Titong v.

CA
287 SCRA 102

DOCTRINE: The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be
"an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" which constitutes or casts a cloud,
doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property.

FACTS:
Mario Titong filed an action for quieting of title against Victorico and Angeles Laurio. Petitioner
alleged that he was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land. He claimed that private
respondents (Laurios), with heir hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing
an area of approximately 2 hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership.
The Laurios denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the
5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo
Espinosa, an adjoining owner of Titongs land. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents,
declaring Laurio as the true and absolute owner of the property. Petitioner appealed to the CA,
the RTC decision was affirmed and the MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the action for quieting of title should have prospered. -- NO

HELD:
The SC held that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should
have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may
be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.

Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon
the owner's title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for
quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding."
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that
other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same
action.

Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other
course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an
"instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title over the
property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the respondents, together with their hired
laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the
plaintiff and plowed the same. He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees.

Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the
property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property.
Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely
not one for quieting of title. In addition, when the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to
the complaint, it would have become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary
dispute.

MPF
Pingol v. CA
226 SCRA 118

DOCTRINE: A vendee (buyer) in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment
thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring
suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not
necessary that the vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

FACTS:
1969 - Pingol, the owner of a lot in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF
LAND (274.5 sqm) in favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years. And
Donasco agreed to pay in monthly basis (for 72 months).
Both agreed that in case of default in the payment due the same should earn a legal
interest.
Donasco took possession immediately and constructed a house thereon.
1984 - Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000
downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161.
The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the
balance with Pingol.
However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount.
Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with
Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon
Donascos lot).
Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full
payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale).
With Donascos breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale
was deemed cancelled, and the continuous occupancy of the heirs was only
being tolerated by Pingol.

RTC: ordering heirs of Donasco to pay monthly rental to Pingol
CA: ordering Pingol to accept the sum of P10,161 plus legal interest from heirs of Donasco as
payment to the land in question

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco. -- NO
2. Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title.

HELD:
1. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell.
The acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that
the parties intended an absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to
the Donasco upon its actual (upon Donascos possession and construction of the house)
and constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot divested
Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the
expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made
upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has
equitable title over the property.

2. Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was
actually an action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that
the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery
of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos
and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the title.

Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled
to bring suit to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not
necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title
to property in ONEs POSSESSION is imprescriptible.

SC: appealed decision affirmed

AMDG
Gallar v. Hussain
20 SCRA 186

DOCTRINE: An action to quiet title, brought by a person who is in possession of the property, is
imprescriptible. However, if the plaintiff is not in possession, the action would prescribe within
the proper period.

FACTS:
Teodoro Husain is the owner of the land to which he sold to Serapio Chichirita for P30 with the
right to repurchase of such land within six years. Teodoro did not avail his right to repurchase
however, his sister, Graciana Husain, bought the said land shortly after the sale between
Teodoro and Chichirita. It is alleged that that the sale was described to be a resale of the land.
Afterwhich, Graciana sold it to appellee, Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow. Owners
duplicate of the TCT was given to Gallar and since then has been the possessor of the subject
land.

Gallar was unsuccessful when he went to the Cadastral Court to ask that the TCT be issued
under his name. It is noted however that the Cadastral Court granted his request as regards
amending the certificate and changing the registered owner of the land to Husain. Gallar then
filed the suit in the CFI (now RTC) to compel the heirs of Teodoro Husain (Heremenegilda and
Bonifacio) to execute the deed of conveyance in his favor to which the latter refused to execute.

The heirs were denied and alleged that when Graciana bought the land from Serapio, she was
exercising the right to repurchase granted to Teodoro. Also, they invoked that prescription has
set in which bars the appellees action.

ISSUES:
1. WON the land was acquired by Graciana Husain on behalf of his brother Teodoro? -- NO
2. WON this action this is action is for specific performance? -- NO
3. WON appellees action is imprescriptible? -- YES

HELD:
The right to repurchase may only be availed by the person to whom such right was given to or
to the person to whom such right was transferred to. There was no evidence whatsoever to
prove that Graciana acquired the land on behalf of his brother. Graciana bought the land subject
only to his brothers right of remdeption. Therefore, being the owner, she has every right to sell
the land which she did to Elias.

When Teodoro failed to exercise his right of redemption, its ownership became consolidated in
the appellee. Though the sale was in a private document, such was still considered valid. The
delivery of the land and title to Gallar indicates that a sale was consummated.

This action is not for a specific performance but a mere quieting of title. The object of the action
was to remove the cloud cast on Gallars ownership because of the heirs refusal to recognize
the sale. Lastly being the Gallar is in possession when this action was constituted, the action is
imprescriptible. The heirs argument as regards prescription would have been granted by the
court in their favor if the land was not possessed by Gallar.

GCG
Vda de Aviles v. CA
264 SCRA 473

DOCTRINE: Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary Dispute. Quieting of
title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with
respect to title to real property.

FACTS:
Petitioners aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in Malawa,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly described as fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and
residential land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E by Malawa River, on the S by
Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, with an area of 18,900 square
meters and declared under Tax Declaration No. 31446. This property is the share of their father,
Eduardo Aviles and brother of the defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents.
Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property since 1957. In fact, the
latter mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank branch in
Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the
presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and
Juana and Apolonio Joaquin pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary
limits of the property and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the
property was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs mother and the land was
subsequently transferred and declared in her name.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with
an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and
moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs over said portion.
Defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition executed by him and his brothers,
Anastacio and Eduardo. The respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured
before the execution of the agreement but he was not present when the measurement was
made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller area because his brother Eduardo asked him that he
wanted a bigger share because he has several children to support. The portion in litigation
however is part of the share given to him in the agreement of partition.
At present, he is only occupying a smaller than his actual share. Tax Declarations Nos. 23575,
481 and 379 covering his property from 1958 show that the area of his property is 14,470
square meters. The riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is
500 square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square
meters. That the topography of his land is not the same, hence, the height of his pilapils are
likewise not the same.
The trial court disposed of the case thus ordering the parties to employ the services of a Land
Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate and determine
the extent and the boundary limit of the land of the defendant on its southern side in order that
the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actual area
given to the defendant be determined. It ordered the complaint dismissed for lack of basis and
merits
Dissatisfied with the trial courts decision, petitioners appealed to the respondent appellate
Court. In its now-assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial
court, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling
a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. It
affirmed the decision of the trial court in dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it opined that the complaint for
quieting of title instituted by the petitioners against private respondent before the court a quo is
not the proper remedy but rather, it should be a case for ejectment.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary
Dispute. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property of
any interest therein."

In fine, to avail the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly
misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in
holding that there was no xxx evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract,
xxx, and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, (i) the Agreement of Partition
executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners father and
predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed
upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de
Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way
constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises
from the parties failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence
of the agreement of partition and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was alloted (sic) to them
and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There is no
adverse claim by the defendant which is apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and which constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed
property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the clouds or doubts which can be removed
in an action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute. The precedent on this matter cited by the respondent Court in its Decision is
herewith reproduced in full.