ROMANO, Gerlianne Joy S.

Law 2B

LA BUGAL-BLAAN vs RAMOS
G.R 127882 January 27, 2004

FACTS:
President Fidel Ramos approved RA 7942 known as the Mining Act to
"govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral
resources. Shortly, after its effectivity, the President entered into a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation
Philippines (WMCP) which is owned by WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd.
(The latter is a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings
Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration company.),
covering 99, 387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kuradat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor
Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by
DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR
Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942
and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon.
The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter. Petitioners
claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They
pray that the Court issue an order:(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from
acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;(b)
Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as
unconstitutional and null and void;(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional
andnull and void; and(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines,Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal
and null and void.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing
fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit Philippine mineral resources

RULING:
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for
permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine which
states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, exploration
and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is
an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore RA 7942 is invalid
insofar as said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service
contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.


UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES vs IAC
GR 69997 September 30, 1987

FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted the following
mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu Albay.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned
their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The assignment of
rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2,
1959.
The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and
transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of
Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the
respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in
the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.
Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free patents were granted by the
respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles
were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay. The petitioner filed a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of patents against the private respondents and prayed
that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for properties over which original
certificates of title had already been issued in its favor be declared null and void.
On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.
It ruled that since the disputed properties form part of disposable land of the public
domain, the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines and that, therefore, the petitioner lacks
personality to institute the annulment proceedings. The petitioner appealed to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court.
On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It
ruled that the titles issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which belong to the
public domain and that these cannot be the subject of private ownership. According
to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law, only the Solicitor General
or the officer acting in his stead has the authority to institute an action on behalf of
the Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and for reversion of their
homesteads to the Government.
ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it
ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain; and b) whether or not
the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on the ground that the
petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

RULING:
Nowhere in the records of this petition is there any mention of a date before
November 15, 1935 as to when essential acts regarding its mining claims were
executed. It is silent as to when the land was entered, measured, and plotted; when
the legal posts and notices were put up; when the claim was registered with the
mining recorder; whether or not the annual amount of labor or development, and
other requirements under the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed. These may
have been complied with but not necessarily before 1935.
A mere mention in the Torrens title that the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 were followed is not sufficient. The Philippine Bill provides the
procedures for the perfection of mining claims but not the dates when such
procedures were undertaken by any prospector or claimant. The same procedures
would have to be followed even after the Jones Law of 1916 and the Constitution
of 1935 were promulgated, but subject to the restrictions of the fundamental law.
Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the
locations of its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15,1935 when the
Government of Commonwealth was inaugurated. Herefore, applying the
aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode
patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of
the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which
may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance
of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the
private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for
agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or
utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION vs BALITE
PORTAL MINING
GR 135190 April 3, 2002

FACTS:
On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining
Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a
Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving
conflicting mining rights. On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study
thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.
On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao,
the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC).
It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03
on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would
effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the
memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain
studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the
DENR.
The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a
manifestation of the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options, after
determining its feasibility through studies. MO 97-03 was only the initial step in
the ladder of administrative process and did not, as yet, fix any obligation, legal
relationship or right. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied for lack of merit. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WON CA erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not
adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal Conflict.

HELD:
No, since the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the
memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed there under was merely a
study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not
grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners
or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned
to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's
rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the
State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national
interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the
exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest.
The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of
the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the
constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded
from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy
in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As implied earlier,
the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for this
option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.
In this regard, petitioners imputation of bad faith on the part of the DENR
Secretary when the latter issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. Hence petition
denied.

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES
GR 179674 July 28, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner prays for the setting aside or reversal of the Decision dated 28
December 2006 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)-Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) which affirmed the Orders dated 14
September 2005

and 27 December 2005 of the DENR-Panel of Arbitrators, Region
1, San Fernando City, La Union (Panel of Arbitrators), in Case No. 2005-00012-I,
dismissing the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner to the Application for
Exploration Permit of private respondent Montague Resources Philippines
Corporation.
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws
engaged in the business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners Application
for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration,
development and commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral
deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA
No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.
Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent
filed an Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the same
properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089 and MPSA
No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified Protest/Opposition
to the Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It
was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on August 30, 2005 and was
received by the latter on September 5, 2005. Prior, however, to petitioners filing
of its Verified rotest/Opposition to the private respondents Application for
Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied. The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to
private respondent. Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified
Protest/Opposition of petitioner. Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which
was also dismissed. The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment
was rendered against the petitioner. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or
revoke EP No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent.

HELD:
The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP
No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent Section 77 of Republic Act No.
7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus: Sec. 77. Panel of
Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following: 1. Disputes involving rights to
mining areas; 2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits; 3. Disputes
involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and 4.
Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the
effectivity of this Act.
The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts,
and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over
cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing.
As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section
28 of DAO NO. 96-40explicitly provides:
Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit . The
Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration Permit for
failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and for violation(s)
of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued. For renewed
Exploration Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director shall
cause the cancellation of the same. According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96- 40,
Director means the Director of the MGB Central Office, while Regional
Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office. As the
authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same
necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same.
Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private
respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.

PICOP RESOURCES INC vs BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION
GR 163509 December 6, 2006

FACTS:
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a
Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration,
development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18)
mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement,
Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining
claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines
Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found
within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit was
subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28,
1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in
petitioner PICOPs logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and
petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual
recognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims.
Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements. While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw
Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over
thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation. The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw
Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining
operating agreement with CMMCI.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended MPSA
applications were published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act
of 1995. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-
Sciences Bureau (MGB), an adverse claim and/or opposition to private respondent
Base Metals application. After the submission of their respective position paper,
the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order disapproving private respondent Base Metals
MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time, that the granting of the
MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a
Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents
thereto, without the grantees consent, the area is considered closed to mining
location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in
forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the
government to a qualified person or entity and if it is leased the consent of the
lessor is necessary, in addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency
concerned before it is subjected to mining operation. Plantation is considered
closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes.
They cannot exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the
other operates. Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with
public respondent MAB, the latter rendered the assailed decision setting aside the
Panel Arbitrators order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB.

ISSUE:
(a)Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, closed
to mining activities and (b) Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract
protected by the non-impairment clauseof the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, not
closed to mining activities. RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all
forest reserves but only those proclaimed aswatershed forest reserves. There is no
evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. Even granting that the area covered by the
MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not
necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities.
Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mining
Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in
the forest reserve established under Proclamation369, the Court in that case
actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire
mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest
and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of
Mines and Geosciences. Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in
timberland or forestry subject to existing rights and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47
of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public
forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a
contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of
its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication
by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the
exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area. The
warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession
area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral
resources, occurring within the concession. The Presidential Warranty cannot be
considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a
collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber
license. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot
be invoked.

LONEY vs PEOPLE
GR 152644 February 10, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are
the Pres. and CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a corporation engaged in mining in the
province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings (mine waste) from
its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On March 24, 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, Mt. Tapian pit had
discharged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067
or the Water code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution
Decree of 1976, Sec. 108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, and
Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property.
In the Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration to its
Joint Order quashing the information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The
MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the
RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing
that the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942 and the petition was raffled to Br. 94 while public
respondents appeal assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the
Information for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was
consolidated with petitioners petition.
MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondents appeal but denied petitioners
petition. Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that
Br. 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because 1.the Informations for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC proceeded
from are based on a single act or incident of polluting the rivers thru dumping of
mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the other
charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection,
negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them, 2. The
duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Br. 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.

RULING:
The petition has no merit. In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the
additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on
the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac
Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily
proved that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off
and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they
cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised
Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not
an essential element of these laws.
Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenes
ruling in People vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the courts statement in
Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless
each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Thus,
Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on
a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue here,
but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for
an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a
national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under the first sentence of Sec. 21,
Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in
Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

DESAMA vs ELISEA GOZUN
GR 157882 March 30, 2006

FACTS:
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with
foreign companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale
exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an
Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000
ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of
the law, DENR rolled out its implementing rules and regulations. Didipio
petitioned to have the law and the IRR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it
constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942
and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their
sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which
they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private
purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the
corresponding payment of justcompensation. They assert that public respondent
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land
without payment of just compensation.
In their memorandum petitioners pose whether or not Republic Act No.
7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful
taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section
9, Article III of the Constitution issues, among others issues.

ISSUE:
Whether there has been an actual controversy or issue with respect to the
unlawful and unjust taking of property without payment of just compensation.
HELD:
Public respondents are of the view that petitioners eminent domain claim is not
ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their
properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are
in danger on account of CAMCs FTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that
the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which this Court can
take cognizance of. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
However, the court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to
consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there
is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides
for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage
done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or
installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and
justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent
domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION vs MACROASIA
CORPORATION
GR 169080 December 19, 2007

FACTS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and
IndustrialCorporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.
Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation
and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.After sometime,
Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and
other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease
Contract No. V-1050, before thePanel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-
Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also
wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and
other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation
(Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining
claims covering such areas contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia) mining lode
claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835
hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending
applications coveringanother 4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brookes
Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts. Macroasia
refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.Based on the records of
the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field investigations, the POAgranted the
petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found
the claims of the others indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the
preferential right to Macroasias mining areas.
It upheld Blue Ridges petition, but only as against the Mining Lease
Contract areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared
automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid
Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the
MAB.Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of
appeal; thus, withrespect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and
executory.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the
Mining Lode/LeaseContracts of Macroasia.However, the MAB, subsequently
issued a resolution vacating its previous decision, holding thatneither the POA nor
the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by
theDENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a
mineral agreement wasexclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.Celestial and
Blue Ridge made an appeal.The CA Special 12th Division affirmed the
MAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to
approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestials
Motion for Reconsideration. While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue
Ridges petition; reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated
the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining disputewithin the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the
power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes
the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to
cancel miningcontracts and privileges?

HELD:
It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining
contracts and privileges. After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO
279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and
case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has
the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements ba
sed on the following reasons: The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral
agreements emanates from his administrative authority, supervision, management,
and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987.It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that
manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development of all mineral
resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all
lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said
lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources
which include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of
the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to
approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said
agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR
Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights
clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements. The DENR Secretarys power to cancel
mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230,
Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of
a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.

APEX MINING CO vs Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp
GR 152613 & 152628 November 20, 2009

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held
that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one
of the conditions stipulated in the permit. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133
violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a
mining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision
pointed out that EP 133expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or
after its expiration. It likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent
any question against its validity. In view of this, and considering that under Section
5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Mining Act of 1995,
mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State
or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of ownership of priority right
over the contested Diwalwal GoldRush Area as having been overtaken by the said
proclamation. Thus, it was held in the assailed decision that it is now within the
prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining
operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities
including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and
regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision,
praying that the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement that mining
operations, are now, therefore within thefull control of the State through the
executive branch. Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and
Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.
Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the
State of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private
sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its
application for an exploration permit. Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion
for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them. In the
Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.

ISSUES:
1.Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to
SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth
in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.
2.Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the
disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution.
3.Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this
case is contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v.
Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July1991, 199 SCRA 278).
4.Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as
mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
5.Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was
belatedly raised.

RULING:
1.The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex
Mining Co., Inc. v.Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that were
not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of the
condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and
invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this assignment was effected
without the approval of the Secretary of DENR;
2.SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its
supposed right was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by
its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to
SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is
a mere license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has been
withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed
area under the full control of the State through the Executive Department;
3.The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463
applies to the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration permit
is an interest in a mining lease contract;
4.The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297
was raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its Motion for
Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said proclamation is
found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing statutes;
5.The motion for reconsideration of Camilo Banad, et al. cannot be passed
upon because they are not parties to the instant cases;6.
The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept
their applications for exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the
Executive Department that has the prerogative to accept such applications, if ever
it decides to award the mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity.


LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO vs WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD
GR 162331 Novermber 20, 2006

FACTS:
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned
subsidiary of WMCResources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a
Financial and Technical AssistanceAgreement, denominated as the Columbio
FTAA No. 02-95-XI (Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration,
development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in aninitial
contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat,Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order
No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.The
Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining
Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
(collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan
Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan
Companies on 25 April 1991,as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July
1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, South
Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the
right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires
to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims covering the area subject
of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the
Columbio FTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement
with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject
to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise of their right of first refusal
to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August 2000, petitioner sought the approval
of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary. In the interim, on 10
January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement between petitioner and
WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions
for its validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another
Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated
assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire theshareholdings and
undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius
Mines,Inc. increased its authorized capitalization to P250 million. Subsequently,
WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Shares of Stocks on 23 January 2001.
After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical
qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer
of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the
assailed Order. According to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department
Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. meets the
qualification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 02-95-XI, and
that the application for transfer of said FTAA went thru the procedure and other
requirements set forth under the law.
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius
Mines, Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR
Secretary with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18
December 2001 Order of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) approving the application for and the consequent
registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc.on the ground that:1) it violates the constitutional right of Lepanto to due
process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with the
regular courts; and 3) it blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act.
In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40
thereof requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of
financial or technical assistance agreements should have a retroactive
application to the Columbio FTAA.

RULING:
Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict the
established legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied
from the language used in the law. In the case at bar, there is an absence of
either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore,
any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively, in view of the
rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively,
unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning
can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot
be otherwise satisfied.

BENGUET CORP VS DENR
GR 163101 February 13, 2008

FACTS:
Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to
Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four
mining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a
Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims were covered by Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G.
Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.
After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N.
Tachuling, issueda letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the
mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then
sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating
the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the provisions of
the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of
obligations stipulated therein.
J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the
RAWOP. POA issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental
Agreement. BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA
Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision
was upheld by DENR-MAB. Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or no the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is proper.

RULING:
The instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an
improper Remedy.The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by
certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the
Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of
the[MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform
rule on appealsfrom quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their
judgments and final orders are nowrequired to be brought to the CA on a verified
petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ
of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition;
hence, it isno different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule
43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 among
these agencies are indicate that the enumeration isnot exclusive or conclusive
and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct
resort from administrativeagencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained from theappropriate lower tribunals, or unless
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of aremedy falling
within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.Thus Benguet should
have filed the appeal with the CA.Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the
CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On
this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.

CARPIO vs SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION
GR 148267 August 8, 2002

FACTS:
This case originated from a petition filed by respondent [Sulu Resources
Development Corporation] for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No.
MPSA-IV-13, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner [Armando C.
Carpio] filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his
landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents claim,
thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the quarry resources on his
properties.
After due proceedings were held, the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-
Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioners
opposition/adverse claim. Respondent appealed the foregoing Resolution to the
Mines Adjudication Board.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of
respondents failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Acts
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Mines Adjudication Board rendered the
assailed Order dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board. An
appeal was filed with the CA but same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines
Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by
the respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court
of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Factual controversies are usually involved in
administrative actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because,
unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In Metro Construction
we observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC
decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions of fact
and law. At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or
alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present case, the
CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional duty of the judiciary. To
summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB
Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that [n]o
law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. On the other hand,
Section 79 of RA No. 7942 providesthat decisions of the MAB may be reviewed
by this Court on a petition for review by certiorari. This provision Is obviously
an expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court
has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily burden it.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi- judicial bodys
decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the
substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved partys right to appeal is
preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made
or decided. The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this
remedy.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a
uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from
their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an
organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated
under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 --
among these agencies are-- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or
conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which,
though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended
by RA No. 7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact,
has more elbow room to resolve them. By includingquestions of fact among the
issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA,
Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43
explicitlyexpanded the list of such issues. According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n
appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and
in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that
direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained,
unless the redress desired cannot beobtained from the appropriate lower tribunals,
or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. In brief,
appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for
review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY vs HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
GR L-49109 December 1, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioner is a mining corporation, it alleges that it is the holder of fifty valid
mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the
Philippine Bill of 1902.P.D. No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting
and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one year from the approval of
the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under
protest", with a reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not
waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree
No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.
Three days before filing the disputed mining lease application, petitioner
filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its
rights (except by said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as
unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process
of law. Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared
as its own private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the CFI
Camarines Norte.
The cases cited by petitioner recognize the right of a locator of a mining
claim as a property right. This right, however is not absolute. It is merely a
possesory right, more so, in this case, where petitioner's claims are still unpatented.
They can be lost through abandonment or forfeiture or they may be revoked for
valid legal grounds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

RULING:
Even assuming that petitioner was not bound to exhaust administrative
remedies on the question of whether or not its mining claims are still subsisting
before challenging the constitutionality of said Decree. It is a valid exercise of the
sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which
petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of
which mineral deposits are a valuable asset.
It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all
mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over
which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may
still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec. No.
463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.Mere location does not
mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It merely
segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-
be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals
found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to
acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve
or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator
should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work
and improvements in the located mining claim.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution which states:"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of
the grant".

VILLARIN VS PEOPLE
GR 175289 August 31, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay
Captain Sudaria of Tagpangi, CDO, Baillo and Boyatac, were charged with
violation of Section 68, PD No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. City
Prosecutor recommended to charge Villarin as well. The Version of the Defense:
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-
an,Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair
the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly with the concurrence of
the Barangay Council. Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs,
Villarin commissioned Boyatac toinquire from Sudaria about the availability of
timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the
specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to
attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was transported from
Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike
Force Teamand taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, the
security guard on duty. RTC found them guilty. CA affirmed the judgment of
RTC.

ISSUE:
SSUE: WON mere possession of timber without criminal intent is
punishable.
RULING:
"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of
PD No. 705, to wit:(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authorization; and (2) Possession of timber
or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest
laws and regulations."The Information charged petitioners with the second offense
which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents.As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum
and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. "However, the prosecution
must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi)" the
timber. "Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime] is
in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the dominion and control
of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over
theplace where it is found."There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive
possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and
Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage
without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and
considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the
possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of
said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential. Petition denied.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO
GR 139548 December 22, 2000

FACTS:
Marcopper Mining Corporation registered its mining claims in Pao, Kasibu,
NuevaVizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982.
Private respondents Alberto G.Bumolo and others registered their mining claims in
the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims were
subsequently converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).
On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the
mining. Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and
irrevocable right to explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for
extension. petitioner filed Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau
of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged ground that a portion of the area
covered by the mining claims was within the Magat River Forest Reservation
under Proc. 573 of June26, 1969 and with DAR on account of alleged coverage of
the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc.
1498 of 11 September 1975.
Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners Prospecting
Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991
endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the area
covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in
conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in
the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel
Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for
reconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be
respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized. As regards
petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a clearance to
prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines
Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the
Magat River Forest Reservation. On June 11,1998 the rejection of the PPA was
affirmed whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G.Bumolo et al. that
had been converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO
No. 96-40, were given due course. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Respondent MAB denied petitioners motion.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA
was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.

RULING:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive
Director Paragas indenying petitioner's PPA. The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA
moreover, did not emanate from a single recommendation of the RTD for Mines.
Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 Bumolo group of PD 463
claims which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30
group of claims was confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to
be outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing
government reforestation projects.
the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a)
confirmation asearly as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991Memorandum Report of Regional
Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the National Mapping
and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps
to the office of the Regional Executive Director.
Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the
Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error
committed by somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the
fact that the allegation does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned
documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPA
had already settled the issue. Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the
bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands Management
Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996and
as shown in the Land Use map of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is
indeed outside any government reservation.