Page 1 of 19

DISTRICT COURT
ARAPAHOE COUNTY, COLORADO
Arapahoe County Justice Center
7325 South Potomac Street
Englewood, Colorado 80112




CHRISTA RENEE PRYOR
Plaintiff

v.

ANTHONY MASSEY
Respondent



Anthony Massey, Pro Se
PO Box 21813
Denver, Colorado 80221
720-336-1295
xtony@tonymassey.com









- COURT USE ONLY





Case: 13 CV 940

Division: 204

Judge:

Courtroom:
OPENING BRIEF, APPEAL FROM THE
ARAPAHOE COUNTY COURT

COMES NOW, the Appellant, Anthony Massey, in support of his Opening Brief and requesting the
District Court to review de novo the County Courts grant of a Temporary and Permanent Civil
Protection Order against Mr. Massey:








Page 2 of 19




TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................................... 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................................................................. 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ................................................................................................................................ 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................... 17




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Colo.1998)................................... 11
Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 398 P.2d 80 (1975) ....................................................................................... 7
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) ................................................................................................. 7
Cannon v. City and County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993) ................................................... 6
Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ........................................................................... 9
Cohen v. Cal, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)....................................................................................................... 6
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) ................................................................................................... 9
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) ................................................................... 9
Flores v. City and County of Denver, 220 P. 2d 373 (Colo. 1950) .......................................................... 8
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 139 (1992) ...................................................... 7
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) ....................................................................... 7
People v. Esparza-Treto, 08CA2101, 29 (Colo.App. 7-21-2011). ......................................................... 11
People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939,941,942 (Colo. 1993) .............................................................................. 6
PETA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002) ................................................................... 8
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. _____ (2011) ................................................................................................. 6
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) .............................................................................................. 7
Statutes
C.R.S. 13-14-102 ................................................................................................................................. 11
C.R.S. 18-3-602 ................................................................................................................................... 11
Rules
Page 3 of 19



C.R.C.P. 65(b) ........................................................................................................................................ 10
Constitutional Provisions
Constitution of the State of Colorado Article 2, Section 10 ..................................................................... 5
Constitution of the United States First Amendment ................................................................................. 5

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether the Permanent Civil Protection Order as applied to Mr. Massey is unconstitutional, and is
instead being used as retaliation against a constitutionally protected picket line and Mr. Massey for
participating in such picket.

2. Whether C.R.S. 13-14-102 (4) (a) was properly applied to Mr. Massey.

3. Whether C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d) was properly applied to Mr. Massey.

4. Whether C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1) as applied to Mr. Massey satisfies the legislative declaration of the
statute.

5. Whether Magistrate Apostoli violated sections C.R.S. 13-14-102 on issuing orders against Mr.
Massey.

6. Whether Magistrate Apostoli erred in her judicial discretion in issuing a Temporary or Permanent
Civil Protection order against Mr. Massey due to bias.

7. Whether there was sufficient evidence to issue the Temporary or Permanent Civil Protection Order
against Mr. Massey.


STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed for a Temporary Civil Protection Order in County Court raising
various allegations against Mr. Massey. The matter came before Magistrate Apostoli. A similar filing
for a Temporary Civil Protection Order was made against Jo Ann Scott. The June 10, 2013 hearing
was a combined hearing for the orders against both Mr. Massey and Ms. Scott. The Temporary Civil
Protection Orders were granted, and the matters set for a Permanent Protection Order hearing on June
24, 2013.

At the June 24 hearing, Mr. Massey denied the allegations of the Plaintiff, and generally argued the
restraining order laws do not apply in this case, as the allegations do not match the prohibited conduct
outlined in the laws. The matter regarding Ms. Scott has been continued to November, and the
Temporary Civil Protection Order remains in place against her.






Page 4 of 19



The Permanent Protection Order was granted against Mr. Massey on June 24, 2013.

Mr. Massey now appeals the Permanent Civil Protection Order as well as the underlying Temporary
Civil Protection Order to the District Court.



STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Initially, the Plaintiff's main justification for the Temporary Civil Protection Order is an alleged
incident on March 07, 2013 - where the Plaintiff states that Mr. Massey, and Jo Ann Scott (at a
distance of three or four car lengths [P59:10,14 and P93:6]) followed the Plaintiff from Plaintiff's
husbands place of employment to a location on South Santa Fe Drive - while Mr. Massey was
videotaping the entire incident (P75:7, P92:12). The alleged incident ended with no contact and the van
with Mr. Massey and Ms. Scott driving away. (P74:15-P75:9 and P91:13-P93:24). Mr. Massey has
never been subpoenaed to produce the alleged video, A search warrant has never been served for the
alleged video. The alleged video simply doesn't exist. Further, Plaintiff has not produced any video or
photographic evidence from the alleged incident.

On March 07, 2013, during a false 911 call - Plaintiff originally stated a protester and his wife were
following her. Mr. Massey was interrupted while trying to say this during the Arapahoe County
proceedings. (P113:5-6). Mr. Massey has never been married.

Even if the allegations were true, the allegations do not rise to a crime. The allegations simply state
that a vehicle followed another vehicle. There are no allegations of aggressive driving,
communications between the vehicles, threats, etc. The alleged incident of March 07, 2013 did not
occur. A criminal trial is pending in Denver County Court. We have submitted multiple affidavits
regarding the whereabouts of Mr. Massey and Ms. Scott on March 07, 2013 (P23-40).

The case generally morphed into where Plaintiff argued that Mr. Massey has made various coarse
statements to her, e.g. that she had a secret abortion, she is cheating, she's a whore, etc.

Mr. Massey and Ms. Scott are part of a pro-life picket line on the sidewalk outside of the Planned
Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains Denver Stapleton Abortion Clinic, located at 7155 East 38th
Avenue, Denver, Colorado, (PPRM Facility) where Plaintiff's husband is employed as the Director
of Security.

The PPRM Facility takes up a city block, and is surrounded by a seven foot fence, that is covered at the
front and back entrances with a black tarp. The fence is approximately seven inches away from the
edge of the sidewalk. There are bushes and other landscaping inside of the fence. South of the
driveway, there are trees, bushes, and other landscaping inside of the fence.

As part of the picket line, various messages are communicated to those entering and departing the
PPRM Facility. Further various signs and other displays are present. Because Plaintiff enters and
departs the PPRM Facility, various messages are communicated to her as well (except in the case of
Mr. Massey and Ms. Scott, who are currently unconstitutionally restrained from doing so).



Page 5 of 19



Mr. Massey has never stated Plaintiff is a whore. Mr. Massey has never stated Plaintiff was cheating.

Mr. Massey has never stated Plaintiff had a secret abortion. Any communication between Mr. Massey
and Plaintiff has been while Mr. Massey was standing on the sidewalk outside of the gate of the PPRM
facility.



SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This appeal is supported by Mr. Massey's claims that the Temporary and Permanent Civil Protection
Orders as applied to him are unconstitutional, because the orders were a direct result of Mr. Massey's
participation in a constitutionally protected peaceful pro-life picket of an abortion clinic that employs
the husband of the Plaintiff.

Because Mr. Massey participates in the pro-life picket, he has been the subject of false allegations by
the Plaintiff, as well as in the instant case, been subjected to judicial bias and partiality due to his
picket activity. This bias is what really caused the Protection Orders to be issued against Mr. Massey.

This appeal is further supported by Mr. Massey's claim that C.R.S. 13-14-102 was improperly
applied to him in the issuance of a Temporary and Permanent Civil Protection Order against Mr.
Massey. The purpose of a protection order is to restrain against imminent dangers, assaults, threatened
bodily harm, emotional abuse, and stalking not silence constitutionally protected speech.


ARGUMENT

A. The Permanent Civil Protection Order as applied against Mr. Massey is unconstitutional.

1. The Protection Order is unconstitutional and is simply being used as a weapon in a retaliatory
attack against the picket line in general and Mr. Massey specifically as retaliation for the
constitutionally protected picket and protest activities of the picket line.

2. Mr. Massey raised the arguments that he has been forced to serve various penalties... The
Permanent Civil Protection Order is yet another penalty that Mr. Massey has been forced to
endure in violation of his 5th and 14th amendment rights (deprivation of liberty), for engaging
in speech that was protected by the Constitution of the United States First Amendment, as well
as the Constitution of the State of Colorado Article 2, Section 10.

3. Further Mr. Massey was deprived of his 5th and 14th amendment rights to due process to
properly defend himself against the charges and allegations generally arising from the Denver
County case, as well as the unnecessary stress of time limits imposed by Magistrate Apostoli
which resulted in Mr. Massey being unable to finish his testimony, as well as redirect
examination of a witness (P125:7-11).

4. While this Arapahoe County case began as a case about an alleged event where a car followed
another car, it morphed into including the Plaintiff alleging that Mr. Massey made various
statements to Ms. And Mr. Pryor. e.g. getting a secret abortion, calling her a liar and a
Page 6 of 19



whore (P74:10-11), (P91:6-10), name calling, threats of lawsuit (P75:10-18), screaming at
people (P78:10-15) name calling, etc. (P94:9-16).

5. The Plaintiff also complained about the picket line generally:, you guys stand outside, you
harass women, you scream vile, disgusting, nasty things to people every single day (P99:18-
20) You guys are nothing but sidewalk bullies (P99:25).

Even if these statements were true they would all fall under protected speech under the First
Amendment.

Mr. Massey has never called Plaintiff a whore.

6. The First Amendment provides a shield against tort liability. The Plaintiff alleged Mr. Massey
made various statements at a public place regarding an issue of public concern - the murder of
preborn children in the womb via abortion.

Snyder held Given that Westboros speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern,
that speech is entitled to special protection under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot
be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. _____ (2011).

Even if Mr. Massey made some specific statements directed at the Plaintiff, that too is likely to
be protected speech.

even if a few of the signssuch as Youre Going to Hell and God Hates Youwere
viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that
would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboros
demonstration spoke to broader public issues.
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. _____ (2011).

The alleged content of the speech is protected as well.

Smith held that a state may not prohibit speech in public places merely because it is
'offensively coarse' People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939,941,942 (Colo. 1993).

The U.S. Supreme Court found free speech protection when it held a defendant could not be
convicted of disturbing the peace by offensive conduct for displaying a jacket bearing a
four-letter word (F--- the Draft) in the corridor of a courthouse.
Cohen v. Cal, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).

In Cannon, Protesters were carrying signs around an abortion clinic that read the killing
place. The court held The fact that speech arouses some people to anger is simply not
enough to amount to fighting words in the constitutional sense. and while it must be admitted
that the signs were likely to offend those entering the clinic, their offensiveness was not
inherently likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace. Finally, although the words
"killing" or "murder" are certainly emotionally charged, it is difficult to conceive of a forceful
presentation of the anti-abortion viewpoint which would not assert that abortion is the taking of
human life.
Cannon v. City and County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1993).
Page 7 of 19




Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though
not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, pp. 571-572, is nevertheless protected
against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger
of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).


The U.S. Supreme Court has held that speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply
because it may embarrass others or coerce them [other people] into action.
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).

The Supreme Court of Colorado similarly stated [i]f unsettling, disturbing, arousing, or
annoying communications could be proscribed. . . the protection of the First Amendment would
be a mere shadow indeed.
Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 398 P.2d 80 (1975).


Because of this holding, the First Amendment must only be limited when the language does
more than simply annoy or disturb an individual recipient. Speech is not subject to civil liability
or even criminalization because someone finds the speech to be offensive.

"Listener's reaction to speech is not [bold added] a content-neutral basis for regulation."
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 139 (1992).

As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988). emphasis added.

7. Further, the Plaintiff states that she does not want to be yelled at and screamed at. (P94:20-21)
(P133:10-21). Obviously, it would be unconstitutional to restrain someone who as a part of a
protest from communicating an urgent message.

8. The picket line meets reasonable time, place, and manner standards. The picket line is
conducted in a traditional public forum the sidewalk outside of the PPRM Facility during the
daytime. Further, Mr. Massey (along with other protesters) speak loud enough to be heard with
the message to be communicated. Mr. Massey and the other protesters not scream and yell for
the sake of screaming and yelling. For example, there are many conversations with guards or
others at the front gate and these conversations are conducted at normal conversational
speaking volumes.



Page 8 of 19




9. In PETA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002). The PETA Court distinguished
between protest on school property and public property adjacent to the school. The content-
neutral speech restrictions in public forums are subject to strict scrutiny while content-neutral
restrictions in non-public forums are subject to the reasonableness test. The Court held that
sidewalks generally are traditional public fora for First Amendment purposes, and thus
content-neutral speech restrictions are strictly scrutinized. PETA at 1199, 1204.

10. It also held that the public sidewalk adjacent to school grounds may not be declared off limits
for expressive activity by members of the public and the government may not prevent speech
simply because it may elicit a hostile response. PETA at 1200, 1206. The 10th Circuit Court,
"In Cox, about 2,000 protesters peacefully demonstrated against segregation. The State
contended that the conviction of a protester should be upheld because of the fear that violence
was about to erupt because of the demonstration. The Court rejected this argument, finding that
the students themselves threatened no violence...found that persons may not be punished
'merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views' [bold added], Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 561, 569 (1965)". PETA at 1206.

11. In Flores, a protest occurred at the Governors residence at 7:30 in the evening, The protesters
were chanting such phrases as, "Governor Knous come out of the house"; "the death of
Reuben Garcia is on your shoulders"; "clean up Golden"; "stop beating the boys." Some
carried placards containing such statements as, "Gov. Knous appoint a citizen's committee to
investigate Golden"; "stop the whipping of boys";

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the defendants.
Flores v. City and County of Denver, 220 P. 2d 373 (Colo. 1950)

Flores matches most of the false accusations made by the Plaintiff. Governor Knous was
specifically addressed, and accused of being responsible for whipping and beating boys and
for the death of Reuben Garcia.

In the instant case, the Plaintiff alleges Mr. Massey of calling her names, accusing her of
cheating, getting a secret abortion, etc. Mr. Massey has never accused Plaintiff of cheating or
getting a secret abortion.

12. The direct link to this case being about restraining constitutionally protected speech, and not
about restraining physical threats is found during the Temporary Protection Order hearing on
June 10, 2013. Upon hearing that they scream at everybody that enters the clinic, the orders
against Mr. Massey and Ms. Scott are granted.

The Court: Do they scream at everybody that enters the clinic?
Ms. Pryor: I mean for the most part, yes, they do.
The Court: All right, Ms. Pryor, I'm going to grant your request. I'm a little bit iffy to be
honest with you on this.
(P78:13-18)



Page 9 of 19



13. The orders are granted as a result of speech - not as a result of threats, violence etc. The
Magistrate could have asked did they scream at you?, were they insults or fighting words
directed at you?, were they screaming threats against you or your family?. At least
affirmative answers to these questions would have provided some minor basis for a protection
order. If screaming at somebody is justification for issuance of a Civil Protection Order,
Governor Knous could have obtained 50-70 protection orders against the protesters outside his
residence.

Most of the chanting was in a high-pitched voice, more or less like a football game.
Flores, Id.

A state may not keep law and order by depriving citizens of their rights.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).

The Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected
speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975).

a state may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the
guise of conserving desirable conditions.
Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

14. The issuance of the Permanent Civil Protection Order is a direct attack on the picket line in
general, as it may chill protected speech, especially since many of the same exact allegations
raised by the Plaintiff have already been unjustly used against another member of the picket
line ( Jo Ann Scott ) and may be unjustly used against other picketers in the future.

15. Attacks against the picket line at Planned Parenthood via criminal charges and Civil
complaints have been going on for years and is a well-established pattern of abuse of the
constitutional rights of those involved in the picket line, such as Mr. Massey.

16. Some years ago, Denver Pro-life activists filed a lawsuit against the City of Denver and Rocky
Mountain Planned Parenthood under section 1983 of Title Seven of the 1965 Civil Rights Act
for attacking their First Amendment rights under color of the law. Via discovery in that case,
they learned of a long series of secretive meetings in which various PP friendly individuals in
the political, police, and judicial establishment of the City of Denver had worked with Planned
Parenthood and NARAL on a sustained attack upon the First Amendment activities of anti-
abortion activists.

17. The Permanent Civil Protection Order against Mr. Massey issued by Arapahoe County
represents a renewal of that attack, and it makes Arapahoe County and its various
departments and representatives liable to a section 1983 lawsuit for attacking first amendment
rights UNDER COLOR OF THE LAW.





Page 10 of 19





B. Improper application of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (4) (a) and violation of C.R.C.P. 65(b) against Mr.
Massey upon issuance of Temporary Civil Protection Order.

18. Statutory requirement for issuance of Temporary Civil Protection Order requires the existence
of imminent danger to the life or health of the proposed protected party.

The Plaintiff generally alleges that vehicle A followed vehicle B one single time,
generally from a distance of 3-4 car lengths behind, and calls it Stalking. Mrs. Scott
and the co-defendent (sic) in this criminal case followed me from my husbands work
and proceeded to continue following me to approx. Santa Fe and Florida Road. During
this time, I made several lane changes and their vehicle continued to follow me. The
co-defendent is Mr. Massey.

The Plaintiff provides further allegations that Mrs. Scott has a violent past, and has
yelled remarks to the Plaintiff. The allegations of a violent past relate to a conviction
for Ms. Scott from 1988, when the Plaintiff was a three year old girl. This conviction
did not involve the Plaintiff. There is no allegation of physical threats against the
Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff checked various boxes generally alleging imminent danger, but failed to
provide any supporting arguments or evidence for such allegations.

19. These allegations grossly fail to meet the imminent danger standard.

C.R.C.P. 65(b) states temporary restraining order may be granted if the Plaintiff will
experience immediate, irreparable injury, loss, or damage.

These allegations grossly fail to meet the immediate, irreparable injury, loss, or
damage standard.

20. Magistrate Apostoli issued a Temporary Civil Protection Order against Mr. Massey, even
though such order grossly failed to meet the required standards.

21. The Temporary Civil Protection Order issued against Mr. Massey was a direct result of
misapplication of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (4) (a) and significant deviation from guidance
provided in C.R.C.P. 65(b).









Page 11 of 19




C. Improper application of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d) against Mr. Massey upon issuance of
Permanent Civil Protection Order.

22. The statutory requirements for a permanent civil protection order are To prevent assaults and
threatened bodily harm; To prevent domestic abuse; To prevent emotional abuse of the elderly
or of an at-risk adult; To prevent stalking.

23. The allegations clearly do not meet the statutory requirements of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-
c). There are no allegations or threats of bodily harm. There has never been and is no domestic
arrangement involving Plaintiff and Mr. Massey. The Plaintiff is not an elderly or at-risk adult.

24. The Plaintiff alleges stalking in her complaint, but then provides one single alleged incident to
support this allegation a white van followed her car at a distance.

25. Stalking is defined by C.R.S. 18-3-602 (1), and generally requires a credible threat and in
connection with the threat takes repeated actions such as following, contact, etc. An alternate
definition is provided in (1) (c) , requiring the repeated actions of following, contact, etc. that
would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress.

- The Plaintiff does not allege a threat.
- The Plaintiff alleges a single incident.

Therefore the allegations do not meet the definition of stalking as defined by statute.

26. Magistrate Apostoli issued the Permanent Civil Protection Order against Mr. Massey even
though such order did not meet the guidelines set out in C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d).

27. Issuance of the Permanent Civil Protection Order resulted in the improper application of
C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d) against Mr. Massey.


D. Significant deviation from legislative declaration of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1) in issuance of
Permanent Civil Protection Order against Mr. Massey.

28. When conducting statutory interpretation, a court's task is to give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly and the purpose of the statute's legislative scheme.
People v. Esparza-Treto, 08CA2101, 29 (Colo.App. 7-21-2011).

29. We consider whether the resulting interpretation is inconsistent with the purposes of the
legislation.
See, e.g., AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023, 1031 (Colo.1998)

30. C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1) (a) states protection orders promote safety, reduce violence, and
prevent serious harm and death.

31. Therefore, it is the role of the District Court to limit any use of the statute beyond the expressed
legislative intent. Here that would involve reversal of the Permanent Civil Protection Order, as
it does not promote safety, reduce violence, or prevent serious harm or death.
Page 12 of 19




32. Section (b) (I) (II) (III) describes various forms of domestic violence, and that Civil Protection
Orders provide assistance to victims of domestic violence.

33. The legislative intent is very clear: A Civil Protection Order is to protect someone from
physical harm or death. Credible threats of physical harm or death are not alleged by the
Plaintiff in this case.

34. Notwithstanding the legislative intent of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1), the Temporary and
Permanent Civil Protection Orders were issued against Mr. Massey.


E. Magistrate Apostoli violated C.R.S. 13-14-102 (9) requiring the magistrate be of the
opinion that the defendant has committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of a civil
protection order and that unless restrained will continue to commit such acts.

35. Magistrate Apostoli simply stated that Mr. Massey has committed such acts as alleged in the
issuance of the temporary protection order (P135:14-16), and issued the Permanent Civil
Protection Order, even though the alleged acts do not constitute grounds for issuance of a
Permanent Civil Protection Order, as shown in C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d).


F. Magistrate Apostoli showed multiple examples of outrageous partiality and extreme bias
against Mr. Massey, in violation of Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rules 2.2
Impartiality and Fairness, 2.3(a) performance of duties without bias or prejudice, 2.8(b) a
judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous....

36. Magistrate Apostoli was impatient, undignified, and discourteous towards Mr. Massey.

37. Throughout the Permanent Protection Order hearing, Magistrate Apostoli displayed an entirely
un-judicial temperament, and antagonism towards respondent and was indulgent to the Planned
Parenthood connected Plaintiff. She should be recused from any abortion protester cases.

38. Mr. Massey asked Magistrate Apostoli if he could use the podium. Her response was that Mr.
Massey could use the podium, but warned him that If your behavior becomes inappropriate,
I'm going to have you sit back down. (P116:35:9)

39. Magistrate Apostoli accused Mr. Massey of going on a tirade. (P117:10-11) She stated that
among things he could do with his time, he could use it in a tirade at the podium (P125:22).

40. During the June 24, 2013 Permanent Protection Order Hearing, Magistrate Apostoli overruled
multiple objections, generally resulting in testimony completely irrelevant to the protection
order case.





Page 13 of 19



A. Questions regarding psychiatric condition of a respondent witness.

At P121:09, P122:06, P123:05. Objections relating to questions regarding diagnosis
of psychosocial disorder, being in a psychiatric facility, and psychiatric diagnoses
being asked of a respondent witness by the Plaintiff, AND MAGISTRATE
APOSTOLI (P123:18). These questions are irrelevant to the protection order case.
Further, redirect examination of this witness was denied. (P125:07) This is
outrageous and unjustified.

B. Questions regarding irrelevant past events of a witness.

Multiple objections relating to Plaintiff questions to a witness regarding why the
witness was on probation, the feelings of the witness in relation to the abortion
industry, and whether the witness has attempted to cause physical harm to anyone in
the abortion industry.
(P129:12, P130:21, P131:16)


C. During the June 24, 2013 Permanent Protection Order Hearing Mr. Massey was
threatened with contempt when Plaintiff was not following procedure, and Mr.
Massey was attempting to object.

Plaintiff was beginning to allege that a witness was committing perjury. Mr. Massey
believes he was attempting to object, but it is not shown clearly in the transcript.
However, Magistrate Apostoli stated Knock it off. I will find you in contempt of
Court, Mr. Massey,
(P131:23-24).

41. The partiality and extreme bias actually started on June 10, at the temporary protection order
hearing.

42. The motivation for the partiality is that Mr. Massey is a peaceful pro-life protester of abortion
at the PPRM Facility. ( Open your mouth for the speechless, In the cause of all who are
appointed to die. Open your mouth, judge righteously, And plead the cause of the poor and
needy. - Proverbs 31:8-9 and Rescue those who are being taken away to death; hold back
those who are stumbling to the slaughter. - Proverbs 24:11 )

43. Magistrate Apostoli knew very early on that the Respondent was a protester at the Plaintiff's
husbands place of work. ( P73:11)

44. When the Plaintiff described the alleged white van chase incident on June 10, Magistrate
Apostoli asked no questions about this, showing little to no interest in it - even though it was a
pretty vague and convoluted version of the story that Plaintiff has been telling for months. She
made no attempts to square it with the allegations of stalking and harassment made by the
Plaintiff.



Page 14 of 19



45. However, Magistrate Apostoli did ask the question Do they scream at everybody that enters
the clinic? and the Plaintiff generally responded in the affirmative, Magistrate Apostoli
immediately granted the Temporary Civil Protection Order. ( P78:13-17) This is strong
evidence for the bias and partiality.

46. The Plaintiff's affirmative response should have actually been to the respondent's benefit,
because if the protesters are addressing everyone, then no one is being singled out, like the
Plaintiff alleges.

47. The Picket Line has been in front of the PPRM Facility since August 1989 -24 years. Mr.
Massey has been part of the picket line for two years. The Picket Line is on the public
sidewalk, and outside a seven foot fence.

48. However, just before this, Magistrate Apostoli asks when the last contact was, and there was no
contact in three months - Some of that time where Mr. Massey was not under a protection
order, from March 07 to April 24 - almost two months. But that was not a mitigating factor
either.

49. The protection orders against the respondent (as well as Respondent Scott in an identical case)
are targeting and attacking the picket line and the lawful peaceful protest activities of the
respondent. For example Respondent Scott is/has been prevented from the picket line until
November, 2013 due to fear of being arrested, and refusal of Magistrate Apostoli to modify
Respondent Scott's Temporary Civil Protection Order with a similar peaceful protest
modification as she did for Mr. Massey.

50. Even though there is a peaceful protest modification for Mr. Massey the respondents should
not be forced to a civil penalty of a Temporary or Permanent Civil Protection Order because of
their peaceful protest activities. There should be no penalties, because no crimes have been
alleged or committed.


G. There was insufficient evidence to issue the Temporary or Permanent Civil Protection Order.

51. Magistrate Apostoli relied upon the multiple lies of the Plaintiff, and never even asked a single
question of the Plaintiff regarding Mr. Masseys multiple objections and in testimony that the
Plaintiff was lying (P111:21, P112:11-11, P43-45 [Section 5]).

52. Plaintiff swore an oath to tell the truth to the court, and grossly failed to do so.
(P13:10-13, P73:19-P74:3, P9:1-9).

It is because of the Plaintiff's failure to tell the truth, that this entire case even exists, here in
Arapahoe County and in Denver County.







Page 15 of 19



53. The Plaintiff made the following false allegations in her Verified Complaint for Civil
Protection Order. (complaint) (P10-13)

1(b), and 4(b); Allegation of Stalking, as defined by 18-3-602, C.R.S. (P11) - Mr. Massey
has never committed stalking by any definition including the statutory definition. The case in
Denver County is an allegation of harassment.

4 Allegation of events of March 07, 2013. (P11)

4(d), Plaintiff denied existence of other protection orders. There were restraining orders
against both Mr. Massey and Ms. Scott. The Plaintiff knew the protection orders existed, as she
referenced them in online communications on Twitter. On May 27, 2013, at 2:01 P.M. Plaintiff
stated Too bad the protection order doesnt protect my husband too. Some people just
desperately need to their own lives.
(P56-58)

5(a,b), Plaintiff generally alleges imminent danger to life / health / and physical and
emotional harm, and provides no evidence thereof. (P12)

6, Plaintiff alleges that knowledge of her address will endanger her. (P12)


54. In testimony, the Plaintiff alleged he stalks me around the compound.

The Plaintiff testified she only knew the dictionary definition of Stalking. However, in this
case, the controlling definition is C.R.S. 18-3-602 (1-2). The Statue provides various
requirements in order for an act to be defined as Stalking.

55. The statutory requirements for stalking have not been met. This is further evidenced by the fact
that considering the contentious protest situations it is impossible to consider a scenario where
stalking charges would not be pressed at the earliest opportunity to do so against Mr. Massey.

56. Plaintiff further supports her argument by stating Mr. Massey jumps out of bushes to video tape
her. (P91:6)

It is impossible for Mr. Massey, Ms. Scott, or any other protester to jump out of bushes or
otherwise stalk someone around the compound. The compound described is the PPRM
Facility. (The bushes and landscaping are inside fence, on the PPRM property),

57. Mr. Massey and others conduct regular picket / protest activities on the public sidewalk outside
of the PPRM Facility. These are free speech and freedom of religion activities protected by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

58. The PPRM Facility is a two story office and medical building surrounded by a parking lot on
the west and north ends, and entirely surrounded by a fence seven feet tall. There is landscaping
(e.g. trees and bushes) on the inside of the fence, on PPRM property. There are three gates at
the facility that allow vehicles to enter and exit the facility.


Page 16 of 19




59. The facility employs armed guards and an armed guard has always been present any time that
Mr. Massey has been protesting the facility.

60. Sometimes there will be at least two armed guards at the facility. The normal guard assigned to
watch the gates and parking lot, as well as Mr. Pryor, a higher level employee with the title of
Director of Security. Sometimes there are two regular guards assigned to watch the gates
and parking lot.

61. Had Mr. Massey ever been on the grounds of the compound, minimum recourse against Mr.
Massey would have been the police called and trespassing charges pressed. Maximum recourse
would have been lethal force used against Mr. Massey.

62. Mr. Massey had not been arrested or ticketed at the PPRM Facility or for protest activities, until
the arrest on March 23, 2013.

63. After the Arapahoe County court hearing on June 24th, Mr. Pryor has represented to Mr.
Massey that because Mr. Massey is on a public sidewalk surrounding the PPRM Facility, he is
around the compound. If one were to rely on this faulty definition, then simply walking
along a public sidewalk and speaking to a person multiple times could result in multiple false
charges of harassment and stalking.

64. Due to the lies of the Plaintiff, Magistrate Apostoli is under the impression there is a stalking
case in Denver. What is the status of the Denver stalking case? (P95:22)

65. On June 10, the Plaintiff testified Ms. Scott is still on probation for an attempted murder
charge for trying to blow up an abortion clinic. (P74:21-23). Ms. Scott has never been
charged with attempted murder. Ms. Scott is not on probation. Ms. Scott completed a sentence
in 1988 and was not required to serve probation.

H. The alleged events of March 07, 2013 did not occur. Mr. Massey was generally restrained by
Magistrate Apostoli from defending against the alleged events of March 07, 2013.

66. Mr. Massey was at home at the time of the alleged incident sending out payments on the
Internet.
(P28-32)

67. Mr. Massey is accused of videotaping the entire incident - yet Mr. Massey has never been
subpoenaed to produce the video, nor a search warrant served on Mr. Massey for the video.
Mr. Massey continued videotaping the entire incident from the passenger seat (P11, P75:6-7,
P92:11-13).

68. The video does not exist and has never existed, because the allegations are completely false.

69. Ms. Jo Ann Scott took Mr. Massey directly from the PPRM Facility to his home in northwest
Denver.


Page 17 of 19





70. Ms. Scott then proceeded directly to her mother-in-laws house where she spoke and interacted
with multiple people. (P23-27, P33-40)


I. Plain Errors

71. Because of the multiple foregoing errors and problems shown involving these proceedings,
Mr. Massey respectfully requests the District Court to review the proceedings for Plain Errors
de novo.



CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons and authorities, Mr. Massey prays in the name of the LORD
JESUS CHRIST for this court to declare Plaintiff in Contempt of Court for flagrant violations of her
oath to tell the truth, REVERSE the County court's Permanent Civil Protection Order against Mr.
Massey, and to REVERSE the County court's Temporary Civil Protection Order against Mr. Massey.





























Page 18 of 19











Done this ___________ day of September, 2013.


_________________________________
Anthony Massey, Pro Se
P.O. Box 21813
Denver, Colorado 80221
720-336-1295
xtony@tonymassey.com
































Page 19 of 19



RETURN OF SERVICE


State of Colorado, County of ____________________________

I declare under oath that I served this OPENING BRIEF, APPEAL FROM THE
ARAPAHOE COUNTY COURT

in The City of _________________________ County of __________________, State of Colorado,

on (date) __________________________, At (time) _________________,



At the following location: ______________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

To the following person, _______________________________________________________


By (State Manner of Service) _______________________________________________


_______ I am over the age of 18 years of age and am not interested in nor a party to this case.


Signed under oath before me on ____________________, __________________________________
Date Signature of Person Serving Document


_____ Private Process Server Fee __________________



_______________________________________,
Signature of Notary Public


My Commission expires: ______________________________