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Friendship

Some people may have no friendships of a high level of moral excellence. And, as
Aristotle recognized, some people may actually be incapable of such friendships. A
truly selfsh person could not have friends in the fullest sense. If someone were
genuinely able to care for another person for the other's own sae, if someone were
able to give much of him!or herself to the other freely and for the other's own sae,
then he or she would not be selfsh.
It is true that selfsh people can be very attached to one or another person ! eg., a
spose or friend. "ut it seems that such a friendship could not be a friendship of the
most morally excellent ind. #he attachment or friendship would be too grounded in
self!centered considerations. #hus, a selfsh man could be very attached to his wife,
dote on her, and in some ways do a lot for her. "ut this would not mean that he
really cared for her for her own sae. $is behavior would be compatible with his
caring for her, so to spea, for her willingness to serve him, to be at his command,
to %atter his ego. $is giving could be a minor concession for her serving him or even
a further expression or assertion of his power over her and of her dependence on
him. If he were truly selfsh, then something lie this would be the most liely
explanation of his &benefcent' behavior.
'evertheless, it would be wrong to say that selfsh people cannot really have friends
at all, in any sense of the term. (or frst of all, there are important aspects of
friendship besides caring for the other ! i.e., en)oying being with the other person,
or sharing certain inds of activities, or liing the other person. So selfsh people can
have friends, in that there are others whom they lie and en)oy sharing certain inds
of activities with. Second, even selfsh people can wish others well, be well disposed
towards others.
#hus, there are very di*erent levels of friendship, levels which are understood in
moral terms, in terms of how fully one cares for the other. (riendship always
involves a giving of self to the other and a valuing of the other for his or her own
sae. (riendship is an expression of moral activity on our part.
In caring about the weal and woe of my friend +ave, it is integral to the nature of
this caring that it be for someone whom I lie, whom I onw lies me, who cares
about my weal and woe, whom I trust, who is personally important to me who cares
about our friendship, etc. In acting from friendship toward +ave, I express my
acnowledgement of a relationship which includes all these feelings and attitudes.
#his is why the caring and the acts of benefcence are not separate form my own
interests, from what is personally a good to me. In fact, friendship is a context in
which the division between self!interest and other!interest is often not applicable.
! ,.A. "lum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality. 1980 Routledge and Kegan Paul

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