackening of the margin at the
entrance of the gunshot wound. The blackening is due to smoke smudging, gunpowder tattooing and, to a
certain extent, burning of the wound margin.
36
As found by the medico-legal officer in this case, Butad's
body did not have any powder burns. In response to the court's queries, Dr. Calipayan testified:
COURT'S QUESTIONS
Q Being an expert, is it a scientific fact that every gun burst within ten (10) inches distance as you said, is
it always a fact that there is presence of powder burns?cralaw library
A It is always a fact, if the caliber of the firearm is higher or I can say, may be .22 caliber as well as there
is a gun powder that burst. If it is fired about less than ten (10) inches from the surface of the skin, it will
always cause powder burns.
Q And in this case, you cannot indicate the presence of powder burns?cralaw library
A Because I did not find any.
37

The fact that there were no powder burns on Butad's body indicates that the shots were fired at a
distance of more than two (2) feet and not at close range as the defense suggests. Moreover, Butad
sustained four (4) gunshot wounds, three (3) of which were in the chest area, circumstances which are
inconsistent with the defense's theory of accidental firing.
38

On the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, the defense questions Payud's testimony averring that
its witness, Benjamin Mahusay, testified that he and Payud were already on their way home
when they heard the gunshots. According to Mahusay, he attended a cockfight which ended at 5 o'clock
in the afternoon of January 17, 1997. He went home afterwards and claimed to have met Payud on the
way home at around 5 in the afternoon.
39
It was at this time that he and Payud supposedly heard
gunshots.
Mahusay's account, however, conflicts with the established fact that Butad was shot to death at around
6:30 that night. His testimony all the more loses significance in the face of Payud's compelling testimony
that she went back to Sitio Landing to fetch her children and witnessed the killing.
40

Moreover, it is not true, as the defense insists, that Andresa Villamor did not witness the actual shooting.
She unequivocally testified that she turned back and saw Sabang take the pistol from Butad and point the
gun at the latter. She instinctively covered her eyes shouting, "Do not shoot my uncle!" She uncovered
her eyes after hearing the first gunshot, saw petitioner still pointing the gun at Butad, and watched as
petitioner shot Butad two (2) more times.
41

In the final analysis, petitioner failed to demonstrate any reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. His conviction of the crime of homicide is certain. Under Art. 249
of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punished by reclusion temporal. There being one (1) mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period.
42
Applying the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty
ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporalas maximum.
As regards the matter of damages, we affirm the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for
the heirs of Butad in line with recent jurisprudence. Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the
heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.
43
We also affirm the
award of P180,000.00 representing loss of earning capacity at a reasonable life expectancy of three (3)
years considering that Butad was already 67 years old at the time of the incident.
44
Likewise affirmed are
the award of P50,000.00 as burial expenses duly proven, attorney's fees of P40,000.00, and appearance
fee of P1,000.00 per hearing.
We, however, agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that consistent with pertinent jurisprudence,
the award of moral damages should be reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
45
Finally, in the
absence of any aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly withheld the award of exemplary
damages.
46

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 16, 2004 and its Resolution dated July 6, 2005, affirming the Judgment rendered
by the Regional Trial Court dated November 26,
1999, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced
toP50,000.00. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.


Angel
People vs Dagani

Angel

Facts:
- Crime of murder was reduced to homicide by the Supreme Court absence proof of treachery and
it also dissolved ruling of RTC and affirmation of CA that there was conspiracy between 2
accused.
- Accused are Dagani and Santiano
- At about 4: 45 i n t he af t er noon a gr oup of men wer e dr i nki ng i n t he cant een
l ocat ed i nsi de t he compound of PNR.
- Al l of a sudden, appel l ant s, who wer e secur i t y of f i cer s of t he PNR ent er ed t he
cant een and appr oached t he gr oup.
- Appel l ant Dagani Javi er whi l e Sant i ano shot Javi er t wi ce at hi s l ef t si de, ki l l i ng
t he l at t er .
- Appel l ant s sai d t hat t hey wer e or der ed by t hei r desk of f i cer t o i nve st i gat e a
commot i on at t he cant een.
- That Dagani appr oached Javi er who had been st r i ki ng a bot t l e of beer on t he
t abl e. Javi er t hen pul l ed out a . 22 cal i ber r evol ver and at t empt ed t o f i r e at
Dagani , but t he gun f ai l ed t o go of f .
- Then suddenl y, whi l e out si de t he cant een, Sant i ano hear d gunf i r e and, f r om hi s
vant age poi nt , he saw Javi er and Dagani gr appl i ng f or a . 22 cal i ber gun whi ch
bel onged t o Javi er .
- Dur i ng t he cour se of t he st r uggl e, t he gun went of f , f or ci ng Sant i ano t o f i r e a
war ni ng shot
- He hear d Javi er s gun f i r e agai n, so he deci ded t o r ush i nt o t he
cant een. Sant i ano t hen shot Javi er f r om a di st ance of l ess t han f our met er s.

- Appel l ant s i nvoked t he j ust i f yi ng ci r cumst ances of sel f - def ense and l awf ul
per f or mance of of f i ci al dut y as PNR secur i t y of f i cer s.

- They ar gued t hat t he pr osecut i on f ai l ed t o est abl i sh t r eacher y and conspi r acy.

- RTC nonetheless find them gui l t y beyond r easonabl e doubt of t he cr i me of Mur der
wi t h t he pr esence of t he mi t i gat i ng ci r cumst ance of vol unt ar y sur r ender and
gr ant i ng t hem t he benef i t of [ t he] I ndet er mi nat e Sent ence Law

They were asked to pay P50, 000. 00 as deat h i ndemni t y, P31, 845. 00 as
f uner al and bur i al expenses, P30, 000. 00 as and f or [ si c] at t or ney s f ees,
P1, 000. 00 per appear ance of counsel .

- RTC is convinced about the judgment because:
- appel l ant s f ai l ed t o pr ove t hat Javi er at t empt ed t o squeeze t he t r i gger of t he
. 22 cal i ber gun when he poi nt ed i t at Dagani
- t hat dur i ng t he cour se of t he st r uggl e f or t he possessi on of t he . 22 cal i ber gun,
t he danger t o t he l i f e of t he accused ceased t o be i mmi nent
- i n gr appl i ng f or t he weapon, Dagani cont r ol l ed t he hands of Javi er and
pushed t hem away f r om hi s body;
- appel l ant s f ai l ed t o pr oduce t he t wo empt y shel l s as physi cal evi dence of t he
gunf i r e al l egedl y caused by Javi er ;
- no poi nt s of ent r y or bul l et mar ki ngs on t he wal l s of t he cant een wer e shown
- no unl awf ul aggr essi on was pr esent on t he par t of t he vi ct i m
- appel l ant s f ai l ed t o pr ove t hat t hey wer e on of f i ci al dut y at t he t i me of t he
i nci dence
- si nce i t was not est abl i shed t hat Javi er act ual l y f i r ed hi s gun, t he i nj ur y
i nf l i ct ed upon hi m cannot be r egar ded as a necessar y consequence of t he due
per f or mance of an of f i ci al dut y;
- appel l ant s wer e act i ng i n conspi r acy;
- on t he i ssue of t r eacher y, i t i s cl ear t hat Javi er had been shot whi l e hi s hands
wer e bei ng hel d by Dagani and hi s body was out of bal ance and about t o f al l ;
and t hat t he mi t i gat i ng ci r cumst ance
- RTC consi der ed mi t i gat i ng ci r cumst ance due t o vol unt ar y sur r ender and penal t y
was r educed t o r ecl usi on
- CA af f i r med deci si on of RTC wi t h sl i ght modi f i cat i on. Appel l ant s wer e
sent enced t o r ecl usi on per pet ua
- Hence, necessar y r evi ew of Supr eme Cour t
- Appel l ant s say t hat RTC and CA er r ed i n not APPRECI ATI NG SELF DEFENSE,
LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFI CI AL DUTY, unabl e t o CONSPI RACY,
t hus f ai l t o est abl i sh Gui l t BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

SC Ruling:
- Murder was reduced to homicide absence proof of treachery. Conspiracy between accused was
dissolved absence proof. Self-defense and performance of official duty cannot be invoked as
justifying circumstance

Ratio:
On self defense: The def ense was unabl e t o pr ove t hat t her e was
unl awf ul aggr essi on on t he par t of Javi er . They wer e unabl e t o pr esent
evi dence t hat t he vi ct i m act ual l y f i r ed hi s gun. No spent shel l s f r om t he
. 22 cal i ber pi st ol wer e f ound and no bul l et s wer e r ecover ed f r om t he
scene of t he i nci dent . Javi er al so t est ed negat i ve f or gunpowder
r esi due. Mor eover , t he t r i al cour t f ound appel l ant Dagani s account of
t he i nci dent t o be i ncr edi bl e and sel f - ser vi ng. I n sum, t he def ense
pr esent ed a bar e cl ai m of sel f - def ense wi t hout any pr oof of t he exi st ence
of i t s r equi si t es.
[ 15]


- danger t o t hei r l i ves had al r eady ceased t he moment Dagani hel d down t he
vi ct i m and gr appl ed f or t he gun wi t h t he l at t er . Af t er t he vi ct i m had been
t hr own of f - bal ance, t her e was no l onger any unl awf ul aggr essi on
- Sant i ano went beyond t he cal l of sel f - pr eser vat i on when he pr oceeded t o i nf l i ct
t he excessi ve and f at al i nj ur i es on Javi er ,
- Means t hat ar e r easonabl e and necessar y wer e not sat i sf i ed t o i nvoke sel f
def ense.
Considering the circumstances in its entirety. I t does not j ust i f y appel l ant Sant i ano s
act of f at al l y shoot i ng t he vi ct i m t wi ce.
[ 26]

- Regarding exercise of lawful duty as justifying, Two r equi si t es must concur bef or e t hi s
def ense can pr osper : 1) t he accused must have act ed i n t he per f or mance of a
dut y or i n t he l awf ul exer ci se of a r i ght or of f i ce; and 2) t he i nj ur y caused or t he
of f ense commi t t ed shoul d have been t he necessar y consequence of such l awf ul
exer ci se.
[ 31]

These criteria was not satisfied. Accused were not in duty when incident happened. Assuming
arguendo that they are, what they did will still not fall within the boundaries of fulfilling their lawful
duty.
- The law does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill
- it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers in the performance of their
duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits.
- Regarding conspiracy, although the victim had been shot by one of the accused while being held
by a co-accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were animated by the same
purpose or were moved by a previous common accord. conspiracy must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.
39

- The prosecution did not establish that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the gun from Javier
and in the process, held the latters hands, was for the purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at
Javier
- Dagani "seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as Javier gradually
fell to the ground
- It must be resolved in favor of the accused.

Angel
People v. Palaganas
Angel

G.R. No. 165483 September 12, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Aggravating circumstance

Laws Applicable: Art. 14

FACTS:
January 16, 1998 8pm: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were on a drinking spree in
their house because Melton visited his brothers in Pangasinan all the way from San Fernando, La Union.
January 16, 1998 9:45 pm: The brothers decided to go to Tidbits Videoke bar to continue their drinking
spree and to sing. They were the only customers
January 16, 1998 10:30 pm: Jaime Palaganas, Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived and
they occupied a different table. When Jaime sang My Way, Melton sang along. But, Jaime resented
this, approached the brother and said in Pangasinan dialect "As if you are tough guys. You are already
insulting me in that way." Jaime struck Servillanos head with the microphone and a fight ensued. Virgilio
Bautista did not joined in and just left. During the rumble, Ferdinand went out of the bar. Michael was
about to pursue him but was stopped by Servillano. They went back to continue to fight with Jaime. Edith
Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the bar, arrived and pacified them. Servillano noticed that
his wristwatch was missing. Since the brothers could not locate it inside the bar, they went outside. They
saw Ferdinand at them and said to Rujjeric Palaganas "Oraratan paltog mo lara" meaning "They are the
ones, shoot them." Rujjeric shot Servillano first at the left side of the abdomen penetrating his large
intestine and urinary bladder causing him to fall on the ground then Melton with a fatal shot on the head
and on the right thigh. When Servillano noticed that Melton was no longer moving, he told Michael "Bato,
bato and they threw stones at Rujjeric and Ferdinand. Michael was hit on the right shoulder.
The police came and took the Ferrer brothers to Manaoag Hospital and later to Villaflor Hospital in
Dagupan.
Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm
Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm
Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm
Criminal Case No. U-9634: using a caliber .38 without first securing the necessary permit/license in
violation to Comelec Res. 2958
Rujjeric and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" Upon motion of Ferdinand, the four
cases were consolidated.
RTC: Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide but acquitted of
the charge of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code while Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him.
CA Affirmed
Rujjeric argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant case and, thus,
his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun, he was then a victim of an unlawful
aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left
shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers


ISSUE: W/N Rujjeric was guilty of the crime of Homicide and 2 counts of Frustrated Homicide

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Criminal Case No. U-9608: Shooting Servillano with unlicensed firearm - attempted homicide. There
being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto
mayor as minimum period to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum period
Criminal Case No. U-9609: Shooting Melton with unlicensed firearm - homicide is reclusion temporal -
There being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum period to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum period
Criminal Case No. U-9610: Shooting Michael with unlicensed firearm - frustrated homicide. There
being a special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum
period to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum period.

petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant case and, thus,
his acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a
victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an injury in
his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
o no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting
them. Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying any
weapon
o When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not in a state of actual or imminent
danger considering the wide distance (4-5 meters) of the latter from the location of the former. He was still
capable of avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have also called or
proceeded to the proper authorities for help
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
o gun was far deadlier compared to the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. x x x.
unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense. It is an essential and indispensable
requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-
fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.
when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not
any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if
the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is
only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were
not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury
Michals wound took six to eight days to heal - attempted homicide
use of an unlicensed firearm - special aggravating circumstance by Republic Act. No. 8294 on June 6,
1997
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those
mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal
Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot
increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information,
and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstance, CANNOT be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance

Angel
People v Ricohermoso
Angel

L 30527 28 | March 29, 1974 | J. Aquino

Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury

Facts:

Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales,
chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin,
Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to taste the
palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.

Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermosos house and asked
him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever
happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his
bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and
place, Ricohermosos brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and
rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, he
discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally wounded.

The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.



Issue:

W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or
injury



Held:

No. Juan Padernals reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his act in preventing
Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was designed to
insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the assailants and not an act to prevent
infliction of greater evil or injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.

Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones leves,
from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon.

Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.

(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecutions version of the
case and trial courts finding of guilt.)

Angel
People v Norma Hernandez
Angel

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendant-Appellants: Maria Norma Hernandez, Mariano Hernandez (father) & Ramona Martinez
(mother)

FACTS:

Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma Hernandez and after months of
courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to bring his parents over
her home so that they could talk about their marriage.
When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens and goats and they agreed to
buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the sponsors and to repair the uncles roof.
While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his parents waited
but she never showed up thus causing them great shame and humiliation.
Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that she wasnt really in love with him.
Her parents tried to persuade her to accept the proposal and that she only accepted it out of obedience to
her parents and the uncles insistence.
Before Vivencios parents came to their home, she already counselled them not to bring the chickens and
that they should not regret whatever may happen later.
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasnt honestly in love with Vivencio and so she decided to
leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage.
Appellants parents also corroborated her testimony.
RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent
celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
HELD:

Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.
RATIO:

Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasnt been proven. There is no malice in the act of the
appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent the marriage
after mature consideration.
Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the complainant & appellant before the
incident. There always existed good relations between them for they were neighbours so it cannot be
sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating the marriage.
Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry and it would be utterly
inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply because she desisted in continuing with the
marriage. If she would be liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her to go into a marriage
without her free consent.
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11 par.4,
RPC)

Angel
People v Delima
Angel

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANILO DELIMA (Acquitted) and OSCAR
AREO, accused.
OSCAR AREO, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision
[1]
dated October 13, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 4426, finding herein appellant, Oscar Areo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for killing Roberto Pilapil.
The record shows that, on September 3, 1997, Provincial Prosecutor Juan C. Latorre, Jr. filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Samar an Information
[2]
charging Oscar Areo and his co-accused, Danilo Delima,
with murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8
th
day of August, 1997, at nighttime which was purposely sought, at Barangay
Bachao, Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with abuse
of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hold and hack
one Roberto Pilapil with the use of a bolo (sundang) with which the said accused had conveniently
provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon said Roberto Pilapil multiple
hacking wounds in the different parts of his body, which wounds directly caused the death of Roberto
Pilapil.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on September 25, 1997, appellant, Oscar Areo, and his co-accused, Danilo Delima,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
[3]

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Pedro Papiona,
[4]
an alleged eyewitness to the
incident; Dra. Lucia L. Astorga,
[5]
Municipal Health Officer of Daram, Samar; SPO4 Juanito Batayen of
Daram, Samar; Saludada Pilapil
[6]
and Vicenta Pilapil,
[7]
mother and wife of the victim, respectively.
The prosecutions evidence established the following:
On August 8, 1997, at around 6:00 p.m., the victim, Roberto Pilapil, together with his eight children,
was inside their house in Barangay Bachao, Daram, Samar, watching over his wife, Vicenta Pilapil, who
was about to give birth. Appellant Oscar Areo and his co-accused, Danilo Delima, arrived to ask Roberto
if they could have a drinking session inside his house. Roberto agreed, so they drank beer and rhum.
During the drinking spree, Oscar reminded Roberto about the parcel of land in Sitio Naparikan which was
being occupied by his (Robertos) father. Oscar insisted that they (Areos) owned the same, claiming that
his mother had previously bought it. Roberto replied that his father owned the land and that he knew
nothing about the transaction being referred to by Oscar.
At around 11:00 p.m., Robertos mother, Saludada Pilapil, arrived and advised them to stop
drinking. Consequently, Danilo and Oscar left and proceeded to the latters house. A few minutes later,
Danilo returned to fetch Roberto who was then already sleeping. Saludada advised her son not to leave
but Roberto went with Danilo just the same.
On reaching Oscars house, Roberto was suddenly hog-tied by Danilo. Thereupon, Oscar pulled out
a bolo and started hacking Roberto while Danilo held both hands of the victim. At that instance,
Saludada, who followed her son, shouted for help. Upon hearing the cries of Saludada, Pedro Papiona
came out of his sons house. Oscar and Danilo ran away on seeing him.
On the other hand, the defense presented six witnesses: the appellant himself;
[8]
his co-accused
Danilo Delima;
[9]
Manuel Caete,
[10]
a friend of Oscar and Danilo; Julita Leona Areo,
[11]
wife of the
appellant; Estelita Delima
[12]
and Dorina Rosales Delima,
[13]
wife and mother of Danilo, respectively.
According to the defense witnesses, at about 7:00 p.m. on August 8, 1997, the appellant and
his kumpadre,Manuel Caete, went to the house of Ronilo Lanzarete to watch a betamax movie. They
drank liquor while watching the movie. Accused Danilo Delima also went to the house of Ronilo
Lanzarete and joined Oscar and Manuel in the drinking session. The movie ended at past 9:00
p.m. Thereafter, Oscar went home and ate supper with his wife and children before retiring to bed. While
asleep, Oscar was roused by a loud shout coming from outside urging him to come down. Oscar looked
out the window and found that it was the victim, Roberto Pilapil. Roberto continued shouting, warning
Oscar that if he did not come down, Roberto would go after him inside the house. While Roberto was
opening the door of the kitchen, Oscar quickly got hold of the bamboo pole from their window and struck
Robertos hand that was holding a bolo. When the bolo fell, Oscar picked it up and hacked Roberto
several times for fear that Roberto was still poised to attack him. After Roberto fell to the ground, he
pleaded for mercy but appellant ignored his plea. Instead Oscar proceeded immediately to his fathers
house with his family for fear of reprisal from Robertos relatives.
At around 6:30 a.m. the following day, Oscar was fetched for questioning by a barangay tanod from
his fathers house. Together they went to the barangay hall, bringing the bolo that he used in hacking the
victim. There he met Danilo.
Oscar further testified that Roberto challenged him to a fight because the latter was harboring a
grudge against him. He (Oscar) admitted cutting 15 minonga trees from the land, formerly owned by a
certain Cayang, that was later on sold to Robertos mother, Saludada Pilapil.
Appellants co-accused, Danilo Delima, professed innocence of the crime. Danilo testified in court
that, on August 8, 1997, he was in the mountain making charcoal. He went home at around 5:00
p.m. After eating supper, he and his family went to the house of Ronilo Lanzarete to watch a betamax
movie. Danilo drank liquor with the appellant and Manuel Caete until the movie was finished at about
9:00 p.m. He and his family then went home to sleep. As far as he was concerned, nothing unusual
happened that whole evening.
The following day, Danilo learned that Roberto was killed. He was later arrested as one of the
suspects in the killing.
The testimonies of the appellant and his co-accused, Danilo Delima, were corroborated by Manuel
Caete, Dorina Rosales Delima and Julita Leona Areo.
Julita Leona Areo, wife of the appellant, testified that, at around 11:30 p.m. on August 8, 1997, she
was awakened by Roberto who was challenging her husband to a fight. She restrained her husband and
told him not to go down. But when Roberto cut the rope which served as a door lock and he was about to
enter their house, she released her husband who then struck Roberto in the hand that was holding a bolo.
When the bolo fell, appellant picked it up and hacked Roberto.
On October 13, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant Oscar Areo guilty of
murder and acquitting Danilo Delima for insufficiency of evidence. The judgment read:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Oscar Areo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder as charged in the information and for this offense there being no aggravating circumstance
proved by the prosecution he is hereby sentenced toreclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Roberto
Pilapil, represented by Mrs. Vicenta Pilapil, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay one-half of the costs.
The accused Oscar Areo has been detained since August 9, 1977.
For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Danilo Delima is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio.
So ordered.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant raises the following assignments of error:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER BASED
ON THE VERY INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE ALLEGED PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
AS CORROBORATED BY HIS WITNESSES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCES ADDUCED BY THE
ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT THAT THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE ATTENDED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE ACT COMPLAINED
OF.
To escape criminal liability, appellant invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He admits
hacking Roberto but vigorously insists that he did so to defend himself and his family.
Appellant further contends that it was Roberto who started the aggression by acting in a manner that
was threatening and dangerous to him and his family. When appellant saw that Roberto was already
opening the door of their kitchen and sensing that Roberto had a bolo, Oscar took the bamboo pole from
the window and struck Robertos hand holding the bolo. When the bolo fell, Oscar picked it up and, afraid
that Roberto was still going to attack him, he hacked Roberto several times. Oscars declaration was
corroborated by his wife who was present at the scene of the crime.
Despite this corroboration, however, we are not convinced by appellants theory of self-defense.
Jurisprudence holds that, when the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-defense to
escape criminal liability, the burden of proof shifts to him. It necessarily follows that he must now rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
latters evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.
[14]
He must
then prove the following elements of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the one resorting to self-defense.
[15]
Of these requisites, the most indispensable is unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or
repel. And for unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be a strong and positive act of real
aggression, not merely a threat or an intimidating stance. Thus, the accused who claims self-defense
must positively establish that there was an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof, by the victim.
[16]

Upon review of the evidence on record, we find that the appellant has failed to discharge this
burden. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to speak of. Contrary to the claim of
the defense, the prosecution established through its eyewitness that the victim was lured to the
appellants house and there hacked by the appellant. Appellants effort to buttress his theory of self-
defense can only be described as desperate. The trial court in its decision found that unlawful aggression
was not proven, thus:
Defendant Oscar Areos claim that he acted in self-defense is unfounded. In order that this defense may
prosper, it is necessary that such plea be established by a clear and convincing evidence. He did not
receive even a scratch or bruise in the alleged attack which the deceased Roberto Pilapil, armed with a
bolo, made upon him. There can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful aggression. Such
unlawful aggression was not found in this case.
To successfully invoke self-defense, appellant must prove, by satisfactory evidence, the concurrence
of all the elements of self-defense, the most important of which is unlawful aggression by the victim.
Without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, and conviction of
appellant must follow.
[17]

Another factor that militates against the appellants claim of self-defense is the physical evidence on
record, that is, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim. As testified to by Dr. Lucia Astorga, the
attending physician, the victim suffered eight wounds, most of them fatal. It is an oft-repeated rule that the
presence of many wounds on the victim negates self-defense; it in fact indicates a determined effort to kill
him. Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was the deceased who initiated the attack and the
accused merely defended himself, clearly there was no need for him to stab the victim several times if the
purpose was simply to disable the victim or make him desist from his unlawful assault.
[18]

One thing more is the matter of flight. Appellant admitted that, immediately after the incident, he fled
from the crime scene. Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of guilt, although the opposite does
not necessarily imply innocence either.
[19]
Appellants alleged fear of retaliation from the victims relatives
was a figment of his imagination. He failed to report the incident immediately to the barangay chairman
and police authorities, negating his claim of self-defense. In sum, appellant failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to prove self-defense.
Furthermore, what appellant tries to depict is that it was the accused who was the unlawful
aggressor. We do not think so. It would have been totally against human nature for the victim to look for
trouble at a time when he was with his family, awaiting the birth of his new baby. Under the
circumstances, we cannot believe appellant that it was the victim who went to his house to commit
violence there.
For all the foregoing reasons, we accept the testimony of Robertos mother that her son was lured to
the appellants house and hog-tied before he was hacked to death. This constituted treachery which is
committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, method and form of execution employed
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that such means, method
and form of execution are deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person.
[20]
These two conditions were evidently present in the instant case.
We, therefore, find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial
court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant under Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The record shows that the trial court failed to award moral damages. The victims widow testified
that the death of her husband caused her sorrow and suffering, and left her eight children to
support. Moral damages, which include physical suffering and mental anguish, may be recovered in
criminal offenses resulting in the victims death. Therefore, the Court awards the amount of P50,000 as
moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29 in Criminal Case No. 4426 finding Oscar Areo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Roberto Pilapil the
amount of P50,000 as moral damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Angel
PEOPLE VS. LAGATA (1949)
Angel

BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ESCAPING PRISONERS
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines

Defendant-Appellant: Ignacio Lagata

FACTS:

The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners
(Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar.
Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards, they were called
to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look for
him.
Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the 2nd
one. They were already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he
ran away because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions were also probably
scared and that is why they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibaez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio Lagata
ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote plantation and found
footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened
grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left
arm. Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they were
assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace
was shot, he ran away because he also could have been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though his testimony
corroborated those of the other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president, verified
the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.
Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners were running far from him
when he already ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped
under his custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless
already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoners work.
HELD:

Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious physical injuries.
Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance.
(Art.11 par.5, RPC)
RATIO:

It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record does not show that Tipace
was bent on committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape.
According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around him. How could anyone intending
to escape run towards and around the very guard one was supposed to escape from?
Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his duties, the circumstances show
that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and
even kill one of them.
While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would
authorize them to fire against them.

Angel
MAMANGUN V PEOPLE
Angel


11
FEB
GR No. 149152 | February 2, 2007 | J. Garcia

Fulfillment of Duty/Lawful Exercise of Right

Facts:

Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-holdup call, with his fellow police
officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which
prompted residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and proceeded to the
rooftop of Antonio Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun,
searched the rooftop and saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who was
ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener Contreras (not the
suspect) Contreras died of the gunshot wound.

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to the lighted rooftop. He
was beside Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun
pointed his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed Hindi ako, hindi ako! to which Mamangun replied,
Anong hindi ako? and shot him.

The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only ones at the dark rooftop when
Mamangun noticed a crouching man who suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted Pulis, tigil!
whereupon the person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamanguns head. This prompted
Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that Contreras only said Hindi ako, hindi ako
only when they approached him. Mamangun then asked Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there
are policemen here. Mamangun reported the incident to the desk officer who directed investigator
Hernando Banez to investigate the incident. Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.



Issue:

W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the petitioners fulfillment of his duty



Held:

No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms Sandiganbayans decision after finding the
petitioners testimony to be nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per
Sandiganbayans observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused and biased with respect to
his co-policemen-witnesses because:

After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by Mamangun, it is contrary to human
experience for a man (who is not the suspect) to attack one of three policemen with drawn guns
Mamanguns admission that he did not ask the victim Why did you try to hit me, if you are not the one?
clearly belies their claim
The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears that the victim instinctively
shielded himself instead
Additionally, petitioners pretense that Contreras struck him was not initially reported to the desk and was
only conveniently remembered when the investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.

Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely justify the petitioners firing the fatal
gunshot. The element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which leads to the
failure of the petitioners plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a privileged mitigating
circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying circumstance the injury was caused by necessary
consequence of due performance of duty.


Angel
People v. Beronilla
Angel

L 4445 | February 28, 1955 | J. JBL Reyes

Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior

Facts:

Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the
judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the
elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.

Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla,
who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army,
operating as guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a
memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason,
espionage and aiding or abetting the enemy.

Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed under
custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents.
Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying I can only compliment you for your impartial
but independent way of handling the whole case.

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the murder
of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty
to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted on the
grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.



Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to
lawful order of superior



Held:

Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could
not question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality.

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal
was done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that
Beronilla received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which called
attention to the illegality of Borjals conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would
not have dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part
because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on
doubts of illegality and death sentence review sent to the superior officers.

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea
(Crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be innocent).

Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are any reasonable
doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of
the accused.

Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

Angel
Tabuena vs Sandiganbayan
Angel


Issue: Tabuena and Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated
October 12, 1990, as well as the resolution dated December 20, 1991
denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under
Article 217 of the RPC.

Facts:

On January 10, 16 and 30 year 1986, TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS
(25), TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (25), and FIVE MILLION PESOS (5),
were withdrawn (from PNB extension office) respectively by principal
accused, Luis A. Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International
Airport (MIAA). This purportedly as partial payments to the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), for unpaid
obligations.
All the above withdrawals were done by way of cash placed in
peerless boxes and duffle bags, laded on a PNB armored car and
delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez (secretary of
Pres. Marcos), to which she issued a receipt only on the last day of
delivery January 30, 1986 (5 million).

Why did Tabuena withdraw the said amount? What authority allowed him
to withdraw the amount?

It was an order by President Marcos: 1) over the phone 2) another by
way of memorandum (see below)

Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the
following essential antecedents:

Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay
directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena
replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena
received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos,
a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred
to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal
instruction, to wit:

"Office of the President

of the Philippines

Malacaang

January 8, 1986

MEMO TO: The General Manager

Manila International Airport Authority

You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, through this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE
MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's
account with said Company mentioned in a Memorandum of Minister
Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985 and duly approved
by this Office on February 4, 1985.

Your immediate compliance is appreciated.

(Sgd.)
FERDINAND MARCOS."[4]

It must be noted that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for
the months of January to June 1986.

Based on the following findings, which will be listed below, the
Supreme Court acquitted Tabuena and co-accused Peralta, the
dispositive portion says:

Final decision of this case; held: WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta
are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the

Why did the court acquit the accused? (herein petitioners, Tabuena
and Peralta).

1) On the reason of good faith, a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the
accused.

Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was
what the MARCOS memorandum required him to do. He could not be
faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential
directive, Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior.

2) Tabuena did not have to observe all auditing procedures of
disbursement (all disbursement above 1000 should be made in check,
payment of all claims against the govt. had to be supported with
complete documentation)

Tabuena did not have the luxury of time to observe all the procedures
of disbursement considering that the MARCOS memorandum enjoined
hi "immediate compliance", with the directive that he forward to the
president's office the P55 Million in cash.

3) The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already
converted and misappropriated the P55 million when he delivered the
same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC.

It must be stressed that the MARCOS memorandum directed Tabuena "to
pay immediately the PNCC, through this office, the sum of 55M pesos"
Tabuena did exactly as the memorandum ordered, he was acting in good
faith when he delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez.

4) Even assuming that the sole purpose of the Marcos Memorandum was
for the personal benefit of those in power, still, no criminal
liability can be imputed to Tabuena

Why? For the very simple reason that no conspiracy was established
between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55 million.

5) Finally, the most compelling reason of all is the violation of the
accused's constitutional right to due process.

The court revealed its biased nature during its numerous questioning
over the witnesses (Monera, Peralta, and Tabuena), alarmingly even
exceeding the number of questions of the cross-examiner. In addition
the questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations
characteristic of probing, confrontation and insuation.

"A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses
as to create the impression that he is allied with the prosecution"