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1) A physical condition or a release of a haz- ardous material that could result from component
failure and result in human injury or death, loss or damage, or environ- mental degradation.
A. Hazard
B. Loss
C. Failure
2) Limitation of any negative conse- uence or reduction in pro!a!ility of a particular event.
A. "itigation
B. #eduction
C. #esidual
3) "ethods that use engineering judgment and e$perience as the !ases for the analysis of
pro!a!ilities and conseuences of failure.
A. %ualitative ris& assessment
B. #elative ris&
C. 'ominal ris&
4) An analysis that identifies and delineates the com!inations of events, estimates the freuency of
occurrence for each com!ination and estimates the conseuences.
A. %unatitative ris& analysis
B. %ualitative ris& analysis
C. (rocess hazard analysis
5) ))))))uses logic models depicting com!inations of events
A. %unatitative ris& analysis
B. %ualitative ris& analysis
C. (rocess hazard analysis
6) %uantitative ris& analysis logic models generally consist of ))))..and ))))
A. *vent trees and fault trees
B. (roduct trees and loss trees
C. Li&lilhood trees and conseuence trees
7) ))))).delineate initiating events and com!inations of system successes and failures
A. *vent trees
B. Fault trees
C. Logic trees
8) ))).. +epict ,ays in ,hich the system failures rep- resented in the event trees can occur.
A. *vent trees
B. Fault trees
C. Logic trees
9) -he comparative ris& of a facility, process unit, system, euipment item or component to other
A. #elative ris&
B. A!solute ris&
C. 'o ris&
10) Com!ination of the pro!a!ility of an event and its conseuence.
A. #is&
B. Failure
C. Loss
+. #eduction
11) .ystematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the ris&.
A. #is&
B. #is& analysis
C. Hazard analysis
12) ))))).. (ro- vides a !asis for ris& evaluation, ris& mitigation and ris& acceptance.
A. #is&
B. #is& analysis
C. Hazard analysis
13) (rocess used to assign values to the pro!a!ility and conseuence of a ris&.
A. #is& evaluation
B. #is& estimation
C. #is& identification
14) (rocess used to compare the esti- mated ris& against given ris& criteria to determine the signifi-
cance of the ris&.
A. #is& evaluation
B. #is& estimation
C. #is& identification
15) (rocess to find, list, and char- acterize elements of ris&.
A. #is& estimation
B. #is& evaluation
C. #is& identification
16) Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization ,ith regard to ris&.
A. #is& management
B. #is& evaluation
C. #is& control
17) -hing or activity ,ith a potential for con- seuence.
A. .ource
B. Hazard
C. -o$ic
18) )))))..in a safety conte$t is a hazard.
A. .ource
B. -o$ic
19) -he ris& prior to mitigation activities
A. /nmitigated ris&
B. 0no,n ris&
C. "itigated ris&
20) )))) is the com!ination of the pro!a!ility of some event occurring during a time period of
interest and the conse- uences, associated ,ith the event.
A. #is&
B. Loss
C. "itigated ris&
21) Act of mitigating a &no,n ris& to a lo,er level of ris&
A. #is& reduction
B. #is& mitigation
C. #is& evaluation
22) A pro- cess to assess ris&s, to determine if ris& reduction is reuired and to develop a plan to
maintain ris&s at an accepta!le level.
A. #is& management
B. #is& mitigation
C. #is& control
23) 1hen somem ris& identified as accepta!le then one of the follo,ing is not reuired
A. #is& reduction
B. #is& evaluation
C. #is& mitigation
+. #is& control
24) 2n process plants, ))))))) are esta!lished to detect and evaluate deterioration due to in-
ser- vice operation
A. 2nspection and testing programs
B. Condition monitoring programs
C. (reventive maintenance programs
+. 2nservice inspection programs
25) 1hen an euipment has lo, deterioration rates as an inspector ,hat you decide in lieu of internal
A. 3n-stream inspection
B. 3ut of service inspection
C. *$ternal inspection
26) )))) represents the ne$t generation of inspection approaches and interval setting,
recognizing that the ultimate goal of inspection is the safety and relia!ility of operating facilities.
A. #!i
B. (ha
C. Hazop
+. #cm
27) For a typical inspection program, if e$cessive inspection is applied then,
A. Level of ris& may go up
B. Level of ris& may go do,n
C. Level of ris& remain the same
28) ))) provides a consistent methodology for assessing the optimum com!ination of methods
and freuencies.
A. #!i
B. #cm
C. (ha
+. Hazop
29) -hrough ))))), inspection activities are focused on higher ris& items and a,ay from lo,er
ris& items.
A. #!i
B. (ha
C. #cm
+. Hazop
30) Follo,ing are not the residual ris& factors for loss of containment
A. Human error
B. 'atural disasters
C. Fundamental limitations of inspection method
+. -o$ic fluid containment
31) #!i is focused on a sys- tematic determination of
A. #elative ris&s
B. A!solute ris&s
C. Compara!le ris&s
+. -otal ris&s
32) Act of mitigating a &no,n ris& to a lo,er level of ris&.
A. #is& reduction
B. #is& management
C. #is& mitigation
33) .ome failures have potentially serious conse- uences, !ut if the pro!a!ility of the incident is lo,,
A. -he ris& may not ,arrant immediate action
B. -he ris& may ,arrant immediate action
C. -he ris& may ,arrant appropriate mitigation action
34) 2f the pro!- a!ility and conseuence com!ination 4ris&5 is high enough to !e unaccepta!le, then
A. A mitigation action to predict or prevent the event is recommended.
B. A mitigation action to predict or prevent the event is not recommended
C. 1arrant to analyse ris&s involved
35) )))))..refers to a prescrip- tive methodology that has resulted from the application of ris&
analysis techniues at many different types of facilities,
A. %uantitative ris& assessment 4ra5
B. %ualitative ris& assessment
C. .emiuantitative ris& assessment
36) A r!i analysis shares many of the techniues and data reuirements ,ith a )).
A. %ra
B. (ha
C. Hazop
+. *vent tree
37) 2f a ra has !een prepared for a process unit, the ))))analysis can !orro, e$tensively from
this effort.
A. #!i conseuence
B. #!i li&lihood
C. #!i pro!a!ility
38) Hazard identification in a r!i analysis generally focuses on identifia!le failure mech- anisms in the
euipment 4inspecta!le causes5 !ut does not e$plicitly deal ,ith
A. 3ther potential failure scenarios resulting from events such as po,er failures or human
B. 3ther potential failure resulting from events such as flamma!le fire due to lea& from
C. *nvironmental impact caused due to to$ic release
39) )))))..deals ,ith total ris& than ,ith ris& involve only ,ith the euipment
A. %ra
B. #!i
C. (ha
+. Fta
40) #is& presented in unatitative ris& analysis as a
A. (recise numeric value
B. Form of ris& matri$
C. Form of event tree and fault tree
41) #is& presented in ualitative ris& analysis as
+. (recise numeric value
*. Form of ris& matri$
F. Form of event tree and fault tree
42) #esults from unatitative analysis logic models are validated !y
A. *$pert judgment.
B. 2nspection engineer
C. "aintenance engineer
+. 3perations personnel
43) -he suita!ility and current condition of the euipment ,ithin the current operating envelope ,ill
determine the )))).of the euipment from one or more deterioration mechanisms.
A. (ro!a!ility of failure 4pof5
B. Conseuence of failure
C. -otal ris&
+. #elative ris&
44) -he pro!a!ility of failure, ,hen cou- pled ,ith the associated conseuence of failure 4cof5
4seesection 665 ,ill determine )))).associated ,ith the euipment item,
A. 3perating ris&
B. #an&ing
C. #esidual ris&
45) )))). 2s a ris& management activity that may lead to ris& reduction.
A. 2nspection
B. *valuation
C. Analysis
46) -he primary product of a r!i effort should !e
A. An inspection plan for each euipment item evaluated
B. "itigation plan for each euipment item evaluated
C. #esidual ris& assessment plan for each euipment item evaluated
47) Follo,ing are some of the recognised ris&s ,hich cannot !e managed !y inspection alone e$cept one
A. *uipment nearing retirement.
B. Failure mechanisms 4such as !rittle fracture, fatigue5 ,here avoidance of failure
primarily depends on operating ,ithin a defined pressure7temperature envelope.
C. Conseuence-dominated ris&s.
+. -he suita!ility and current condition of the euipment ,ithin the current operating
envelope ,ill determine the pro!a!ility of failure 4pof5 of the euipment from one or
more deterioration mechanisms.
48) Follo,ing are the non-inspection mitigation actions e$cept one
A. #eplacement or upgrade
B. *uipment redesign
C. "aintenance of strict controls on operating conditions
+. #is& management !y monitoring the deterioration
49) 2n the event of a lea& the potential failure of an isolation valve could
A. 2ncerease the inventory
B. +ecrease the inventory
C. 'o harm to inventory
50) (otential hazards identified in a pha ,ill often affect the
A. (ro!a!ility of failure side of the ris& euation.
B. Conseuence of failure side of the euation
51) #!i may include methodolo- gies to assess the effectiveness of the management systems in
A. "echanical integrity
B. -otal asset integrity
C. (lant integrity
52) *uipment relia!ility is especially important if lea&s can !e caused !y
A. .econdary fail- ures, such as loss of utilities
B. (rimary failures such as lea& due to severe corrosion
C. -ertiary failures due to valve gland pac&ing lea&
53) #elia!ility efforts, such as reli- a!ility centered maintenance 4rcm5, can !e lin&ed ,ith r!i,
resulting in an integrated program to
A. #educe do,ntime in an operating unit.
B. #educe operating time of an unit
C. -o reduce ris& !y mitigation activities
54) 2n jurisdictions that permit the applica- tion of the api inspection codes and standards
A. #!i should !e an accepta!le method for setting inspection plans.
B. #cm should !e an accepta!le method for setting the inspection plans
C. (ha
55) )))))to !e esta!lished to judge accepta!ility of ris& could !e an o!jective of the r!i
assessment if such criteria do not e$ist already ,ithin the user8s company.
A. #is& criteria
B. #is& plan
C. #is& analysis
56) ))))))).. 2s usually not the primary o!jec- tive of a r!i assessment, !ut it is freuently a
side effect of optimization.
A. #educing inspection costs
B. 2ncreasing inspection costs
C. 2ncreasing freuency of inspection programs
57) 1hen the inspection program is optimized !ased on an understanding of ris&, one or more of the
follo,- ing cost reduction !enefits may !e realized. *$cept one
A. 2neffective, unnecessary or inappropriate inspection activi- ties may !e eliminated.
B. *ffective, necessary or appropriate inspection activi- ties may !e eliminated.
C. 3n-line or non-invasive inspection methods may !e su!sti- tuted for invasive methods that
reuire euipment shutdo,n.
+. "ore effective infreuent inspections may !e su!stituted for less effective freuent
58) -he follo,ing are the ris&s identified !y r!i assessment that may !e man- aged !y actions other
than inspection. *$cept one
A. "odification of the process to eliminate conditions driving the ris&.
B. "odification of operating procedures to avoid situations driving the ris&.
C. Chemical treatment of the process to reduce deterioration rates7suscepti!ilities.
+. 2dentifing and detecting deterioration and predicting future deterioration states ,ith
advanced inspection techniue4s5.
59) For ualititive r!i analysis it iis important to esta!lish a set of rules to assure consistency in
A. Categorization or classification
B. .egregation
C. #an&ing
60) 9enerally, a ualitative analysis using !road ranges reuires a )))))))..from the user
than a uantitative approach.
A. Higher level of judgment, s&ill and understanding
B. Lo,er level of judgement, s&ill and understanding
61) -he models are evaluated)))))))..to provide !oth ualitative and uantitative insights
a!out the level of ris& and to identify the design, site, or operational characteristics that are the
most important to ris&.
A. (ro!a!ilistically
B. .tatistically
C. Linearly
+. Logically
63)(otential source of errors in r!i analysis regarding data uality are the follo,ing e$cept
a. Assumptions in euipment history
!. 3utdated dra,ings and documentation
c. 2nspector error
d. Advanced inspection methods
64)-he follo,ing assumption can !e made that significantly impact the calculated corrosion rate
early in the euipment life
A. 2f the !ase line thic&ness ,ere not performed the nominal thic&ness may !e used for the
original thci&ness
B. 2f original thic&ness not availa!le, averaged ut thic&ness readings may !e used
C. 2f the original thic&ness not availa!le, ma$imum ut thic&ness readings may !e used
65) may result in the calculated corrosion rate appearing artifcially
high or low.
A. Clerical error
B. Measurement error
C. nspector error
!. "t scanning
66)#he data $alidation step stresses the need %or a &nowledgea'le indi$idual
A. #o comparing data %rom the inspections to the e(pected deterioration
mechanism and rates.
B. #o com)pare the results with pre$ious measurements on that system*
C. +imilar systems at the site or within the company or pu'lished data.
!. All o% the a'o$e
6,) the amount and type o% codes and standards used 'y a %acility can ha$e
A. +ignifcant impact on r'i results
B. -o impact on r'i results
C. .ess signifcant impact on r'i results
6/)0ho should 'e consulted to defne the e1uipment deterioration mechanisms*
suscepti'ility and potential %ailure modes.
A. A metallurgist or corrosion specialist
B. A metallurgist and corrosion specialist
C. A metallurgist only
!. Corrosion specialist only
62)))))))))))))))))))are the primary inputs into the pro'a'ility o% %ailure e$aluation.
A. #he deterioration mechanisms* rates and suscepti'ili)ties
B. .oss o% containment % 3uid
C. 4luid to(icity and its concentration
!. !amage mechanisms and its se$erity
,5)))))))))))))))))))))))))))is &ey to per)%orming deterioration mechanism
A. "nderstanding e1uipment operation and the interaction with the chemical
and mechanical en$ironment.
B. "nderstanding e1uipment operation and process upsets
C. "nderstanding e1uipment operation and its sa%ety protecti$e measures
,6)0ho can pro$ide use%ul input 7such as the spectrum o% process condi)tions*
in8ection points etc.) #o aid materials specialists in the identifcation o%
deterioration mechanisms and rates.
A. 9rocess specialists
B. 9lant operation specialists
C. Asset integrity e(perts
!. nspection engineers
,:)#hinning causes the loss o% material %rom
A. ;(ternal sur%aces only
B. nternal sur%aces only
C. ;(ternal or internal sur%aces
,3)+sc occurs when e1uipment is e(posed to en$ironments
A. Conduci$e to certain crac&ing mechanisms
B. "n%a$oura'le to certain crac&ing mechanisms
C. "n'enefcial to certain crac&ing mechanisms
,4)))))))))))))))))are o%ten necessary to esta'lish suscepti'ility o% e1uipment to
stress corrosion crac&ing.
A. .iterature* e(pert opinion and e(perience
B. Crac&ing mechanisms
C. !amage mechanisms
!. 4luid to(icity and its constituents
,5)cur$es are re%erred %or htha deterioration mechanism %or car'on and
low ally steel materials
A. -elson cur$es
B. 9h concentration cur$es
C. +chmidtt cur$es %or sulfde corrosion
,6)4ollowing are the critical $aria'les %or deterioration mechanism e(cept
A. Material o% construction
B. 9rocess operating
C. +tart up and shut down conditions
!. nsulation
,,)4ollowing are the common mechanical deterioration mehanisms e(cept
A. 4atigue
B. +tress<creep rupture
C. #ensile o$erload
!. ntergranular corrosion
,/)!epending on the methodology employed in 1ualitati$e analysis* the
categories may 'e descri'ed with words such as
A. =igh* medium or low or may ha$e numerical descriptors.
B. =igh* medium or low only
C. -umerical discriptors only
,2)0hen in accurate or insu>cient %ailure data e(ists on the specifc e1uipment
item %or 1uantati$e pro'a'ility o% %aliure analysis then
A. ?eneral industry* company or manu%acturer %ailure data used
B. 9rocess ha@ard analysis %ailure data may 'e used
C. 9rocess and to(ic concentration analysis may 'e used
/5)!eterioration rates can 'e e(pressed in terms o%
A. Corrosion rates %or thinning or suscepta'ility %or mechasnisms where
deterioration rate is un&nown
B. Corrosion rates %or thinning on ly
C. mmeasura'le 1uantity
!. !iscrete num'ers
;. +uscepti'le rates only
/6)!amage mechanisms where deterioration rates are immeasura'le or
un&nown are
A. +tress corrosion crac&ing
B. =ydrogen inducen crac&ing
C. #hinning
!. All o% the a'o$e
;. Both a and '
/:)#he a'ility to state the rate o% deterioration precisely is aAected 'y the
%ollowing e(cept
A. By e1uipment comple(ity
B. #ype o% deterioration mechanism* process and metallurgical $ariations*
C. naccessi'ility %or inspection* limitations o% inspection and test methods
!. .ac& o% co$erage o% an area su'8ect to deterioration.
;. -one o% the a'o$e
/3)#he type o% %ailure mode that li&ely to occur due to pitting
A. +mall hole si@ed lea&s
B. +mall holes to ruptures
C. Crac&s
!. Catastrophic rupture
/4)#he type o% %ailure mode that li&ely to occur due to ssc
A. +mall holes to rupture
B. +mall holes
C. Crac&s
!. Bnly rupture
/5)#he type o% %ailure mode that li&ely to occur due to mechanical and
metallurgical deterioration
A. +mall holes to ruptures
B. Crac&s
C. Catastrophic ruptures
!. .ea&s
/6)#he type o% %ailure mode that li&ely to occur due thinning
A. .arger lea&s or rupture
B. Bnly rupture
C. Metal loss
!. Crac&s
/,)% a $ery aggressi$e acid is carried o$er %rom a corrosion resistant part o% a
system into a downstream $essel that is made o% car'on steel* the result
would 'e
A. Capid corrosion could result in %ailure in a %ew hours or days.
B. ?eneral corrosion o$er a period o% time could result in metal loss
C. -o deterioration will ta&e place since car'on steel is resistent to
aggressi$e acid
//)% multiple inspections ha$e 'een per%ormed* which inspection may 'est
re3ect current operating conditions.
A. Most recent inspection
B. Base line inspection sur$ey
C. 9rocess conditions
!. Corrosion sur$ey
/2)(ro!a!ility side of the ris& euation is normally managed !y
A. (lant inspectors or inspection engineers
B. "aintenance planning engineers
C. (rocess safety personnel
+. Both a and !
25)3ther functional failures are usually covered ,ithin
A. #!i
B. #cm
C. (ha
+. Hazop
26)Follo,ing ,ill cover the functional failures e$cept
A. Heat e$changer tu!e failure
B. (ressure relief device failure
C. #otating euipment failure
+. .tatic euipment failure due to process environment
2:)Dualitati$e conse1uence analysis o% %ailure can 'e estimated separately %or
each unit* system* e1uipment group or indi$idual e1uipment item.
A. Bn the 'asis o% e(pert &nowledge and e(perience
B. Bn the 'asis o% a$aila'le data
C. Bn the 'asis o% process and en$ironmental conditions
!. -o 'asis re1uired since it is 1ualitati$e
23)Cesults o% 1uantitati$e conse1uence analysis are usually e(pressed in
A. -umeric
B. Canges %rom high to low
C. 4re1uency
!. Bccasion
24)n most conse1uence e$aluations* a &ey element in deter)mining the
magnitude o% the conse1uence is
A. #he $olume o% 3uid released.
B. Amount o% sur%ace area e(posed due to to(ic release
C. 9hysical area impacted 'y release
25)4ollowing is the unit o% measure o% conse1uence that are least de$eloped among
those currently used %or r'i assessment
A. AAected area
B. Cost
C. ;n$iromental damage
!. +a%ety
26)Most o% the damage %rom thermal eAects tends to occur in
A. Close range
B. 0ide range
C. .arge distance
!. -one o% the a'o$e
2,)#o(ic releases in r'i are only addressed when they aAect
A. 9ersonnel
B. ;1uipment
C. 9rocess
2/)#he r'i program %or en$ironmental conse1uences* typically %ocuses
A. Bn acute and immediate en$i)ronmental ris&s* rather than chronic ris&s
%rom low)le$el emissions
B. Bn acute and immediate chronic ris&s than immediate en$ironmental
C. -on threat en$ironmental ris&s
22)#he conse1uences o% en$ironmental damage are 'est understood 'y
A. Cost
B. Celease
C. Eolume o% 3uid
!. #o(ic concentration
655) Maintenance impact will generally 'e measured in monetary terms and
typically includesF
A. Cepairs and e1uipment replacement
B. Method o% cleanup
C. +a%ety systems
6:65 ))))))..is a po,erful tool that is !eing used !y many companies, governments
and regulatory authorities as one method in determining ris& acceptance.
A. Cost-!enefit analysis
B. #is& analysis
C. Cost conseuence analysis
+. #is& !ased cost analysis
6:;5 /sing ris& assessment the inspections are prioritised !ased on
A. #is& value
B. #is& matri$
C. #is& conseuence
+. #is& failure
6:<5 ))))))).typically involves revie,ing some or all input varia!les to the ris&
calculation to determine the overall influence on the resultant ris& value.
A. .ensitivity analysis
B. #is& analysis
C. (rocess hazard analysis
+. .afety ris& analysis
6:=5 )))))is an important part of the data validation phase of ris& assessment.
A. .ensitivity analysis
B. #is& analysis
C. (ro!a!ility analysis
+. (rocess hazard analysis
6:>5 -he information gathering performed after the sensitivity analysis should !e focused on
A. "ore certainty for the &ey input varia!les.
B. Less cerainity for the &ey input varia!les
C. 'o certainity for the &ey input varia!les
+. 'one of the a!ove
6:?5 -oo conservative assumptions made for the availa!le or unavaila!el data lead to overestimating
conseuences or pro!a!ility of failure values ,ill
A. 2nflate the claculated ris& values
B. "ay mislead inspection planners, management and insurers
C. Can create a lac& of credi!ility for the user and the r!i process
+. All of the a!ove
6:@5 3nce the ris& values are developed, one ,ay of presenting results of the ris& values are !y
A. #is& matri$ or plot
B. #is& indicators
C. #is& ran&ing
+. #is& occurance
6:A5 1hen the conseuence category is given a higher ,eightage than the pro!a!ility category then the
ris& matri$ ,ill !e
A. .ymmetrical
B. Asymmetrical
C. Logical
+. 'one of the a!ove
6:B5 Highest ris& ran&ing in the ris& matri$ is to,ard the
/pper right corner of the matri$
/pper left corner of the matri$
Lo,er right corner of the matri$
Lo,er left corner of the matri$
66:53nce the ris& plots have !een completed then the ris& plot or matri$ can !e used as )))))
during the prioritization process
A. .creening tool
B. 9uideline tool
C. Control line tool
+. #is& determination tool
6665))))))policies influence the placement of ris& thresholds
A. Corporate safety and financial policies
B. "aintenance inspection policies
C. *ngineering design policies
+. 'one of the a!ove
66;5A pressure vessel ,hich is critical for operations,,hose design pressure is 6> !ar and its operating
pressure under normal conditions vary from ? !ar to 6:!ar. -he vessel is in sulphuric acid process
environment. 2n due course of time after the vessel put into service for 6:years, it su!ject to thinning
due to sulphuric acid corrosion and found that localised corrosion upto @mm4 nominal thic&ness-
6:mm, t-min-=mm5. -he vessel undergone r!i analysis and categorised under higher ris& ran&ing,
follo,ing are the !est suita!le mitigation action to !e consired
A. *uipment to !e decomissioned
B. *uipment redesign
C. #eduction of operating pressure accepta!le to the process follo,ed !y cost effective
inspection program ,ith repair as indicated !y the inspection results
+. All of the a!ove
*. 'one of the a!ove
66<5-he uality of the inspection data and the analysis or interpretation ,ill greatly affect the
A. Level of ris& mitigation
B. Level of failure
C. Level of prediction
+. 'one of the a!ove
66=5Follo,ing are the tools critical to achiece ris& mitigation through inspection
A. (roper inspection methods
B. (roper data analysis tools
C. Both a and !
+. All of the a!ove
66>51hich plays a major role in over all ris& management strategy
A. 2nspection
B. "itigation
C. Conseuence
+. Failure
66?51hich inspection techniue for a piping circuit ,ould !e considered to have little or no !enefit
if the deterioration mechanism results in unpredicta!le local- ized corrosion
A. .pot thic&ness readings
B. /ltrasonic readings
C. #adiography
+. All of the a!ove
66@52n the case of localised corrosion, ,hich inspection techniue is more effective
A. /ltrasonic for thic&ness monitoring
B. #adiography
C. /ltrasonic fla, detection
+. 'one of the a!ove
66A51hich are the !est cases that may cause deterioration and increase the ris& of the euipment ,hen
managing the ris& ,ith inspection activities
A. "oisture ingress to euipment leading to scc or poly- thionic acid crac&ing.
B. 2nternal inspection of glass lined vessels.
C. #is& associated ,ith shutting do,n and starting up
+. All of the a!ove
66B5))))))) !e performed to determine ,hat size fla,s, if found in future inspections, ,ould
reuire repair or euipment replacement.
A. Fit- ness-for-service
B. #!i analysis
C. (rocess hazard analysis
+. All of the a!ove
%uestions completed upto 6;.@ chapter