LOCAL AUTONOMY, DEVOLUTION & DECENTRALIZATION

G.R. No. 152774 May 27, 2004

THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor, HERMILANDO I.
MANDANAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary and Chairman of the Oversight
Committee on Devolution; HON. EMILIA BONCODIN, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in
the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos
(P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government
Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Background
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION." The program was established to "facilitate the
process of enhancing the capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the discharge of
the functions and services devolved to them by the National Government Agencies
concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code."
1
The Oversight Committee (referred
to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b) of
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to
formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective
implementation.
2
Further, to address the funding shortfalls of functions and services
devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program, the "Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization Fund" was created.
3
For 1998, the DBM was directed to set
aside an amount to be determined by the Oversight Committee based on the devolution
status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG.
4
The initial fund was to be sourced from
the available savings of the national government for CY 1998.
5
For 1999 and the
succeeding years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be
incorporated in the annual GAA.
6
The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue
the implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution
of said fund to the LGUs.
7

The LGSEF in the GAA of 1999
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the GAA of 1999, the program was
renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF).
Under said appropriations law, the amount ofP96,780,000,000 was allotted as the share of
the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title XXXVI A.
Internal Revenue Allotment of Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following proviso:
... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS (P5,000,000,000)
shall be earmarked for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund for the
funding requirements of projects and activities arising from the full and efficient
implementation of devolved functions and services of local government units
pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be released to the local
government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including
such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of
said fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be
prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution as constituted pursuant to
Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b) of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal Revenue
Allotment shall be released directly by the Department of Budget and
Management to the Local Government Units concerned.
On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo B. Zamora as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-
005 and OCD-99-006 entitled as follows:
OCD-99-005
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP5
BILLION CY 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION
FUND (LGSEF) AND REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA TO APPROVE SAID ALLOCATION
SCHEME.
OCD-99-006
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP4.0
BILLION OF THE 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION
FUND AND ITS CONCOMITANT GENERAL FRAMEWORK,
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE, AS PROMULGATED BY THE
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION.
OCD-99-003
RESOLUTION REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA TO APPROVE THE REQUEST OF THE OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION TO SET ASIDE TWENTY PERCENT
(20%) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND
(LGSEF) FOR LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROJECTS AND OTHER
PRIORITY INITIATIVES FOR LGUs INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPABILITY
BUILDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES
AND MECHANICS AS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMITTEE.
These OCD resolutions were approved by then President Estrada on October 6,
1999.
Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to Resolution No. OCD-99-005,
the five billion pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as follows:
1. The PhP4 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance with
the allocation scheme and implementing guidelines and mechanics
promulgated and adopted by the OCD. To wit:
a. The first PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in
accordance with the codal formula sharing scheme as
prescribed under the 1991 Local Government Code;
b. The second PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in
accordance with a modified 1992 cost of devolution fund
(CODEF) sharing scheme, as recommended by the respective
leagues of provinces, cities and municipalities to the OCD. The
modified CODEF sharing formula is as follows:
Province : 40%
Cities : 20%
Municipalities : 40%
This is applied to the P2 Billion after the approved amounts granted to
individual provinces, cities and municipalities as assistance to cover
decrease in 1999 IRA share due to reduction in land area have been
taken out.
2. The remaining PhP1 Billion of the LGSEF shall be earmarked to support local
affirmative action projects and other priority initiatives submitted by LGUs to the
Oversight Committee on Devolution for approval in accordance with its
prescribed guidelines as promulgated and adopted by the OCD.
In Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the Oversight Committee set aside the one billion pesos or
20% of the LGSEF to support Local Affirmative Action Projects (LAAPs) of LGUs. This
remaining amount was intended to "respond to the urgent need for additional funds
assistance, otherwise not available within the parameters of other existing fund sources."
For LGUs to be eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF, the
OCD promulgated the following:
III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY:
1. LGUs (province, city, municipality, or barangay), individually or by group or
multi-LGUs or leagues of LGUs, especially those belonging to the 5th and 6th
class, may access the fund to support any projects or activities that satisfy any of
the aforecited purposes. A barangay may also access this fund directly or through
their respective municipality or city.
2. The proposed project/activity should be need-based, a local priority, with high
development impact and are congruent with the socio-cultural, economic and
development agenda of the Estrada Administration, such as food security, poverty
alleviation, electrification, and peace and order, among others.
3. Eligible for funding under this fund are projects arising from, but not limited
to, the following areas of concern:
a. delivery of local health and sanitation services, hospital services and
other tertiary services;
b. delivery of social welfare services;
c. provision of socio-cultural services and facilities for youth and
community development;
d. provision of agricultural and on-site related research;
e. improvement of community-based forestry projects and other local
projects on environment and natural resources protection and
conservation;
f. improvement of tourism facilities and promotion of tourism;
g. peace and order and public safety;
h. construction, repair and maintenance of public works and
infrastructure, including public buildings and facilities for public use,
especially those destroyed or damaged by man-made or natural
calamities and disaster as well as facilities for water supply, flood
control and river dikes;
i. provision of local electrification facilities;
j. livelihood and food production services, facilities and equipment;
k. other projects that may be authorized by the OCD consistent with the
aforementioned objectives and guidelines;
4. Except on extremely meritorious cases, as may be determined by the Oversight
Committee on Devolution, this portion of the LGSEF shall not be used in
expenditures for personal costs or benefits under existing laws applicable to
governments. Generally, this fund shall cover the following objects of
expenditures for programs, projects and activities arising from the implementation
of devolved and regular functions and services:
a. acquisition/procurement of supplies and materials critical to the full
and effective implementation of devolved programs, projects and
activities;
b. repair and/or improvement of facilities;
c. repair and/or upgrading of equipment;
d. acquisition of basic equipment;
e. construction of additional or new facilities;
f. counterpart contribution to joint arrangements or collective projects
among groups of municipalities, cities and/or provinces related to
devolution and delivery of basic services.
5. To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group of LGU shall submit to the
Oversight Committee on Devolution through the Department of Interior and
Local Governments, within the prescribed schedule and timeframe, a Letter
Request for Funding Support from the Affirmative Action Program under the
LGSEF, duly signed by the concerned LGU(s) and endorsed by cooperators
and/or beneficiaries, as well as the duly signed Resolution of Endorsement by the
respective Sanggunian(s) of the LGUs concerned. The LGU-proponent shall also
be required to submit the Project Request (PR), using OCD Project Request Form
No. 99-02, that details the following:
(a) general description or brief of the project;
(b) objectives and justifications for undertaking the project, which
should highlight the benefits to the locality and the expected impact to
the local program/project arising from the full and efficient
implementation of social services and facilities, at the local levels;
(c) target outputs or key result areas;
(d) schedule of activities and details of requirements;
(e) total cost requirement of the project;
(f) proponent's counterpart funding share, if any, and identified source(s)
of counterpart funds for the full implementation of the project;
(g) requested amount of project cost to be covered by the LGSEF.
Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee as contained in
Attachment - Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the LGUs were required to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and submit
the project proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to the DILG for
appraisal. The project proposals that passed the DILG's appraisal would then be submitted
to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. Upon its approval, the
Oversight Committee would then serve notice to the DBM for the preparation of the
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect
the release of funds to the said LGUs.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2000
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the amount
of P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes.
As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000 contained a proviso earmarking five billion
pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special Provisions,
Title XXXVII A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as that contained in
the GAA of 1999.
The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-2000-023 dated June 22, 2000,
adopted the following allocation scheme governing the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2000:
1. The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be allocated to and shared by
the four levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays,
using the following percentage-sharing formula agreed upon and jointly endorsed
by the various Leagues of LGUs:
For Provinces 26% or P 910,000,000
For Cities 23% or 805,000,000
For Municipalities 35% or 1,225,000,000
For Barangays 16% or 560,000,000
Provided that the respective Leagues representing the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays shall draw up and adopt the horizontal
distribution/sharing schemes among the member LGUs whereby the Leagues
concerned may opt to adopt direct financial assistance or project-based
arrangement, such that the LGSEF allocation for individual LGU shall be released
directly to the LGU concerned;
Provided further that the individual LGSEF shares to LGUs are used in
accordance with the general purposes and guidelines promulgated by the OCD for
the implementation of the LGSEF at the local levels pursuant to Res. No. OCD-
99-006 dated October 7, 1999 and pursuant to the Leagues' guidelines and
mechanism as approved by the OCD;
Provided further that each of the Leagues shall submit to the OCD for its approval
their respective allocation scheme, the list of LGUs with the corresponding
LGSEF shares and the corresponding project categories if project-based;
Provided further that upon approval by the OCD, the lists of LGUs shall be
endorsed to the DBM as the basis for the preparation of the corresponding NCAs,
SAROs, and related budget/release documents.
2. The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be earmarked to
support the following initiatives and local affirmative action projects, to be
endorsed to and approved by the Oversight Committee on Devolution in
accordance with the OCD agreements, guidelines, procedures and documentary
requirements:
On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a Memorandum authorizing then
Executive Secretary Zamora and the DBM to implement and release the 2.5
billion pesos LGSEF for 2000 in accordance with Resolution No. OCD-2000-
023.
Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, promulgated Resolution No. OCD-2001-29 entitled
"ADOPTING RESOLUTION NO. OCD-2000-023 IN THE ALLOCATION,
IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE OF THE REMAINING P2.5 BILLION
LGSEF FOR CY 2000." Under this resolution, the amount of one billion pesos of
the LGSEF was to be released in accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution No.
OCD-2000-23, to complete the 3.5 billion pesos allocated to the LGUs, while the
amount of 1.5 billion pesos was allocated for the LAAP. However, out of the
latter amount, P400,000,000 was to be allocated and released as
follows: P50,000,000 as financial assistance to the LAAPs of
LGUs; P275,360,227 as financial assistance to cover the decrease in the IRA of
LGUs concerned due to reduction in land area; and P74,639,773 for the LGSEF
Capability-Building Fund.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2001
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations law for
2001, the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with the IRA of the
LGUs therein and the proviso earmarking five billion pesos thereof for the
LGSEF.
On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee adopted Resolution No. OCD-
2002-001 allocating the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2001 as follows:
Modified Codal Formula P 3.000 billion
Priority Projects 1.900 billion
Capability Building Fund .100 billion

P 5.000 billion
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF which is to be allocated
according to the modified codal formula shall be released to the four levels of LGUs, i.e.,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, as follows:
LGUs Percentage Amount
Provinces 25 P 0.750 billion
Cities 25 0.750
Municipalities 35 1.050
Barangays 15 0.450

100 P 3.000 billion
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for priority projects shall be
distributed according to the following criteria:
1.0 For projects of the 4th, 5th and 6th class LGUs; or
2.0 Projects in consonance with the President's State of the Nation Address
(SONA)/summit commitments.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million LGSEF capability building fund
shall be distributed in accordance with the recommendation of the Leagues of Provinces,
Cities, Municipalities and Barangays, and approved by the OCD.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the individual
members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-
2002-001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said
resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD-2002-001.
The Petitioner's Case
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the provisos
in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the
Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-
2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner
submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they
earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and
2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the "just share" of
the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be
"automatically and directly" released to them "without need of further action" are,
likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-billion-peso
portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the
implementing rules and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed
by the Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the
LGUs' share in the national taxes "shall be automatically released to them." The petitioner
maintains that the use of the word "shall" must be given a compulsory meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight
Committee with the authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF,
which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy
as embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. The petitioner
cites as an example the experience in 2001 when the release of the LGSEF was long
delayed because the Oversight Committee was not able to convene that year and no
guidelines were issued therefor. Further, the possible disapproval by the Oversight
Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would result in the diminution of the
latter's share in the IRA.
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions is the
improper amendment to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on the
percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs. Said provision allocates the IRA as
follows: Provinces 23%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 34%; and Barangays
20%.
8
This formula has been improperly amended or modified, with respect to the five-
billion-peso portion of the IRA allotted for the LGSEF, by the assailed OCD resolutions as
they invariably provided for a different sharing scheme.
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by the executive branch of a
substantive law. Moreover, the petitioner mentions that in the Letter dated December 5,
2001 of respondent Executive Secretary Romulo addressed to respondent Secretary
Boncodin, the former endorsed to the latter the release of funds to certain LGUs from the
LGSEF in accordance with the handwritten instructions of President Arroyo. Thus, the
LGUs are at a loss as to how a portion of the LGSEF is actually allocated. Further, there
are still portions of the LGSEF that, to date, have not been received by the petitioner;
hence, resulting in damage and injury to the petitioner.
The petitioner prays that the Court declare as unconstitutional and void the assailed
provisos relating to the LGSEF in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed OCD
resolutions (Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023,
OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001) issued by the Oversight Committee pursuant thereto.
The petitioner, likewise, prays that the Court direct the respondents to rectify the unlawful
and illegal distribution and releases of the LGSEF for the aforementioned years and release
the same in accordance with the sharing formula under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Finally, the petitioner urges the Court to declare that the entire
IRA should be released automatically without further action by the LGUs as required by
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Respondents' Arguments
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to dismiss the
petition on procedural and substantive grounds. On the latter, the respondents contend that
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed resolutions
issued by the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally infirm. The respondents
advance the view that Section 6, Article X of the Constitution does not specify that the
"just share" of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the Local Government Code of
1991. Moreover, the phrase "as determined by law" in the same constitutional provision
means that there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the
"just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. In other words, Congress is the arbiter of
what should be the "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes.
The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was not intended
to be a fixed determination of their "just share" in the national taxes. Congress may enact
other laws, including appropriations laws such as the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
providing for a different sharing formula. Section 285 of the Local Government Code of
1991 was merely intended to be the "default share" of the LGUs to do away with the need
to determine annually by law their "just share." However, the LGUs have no vested right
in a permanent or fixed percentage as Congress may increase or decrease the "just share"
of the LGUs in accordance with what it believes is appropriate for their operation. There is
nothing in the Constitution which prohibits Congress from making such determination
through the appropriations laws. If the provisions of a particular statute, the GAA in this
case, are within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact, they should be
sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of their enactment.
On procedural grounds, the respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition outright as
the same is defective. The petition allegedly raises factual issues which should be properly
threshed out in the lower courts, not this Court, not being a trier of facts. Specifically, the
petitioner's allegation that there are portions of the LGSEF that it has not, to date, received,
thereby causing it (the petitioner) injury and damage, is subject to proof and must be
substantiated in the proper venue, i.e., the lower courts.
Further, according to the respondents, the petition has already been rendered moot and
academic as it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. The IRAs for the years 1999,
2000 and 2001, have already been released and the government is now operating under the
2003 budget. In support of this, the respondents submitted certifications issued by officers
of the DBM attesting to the release of the allocation or shares of the petitioner in the
LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001. There is, therefore, nothing more to prohibit.
Finally, the petitioner allegedly has no legal standing to bring the suit because it has not
suffered any injury. In fact, the petitioner's "just share" has even increased. Pursuant to
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the share of the provinces is 23%.
OCD Nos. 99-005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the provinces 40% of P2 billion of the
LGSEF. OCD Nos. 2000-023 and 2001-029 apportioned 26% of P3.5 billion to the
provinces. On the other hand, OCD No. 2001-001 allocated 25% of P3 billion to the
provinces. Thus, the petitioner has not suffered any injury in the implementation of the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions.
The Ruling of the Court Procedural Issues
Before resolving the petition on its merits, the Court shall first rule on the following
procedural issues raised by the respondents: (1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or
locus standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the petition involves factual questions that
are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the issue had been rendered
moot and academic.
The petitioner has locus standi to maintain the present suit
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
9
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear
that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
10

The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present
suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an
interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs' share in the
national taxes or the IRA. The petitioner's constitutional claim is, in substance, that the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the "automatic release" to
the LGUs of their share in the national taxes. Further, the injury that the petitioner claims
to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the assailed
measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the
validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions as the petitioner clearly has "a plain, direct and adequate interest" in the
manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.
The petition involves a significant legal issue
The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs
of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991. This is undoubtedly a legal question. On the other hand, the
following facts are not disputed:
1. The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF in the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted budget for 2001;
2. The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions providing for the allocation
schemes covering the said five billion pesos and the implementing rules and
regulations therefor; and
3. The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their compliance with the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms,
prescribed by the Oversight Committee.
Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal question now before
this Court, are no longer in issue, the same need not be determined by a trial court.
11
In any
case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction
over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary
jurisdiction.
12

The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the "transcendental
importance" of the case, as it necessarily involves the application of the constitutional
principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy,
therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the
case forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved notwithstanding the supervening events
Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the resolution of the case had
already been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including the LGSEF, for 1999,
2000 and 2001, had already been released and the government is now operating under a
new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for this Court to resolve the
substantive issue raised by the instant petition. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation
of the Constitution.
13
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
14

Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before
it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."
15
For the GAAs in the coming years may
contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question
may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a
categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.
Substantive Issue
As earlier intimated, the resolution of the substantive legal issue in this case calls for the
application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local
autonomy.
16
In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly adopted as a policy
that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and
promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Section 2 thereof reiterates the State policy in this wise:
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President's
power over the LGUs to one of general supervision.
17
This provision has been interpreted
to exclude the power of control. The distinction between the two powers was enunciated in
Drilon v. Lim:
18

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
19

The Local Government Code of 1991
20
was enacted to flesh out the mandate of the
Constitution.
21
The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2 thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units.
Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding year the amount of
five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated
pursuant thereto, transgress the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions
violate the constitutional precept on local autonomy
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall
have a "just share" in the national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be determined by law;
and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions, underscores the
automatic release of the LGUs' "just share" in this wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government units shall have the
power and authority to establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient
and effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives and
priorities; to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which
shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by
them;to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly
released to them without need of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit shall
be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal
or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the
end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local government
units under existing laws.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "automatic" as "involuntary either
wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex
nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton." Further, the
word "automatically" is defined as "in an automatic manner: without thought or conscious
intention." Being "automatic," thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory. As such, the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the "just
share" accruing to them from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local
Government Code of 1991, the "just share" of the LGUs shall be released to them "without
need of further action." Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr. v.
Aguirre,
22
viz:
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy
is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further
that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after
every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "SHALL"
is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is,
therefore, IMPERATIVE.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10
percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is
equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often
temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government
does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of
national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the
President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs' IRA, but the
rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters
of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal
methods.
23

The "just share" of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the appropriations law or GAA
enacted by Congress annually. Under the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos was earmarked for the
LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that "such amount shall be released to
the local government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including
such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said fund
among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the
Oversight Committee on Devolution." Pursuant thereto, the Oversight Committee, through
the assailed OCD resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF such that:
For 1999
P2 billion - allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC
P2 billion - Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 40%;
Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%)
P1 billion projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.
24

For 2000
P3.5 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 26%;
Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 16%);
P1.5 billion projects (LAAP) approved by the OCD.
25

For 2001
P3 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 25%;
Cities 25%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 15%)
P1.9 billion priority projects
P100 million capability building fund.
26

Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight
Committee's prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated for
various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999;P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2 billion for
2001), the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down
guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of
funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding based on the criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee;
(b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project
proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight
Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon approval thereof that the
Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for the projects.
To the Court's mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF
is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the
LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the
release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that
the "just share" of the LGUs "shall be automatically released to them." The LGUs are,
thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is
obeyed.
27
Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the use of the word "shall"
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
28

Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution
and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and subversive of the
principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. Moreover, it finds no
statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee was created merely to formulate the rules
and regulations for the efficient and effective implementation of the Local Government
Code of 1991 to ensure "compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined
under the Constitution."
29
In fact, its creation was placed under the title of "Transitory
Provisions," signifying its ad hoc character. According to Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
the principal author and sponsor of the bill that eventually became Rep. Act No. 7160, the
Committee's work was supposed to be done a year from the approval of the Code, or on
October 10, 1992.
30
The Oversight Committee's authority is undoubtedly limited to the
implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the
same. Neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and promote
local autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion below between Messrs. Jose N.
Nolledo and Regalado M. Maambong, then members of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, to wit:
MR. MAAMBONG. Unfortunately, under Section 198 of the Local Government Code, the
existence of subprovinces is still acknowledged by the law, but the statement of the
Gentleman on this point will have to be taken up probably by the Committee on
Legislation. A second point, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that under Article 2, Section 10 of
the 1973 Constitution, we have a provision which states:
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially
the barrio, to insure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
This provision no longer appears in the present configuration; does this mean that the
concept of giving local autonomy to local governments is no longer adopted as far as this
Article is concerned?
MR. NOLLEDO. No. In the report of the Committee on Preamble, National Territory, and
Declaration of Principles, that concept is included and widened upon the initiative of
Commissioner Bennagen.
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you for that.
With regard to Section 6, sources of revenue, the creation of sources as provided by
previous law was "subject to limitations as may be provided by law," but now, we are
using the term "subject to such guidelines as may be fixed by law." In Section 7, mention
is made about the "unique, distinct and exclusive charges and contributions," and in
Section 8, we talk about "exclusivity of local taxes and the share in the national wealth."
Incidentally, I was one of the authors of this provision, and I am very thankful. Does this
indicate local autonomy, or was the wording of the law changed to give more autonomy to
the local government units?
31

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. In effect, those words indicate also "decentralization" because local
political units can collect taxes, fees and charges subject merely to guidelines, as
recommended by the league of governors and city mayors, with whom I had a dialogue for
almost two hours. They told me that limitations may be questionable in the sense that
Congress may limit and in effect deny the right later on.
MR. MAAMBONG. Also, this provision on "automatic release of national tax share"
points to more local autonomy. Is this the intention?
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, the Commissioner is perfectly right.
32

The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
33
in this wise:
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy 'means a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.'
The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national administration
but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable'
and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same
time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables
it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision' over
them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.' He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization
of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
34

Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. The fairly recent case
of Pimentel v. Aguirre
35
is particularly instructive. The Court declared therein that local
fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities:
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy
in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means
that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as
the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to
the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not ...
36

Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.
37

Following this ratiocination, the Court in Pimentel struck down as unconstitutional Section
4 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 372 which ordered the withholding, effective
January 1, 1998, of ten percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation
by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a "withholding" of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold the
distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed
by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down. They
cannot, therefore, be upheld.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot amend
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991
Section 284
38
of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third year of its
effectivity, the LGUs' share in the national internal revenue taxes shall be 40%. This
percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except "in the event the national government
incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon compliance with stringent
requirements set forth in the same section:
Sec. 284. ...
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon recommendation
of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of
Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in
the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of the national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year; Provided, further That in the first
year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the
thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment which shall include the cost of devolved
functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the
cost of devolved personnel services.
Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception to the mandatory automatic
release of the LGUs' IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current
fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in
which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the
collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly
basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter
of the current fiscal year. In the instant case, however, there is no allegation that the
national internal revenue tax collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have
fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal years.
Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs:
Sec. 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. The share of local government units in
the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner:
(a) Provinces Twenty-three (23%)
(b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities Thirty-four (34%); and
(d) Barangays Twenty percent (20%).
However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion pesos
LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in the GAAs
of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different sharing scheme. For example, for
1999, P2 billion of the LGSEF was allocated as follows: Provinces 40%; Cities 20%;
Municipalities 40%.
39
For 2000, P3.5 billion of the LGSEF was allocated in this manner:
Provinces 26%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 26%.
40
For 2001, P3
billion of the LGSEF was allocated, thus: Provinces 25%; Cities 25%; Municipalities
35%; Barangays 15%.
41

The respondents argue that this modification is allowed since the Constitution does not
specify that the "just share" of the LGUs shall only be determined by the Local
Government Code of 1991. That it is within the power of Congress to enact other laws,
including the GAAs, to increase or decrease the "just share" of the LGUs. This contention
is untenable. The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is
conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local Government Code of 1991
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot
include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a
separate legislation.
42

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to
specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit.
43
Any
provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an "inappropriate
provision." The category of "inappropriate provisions" includes unconstitutional provisions
and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of
laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
44

Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage sharing
therein, which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters of general and
substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs, as
the respondents contend, would be to give Congress the unbridled authority to unduly
infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year.
This, the Court cannot sanction.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that, unlike those of 1999, 2000 and 2001, the
GAAs of 2002 and 2003 do not contain provisos similar to the herein assailed provisos. In
other words, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 have not earmarked any amount of the IRA for
the LGSEF. Congress had perhaps seen fit to discontinue the practice as it recognizes its
infirmity. Nonetheless, as earlier mentioned, this Court has deemed it necessary to make a
definitive ruling on the matter in order to prevent its recurrence in future appropriations
laws and that the principles enunciated herein would serve to guide the bench, bar and
public.
Conclusion
In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly
expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of the
century when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission dated April 7, 1900, ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in
the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the
Islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to
manage their own affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the
least degree of supervision and control in which a careful study of their capacities and
observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance
of law, order and loyalty."
45
While the 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local
autonomy, nonetheless, it limited the executive power over local governments to "general
supervision ... as may be provided by law."
46
Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution
explicitly stated that "[t]he State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities."
47
An entire article on Local Government was incorporated therein.
The present Constitution, as earlier opined, has broadened the principle of local autonomy.
The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly increased the powers of the local
governments in order to accomplish the goal of a more meaningful local autonomy.
Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the
degree of autonomy that they enjoy.
48
As eloquently put by
M. De Tocqueville, a distinguished French political writer, "[l]ocal assemblies of citizens
constitute the strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary
schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach; they teach men how to use
and enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free governments but without the spirit of
municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty."
49

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are
based.
50

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General
Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149848 November 25, 2004
ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET
and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.


D E C I S I O N


TINGA, J .:
At stake in the present case is the fate of regional autonomy for Muslim Mindanao which
is the epoch-making, Constitution-based project for achieving national unity in diversity.
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
1
(Petition) are the
constitutionality and validity of Republic Act No. 8999 (R.A. 8999),
2
entitled "An Act
Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur
and Appropriating Funds Therefor," and Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Department Order No. 119 (D.O. 119)
3
on the subject, "Creation of Marawi Sub-
District Engineering Office."
The Background
The uncontested legal and factual antecedents of the case follow.
For the first time in its history after three Constitutions, the Philippines ordained the
establishment of regional autonomy with the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sections
1
4
and 15, Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras. Section 15 specifically provides that "[t]here shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." To effectuate this mandate, the Charter
devotes a number of provisions under Article X.
5

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled "An
Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," was
enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a
plebiscite in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga.
6
In
the ensuing plebiscite held on 19 November 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for the
creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).
7
The law contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government.
8

In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12 October
1990, Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426), entitled "Placing the Control and Supervision
of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other
purposes." Sections 1 to 3
9
of the Executive Order are its operative provisions.
ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon C. Aquino flew
to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the inauguration. At that point, she
had already signed seven (7) Executive Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of seven
(7) cabinet departments, namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment; (3)
science and technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social welfare and
development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources.
10

Nearly nine (9) years later, on 20 May 1999, then Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 which reads, thus:
Subject: Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
Pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of Executive Order No. 124 dated 30 January 1987,
there is hereby created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which
shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under
the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. The
headquarters of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office shall be at the former
quarters of the Marawi City Engineering Office.
Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall be made
up of employees of the National Government Section of the former Marawi City
Engineering Office who are now assigned with the Iligan City Sub-District
Engineering Office as may be determined by the DPWH Region XII Regional
Director. (Emphasis supplied)
Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then President Joseph E. Estrada approved
and signed into law R.A. 8999. The text of the law reads:
AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING DISTRICT IN THE FIRST
DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. The City of Marawi and the municipalities comprising the First
District of the Province of Lanao del Sur are hereby constituted into an
engineering district to be known as the First Engineering District of the Province
of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 2. The office of the engineering district hereby created shall be established
in Marawi City, Province of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be
included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment
into law. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the maintenance and
continued operation of the engineering district office shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled "An Act to Strengthen
and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending
for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended." Like its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains
detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the retained areas of
governance of the National Government.
11

R.A. 9054 lapsed into law
12
on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a plebiscite held on 14
August 2001. The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM
on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM
Organic Acts.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir M.
Dimalotang (Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH Secretary Simeon A.
Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A.
8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition.
13

Consequently, petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their
capacity as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First
Engineering District of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-ARMM) in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to
prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and
releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to
the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH;
and (3) to compel the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to
release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi City and the First District
of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only;
and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional
area.
14

The petition includes an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin respondent
DBM Secretary from releasing funds for public works projects in Lanao del Sur to entities
other than the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, and also to
restrain the DPWH Secretary from allowing others besides the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement public works projects in Lanao del
Sur.
15

To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out
that the challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
16

Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently
and thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995)
from which the law originated is questionable. Petitioners assert as well that prior to the
sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was
made. The House Committee on Public Works and Highways (Committee) failed to invite
a single official from the affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the law was
skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph E. Estrada during the pendency of
the impeachment proceedings.
17

In its resolution of 8 October 2001, the Court required respondents to file their
comment.
18
In compliance, respondents DPWH Secretary and DBM Secretary, through the
Solicitor General, filed on 7 January 2002, their Comment.
In their Comment,
19
respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain the
validity of D.O. 119, arguing that it was issued in accordance with Executive Order No.
124 (E.O. 124).
20
In defense of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that the
powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of
Congress.
21
Respondents also contend that the petitioners have no locus standi or legal
standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that
petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
22

Asserting their locus standi, petitioners in their Memorandum
23
point out that they will
suffer actual injury as a result of the enactments complained of.
24

Jurisdictional Considerations
First, the jurisdictional predicates.
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the
political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.
25

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power:
First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the
person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
26

In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on the ground that
they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. As
held in Taada v. Angara,
27
"where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute." But in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition
questioning acts of the political departments of government, the Court will not review the
wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only on either of two
grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
28

For an abuse to be grave, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when
respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
29

The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal standing or locus
standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the decree, as distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.
30

A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that
the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected
to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
31

But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it
does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved.
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
32

In the instant case, petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. When he
filed this petition, he was the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the District Engineer of the First
Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, petitioner
Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of the rank and file employees also of the First
Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty
and responsibility of supervising and implementing all public works projects to be
undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction.
33

It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering
District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and
responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have
apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of
being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and
substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A.
8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the
validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
Points of Contention
In the petition before us, petitioners contend that R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are
unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree in part.
Republic Act No. 8999
At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999
unconstitutional for the adjudication of this case. The accepted rule is that the Court will
not resolve a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can
be disposed of or settled on other grounds.
34

The plain truth is the challenged law never became operative and was superseded or
repealed by a subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they
are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they
enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite.
35
Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an
ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to
a plebiscite.
We quote excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the reason I am bringing this up. This thing involves
some rather far-reaching consequences also in relation to the issue raised by
Commissioner Romulo with respect to federalism. Are we, in effect, creating new
categories of laws? Generally, we have statutes and constitutional provisions. Is
this organic act equivalent to a constitutional provision? If it is going to be
equivalent to a constitutional provision, it would seem to me that the formulation
of the provisions of the organic act will have to be done by the legislature, acting
as a constituent assembly, and therefore, subject to the provisions of the Article
on Amendments. That is the point that I am trying to bring up. In effect, if we opt
for federalism, it would really involve an act of the National Assembly or
Congress acting as a constituent assembly and present amendments to this
Constitution, and the end product itself would be a constitutional provision which
would only be amendable according to the processes indicated in the Constitution.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I express my personal opinion in this respect.
I think to require Congress to act as a constituent body before enacting an organic
act would be to raise an autonomous region to the same level as the sovereign
people of the whole country. And I think the powers of the Congress should be
quite sufficient in enacting a law, even if it is now exalted to the level of an
organic act for the purpose of providing a basic law for an autonomous region
without having to transform itself into a constituent assembly. We are dealing still
with one subordinate subdivision of the State even if it is now vested with certain
autonomous powers on which its own legislature can pass laws.
FR. BERNAS. So the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic
act are: What segment of the population will participate in the plebiscite? In what
capacity would the legislature be acting when it passes this? Will it be a
constituent assembly or merely a legislative body? What is the nature, therefore,
of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if
we are going to amend this organic act, what process will be followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing
in our report.
First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the regions should
be allowed to participate in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the
character of a charter passed by the Congress, not as a constituent assembly, but
as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the organic act will still be subject to
amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now constituted, unless the
Gentlemen has another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again.
MR. NOLLEDO. Those who will participate in the plebiscite are those who are
directly affected, the inhabitants of the units constitutive of the region. (Emphasis
supplied)
36

Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite
requirement.
37
In fact, R.A. 9054 itself, being the second or later ARMM Organic Act, was
subjected to and ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the
functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City
at the time)
38
to the Regional Government. By creating an office with previously devolved
functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should
therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it could validly take
effect. Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become
operative.
From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a
statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Of course, the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest.
39
Implied repeal by
irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject
matter; they are clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be
enforced without nullifying the other.
40

The Court has also held that statutes should be construed in light of the objective to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits
intended.
41

R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of
autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and
Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A.
8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over
infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A.
9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic
Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the
regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution.
On the other hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of
regional autonomy.
Regional Autonomy Under
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer
to the cry for a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy.
42
According to Commissioner
Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the Committee which drafted the provisions, it "is an
indictment against the status quo of a unitary system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied
the hands of progress in our country . . . our varying regional characteristics are factors to
capitalize on to attain national strength through decentralization."
43

The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the
separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.
44
These cultures,
as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.
45

Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society
of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist approach.
46
Policies emanating from
the legislature are invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for
minority representation. As a result, democracy becomes an irony to the minority group.
47

Several commissioners echoed the pervasive sentiment in the plenary sessions in their own
inimitable way. Thus, Commissioner Blas Ople referred to the recognition that the Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras "do not belong to the dominant national community" as the
justification for conferring on them a "measure of legal self-sufficiency, meaning self-
government, so that they will flourish politically, economically and culturally," with the
hope that after achieving parity with the rest of the country they would "give up their own
autonomous region in favor of joining the national mainstream."
48
For his part, the Muslim
delegate, Commissioner Ahmad Alonto, spoke of the diversity of cultures as the
framework for nation-building.
49
Finally, excerpts of the poignant plea of Commissioner
Ponciano Bennagen deserve to be quoted verbatim:
. . . They see regional autonomy as the answer to their centuries of struggle
against oppression and exploitation. For so long, their names and identities have
been debased. Their ancestral lands have been ransacked for their treasures, for
their wealth. Their cultures have been defiled, their very lives threatened, and
worse, extinguished, all in the name of national development; all in the name of
public interest; all in the name of common good; all in the name of the right to
property; all in the name of Regalian Doctrine; all in the name of national
security. These phrases have meant nothing to our indigenous communities,
except for the violation of their human rights.
. . .
Honorable Commissioners, we wish to impress upon you the gravity of the
decision to be made by every single one of us in this Commission. We have the
overwhelming support of the Bangsa Moro and the Cordillera Constitution. By
this we mean meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. We propose that we
have a separate Article on the autonomous regions for the Bangsa Moro and
Cordillera people clearly spelled out in this Constitution, instead of prolonging
the agony of their vigil and their struggle. This, too is a plea for national peace.
Let us not pass the buck to the Congress to decide on this. Let us not wash our
hands of our responsibility to attain national unity and peace and to settle this
problem and rectify past injustices, once and for all.
50

The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and
the Cordillera people who have been fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights their
unique cultures and the unresponsiveness of the unitary system to their aspirations.
51
The
Moros' struggle for self-determination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the
Philippines. Even at present, the struggle goes on.
52

Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace and
order problems and secessionist movements. Parenthetically, autonomy, decentralization
and regionalization, in international law, have become politically acceptable answers to
intractable problems of nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict and threat of secession.
53

However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a
sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines."
54

Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government
unit vis--vis the central government.
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as a right to
political separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations between a
certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the right of peoples to the necessary
level of autonomy that would guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the
establishment of priorities by the community's internal decision-making processes and the
management of collective matters by themselves.
55

If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself reflecting a preference for homogeneous,
independent nation-states, it is incapable of universal application without massive
disruption. However, if self-determination is viewed as a means to an endthat end being
a democratic, participatory political and economic system in which the rights of
individuals and the identity of minority communities are protectedits continuing validity
is more easily perceived.
56

Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the
people of a particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central
government.
57

The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common
tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and
heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved
through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member communities
who choose their own authorities from within the community and exercise the
jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs.
58

In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means
for national integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their
trust in the government and pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the
development programs in the region.
59
Again, even a glimpse of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission could lend a sense of the urgency and the inexorable appeal of
true decentralization:
MR. OPLE. . . . We are writing a Constitution, of course, for generations to come,
not only for the present but for our posterity. There is no harm in recognizing
certain vital pragmatic needs for national peace and solidarity, and the writing of
this Constitution just happens at a time when it is possible for this Commission to
help the cause of peace and reconciliation in Mindanao and the Cordilleras, by
taking advantage of a heaven-sent opportunity. . . .
60

. . .
MR. ABUBAKAR. . . . So in order to foreclose and convince the rest of the of the
Philippines that Mindanao autonomy will be granted to them as soon as possible,
more or less, to dissuade these armed men from going outside while Mindanao
will be under the control of the national government, let us establish an
autonomous Mindanao within our effort and capacity to do so within the shortest
possible time. This will be an answer to the Misuari clamor, not only for
autonomy but for independence.
61

. . .
MR. OPLE. . . . The reason for this abbreviation of the period for the
consideration of the Congress of the organic acts and their passage is that we live
in abnormal times. In the case of Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, we know
that we deal with questions of war and peace. These are momentous issues in
which the territorial integrity and the solidarity of this country are being put at
stake, in a manner of speaking.
We are writing a peace Constitution. We hope that the Article on Social Justice
can contribute to a climate of peace so that any civil strife in the countryside can
be more quickly and more justly resolved. We are providing for autonomous
regions so that we give constitutional permanence to the just demands and
grievances of our own fellow countrymen in the Cordilleras and in Mindanao.
One hundred thousand lives were lost in that struggle in Mindanao, and to this
day, the Cordilleras is being shaken by an armed struggle as well as a peaceful
and militant struggle.
. . .
Rather than give opportunity to foreign bodies, no matter how sympathetic to the
Philippines, to contribute to the settlement of this issue, I think the Constitutional
Commission ought not to forego the opportunity to put the stamp of this
Commission through definitive action on the settlement of the problems that have
nagged us and our forefathers for so long.
62

A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.
63

Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates,
whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It
involves decision-making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a
larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments.
Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that
have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the
central government.
64

Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is
administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority
and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. This mode of
decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization.
65

Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of
powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the
central government to local government units.
66
This is a more liberal form of
decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities.
67
It aims to
grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of their right to self-
government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.
68

This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy in Limbona v. Mangelin,
69
thus:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them,
but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.
In the case, the Court reviewed the expulsion of a member from the Sangguniang
Pampook, Autonomous Region. It held that the Court may assume jurisdiction as the local
government unit, organized before 1987, enjoys autonomy of the former category. It
refused, though, to resolve whether the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the
1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere
administration.
70

A year later, in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit,
71
the Court, with the
same composition, ruled without any dissent that the creation of autonomous regions
contemplates the grant of political autonomyan autonomy which is greater than the
administrative autonomy granted to local government units. It held that "the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution (Art. X, Sec. 2) refers to administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions."
72

And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean "meaningful and authentic
regional autonomy."
73
As articulated by a Muslim author, substantial and meaningful
autonomy is "the kind of local self-government which allows the people of the region or
area the power to determine what is best for their growth and development without undue
interference or dictation from the central government."
74

To this end, Section 16, Article X
75
limits the power of the President over autonomous
regions.
76
In essence, the provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous
regions.
77
Consequently, Congress will have to re-examine national laws and make sure
that they reflect the Constitution's adherence to local autonomy. And in case of conflicts,
the underlying spirit which should guide its resolution is the Constitution's desire for
genuine local autonomy.
78

The diminution of Congress' powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v.
Court of Appeals,
79
wherein this Court held that "the omission (of "as may be provided by
law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from
Congress and to break Congress' 'control' over local government affairs."
This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers, as specified in
Sections 18 and 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are
powers over certain areas. Worthy of note is that the area of public works is not excluded
and neither is it reserved for the National Government. The key provisions read, thus:
SEC. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees
from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of
the Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of general
welfare of the people of the region. (Emphasis supplied)
E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government (ARG). Sections 1 and 2 of E.O. 426 provide:
SECTION 1. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) within the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) including their functions, powers and
responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, budgets and liabilities are
hereby placed under the control and supervision of the Autonomous Regional
Government.
In particular, these offices are identified as the four (4) District Engineering
Offices (DEO) in each of the four provinces respectively and the three (3) Area
Equipment Services (AES) located in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu and Maguindanao
(Municipality of Sultan Kudarat).
SEC. 2. Functions Transferred. The Autonomous Regional Government shall be
responsible for highways, flood control and water resource development systems, and
other public works within the ARMM and shall exercise the following functions:
1. Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and works
supervision for the infrastructure projects whose location and impact are confined
within the ARMM;
2. Undertake the maintenance of infrastructure facilities within the ARMM and
supervise the maintenance of such local roads and other infrastructure facilities
receiving financial assistance from the National Government;
3. Ensure the implementation of laws, policies, programs, rules and regulations
regarding infrastructure projects as well as all public and private physical
structures within the ARMM;
4. Provide technical assistance related to their functions to other agencies within
the ARMM, especially the local government units;
5. Coordinate with other national and regional government departments, agencies,
institutions and organizations, especially the local government units within the
ARMM in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects;
6. Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take appropriate
measures to make the services of the Autonomous Regional Government
responsive to the needs of the general public and recommend such appropriate
actions as may be necessary; and
7. Perform such other related duties and responsibilities within the ARMM as
may be assigned or delegated by the Regional Governor or as may be provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the
administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the
ARG. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 provides:
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SEC. 20. Annual Budget and Infrastructure Funds. The annual budget
of the Regional Government shall be enacted by Regional Assembly.
Funds for infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the
central government or national government shall be appropriated through
a Regional Assembly Public Works Act.
Unless approved by the Regional Assembly, no public works funds
allocated by the central government or national government for the
Regional Government or allocated by the Regional Government from its
own revenues may be disbursed, distributed, realigned, or used in any
manner.
The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples, the people of
Muslim Mindanao in this case, the right to self-determinationa right to choose
their own path of development; the right to determine the political, cultural and
economic content of their development path within the framework of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic.
80
Self-
determination refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the
autonomous peoples' uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for self-
expression and self-construction.
81

In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be
given freedom and independence with minimum interference from the National
Government. This necessarily includes the freedom to decide on, build, supervise
and maintain the public works and infrastructure projects within the autonomous
region. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM
and transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and
funds to the ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered. This
unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus, reached at the
Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the
centrality of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for
Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this
country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National
Government takes control again. The hands, once more, of the autonomous
peoples are reined in and tied up.
The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue
of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices
of the DPWH within the ARMM, including their functions, powers and
responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG.
Among its other functions, the DPWH-ARMM, under the control of the Regional
Government shall be responsible for highways, flood control and water resource
development systems, and other public works within the ARMM. Its scope of
power includes the planning, design, construction and supervision of public
works. According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional Government enables it
to appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for the region
by the central government.
The use of the word "powers" in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable case of
devolution.
In this regard, it is not amiss to cite Opinion No. 120, S. 1991
82
of the Secretary of
Justice on whether the national departments or their counterpart departments in
the ARG are responsible for implementation of roads, rural water supply, health,
education, women in development, agricultural extension and watershed
management. Referring to Section 2, Article V of R.A. 6734 which enumerates
the powers of the ARG, he states:
It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for the areas of
executive power mentioned therein, all other such areas shall be exercised by the
Autonomous Regional Government ("ARG") of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. It is noted that programs relative to infrastructure facilities,
health, education, women in development, agricultural extension and watershed
management do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the
abovequoted provision of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these
spheres of executive responsibility have been transferred to the ARG.
Reinforcing the aboveview (sic) are the various executive orders issued by the
President providing for the devolution of the powers and functions of specified
executive departments of the National Government to the ARG. These are E.O.
Nos. 425 (Department of Labor and Employment, Local Government, Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources, Social Welfare and Development and
Science and Technology), 426 (Department of Public Works and Highways), 459
(Department of Education, Culture and Sports) and 460 (Department of
Agriculture). The execution of projects on infrastructure, education, women,
agricultural extension and watershed management within the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao normally fall within the responsibility of one of the
aforementioned executive departments of the National Government, but by virtue
of the aforestated EOs, such responsibility has been transferred to the ARG.
E.O. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act, R.A.
6734the validity of which this Court upheld in the case of Abbas v. Commission on
Elections.
83
In Section 4, Article XVIII of said Act, "central government or national
government offices and agencies in the autonomous region which are not excluded under
Section 3, Article IV
84
of this Organic Act, shall be placed under the control and
supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the
oversight committee."
Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national
government to the autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy.
The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic
Acts and results in the recall of powers which have previously been handed over. This
should not be sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts' desire for greater autonomy for the
ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears stressing that
national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the
autonomy of autonomous regions. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional autonomy illusory
with respect to infrastructure projects. The Congressional Record shows, on the other
hand, that the "lack of an implementing and monitoring body within the area" has hindered
the speedy implementation, of infrastructure projects.
85
Apparently, in the legislature's
estimation, the existing DPWH-ARMM engineering districts failed to measure up to the
task. But if it was indeed the case, the problem could not be solved through the simple
legislative creation of an incongruous engineering district for the central government in the
ARMM. As it was, House Bill No. 995 which ultimately became R.A. 8999 was passed in
record time on second reading (not more than 10 minutes), absolutely without the usual
sponsorship speech and debates.
86
The precipitate speed which characterized the passage of
R.A. 8999 is difficult to comprehend since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in the
amendment of the first ARMM Organic Act and, therefore, could not take effect without
first being ratified in a plebiscite. What is more baffling is that in March 2001, or barely
two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in January 2001, Congress passed R.A. 9054,
the second ARMM Organic Act, where it reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in
ARMM, including Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, to the Regional Government and
effectively repealed R.A. 8999.
DPWH Department Order No. 119
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions
of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated the
creation of the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region
87
and which defined the basic
structure of the autonomous government.
88
E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of
the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the
four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi.
89
Accordingly, the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur
has jurisdiction over the public works within the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of
the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of
E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously
devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O.
426. The DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of power
the Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed and approved
by President Aquino in her residual legislative powersis of no moment. It is a finely-
imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a
general one.
90
Lex specialis derogant generali. As this Court expressed in the case of
Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
91
"another basic principle of statutory
construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the
same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that
where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefor specially should prevail."
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and
supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124
should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect
superseded E.O. 124. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different
vintages, the later enactment prevails because it is the later legislative will.
92

Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that "all laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic
Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly."
93
With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is
the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus
officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Grave abuse of discretion
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A.
8999 despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the
DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has
been rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however, cannot uphold
petitioners' argument that R.A. 8999 was signed into law under suspicious circumstances
to support the assertion that there was a capricious and whimsical exercise of legislative
authority. Once more, this Court cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or
expediency of the acts of the legislative branch.
Likewise, the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing with the affected agency
during the inception of the law does not render the law infirm. This Court holds that the
Congress did not transgress the Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to
invite a resource person from the DPWH-ARMM during the Committee meeting. Section
27, Rule VII of the Rules of the House
94
only requires that a written notice be given to all
the members of a Committee seven (7) calendar days before a regularly scheduled
meeting, specifying the subject matter of the meeting and the names of the invited resource
persons. And it must be emphasized that the questions of who to invite and whether there
is a need to invite resource persons during Committee meetings should be addressed solely
to Congress in its plenary legislative powers.
95

Conclusion
The repeal of R.A. 8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119 provide the necessary
basis for the grant of the writs of certiorari and prohibition sought by the petitioners.
However, there is no similar basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent DBM Secretary to release funds appropriated for public works projects in
Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to allow the DPWH-ARMM, First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects within its
jurisdictional area. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly provides that "(f)unds for
infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central government or national
government shall only be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act"
passed by the Regional Assembly. There is no showing that such Regional Assembly
Public Works Act has been enacted.
WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No. 8999
and rendered DPWH Department Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it
seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of
prohibition ISSUE commanding respondents to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and
D.O. 119, and maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the
First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi
and the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur. However, the petition
insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against respondents is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Acting C.J.), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Corona, J., on leave.

G.R. No. 170626 March 3, 2008
THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS,
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA
represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS, MARIO
BACUD, WALTER FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA
CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY SIMANGAN, petitioners,
vs.
PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Orders dated 20 October 2005
1
and 30 November 2005
2
of the Regional Trial Court
(trial court), Branch 27, of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in Special Civil Action No. 6727.
In its assailed Orders, the trial court ruled that the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayombong,
Neuva Vizcaya (Sangguniang Bayan), exceeded its jurisdiction when it imposed upon
respondent Severino Martinez the administrative penalty of removal from office.
Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay Don Mariano
Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local government unit created, organized and
existing as such under pertinent laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent
Martinez is the incumbent Punong Barangay of the said local government unit.
3

On 5 November 2004, Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft
and Corruption by petitioner through the filing of a verified complaint before the
Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant
to Section 61
4
of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint
against Martinez on 6 December 2004 for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
5
Petitioner alleged that Martinez committed
the following acts:
1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their
solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer
derived from composting.
2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable
materials taken from garbage collection.
3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for
private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from
this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x.
4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and
other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of
said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste
Management Project. x x x.
5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because
although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he,
however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed
to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x x x.
6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain
because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.
6

Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended Administrative Complaint dated 6
December 2004, Martinez was declared by the Sangguniang Bayan as in default. Pending
the administrative proceedings, Martinez was placed under preventive suspension for 60
days or until 8 August 2005.
7

On 28 July 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon
Martinez the penalty of removal from office.
8

The Decision dated 28 July 2005 was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor of Bayombong,
Nueva Ecija, Severino Bagasao, for its implementation. On 3 August 2005, Municial
Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the Sanggunaing Bayan is
not empowered to order Martinezs removal from service. However, the Decision remains
valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the
indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.
9
The
dispositive portion of the said Memorandum states that:
10

The FOREGOING considered come AUGUST 8, 2005, respondent SEVERINO
D. MARTINEZ is hereby directed NOT to ASSUME and DISCHARGE the
functions of the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano
Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and for complainant JOSE CENEN
SANTOS to CONTINUE assuming and discharging the functions of the said
office in ACTING CAPACITY pursuant to the provisions of Sections 67 and 68
of Republic Act No. 7160.
On 26 August 2005, Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against
petitioner, the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of the
Decision dated 28 July 2005 of the Sangguniang Bayan. This case was docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 6727, which was initially heard by Branch 28, but later raffled to Branch
27 of the trial court.
11

On 20 October 2005, the trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the
proper courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official
from office, in accordance with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the
Order of the Sangguniang Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As a
consequence, Mayor Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the
basis of a void order. The trial court further ruled that Martinez properly availed himself of
the remedy of Special Civil Action, where the order assailed was a patent nullity.
12

On 10 November 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
13
of the trial courts
Order dated 10 October 2005. The trial court denied the said motion in another Order
dated 30 November 2005.
14

Hence, the present petition was filed.
Although Martinezs term as Punong Baranggay expired upon the holding of the 29
October 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and, thus,
rendering this petition moot and academic, the Court will nevertheless settle a legal
question that is capable of repetition yet evading review.
15

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove
Martinez, an elective local official, from office. The pertinent legal provisions and cases
decided by this Court firmly establish that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do
so.
Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove
elective local officials from office:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis provided.)
During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,
16
the legislative
intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan and the
appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials
was evident:
Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of
whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can
suspend or remove an elective official.
Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just
add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the
proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in
the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may
be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like to
suggest that we consider replacing the phrase "PROPER REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN" simply by
"COURTS." Kasi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o
ang Sandiganbayan.
Senator Pimentel. "OR THE PROPER COURT."
Senator Saguisag. "OR THE PROPER COURT."
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President.
Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that we will craft to
capture the other ideas that have been elevated. (Emphasis provided.)
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,
17
the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the
President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of
the Local Government Code. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which provided that:
Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.
x x x x.
(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the
disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other.
The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the
Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it
granted to the "disciplining authority" the power to remove elective officials, a power
which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law,
the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove Martinez.
Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be
filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal from office. It further
claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is
warranted.
18

The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner would run counter to the
rationale for making the removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative.
In Pablico v. Villapando,
19
the court declared that:
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local
officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124
(sic 125)
20
(b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to
remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to
the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law
on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed
and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an
ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their
constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the
caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining
authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it
should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official
from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether
or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the
courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of
the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the
petitioners interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.
Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an
implementing arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be
an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts
under the orders of the legislative bodies of local governments. The courts would be
stripped of their power of review, and their discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of
removal from office is thus left to be exercised by political factions which stand to benefit
from the removal from office of the local elective official concerned, the very evil which
Congress sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after a
trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure
impartiality and fairness and protect against political maneuverings. Elevating the removal
of an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court case may be
justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the official concerned but also, in
effect, deprives the electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted.
As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure
for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring
elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power
under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by
the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of
removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court
assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently
apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the
other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan may impose on the erring electivebarangay official is suspension; if it deems that
the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper
charges be filed in court.
Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the judiciary the power to remove
local elective officials violates the doctrine of separation of powers. This allegation runs
contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as well as jurisprudence.
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the
political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.
21
Paragraph 2,
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis provided.)
The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be
applied in accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office
of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of
the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal,
the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of the right to
discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the extreme
penalty of dismissal.
Petitioner questions the Decision dated 20 October 2005 of the trial court for allowing the
petition filed before it as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. If, indeed, the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinez from
office, then Martinez should have sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
This Court upholds the ruling of the trial court.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-
observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds
allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.
22

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public
policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be
dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5)where the question raised is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial
intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8)
where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo
warranto proceedings.
23

As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions
involved are essentially judicial.
In this case, it is apparent that the Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing Martinez from office. Such act was
patently illegal and, therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an
administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of the Sangguniang Bayan.
24
Thus,
his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was justified.
In addition, this Court in Castro v. Gloria
25
declared that where the case involves only
legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such
judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an exception to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law cannot be resolved with finality
by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an
exercise in futility. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice
rather than to an administrative body.
26

In the present case, Martinez raised before the trial court the sole issue of whether the
Sangguniang Bayan has jurisdiction over a case involving the removal of a local elective
official from office.
27
In Martinezs petition before the trial court, only a legal question was
raised, one that will ultimately be resolved by the courts. Hence, appeal to the
administrative officer concerned would only be circuitous and, therefore, should no longer
be required before judicial relief can be sought.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Bayombong RTC in Special Civil Action No. 6727 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM,
JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH
SAUPI, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO
BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN,
Treasurer of the Philippines,Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 196305
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Elections,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President, and FELICIANO
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 197221
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 197280
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO
DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman, SIXTO
BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his
capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 197282
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 197392
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 197454
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J .:
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas
Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep.
Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding
Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the
manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No.
197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary
restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate
of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
The Motions for Reconsideration
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of their motion:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, CONSIDERING THAT THE
CONSTITUTION GIVES THE ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS.
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE ORGANIC ACT (R.A.
9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT VIOLATE
SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PRINCIPLE[.]
1

The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED
WITH THE TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A) THERE IS NO
EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B)
THE ARMM IS MORE SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS
AND AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS OWN
APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM
INDUBITABLY PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY OR
TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM GOVERNOR, VICE
GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.
III. THE PRESIDENTS APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED TO
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS ONLY VESTED WITH
SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE
AWESOME POWER TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING
ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE HOLDOVER OF
ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING THE ELECTION AND
QUALIFICATION OF THEIR SUCCESSORS.
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO ARMM ELECTED
OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY
THE CONSTITUTION BUT PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC ACTS.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF VOTES IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY
OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC
ACTS DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF
A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS
DOES NOT UNDULY EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION WITH THE
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD AND CONDUCT
SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND THE ENACTMENT OF AN
IMPROVIDENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN
ANALOGOUS CAUSE WARRANTING COMELECS HOLDING OF
SPECIAL ELECTIONS.
2
(italics supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET A STATUTE,
IT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON THAT THERE BE DOUBT OR
AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992 ELECTIONS AND TURN-
OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE FRAMERS,
AND APPLYING THE SAME TO ELECTIONS 20 YEARS AFTER, THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY HAVE
VIOLATED THEFOREMOST RULE IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
x x x x
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT RA
9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY TO
AMEND RA 9054.
x x x x
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN
RA 9054 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
x x x x
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A PLEBISCITE IS NOT NECESSARY IN
AMENDING THE ORGANIC ACT.
x x x x
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
x x x x
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.
3
(italics and
underscoring supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that:
A.
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs
FOR THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT OF OIC
REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH
THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO A
PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE, WHICH
PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY
CHARACTERIZING THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON
APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR THE ARMM
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
C.
THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054 DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE
ELECTED IN EITHER AN ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST
POSSIBLE TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM
REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE FUNCTIONING AS
SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7,
ARTICLE VII OF R.A. NO. 9054.
D.
WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS,
SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE
ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE
UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN THE MAY 2013
SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.
4

Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
a) the Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM
elections;
b) RA No. 10153 negates the basic principle of republican democracy which, by
constitutional mandate, guides the governance of the Republic;
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to
comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of Representatives and the Senate,
voting separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite;
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to hold their offices even
after their terms are over and non-elective individuals getting into the vacant
elective positions by appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better
choice;
e) the President only has the power of supervision over autonomous regions,
which does not include the power to appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM
elective officials; and
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately from the national and
local elections as this will make it easier for the authorities to implement election
laws.
In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional
elections with national and local elections?
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to
comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the Presidents
supervisory powers over autonomous regions?
The Courts Ruling
We deny the motions for lack of merit.
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of
national and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to
synchronize the national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the
following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which
may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the
election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials
first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
x x x x
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended
to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
To fully appreciate the constitutional intent behind these provisions, we refer to the
discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we
will temporarily indicate as Section 14. It reads: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE
FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE AT NOON OF
JUNE 1992."
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide
be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view
of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new
proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions
giving a term to the incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then,
since the term provided by the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local
officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next election for said
officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain,
subsequently, any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and
consequently, we should not have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower
House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we
also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993 for the
Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining
12 who will be elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993.
So, consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election
will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the local officials and the Members of
the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every
three years, therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the
term of six years for the President and another six years for the Senators with the
possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three years insofar as the
first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first
synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the
Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one
who proposed that in order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body
approved the first national and local officials to be elected in 1987 shall continue in
office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing. That means
they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years
and continue beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and
presidential elections. This time, in 1992, the President shall have a term until 1998
and the first 12 Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12 shall serve until 1995,
and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we
shall have an election every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to
synchronize our elections every three years which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
x x x x
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent
President and Vice-President in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the
Senators and local officials with the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the
assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.
MR. GUINGONA. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all, from the
President up to the municipal officials.
5
(emphases and underscoring ours)
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly
there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down
to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
We came to the same conclusion in Osmea v. Commission on Elections,
6
where we
unequivocally stated that "the Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local
elections."
7
Despite the length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to
convince us to deviate from this established ruling.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners contention that the ARMM elections are
not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization because the ARMM
elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of
the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to
consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the
time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a
constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to
endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate
sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing
instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite
future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged
from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process
intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.
8

To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," clearly shows the
intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local
governments. We refer to Section 1 of this Article, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the
State under the heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional
intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.
That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the "local
governments," and does not make a distinction between the "local government" and the
"regional government," is particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms of
government, but as political units which, while having more powers and attributes than
other local government units, still remain under the category of local governments. Since
autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that elections held in
autonomous regions are also considered as local elections.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not covered by this mandate since
they are regional elections and not local elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed."
9
Applying this principle to determine the scope of
"local elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood in its ordinary
sense. As defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, "local"
refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a
community or minor political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are
held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this
definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or
municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from
the other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law
does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
10

RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the
ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
We cannot agree with their position.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only
the first ARMM elections;
11
it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM
elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any
provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the
first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
We reiterate our previous observations:
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of
succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent
history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections.
The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix the date of the subsequent
elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date
to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176,
RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the
dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or
provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently,
there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections.
Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections
fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to
approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the
date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws
which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the
Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No.
10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in
Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
12
(emphases supplied)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 contends, however, that there is no lacuna in RA No.
9054 as regards the date of the subsequent ARMM elections. In his estimation, it can be
implied from the provisions of RA No. 9054 that the succeeding elections are to be held
three years after the date of the first ARMM regional elections.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court may not, in the
guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion.
13
Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think
should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention had been called to the omission.
14
Providing for lapses within the law falls within
the exclusive domain of the legislature, and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have no
authority to intrude into this clearly delineated space.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is
no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article
XVII of RA No. 9054.
Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we have already
established that the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054
15
is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass
irrepealable laws.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these
laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal
laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers
of Congress. As we explained in Duarte v. Dade:
16

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to
persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal
the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited
or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed
by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at
which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode
of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the
effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere
majority vote, provided there is quorum.
17
In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054
to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote),
Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we
sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon,
and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.
18

We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his dissenting
opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold
for each House of Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA
9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers. One Congress cannot limit or
reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a higher vote
threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can
be passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary
legislation, to amend the Constitution."
19

Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad
Similarly, we struck down the petitioners contention that the plebiscite
requirement
20
applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]" We interpreted this to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation
of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution
which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act
21
require ratification through a
plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
The petitioners argue that to require all amendments to RA No. 9054 to comply with the
plebiscite requirement is to recognize that sovereignty resides primarily in the people.
While we agree with the petitioners underlying premise that sovereignty ultimately
resides with the people, we disagree that this legal reality necessitates compliance with the
plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were to go by the
petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all amendments
to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming effective,
this would lead to impractical and illogical results hampering the ARMMs progress by
impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the
region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably
follow the holding of a plebiscite.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in giving the
President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the elective officials of the
ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic structure of the government, and thus
requires compliance with the plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.
Again, we disagree.
The pertinent provision in this regard is Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which reads:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.
We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic structure of the
ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM
regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to
"perform the functions pertaining to the said offices."
Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of
RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover
capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be
allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is
no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from
performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X which provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The
terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the
Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on
the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the
autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all
elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established that elective
ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does
not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of
amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit
by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local
officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended
by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various
laws. One significant difference between the present case and these past cases
22
is that
while these past cases all refer to electivebarangay or sangguniang kabataan officials
whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present case
refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and
the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall within the three-year
term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory
basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only
apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
23

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear
that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it
deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this
decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for
the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in
the ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.
COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM.
To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
24
Although the
legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has
granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is
confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this
power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such
as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly
and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be
heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the
basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and
underscoring ours]
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section 5 and Section 6 of
BP 881 address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do
not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances,
such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this
does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP
881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM elections
and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this
Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to shorten
the terms of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with
the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the
COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section
8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three years.
Presidents authority to appoint OICs
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the Presidents power to appoint pertains
only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions held by elective officials.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature.
25
Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted above. Section
10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers
of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint;
but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its counterpart in
the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the
various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987
Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is empowered to make and
divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in providing
for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction
between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of presidential
appointments, as made evident in the following exchange:
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after "captain" and x x x
delete "and all" and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment
because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
26

The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the Armed
Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint."
27
The second sentence acts as the "catch-all
provision" for the Presidents appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power
to appoint is essentially executive in nature.
28
The wide latitude given to the President to
appoint is further demonstrated by the recognition of the Presidents power to appoint
officials whose appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where
there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for
filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by
appointment.
Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the Presidents appointment power
should be strictly construed and must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.
29
Given
that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government
from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment
power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power
to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution,
30
which merely grants the President the power of supervision over
autonomous regions.
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the Presidents appointment power. There is
no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments
and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific
confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."
31
This is distinguished from
the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter."
32

The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents alleged power of control over the
OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the power to
remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs
will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the
people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. The
provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices
of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these
same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in
the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the
power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this
regard are more apparent than real.
RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but
within the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153
primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections
with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled
ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide the
ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of
those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21) months away
of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to
Congress to address the problem created by synchronization (a) allow the incumbent
officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b)
call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next
ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the
President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of
supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the
ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already
established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last
available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the
adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No.
10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In other words,
"given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of
constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM
officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific
period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VI I of the
Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?"
33

We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local
community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders. However, we have
to keep in mind that the adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to
comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure is comparable to
the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for instance, the President appoints
officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local government units.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted
to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to
the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then
called the Sangguniang Pampook).
34

Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280, in their Manifestation and Motion dated December 21,
2011, question the propriety of the appointment by the President of Mujiv Hataman as
acting Governor and Bainon Karon as acting Vice Governor of the ARMM. They argue
that since our previous decision was based on a close vote of 8-7, and given the numerous
motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, the President, in recognition of the
principle of judicial courtesy, should have refrained from implementing our decision until
we have ruled with finality on this case.
We find the petitioners reasoning specious.
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies
only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction
or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its
proceedings for practical and ethical considerations.
35
In other words, the principle of
"judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the
higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.
36
Consequently, this principle cannot be
applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest
otherwise would be to disregard the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole
system of government is founded upon.
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not, and
cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of
how close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of
the en banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case,
37
a decision garnering
only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must
be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that,
based on the voting, "the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be
granted."
38

Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to Issue
Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for reconsideration were filed by the
aggrieved parties challenging our October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO
we initially issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective. He
further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18, 2011
decision pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not
outright insolence"
39
to this Court.
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v. COMELEC,
40
where the Court held
that while it had already issued a decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet
final and executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The
petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,
41
where the Court reproached the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for manifesting its intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that
the Court had not yet lifted the TRO previously issued.
42

We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a subject of a
motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It does not follow, however, that the
TRO remains effective until after we have issued a final and executory decision, especially
considering the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18, 2011 decision,
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the
validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law.
We likewise LIFT the temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of
September 13, 2011. No costs.
43
(emphases ours)
In this regard, we note an important distinction between Tolentino and the present case.
While it may be true that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in both cases,
the petitions assailing the challenged laws were dismissed by the Court, an examination of
the dispositive portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court did not
categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the present case, we expressly lifted the
TRO issued on September 13, 2011.1wphi1 There is, therefore, no legal impediment to prevent
the President from exercising his authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice
Governor as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.
Conclusion
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in G.R. No.
197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually given the President the
power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the event that the elections of barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal circumstances
which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153 was passed in order to
synchronize the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. In the course of
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to
grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a)
holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b)
Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials
for less than three years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal proscription which prevents these
specific government officials from continuing in a holdover capacity should some
exigency require the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners motions for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY with FINALITY the motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit and UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner,
vs.
Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA
BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local
government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their
officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and
seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from
performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a
portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by
administrative fiat.
The Case
Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section
1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to
reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-
personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order,
which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a
Motion for Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for Intervention,
1
attaching thereto his
Petition in Intervention
2
joining petitioner in the reliefs sought. At the time, intervenor was
the provincial governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of the
Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments. In a Resolution
dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted said Motion and Petition.
The Facts and the Arguments
On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with
emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as follows:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation
requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic
stability and sustain the country's growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management
measures to match expenditures with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities
and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments
units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total
expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for
non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and
staffing by deferring action on the following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual
personnel, regardless of funding source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those
which have already been contracted out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated
with scholarships and trainings funded by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the
government except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments in
the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet;
e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by
government training institutions and agencies in the performance of their
regular functions and those that are funded by grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except
those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and those
involving regular competitions/events;
g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source
of compensation from government received by the person concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those
required by law or those already being undertaken on a regular basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly
and specifically authorized by law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by
institutions to victims of calamities.
3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs
4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies,
electricity and other utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation
problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves
SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources of cost-
savings, provided the 25% minimum savings under Section 1 is complied with.
SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these measures shall be
submitted to the Office of the President, through the Department of Budget and
Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached format.
SECTI ON 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10%
of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall conduct a monthly
review of the fiscal position of the National Government and if necessary, shall
recommend to the President the imposition of additional reserves or the lifting of
previously imposed reserves.
SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998 and shall remain
valid for the entire year unless otherwise lifted.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety-seven."
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal
revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the
power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in
contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of
the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the
national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372
was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation"
and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It
allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merelydirects local
governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal
services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA
does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their
revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment
and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation."
The Issues
The Petition
3
submits the following issues for the Court's resolution:
"A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all
LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy
"B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA"
In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to
reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which
withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the
President's power of general supervision over local governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had the locus
standi to bring this suit, despite respondents' failure to raise the issue.
4
However, the
intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered academic any further discussion on this
matter.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Main Issue:
Validity of AO 372
Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned
Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define certain
crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of general supervision over local
governments and (2) the extent of the local governments' autonomy.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v.
Silvosa,
5
the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government
officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national
government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in
meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
6

In Taule v. Santos,
7
we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority
than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their
duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power,
when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority over such body,"
8
we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,
9
the difference between control and supervision was
further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or
accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion,
order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On
the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see
to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do
they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may
order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe
their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.
10
The
members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they
are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.
11
In
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign
powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long
as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token,
the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local
governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
12

In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,
13
we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation,
however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.
14

Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to
local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law
may provide.
15
The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power
was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin
16
as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and
accountable,'
17
and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.'
18
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
'general supervision'
19
over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.'
20
He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.
21

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization
of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."
22

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs
and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal
governments are still agents of the national government.
23

The Nature of AO 372
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the nature of
AO 372. As its preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash management measure"
adopted by the government "to match expenditures with available resources," which were
presumably depleted at the time due to "economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation." Because of a looming financial crisis, the President deemed it necessary to
"direct all government agencies, state universities and colleges, government-owned and
controlled corporations as well as local governments to reduce their total expenditures by
at least 25 percent along suggested areas mentioned in AO 372.
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy
in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means
that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as
the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to
the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the
necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local
and national officials,
24
who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional
fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,
25
primarily
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated
social and economic policies, plans and programs
26
for the entire country. However, under
the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are
subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
27

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit,
the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the]
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of
Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in
the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment
shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to
show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector
deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of
local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much
less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued
by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is
intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-
reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is
facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within
the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we
agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code
have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the
directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x
x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and
does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The
language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a
boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize
the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would
do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the
crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and
their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor
general's contention in regard to Section 1.
Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy
is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.
28
The Local Government Code
29
specifies
further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days
after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."
30
As a rule, the term "shall" is
a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.
31
The provision is,
therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10
percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such
withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is
equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often
temporarily."
32
Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government
does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of
national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the
President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the
rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters
of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal
methods.
Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent
Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds that,
allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the President
as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is implied in the
President's authority to adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit.
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred
and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with
administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality
of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and
abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on
them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered
that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section
4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous
en banc case Taada v. Angara,
33
this Court held that when an act of the legislative
department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy
becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.'
34
Once a 'controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'
35

x x x x x x x x x
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,
36
it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters
that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by
any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:
37

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a
statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the
judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws,
as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the
courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the parties; hence it
is deemed waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its use against a party that
has not been given sufficient notice of its presentation, and thus has not been given the
opportunity to refute it.
38

Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice Kapunan
posits that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the President's role as chief fiscal officer,
who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of
safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and
use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory mandates."
39
He cites
instances when the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal affairs of LGUs.
Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law
and have not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4
of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government
Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are
indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any
legal or constitutional basis.
Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable
public sector deficit. It must be emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this
Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President
may make necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as
stated in the main part of this Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the LGC, which
Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in the
same provision -- that such reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding officers
of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of
local governments.
Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national
government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local
development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that no
such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372. This is why
the petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor and at the same time
president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of
Leagues of Local Governments) have protested and instituted this action. Significantly,
respondents do not deny the lack of consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287
40
of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the
President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain
requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable
to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20 percent of
their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive power granted the
President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby
permanentlyPROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43,
respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local
government units are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J. Kapunan in his dissenting opinion.

G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI,
JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN.
JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM
and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers of the Phil.
Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J .:
On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
1
Andres
Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an
Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were
purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when
inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized
by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG).
2
The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard
at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known
leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National
Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis
Committee.
3
The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee,
convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial
Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by respondents General
Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP component was
headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy
Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
4

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male
civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas
of Patikul.
5
The organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of
Understanding"
6
entered into
between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan;
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine
National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum
alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of
the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the
hostages may be achieved."
7

This Memorandum, which was labeled secret on its all pages, also outlined the
responsibilities of each of the party signatories, as follows:
Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:
1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed for the
activation of the CEF;
2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units which
shall participate in the operations and to propose them for the approval of the
parties to this agreement;
3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral
action(s) by the CEF without the knowledge and approval by both parties.
Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):
1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military
operations and law enforcement;
2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the
performance of their assigned task(s);
3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified areas
of operation(s);
4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as called
for in the course of operation(s)/movements of the CEF.
8

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, announced to the media that government troops had cornered some one
hundred and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3)
hostages.
9
However, the ASG made
contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the
jungle area.
10
The government troops yielded and went back to their barracks; the
Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp, while police and civilian forces pulled back
from the terrorists stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen (15) kilometers. Threatening that one
of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military
camps and bases in the different barangays in Jolo.
11
The authorities were given no later
than 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply.
12

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009
(Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu.
13
It cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security
Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and
other actions necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the proclamation
states:
NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I,
ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL TAN, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF SULU, DO
HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE PROVINCE OF SULU,
AND CALL ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE WITH THE ASSISTANCE
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN
EMERGENCY FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:
1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;
2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as
may be issued by proper authorities;
3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of
the kidnappers and their supporters; and
4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to
ensure public safety.
DONE AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL, PROVINCE OF SULU THIS
31STDAY OF MARCH 2009. Sgd. Abdusakur M. Tan Governor.
14

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent
P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim.
15
Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and
interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his
deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was
detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul
Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula,
Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani, were also
arrested.
16
The affidavit
17
of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG
supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April
2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG.
On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of
the "Guidelines for the Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a
State of Emergency in the Province of Sulu."
18
These Guidelines suspended all Permits to
Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed
civilians to seek exemption from the gun ban only by applying to the Office of the
Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines also
allowed general searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.
On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop
Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
19
claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it
threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued
ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and
calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
20
Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not
authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and
limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.
In his Comment, Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts when they filed the instant petition directly in the court of last resort,
even if both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) possessed
concurrent jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court under Rule 65.
21
This is the only procedural defense raised by respondent
Tan. Respondents Gen. Juancho Saban, Col. Eugenio Clemen, P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim,
and P/SUPT. Bienvenido Latag did not file their respective Comments.1wphi1
On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires,
as Governor Tan allegedly acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government
Code, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during
calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition.
22
Furthermore,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency
as evidenced by Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its
regular session.
23

The threshold issue in the present case is whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section
16, of the Local Government Code authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of
emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the
conduct of general searches and seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question of
whether or not the provincial governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the
CEF under the said provisions.
We grant the petition.
I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts
We first dispose of respondents invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which
allegedly prevents judicial review by this Court in the present case, citing for this specific
purpose, Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v.
Yuipco.
24
Simply put, the
doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts and not in the Supreme
Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be sought unless special
and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this
is that this Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. It cannot be burdened with
deciding cases in the first instance.
25

The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari,
26
the Court
stated:
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly
from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving
factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving
factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional questions of transcendental
importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual
issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls
under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
27

The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the
Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction.
28
More crucially, this case involves acts of a
public official which pertain to restrictive custody, and is thus impressed with
transcendental public importance that would warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The
Court would be remiss in its constitutional duties were it to dismiss the present petition
solely due to claims of judicial hierarchy.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
29
the Court highlighted the transcendental public
importance involved in cases that concern restrictive custody, because judicial review in
these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense of civilians in police power
cases due to the diminution of their basic liberties under the guise of a state of
emergency."
30
Otherwise, the importance of the high tribunal as the court of last resort
would be put to naught, considering the nature of "emergency" cases, wherein the
proclamations and issuances are inherently short-lived. In finally disposing of the claim
that the issue had become moot and academic, the Court also cited transcendental public
importance as an exception, stating:
Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na
pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng
nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na
nakapaloob dito,
(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang
maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.
Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present
petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly,
the petitions are subject to judicial review.
Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the
foregoing exceptions. Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in generates
public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of
disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As
petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an
existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is
capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the
education and guidance of all concerned.
31
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental
public importance.
II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the
Republic
i. One executive, one commander-in-chief
As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior,
32
it has already been established that there is
one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means
that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
33
As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his
ponencia in Villena:
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which
is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that
is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the
principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This
means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other.
34

Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what
became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are
exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion
that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the
president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The
Presidents Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of
Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the
Constitution:
Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
35

Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
36

The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Courts authority to
review the factual basis thereof.
37
By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is
of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President
alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of
the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any
other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law x x x.
38

Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3
39
of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the
civilian president the nations supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section
3, when read with Article VII,
Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of
the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of
military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct
military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to
delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate
power is his.
40
As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the
naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the
manner he may deem most effectual.
41

In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
42
the Court had occasion to rule
that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or
substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power.
43
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to
call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
44

That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president is clear from
the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power
of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may
be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to
review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But
when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is
necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it
subject to judicial review.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power
to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil
rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review
by this Court.
x x x Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in
his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
45
(Emphasis Supplied)
In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,
46
the Court characterized these powers
as exclusive to the President, precisely because they are of exceptional import:
These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law.
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of
guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by
the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but
there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similargravitas and
exceptional import.
47

In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as
the leader of the countrys police forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the framing of this
provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the word "control," employing the same
rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as the only Executive under the
presidential form of government.
48

Regarding the countrys police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that:
"The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law."
49

A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision
over the police,
50
and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations, viz:
Mr. Natividad: By experience, it is not advisable to provide either in our Constitution or by
law full control of the police by the local chief executive and local executives, the mayors.
By our experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and sanctuaries for vices and
abuses. If the national government does not have a mechanism to supervise these 1,500
legally, technically separate police forces, plus 61 city police forces, fragmented police
system, we will have a lot of difficulty in presenting a modern professional police force.
So that a certain amount of supervision and control will have to be exercised by the
national government.
For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order problems or
police problems, such as riots, conflagrations or organized crime, the national government
may come in, especially if requested by the local executives. Under that situation, if they
come in under such an extraordinary situation, they will be in control. But if the day-to-day
business of police investigation of crime, crime prevention, activities, traffic control, is all
lodged in the mayors, and if they are in complete operational control of the day-to-day
business of police service, what the national government would control would be the
administrative aspect.
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. de los Reyes: so the operational control on a day-to-day basis, meaning, the usual
duties being performed by the ordinary policemen, will be under the supervision of the
local executives?
Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. de los Reyes: But in exceptional cases, even the operational control can be taken over
by the National Police Commission?
Mr. Natividad: If the situation is beyond the capacity of the local
governments.
51
(Emphases supplied)
Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise
supervision and control over the police, through the National Police Commission:
Mr. Rodrigo: Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-
Chief of all the armed forces.
Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.
Mr. Rodrigo: Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not
suppose they come under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the
Philippines.
Mr. Natividad: They do, Madam President. By law, they are under the supervision and
control of the President of the Philippines.
Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.
Mr. Natividad: He is the President.
Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that
the President is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.
Mr. Natividad: No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.
Mr. Rodrigo: There are two other powers of the President. The
President has control over ministries, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local
governments. Under which does the police fall, under control or under supervision?
Mr. Natividad: Both, Madam President.
Mr. Rodrigo: Control and supervision.
Mr. Natividad: Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the
President.
52

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is
clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled
control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority
over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek
assistance from the police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional
Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the
NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of
the power of executive control.
53

iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor
Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by
the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed
subsequently.
Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of
David v. Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the issue of the declaration of a state of
emergency, does it limit the said authority to the President alone. Respondents contend that
the ruling in David expressly limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a
condition which covers the entire country, and does not include emergency situations in
local government units.
54
This claim is belied by the clear intent of the framers that in all
situations involving threats to security, such as lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise
calling-out powers. As reflected in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission:
Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase OR PUBLIC DISORDER
in lieu of "invasion or rebellion." Mr. Sumulong stated that the committee could not accept
the amendment because under the first section of Section 15, the President may call out
and make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless violence but
even invasion or rebellion without declaring martial law. He observed that by deleting
"invasion or rebellion" and substituting PUBLIC DISORDER, the President would have to
declare martial law before he can make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless invasion or rebellion.
Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation
where there is some lawless violence in a small portion of the country or public disorder in
another at which times, the armed forces can be called to prevent or suppress these
incidents. He noted that the Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor degree but he can
also exercise such powers should the situation worsen. The words "invasion or rebellion"
to be eliminated on line 14 are covered by the following sentence which provides for
"invasion or rebellion." He maintained that the proposed amendment does not mean that
under such circumstances, the President cannot call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress the same.
55
(Emphasis supplied)
III. Section 465 of the Local
Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation
1-09
Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a
terroristic act, and used this incident to justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under
Proclamation 1-09.
56
He invokes Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local
Government Code, which purportedly allows the governor to carry out emergency
measures and call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies for assistance.
But a closer look at the said proclamation shows that there is no provision in the Local
Government Code nor in any law on which the broad and unwarranted powers granted to
the Governor may be based.
Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in the
pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters,"
57
as being violative of the constitutional
proscription on general search warrants and general seizures. Petitioners rightly assert that
this alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and
seizures are proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
particularly:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
58

In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial
law powers of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ."
59

We find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies
the acts sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Not even Section 465 of the said Code, in
relation to Section 16, which states:
Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.
x x x x x x x x x
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
provincial governor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and
activities of the provincial government, and in this connection, shall:
x x x x x x x x x
(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath
of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the
exercise of the appropriate corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the province
and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:
x x x x x x x x x
(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot,
lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public
interest so requires and the police forces of the component city or municipality where the
disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators.
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(Emphases supplied)
Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the
said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural.
The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and
implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in
the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find
any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions.
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two
reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a
"national law enforcement agency," to which the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong.
Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and
defend the Republic against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the
integrity of the national territory.
60

Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces
were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were
inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the
assistance of national law enforcement agencies.
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently
vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the
Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.
The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and
administrative in nature.1wphi1The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the
delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents,
61
and should not be unduly
stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.
In the sponsorship remarks for Republic Act 7160, it was stated that the devolution of
powers is a step towards the autonomy of local government units (LGUs), and is actually
an experiment whose success heavily relies on the power of taxation of the LGUs. The
underpinnings of the Code can be found in Section 5, Article II of the 1973 Constitution,
which allowed LGUs to create their own sources of revenue.
62
During the interpellation
made by Mr. Tirol addressed to Mr. de Pedro, the latter emphasized that "Decentralization
is an administrative concept and the process of shifting and delegating power from a
central point to subordinate levels to promote independence, responsibility, and quicker
decision-making. (I)t does not involve any transfer of final authority from the national
to field levels, nor diminution of central office powers and responsibilities. Certain
government agencies, including the police force, are exempted from the decentralization
process because their functions are not inherent in local government units."
63

IV. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF
Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private
citizen armies is proscribed. Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:
Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall
be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF)
not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be
dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.
Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace and order
within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be
organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The
defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National
Government."
Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not
authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the
respondent Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves wary of armed
citizens groups, as shown in the following proceedings:
MR. GARCIA: I think it is very clear that the problem we have here is a paramilitary force
operating under the cloak, under the mantle of legality is creating a lot of problems
precisely by being able to operate as an independent private army for many regional
warlords. And at the same time, this I think has been the thrust, the intent of many of the
discussions and objections to the paramilitary units and the armed groups.
MR. PADILLA: My proposal covers two parts: the private armies of political warlords and
other armed torces not recognized by constituted authority which shall be dismantled and
dissolved. In my trips to the provinces, I heard of many abuses committed by the CHDF
(Civilian Home Defense Forces), specially in Escalante, Negros Occidental. But I do not
know whether a particular CHDF is approved or authorized by competent authority. If it is
not authorized, then the CHDF will have to be dismantled. If some CHDFs, say in other
provinces, are authorized by constituted authority, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of National Defense, if they are recognized and
authorized, then they will not be dismantled. But I cannot give a categorical answer to any
specific CHDF unit, only the principle that if they are armed forces which are not
authorized, then they should be dismantled.
64
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) in the present case, is also invalid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding
respondents to desist from further proceedings m implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series
of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation and guidelines are
hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 198860 July 23, 2012
ABRAHAM RIMANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., represented by its President,
ROSEMARIE LLARENAS and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to annul and set aside Decision
2
dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP NO. 112152.
The Facts
The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before
Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission
Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against
Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting
mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.
The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to
issue a business permit in favor of the respondent.
In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a
parcel of land which formerly belonged to the national government but later on certified by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its business of
emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed
an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees
therefor.
The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent
executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was
amenable to signing such contract subject to some proposed revisions, which, however,
were not acceptable to the petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence,
the petition for mandamus.
The Ruling of the RTC
On May 26, 2009, the RTC denied the petition
3
for lack of merit based on the
ratiocinations that: (a) the Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject
parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the
Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require
the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business operation is being conducted
on a real property owned by the municipality; and (c) a mayors duty to issue business
permits is discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
4

The Ruling of the CA
Unwaivering, the respondent appealed to the CA. In its Decision
5
dated March 30, 2011,
the CA held that the appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering that the
period for which the business period was being sought had already lapsed. As such, any
ruling on the matter would bring no practical relief. Nonetheless, the CA proceeded to
resolve the issues involved in the appeal for academic purposes.
The CA disagreed with the RTC and found that the factual milieu of the case justifies the
issuance of a writ of mandamus. The CA reasoned that the tax declaration in the name of
the municipality was insufficient basis to require the execution of a contract of lease as a
condition sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit. The CA further observed that
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its
imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of the
Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or
inaction, for that matter, was done in the performance of official duties that are legally
protected by the presumption of good faith. The CA likewise stressed that the civil action
filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the expiration of
his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.
Despite its incessant declarations on the mootness of the case, the CA disposed of the
appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 26 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, in Special Civil Action Case No. 72-BG, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
6

The petitioner moved for reconsideration
7
questioning the pronouncement of the CA that
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81 was void and arguing that a petition for
mandamus is not the proper vehicle to determine the issue on the ownership of the subject
land. The motion was denied in the CA Resolution
8
dated September 30, 2011.
The petitioner is now before this Court reiterating the arguments raised in his motion for
reconsideration.
Our Ruling
We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and
academic owing to the expiration of the period intended to be covered by the business
permit.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value
9
or in
the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
10
In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief
to which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition.
11
As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness.
12

The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business
permit in favor of respondent corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been
superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the petitioners term as mayor.
Verily then, the issue as to whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondents business permit ceased to
present a justiciable controversy such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical
value. Should the writ be issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the
effectivity date of the business permit no longer subsists.
While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of
the respondent, we find that the decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.
The CAs conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by
convincing evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus,
the overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal was its mootness
and the CA should have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus that
spawned it.
More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit
since the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.
This was the pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor
13
where
a determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits
under the Local Government Code,
14
viz:
Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides, thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the
same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and
priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those
resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development and country-
wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
x x x x
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation
of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to
law or ordinance.
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is
pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power
to local governments.1wphi1Local government units exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is
unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x
x x x x
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the
respondent mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the
delegated police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof
cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised,
the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of
mandamus.
15
(Citations omitted)
Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is
incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayors discretionary duty to issue business
permits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate justice

CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER & ABOLITION
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J .:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati."
1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos,
Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section
8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed
in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the
same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of
Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present
territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on
the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on
the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by
the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases
involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati
and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of
the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should
be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This
is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area
of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought
about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by
an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not
add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise
the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land
area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government,
legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
3
We take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes.
4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable
certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench,
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act
of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these
peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is
beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by
meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is
not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city
may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries
with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently
served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must
contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing
in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such
description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would
be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks
to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local
government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make
local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents
while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To
invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the
spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave,
instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the
law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA
520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of
R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of
the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until
such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall
have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city
will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and
employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions
and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of
the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from
serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the
new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the
term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms
previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and
eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position
in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude
that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of
respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements
before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are:
1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.
5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on
the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this
coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig
(except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they
hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-
urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative
districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by
the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections
to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu
of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
for: (1) reapportionment
6
cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is
not expressed in the title of the bill
7
and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.
8
In said case, we
ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution
9
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than
a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A.
No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation
for an indeterminate period of time.
10
The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city
or province a particle of their sovereignty.
11
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It
is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI
12
of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
13
Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district
may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a
city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.
14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a
liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be
sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror,
fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to
add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit to be created or converted should be properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a
Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial
boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional
or illegal. The Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a
condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from
one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The
petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only
applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT
CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of
Article X thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The
voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code
shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati
provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise
fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause
contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the
said Section which reads in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the
Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commissionand
subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members
thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on
the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards
set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by
the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases
supplied)


Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to
add a few observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit to be created or converted should be properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a
Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial
boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional
or illegal. The Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a
condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from
one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The
petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only
applies to the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT
CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of
Article X thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The
voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code
shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati
provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise
fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause
contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the
said Section which reads in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the
Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commissionand
subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members
thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on
the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards
set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by
the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases
supplied)
Footnotes
1 R.A. No. 7854 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 12240 sponsored
by Congressman Joker Arroyo and Senate Bill No. 1244 sponsored by
Senator Vicente Sotto III.
2 Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity
to provide services, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of
the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the
Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. . . .
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. . . .
3 August 18, 1994, Senate Deliberations on H.B. No. 12240, pp. 23-28.
4 Ibid, citing as example the City of Mandaluyong.
5 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (19180); Cruz, Constitutional
Law, 1991 ed., p. 24.
6 Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
7 Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 26 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
8 G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994.
9 Section 5(1), Article VI.
10 In this connection, we take judicial notice of the fact that since 1986
up to this time, Congress has yet to pass a general reapportionment law.
11 Section 1, Article II provides that "the Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority from them."
12 Sec. 5. . . .
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
xxx xxx xxx
13 As per the certificate issued by Administration Tomas Africa of the
National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of
1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House
Bill No. 12240 (converting Makati into a highly urbanized city), p. 15.
14 Sec. 3 provides: "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to
at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to
on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created or where the city, whose
population has so increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred, and twenty days
before the election."

G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR.
NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D.
MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON.
RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal
Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO
MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON.
PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON.
ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR.
RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY.
ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed
by Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No.
7720, entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," mainly because the
Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by
Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average
annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order
to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into
Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was
filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal
author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano,
Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on
Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public
hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government.
The committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December
9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January
28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
Known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator
Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of
Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to
the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB
No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on
HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking
into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243.
Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto
by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second
Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the
House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief
Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was
held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor
of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin
issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the
computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion
into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate
passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said
to have originated in the House of Representatives.
I
The annual income of a local
government unit includes the IRAs
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average
annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls
below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its
conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiago's average annual income in
the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P 20,379,057.07
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P 21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 41,949,163.94
Minus:

IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P 15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P 13,109,560.47
===============
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting
the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on
the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim that Santiago's income is far below the
aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of
Finance, which indicates Santiago's average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is
allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the
computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers
and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or
decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among
others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.
1
Such income must be duly certified by
the Department of Finance.
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with
the aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the
meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local
government unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the
institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law
and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.
3
Remaining to be an intra
sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be
an imperium in imperio,
4
the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
5
Power which used to be
highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral
local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also with
their own resources and assets.
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system
certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and
increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider
scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the
vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is
accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers
and effectively carry out its functions.
7
Availment of such resources is effectuated through
the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own
source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share
being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its
equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if
any, within its territorial boundaries.
8

The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue
to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to
specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and
its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of
the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects.
9
As such, for purposes of
budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local
government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization
proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in
the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming
the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.
10

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.
11
They
thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of
Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at
least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of
said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that "the average
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income." To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring
item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer,
since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local
Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers
referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".
12

Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-93
13
correctly encapsulizes the full import of
the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be "revenues and receipts
realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General
Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections
284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other
national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar
others" (Emphasis ours).
14
Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting
and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by
the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the
Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.
15

II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional
prescription,
16
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate,
is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves
cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while
SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive
not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the
bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible
under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved
on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on
the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28,
1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee
on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held
in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved
on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene
the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House
of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance.
17
There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as
a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, we explained:
. . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. . . . as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make
the House superior to the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No.
11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the
Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S.
No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No.
11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the
enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the
same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives
on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On
the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the
same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to
bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. . . .
18

III
Every law, including RA No. 7720,
has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality.
19
Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt.
20
Those who petition this court to declare a law to be
unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a
declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification
of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V.
BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in
his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity
as Provincial Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

PUNO, J .:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela
from an independent component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the
people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
1

On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720.
Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city, viz.:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT
COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by
deleting the words "an independent" thereon so that said Section will
read as follows:
Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of
Santiago shall be converted into a component city to
be known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred
to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The
territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of
Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting
the entire section and in its stead substitute the following:
Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-
Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and
any Elective Provincial Position for the Province of
Isabela. The voters of the City of Santiago shall be
qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial
Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members and other elective provincial positions of the
Province of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can
be a candidate for such provincial positions and any
elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause. All existing laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.
2
They alleged as ground the lack of
provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a
proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the
petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City.
Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They
also contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks
jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials.
The Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More
importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an
independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
"creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao,
3
a
member of the provincial board of Isabela.
4
He contended that both the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed
qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local
Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They
defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of
Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient
rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct
injury as a result of its enforcement.
5
Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he
filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not
need the consent of the city council of Santiago. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the
city of Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as
mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A.
No. 8528 is direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of
Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are
residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their
city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528
gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.1wphi1.nt
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar
on the ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has
long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which defines judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." To
be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court in
many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,
6
we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers "to those questions
which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,
7
we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy
granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or
disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be
self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is a legal not a
political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the
requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide.
The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances
of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to
provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to
a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the
Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local
government units belongs to Congress.
8
This power is part of the larger power to enact laws
which the Constitution vested in Congress.
9
The exercise of the power must be in accord with the
mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City
from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of
Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading
falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the
said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as
the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the
people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this
constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave
more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986
EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of
politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government
unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It
is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them
direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This
plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more
autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished.
The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial
governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be
reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will
now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching
changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz.:
10

Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No.
8528 had "merely re-classified" Santiago City from an independent
component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic)
the Act were operational would be, actually, that of conversion.
Consequently, there would besubstantial changes in the political culture
and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of
Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to
the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically, and administratively.
Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land
area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to the benefit or
advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the
subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue allotment
(IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and
population of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City
Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City
Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may
be shared with the province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other
quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes
(Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A.
No. 7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for
the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the
local operations of the City Government because of reduced shares of
the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of R.A.
No. 7160. The City Government's share in the proceeds in the
development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since
certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292,
R.A. No. 7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as
provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the
Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every
component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the
province acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions
(Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section
30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section
455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with
respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section
455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials will also be
effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63,
R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political
autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No.
7720, it is the Office of the President which has supervisory authority
over it as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160;
Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468, (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii),
and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in
administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by
the latter (Section 67 R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City
from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of
its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor
reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people
of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed,
there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes
their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution
when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance
prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
xxx xxx xxx
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so
long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly
affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies
R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago
City. This power of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger,
division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the
amendment merely caused a transitionin the status of Santiago as a city. Allegedly, it is a
transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No.
8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for
the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever
there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the
downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink
away from the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political
configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that
"only if the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the
local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city,
municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two
conditions first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government
Code on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the
people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed
the said criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These
requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a
plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will
be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been
satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be
conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another
date.
11
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991,
opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.
12

It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different
purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and
land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified
indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these
"indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office,
and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose
to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of
gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political
representatives of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-
observed by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries are ". . . basic to local government, it is also imperative that these
acts be done not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality
concerned. . . . By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also
eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for
the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local government
units."
13

The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments
of its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was
proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent component city barely two
and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000
votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of
Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-political
status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to
aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is
unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no
longer participate or be voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of
Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to
be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the
Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people
via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess
was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of
the amendment "after a very enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We
quote the debates, viz.:
14

BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 City of Santiago
Senator Tatad. Mr.
President, I move
that we consider
House Bill No.
8729 as reported
out under
Committee Report
No. 971.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
[Silence] there
being none, the
motion is
approved.
Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill
without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720
ENTITLED "AN ACT
CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO
INTO AN INDEPENDENT
COMPONENT CITY TO BE
KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
Senator Tatad. Mr.
President, for the
sponsorship, I ask
that the
distinguished
Chairman of the
Committee on
Local Government
be recognized.
The President.
Senator Sotto is
recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
Mr. President.
House Bill No.
8729, which was
introduced in the
House by
Congressman
Antonio M. Abaya
as its principal
author, is a simple
measure which
merely seeks to
convert the City of
Santiago into a
component city of
the Province of
Isabela.
The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically
an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an independent component
city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said
province as a local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory
Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an "island in the
provincial milieu.
The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are
they qualified to run for any elective positions in the Province of Isabela.
The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the
power and authority of general supervision over the city and its officials,
which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of the
President, which is very far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of
Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the said
province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the
proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of
Isabela.
Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of
this august Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local
Government, recommending approval, with our proposed committee
amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The President. The
Majority Leader is
recognized.
Senator Tatad. Mr.
President, I moved
(sic) that we close
the period of
interpellations.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
[Silence] There
being none, the
period of
interpellations is
closed.
Senator Tatad. I
move that we now
consider the
committee
amendments.
Senator Roco. Mr.
President.
The President.
What is the
pleasure of Senator
Roco?
Senator Roco. Mr.
President, may I
ask for a
reconsideration of
the ruling on the
motion to close the
period of
interpellations just
to be able to ask a
few questions?
Senator Tatad.
May I move for a
reconsideration of
my motion, Mr.
President.
The President. Is
there any objection
to the
reconsideration of
the closing of the
period of
interpellations?
[Silence] There
being none, the
motion is
approved.
Senator Roco is recognized.
Senator Roco. Will
the distinguished
gentlemen yield
for some
questions?
Senator Sotto.
Willingly, Mr.
President.
Senator Roco. Mr.
President, together
with the Chairman
of the Committee
on Local
Government, we
were with the
sponsors when we
approved this bill
to make Santiago a
City. That was
about two and a
half years ago. At
that time, I
remember it was
the cry of the city
that it be
"independent."
Now we are
deleting that word
"independent."
Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for
the Record, I want some explanation on what happened between then
and now that has made us decided that the City of Santiago should cease
to be independent and should now become a component city.
Senator Sotto. Mr.
President, the
officials of the
province said
during the public
hearing that they
are no longer
vested with the
power and
authority of
general
supervision over
the city. The
power and
authority is now
being exercised by
the Office of the
President and it is
quite far from the
City of Santiago.
In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some
sectors that they want to participate in the provincial elections.
Senator Roco. Mr.
President, I did not
mean to delay this.
I did want it on
record, however. I
think there was a
majority of 14,000
who approved the
charter, and maybe
we owe it to those
who voted for that
charter some
degree of respect.
But if there has
been a change of
political will, there
has been a change
of political will,
then so be it.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr.
President, to be
very frank about it,
that was a very
important point
raised by Senator
Roco, and I will
have to place it on
the Record of the
Senate that the
reason why we are
proposing a
committee
amendment is that,
originally, there
was an objection
on the part of the
local officials and
those who oppose
it by incorporating
a plebiscite in this
bill. That was the
solution. Because
there were some
sectors in the City
of Santiago who
were opposing the
reclassification or
reconversion of the
city into a
component city.
Senator Roco. All
I wanted to say,
Mr. President
because the two of
us had special
pictures (sic) in the
city is that I
thought it should
be put on record
that we have
supported
originally the
proposal to make it
an independent
city. But now if it
is their request,
then, on the
manifestation of
the Chairman, let it
be so.
Thank you.
Senator Drilon.
Mr. President.
Senator Drilon.
Will the gentleman
yield for a few
questions, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. Yes,
Mr. President.
Senator Drilon.
Mr. President,
further to the
interpellation of
our good friend,
the Senator from
Bicol, on the
matter of the
opinion of the
citizens of
Santiago City,
there is a
resolution passed
by the Sanggunian
on January 30,
1997 opposing the
conversion of
Santiago from an
independent city.
This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings.
And that is the reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the
amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.
The question I would like to raise and I would like to recall the
statement of our Minority Leader is that, at this time we should not be
passing it for a particular politician.
In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order
that the additional territory be added to the election of the provincial
officials of the province of Isabela.
Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. If it
is, I am not aware
of it, Mr.
President.
Senator Alvarez.
Mr. President.
The President.
With the
permission of the
two gentlemen on
the Floor, Senator
Alvarez is
recognized.
Senator Alvarez.
As a born inbred
citizen of this city,
Mr. President, may
I share some
information.
Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial
leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership,
because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger
territory.
As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of
Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral
process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into
provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this
amendment is being put forward.
While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council,
those who signed the resolution were not the whole of the council. This
bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a
constituency, the voice of the district.
I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose
voice must be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the people,
the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should
be given account, as we do give account to many of the legislations
coming from the House on local issues.
Senator Drilon.
Mr. President, the
reason why I am
raising this
question is that, as
Senator Roco said,
just two and-a-half
years ago we
passed a bill which
indeed
disenfranchized
if we want to use
that phrase the
citizens of the City
of Santiago in the
matter of the
provincial election.
Two-and-a-half
years after, we are
changing the rule.
In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in
a plebiscite in order to approve the conversion of the city into an
independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised
by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part
of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the
Committee Chairman as an amendment.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez.
Mr. President, the
Constitution does
not require that the
change from an
independent to a
component city be
subjected to a
plebiscite.
Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as
follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of
those enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in
adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a
plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr.
President, the key
word here is
"conversion". The
word "conversion"
appears in that
provision wherein
we must call a
plebiscite. During
the public hearing,
the representative
of Congressman
Abaya was
insisting that this
is not a
conversion; this is
merely a
reclassification.
But it is clear in
the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a
component city. That is how the members of the committee felt. That is
why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a
plebiscite in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a
plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the other people of
Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the
province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are
opposing it. To them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide,
instead of the political leaders of Isabela deciding for them.
Senator Tatad. Mr.
President.
The President. The
Majority Leader is
recognized.
Senator Tatad. At
this point, Mr.
President, I think
we can move to
close the period of
interpellations.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
[Silence] There
being none, the
motion is
approved.
Senator Tatad. I
move that we now
consider the
committee
amendments, Mr.
President.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
[Silence] There
being none the
motion is
approved.
Senator Sotto. On
page 2, after line
13, insert a new
Section 3, as
follows:
Sec 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY
AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS
STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. THE CONVERSION OF
THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT
CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL
TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RETIFICATION OF
THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF
SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE
HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60)
DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL
CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
Senator Enrile. Mr.
President.
The President.
Senator Enrile is
recognized.
Senator Enrile. I
object to this
committee
amendment, Mr.
President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Tatad.
May I ask for a
one-minute
suspension of the
session.
The President. The
session is
suspended for a
few minutes if
there is no
objection. [There
was none].
It was 7:54 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President. The
session is resumed.
Senator Sotto is recognized.
Senator Sotto. Mr.
President, after a
very enlightening
conversation with
the elders of the
Body, I withdraw
my amendment.
The President. The
amendment is
withdrawn.
Senator Maceda.
Mr. President.
The President.
Senator Maceda is
recognized.
Senator Maceda.
We wish to thank
the sponsor for the
withdrawal of the
amendment.
Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela I am no
great fan of the Senator from Isabela but it so happens that this is a
local bill affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a
resident and registered voter.
So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national
importance, senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as possible,
accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done
on matters affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind
them.
Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez.
Mr. President.
The President.
Senator Alvarez is
recognized.
Senator Alvarez.
Mr. President, may
I express my
deepest
appreciation for
the statement of
the gentleman
from Ilocos and
Laguna. Whatever
he may have said,
the feeling is not
mutual. At least
for now, I have
suddenly become
his great fan for
the evening.
May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the
cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but because
it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the
leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the province. How
could we extricate the town from the province?
But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the
Chairman of the Committee.
Senator Tatad. Mr.
President.
The President. The
Majority Leader is
recognized.
Senator Tatad.
There being no
committee
amendments, I
move that the
period of
committee
amendments be
closed.
The President.
Shall we amend
the title of this bill
by removing the
word
"independent"
preceding
"component city"?
Senator Sotto. No,
Mr. President. We
are merely citing
the title. The main
title of this House
Bill No. 8729 is
"An Act
Amending Certain
Sections of
Republic Act
7720". The title is
the title of
Republic Act
7720. So, I do not
think that we
should amend that
anymore.
The President.
What is the
pending motion?
Will the gentleman
kindly state the
motion?
Senator Tatad. I
move that we close
the period of
committee
amendments.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
[Silence] There
being none, the
motion is
approved.
Senator Tatad.
Unless there are
any individual
amendments, I
move that we close
the period of
individual
amendments.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
[Silence] There
being none, the
period of
individual
amendments is
closed.
APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
Senator Tatad. Mr.
President, I move
that we vote on
Second Reading
on House Bill No.
8729.
The President. Is
there any
objection?
[Silence] There
being none, we
shall now vote on
Second Reading
on House Bill No.
8729.
As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
Several Members.
Aye.
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silences]
House Bill No. 8279 is approved on Second Reading.
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the
downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice
of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC,
15
BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of
Negros Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking
down the law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its
enactment, viz:
The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation
of the new Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held on
February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the
new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in
office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and
Vice-President." Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: "With
indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and
proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of
government officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was
appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986,
the political machinery was in place to deliver the "solid North" to ex-
President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del
Norte during the elections the unashamed use of naked power and
resources contributed in no small way to arousing "people's power"
and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism
that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.
The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional.
Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz., the
plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and
the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of
the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as
provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the
remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely,
the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities
of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,
Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid, San Enrique, Ilog,
Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and
disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing
1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its
boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." It is plain that all the
cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not
merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected.
It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of Negros
Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite,
because the whole is affected by its proposed division and substantial
alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the
areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and
illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that
they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic
principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly
independent component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a
plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental,
16
and the City of San Carlos,
Pangasinan
17
whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the
election of officials of the province to which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to
a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the
city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of
Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not
highly urbanized cities which alone were considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the
case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:
18

. . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President,
merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of
provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the
status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that
the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and
prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City
of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized
city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of
the city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in any way
changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason
that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill
19
allowing qualified voters of
the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental.
In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the people of
Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a component city.
20
Indeed, during the
debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous
situation then obtaining". . . where voters of one component city cannot vote simply
because their charters so provide."
21
Thus, Congress amended other charters of component
cities prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents
to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., pls. see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see dissent.
Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., we join Justice Mendoza in his dissent.
Buena, J., please see dissent.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J ., separate opinion;
I share the opinion of the majority of my colleagues that, for the reasons expressed in
the ponencia, a plebiscite is essential in order to render effective the conversion of the City
of Santiago, Isabela, from an independent to a component city. I would not go to the
extent, however, of declaring Republic Act No. 7720 unconstitutional; instead, with due
respect, I take the view that a plebiscite can be held conformably with the provisions of the
Local Government Code. I do not see, in this instance, a serious incompatibility in having
Republic Act No. 7720 stand along with the Local Government Code.
MENDOZA, J ., dissenting opinion;
The issue in this case is whether the conversion of the City of Santiago in Isabela province
from an independent component city to a component city constitutes the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a city within the
contemplation of Art. X, 10 of the Constitution so as to require the approval of the people
in a plebiscite. The Court, in declaring R.A. No. 8528 unconstitutional for lack of
provision for a plebiscite, does not say that the reclassification of Santiago City as an
ordinary component city constitutes creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundary. Nonetheless, the Court today holds that because the reclassification
of the city would result in a "material change in the political and economic rights of the
local government units directly affected as well as the people therein," the approval of the
law in a plebiscite is required.1wphi1.nt
With all due respect I submit that not every change however "material" and far-reaching
in the classification of a local government unit requires popular approval. Only if the
reclassification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local
government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people, for then
there would be a creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the
boundary of a local government unit, as the case may be, within the meaning of Art. X,
10 of the Constitution. Thus, the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), in
implementing the constitutional provision in question, states:
Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity
to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of
the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Sec. 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local
government units shall comply with the same requirements herein
prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall
not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government
unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification
of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its
current income classification prior to such division.
The income classification of local government units shall be updated
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the
changes in their financial position resulting from the increased revenues
as provided herein.
Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local government unit
may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been
irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for
its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national
agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the sanggunian
concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify
the province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local
government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.
The conversion from an independent component city to a component city involves no such
changes in income, population, or land area. There may be changes in the voting rights of
the residents of the city, the supervision of the city's administration, and the city's share in
the local taxes, as petitioners point out, but such changes do not amount to the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of a local government
unit so as to require a plebiscite for their approval. An independent component city and an
ordinary component city are both component cities, as distinguished from highly urbanized
cities.
1
The only difference between them is that the charters of the independent component cities
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials and such cities are independent of
the provinces in which they are located.
2
Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring
income.
Sec. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided,however, That the criteria established in this Code
shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials.
Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Sec. 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum
population of two hundred thousand (200,000.00) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual
income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer; shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet the above requirements shall be considered
component cities of the province in which they are geographically
located. If a component city is located within the boundaries of two (2)
or more provinces, such city shall be considered a component of the
province of which it used to be a municipality.
(c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded
from voting for elective provincial officials.
Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified
voters of independent component cities shall be governed by their
respective charters, as amended, on the participation of voters in
provincial elections.
Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective
provincial officials prior to the classification of said cities as highly
urbanized after the ratification of the Constitution and before the
effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such right.
The Court says that the changes resulting from the reclassification of Santiago City as an
ordinary component city "cannot be considered insubstantial." For one, it is said, its
independence will be diminished because the city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. For another, the resolutions and
ordinances of the city council will have to be approved by the provincial board of Isabela.
The fact is that whether the City of Santiago is an independent component city or an
ordinary component city, it is subject to administrative supervision, with the only
difference that, as an independent component city, it is under the direct supervision of the
President of the Philippines, whereas, as an ordinary component city, it will be subject to
the supervision of the President through the province.
3
That is hardly a distinction. For the fact
is that under the Constitution, the President of the Philippines exercises general supervision over all
local governments.
4

Nor does it matter that ordinances passed by the city councils of component cities are
subject to review (not approval as the Court says) by the provincial boards for the purpose
of determining whether the ordinances are within the powers of the city councils to
enact.
5
For that matter, ordinances passed by the city councils of independent component cities are
likewise subject to review, although by the Office of the President.
6
The reason for this is to be
found in Art. X, 4 of the Constitution which provides:
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within
the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
In any case, these are not important differences which determine whether the law effecting
them should be approved in a plebiscite. The defining characteristics of a local government
unit are its income, population, and local area, as 450 and 452 of the LGC provide.
These are referred to in 7 of the LGC and its Implementing Rules as the "verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services." Tested by these
standards, there is no change in the City of Santiago requiring the approval of the people in
a plebiscite.
The majority states: "It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of
Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the
approval of its People thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor
reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of
Santiago City when R.A. No. 8525 downgrades the status of their city." The conversion of
the then Municipality of Santiago in Isabela Province by R.A. No. 7720 was an act of
creation. It was based on the municipality's satisfying the requisites for the creation of a
city as provided in the LGC, to wit:
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of a least
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office;
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring
income.
As thus indicated these requisites are based on the "verifiable indicators" of income,
population, and land area and, therefore, the conversion of what was once a municipality
into a city needed approval in a plebiscite. But the conversion of Santiago City from an
independent component city into a component city involves no more than a change in the
right of the people (i.e., the registered voters of the city) to vote for provincial elective
officials.
If an analogy is needed, it is to the reversion of a component city whether independent
or ordinary to the status of a municipality. For then the city is actually abolished and
abolition, as stated in the Art. X, 10 of the Constitution, must be approved by the majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite. Stated otherwise, when a municipality is converted into a
city, a city is created, and when the city is reverted into a municipality, the city
isabolished. Both acts of creation and abolition require the approval of the people in a
plebiscite called for the purpose. But when an independent component city is converted
into a component city, it is not created into another form, it is not divided, it is not merged
with another unit of local government, it is not abolished, much less is its boundary
substantially altered.
Indeed, this is not the first time that an independent component city is converted into a
component city without a plebiscite. The City of Oroquieta, created as an independent
component city in 1969 by R.A. No. 5518, was converted into a component city in 1989
by R.A. No. 6726, while the City of San Carlos, created as an independent component city
in 1965 by R.A. No. 4187, was converted into a component city by R.A. No. 6843 in 1990.
In both cases, the conversion was made without submitting the matter to a plebiscite.
There is, therefore, no reason for requiring that the reclassification of Santiago City as a
component city must be approved by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite and for
holding that, because R.A. No. 8528 contains no provision for such plebiscite, it is
unconstitutional.
It is easy to sympathize with calls for plebiscites as an exercise of direct democracy by the
people. But, although the Constitution declares that "Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them," it also provides that we are a "republican
State."
7
It is thus a representative form of government that we have. With few exceptions, we have
vested the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines.
8
This means that when an act of the
people's representatives assembled in Congress is duly passed and approved by the President in the
manner prescribed in the Constitution, the act becomes a law
9
without the need of approval or
ratification by the people in order to be effective.
10

This is the theory of representative government. Such a government is no less democratic
because it is indirect. In some ways it is better than direct government given the
complexity of modern society, let alone the volatility of voters and their susceptibility to
manipulation. In this age of mass communication there is less reason to distrust the
judgment of the people's representatives in Congress on matters such as this and, therefore,
no reason to require the people to manifest their sovereign will, except where this is
expressly required by the Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
BUENA, J ., dissenting opinion;
With all due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, whose well-
written ponenciaexpresses his opinion with clarity, I regret that I am unable to agree that
Republic Act No. 8528 should be declared as unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that
Sec. 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 10 Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:
Sec. 10, Chapter 2. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or
units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting
such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
In short, conversion does not appear in the 1987 Constitution nor in the Section 10,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code. Surprisingly, Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f)
(1) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code included conversion in the
enumeration of the modes of changing the status of local government units, thus:
(f) Plebiscite. (1) No creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance
prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Other than that, the Local Government Code uses the term "conversion" only in the
following instances: (1) Section 7, which provides that "[a]s a general rule, the creation of
a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: . . . . . .;"
(2) Section 450, which provides for the requisites for the "conversion" of a municipality or
a cluster of barangays into a component city; and (3) Section 462, which involves the
"conversion" of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. defines
1
"conversion," as "the elevation of an LGU from one
level to another, like converting a municipality to a city or a component city to a highly urbanized
one or the raising of the classification of one municipality, city or province from a fourth class
category to third, second or first." It is my humble opinion therefore that the requirement of a
plebiscite does not apply to the case at bar which does not involve the upgrading or elevation of
Santiago City but a downgrading thereof.
2. I am not convinced that a mere Rule and Regulation intended to implement the Local
Government Code can expand the terms and provisions clearly expressed in the basic law
to be implemented. As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in his Comment on the
petition viz.:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the power of administrative agencies to
promulgate rules and regulations must be in strict compliance with the
legislative enactment. Thus, in Tayug Rural Bank vs.Central Bank of the
Philippines (146 SCRA 129-30), this Honorable Court ruled that in the
case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation to
implement said law, the basic law prevails as said rule or regulation can
not go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Neither can
such rules and regulations extend or expand the letter and spirit of the
law they seek to implement. (Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259
SCRA
529)
2

As a matter of fact, Mr. Justice Puno, in his ponencia in the above cited case of Iglesia ni
Kristo, opined that "(T)his rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that
administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek
to enforce.
3

3. The proceedings in the Senate show that the Committee on Local Government, to which
H.B. No. 8729 was referred, reported back to the Senate with the recommendation that it
be approved with the following amendment:
Sec. 3. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by
deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the following:
Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. THE CONVERSION OF
THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT
CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL
TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF
SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE
HELD FOR THE PURPOSE WITHIN (60) DAYS
FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL
CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.
However, after the deliberations in the Senate, the Committee on Local Government
decided to withdraw the foregoing proposed amendment. Hence, on February 6, 1998, the
Republic Act No. 8528, the constitutionality of which is challenged by the petitioners, was
approved.
Be that as it may, may this Court properly require a plebiscite for the validity of said law
when Congress itself, which had been given the opportunity to include such a requirement,
decided against it? Are we not supplanting our judgment over that of Congress, a co-equal
branch of government entrusted by the Constitution to enact laws? I respectfully submit
that we may not do so without disturbing the balance of power as apportioned and
delineated by the Constitution.
4. I likewise submit that we must consider the ramifications of a declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 on Republic Act No. 6726 (1989) and
Republic Act No. 6843 (1990), respectively allowing the voters of the City of Oroquieta
(Misamis Oriental) and San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to vote and be voted for any of the
respective provincial offices, in effect downgrading them from independent component
cities to component cities. The resulting confusion on the political structures of the local
government units involved would surely be disastrous to the order and stability of these
cities.
5. Finally, in a situation where the supposed breach of the constitution is doubtful,
equivocal and, at best, based on argumentative implications, I believe that, as we have
ruled in a plethora of cases
4
, every law has in its favor, the presumption of constitutionality and
in case of doubt, the Court must exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the
nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it.1wphi1.nt
I therefore vote to dismiss the petition.

G.R. No. 135927 June 26, 2000
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR
HASSAN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP
and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN,respondents.
BUENA, J .:
Way back in the 1950's and during the martial law era, it has been said that even the dead,
the birds and the bees voted in Lanao. This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the Order issued by the Commission on Elections
[COMELEC, for brevity] dated June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum,
Lanao Del Sur as "ghost precinct," is an illustrative case.
The facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of
book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among
others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private
respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan, subject
matter of the present petition for certiorari.
1

On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams
to the respective Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the questioned precincts in
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for
abolition of precincts and annulment of book of voters.
2

On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T.
Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay
chairmen of the twenty three (23) barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which
were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in
Opposition"
3
which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected
precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the
questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the
incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
4

After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the
COMELEC issued an Order
5
dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law
Department for appropriate investigation. The COMELEC Law Department conformably
issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive
investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the
investigation conducted."
6
Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE
INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing
Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular
inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the Municipality of Madalum,
Lanao Del Sur."
7

On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts
yielding the following results
At 12:10 pm, the Task Force Investigation Team from the COMELEC
accompanied by traditional leaders, political leaders, many concerned residents of
this town, a representative from the Lanao del Sur Provincial Statistics Office,
Mr. Lacson Abdullah, and a Team from the DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur,
arrived in the area supposedly Barangay Padian Torogan with these comments
and observations:
It appears that in this area there are only two structures: One is a concrete house
with no roof, and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This
obviously mean that no single human being could possibly reside in these two
structures.
Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a
residential place. So this contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC
Team from the Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total
population of 285. (Ref. Municipal census Report as of September 1, 1995).
Besides, no less than the Chairman of the COMELEC Investigating Team asked
the people around who among them is a resident or a registered voter in the so-
called Barangay Padian-Torogan, and no one answered affirmatively.
Then at 12:50 PM, the COMELEC Investigating Team still with the people
mentioned above are in Barangay Lumbac to look for the other supposed
Barangay named Rakutan, and found this observations.
x x x x x x x x x
By the way, unfortunately, at the peak of this ocular inspection, the Madalum
Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine
Gun, arrived at the scene at exactly 12:55 pm boarding an orange Mitsubishi car
with four armed bodyguards, the (sic) confronted the Team Leader of the
COMELEC Investigating Group and angrily insisted to stop the ocular inspection.
This STACOM Mindalano, in warning a photographer not to take a shot on him,
pointed his pistolized Rifle to this man when the photographer positioned his
camera to take a picture of him while he is arguing with the investigating leader,
Mr. CASAN MACADATO.
Moving camera film and several pictures are added hereto for further information
and as exhibits. Also attached hereof are the names and signatures of among the
more-or-less one hundred people who observed the conduct of this ocular
inspection.
(NOTE: This writer, Mr. Khalil Y. Alawi, is a member of the five (5) man
Committee from the DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur created in respect to the
Memo/Invitation from the COMELEC Provincial Office of Lanao del Sur dated
June 15, 1998 signed by Mr. CASAN MACADATO, EO II, Chief Investigation
Team. Mr. Macadato designated verbally and in public Mr. ALAWI to be his
Secretary during this investigation, and of course, the (sic) with the consent of the
DILG Team).1wphi1.nt
I hereby certify that the foregoing are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge.
Prepared by: (sgd) Khalil Y. Alawi
Member, DILG Team
Submitted by: (sgd) Casan Macadato
Election Officer II
Chairman, Task Force Investigation Team
8

On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the
Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated
June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and
Rakutan were uninhabited.
9

On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as
ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc:
(1) resolves to GRANT the request and hereby:
(a) DIRECTS the Task Force Investigating Team created
pursuant to the Order of the Commission en banc dated
February 11, 1998, to continue the conduct of ocular inspection
and investigation as contained in the original directive of the
Law Department dated April 29, 1998;
(b) RECOMMENDS to the PNP Director and the Regional
Director of the Philippine National police, (1) to immediately
relieve and transfer Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano of
Madalum, Lanao del Sur and transfer him to an area where it
will be extremely difficult for him to return to Mandalum and
do further damage to effort of the Commission to investigate
ghost precincts in said area considering the urgency of said
investigation. (2) to look into the possibility of involvement of
other policement (sic) in Madalum in the aforestated criminal
mischief of the Police Station Commander or their possible
partisanship.
(c) RECOMMENDS to AFP Regional Command, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to immediately assign sufficient
number of men to maintain peace and order in the Municipality
of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, and to escort and secure the safety
of the COMELEC Investigating Team during the conduct of
ocular inspections and investigations.
(2) finds Padain Togoran as ghost precinct and shall be excluded from
the special election to be conducted in Madalum.
(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Madatu, to immediately resume
the investigation, the remaining ghost precincts in Madalum and to
submit its findings to the Commission with dispatch, allowing it to
submit partial findings if necessary.
The Law Department of this Commission is hereby directed to implement this
order.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis supplied)
10

On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor
Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and
Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition forcertiorari and mandamus urging us to
nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Likewise, petitioners moved to consolidate this case with G.R. No. 134456
entitled "Sultan Sarangani, et. al vs. COMELEC, et. al" alleging that G.R. No. 134456 also
involves a COMELEC decision declaring the precinct corresponding to eight (8)
barangays in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as ghosts precincts.
In a resolution
11
issued by this Court on January 19, 1999, we denied the motion to
consolidate, considering that G.R. No. 134456 had already been dismissed in our
resolutions of August 4, 1998 and August 18, 1998.
The basic issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct.
12

On a preliminary matter, though not clear, it appears from the records that Padian Torogan
is a barangay in Madalum, Lanao del Sur and it was erroneous for the COMELEC to
consider Padian-Torogan as a ghost precinct. In any case, the court is not tasked to
determine whether the so-called Padian Torogan is a barangay or a mere election. The
petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one
declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not
mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To
be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would be the election
precinct in the said place.
It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one
precinct per barangay.
1
In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to
them by number. Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain election precinct
actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a
factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the
COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive
upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the
same.
14
Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted
efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in
the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no
inhabitants, afortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have
left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants
considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that
nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local
government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local
government unit (LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city,
municipality, or any other political subdivision.
15
In the case of a barangay, except in
Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement
of a plebiscite
16
conducted for the purpose in the political units affected.1awphil
The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal
or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have substantially affected
the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of
an election by means available to it.
17
The assailed order having been issued pursuant to
COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of
discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand. Judicial
interference is unnecessary and uncalled for.
18
No voter is disenfranchised because no
such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution
19
is not
tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is
conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not
otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all
the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of
suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of
some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the
people.
20

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed Order dated June 29,
1998 of the Commission on Elections is UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official business.
Pardo, J., no part, was COMELEC Chairman at the time.

G.R. No. 146319 October 26, 2001
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 146342 October 26, 2001
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted
pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806,
an "Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor."
1

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
2
the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed
3
the
creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite.
4

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsogon,
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R.
No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day
period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20)
day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
before conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another
petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition seeking to enjoin the further
implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section
450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of
Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon,
thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.
5

Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001
elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then,
the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and political
powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.
We shall first delve on petitioner's constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R
No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
6
This presumption is
rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts.
7
The theory is
that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful
scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law.
8
This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
one.
9
In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt,
10
for to
doubt is to sustain.
11

Petitioner initially reject R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution which provides,inter alia:
"SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected." (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
"SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income."
(Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806
complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he
is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster
of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
This contention is devoid of merit.
Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a
criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture,
allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality
or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the
Code distinctly provides:
"SECTION 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local
government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for
their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That
the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not
fall below its current income classification prior to such division. . . . ." (Emphasis
ours)
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or
a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided
that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no "compelling" reason for merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering
that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component
city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not
competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,
12
this Court, through Justice Jose P.
Laurel, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"
13
and
"may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical. "
14

Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
"SECTION 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are:
(1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the
creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has been provided on
the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one
subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon
City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of
the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was
created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor," cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two
municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on
this consequence.
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
15
The rule is sufficiently complied
with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect,
16
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
17
Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to
cripple or impede legislation."
18

Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to
defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite
conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City.
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within
120 days from the "approval" of said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz:
"SECTION 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate
existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the
qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of
this Act. x x x ." (Emphasis ours)
The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus,
petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from
the expiration of the 120-day period after theapproval of the Act. This 120-day period
having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no
longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16,
2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:
"SECTION 65. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation."
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY a newspaper of
general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local
circulation in the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on
September 1, 2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning
point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from
the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The
COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law,
citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,
19
it could only schedule the plebiscite after
the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite
was well within the 120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct.
In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:
"SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall
take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall
be conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date." (Emphasis ours)
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be
conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its
approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date" for
conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the effectivity of
the law.
Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read
together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as
used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the
fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws relating to the same subject should be read
together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence.
As we stated in Taada:
"ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on
the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion,
and so hold, that the clause 'unless it is otherwise provided' refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication." (Emphasis supplied)
To give Section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective
even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information
campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as
required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Code. However, no proof whatsoever was presented by petitioner to substantiate his
allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption
20
that the COMELEC regularly
performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178628
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
These consolidated petitions
1
seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative
district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
2

The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for
the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and
eight municipalities.
3
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as
amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).
4
Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato
City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but
of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in
November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
5
enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,
Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province
of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby
created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
x x x x
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by
the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue
to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are
residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a
consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective
provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant
position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold
office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local
elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are
receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in
accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the
number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes
Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities
6
were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus,
what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part
of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29
October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act
201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6
March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan
in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted
the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27
February 2007,
7
provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt
the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the
appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on
29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
8

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City)."
9
1avvphi1
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
10
and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
11
Thus, Sema asserted that the
COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902
which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the
COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the
lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.
12
Sema further
claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to
create or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose
not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of
the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC
issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2)
Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the
proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June
2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March
2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff
Kabunsuan including Cotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely
renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed
that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make
Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies
exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum
population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation
of a legislative district within a city.
13

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents
Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597
to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new
province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the
Court in Felwa v. Salas
14
stated that "when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment"; (b) Section 462 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) "affirms" the apportionment of a legislative
district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its
earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and
joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is "self-executing." Thus, every new province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following
grounds: (a) the "province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the
provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of
RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact
measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of
legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing
a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will
lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of
Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to
the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a
population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of
Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments
on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in
the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national
law creating a legislative district for such new province.
15

In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No.
177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.
16
On
the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in
G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as
a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces
under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous
regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may
be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.
17
However, Sema
concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to
the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than
those mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution.
18
Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be
construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x
that do not comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160.
19

(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was
not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to
the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than
those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces
contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen
(thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its
Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section
10 and Section 6,
20
Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create
provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national
law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen
reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the
Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its
position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments
on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered
G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628
echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No.
7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of
Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC,
through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a
temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law."
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are
proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902;
and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in
G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article
VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of
Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
21
On the other
hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty."
22
True, the
COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
23
Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude
from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City." These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the
petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of
Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality
of election laws, rules, and regulations.
24

Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in
the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens
election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether
the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of "Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this
incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel
issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently
concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as
well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional
provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality
or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation
must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite
in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction,
25
subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an
Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
26
1avvphi1
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the
power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted
by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.
27
In the present case, the question arises
whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section
10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities
is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or
more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create
a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population
reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power
to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then
is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past
28
Constitutions, the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts,
and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable
membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts
of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v.
COMELEC,
29
we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part
of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion
legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would
be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a
superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative
districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.
Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act,
provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the
following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever
Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always
elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.
30

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office,
and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.
31
It
would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly
to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory.
The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its
occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or
regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assemblys legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the
exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by
abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA
Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes
Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the
creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members
as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to
the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment
shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29
October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in
the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the
statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment."
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695),
creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and
providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was
unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided
in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and
twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may
be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at
least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years
after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall
have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as
that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors
from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as
practicable, contiguous and compact territory."
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a)
indirectly, through the creation of a province for "each province shall have at least
one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the
apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second
method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the
creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general
tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein
alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither
by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions
under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were
to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution,
which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces
have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of
additional representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned
requirements.
32
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created
legislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a
province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the
maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces
were created by anational law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was
created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district.
Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the
constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to
Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating
provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must
have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger
the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress
has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the
first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of
only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of
Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that
"[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at
least one representative."
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19,
33
Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the
criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income
of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum
population of 250,000.
34
The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative
body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in
the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one
representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the
ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section
461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at
least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the
House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous
creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack
Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:
35

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x
and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of
Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be
done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there
may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will
each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you
are saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
x x x x
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000)
representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally
possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.
36
(Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on
regional autonomy,
37
nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these
disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government
under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts
cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the
ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the
regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny
province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a
national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership
of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally,
in the present 14th Congress, there are 219
38
district representatives out of the maximum
250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20
percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats
available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This
leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district
representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable
membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction
and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x." The
Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government
is established "within the framework of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article
X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be created x x x within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves
also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality
of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria
established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve
the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate
case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office
like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the
ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic
and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as
it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we
declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
1
with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by
Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 9371
2
- the law
that Resolution No. 7837 implements - is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed
and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro."
3
This law eventually became Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9371.
4
It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two.
For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to
either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. The
constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well as
eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro
is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan,
Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan,
Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an,
Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall
comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion,
Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS
Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays
from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.
5

On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No.
7837
6
implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March
27, 2007.
7
On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the following
as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of
Canvassers.
8

In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional
grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371
without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite
which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He
prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead
to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for
Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded
according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the
constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province,
city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did
not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del Mar v.
PAGCOR,
9
the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within
the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a
common denominator - the material change in the political and economic rights of the
local government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 4) a voter's
sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was
arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only
allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a
voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the
city council for the other legislative district, and 6) government funds were illegally
disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.
10

THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be limited to the
following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant
petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local
government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?
OUR RULING
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally
without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, andhabeas corpus.
11
It was pursuant to this original
jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
12
and the RTCs,
13
a direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of
practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in
favor of matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule
otherwise known as the "principle of hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, the
principle requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
14

Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions to
the rule, are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our
nation's lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed.
15
The present petition
is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised - among them,
whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local
government unit - are reasons enough for considering it an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the
COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371
decrees. As an action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition
forcertiorari.
16
For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a
stumbling block in our consideration of the present case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro
as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative
apportionment. This argument essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the
constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative districts and division of local
government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of
the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body.
17
It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting
power among the districts.
18
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by
the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
19

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules
on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment
speaks of, are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as
"municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.
20
In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been
defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants
of a city or town for the purpose of local government thereof."
21
The creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government
(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the
authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the
apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts,
22
and likewise acts on local
government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not
much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different
although they interface and relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and
the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be
effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize
population and voting power among districts."
23
Hence, emphasis is given to the number of
people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the
representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each
district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of
the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every province
(irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative
districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate and interface with
each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment,
Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate
existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be
observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the local
government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are specified as verifiable
indicators of viability and capacity to provide services.
24
The division or merger of existing
units must comply with the same requirements (since a new local government unit will
come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce the income, population, or land
area of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code.
25

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on
the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local government unit.
26
In contrast, no plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,
27
a case
that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no
plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because
one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the
Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by
Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district
only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did
not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a
reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one
under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical
roots of these two provisions, the nature of the concepts they embody as heretofore
discussed, and their areas of application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC,
28
we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of
our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the Fourteenth Amendment
29
of the U.S.
Constitution and from the constitutions of some American states. The Philippine Organic
Act of 1902 created the Philippine Assembly,
30
the body that acted as the lower house of
the bicameral legislature under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as
the upper house. While the members of the Philippine Commission were appointed by the
U.S. President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine
Assembly were elected by representative districts previously delineated under the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the
Philippine Assembly among the provinces as nearly as practicable according to population.
Thus, legislative apportionment first started in our country.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment
provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts
electing one delegate each to the House of Representatives. Section 16 of the Act
specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine
Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative
apportionment together with "district" as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was
"equality of representation . . . as an essential feature of republican institutions" as
expressed in the leading case of Macias v. COMELEC.
31
The case ruled that inequality of
representation is a justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was reiterated in Montejo
v. COMELEC.
32
Notably, no issue regarding the holding of a plebiscite ever came up in
these cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal
representation "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with each district being, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This formulation was essentially carried over
to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of
party-list representatives. In neither Constitution was a plebiscite required.
The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local government
units was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. However, as early as
1959, R.A. No. 2264
33
required, in the creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the
creation and definition of boundaries be "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the
areas affected." In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this
further by requiring that the "Act shall take effect after a majority of voters of the
Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their municipality into a city in
a plebiscite." This was followed up to 1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a
plebiscite as a condition for the creation and conversion of local government units as well
as the transfer of sitios from one legislative unit to another.
34
In 1973, the plebiscite
requirement was accorded constitutional status.
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was
never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became
constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation,
division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never
with the concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a
political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political
subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more
appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a
corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district;
it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in
their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality,
which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does not
have its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the
voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the
legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality
that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for
any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative
district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are
the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
35
They possess legal personality on the
authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines
them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose
boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution
and the Legislature.
36
A local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the
election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of
its Sanggunian.
37

As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in
carrying out the functions of government."
38
As a corporate entity with a distinct and
separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole
benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of
local affairs"
39
and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate capacity
on local concerns.
40
In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the
consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its
intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a
division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality
or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for
the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in
accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the
Constitution. Its core provision - Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of
Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections
after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas,
Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat,
Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-
an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall
comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion,
Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS
Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays
from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate
entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit
and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely
whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the
delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of
Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play
and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another
congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No.
7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the
congressional apportionment made. The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however,
is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law - R.A. No. 6636
41
- whose
Section 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more
than one representative district shall have eight (8) councilors for each
district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified voters therein,
provided that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other
cities comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each
and all other cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the said cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present
number of councilors according to their charters be reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into
two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by
giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang
Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one
congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately
500,000.
42
By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman,
Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of
the city's population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily means better access
to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with
its ranks increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In
representation terms, the fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for
each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each congressman and
each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer numbers
are now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now has twice the
number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total
number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its
numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but
be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in Congress.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1
has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed
mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays.
43
Thus,
R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall
be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered
voters therein. We settled this very same question in Herrera v. COMELEC
44
when we
interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied
to the Province of Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the
number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official
1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the
National Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of
Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the
National Statistics Office which shows thatbarangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first
district have a total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts.
45
The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
standard in gauging equality of representation.
46
In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one
representative," while ensuring representation for every province regardless of the size of
its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease
of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are
found and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical
standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the
units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de
Oro City into two districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly
rural barangays while the second district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But
even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the division on the basis of the
difference in the barangays' levels of development or developmental focus as these are not
part of the constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or reapportionment. What
the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the
lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse of
discretion or violation of the established legal parameters, this Court cannot intrude into
the wisdom of these policies.
47

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA,
and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO, J .:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010.
1

The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected
in the Decision, that Congress reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda
(Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos
Citys population in 2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the
other sources of Malolos Citys population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of
Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report
2
) and as of 2008 (Certification of the
City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008,
3
and Certification of the Liga ng
Barangay, dated 22 August 2008
4
) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic
Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these
materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of
the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws
creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Courts judicial
review power,
5
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting
on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least
250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation,
the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the
population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus,
nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an
apportionment law alleged to violate the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation:
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing
conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the
question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming
weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:]
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one
which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the
political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it.
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political
situation does not render it political instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no
excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not
justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing
inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely
approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution.
6
(Emphasis
supplied; internal citations omitted)
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend
that this Court has no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELECs theory, this Court would be
reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable and
non-authoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There
can be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
7

Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress
used to measure Malolos Citys compliance with the constitutional limitation are
unreliable and non-authoritative. On Mirandas Certification, (that the "projected
population of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135s requirements
that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of demographic
projections and estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination
Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the
middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be
issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using
Mirandas own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos Citys population as of 1
August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as
base Malolos Citys population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda
issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the
document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrators designated
certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use
demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the
projection as of the middle of 2010.1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report, the
Certification of the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the
Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of
them qualifies as authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of
Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on
the population census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual
population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos Citys population at
223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts
Malolos Citys claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear
that come Year 2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the
constitutional requirement."
8
This unbecoming attack by the governments chief counsel
on the integrity of the processes of the governments census authority has no place in our
judicial system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called data
"sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the performance of its
functions.
The Certification of the City of Malolos Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes
from its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of
pursuing its business. To elevate the water districts so-called population census to the
level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This
will allow population data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other
utilities to enter into legislative processes even though these private entities are not in the
business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training, experience and
competence to handle, collate and process them.
Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like
the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct
population census, much less during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135
authorizes to conduct population census are local government units (that is, province, city,
municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and
under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing.
9

By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent
population figures,
10
the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-
NSO authorized certifications. EO 135s stringent standards ensuring reliability of
population census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government
decisions and, in this case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional mandate
of creating congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA
9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and
authoritativeness of Mirandas certificate.
11
It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt
standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express
prohibition.
12
Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on
the reliability of an NSO certification of a citys population for purposes of creating its
legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-urbanized or an
independent component city.
13
Congress itself confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO
135s paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the
population requirement in the creation and conversion of local government units shall be
proved exclusively by an NSO certification.
14
Unquestionably, representation in Congress
is no less important than the creation of local government units in enhancing our
democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the same stringent
standards.
Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May
2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor
proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.
Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on
the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos
City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan
isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.
15
This contravenes the
requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the
OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First
Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an
insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to
the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient
representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of
Bulacan in Malolos Citys legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting
contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity
and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of
constituents.
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission
on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further
pleadings be allowed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE
ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO
and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J .:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From
Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on
Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to
the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October
2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation.
1
In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for
the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,
2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District Municipalities/Cities Population
1st District Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando
417,304
2nd District Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
474,899
Pili
Ocampo
Bombon
Calabanga
3rd District Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
372,548
4th District Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table
3
illustrates
the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District Municipalities/Cities Population
1st District Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
176,383
2nd District Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor
276,777
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga
439,043
4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion
Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma
372,548
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato
Buhi
Bula
Nabua
429,070
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of
the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No.
4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against,
the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and
position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional
district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the
stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the
Constitution for such new district.
4

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill
by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of
the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken
for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither
did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
5
The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.
6
The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district.
7
The petitioners
theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created
by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid.
8
Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to
form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least
250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a
legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum
population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation
of additional legislative seats.
9
The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional
Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to
two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five
million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.
10
According to the petitioners, 55 million people
represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every
one (1) representative.
11
Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by
the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently
from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population
threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first
district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the
creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5,
Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as
provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.
12

The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the
dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal
technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between
cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain
and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application
with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.
13
Rather, the 250,000
minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only
creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be
sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari
and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents
cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716,
they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging
in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust
of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory
relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the
petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues
that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their
content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules,
14
as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted
with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.
15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
16
and
Jaworski v. PAGCOR,
17
this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of
the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount
public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that
we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan
v. Guingona,
18
Tatad v. Executive Secretary,
19
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
20
and
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,
21
just to name a few, that absence of direct
injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is
able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,
22
this
Court held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly
and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has
been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.
23

Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or
not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption
of constitutionality.
24
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there
must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated
or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution
nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality
will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
25

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative
district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a
province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a
city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point
to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a
city, but not for a province.
26

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in
turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.
27

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which
was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it
happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati,
which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation
of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because
the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering
that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at
least one congressional representative.
28
(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement
for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be
entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000
to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an
additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population
of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by
the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants
as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely
an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred
fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which,
upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance
that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such
records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan
Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a
province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that,
for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of
250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district.
And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within
the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts
have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole,though it was among,
several determinants.
From its journal,
29
we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the
entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number
of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional
Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73)
provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;
30
second, the
remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio."
31
Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief
Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark
32
for the Ordinance to be
appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which
are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000
and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986
projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection
indicates that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate
that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one
representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all
cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for
the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from
this, the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and
complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than
population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns
when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point,
Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the
Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the
Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the
standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the
legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and
contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was
included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto
Princesa from San Vicente.
x x x x
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based
on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined
population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and
Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the
capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are
more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns
of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most
of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa
be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments.
He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.
33

"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the
interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto
Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed,
however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the
contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern
towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of
Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total
population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be
no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the
Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.
34

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by
the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with
the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to
Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are
placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special
consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be
divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba
could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however,
pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain
times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially
and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question
that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business
matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are
united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by
passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the
Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated
that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are
not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the
venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration
of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly
Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr.
Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the
amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio
City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of
Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La
Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City
alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region
I.
35

Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts
based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district
"supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice
growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the
standard of compactness."
36
In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters
discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and
the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political,
traditional and sectoral leaders."
37
For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner
Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."
38

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we
stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
39
that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid
equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to
the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis
supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of
petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a
250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the
petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the
provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of
250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in
2007 is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the
Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among
provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it
was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes
this point.
40
In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and
does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as
that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests
and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more
importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other
than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation
of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the
discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the
redistricting of Districts One and Two.
41

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased
population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,
42
that would warrant the invalidation of
Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and
second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting
additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only
factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district.
Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the
letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented
by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
*

Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
*
On Official Leave.
1
Republic Act No. 9716 was published in the 15 October 2009 issue of the
Manila Standard.
2
Figures based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National
Statistics Office.
3
Figures based on the 2007 Census of Population conducted by the National
Statistics Office.
4
Rollo, p. 40.
5
Id. at 12.
6
Id. at 14-15.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 16.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 12-13.
13
Id. at 96.
14
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 400 Phil. 307
(2000); Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998).
15
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506, 528 (2002); Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 646 (2000); Lim v. Executive
Secretary, 430 Phil. 555, 580 (2002).
16
Id.
17
464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
18
G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110.
19
346 Phil. 321 (1997).
20
Supra note 15.
21
Id.
22
Supra note 15 at 580.
23
G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
24
Alvarez v. Guingona, 322 Phil. 774, 789 (1996).
25
The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 11 November
1993, 227 SCRA 703, 705-706.
26
Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, pp. 136-138.
27
312 Phil. 259 (1995).
28
Id. at 272-273.
29
Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, pp. 1859-1881.
30
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 949.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 1861.
34
Id. at 1867.
35
Id. at 1872.
36
Id. at 1867-1868.
37
Id. at 1861.
38
Id. at 1874.
39
G.R. No. 176970, 8 December 2008, 573 SCRA 290, 309-310.
40
Rollo, p. 4.
41
Sen. Aquino, Mr. President, we have to respond to the last statement. The others
that have been recommended together with the Camarines Sur bill were all tested
based on one standard, not separate standards for everybody. It is our opinion and
that is the source of this discussion and of this debate; that we hold that there is a
250,000-rule embodied in so many provisions of the Constitution. Our
distinguished collegue from the Bicol and Makati areas does not agree. I think we
have established that we do not agree on our interpretation of the Constitution.
With his permission, Mr. President, since I am against of his time, may
we move on to the next point so as not to be accused of delaying the
passage of the bill any further?
May we ask: Why was Libmanan not considered to be a portion of the
proposed first district? Because having done the same, instead of having
the 170,000-figure, we would have a 269,222 population figure.
Sen. Arroyo. All right. Look at that map.
Sen. Aquino. May we just move to another rostrum, Mr. President. We
cannot view the details from this particular rostrum, with the indulgence
of our distinguished colleague.
Sen. Arroyo. x x x.
x x x x.
Now, the first district of Camarines Sur is so big that it consists of 40%
of the province, area-wise. Libmanan is the biggest municipality in the
entire or present first district. It stuck in the middle. We cannot move
that no matter what because that is the biggest. Anyway, we move it
left, we move it right, it would change the configuration. Those are the
practical difficulties in trying to figure out how. That is the situation. As
we see, there is a water extension of the gulf. We cannot connect them
because they are separated by water. So it is no longer contiguous
because it is separated by water and there is nothing we can do about it.
That is what I was saying about mathematical formula. We cannot have
mathematical formula when a natural boundary like water cannot make
the municipalities contiguous. That is the picture. It is all there.
The violet is the tagalog-speaking province. The green is the Bicol-
speaking province so that is the only way to divide it. So much has been
done in the Lower House in trying to figure it out. But as long as the
three Congressman do not agree, then there is nothing we can do about
it. That Representative, what the Congressman say in his district is
"king". He is the king there, there is nothing we can do about it. We
respect that.
Libmanan is the biggest one. We cannot move that anyway. (TSN,
Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, 22 September 2009).
42
Grave abuse of discretion contemplates a situation where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Cabrera v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 182084, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 686, 691).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation



DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J .:
I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic
and republican State"
1
that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the
Orwellian concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority opinion
allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative district created
by Congress to send one representative to Congress even if the district has a population of
only 176,383. In sharp contrast, all other legislative districts created by Congress send one
representative each because they all meet the minimum population requirement of
250,000.
The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly
repugnant to the clear and precise "standards" prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4)
2
of Article VI
mandates that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards" fixed in Section 5. These constitutional standards, as far as population is
concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum population of 250,000 per
legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the
population base increases; and (4) uniformity in apportionment of legislative districts "in
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." The assailed RA 9716 grossly
violates these constitutional standards.
Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities
There was never any debate
3
in the design of our government that the members of the
House of Representatives, just like the members of the Senate, represent people not
provinces, cities, or any other political unit.
4
The only difference is that the members of the
Senate represent the people at large while the members of the House represent the people
in legislative districts. Thus, population or the number of inhabitants in a district is the
essential measure of representation in the House of Representatives.
5
Section 5(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, just like in the previous Constitutions,
6
could not be any
clearer:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the
principle of "one person, one vote,"
7
is the cardinal feature of any polity, like ours,
claiming to be a "democratic and republican State."
8
A democracy in its pure state is one
where the majority of the people, under the principle of "one person, one vote," directly
run the government.
9
A republic is one which has no monarch, royalty or nobility,
10
ruled
by a representative government elected by the majority of the people under the principle of
"one person, one vote," where all citizens are equally subject to the laws.
11
A republic is
also known as a representative democracy. The democratic and republican ideals are
intertwined, and converge on the common principle of equality -- equality in voting power,
and equality under the law.
The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting
power -- that each vote is worth the same as any other vote,
not more or less. Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or
literacy, voters have an equal vote. Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this
means equal representation for equal numbers of people
12
or equal voting weight per
legislative district. In constitutional parlance, this means representation for every
legislative district "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
13
or proportional representation. Thus, the
principle of "one person, one vote" or equality in voting power is inherent in proportional
representation.
It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court unanimously
struck down an apportionment law which:
(a) x x x gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got
four only; (b) x x x gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population
got three only; (c) [gave] Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato
x x x more than both, five members having been assigned to it; (d) [gave] Samar (with
871,857) four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan with
557,691 x x x two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f)
[gave] Misamis Oriental with 387,839 x x x one member only, while Cavite with less
inhabitants (379,904) got two.
14
x x x x
for being repugnant to the constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution that the
Members of the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants."
15

Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that
the Members of the House "shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio x x x." The phrase "as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants" in the 1935 Constitution has been changed in the 1987 Constitution
to the more precise "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." The addition of the phrase "on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio" was meant to stress that the rule on proportional
representation shall apply uniformly in the apportionment of every legislative district.
The phrase "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants," which
precedes the phrase "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area," means that
legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area shall be
apportioned according to proportional representation or equal representation for equal
numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one legislative district for every given number of
people, whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio" means that the ratio of one legislative
district for every given number of people shall be applied uniformly in all apportionments,
whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI
mandates that "[e]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x
shall have at least one representative." Consequently, a population of 250,000 serves as the
default minimum population applicable to every legislative district following the rule on
uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or in
the Metropolitan Manila area.
The phrase "progressive ratio" means that the number of legislative districts shall increase
as the number of the population increases, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan
Manila area. Thus, a province shall have one
legislative district if it has a population of 250,000, and two legislative districts if it has
500,000. This insures that proportional representation is maintained if there are increases
in the population of a province, city, or the Metropolitan Manila area. This is what is
meant by a "progressive ratio" in the apportionment of legislative districts, a ratio that
must also be uniformly applied.
Obviously, the 1987 Constitution has laid down clear and precise standards in the
apportionment of legislative districts compared to the 1935 Constitution. What is
inescapable is that the 1987 Constitution has strengthened and tightened the requirement of
uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or the
Metropolitan Manila area.
To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can
disregard the minimum population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a
minimum population only in cities is logically flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and
fatally corrosive of the bedrock notion that this country is a "democratic and republican
State."
16
This ruling of the majority strikes a debilitating blow at the heart of our
democratic and republican system of government.
Under the majoritys ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without
regard to any minimum population. Such legislative districts can have a population of
150,000, 100,000, 50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the window the constitutional
standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative
districts. To disregard the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in provincial
legislative districts while
maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the
constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of
legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This means
that legislative districts in provinces can have a minimum population of anywhere from
100 (or even less) to 250,000, while legislative districts in cities will always have a
minimum population of 250,000. This will spell the end of our democratic and republican
system of government as we know it and as envisioned in the 1987 Constitution.
Constitutional Standards for Reapportionment:
Population and Territory
The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws like
RA 9716 will be tested, following its command that "Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standardsprovided in this
section,"
17
referring to Section 5, Article VI. These standards relate to first, population, and
second, territory. Section 5 admits of no other standards.
On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule
on proportional representation, which is the universal standard in direct representation in
legislatures. Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000 per legislative
district, which was not present in our previous Constitutions. Third is the rule on
progressive ratio, which means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the
number of the population increases in accordance with the rule on proportional
representation. Fourth is the rule on uniformity, which requires that the first three rules
shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Manila area.
The Constitution
18
and the Ordinance
19
appended to the 1987 Constitution fixes the
minimum population of a legislative district at 250,000. Although textually relating to
cities, this minimum population requirement applies equally to legislative districts
apportioned in provinces and the Metropolitan Manila area because of the constitutional
command that "legislative districts [shall be] apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." To reiterate, the
Constitution commands that this rule on uniformity shall apply to legislative districts in
"provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." Otherwise, districts apportioned in
provinces, if freed from the minimum population requirement, will have constituencies
two, four, ten times lower than in districts apportioned in cities, violating the constitutional
command that apportionment shall be based on a uniform ratio in "provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area."
In short, the constitutional "standards" in the apportionment of legislative districts under
Section 5 of Article VI, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional
representation; (2) a minimum "population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" per
legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the
population base increases; and (4) uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts
in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
For territory, the Constitution prescribes the "standards" that a legislative district must be,
"as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent."
To repeat, other than population and territory, there are no other standards prescribed in
Section 5 of Article VI. This Court cannot add other standards not found in Section 5.
The Malapportionment of RA 9716 Flouts
the Constitutional Standards on Population
RA 9716 grossly malapportions Camarines Surs proposed five legislative districts by
flouting the standards of proportional representation among legislative districts and the
minimum population per legislative district.
Based on the 2007 census, the proposed First District under RA 9716 will have a
population of only 176,383, which is 29% below the constitutional minimum population of
250,000 per legislative district. In contrast, the remaining four proposed districts have
populations way above the minimum with the highest at 439,043 (proposed Third District),
lowest at 276,777 (proposed Second District) and an average of 379,359. Indeed, the
disparity is so high that three of the proposed districts (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts)
have populations more than double that of the proposed First District.
20
This results in wide
variances among the districts populations. Still using the 2007 census, the ideal per
district population for Camarines Sur is 338,764.
21
The populations of the proposed
districts swing from this ideal by a high of positive 29.6% (Third
District) to a low of negative 47.9% (First District).
22
This means that the smallest
proposed district (First District) is underpopulated by nearly 50% of the ideal and the
biggest proposed district (Third District) is overpopulated by nearly 30% of the ideal.
The resulting vote undervaluation (for voters in the disfavored districts) and vote
overvaluation (for voters in the First District) fails even the most liberal application of the
constitutional standards. Votes in the proposed First District are overvalued by more than
200% compared to votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts and by more than 60%
compared to votes in the Second District. Conversely, votes from the Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Districts are undervalued by more than 200% compared to votes in the First District
while those in the Second District suffer more than 60% undervaluation.
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population, to
the last digit, for every legislative district. However, under the assailed RA 9716, the
variances swing from negative 47.9% to positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting yardstick,
such variances are grossly anomalous and destructive of the concept of proportional
representation. In the United States, the Supreme Court there ruled that a variance of even
less than 1% is unconstitutional in the absence of proof of a good faith effort to achieve a
mathematically exact apportionment.
23

Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquinos attempt to redraw districting lines to make all
five proposed districts compliant with the minimum population requirement (and thus
lessen the wide variances in population among the districts) was thwarted chiefly for
political expediency: his colleagues in the Senate deemed the existing districts in
Camarines Sur "untouchable" because "[a Congressman] is king [in his district]."
24
This
shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to
achieve a more precise proportional representation in the redistricting under the assailed
RA 9716. Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers with vote valuation, and consequently with the
constitutional standard of proportional representation, based solely on the whims of
incumbent Congressmen, an invalid standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article
VI.
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in
creating the proposed First District, which will have a population of only 176,383. The
minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district admits of no variance and must be
complied with to the last digit. The Constitution mandates a population of "at least two
hundred fifty thousand" for a legislative district in a city, and under the principle of
"uniform and progressive ratio," for every legislative district in provinces and in the
Metropolitan Manila area.
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One Representative"
No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one
representative" means only that when a province is created, a legislative district must also
be created with it.
25
Can this district have a population below 250,000? To answer in the
affirmative is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be
apportioned "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." That the Constitution never meant to exclude
provinces from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the opening
provision of Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x." (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional
representation, on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
26

Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution
Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
or Mariano v. COMELEC
27
and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
28
as normative props to shore up
the hollow proposition that reapportionment in provinces can dispense with the minimum
population of 250,000 as prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. In the first place, the
Constitutional Commission, exercising constituent powers, enjoyed absolute discretion to
relax the standards it textualized in Section 5, Article VI, in the interest of creating
legislative districts en masse cognizant of legitimate concerns.
29
Only the people, through
the instrument of ratification, possessed the greater sovereign power to overrule the
Constitutional Commission. By overwhelmingly ratifying the 1987 Constitution, the
people in the exercise of their sovereign power sanctioned the Constitutional
Commissions discretionary judgments.
In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers under the
1987 Constitution and subject to the reapportionment standards in Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. Congress is strictly bound by the reapportionment standards in Section 5,
unlike the Constitutional Commission which could create one-time exceptions subject to
ratification by the sovereign people. Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never deviated
from the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating a legislative district.
Thus, in Republic Act No. 7854 (RA 7854) which doubled the legislative districts in
Makati City, the Court in Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the certification by the
National Statistics Office that at the time of the enactment of RA 7854, the population of
Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives.
30

Footnote 13 in Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certificate issued by
Administrator Tomas Africa of the National Census and Statistics Office, the population of
Makati as of 1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill
No. 12240 (converting Makati into a highly urbanized city) x x x."
Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts
in Cagayan de Oro City, the two districts created complied with the minimum population
of 250,000 (254,644 and 299,322, respectively), as the Court noted in Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC.
31
Contrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, neither Mariano v.
COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v. COMELEC supports the claim that Congress can create a
legislative district with a population of less than 250,000. On the contrary, these cases
confirm that every legislative district must have a minimum population of 250,000. Only
very recently, this Court in Aldaba v. COMELEC
32
struck down a law creating a legislative
district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just short of the 250,000 minimum
requirement.
RA 9716 Harbinger for Wave of Malapportionments
More than 20 years after the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress has yet to comply
with the Constitutions mandate that "[w]ithin three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
33
Instead, Congress has contented itself with enacting
piecemeal reapportionment laws for individual areas, either for this sole purpose
34
or
ancillary to the conversion
35
or creation
36
of a local government unit, at the behest of
legislators representing the area. As movements
of district lines spell doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process
subjects Congress to intense pressure to keep off certain districts.
Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with
constitutional imperatives. RA 9716 marks a tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor of
entrenched interests, sacrificing the Constitution and ultimately, the ideals of
representative democracy, at the altar of political expediency. If left unchecked, laws like
RA 9716 will fill the House of Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one,
representing districts two, four, ten times more populous than other favored districts,
elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and another, representing small, favored
districts, elected by voters holding "premium votes" two, four, ten times more valuable
than the votes in disfavored districts.
Our oath of office as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this
constitutionally abhorrent scheme, a scheme that for the first time under the 1987
Constitution creates a new politically privileged class of legislators in what is supposed to
be a "democratic and republican State."
37
To uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the blatant
violation of the constitutional standards requiring proportional representation and a
minimum population in the creation of legislative districts. This will derail our one person,
one vote representative democracy from the tracks clearly and precisely laid down in the
1987 Constitution.
And for what end -- to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a new
political elite exercising more legislative power than their votes command? Such a grant of
privileged political status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility title, which
is banned under the 1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to those who embark on a
grotesquely anomalous constitutional revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a
"democratic and republican State."
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one
person, one vote" that insures equality in voting power. All votes are equal, and there is no
vote more equal than others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our
democracy. This Court is supposed to be the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly, here
the Court, in ruling that there are some votes more equal than others, has failed in its
primordial constitutional duty to protect the essence of our democracy.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Republic Act No. 9716 for grossly violating the standards of proportional representation
and minimum population in the creation of legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
I concur with the ponencias discussion on the procedural issue.
"Transcendental importance" doctrine aside, petitioners have the requisite locus
standi. Petitioners are suing not only as lawmakers but as taxpayers and citizens as well.
At the initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be nullified, on the supposition that
expenditure of public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
1
Republic Act No. 9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates
the creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the expenditure of
public funds.
I DISSENT, however, on the ponencias conclusion, on the substantive issue, that a
population of 250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of
a new legislative district in a province.
Contrary to the ponencias assertion, petitioners do not merely rely on Article VI, Section
5 (3) but also on Section 5 (1) of the same Article.
2
Both provisions must be read together
in light of the constitutional requirements of population and contiguity.
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with
respect to existing provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly
created provinces under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and territory
requirements are met).
The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.
3
The actual population of the City of
Makati during the Senate deliberations in 1994 on House Bill (H.B.) No. 4264 that was to
be enacted into R.A. No. 7854 was 508,174.
4
That is why the Court in Mariano declared:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.
5
(emphasis in the original)
Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement
as it merely stated that Makatis legislative district may still be increased as long as the
minimum population requirement is met. The permissive declaration at that time
presupposes that Makati must still meet the constitutional requirements before it can have
another congressional district.
The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles
the creation of a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on
increasing population. There is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an
alternative addition to the income requirement.
The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec.
6
Notably, the ponencia spliced
that portion of the decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its argument. Thus the
ponencia quotes:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x To ensure
quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
(emphasis and underscoring in the original by the ponente)
It omitted that portion which specified the respective total population of the two districts
as above 250,000. Thus the full text of the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of
Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the
National Statistics
Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oros first district have a total
population of 254,644while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these
figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however,
does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality
of representation. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum
population requirement at the time of reappportionment. The ponencias construal of the
disparity in population sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs from the
disparity of population in the present case.
The Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000 benchmark
was used in apportioning the legislative districts in the country. The sponsorship speech of
Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr.
7
reflects so.
x x x x. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory.Each city or each province with a population of at least 250,000 shall
have at least one Representative. This is Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative. x x x x
The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned
among the provinces and cities with a population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the
1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our
population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with
at least 250,000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we at
first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces; and one each for all cities with a
population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan,
Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we
then proceeded to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and
cities in accordance with number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. x x x x. (capitalization, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended to apply the minimum population requirement of
250,000 to both cities and provinces in the initial apportionment, in proportion to the
countrys total population at that time (56 million).
Yet the ponencia asserts that the 250,000 benchmark was used only for the purpose of the
1986 initial apportionment of the legislative districts, and now disregards the benchmarks
application in the present petition. It is eerily silent, however, on what the present
population yardstick is. If the present estimated population of 90 million is to be the
dividend,
8
then there would roughly be one legislative district representative for every
450,000.
Following the constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below
250,000. This is the average "uniform and progressive ratio" that should prevail. Thus,
using the present population figure, the benchmark should be anywhere between 250,000-
450,000 persons per district. Using anything less than 250,000 is illogical, for it would
operate to allow more than 360 representatives of legislative districts alone on some
capricious basis other than the variable of population.
A case in point is the congressional reapportionment done in the provinces of Sultan
Kudarat and Zamboanga Sibugay effected through Republic Act No. 9357
9
and Republic
Act No. 9360,
10
respectively. At the time of the congressional deliberations and effectivity
of these laws, the population count in these provinces more than met the basic standard.
Sultan Kudarat already had a population of 522,187 during the 1995 census year,
11
while
Zamboanga Sibugay met the population threshold in 2001 with an estimated 503,700
headcount.
12

The ponencia sweepingly declares that "population was explicitly removed as a
factor."
13
Far from it. Population remains the controlling factor. From the discussions in
the initial apportionment and districting of Puerto Princesa, Baguio, Cavite, Laguna,
Maguindanao and Cebu in 1986, it is clear that population and contiguity were the primary
considerations, and the extraneous factors considered were circumspectly subsumed
thereto.
The ponencia harps on petitioners admission that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to
SIX legislative districts, given its population of 1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that
there is nothing wrong in the creation of another legislative district in the province. This is
a wrong premise. It bears noting that petitioners raised the legislative entitlement to
underscore the GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION committed in the enactment of R.A.
9716.
R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring the first and second districts. It
did not, however, touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly reapportioned,
can easily form another district. No reasons were offered except Senator Joker Arroyos
during the Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz: "When it comes to their district,
congressmen are kings. We cannot touch them. He [referring to Rep. Villafuerte] does not
also want it [referring to the district of Rep. Villafuerte] touched... even if they have a
pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it touched."
14

The resulting population distribution in the present case violates the uniform and
progressive ratio prescribed in the Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716, the tally of population percentage per district in
Camarines Sur based on its population of 1,693,821 was as follows:
District 1: 24.6%
District 2: 28.03%
District 3: 21.99%
District 4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per district after the passage of R.A. 9716:
District 1: 10.4%
District 2: 16.34%
District 3: 25.9%
District 4: 21.99% (former District 3)
District 5: 25.33% (former District 4)
Remarkably, before R.A. No. 9716, the first district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A.
No. 9716, it suffered a very significant drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157.
The extraneous factors
15
cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting,
particularly the inclusion of the municipality of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic
difference is a weak basis to segregate the municipalities in the redistricting. To sanction
that as basis would see a wholesale redistricting of the entire country, given the hundreds
of dialects being spoken. Imagine Binondo being segregated from the Tagalog-speaking
district of Tondo or Sta. Cruz in Manila on the ground that Fookien is largely spoken in
Binondo.
The former first district supposedly occupied 40% of the total land area of Camarines Sur.
But the former fourth district (which is now the fifth) comprises the same percentage of
land area, if not bigger. If land area was a factor, then the former fourth district should
have been re-districted also since it is endowed with a big area like the former first district.
The municipality of Libmanan is supposedly isolated by a body of water from the first
district. But so is the municipality of Cabusao which is situated northeast of Libmanan and
which is bordered by the same body of water. Yet Cabusao is part of the new first district.
Considering the similar geographical location of the two municipalities, there is no
compelling reason to segregate Libmanan from the first district and tack it to the newly
created second district.
The seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims
16
had already ruled that these factors cannot be
permissively considered in legislative reapportionment.
x x x Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling
criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. x x x [We] hold that, as a
basic constitutional standard, [equal protection] requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an
individuals right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its
weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in
other parts of the [State].
x x x x
[Equal protection] requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.
We realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one
has an identical number of residents, citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or
precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement. So long as the divergences from
a strict population principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor
economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify
disparities from population-based representation. Citizens, not history or economic
interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification for
deviations from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or
pastures, vote. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Undoubtedly, Camarines Surs malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering.
17

A final word. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from population, should be
considered in the composition of additional districts, thereby adding other requisites
despite the Constitutions clear limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia
effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic lawmakers to reconfigure their own
principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors,
such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even religious ones, is an invitation
to a free-for-all.
In light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition
and DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 9716.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O.
MEDINA, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the
Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT;
House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del
Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new
Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON.
ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE,
HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON.
CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors.
R E S O L U T I O N
NACHURA, J .:
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated
October 20, 2010 filed by Movant-Intervenors
1
dated and filed on October 29, 2010,
praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and (b) resolve their motion for
reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief
background of the relevant antecedents
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).
2
On December 3, 2006, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).
3
The
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
4
With the approval
of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim
set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during
the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of
provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
5

On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O.
Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9355.
6
The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
7

Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte,
filed another petition for certiorari
8
seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the
people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law
was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of
only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of
Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.
Constitution, Article X Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision
9
granting the petition.
10
The
Decision declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC.
Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as
null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article
9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such
exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
11

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their
respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution
12
dated May 12,
2010,
13
the Court denied the said motions.
14

Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of
court to admit their second motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second
motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually "noted without action" by this
Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.
15

Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8790, relevant to this case, which provides
RESOLUTION NO. 8790
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously
components of the First Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In
December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the Province of Dinagat Island[s] was
created and its creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this
purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice
Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats
pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled "Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the Philippines,
et al." rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355
unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province
prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the
1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above
decision of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of
Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names
of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position for Governor, Dinagat
Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice
Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for the ten
(10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have already been configured into the system and
can no longer be revised within the remaining period before the elections on May 10,
2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether
the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current
system configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning
that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del
Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of
the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the
Province of Dinagat Islands will, for the positions of Member, House of
Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the candidates for the said
positions.
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del
Norte, will, for the position of Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said
position. Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the
position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of the
candidates for the said position[s].
Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be
able to vote for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
and Member, House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for
Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile, voters of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands.
Also, the voters of the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be
able to vote for the Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given
this situation, the Commission will postpone the elections for Governor,
Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative
District, Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election will
result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for
Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First
Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte.
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of
the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the
election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b"
above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House
of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte
(with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte
whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that
the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case
and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put,
movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled
since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for governor,
vice governor, and House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan
member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of
Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents,
they have a clear and strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion
of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter
province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have to be
restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts
will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be
discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and
protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12,
2010 Resolution would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors
raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the
passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the
LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in
the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,
16
the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said
motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July
20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings
17
of the Court, allowing intervention as an
exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time
before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of
argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the
said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos
A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District of
Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro,
Surigao del Norte, and that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after
they were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao del Norte,
respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above
motion.
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for
reconsideration of the original parties, and neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion,
which our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for
reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for
reconsideration were already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to treat
Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be considered as a second
motion for reconsideration to warrant the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court.
18
It should be noted that this motion prays for the recall of the
entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July 20,
2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to
intervene and to admit motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not
rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but
only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this
denial elaborated on movants-intervenors interest in this case which existed only after
judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention and their motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial reconsideration
of the said resolution.
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support
the claim that this was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to reopen the case despite an
entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this
controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat
Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in
Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of
Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will
have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper
party interest for movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main
case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if the intervention be not
entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy as regards to the
impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the Courts
mind, there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by
movants-intervenors.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at
stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be argued that their interest in this case
should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is
obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than real. This is because
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain
finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government officials
stated therein would only have to be postponed. Given such a scenario, movants-
intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to the
reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have remained
candidates for the respective positions they have vied for and to which they have been
elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought
is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest
in the constitutional question raised.
19

It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality. Indeed, they
have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective
positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified
and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors should not be
left without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this case became
manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of such a
decision would definitely work to their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice,
without even them being parties to the dispute. Such decision would also violate their right
to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-
intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but also
of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy
should be weighed on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
20
The
second exception attends this case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
21
where
technicalities of procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional
issues raised were of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving
the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for intervention should be given
due course since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the
outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the
novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12,
2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a
case, which, though merely a statutory right that must comply with the requirements of the
rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts should proceed with
caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and
ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would
have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from
the constraints of technicalities.
22

Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in
light of attendant extraordinary circumstances.
23
The power to suspend or even disregard
rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself had already declared final.
24
In this case, the compelling concern is not only to
afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected
by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at
the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local
government units. In this manner, the thrust of the Constitution with respect to local
autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and the attainment of national
goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court
finds that the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve
affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver
basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income,
population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light,
Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these
three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of
the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from congressional debates are quoted
hereunder
HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we
thought
CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic
viability of the new local government unit, the new province?
x x x x
HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the
House version, because we also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land
area and population are functions really of the viability of the area, because you have an
income level which would be the trigger point for economic development, population will
naturally increase because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the
particular area from being converted into a province because of the population problems in
the beginning, it will never be able to reach the point where it could become a province
simply because it will never have the economic take off for it to trigger off that economic
development.
Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay
for overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the population. Over and above
that, the provincial officials should be able to trigger off economic development which will
attract immigration, which will attract new investments from the private sector. This is
now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the
proponents, simply by telling them, "Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand,"
you will never be able to become a province because nobody wants to go to your place.
Why? Because you never have any reason for economic viability.
x x x x
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?
HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers
HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area
because
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters,
ah, square kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative
efficiency and delivery of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted,
there is only one central government and then everybody falls under that. But it was later
on subdivided into provinces for purposes of administrative efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no
longer there precisely because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so wide
that no one man can possibly administer all of the complex machineries that are needed.
Secondly, when you say "delivery of basic services," as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor,
there are sections of the province which have never been visited by public officials,
precisely because they dont have the time nor the energy anymore to do that because its
so wide. Now, by compressing the land area and by reducing the population requirement,
we are, in effect, trying to follow the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which
is to deliver basic services and to make it more efficient in administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is
able to do it without being a burden to the national government. Thats the assumption.
HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if
we go on a minimum income level, then we say, "this is the trigger point at which this
administration can take place."
25

Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city,
and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz.
For a Barangay:
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a
contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro
Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where
such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay
or barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural
communities, barangays may be created in such communities by an Act
of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for
barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his
territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate
action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area
and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation
plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang
panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created
only by Act of Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements
prescribed in this Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be
created in the indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon
recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is
located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are
present:
(1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand
(2,000) inhabitants, except in municipalities and cities within
MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be
created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such
territory shall have a population of at least five thousand
(5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a
barangay shall not reduce the population of the original
barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised
by two (2) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries.
Municipality:
LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five
hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants
as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50)
square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not
reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality
or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area
shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds,
transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered regular municipalities.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality
shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately
preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand
(25,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and
(iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty
(50) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed
of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality
sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said
creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
City:
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisities:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the
land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF.
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or
land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of
a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:
LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF.
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
non-recurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or
land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation
of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to
the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area,
are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of
one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided
in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC,
although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would
form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities.
It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in
Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct
the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative
intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the
LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations
underpinning the principle of local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units.
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR
26
and in the Whereas
clauses of Administrative Order No. 270,
27
which read
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure
the autonomy of local governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals;
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to
convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation
of all the provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all
the concerned sectors of society and consideration of the operative principles of local
autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code of 1991, has completed the
formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; x x x
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could
prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture
an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in
themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist
of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450
and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the
minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to
create a province with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate
the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the
delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more
difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered
because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous
land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause,
as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in
the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together with territorial
contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,
28
with respect to
his
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the
distinguished Senator about the action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This
was passed about two years ago and has been pending in the Senate for consideration. This
is a bill that I am not the only one involved, including our distinguished Chairman here.
But then we did want to sponsor the bill, being the Chairman then of the Local
Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in
the creation of the new provinces, because of the vastness of the areas that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I
have said a while ago, that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two years. And
Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will
support this bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the Local Government Code,
which I have in writing from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we
in the House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the whole
Philippines to create a new province, and that is quite the concern of the respective
Congressmen.
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the
mother province from voting against the bill, if a province is going to be created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to
create another province, when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will
happen to Palawan? We wont have one million people there, and if you look at Palawan,
there will be about three or four provinces that will comprise that island. So, the
development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2,
1989. This was practically about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House Bill
7166.
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
"Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your House No.
7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local Government Code, Senate Bill No. 155,
which is pending for second reading.
Thank you and warm regards.
Very truly yours,"
That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the
Senate has adopted another position.
So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, thats the
only bill that is involving the present Local Government Code that we are practically
considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we do not approve it, as approved by
the lower House. This can be [an] irritant in the approval of the Conference Committee
Report. And I just want to manifest that insofar as the creation of the province, not only in
my province, but the other provinces. That the mother province will participate in the
plebiscite, they can defeat the province, lets say, on the basis of the result, the province
cannot be created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I dont see why, we should put this
stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they are seeking.
So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an
approved version of the House, and I will not be the one to raise up and question the
Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the House that are interested in this bill. And
they have been approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker reminded me to make
sure that it takes the cudgel of the House approved version.
So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not, because its the
wish of the House, but because the mother province will participate anyhow, you vote
them down; and that is provided for in the Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the
amendment with regards to the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the
plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words,
we dont want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they are left in the
devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their
situation. But the province of South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial
conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital
town is in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the West. And
if they have to travel from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one
hundred forty kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same
distance. And from the North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is the
problem there. And besides, they have enough resources and I feel that, not because I am
interested in the province, I am after their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on
those people? I have no interest but then I am looking at the future development of these
areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can
foresee what the creation of a new province will bring to these people. It will bring them
prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it will encourage even foreign investors.
Like the PAP now, they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even
the AID people are asking me, "What is holding the creation of a new province when
practically you need it?" Its not 20 or 30 kilometers from the capital town; its about 140
kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel that far and our road is not like
Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities
there that are just one municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the
income. Of course, they dont have the population because thats a part of the land of
promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday because they feel that there are
more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance
the development of the Philippines, not because I am interested in my province. Well, as
far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the twilight years of my life to serve and I would
like to serve my people well. No personal or political interest here. I hope the distinguished
Chairman of the Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has
already approved because we dont want them to throw the Conference Committee Report
after we have worked that the house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and not
even considered by the Senate. And on top of that, we are considering a bill that has not
yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the
legislative history of the Senate version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am sure
there was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it. Maybe the House version was
incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were introduced
and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not hold on to the original version and as a result
new criteria were introduced.
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a
book, Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your end
so that the objective that you want [to] achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with
sympathy. We will review our position on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate version
and we will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into it.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on
economic stimulation of a certain area. Like our case, because I put myself on our
province, our province is quite very big. Its composed of four (4) congressional districts
and I feel it should be five now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and
conversed proposing to divide the province into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on those
areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting
that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to
Ragay, very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That area now is infested
with NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be extended
to these areas. With a big or a large area of a province, a certain administrator or provincial
governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For me, if we really would like to
stimulate growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or geographical
impossibilities, where administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain
provisions in the law where maybe we can treat it with special considerations.
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far as
provinces are concerned. It is very surprising that there are provinces here which only
composed of six municipalities, eight municipalities, seven municipalities. Like in
Cagayan, Tuguegarao, there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in
Batanes province?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.
CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one
congressional district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito.
Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a
population of 63 thousand. But we do not hold it against the province because maybe
thats one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The land area for Camiguin is only
229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every
province, palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very
clear that in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang
tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because
what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To devolve powers in
order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their
respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make
a generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province
because of some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic
growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from the national government to a
particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve the same purpose?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually,
tinitingnan lang yun, provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say,
20% of the area.
Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and
Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, its composed
of six, but the share of Siquijor is the same share with that of the province of Camarines
Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even
with sympathy because of the explanation given and we will study this very carefully.
29

The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show
the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the previously
underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to directly share in the
allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under
Sections 284 and 285
of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land
area, population, and local revenue.
30

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction,
such as the legislative history of the law,
31
or may consider the implementing rules and
regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative
construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed
incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee
consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to
Section 533
32
of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall
formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and
effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring
compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was
also mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted by
Congress, to wit
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to
attain decentralization and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC,
Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a new law, now the LGC of 1991,
which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic
country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local
government units composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442
and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but
inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence,
the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives,
particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it
cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight Committee of the exemption from
the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or
more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section
461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
To be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee evidently conducted
due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and considered
the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was
formulated.
33
Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to
great weight and respect from this Court,
34
but to legislative construction as well,
especially with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government
units as members of the Oversight Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative
construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in
place, which Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately
translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and
viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following
the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant
to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon
in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show
the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more
islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC
was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income ofP82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation,
as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of
basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a
province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As
we have held in League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections
35

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it
is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as
much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts
ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of
the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-
equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind:
the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-
partite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the
three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others
acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions.
Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of
course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being
that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional
prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is
nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-
intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT
the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is
declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL,
and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the
officials thereof are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Congressman Francisco T. Matugas (incumbent Congressman of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte), Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo
Carlos A. Egay, Jr. (incumbent Governor and Vice Governor, respectively, of the
Province of Surigao del Norte), Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon.
Mamerto D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol
(incumbent Board Members of the First Provincial District of Surigao del Norte).
2
Passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on August 28, 2006 and
August 14, 2006, respectively.
3
R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 10.
SECTION. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless
said law or ordinance fixes another date.
4
Rollo, pp. 124-127.
5
Id. at 143.
6
Rollo (G.R. No. 175158), pp. 3-20.
7
Per the November 28, 2006 Resolution, the Court dismissed the petition due to
its defective or insufficient verification and certification of non-forum shopping
and the failure of petitioners counsel to indicate an updated Integrated Bar of the
Philippines official receipt. In its February 13, 2007 Resolution, the Court
dismissed the petition with finality. On April 11, 2007, an Entry of Judgment was
issued. (Id. at 77A and 112.)
8
Rollo, pp. 3-43.
9
Id. at 736-765.
10
Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno (now retired) and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio
Morales, Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose
Portugal Perez, and Jose Catral Mendoza, concurring.
11
Dissented to by Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, joined by
Associate Justices Renato C. Corona (now Chief Justice), Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Roberto A. Abad.
12
Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno (now retired) and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio-
Morales, Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and
Jose Catral Mendoza, concurring.
13
Dissented to by Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, joined by Associate
Justices Renato C. Corona (now Chief Justice), Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Roberto A. Abad.
14
Rollo, pp. 984-997.
15
Id. at 1153-1154.
16
Id. at 1155- 1158.
17
Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, 613
SCRA 385; Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., G.R. No. 176409, February
27, 2008, 547 SCRA 148; Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 527 (2003); Mago
v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 225 (1999); Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044,
January 27, 1995, 240 SCRA 649; Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 203 Phil. 652 (1982); and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181
Phil. 432 (1979).
18
Sec. 3. Second Motion for Reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a
second motion for reconsideration and any exception to this rule can only be
granted in the higher interest of just by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher
interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is
likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration
can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final
by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.
19
The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, G.R. No. 183591, October 14,
2008, 568 SCRA 402, citing Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 372
Phil. 401 (1999) and Vicente V. Mendoza, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 137 (2004).
20
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
21
Id. at 223.
22
See Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon. Rodrigo Cosico, 434 Phil. 753 (2002); People v.
Hon. Chavez, 411 Phil. 482 (2001).
23
Id.
24
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468, 492.
25
Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting of the Committee on Local
Government, May 22, 1991, 4th Regular Session, pp. 57-67.
26
ARTICLE 3. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the
Sate that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine
and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization whereby local government units (LGUs) shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the LGUs.
27
Prescribing the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
28
Congressman Chiongbian is one of the sponsors of House Bill No. 34061, the
House of Representatives version of the proposed Local Government Code.
29
Bicameral Conference Committee on Local Government (Book III), March 13,
1991, pp. 18-28.
30
Section 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. Local government units
shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty
percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%):
Provided, That in the event that the National Government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government, and Secretary of
Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the "liga", to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year: Provided, further, That
in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government units
shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment
which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public
services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of
devolved personal services.
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. The share of local
government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in
the following manner:
(a) Provinces Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays Twenty percent (20%):
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and
municipality shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area Twenty-five percent (25%) and
(c) Equal Sharing Twenty-five percent (25%):
Provided, further, That the share of each barangay with a population of
not less than one hundred (100) inhabitants shall not be less than Eighty
thousand pesos (P80,000.00) per annum chargeable against the twenty
percent (20%) share of the barangay from the internal revenue allotment,
and the balance to be allocated on the basis of the following formula:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code:
(1) Population Forty percent (40%); and
(2) Equal Sharing Sixty percent (60%)
(b) On the second year:
(1) Population Fifty percent (50%); and
(2) Equal Sharing Fifty percent (50%)
(c) On the third year and thereafter:
(1) Population Sixty percent (60%); and
(2) Equal Sharing Forty percent (40%):
Provided, finally, That the financial requirements of barangays created
by local government units after the effectivity of this Code shall be the
responsibility of the local government unit concerned.
31
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corp., 462 Phil. 96, 129-131,
416 SCRA 436 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 559; 299
SCRA 199 (1998).
32
Sec. 533. Formulation of Implementing Rules and Regulations.(a) Within one
(1) month after the approval of this Code, the President shall convene the
Oversight Committee as herein provided for. The said Committee shall formulate
and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and
effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring
compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the
Constitution.
(b) The Committee shall be composed of the following:
(1) The Executive Secretary, who shall be the Chairman;
(2) Three (3) members of the Senate to be appointed by the
President of the Senate, to include the Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government;
(3) Three (3) members of the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker, to include the Chairman of the
Committee on Local Government;
(4) The Cabinet, represented by the following:
(i) Secretary of the Interior and Local Government;
(ii) Secretary of Finance;
(iii) Secretary of Budget and Management; and
(5) One (1) representative from each of the following;
(i) The League of Provinces;
(ii) The League of Cities;
(iii) The League of Municipalities; and
(iv) The Liga ng mga Barangay.
(c) The Committee shall submit its report and recommendation to the
President within two (2) months after its organization. If the President
fails to act within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the
recommendation of the Oversight Committee shall be deemed approved.
Thereafter, the Committee shall supervise the transfer of such powers
and functions mandated under this Code to the local government units,
together with the corresponding personnel, properties, assets and
liabilities of the offices or agencies concerned, with the least possible
disruptions to existing programs and projects. The Committee shall
likewise recommend the corresponding appropriations necessary to
effect the said transfer.
For this purpose, the services of a technical staff shall be enlisted from
among the qualified employees of Congress, the government offices, and
the leagues constituting the Committee.
(d) The funding requirements and the secretariat of the Committee shall
be provided by the Office of the Executive Secretary.
(e) The sum of Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00), which shall be
charged against the Contingent Fund, is hereby allotted to the Committee
to fund the undertaking of an information campaign on this Code. The
Committee shall formulate the guidelines governing the conduct of said
campaign, and shall determine the national agencies or offices to be
involved for this purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)
33
As found in the Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991,
viz.:
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and
consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and consideration
of the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local
Government Code of 1991, has completed the formulation of the
implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
34
Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 728.
35
G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636,
644-645.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J .:
I join Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and Justice Arturo D. Brion in their dissents. I file this
separate dissenting opinion because the majoritys ruling today, legitimizing the creation
of a province in blatant violation of the Constitution and the Local Government Code,
opens the floodgates to the proliferation of pygmy provinces and legislative districts,
mangling sacred and fundamental principles governing our democratic way of life and
exacerbating the scourge of local dynastic politics.
First. The Dinagat Islands province simply does not meet the criteria for the creation
of a province. To implement the Constitution and for reasons of political practicality and
economic viability, Section 461 of the Local Government Code bars the creation of
provinces unless two of three minimum requirements are met. Section 461 of the Code
provides:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, that the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 461 requires a province to meet the minimum income requirement and either the
minimum land area or minimum population requirement. In short, two of the three
minimum requirements must be satisfied, with the minimum income requirement one
of the two. The Dinagat Islands province, whose income at the time of its creation in 2006
was P82,696,433.22, satisfies only the minimum income requirement. The Dinagat
Islands province does not meet either the minimum land area requirement or the
minimum population requirement. Indisputably, Dinagat Islands cannot qualify as a
province under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the law that governs the
creation of provinces.
Based on the 2000 census, Dinagat Islands population stood only at 106,951, less than
half of the statutory minimum of 250,000. In the census conducted seven years later in
2007, one year after its creation, its population grew by only 13,862, reaching 120,813,
still less than half of the minimum population required. The province does not fare any
better in land area, with its main island, one sub-island and around 47 islets covering only
802.12 square kilometers, less than half of the 2,000 square kilometers minimum land area
required.
The Local Government Code contains no exception to the income and population or land
area requirements in creating provinces. What the Code relaxed was the contiguity rule for
provinces consisting of "two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province."

The minimum land area of 2,000
square kilometers in the Code for the creation of a province was never changed, andno
exception was ever created by law. Hence, the exception created in the implementing
rule
1
of the Local Government Code, exempting provinces "composed of one (1) or more
islands" from the minimum land area requirement, is void for being ultra vires, granting a
statutory exception that the Local Government Code clearly withheld. The implementing
rule, being a mere administrative regulation to implement the Local Government Code,
cannot amend the Code but must conform to the Code. Only Congress, and not any other
body, is constitutionally empowered to create, through amendatory legislation, exceptions
to the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Code.
The majority argues that since the exception of island provinces from the minimum land
area requirement was inserted in the implementing rules by the congressional Oversight
Committee, the Court should extend great weight to this "legislative construction" of the
Code. This is gross error. First, in Macalintal v. Comelec,
2
we ruled that a congressional
oversight committee has no power to approve or disapprove the implementing rules of
laws because the implementation of laws is purely an executive function. The intrusion of
the congressional Oversight Committee in the drafting of implementing rules is a violation
of the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. This Court cannot allow such
intrusion without violating the Constitution. Second, Congress has no power to construe
the law. Only the courts are vested with the power to construe the law. Congress may
provide in the law itself a definition of terms but it cannot define or construe the law
through its Oversight Committee after it has enacted the law because such power belongs
to the courts.
It is not difficult to see why Congress allowed an exception to the land area requirement in
the creation of municipalities
3
and cities
4
but withheld it for provinces. The province, as
the largest political and corporate subdivision of local governance in this country, serves as
the geographic base from which municipalities, cities and even another province will be
carved, fostering local development. Todays majority ruling, allowing the creation of an
island province irrespective of population and land area so long as it has P20 million
annual income, wipes away the territorial and population tiering among provinces, cities
and municipalities the Local Government Code has carefully structured, reducing
provinces to the level of a rich municipality,
5
unable to host otherwise qualified new
smaller local government units for sheer lack of space.
Despite the majoritys ingenious resort to "legislative construction" in the implementing
rules to exempt Dinagat Islands from the minimum land area requirement, the majority
cannot escape one glaring fact: Dinagat Islands province satisfies only the minimum
income requirement under Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Even assuming
that the minimum land area requirement does not apply to island provinces, an
assumption that is devoid of any legal basis, Dinagat Islands still fail to meet the
minimum population requirement.Under Section 461 of the Code, two of the three
minimum requirements must be satisfied in the creation of a province, with the income
requirement being one of the two minimum requirements. The majoritys ruling today
creates the Dinagat Islands province despite the indisputable fact that it satisfies only one
of the two necessary requirements prescribed in Section 461. The majoritys ruling clearly
violates Section 461 of the Code, no question about it.
Second. It is mandatory that a province must have a population of at least 250,000. The
1987 Constitution mandates that "each province[,] shall have at least one
representative."
6
In Sema v. Commission on Elections,
7
we categorically ruled that "the
power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative
district." Thus, when Congress creates a province it necessarily creates at the same time a
legislative district. The province must comply with the minimum population of 250,000
because the Constitution mandates that 250,000 shall be the minimum population for the
creation of legislative districts.
8

The Constitution provides for proportional representation in the House of
Representatives when it declares that "legislative districts [shall be] apportioned
among provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants x x x ." This means that for every given number
of inhabitants, "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area" will be entitled to
one representative. In consonance with this constitutional rule on proportional
representation and in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, the minimum
population for the creation of legislative districts in provinces and citiesmust be the same.
Since the Constitution expressly provides that the minimum population of legislative
districts in cities shall be 250,000,
9
then it necessarily follows that the minimum population
of legislative districts in provinces shall also be 250,000. Otherwise, there will be a blatant
violation of two fundamental principles of our democratic system the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation in the House of Representatives for "provinces,
citiesand the Metropolitan Manila area" and the "one person, one vote" rule rooted in the
Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, to treat land area as an alternativeto the minimum population requirement
(based on the conjunctive "either" in Section 461) destroys the supremacy of the
Constitution, making the statutory text prevail over the clear constitutional language
mandating a minimum population through the requirement of proportional representation
in the apportionment of all legislative districts. In short, in the creation of a province
neither Congress nor the Executive can replace the minimum population
requirement with a land area requirement because the creation of a province
necessarily creates at the same time a legislative district, which under the
Constitution must have a minimum population of 250,000.
Because of the majoritys ruling today, the House of Representatives will now count
among its members a representative of a "premium" district consisting, as of the 2007
census, of only 120,813 constituents, well below the minimum population of 250,000 his
peers from the other regular districts represent. This malapportionment tolerates, on the
one hand, vote undervaluation in overpopulated districts, and, on the other hand, vote
overvaluation in underpopulated ones, in clear breach of the "one person, one vote" rule
rooted in the Equal Protection Clause. To illustrate, the 120,813 inhabitants of Dinagat
Islands province are entitled to send one representative to the House of Representatives. In
contrast, a legislative district in Metro Manila needs 250,000 inhabitants to send one
representative to the House of Representatives. Thus, one vote in Dinagat Islands has
the weight of more than two votes in Metro Manila for the purpose of representation
in the House of Representatives. This is not what our "one person, one vote"
representative democracy is all about.
What special and compelling circumstances have the majority found that entitle the
inhabitants of Dinagat Islands to such a privileged position? Do the inhabitants of Dinagat
Islands have more than twice the IQ of inhabitants of Metro Manila? Do the inhabitants of
Dinagat Islands pay more than twice the amount of taxes that inhabitants of Metro Manila
pay? Are the inhabitants of Dinagat Islands the chosen people of God to lead this country
to greatness? Have the Filipino people, in a plebiscite, agreed to confer on the inhabitants
of Dinagat Islands such privileged position, which is the only constitutionally justifiable
way to grant such privileged status? Indeed, the gross malapportionment this case presents
is just as constitutionally damaging as that in Aquino v. Commission on Elections
10
where
the population of the reapportioned five legislative districts in Camarines Sur, based on
relevant census, fluctuated from a high of 439,043 (Third District) to a low of 176,383
(First District).
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, and now this Dinagat Islands province case, will
mangle beyond recognition the bedrock constitutional principles of proportional
representation in the House of Representatives, as well as the egalitarian rule of "one
person, one vote" universally honored in all modern civilized societies and rooted in the
Equal Protection Clause. With Aquino v. Commission on Elections, a legislative district in
provinces can be created with no minimum population requirement. Thus, a municipality
with a population of only 25,000 can have a legislative district. With this Dinagat Islands
province case, a province, and necessarily a legislative district, can be created with a
population of only 120,000 or even less. In fact, under both Aquino v. Commission on
Electionsand this Dinagat Islands province case, there is no minimum population
requirement whatsoever in the creation of legislative districts in provinces, and thus
even a barangay with a population of 1,000 can be a legislative district. In sharp
contrast, a legislative district in cities can only be created with a minimum population of
250,000 as expressly required in the Constitution. To repeat, the majority has thrown into
the dustbin of history the bedrock democratic principles of proportional representation in
the House of Representatives and the "one person, one vote" rule rooted in the Equal
Protection Clause both of which are enshrined in our Constitution and in our democratic
way of life. Where is the majority of this Court bringing our representative democracy?
Third. Quasi-malapportionment laws like RA 9355 are double-edged knives thrust at the
heart of the anti-dynastic vision of the 1987 Constitution it fosters entrenchment of
political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by assuring political dynasties easy access
to public funds.
Members of Congress are entitled to an equal share of pork barrel funds regardless of the
size of their constituencies. Thus, each seat in the House of Representatives translates to a
potent platform for congressmen to cultivate patronage by doling out development,
livelihood and support projects using pork barrel funds allocated in annual budgets. For
each new province created entailing at the same time the creation of a legislative district
a pipeline to a huge pool of resources is opened, with the Congressman enjoying wide
discretion on how and where he will dispense such legislative largesse.
Under the majoritys ruling, not only land area but also population is immaterial in
creating island provinces. This is an open invitation to ruling political clans strategically
situated in this countrys thousands of islands to sponsor the creation of more
underpopulated provinces within their political bailiwicks,
11
enabling them to capture more
pork barrel funds, thus tightening their grip on the levers of power. This inevitably fuels
the feudal practices plaguing Philippine local politics by fortifying patron (congressman)
ward (constituents) relations upon which dynastic politics thrive. All this at the expense
of taxpayers, mostly residing in city legislative districts with minimum populations of
250,000, who surely would not want their taxes to be spent as pork barrel funds of political
dynasties in underpopulated legislative districts in island provinces.
The 1987 Constitution is not neutral on the scourge of dynastic politics, a phenomenon that
concentrates political power and public resources within the control of few families whose
members alternately hold elective offices, deftly skirting term limits. Its exclusionary
effect on access to public service led the framers of the 1987 Constitution to mandate that
the State "guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service" and that Congress
"prohibit political dynasties x x x."
12
To the Filipino peoples misfortune, Congress non-
implementation of this constitutional directive is now aggravated by this Courts wantonly
loose translation of the Constitutions apportionment standard of proportional
representation.
13
Thus, instead of ensuring compliance with the Constitutions mandate
prohibiting political dynasties, this Court has turned complicit to local politicians
predilection for dynastic entrenchment.
Fourth. Far from being dispensable components in the creation of local government units,
population and land area not income are the pivotal factors in funding local
government units. Under the Local Government Code, these components determine 75%
of the share from the national taxes (Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA) each local
government unit receives, the lifeblood of their operations, based on the following
formula:
1. Population Fifty percent (50%)
2. Land Area Twenty-five percent (25%)
3. Equal sharing Twenty-five percent (25%).
14

x x x x
Thus, population, with a weight of 50%, ranks first in importance in determining the
financial entitlement of local government units, followed by land area with a weight of
25%.
By treating Dinagat Islands land area of 802.12 square kilometers as compliant with the
2,000 square kilometers minimum under Section 461, the majority effectivelyincluded in
their land area computation the enclosed marine area or waters of Dinagat
Islands. This disposition not only reverses, without cause, decades old jurisprudence,
15
it
also wreaks havoc on the national governments allocation of the internal revenue
allotment to existing island provinces which would be justified in invoking todays ruling
to clamor for increased revenue shares due to increased "land area." In short, other island
provinces, like Romblon, Marinduque, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan, can now claim their
enclosed marine areas as part of their "land area" in computing their share of the IRA.
16

On the part of landlocked provinces hosting large bodies of water, like Rizal, Laguna,
Batangas, Cavite and Lanao del Sur, the situation is reversed. Finding themselves holding,
but not surrounded by, water, the submerged territory, no matter how large, is excluded
from the computation of their land area, thus proportionately lowering their share in the
revenue allotment compared to their island counterparts.
Thus, in its zeal to legalize the creation of an obviously disqualified local government unit,
the majority unwittingly creates classes of elite and disadvantaged provinces, using the
most arbitrary factor of geographic accident as basis for classification. Even under the
most benign equal protection analysis, this does not pass constitutional muster.
Fifth. The Constitution and the Local Government Code are normative guides for courts to
reasonably interpret and give expression to the will of the Filipino people as encoded in
their provisions. Members of this Court go beyond the bounds of their sworn duties when
they second guess the intent of the Constitutions framers and the peoples elected
representatives, pretending to act as if they themselves have been accorded electoral
mandate to amend statutes as they see fit. No amount of rhetoric singing paeans to the
virtues of promoting local autonomy can hide the blatant judicial legislation the majority
has succeeded in doing here today, to the detriment of the Constitutions requirements of
proportional representation in the House of Representatives, equal protection under the law
and the prohibition against political dynasties, not to mention the blatant violation of
Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment, the Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated 20 July 2010, and the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
12 May 2010 filed by the intervenors.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice


Footnotes
1
Article 9, paragraph 2 ("[T]he land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one or more islands. x x x x")
2
G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003.
3
Section 442 (b) ("The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall
be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall
not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one
(1) or more islands. x x x x") (emphasis supplied).
4
Section 450 (b) ("The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall
not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. x x x x") (emphasis supplied).
5
Which, under Section 442, must have minimum income, population and land
area of P2.5 million (based on 1991 prices), 25,000 and 50 square kilometers
(contiguous), respectively.
6
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Each legislative
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative." (Emphasis supplied)
7
G.R. Nos. 177597 & 178628, 16 July 2008.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
G.R. No. 189793, 617 SCRA 623 (2010).
11
Much like in the creation of legislative districts, the creation of local
government units is done at the behest of legislators representing the relevant
locality.
12
Section 26, Article II (emphasis supplied).
13
Paradigmatically shown in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189793, 617 SCRA 623 (2010).
14
Section 285.
15
In Tan v. Commission on Elections (No. L-73155, 11 July 1986, 142 SCRA
727), we rejected as baseless the claim that "territory" for purposes of the creation
of a province, includes submerged land: "The use of the word territory in this
particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence
thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the
mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit
exercises control." (Id. at 749; emphasis supplied).
16
Others island provinces would be Cebu, Bohol, Masbate, Catanduanes, Batanes,
Basilan, Siquijor, and Camiguin.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J .:
I join the Dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Diosdado M. Peralta on the strict
merits of the case on why, based on the merits, Republic Act No. 9355 (RA 9355),
otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, should be declared
unconstitutional.
Additionally, I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my objections in the strongest
terms against the transgressions the Court committed in ruling on this case. The result,
which is obvious to those who have been following the developments in this case and
current Supreme Court rulings, is another flip-flop, made worse by the violations of the
Courts own Internal Rules.
1
This is not, of course, the Courts first flip-flop in recent
memory; we did a couple of remarkable somersaults in our rulings in the case of League of
Cities of the Philippines, et al. v. Comelec.
2
This Dissent is written in the hope that the
Courts violation of its own rules in this case will be the last, and that the Court will re-
think its disposition of this case.
The Court rendered its Decision in this case on February 10, 2010, declaring RA 9355
unconstitutional. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in behalf of the respondents,
and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman filed their separate Motions for
Reconsideration. These were their first motions for reconsideration.
On May 12, 2010, the Court denied these motions for lack of merit.
On May 26 and 28, 2010, respondent Governor Ecleo-Villaroman and the OSG
respectively filed their 2nd Motions for Reconsideration. The Court simply noted these
motions without action as they are prohibited pleadings under Section 2, Rule 52 of the
Rules of Court. This procedural rule states:
Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
The Courts Decision of February 10, 2010 became final and executory, and Entry of
Judgment was made by the Clerk of Court on May 18, 2010. At that point, the Decision of
the Court should have been beyond recall.
On June 18, 2010 (or a full month after entry of judgment), new parties, namely
Congressman Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Sol T. Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay,
Jr., Hon. Vicente G. Castrence, Hon. Mamerto D. Galamida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos,
and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.
They prayed that they be allowed to intervene in the case since they were the newly
elected officials of Surigao del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, who were in danger of
losing their positions once the Court's February 10, 2010 decision, declaring R.A. No.
9355 unconstitutional, attained finality. Effectively, they took up the cause of the original
respondent Province of Surigao del Norte then represented by former Governor Robert
Ace Barbers.
The Court denied the motion in its Resolution of July 20, 2010, pursuant to Section 2, Rule
19 of the Rules of Court which allows a motion for intervention only before the rendition
of judgment by the trial court. Applying this rule to an action originally filed with the
Court, we ruled that a motion for intervention could only be filed before, and not after, the
final judgment in the case.
Respondent Governor Ecleo-Villaroman filed, on October 22, 2010, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion (To Resolve Motion for Leave of Court to Admit 2nd Motion for Reconsideration
and, to Set Aside Entry of Judgment). Thus, despite the Entry of Judgment, she sought the
Courts ruling on her 2nd Motion for Reconsideration that had simply been Noted Without
Action by the Court for being a prohibited pleading. The ploy to reopen the case and
escape from the consequences of the final judgment was apparent from the move to set
aside the Entry of Judgment. Effectively, she was moving for the third time to secure the
review of the February 10, 2010 Decision that had been declared final, and to re-submit the
case for another deliberation on the merits.
Side by side with the original respondent, the would-be intervenors - despite the lack of
personality to act on the case- filed on October 29, 2010 an Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment. Of course, this move was duly orchestrated with the respondents
whose own motions were filed a week earlier. This was a motion the would-be
intervenors had no personality to file since their proposed intervention, at that point,
stood denied.
The Court en banc deliberated on the case and by a vote of 9 in favor and 6 against,
decided to lift the entry of judgment and allow the intervention of the new parties. By the
same vote, it voted to completely reverse the Decision of February 10, 2010 and declare
RA 9355, entitled An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, constitutional.
In acting as it did, the Court did not hesitate, by a 9-6 vote, to disregard existing rules that
the Court itself created.
After this vote, the ponente modified the majority resolution in reaction to the original
version of this Dissent. This time, the majority Resolution claimed that it was acting only
on the would-be intervenors' Motion to Lift Entry of Judgment, not on the original
respondents' motion to set aside judgment. The ploy apparently was to avoid the
Dissent's position that the Court acted on a prohibited 2nd motion for
reconsideration without the required vote.
The Court, for reasons of its own, has chosen to live with the public fiction that 2nd
motions for reconsideration are prohibited pleadings pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the
Rules of Court, cited and quoted above. In actual practice, exceptions to this Rule are
allowed and what governs is Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
which provides:
Sec. 3. Second Motion for Reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second
motion for reconsideration and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed
decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially
capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second
motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration. [Emphases
supplied.]
In the present case, the Court simply noted without action respondent Governor Ecleo-
Villaromans and the OSGs 2nd motions for reconsideration because they are prohibited
pleadings. The Court thereafter declared its judgment final, and entry of judgment
followed. Thus, when Governor Ecleo-Villaroman sought to lift the entry of judgment, her
motion which sought to reopen the case for another review was effectively a third
motion for reconsideration that should have been governed by Section 3, Rule 15 of the
Internal Rules. With the modified position that the Court was acting on the movants-
intervenors' motion to lift entry of judgment, the majority sought to avoid the
restrictive rule on 2nd motions for reconsideration.
How the Court acted on the respondents and would-be intervenors' motions is interesting.
a. Violation of the Rule on Reconsideration. By a 9-6 vote, the Court declared the
entry of judgment lifted. In so doing, it completely disregarded its own rule that
any 2nd motion for reconsideration can only be entertained through a vote of 2/3
of the actual membership, or of 10 members, of the Court. It likewise disregarded
the rule that a second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before
the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the
Courts declaration. It conveniently forgot, too, when it subsequently claimed that
the motion it was considering was not by respondent Governor Ecleo but by the
would-be intervenors, that what an original party could no longer do with respect
to a final decision, would-be intervenors practically representing the same
interests and who had not even been recognized by this Court cannot also do;
otherwise, what is directly prohibited is allowed through indirect means.
Unbelievably, among the majority's supporting arguments to support their
violation, was that (1) a motion to lift entry of final judgment is not a motion for
reconsideration of the decision sought to be declared non-final; and that (2) no
exact provision of the Internal Rules covers the lifting of an entered final
judgment.
b. Violation of the Rule on Finality of Judgments. Worse than the above
transgression, the Court turned a blind eye to the finality of the judgment it had
reached in the case.
The judgment in a case becomes final by operation of law (after the lapse of fifteen [15]
days from the parties receipt of the judgment) or upon the Courts declaration of the
judgments finality. Entry of Judgment by the Clerk of Court follows the finality of a
judgment, i.e., if no motion for reconsideration is filed with the Court within fifteen (15)
days from the parties receipt of the judgment.
As mentioned above, no second motion for reconsideration can be entertained once a
judgment has become final. In this case, the Court disregarded its own rules and
entertained a motion to lift the entry of judgment and to reopen the case. It was not an
ordinary violation as the judgment lifted was already final. The respondent Governor's
motion to lift entry of judgment was effectively a third motion for reconsideration (as its
objective is to open the final decision for another consideration) and its consequences need
no elaborate argument to be understood. For the would-be intervenors, it was a matter of
putting the cart before the horse a move to lift the entry of judgment even before the
would-be intervenors had their personality recognized by the Court.
The principle of immutability of a final judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a
strong, credible and effective court. To quote what this Court has repeatedly stated on this
principle:
"It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what
remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating
bodies must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by law. [x x x ], the
Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of immutability of judgment is adhered to by
necessity notwithstanding occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must
somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would "be even more intolerable than the wrong
and injustice it is designed to protect."
3
[Emphases supplied.]
This same principle, incidentally, is what we teach students in law schools as a basic
bedrock principle in the administration of justice. This is the same principle, too, that
is often asked in the bar examinations. Unfortunately, this is the same principle that the
Court violated, through a 9-6 vote, when it decided to lift its Entry of Judgment and to
entertain the reopening of the final judgment in the case for renewed consideration. This,
indeed, is a most unusual move. Did the Majority truly fail to appreciate that the lifting of
the entry of judgment is no different in effect from entertaining a motion for
reconsideration, and can be made, if at all, by the actual parties, not by would-be
intervenors? If a 2nd motion for reconsideration is prohibited and requires a 2/3 vote, can a
vote that removes the character of finality from a judgment be any less?
c. Violation of the Rule on Intervention. The Court disregarded as well the rule on
interventions.
4
The motion for intervention was initially denied since the Courts decision
was already final, and intervention could no longer be allowed. To go around this rule,
the would-be intervenors, without first successfully securing leave to intervene, instead
filed its own motion to lift entry of judgment the same 2nd motion from the original
respondents that the Court previously simply noted without action. The Court granted the
motion to lift judgment by a 9-6 vote, under the fiction that it was an intervening party, not
the barred original respondents, who had asked for it.
To complete this blow-by-blow account, the respondents legal tactician used the ploy of
first reopening the case (initially through the original respondents, and subsequently solely
through the would-be intervenors), and thereafter moved to allow intervention since the
original respondents had by then exhausted their arguments for the constitutionality of RA
9355. On two previous attempts, the original respondents had failed. To get around the
insurmountable block posed by the rule on 2nd motions for reconsideration, they fell back
on their modified Resolution with the position that another party the would-be
intervenors wanted to lift the entry of judgment. Once the entry of judgment was lifted
and intervention was allowed, it was an easy step to reopen the arguments, add to what the
original respondents presented, and submit the case for a ruling on the merits. The same
magic numbers of course prevailed all throughout: 9 to 6.
In this manner, the original and final ruling of the Court, in what is commonly known as
the "Dinagat case" was reversed. Unlike the case of Lazarus who rose from the dead
through a miracle, Dinagat resurrected because the Court disregarded its own rules and
established jurisprudential principles. Of course, it can similarly be called a miracle as no
reversal could have taken place if just one of the series of transgressions pointed out did
not take place. How such resurrection can happen in the Supreme Court is a continuing
source of wonder!
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice


Footnotes
1
A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, effective May
22, 2010.
2
G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 & 178056, February 15, 2011.
3
Vios v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009, citing Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-BALAIS v. Coca-Cola
Bottlers, Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 155651, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 507, 513-
514; Apo Fruits Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009, citing Siy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468
SCRA 154, 161-162, Kline v. Murray, 257 P. 465, 79 Mont. 530, Flores v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 97556 & 101152, July 29, 1996,Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Arceo, G.R. No. 158270, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 85, Temic
Semiconductors, Inc. Employees Union (TSIEU)-FFW v. Federation of Free
Workers (FFW), G.R. No. 160993, May 20, 2008, 554 SCRA 122, 134; Session
Delights Ice and Cream Fast Foods v. CA, G.R. No. 172149, February 8, 2010,
citing Equitable Bank Corp. v. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA
380, 417; and Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No.
165697, August 4, 2009, citing Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. No. 158848, February 4,
2008, 543 SCRA 520, Social Security System v. Isip, G.R. No. 165417, April 4,
2007, 520 SCRA 310, Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172
SCRA 211 (1983).
4
Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads: Time to
intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


DISSENTING OPINION
PERALTA, J .:
With due respect to the ponente, I register my dissent.
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered a Decision in the instant case, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as
An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is
declared NULL and VOID.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration in behalf of
public respondents, and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, representing
the New Province of Dinagat Islands, also filed a separate motion for reconsideration of
the Decision dated February 10, 2010.
On May 12, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration
of the OSG and respondent Governor Geraldine Ecleo- Villaroman, representing the New
Province of Dinagat Islands, for lack of merit. A copy of the Resolution dated May 12,
2010 was received by the OSG on May 13, 2010, while respondent Governor Geraldine
Ecleo-Villaroman, representing the New Province of Dinagat Islands, received a copy of
the said Resolution on May 14, 2010.
The Decision dated February 10, 2010 became final and executory on May 18, 2010, as
evidenced by the Entry of Judgment
1
issued by the Clerk of Court.
On May 26, 2010, respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands, represented by Governor
Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010) and the said Motion for
Reconsideration, while on May 28, 2010, the OSG filed a Motion for Leave to File the
Attached 2nd Motion for Reconsideration (of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010) and the
aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. On June 29, 2010, the Court noted without action
the foregoing motions of respondents, as the said pleadings were considered second
motions for reconsideration of the Decision, which shall not be entertained by the Court, in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
On June 18, 2010, movants-intervenors Congressman Francisco T. Matugas, Hon. Sol T.
Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon.
Mamerto D. Galanida, Hon. Margarito M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010.
Movants-intervenors claimed that they have legal interest in this case as they are the duly
elected officials
2
of Surigao del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections, and their positions
will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010 in this case is not reversed and set aside.
On March 9, 2010, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8790,
3
the
pertinent portion of which reads:
x x x x
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether
the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system
configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province
of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain as two separate
provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province
of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District, Surigao del Norte.
x x x x
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte.
The result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in item "b"
above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of
Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will
have to be conducted.
Since movants-intervenors elective positions would be adversely affected if the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 would not be reversed, they prayed that they be allowed to
intervene in this case and to file their Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, and that their motion for reconsideration be admitted by
the Court.
In a Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010. The Court held that, fundamentally, the allowance or disallowance of a
motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
4
Under Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. The Court ruled that since this case originated
from an original action filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motion-in-
intervention is before and not after resolution of this case, citing Republic v. Gingoyon.
5

It should be noted that this case was decided on February 10, 2010, and the motions for
reconsideration of the Decision were denied in the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The
Decision dated February 10, 2010 became final and executory on May 18, 2010. Movants-
intervenors Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 was filed only on June 18,
2010, clearly after the Decision dated February 10, 2010 had became final and executory;
hence, the said motion was correctly denied.
The ponente submits that the Court should grant movants-intervenors motion for
reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, in full agreement with their position that
their interest in this case arose only after they were elected to their respective positions
during the May 10, 2010 elections.
As stated by the ponente, in their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three main arguments: (1) that the passage of R.A.
No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160 (the
Local Government Code of 1991); (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when
the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact
Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, the ponente urges the Court to take a hard and
intent look at the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors.
Movants-intervenors contended that R.A. No. 9355 is equivalent to the passage of an
amendatory law to the Local Government Code, as
instructed in the case of League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:
6

Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government
code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of
uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law,
adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may
reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income
requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of
amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws
specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned.
Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified
indicators. (Emphasis and [u]nderscoring supplied [by movants-intervenors].)
Defining legislative power, movants-intervenors cited Yakazi Torres Manufacturing, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,
7
thus:
The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make, alter, and repeal
laws. The authority to amend, change, or modify a law is thus part of such legislative
power. It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society. (Emphasis and [u]nderscoring supplied [by movants-intervenors].)
In view of the foregoing, movants-intervenors argued that the Local Government Code is
susceptible to all legislative processes, including amendments, repeals or modifications.
They asserted that there is no impediment for another statute, including R.A. No. 9355, to
amend or modify the Local Government Code as regards the criteria established for the
creation of a province. They noted that R.A. No 9355 relied on Article 9 (paragraph 2) of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, particularly
the provision that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province
is composed of one (1) or more islands." Movants-intervenors asserted that the said
provision should be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 9355; hence, they purported that the
land area requirement in the Local Government Code was modified by R.A. No. 9355.
They contended that "R.A. No. 9355, with the incorporated Article 9 (2) of the IRR of the
Local Government Code, became part of the Local Government Code."
Movants-intervenors argument is unmeritorious. As cited in Yakazi Torres
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, legislative power is the power to make, alter, and
repeal laws; thus, the authority to amend, change, or modify a law is part of such
legislative power. However, in this case, R.A. No. 9355, is not a law amending the Local
Government Code on the criteria for the creation of a province. Instead, R.A. No. 9355 is a
statute creating the Province of Dinagat Islands; hence, subject to the constitutional
provision on the creation of a province. The constitutional provision on the creation of a
province found in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
8

Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991, in Section 461 thereof,
prescribed the criteria for the creation of a province.
9
Hence, R.A. No. 9355 did not amend
the Local Government Code, but was subject to the criteria contained in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.
Moreover, Section 6 of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law
enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, even the Local Government Code clearly provides that Congress may enact a law
creating a local government unit, which in this case involves the creation of a province, but
such creation is subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in the Local
Government Code. Hence, the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is subject to the
requirements contained in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Since R.A. No.
9355 failed to comply with the land area or population requirement in the creation of the
province, it was declared unconstitutional in the Decision dated February 10, 2010.
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, which was cited by
movants-intervenors, does not apply to this case. The Court held in its Resolution dated
May 12, 2010, thus:
In League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the
16 cityhood laws, whose validity were questioned therein, were constitutional mainly
because it found that the said cityhood laws merely carried out the intent of R.A. No. 9009,
now Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code, to exempt therein respondents local
government units (LGUs) from the P100 million income requirement since the said LGUs
had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. Each one of the 16
cityhood laws contained a provision exempting the municipality covered from the P100
million income requirement.
In this case, R.A. No. 9355 was declared unconstitutional because there was utter failure to
comply with either the population or territorial requirement for the creation of a province
under Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Contrary to the contention of the movants-intervenors, Article 9 (2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts a proposed
province from the land area requirement if it is composed of one or more islands, cannot
be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 9355, because rules and regulations cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law. Thus, in the Decision dated February 10, 2010,
the Court held that Article 9 (2) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code
is null and void, because the exemption is not found in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code.
10
There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because
the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
11

Next, movants-intervenors stated that assuming that Section 461 of the Local Government
Code was not amended by R.A. No. 9355, they still sought reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, as they adopted the interpretation of the ponente and
Justice Perez of Section 461 of the Local Government Code in their respective dissenting
opinions. They asserted that the correct interpretation of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code is that of Justice Nachura.
It must be stressed that the movants-intervenors assertion was already answered in the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, denying the motions for reconsideration of the OSG and
Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, representing the Province of Dinagat Islands. The
Court, in the said Resolution, answered the same contention, thus:
The movants now argue that the correct interpretation of Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code is the one stated in the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Antonio
B. Nachura.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nachura agrees that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply
with the population requirement. However, he contends that the Province of Dinagat
Islands did not fail to comply with the territorial requirement because it is composed of a
group of islands; hence, it is exempt from compliance not only with the territorial
contiguity requirement, but also with the 2,000-square- kilometer land area criterion in
Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code, which is reproduced for easy reference:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That,
the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Justice Nachura contends that the stipulation in paragraph (b) qualifies not merely the
word "contiguous" in paragraph (a) (i) in the same provision, but rather the entirety of
paragraph (a) (i) that reads:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau[.]
He argues that the whole paragraph on contiguity and land area in paragraph (a) (i) above
is the one being referred to in the exemption from the territorial requirement in paragraph
(b). Thus, he contends that if the province to be created is composed of islands, like the
one in this case, then, its territory need not be contiguous and need not have an area of at
least 2,000 square kilometers. He asserts that this is because as the law is worded,
contiguity and land area are not two distinct and separate requirements, but they qualify
each other. An exemption from one of the two component requirements in paragraph (a) (i)
allegedly necessitates an exemption from the other component requirement because the
non-attendance of one results in the absence of a reason for the other component
requirement to effect a qualification.
Similarly, the OSG contends that when paragraph (b) of Section 461 of the Local
Government Code provides that the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands," it necessarily dispenses the 2,000 sq. km. land area requirement, lest
such exemption would not make sense. The OSG argues that in stating that a "territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands," the law could not have
meant to define the obvious. The land mass of two or more island will never be contiguous
as it is covered by bodies of water. It is then but logical that the territory of a proposed
province that is composed of one or more islands need not be contiguous or be at least
2,000 sq. km.
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units)
of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion.As a general rule, the creation of a local government
unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income.It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for
all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government
unit concerned;
(b) Population.It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land area.It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance
(DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in the
creation of a local government unit, states in paragraph ( c ) thereof that the land area must
be contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.
Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) The land area must be contiguous;
and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to
meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in the creation of a province
is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the Local Government
Code.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code, providing the requisites for the creation
of a province, specifically states the requirement of "a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers."
Hence, contrary to the arguments of both movants, the requirement of a contiguous
territory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct
and separate requirements for land area under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section
7 (c) of the Local Government Code.
However, paragraph (b) of Section 461 provides two instances of exemption from the
requirement of territorial contiguity, thus:
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
Contrary to the contention of the movants, the exemption above pertains only to the
requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of territorial
contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province
is composed of two or more islands or when the territory of a province is separated by a
chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 square kilometers or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the
Local Government Code.
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or
for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not
contemplated, nor construe its provisions by taking into account questions of expediency,
good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non-compliance
therewith. Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, but only for application.1avvphi1
Further, movants-intervenors pointed out that pursuant to R.A. No. 9355, the Province of
Dinagat Islands has been organized and is functioning as a province, which cannot just be
ignored. Thus, a more realistic and pragmatic view should have been adopted by the Court
in its Resolution
dated May 12, 2010 following the Operative Fact Doctrine, citing Planters Products, Inc.
v. Fertiphil Corporation.
12

In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI)
and private respondent Fertiphil were private corporations, which were both engaged in the
importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. On June 3,
1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued LOI No. 1465, which provides:
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing
formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital
contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such
capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the
Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10.00 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic
market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which amount FPA remitted to the
depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid FPAP6,689,144.00 from July 8, 1985 to January 24,
1986.
After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10.00
levy. Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465,
but PPI refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and
damages against FPA and PPI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. It
questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of
law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation,
which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
The RTC ruled in favor of Fertiphil, and ordered PPI to pay Fertiphil the sum
of P6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from the time of judicial demand; the sum
of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and the cost of suit. Ruling that the imposition of
the P10.00 levy was an exercise of the States inherent power of taxation, the RTC
invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public
purpose. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, but deleted the
award of attorneys fees.
The Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals as LOI No. 1465 failed to comply
with the public purpose requirement for tax laws. As regards the argument of PPI that
Fertiphil cannot seek a refund based on the Operative Fact Doctrine, the Court held:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of operative fact is
inapplicable.
PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared
unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of operative fact, which provides that an
unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. PPI wants to
retain the levies paid under LOI No. 1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be
unconstitutional.
We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on
appeal, unless it has been raised in the court a quo. PPI did not raise the applicability of the
doctrine of operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It cannot belatedly raise the issue with
Us in order to extricate itself from the dire effects of an unconstitutional law.
At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional
law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no
legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being
void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in
accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general
rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter
of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing
that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by
Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited from the levy. It was proven during the
trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank account. Quite the reverse,
it would be inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich
PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every
person who, through an act of performance by another comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him." We
cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI
must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.
13

In this case, the general rule applies that an unconstitutional law is void, and produces no
legal effect. As stated in the decision above, the doctrine of operative fact, as an exception
to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. The said doctrine
recognizes that the actual existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot always
be ignored. The doctrine was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy
14
or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it in the case of Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito.
15

In Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, the Court ruled that Executive Order 386 creating
the Municipality of Malabang is void, and respondent officials were permanently
restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.
Nevertheless, the Court stated there was no basis for respondent officials apprehension
that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of
unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that
municipality, citing Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, thus:
16

x x x The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute
and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
17

Therefore, based on the foregoing, any question on the validity of acts done before the
invalidation of R.A. No. 9355 may be raised before the courts.
Lastly, movants-intervenors contended that the inhabitants of the Province of Dinagat
Islands have expressed their will, through their votes in a plebiscite, to be a province;
hence, the Court should uphold the will of the people and uphold the validity of R.A. No.
9355.
The contention does not persuade. The validity of R.A. No. 9355 creating the province of
Dinagat Islands depends on its compliance with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
which states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
18

Although the political units directly affected by the creation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands approved the creation of the said province, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with
the criteria for the creation of the province contained in Section 461 of the Local
Government Code; hence, it was declared unconstitutional.
As cited in the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, Tan v. Comelec
19
held:
x x x [T]he fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its
officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and
academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error
should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this court to yield
to the respondents urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should
passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion.
Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with
mischief. Respondents submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should
be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and
with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political
subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from
entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
In view of the foregoing, the Court acted in accordance with its sound discretion in
denying movants-intervenors Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 as the
issues raised by them lacked merit or had already been resolved by the Court in its
Decision dated February 10, 2010 and its Resolution dated May 12, 2010 denying
respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Moreover, under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court, a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. Since this case originated from an original action filed before this Court, the
Court properly ruled that the appropriate time to file the motion-in-intervention is before
and not after resolution of this case, citing Republic v. Gingoyon.
20
Further, when movants-
intervenors filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on June 18, 2010, the
Decision of February 10, 2010 had already become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
Aside from urging the Court to take a hard look on the first and second arguments raised
by movants-intervenors, the ponente also wants the Court to consider his arguments for a
reconsideration of the Decision in this case.
The ponente states that the Court must bear in mind that the central policy considerations
in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration
and capability to deliver basic services, and the criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish
these results. He adds that in this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on
the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them
should enjoy preferential consideration. The ponente calls the attention of the majority to
the primordial criterion of economic viability in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, as intended by the framers of R.A. No. 7160.
The argument of the ponente has been discussed in his earlier Dissenting Opinion. It must
be pointed out that from the congressional debates cited by the ponente, the framers of
R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 finally came out with the end
result, that is, Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, which is the basis for the creation of a
province. Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Thus, the requisites for the creation of a province, as provided by R.A. No. 7160, is an
annual income of not less than P20 million and either a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau, or a
population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office. As the wordings of the law are plain and clear, compliance
with the territorial requirement or population requirement cannot be made light of or
disregarded.
In this case, R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands failed to comply with
either the territorial or the population requirement of the Local Government Code. The
Court stated in its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, thus:
As the law-making branch of the government, indeed, it was the Legislature that imposed
the criteria for the creation of a province as contained in Sec. 461 of the Local Government
Code. No law has yet been passed amending Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code, so
only the criteria stated therein are the bases for the creation of a province. The Constitution
clearly mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the
creation of a province; hence, any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in
the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Further, the ponente states that the provisions of both R.A. No 7160 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC-IRR) show that
with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,income, population,
and land area, are provided for. He points out that the exemption from the land area
requirement when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more
islands is expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 and the
LGC-IRR with respect to the creation of municipalities and component cities, respectively,
but the exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, but is expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of
the LGC-IRR.
The ponente opines that there does not appear any rhyme or reason why this exemption
should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. He stated that considering
the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or groups of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province
than in most cities or municipalities. According to the ponente, it is, therefore, logical to
infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for cities) of R.A. No. 7160, but was inadvertently
omitted in Section 461 (for provinces).
The ponente submits that when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section
461 of R.A. No. 7160 -- and reflect the true legislative intent; thus, it would be in order for
the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2), LGC-IRR.
The ponente also submits that Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR amounts to an executive
construction of the provisions, policies, and principles of R.A. No. 7160, entitled to great
weight and respect. He contends that it is actually a detail expressly provided by the
Oversight Committee to fill in the void, honest mistake and oversight committed by
Congress in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160, taking into account the spirit and intent of the
law.
The ponentes argument does not persuade. The Local Government Code took effect on
January 1, 1992, so 19 years have lapsed since its enactment. If the Legislature committed
the "congressional oversight in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160" as alleged by Justice
Nachura, it would have amended Section 461, which is a function of Congress. Substantial
"oversights" in the basic law, particularly as alleged with respect to Section 461 of R.A.
No. 7160, cannot be corrected in the implementing rules thereof, as it is settled rule that
the implementing rules of the basic law cannot go beyond the scope of the basic law.1awphi1
Moreover, it should be pointed out that a province is "composed of a cluster of
municipalities, or municipalities and component cities,"
21
and, therefore, has a bigger land
area than that of a municipality and a city, as provided by law. It is noted that the former
Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) did not provide for a required land
area in the creation of a municipality and a city, but provided for a required land area in the
creation of a province, which is 3,500 square kilometers, now lessened to 2,000 square
kilometers in the present Local Government Code. If only the income matters in the
creation of a province, then there would be no need for the distinctions in the population
and land area requirements provided for a municipality, city and province in the present
Local Government Code. It may be stated that unlike a municipality and a city, the
territorial requirement of a province contained in Section 461
22
of the Local Government
Code follows the general rule in Section 7, Chapter 2 (entitled General Powers and
Attributes of Local Government Units) of the same Code, thus:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion.As a general rule, the creation of a local government
unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income.It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for
all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government
unit concerned;
(b) Population.It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land area.It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance
(DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
23

Moreover, the argument that Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR amounts to an executive
construction of the provisions, policies, and principles of R.A. No. 7160, entitled to great
weight and respect, citing the case of Galarosa v. Valencia,
24
has already been ruled upon
in the Decision dated February 10, 2010, thus:
Further, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
IRRs issued by the Oversight Committee composed of members of the legislative and
executive branches of the government are entitled to great weight and respect, as they are
in the nature of executive construction.
The case is not in point. In Galarosa, the issue was whether or not Galarosa could continue
to serve as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond June 30, 1992, the date when the
term of office of the elective members of theSangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired.
Galarosa was the incumbent president of the Katipunang Bayan or Association
of Barangay Councils (ABC) of the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon; and
was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant to
Executive Order No. 342 in relation to Section 146 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the
former Local Government Code.
Section 494 of the Local Government Code of 1991 states that the duly elected presidents
of the liga [ng mga barangay] at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the
component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex
officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panglungsod, and sangguniang
panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as
presidents of the liga chapters which, in no case, shall be beyond the term of office of
the sanggunian concerned. The section, however, does not fix the specific duration of their
term as liga president. The Court held that this was left to the by-laws of the liga pursuant
to Article 211(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991. Moreover, there was no indication that Sections 491 and 494 should be given
retroactive effect to adversely affect the presidents of the ABC; hence, the said provisions
were to be applied prospectively.
The Court stated that there is no law that prohibits ABC presidents from holding over as
members of theSangguniang Bayan. On the contrary, the IRR, prepared and issued by the
Oversight Committee upon specific mandate of Section 533 of the Local Government
Code, expressly recognizes and grants the hold-over authority to the ABC presidents under
Article 210, Rule XXIX. The Court upheld the application of the hold-over doctrine in the
provisions of the IRR and the issuances of the DILG, whose purpose was to prevent a
hiatus in the government pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted
into office.
The Court held that Section 494 of the Local Government Code could not have been
intended to allow a gap in the representation of the barangays, through the presidents of
the ABC, in the sanggunian. Since the term of office of the punong barangays elected in
the March 28, 1989 election and the term of office of the presidents of the ABC had not
yet expired, and taking into account the special role conferred upon, and the broader
powers and functions vested in the barangays by the Code, it was inferred that the Code
never intended to deprive thebarangays of their representation in the sangguniang
bayan during the interregnum when the liga had yet to be formally organized with the
election of its officers.
Under the circumstances prevailing in Galarosa, the Court considered the relevant
provisions in the IRR formulated by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent issuances
of the DILG in the nature of executive construction, which were entitled to great weight
and respect.
Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the laws
four corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply
apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction like the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules
and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive construction.
In this case, the requirements for the creation of a province contained in Section 461 of the
Local Government Code are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does
not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the provision in Article 9(2) of the IRR
exempting a proposed province composed of one or more islands from the land-area
requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by
the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local
Government Code, and is, therefore, null and void.
The ponente also stated that it may be well to remember basic policy considerations
underpinning the principle of local autonomy, and cited Section 2, R.A. No 7160, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units.
Indeed, the policy of the State is that "the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the attainment of national goals."
However, it must stressed that in the creation of the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State, the requirements provided by the Local Government Code must also be
complied with, which R.A. No. 9355 failed to do.
Further, the ponente states that consistent with the declared policy to provide local
government units local autonomy, he submits that the territory, contiguity and minimum
land area requirements for prospective local government units should be construed
liberally in order to achieve the desired results. He adds that this liberal interpretation is
more appropriate, taking into account the rules on construction of the LGC, viz:
SEC. 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
x x x x
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the
quality of life for the people in the community;
The ponente seeks for a liberal interpretation as regards the territorial requirement in the
creation of a province based on the rules of interpretation of the general welfare provisions
of the Local Government Code. General welfare is clarified in Section 16 of the Local
Government Code, thus:
Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The Local Government Code provides that it is "[t]he general welfare provisions in this
Code which shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community." Nowhere is it stated therein that the provisions for the creation of a local
government unit, the province in particular, should be liberally interpreted. Moreover,
since the criteria for the creation of a province under the Local Government Code are clear,
there is no room for interpretation, but only application.
To reiterate, the constitutional basis for the creation of a province is laid down in Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides that no province may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The criteria for the
creation of a province are found in Section 461 of the Local Government Code. Moreover,
Section 6 of the Local Government Code provides that "[a] local government unit may be
created xxx by law enacted by congress in the case of a province xxx subject to such
limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code."
Based on the criteria for the creation of a province provided for in Section 461 of the Local
Government, the Court found that R.A. No. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands
failed to comply with the population or territorial requirement; hence, R.A. No. 9355 was
declared unconstitutional.
The Decision in this case was promulgated on February 10, 2010. The motions for
reconsideration of the Decision was denied on May 12, 2010. The Decision of February
10, 2010 became final and executory on May 18, 2010, as evidenced by the Entry of
Judgment
25
issued by the Clerk of Court. Movants-intervenors filed their Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 201 only on June 18, 2010, or after the resolution of the case
and one month after the Decision in this case already became final and executory. Hence,
the Court properly denied the said motion.
The ponente contends that there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment filed on October 29, 2010 by movants-intervenors for the simple reason
that the Entry of Judgment was prematurely issued on October 5, 2010 in view of the
pendency of the movants-intervenors motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, which was filed on September 7, 2010.
I cannot agree with such contention. Although Entry of Judgment was made on October 5,
2010, it must be borne in mind that the Decision in this case became final and executory
on May 18, 2010, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment
26
issued by the Clerk of Court. If
the Court follows Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, the date of finality of the
judgment is deemed to be the date of its entry, thus:
Sec. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders.If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order
shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of
finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The
record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed
by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment of final order has become final and
executory.
The amendment in Section 2 above makes finality and entry simultaneous by operation of
law, and eliminates the confusion and guesswork whenever the parties could not have
access, for one reason or another, to the Book of Entries of Judgments.
27
It also avoids the
usual problem where the physical act of writing out the entry is delayed by neglect or
sloth.
28

In addition, the Court properly denied on July 20, 2010 the movants-intervenors Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, since it was filed after the resolution of the case and
after the Decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. With the
denial of the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the movants-intervenors did
not have legal standing to intervene; hence, their motion for reconsideration of the July 20,
2010 Resolution has no bearing on the validity of the Entry of Judgment that was recorded
in the Book of Entries of Judgments on October 5, 2010. Therefore, the Entry of Judgment
cannot be recalled on the ground of pendency of the movants-intervenors motion for
reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
Since movants-intervenors Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 was denied
in the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution filed on September 7, 2010 by movants-intervenors was recommended to also
be denied, but has yet to be acted on by the Court.
Further, on October 22, 2010, respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands, represented by
Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (To resolve
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and, to set aside
Entry of Judgment). Respondent admitted that it filed the Motion for Leave of Court to
Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration on May 26, 2010, twelve (12) days after receipt
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 denying respondents motion for reconsideration.
It should be pointed out that the Court has acted on respondent New Province of Dinagat
Islands Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and the
aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration, which were filed on May 26, 2010 (after the
Decision had become final and executory on May 18, 2010), in the Courts Resolution
dated June 26, 2010. Treated as a second motion for reconsideration of the Decision,
which is disallowed, the Court resolved to note without action the said motions in view of
the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 denying the motions for reconsideration of the
February 10, 2010 Decision. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration.No second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
As the decision in this case became final and executory on May 18, 2010, the decision is
unalterable.1avvphi1 In Gomez v. Correa,
29
the Court held:
It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some
definite point in time.
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-
called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void.
To stress, the motion for reconsideration filed by movants-intervenors on the denial of the
motion for internvention should have been denied since to grant the same would be
tantamount to reopening a case which is already final. Worse, movants-intervenors are not
even original parties to the present case and therefore are not in a position to file a motion
to recall a judgment which is already final and executory.
In view of the foregoing, I maintain that the movants-intervenors Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, which was filed only on June 18, 2010 or after resolution
of the case and after the Decision of February 10, 2010 had become final and executory on
May 18, 2010, was properly denied in the Resolution dated July 20, 2010. Consequently, I
maintain my stand that movants-intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated July 20, 2010, which motion was filed on September 7, 2010, be denied for lack of
merit. Further, it is recommended that movants-intervenors Urgent Motion to Recall Entry
of Judgment filed on October 29, 2010, and the Omnibus Motion (To resolve Motion for
Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration and to set aside Entry of
Judgment) filed on October 22, 2010 by respondent New Province of Dinagat Islands,
represented by Governor Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman, be likewise denied for lack of merit.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
CONCURRING OPINION
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great not by reason
of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.
These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law
will bend.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Northern Securities Co. v. United States
1

On the abstract principles which govern courts in construing legislative acts, no difference
of opinion can exist. It is only in the application of those principles that the difference
discovers itself.
Chief Justice John Marshall
United States v. Fisher
2

Considering the circumstances which supervened after the promulgation of the Decision
on February 10, 2010 and Resolution dated May 12, 2010, I find myself reconsidering my
previous position. Mr. Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura has himself identified factors
not previously considered by this Court, which, in my view, warrant a reversal of our
previous rulings.
The case before us concerns the proper interpretation of Section 461 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7160, also known as the Local Government Code (LGC), which prescribes the criteria
for the creation of a province as follows:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of
the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.
3
(Underscoring supplied)
To implement the provisions of the LGC, the Oversight Committee (created pursuant to
Sec. 533 of the LGC) formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations to carry out the
provisions of the law. Article 9 of said Rules and Regulations provides:
Art. 9 Provinces (a) Requisites for Creation. A province shall not be created unless the
following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(i) Income - An average annual income of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based
on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the DOF. The average annual income
shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and
(ii) Population or land area Population shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute
to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
Since our May 12, 2010 ruling (which denied respondents respective Motions for
Reconsideration), the Office of the Solicitor General (representing the Republic of the
Philippines) and Gov. Geraldine Ecleo Villaroman (representing the new Province of the
Dinagat Islands), each sought leave to file a Second Motion for Reconsideration on May
27, 2010 and May 26, 2010, respectively, which motions were noted without action. The
winning candidates for provincial and congressional seats in Surigao del Norte also sought
to intervene in this case; however, their motion for intervention was denied on July 20,
2010.
Subsequent to the Motions for Reconsideration, Justice Nachura has taken pains to
compare the requisites for the creation of the different local government units (LGUs) in
order to highlight what, in my view, is a glaring inconsistency in the provisions of the law.
To summarize:
LGU Land Area Requirement
Barangay No minimum land area requirement. Rather, the barangay must be created
out of a contiguous territory with a population of at least two thousand
(2,000) inhabitants [Sec. 386(a), LGC]
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
[Sec. 386(b), LGC]
Municipality Contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers
Note the land area requirement is IN ADDITION to the income
requirement of at least Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(PhP2,500,000.00) in average annual income for the last 2 consecutive years
AND the population requirement of at least Twenty Five Thousand (25,000)
inhabitants. [Sec. 442(a), LGC]
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. [Sec. 442(b),
LGC]
City Contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers
Note a city must have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million
Pesos (PhP20,000,000.00) for the last 2 consecutive years AND comply
with either the land area requirement OR have a population of at least one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants. [Sec. 450(a), LGC]
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. [Sec 450(b), LGC]
Province Contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers.
Note a province must have an average annual income of at least Twenty
Million Pesos (PhP20,000,000.00) AND comply with either the land area
requirement OR have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants. [Sec. 461(a), LGC]
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province. [Sec 461(b), LGC]
As Justice Nachura points out, as regards the creation of barangays, land area is not
included as a requirement. However, a minimum land area is provided for the creation of
municipalities, cities, and provinces. Furthermore, while an exemption
4
is provided for
municipalities and cities in cases where the LGU concerned is composed of one or more
islands, in stark contrast, no such exemption exists with respect to provinces.
It is not difficult to see why no exemption is needed for barangays why exempt them
from a requirement that does not even apply to them? In fact, the inclusion of the clause
"[t]he territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands" in Sec.
386(b) of the LGC appears to be surplusage. But I cannot see why there would be a
difference in treatment between cities and municipalities, on one hand, and provinces, on
the other. In fact, as Justice Nachura points out, this may lead to anomalous results. This
leads me to conclude that Justice Nachuras interpretation is indeed correct that the
legislature fully intended to exempt LGUs from the land area requirement in cases where
the LGU concerned encompassed two or more islands, as provided in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for cities), but this legislative policy was not carried over
to Section 461 (for provinces). Consequently, Article 9(2) of the LGCs Implementing
Rules and Regulations were precisely enacted in order to correct the congressional
oversight.
Our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, suggests that this interpretation
is implausible because even if there were any such oversight, Congress had every
opportunity in the last 19 years to correct its mistake. To this I would only observe that
Congress has never, in the last 19 years, been faced with a situation where an amendment
to Section 461 of the LGC was necessary or desirable, and no case concerning the land
area requirement for provinces has ever been brought before this Court since the LGCs
enactment.
5
The only case that has mentioned the land area requirement for provinces, Tan
v. Commission on Elections,
6
(regarding the invalidation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 885
which created the province of Negros Del Norte) dealt with the matter only tangentially, at
best.
7

Justice Peralta also opines that there is no need to search for the legislative intent, since the
language of the law is plain, clear, and unambiguous. I would submit, however, that it is
equally true that the statute must be read as a whole, that its clauses and phrases are not
detached and isolated expressions, but that each and every part must be considered in order
to ascertain its meaning.
8

Therefore, the statute, read as a whole, in the light of its legislative history, cannot be said
to preclude the interpretation placed on it by the majority. But in interpreting a statute
[such as the Local Government Code], we cannot take one sentence, one section, or even
the entire statute alone and say that it has a "plain meaning" as if there were an objective
formula in the few words simply waiting to be grasped by the courts. Instead the statute
must be read as a whole, taking all of its provisions and reading them in the context of the
legal fabric to which they are to be applied. An interpretation that creates an admittedly
anomalous result is not salved by the majority's apologia that, if we read the statute in that
fashion, Congress created the anomaly. Instead the question is whether the statute read as a
whole was intended by Congress to create such results. The law is not an isolated bundle
of capricious and inconsistent commands by a legislature presumed to react mindlessly.
9

It is also relevant that the Senate and the House of Representatives, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, have asserted that Congress intended that provinces
composed of one or more islands should be exempted from the 2,000 sq. km. land area
requirement. Surely, the legislatures will in this case should be given deference, as a co-
equal branch of government operating within its area of constitutional authority.
I also cannot help but note that the Dinagat Islands is not the first small island-province
which has been separated from a larger province through legislative imprimatur. The Court
may take judicial notice of the fact that the island-provinces of Batanes (previously
annexed to Cagayan),
10
Camiguin (previously a sub-province of Misamis
Oriental),
11
Siquijor (previously a sub-province of Negros Oriental),
12
Biliran (previously a
sub-province of Leyte),
13
Guimaras (previously a sub-province of Iloilo),
14
and Marinduque
(previously annexed to Tayabas)
15
also have land areas of well below 1,000 square
kilometers each.
To be clear, I am not making an equal protection argument, since none of these provinces
were created under the auspices of the LGC. I only point this out to show that Congress, in
drafting the LGC, was cognizant of the special circumstances surrounding the creation of
island-provinces, and evidently intended that economic development be a more significant
consideration than size. The Congressional deliberations bear this out:
CHAIRMAN
LINA:
Will you look at the case of how many municipalities are there in Batanes province?
CHAIRMAN
ALFELOR:
Batanes is only six.
CHAIRMAN
LINA:
Six town. Siquijor?
CHAIRMAN
ALFELOR:
Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN
LINA:
Seven.
CHAIRMAN
ALFELOR:
Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN
LINA:
Six also.
CHAIRMAN
ALFELOR:
Six also.
CHAIRMAN
LINA:
It seems with a minimum number of towns?
CHAIRMAN
ALFELOR:
The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one congressional district. But
tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.
CHAIRMAN
LINA:
Camiguin, Camiguin.
CHAIRMAN
ALFELOR:
That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a population of 63 thousand. But
we do not hold it against the province because maybe thats one stimulant where growth
can grow, can start. The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we
hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we would
like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo
ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo eh. Because what is really the thrust of the
Local Government Code? Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have
its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So in every geographical condition, mayroong sariling idiosyncrasies eh. We cannot make
a generalization.
16

Though this Court certainly has the authority to override the legislative interpretation, I do
not believe it is appropriate or necessary in this instance. Rather, we should acknowledge
the "strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs
of its own people [and] that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by
experience."
17

I do not propose that the Court overturn its settled precedent to the effect that
Implementing Rules and Regulations cannot go beyond the terms of the statute. But under
these limited circumstances where a reading of the entire law reveals inconsistencies
which this Court must reconcile, where the legislature has informed the Court of its
intentions in drafting the law, and where the legislative history of the LGC leads one to the
inescapable conclusion that the primary consideration in the creation of provinces is
actually administrative convenience, economic viability, and capacity for development -
then it would be far more just to give effect to the will of the legislature in this case.
In the words of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them." While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret
the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into
the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the
reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the
spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter
but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of
the lawmakers.
18

For these reasons, I thus concur in the opinion of Justice Nachura.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 176951 June 28, 2011
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President
Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento;
and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of
Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar;
Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan,
Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of
Quezon, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President
Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento;
and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan;
Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of
Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of
Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of
Negros Oriental, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President
Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento;
and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del
Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador,
Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BERSAMIN, J .:
We hereby consider and resolve: (a) the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011, attached to which is a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 dated April 29, 2011 (Motion For
Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12, 2011 be reconsidered and set
aside; and (b) the respondents Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
After thorough consideration of the incidents, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration and
grant the Motion for Entry of Judgment.
As its prayer for relief shows, the Motion for Reconsideration seeks the reconsideration,
reversal, or setting aside of the resolution of April 12, 2011.
1
In turn, the resolution of
April 12, 2011 denied the petitioners Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision dated 15 February 2011).
2
Clearly, the Motion for Reconsideration is really a
second motion for reconsideration in relation to the resolution dated February 15, 2011.
3

Another indicium of its being a second motion for reconsideration is the fact that
the Motion for Reconsiderationraises issues entirely identical to those the petitioners
already raised in their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15
February 2011). The following tabulation demonstrates the sameness of issues between
the motions, to wit:
Motion for Reconsideration
of April 29, 2011
Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of
the Decision dated 15 February 2011) dated
March 8, 2011
I. With due respect, neither the Rules of
Court nor jurisprudence allows the
Honorable Court to take cognizance of
Respondent Municipalities multiple
motions. By doing so, the Honorable Court
therefore acted contrary to the Rules of
II. The Resolution Contravenes The 1997
Rules Of Civil Procedure And Relevant
Supreme Court Issuances.
Court and its internal procedures.
II. Contrary to the ruling of the Honorable
Court in the Assailed Resolution, the
controversy involving the Sixteen (16)
Cityhood laws had long been resolved
with finality;thus, the principles
of immutability of judgment and res
judicata are applicable and operate to
deprive the Honorable Court of jurisdiction.
I. The Honorable Court Has No Jurisdiction
To Promulgate The Resolution Of 15
February 2011, Because There is No Longer
Any Actual Case Or Controversy To
Settle.
III. The Resolution Undermines The Judicial
System In Its Disregard Of The Principles
Of Res Judicata And The Doctrine of
Immutability of Final Judgments.
III. Contrary to the Assailed Resolution of
the Honorable Court, the sixteen (16)
Cityhood laws neither repealed nor
amended the Local Government Code. The
Honorable Court committed an error when
it failed to rule in the Assailed Resolution
that the Sixteen (16) Cityhood Laws
violated Article X, Sections 6 and 10 of
the Constitution.
IV. The Resolution Erroneously Ruled That
The Sixteen (16) Cityhood Bills Do Not
Violate Article X, Sections 6 and 10 Of The
1987 Constitution.
V. The Sixteen (16) Cityhood Laws Violate
The Equal Protection Clause Of The
Constitution And The Right Of Local
Government Units To A Just Share In The
National Taxes.
IV. With due respect, the constitutionality
of R.A. 9009 is not an issue in this case. It
was error on the part of the Honorable
Court to consider the law arbitrary.

That Issue No. IV (i.e., the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9009) appears in
the Motion for Reconsiderationbut is not found in the Ad Cautelam Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is of no consequence, for the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9009 is neither relevant nor decisive in this case, the
reference to said legislative enactment being only for purposes of discussion.
The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be
entertained. As to that, Section 2
4
of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified. The
Court has firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading,
5
and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave
has been first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained.
6
The
restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in
the recently promulgated Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15
states:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second
motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the
higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its
actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the
assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the
parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts
declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration "can only
be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of
law or by the Courts declaration" even renders the denial of the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration more compelling. As the resolution of April 12, 2011 bears out,
7
the
ruling sought to be reconsidered became final by the Courts express declaration.
Consequently, the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration is immediately warranted.
Still, the petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the
respondents own second motion for reconsideration. There is no similarity between then
and now, however, for the Court en banc itself unanimously declared in the resolution of
June 2, 2009 that the respondents second motion for reconsideration was "no longer a
prohibited pleading."
8
No similar declaration favors the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Finally, considering that the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes the
issues previously put forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration
(of the Decision dated 15 February 2011), the Court, having already passed upon such
issues with finality, finds no need to discuss the issues again to avoid repetition and
redundancy.
Accordingly, the finality of the resolutions upholding the constitutionality of the 16
Cityhood Laws now absolutely warrants the granting of respondents Motion for Entry of
Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011 and the attached Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011; grants the respondents Motion for
Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011; and directs the Clerk of Court to forthwith issue the
Entry of Judgment in this case.
No further pleadings or submissions by any party shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
The prayer for relief of the Motion for Reconsideration states:
WHEREFORE, Petitioners most respectfully pray that the Resolution
dated 12 April 2011 be forthwith RECONSIDERED, REVERSED or
SET ASIDE.
2
The dispositive portion of the resolution of April 12, 2011 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality.
SO ORDERED.
3
The dispositive portion of the resolution of February 15, 2011 says:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution"
dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by
respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The
Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Cityhood LawsRepublic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393,
9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and
9491are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
4
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
5
Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc., 566 SCRA 451
(2008); APO Fruits corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
164195, April 5, 2011; Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,
254 SCRA 234.
6
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra.
7
Supra, note 2.
8
The resolution of June 2, 2009 pertinently declared:
xxx
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent cities. In effect, the Court
allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited
pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn
the 18 November 2009 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the
Court denied the second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009
Resolution.
xxx

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J .:
The majority decision upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws because (1) of the
pendency of the conversion bills during the 11th Congress; and (2) compliance with the
requirements of the Local Government Code prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.
9009.
I reiterate my dissent.
I .
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government codeand subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other law. There is only
one Local Government Code.
1
To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality,
the Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code
itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws.
Notably, each Cityhood Law provides in its Separability Clause that if any of its provisions
is "inconsistent with the Local Government Code," the other consistent provisions
"shall continue to be in full force and effect."The clear and inescapable implication is
that any provision in each Cityhood Law that is "inconsistent with the Local
Government Code" has no force and effect in short, void and ineffective. Each
Cityhood Law expressly and unequivocally acknowledges the superiority of the Local
Government Code, and thatin case of conflict, the Local Government Code shall prevail
over the Cityhood Law. The clear intent and express language of the Cityhood Laws is
for these laws to conform to the Local Government Code and not the other way around.
Moreover, Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government
Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate and
distinct from the Local Government Code. In other words, the Cityhood Laws do not
form integral partsof the Local Government Code but are separate and distinct laws.
There is therefore no question that the Cityhood Laws are laws other than the Local
Government Code. As such, the Cityhood Laws cannot stipulate an exception from the
requirements for the creation of cities, prescribed in the Local Government Code, without
running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to the faulty conclusion of the majority, the Cityhood Laws do not amend the
Local Government Code. The Legislature never intended the Cityhood Laws to amend the
Local Government Code. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this
interpretation be discerned. Neither the title nor the body of the Cityhood Laws sustains
such conclusion. Simply put, there is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support
the majority decision that the Cityhood Laws amended the Local Government Code.
I I .
The Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency
of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even
have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In
short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will
never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be
limited to existing conditions only.
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood
bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to
convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Further, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that
the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income
as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood
Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, is
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
I I I .
Respondent municipalities must comply with the
P100 million income requirement under the prevailing LGC.
RA No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in the
old Local Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short, RA No. 9009 repealed the
old income requirement of P20 million, a requirement that no longer exists in our statute
books. Compliance with the old income requirement is compliance with a repealed, dead,
and non-existent law a totally useless, futile, and empty act. Worse, compliance with the
old requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution which expressly commands
that "no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code." Therefore, respondent municipalities in order
to validly convert into cities must comply with the P100 million income requirement under
the prevailing Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, and not with the oldP20
million income requirement. Otherwise, such compliance with the old P20 million income
requirement is void for being unconstitutional.
There must be strict compliance with the express command of the Constitution that "no
city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code." Substantial compliance is insufficient because it will
discriminate against all other cities that were created before and after the enactment of
the Cityhood Laws in strict compliance with the criteria in the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA No. 9009. The conversion of municipalities into new cities means an
increase in the Internal Revenue Allotment of the former municipalities and
a corresponding decrease in the Internal Revenue Allotment of all other existing cities.
There must be strict, not only substantial, compliance with the constitutional requirement
because the economic lifeline of existing cities may be seriously affected.
I V.
The increased income requirement of P100 million
is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.
According to the majority, "the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million
from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. x x x no research or empirical data
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-
effects that were likely to arise."
This is glaring error.
The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the Constitution to show the
courts data like inflation figures to support the increased income requirement. As long as
the increased income requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase is a policy
determination involving the wisdom of the law, which exclusively lies within the province
of the Legislature. When the Legislature enacts laws increasing taxes, tax rates, or capital
requirements for businesses, the Court cannot refuse to apply such laws on the ground that
there is no economic justification for such increases. Economic, political or social
justifications for the enactment of laws go into the wisdom of the law, outside the purview
of judicial review. This Court cannot refuse to apply the law unless the law violates a
specific provision of the Constitution. There is plainly nothing unconstitutional in
increasing the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million because such increase
does not violate any express or implied provision of the Constitution.
V.
Failure of 59 existing cities to post P100 million annual income
does not render the P100 million income requirement
difficult to comply.
Suffice it to state that there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement for the
59 existingcities to comply with the P100 million income requirement. Obviously, these
cities were already cities prior to the amendment of the Local Government Code
providing for the increased income requirement of P100 million. In other words, at the
time of their creation, these cities have complied with the criteria prescribed under the old
Local Government Code for the creation of cities, and thus are not required to comply with
the P100 million income requirement of the prevailing Local Government Code. It is
utterly misplaced and grossly erroneous to cite the "non-compliance" by the 59 existing
cities with the increased income requirement of P100 million to conclude that the P100
million income requirement is arbitrary and difficult to comply.
Moreover, as stated, the increased income requirement of P100 million is neither
unconstitutional nor unlawful. Unless the P100 million income requirement violates a
provision of the Constitution or a law, such requirement for the creation of a city must be
strictly complied with. Any local government unit applying for cityhood, whether located
in or outside the metropolis and whether within the National Capital Region or not, must
meet the P100 million income requirement prescribed by the prevailing Local Government
Code. There is absolutely nothing unconstitutional or unlawful if the P100 million income
requirement is easily complied with by local government units within or near the National
Capital Region. The majoritys groundless and unfair discrimination against these
metropolis-located local government units must necessarily fail.
VI .
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are
essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local
government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there
can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not
receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or
more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by
law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national
taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue
Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
As pointed out by petitioners, "respondent municipalities have a total population
equivalent to that of Davao City only, or around 1.3 million people. Yet, the IRA that
pertains to the 16 municipalities (P4,019,776,072) is more than double that for Davao City
(P1,874,175,271). x x x As a result, the per capita IRA alloted for the individual denizen of
Davao is even less than half of the average per capita IRA of the inhabitants of the sixteen
(16) municipalities (P1,374.70 divided by P3,117.24)."
This indisputable fact vividly reveals the economic inequity that will inevitably result from
the unjust allocation of the IRA as a consequence of the conversion of respondent
municipalities into cities. Clearly, if the existing cities share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment is unreasonably reduced, it is possible, even expected, that these cities may have
to lay-off workers and abandon projects, greatly hampering, or worse paralyzing, the
delivery of much needed public services in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
VI I .
Conclusion
The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code
itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, such
criteria cannot be embodied in any other law except the Local Government Code. In this
case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government
Code, provide an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of
cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009.
Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. In addition, the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause and
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution on the fair and equitable distribution of national
taxes to all local government units. Without any doubt, the Cityhood Laws must be striken
down for being unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the League of Cities of
the Philippines.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice


Footnote
1
Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation


DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J .:
"If changing judges changes laws, it is not even clear what law is."
- Richard A. Posner
1

I maintain my dissent that the sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. In questioning
the Courts latest Resolution,
2
petitioners have raised concerns over the "highly irregular
and unprecedented" acts of entertaining several motions for reconsideration.
3
In response
to these concerns, I wish to expound on the effects of the "flip-flopping" decisions on the
Courts role in our democratic system and its decision-making process, in order that it may
"serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws."
4

Our system of democracy is committed irrevocably to a government of laws,
5
and not of
men.
6
Laws give witness to societys moral values
7
and are the depositories of what the
sovereign as a whole has agreed to uphold as the minimum standards of conduct that will
govern relationships and transactions within that society. In a representative democracy,
the Filipino people, through their elected representatives, deliberate, distill and make moral
judgments, which are crystallized into written laws that are made public, accessible and
binding to all.
8
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more
fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various
rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively
settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner.
9

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice.
10
Once the
sovereign peoples "soft" moral choices are hardened through the constitutionally
mandated legislative process,
11
statutory laws perform an equalizing function of imposing a
knowable standard of conduct or behavior to which all members of society must conform
to a social contract which everyone regardless of class, sex or religion is
bound.
12
Legislative enactments are ordinarily prospective and general in character insofar
as they prescribe limitations on an individuals future conduct. Under the rule of
law,
13
ordinary people can reasonably assume that another persons future conduct will be
in observance of the laws and can conceivably expect that any deviation therefrom will be
punished accordingly by responsible authorities. Thus, written constitutions and statutory
laws allow citizens a minimum confidence in a world of uncertainty:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves,
hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic, and even despotic, might
now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a
law that we made and promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not
displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live
by their word.
14

As man-made creations, however, laws are not always entirely encompassing, as future
conditions may change conditions that could not have been perceived or accounted for
by the legislators. Actual situations may arise between two conflicting claims by specific
parties with differing interpretations of the law. In those instances in which a gray area or
an unintended gap exists in the implementation or execution of laws, the judicial
department is charged with the duty of determining the limitations that the law places upon
all actions of individuals.
15
Hence, the courts primary adjudicatory function is to mark the
metes and bounds of the law in specific areas of application, as well as to pass judgment
on the competing positions in a case properly brought before it.
The Court not only functions to adjudicate rights among the parties, but also serves the
purpose of a supreme tribunal of last resort that establishes uniform rules of civil
justice.
16
Jurisprudence "narrows the field of uncertainty"
17
in the application of an unclear
area of the law. The certainty of judicial pronouncement lends respect for and adherence to
the rule of law "the idea that all citizens and all organs of government are bound by rules
fixed in advance, which make it possible to foresee how the coercive powers of
government will be used, whether in its own interests or in aid of citizens who call on
them, in particular circumstances."
18
The Courts historic role of pronouncing what the law
is between the parties
19
is the cornerstone of a government of laws, and not of
men.
20
Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court expounded on the
objectives of uniformity and predictability of judicial decisions, to wit:
This last point suggests another obvious advantage of establishing as soon as possible a
clear, general principle of decision: predictability. Even in simpler times uncertainty has
been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that
those subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes. It is said that
one of emperor Nero's nasty practices was to post his edicts high on the columns so that
they would be harder to read and easier to transgress. As laws have become more
numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in the
courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may
mean. Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, "reckonability," is a needful characteristic of
any law worthy of the name. There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at
all.
21
(Emphasis supplied)
Certainty and "reckonability" in the law are the major objectives of the legal system, and
judicial decisions serve the important purpose of providing stability to the law and to the
society governed by that law.
22
If we are to subscribe to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
theory of a bad man,
23
then law provides reasonable predictability in the consequences of
ones actions relative to the law, if performed in a just and orderly society. As judicial
decisions form part of the law of the land,
24
there is a strong public interest in stability and
in the orderly conduct of our affairs, an end served by a consistent course of
adjudication.
25
Thus, once a court has decided upon a rule of law, "that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages" of the same case
26
and thus offers
to the people some measure of conviction about the legal effects of their actions. In the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, courts should be loathe to revisit prior decisions.
27

In the instant case, the public confusion, sown by the pendulum swing of the Courts
decisions, has yielded unpredictability in the judicial decision-making process and has
spawned untold consequences upon the publics confidence in the enduring stability of the
rule of law in our jurisdiction.
The Court has been entrusted by the sovereign with the duty of voicing out and sharpening
with finality societys collective ideals in its written decisions. Yet, if cases are litigated in
perpetuity, and judgments are clouded with continuous uncertainty, the publics
confidence in the stability of judicial precedents promulgated by the Court would be
greatly diminished. In this case, the Court has reviewed and reconsidered, no less than five
times already,
28
the constitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws.
29
During this time, the
public has been made to endure an inordinate degree of indecision that has disturbed the
conduct of local government affairs with respect not only to the municipalities asking to
become cities, but also with respect to cities genuinely fearful of the destruction of the
standards for the creation of cities and the correlative diminution of the internal revenue
allotments of existing cities. The Courts commitment to provide constant and steadfast
rules on the creation of cities has been inevitably weakened by the "flip-flopping" in the
case that has opened the doors to rabid criticisms of the Courts failure to abide by its own
internal rules and, thus, diminishing reliance on the certainty of its decisions.
To be sure, the Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability
30
would involve the sacrifice of justice
for technicality.
31
The Court has previously provided for exceptions to the rule on
immutability of final judgments, as follows: (1) the correction of clerical errors;
32
(2) nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
33
(3) void judgments;
34
and (4)
supervening events.
35
As exceptions to the general rule, their application to instances
wherein a review of a final and executory decision is called are to be strictly
construed.
36
No convincing argument or extraordinary circumstance has been raised to
justify and support the application of any of these exceptions to warrant a reversal of the
Courts First Decision. Reversing previous, final, and executory decisions are to be done
only under severely limited circumstances. Although new and unforeseen circumstances
may arise in the future to justify a review of an established legal principle in a separate and
distinct case, the extension of a principle must be dealt with exceptionally and cautiously.
Undeniably, the Court in the past has overturned prior decisions even on a second or third
motion for reconsideration and recalled entries of judgment on the ground of substantial
interest of justice and special and compelling reasons.
37
The Court bows to "the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error,
so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."
38
Notable
reversals in recent memory include the cases involving the request for extradition of Mark
Jimenez,
39
the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
40
the land title
covering the Piedad Estate in Quezon City,
41
the just compensation due to Apo Fruits
Corporation,
42
and the "deemed resigned" provision for public appointive officials in the
recent May 2010 election.
43
Although no prohibition exists that would prevent this Court
from changing its mind in the light of compelling reasons and in the interest of substantial
justice as abovedemonstrated, extreme retrospect and caution must accompany such
review.
In the instant case, there is no substantial interest of justice or compelling reason that
would warrant the reversal of the First Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional. There is no injustice in preventing the conversion of the sixteen
municipalities into cities at this point in time. In fact, justice is more equitably dispensed
by the stringent application of the current legislative criteria under the Local Government
Code (LGC),
44
as amended by Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), for creating cities
without distinction or exception. It must be remembered that the declaration of
unconstitutionality is not an absolute ban on these municipalities prohibiting them from
pursuing cityhood in the future once they are able to achieve the PhP100,000,000 income
requirement under RA 9009.
45
Alternatively, their congressional representatives can also
press for another amendatory law of the LGC that would include an explicit exception to
the income requirement for municipalities with pending cityhood bills prior to the
enactment of RA 9009. The route purportedly chosen by Congress to indirectly amend the
LGC through the exemption of annual income requirements in the Cityhood Laws is
improper. If Congress believes that the minoritys construction of its intention in
increasing the annual income requirement is erroneous, then the legislature can show its
disapproval by directly enacting amendatory legislation of the LGC. In both cases, the
remedy available to the sixteen municipalities is not with the Court, but with the
legislature, which is constitutionally empowered to determine the standards for the
creation of a local government unit. The reasoning and substantial justice arguments
expounded to reverse the initial finding of the Court that the Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional are poorly founded.
The LGC is a distinctly normative law that regulates the legislative power to create cities
and establishes the standards by which the power is exercised. Unlike other statutes that
prohibit undesirable conduct of ordinary citizens and are ends by themselves, the LGC
prescribes the means by which congressional power is to be exercised and local
government units are brought into legal existence. Its purpose is to avoid the arbitrary and
random creation of provinces, cities and municipalities. By encapsulating the criteria for
cityhood in the LGC, Congress provided objective, equally applicable and fairly
ascertainable standards and reduced the emphasis on currying political favor from its
members to approvingly act on the proposed cityhood law. Otherwise, cities chartered
under a previous Congress can be unmade, at a whim, by a subsequent Congress,
regardless of its compliance with the LGCs requirements. Fairness and equity demand
that the criteria established by the LGC be faithfully and strictly enforced, most especially
by Congress whose power is the actual subject of legislative delimitation.
In granting it the power to fix the criteria for the creation of a city, the Constitution, of
course, did not preclude Congress from revising the standards imposed under the LGC.
Congress shall enjoy the freedom to reconsider the minimum standards under the LGC, if
future circumstances call for it. However, the method of revising the criteria must be
directly done through an amendatory law of the LGC (such as RA 9009), and not through
the indirect route of creating cities and exempting their compliance with the established
and prevailing standards. By indiscriminately carving out exemptions in the charter laws
themselves, Congress enfeebled the normative function of the LGC on the legislative
power to create cities. Taking the argument to the extreme, a single barangay now has the
chance of being chartered as a component city without compliance with the income,
territorial or population requirements under the LGC, for as long as enough Congressional
support is mustered to push for its exemption not in a general amendatory law, but
through its own specific legislative charter. The selective disregard of the norms under the
LGC in favor of some municipalities cannot be sanctioned in a system where the rule of
law remains dominant. Unless prevented by the Court, Congress will now be emboldened
to charter new cities wholesale and arbitrarily relax the stringent standards under the LGC,
which it imposed on itself.
It must be emphasized that no inconsistency arises from the present minoritys continued
participation in the disposition of the second or subsequent motions for reconsideration of
the parties with the avowed purpose of predictability of judicial pronouncements. The
reiteration of the minoritys position that the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional is an
expression that none of the "new" or rehashed arguments in the subsequent motions have
merited a change in their stand and appreciation of the facts and the law. For the minority
to abandon their involvement from the proceedings in a mechanical adherence to the rule
that the second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are prohibited pleadings that
do not warrant the Courts attention is to capitulate to the sixteen municipalities abhorrent
strategy of insistent prayer for review of re-hashed arguments, already passed on,
repeatedly.
If stability in the Courts decisions
46
is to be maintained, then parties should not be
encouraged to tirelessly seek reexamination of determined principles and speculate on the
fluctuation of the law with every change of its expounders.
47
In Clavano v. Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board, the Court explained that:
"The tendency of the law," observes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "must always be to
narrow the field of uncertainty." And so was the judicial process conceived to bring about
the just termination of legal disputes. The mechanisms for this objective are manifold but
the essential precept underlying them is the immutability of final and executory judgments.
This fundamental principle in part affirms our recognition of instances when disputes are
inadequately presented before the courts and addresses situations when parties fail to
unravel what they truly desire and thus fail to set forth all the claims which they want the
courts to resolve. It is only when judgments have become final and executory, or even
when already deemed satisfied, that our negligent litigants belatedly come forth to pray for
more relief. The distilled wisdom and genius of the ages would tell us to reject their pleas,
for the loss to litigants in particular and to society in general would in the long run be
greater than the gain if courts and judges were clothed with power to revise their final
decisions at will.
48
(Emphasis supplied)
Unlike that of the other two political branches whose mandates are regularly renewed
through direct election, the Courts legitimacy must be painstakingly earned with every
decision that puts voice to the cherished value judgments of the sovereign. The judicial
function in an organized and cohesive society governed by the rule of law is placed in
serious peril if the people cannot rely on the finality of court decisions to regulate their
affairs. There is no reason for the Court to bend over backwards to accommodate the
parties requests for reconsideration, yet again, of the unconstitutionality of the sixteen
Cityhood Laws as borne by the First Decision, especially if the result would lead to the
fracturing of central tenets of the justice system. The peoples sense of an orderly
government will find it unacceptable if the Supreme Court, which is tasked to express
enduring values through its judicial pronouncements, is founded on sand, easily shifting
with the changing tides.
The legal process of creating cities as enacted and later amended by the legislature,
implemented by the executive, and interpreted by the judiciary serves as the peoples
North Star: certain, stable and predictable. Absent the three branches adherence to the rule
of law, our society would denigrate into uncertainty, instability and even anarchy. Indeed,
the law is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to
that supremacy and to observe the limitations it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
that it gives.
49
No public officer is held to these highest of normative standards than those
whose duties are to adjudicate the rights of the people and to articulate on enduring
principles of law applicable to all.
As Justice Robert Jackson eloquently expressed,
50
the Supreme Court is not final because it
is infallible; it is infallible because it is final. And because its decisions are final, even if
faulty, there must be every energy expended to ensure that the faulty decisions are few and
far between. The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice, but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the
people who run the system have done justice.
51

The determination of the correctness of a judicial decision turns on far more than its
outcome.
52
Rather, it turns on whether its outcome evolved from principles of judicial
methodology, since the judiciarys function is not to bring about some desired state of
affairs, but to find objectively the right decision by adhering to the established general
system of rules.
53

What we are dealing with in this case is no longer limited to the question of
constitutionality of Cityhood Laws; we are also confronted with the question of certainty
and predictability in the decisions of the Court under a democratic system governed by law
and rules and its ability to uphold the Constitution and normative legislation such as the
LGC.
The public has unduly suffered from the repeated "flip-flopping" in this case, especially
since it comes from the branch of government tasked to embody in a clear form enduring
rules of civil justice that are to govern them. In expressing these truths, I echo the
sentiment of a judicial colleague from a foreign jurisdiction who once said, "I write these
words, not as a jeremiad,
54
but in the belief that unless the courts adhere to the guidance of
fixed principles, we will soon bring objective law to its sepulcher."
55

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice