SUPREME COURT

STATE OF COLORADO
2 East 14
th
Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80203
________________________
On Certiorari to the
Arapahoe County District Court, Colorado
District Court Case No: 13CV940
Judge Kurt A. Horton
Arapahoe County Court Case No. 13C454
Magistrate Christina Apostoli
________________________
ANTHONY MASSEY,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTA RENEE PRYOR
Respondent
________________________
Anthony Massey, Pro Se
Post Office Box 21813
Denver, Colorado 80221
720-336-1295 ~ xtony@tonymassey.com
COURT USE ONLY
__________________
Case Number:
ANTHONY MASSEYS PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of C.A.R. 28,
32, and 53, including all formatting requirements set forth by those rules.
Specifically, the undersigned certifies that this petition for writ of certiorari
complies with C.A.R. 53(a) because it contains 3799 words, which is less than
3,800 words.
______________________________________
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the government can issue a civil protection order when the statutory
provisions for issuing such order have not been met.
2. Whether the abortion distortion prevalent in the judicial establishment resulted
in significant negative bias during the proceedings against Anthony Massey.
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CASE REPORTED
Christa Renee Pryor v. Anthony Massey, Arapahoe County District Court,
13CV940.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Courts certiorari jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to C.R.S. 13-4-102(f),
C.R.S. 13-6-310, and C.A.R. 52(a). Date of Judgment: April 02, 2014 (See App.
1). The deadline for filing this petition: Not later than 42 days after the rendition
of the final judgment in the District Court. The final judgment rendered by the
District Court in this case was its June 07, 2014 decision on the motion to
reconsider. This petition is timely filed.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In March 2013, Mrs. Christa Pryor invented a fairy tale that on March 07, 2013,
Mr. Anthony Massey and Mrs. Jo Ann Scott were in a white van that followed
Pryor from Planned Parenthood at 38th and Pontiac in Denver to approximately
Santa Fe and Florida Road (See App. 3 PP2, LL. 9-10) while videotaping the
entire incident. There is no video of the incident, because it occurred only in
Pryors imagination. Massey and Scott have never followed Pryor anywhere. They
only know of Pryor from her visits to Planned Parenthood where her husband, Jim
Pryor was formerly employed as the Director of Security.
At the November 12, 2013 hearing regarding issuing a permanent protection order
against Mrs. Scott, after seeing evidence and hearing from several witnesses
including Massey, Arapahoe County Magistrate Apostoli herself den[ied] the
request for a permanent order noting that there was evidence or testimony [...]
that called into question [whether] that act occurred, referring to the incident on
March 7th, 2013. (See App. 6. PP139, LL9 and PP138, LL9-17).
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On January 26, 2014, the Denver County criminal cases involving the same
alleged incident were dismissed against Massey and Scott with prejudice because
of the complaining witnesss inconsistent statements.
The obvious conclusion is that if Scott did not commit the March 07, 2013 actshe
was the alleged driver neither did Massey, who was only the alleged passenger.
The trial and district courts failed to recognize this when it was brought to their
attention.
TIME LINE
In late March 2013, relying on Pryors false allegations, charges for harassment
(not stalking) were filed against Massey and Scott in Denver County Court. The
charges were dismissed with prejudice on January 27, 2014. No subpoena was
ever issued for the alleged video of the incident.
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On June 10, 2013, Pryor filed for Temporary Civil Protection Orders against
Massey and Scott in Arapahoe County. The matter came before Magistrate
Apostoli. In a combined ex-parte hearing, the Temporary Civil Protection Orders
were granted against Massey and Scott, and the matters set for a Permanent
Protection Order hearing on June 24, 2013.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED
Because Massey protests at the Planned Parenthood Denver Stapleton Abortion
Clinic, he was subject to the abortion distortion of our judicial establishment.
THE COURT: Do they scream at everybody that enters the clinic?
MS. PRYOR: I mean for the most part, yes, they do.
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Pryor, Im going to grant your request.
(June 10, 2013 Transcript, PP 7, LL 13-17)
So the protection orders against Massey and Scott were issued because they were
abortion protesters screaming at people. The protesters do not scream, they
talk loud enough to be heard.
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This is strong evidence for the bias and partiality. Pryors affirmative response
should have actually been to Massey and Scotts benefit, because if the group of
protesters (which would include Massey and Scott) are addressing everyone, then
no one individual is being singled out.
Even though Magistrate Apostoli may not like Masseys speech - and retaliated
against it, Justice Scalia said it best when he wrote Protecting people from speech
they do not want to hear is not a function that the First Amendment allows the
government to undertake in the public streets and sidewalks See McCullen v.
Coakley, 573 U.S. ______ (2014) (Scalia, J. Concurring in judgment) at PP 9.
TRIAL OF ANTHONY MASSEY
On June 17, 2013, Massey filed a motion to vacate the Temporary Civil Protection
Order. Massey denied all allegations of Pryor and produced 13 exhibits and five
affidavits about the case. Massey specifically denied that the March 07, 2013
incident ever occurred.
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On June 24, 2013, Magistrate Apostoli held a trial wherein Massey denied the
allegations of Pryor, and argued that the conduct alleged did not match the
statutory requirements for issuance of the protection orders. The Permanent
Protection Order was granted against Massey.
Massey appealed the Temporary and Permanent Civil Protection Orders to the
District Court.
TRIAL OF JO ANN SCOTT
Mrs. Pryor filed two nearly identical Civil Protection Order cases containing the
same false allegations of following Pryor on March 07, 2013. See Christa Renee
Pryor v. Jo Ann Scott, Arapahoe County Court, 13C453.
On November 12, 2013, Magistrate Apostoli held a trial for Scott, the alleged
driver in the March 07, 2013 incident when Massey was the alleged passenger.
There were six total witnesses at Scotts trial. One of them was Massey.
(See App 6. PP85-88)
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Massey was shown a map highlighting the route from the Planned Parenthood
facility, proceeding northwest to his home, located in Northwest Denver. Massey
testified that he rode with Scott and they took the highlighted route to his home on
March 7, 2013. (See App 6. PP87 LL10 - P88 LL10)
At the end of Scotts trial, Apostoli recognized that the evidence calls into
question whether the alleged incident ever happened and denied the Permanent
Civil Protection Order and dismissed the case against Scott. (See App. 6 PP138
LL9-17)
Since Scott was the alleged driver, and Massey the alleged passenger, it would
seem to a sensible judge that the Permanent Civil Protection order against Massey
should also have been dismissed at that time. The trial courts refusal to dismiss
Masseys protection order lends more support to the suspicion that she was
targeting Masseys activities as an abortion protester.
On April 2, 2014, Arapahoe District Court Judge Kurt A. Horton denied Masseys
appeal.
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DISTRICT COURT ERRORS
The district court erred by relying heavily upon the false testimony of the alleged
March 7, 2013 following incident to form its conclusions.
EVASIVE TRAFFIC MANEUVERS
The District Court erroneously concluded that the creation of a dangerous
situation by evasive traffic maneuvers meets the imminent danger and imminent
harm standard.
Scott was the alleged driver, not Massey. Pryor said that the white van followed at
a distance of 3-4 lengths behind and made some lane changes along with Pryor. As
described, there was no danger or harm, but the incident never occurred anyway.
Petitioner provided testimony that she was really scared and petrified Her call
to the police corroborates her alleged fear - (See App. 1 PP 8, LL23)
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It seems that the District Court never listened to the call showing Pryors
demeanor: Its obvious when you listen to the 911 call [...] theres no evidence
that she appears to be afraid whatsoever. In fact, its at least twice, and possibly
three times, that shes giggling. (See App 6 PP130 LL16-20)
PARKING LOT CONFRONTATIONS
The District Court invented the phrase parking lot confrontations to describe the
interactions between Pryor and Massey. Massey was never on the parking lot.
Massey pointed out to the District Court (and it completely ignored) that the
Planned Parenthood abortion facility is a one city block parcel, surrounded
entirely by a seven-foot tall, black, metal fence. INSIDE THE FENCE is the
landscaping, bushes, parking lot, and building. OUTSIDE the fence is the public
sidewalk and public street. (See Opening Brief Paragraph 56-58 and App. 9)
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Any interaction between Pryor and Massey occurred when Massey was outside
the fence at Planned Parenthood, and Pryor was inside the fence, visiting her
armed husband, Jim Pryor. Massey is effectively prevented from going inside the
fence, onto the parking lotwhere he would be arrested for trespassing, and/or
depending on the reaction of the ever-present armed security guard and/or Jim,
Massey risks serious physical injury or death. (See Opening Brief Paragraph 54-
62).
Massey has never been on the parking lot. Pryor has never come out onto the
sidewalk where the picketers are. Therefore any so called confrontation between
Massey and Pryor has been at some distance and on either side of a tall fence.
Since Pryors husband facilitated the secure operation of an abortuary, it is
somewhat inevitable that various anti-abortion protesters will say things to her
about abortion that she doesnt want to hear, when she is visiting her husband.
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SHOVE A CAMERA IN MY FACE
The District Court adopts Pryors obviously exaggerated allegations of shove a
camera in my face. (See App. 1 PP2 LL3). Pryor is always on the parking lot with
her pistol-packing husband while Massey is on the sidewalk outside a seven foot
fence. Jim also packs a cell phone and can get deluxe service from the Denver
Police Department. The District Court shows its bias by accepting this rhetorical
exaggeration as evidence of a close encounter that never happened.
Picketers gather video for the Internet and for legal protection, as this case
illustrates the need. All video is captured while standing on the public sidewalk
and street, outside the fence.
DEATH THREATS
Pryor testified about hearing the terms meet my maker, face God soon, etc.
Terms like this and others like repent, facing Gods courtroom, going to
hell, spoken by various protesters are theological, not physical threats. The
District Court erroneously declares these statements to be physical death threats
directed specifically at Pryor.
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Planned Parenthood monitors and records the speech and conversations of
picketers. Anything resembling a physical death threat would lead to arrest and
prosecution. Mr. Massey has never made any death threats to Pryor.
Pryor simply rewords theological statements into physical threats, and when
presented to the trial and district courts, these false statements were erroneously
accepted as complete truth.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Masseys motion to reconsider brought to the attention of the District Court that
the trial court had dismissed Scotts civil protection order, and the criminal cases
regarding the white van following incident were also dismissed. The District Court
erroneously refused to reconsider its order even though the foundation for its order
had crumbled away.
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WHY THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT
Even if the white van chase had occurred, it did not meet the statutory
requirements for civil protection orders. Other allegations are exaggerated
accounts of the picket line at Planned Parenthood. Picketing is protected by the
First Amendment.
THE PROTECTION ORDERS DID NOT
MEET THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
TEMPORARY CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER
The statutory requirement of for issuance of Temporary Civil Protection Order
requires the existence of imminent danger to the life or health of the proposed
protected party or immediate, irreparable injury, loss, or damage. See C.R.S.
13-14-102 (4)(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b).
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Pryor alleges as imminent danger that on March 7, 2013 vehicle A followed
vehicle B one single time, changing lanes with her, following from a distance of
3-4 car lengths behind (See App. 8, PP2, LL10,14), never communicating, never
taking aggressive action etc.
Pryor did not provide evidence for an upcoming immediate, irreparable injury,
loss, or damage. She didnt provide evidence for any injury, loss, or damage on
March 7, or at any time between March 7 and the June 10th Temporary Protection
Order hearing, or between March 7 and April 24, when no protection orders
existed at all, or between March 7 and March 23, when Massey was arrested for
the alleged white van chase, or anytime before March 7, 2013.

The Temporary Civil Protection Order issued against Massey resulted from
misapplication of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (4) (a) and significant deviation from
guidance provided in C.R.C.P. 65(b) and failed to meet the statutory standards
provided therein.
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PERMANENT CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER
The statutory requirements provided by C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d) for a
permanent civil protection order are To prevent assaults and threatened bodily
harm; To prevent domestic abuse; To prevent emotional abuse of the elderly or of
an at-risk adult; To prevent stalking.
Regarding C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-c): There are no allegations or threats of
bodily harm. There has never been and is no domestic arrangement involving
Pryor and Massey. Pryor is not elderly or at-risk.
Pryor alleges one single incident to support her stalking allegation a white van
followed her car at a distance. No credible threats or communications were
alleged. According to Pryors written statement to the police, the vehicle was
staying 3-4 cars behind me, stayed 3-4 cars behind me (See App 8, PP2,
LL10,14) [Massey was stopped from providing Pryors written statement to the
trial court, See June 24 Transcript PP32 LL5-25].
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Pryor can throw around the word stalking, but Stalking is defined by C.R.S.
18-3-602 (1), and requires a credible threat and in connection with the threat takes
repeated actions such as following, contact, etc. or as provided in (1) (c) ,
requiring the repeated actions of following, contact, etc. that would cause a
reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress. (See App. 7 PP3-4)
- there is no credible threat.
- one single incident is alleged.
- Stalking requires repeated actions.
The allegations fail to meet the definition of Stalking as defined by statute, and
accordingly, fail to meet the C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (d) requirement for issuance
of the Permanent Civil Protection Order. (See App. 5)
The issuance of the Permanent Civil Protection Order by the trial court resulted in
the improper application of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d) against Massey.
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There was significant deviation from legislative declaration of C.R.S. 13-14-102
(1) in issuance of Permanent Civil Protection Order against Mr. Massey.
When conducting statutory interpretation, a court's task is to give effect to the
intent of the General Assembly and the purpose of the statute's legislative scheme.
People v. Esparza-Treto, 08CA2101, 29 (Colo.App. 7-21-2011).
We consider whether the resulting interpretation is inconsistent with the purposes
of the legislation.
See, e.g., AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023, 1031
(Colo.1998)
C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1) (a) provides protection orders promote safety, reduce
violence, and prevent serious harm and death.
The legislative intent is very clear: A Civil Protection Order is to protect someone
from physical harm or death. Credible threats of physical harm or death are not
alleged by Pryor.
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The role of the District Court is to limit any use of the statute beyond the
expressed legislative intent. Here that would involve reversal of the Permanent
Civil Protection Order, as it does not promote safety, reduce violence, or prevent
serious harm or death.
The district court failed to do so, even after being informed of the dismissal of the
criminal cases and Scotts temporary civil protection order.
Section (1) (b) (I) (II) (III) describes domestic violence - not applicable here.
Notwithstanding the legislative intent of C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1), the Temporary
and Permanent Civil Protection Orders were issued against Mr. Massey. The
district court failed to reverse them.
C.R.S. 13-14-102 (9) requires the trial court to be of the opinion that the
defendant has committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of a civil
protection order and that unless restrained will continue to commit such acts.
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The trial court simply stated that Massey has committed such acts as alleged in
the issuance of the temporary protection order (June 24 Transcript PP54,
LL14-16), and issued the Permanent Civil Protection Order, even though the
alleged acts do not constitute grounds for issuance of a Permanent Civil Protection
Order, as shown in C.R.S. 13-14-102 (1.5) (a-d). The district court failed to
correct this faulty conclusion.
THE ABORTION DISTORTION
RESULTED IN BIASED PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
MR. MASSEY
Planned Parenthood and the abortion industry have long received deluxe, Cadillac
service from the Denver Police and the Denver / Arapahoe County courts, because
of the influence which PP, NARAL, NOW, etc. have throughout our government.
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Sophisticated people understand that it isn't the stork that brings babies and that
judicial appointments are not made in heaven. Those that desire to be judges, and
judges desiring to move up the judicial ladder, are well aware that these
appointments are greatly facilitated by recommendations from those in the party
whose officials make the appointments.
Judges are made by political favoritism, and in Colorado right now the abortion
industry is as powerful as the segregationists were in the south when the Civil
Rights movement was challenging the status quo.
Locally, this kind of influence means that a Democrat Mayor who appoints the
Denver County judges and a Democrat governor who appoints the county and
district judges of Colorado are bound to be influenced by the abortion industry.
Consequently, judges are well aware that their careers as judges are liable to be
blighted if they refuse to facilitate the abortion industry agenda of dealing harshly
with pro-life activists.
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Nationally, the law doesnt matter that much in an abortion case either. For
example, Justices Scalia and Kennedy complain that the rest of the Supreme Court
justices are simply disregarding the blatant attack on the First Amendment rights
of pro-life sidewalk counselors which is mandated by C.R.S. 18-9-122 (3). In
short, six of the nine justices at the pinnacle of the legal profession set aside basic
First Amendment law and went along with the attack on anti-abortion Sidewalk
Counselors. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
Not much has changed in the 14 years since Hill.
Today's opinion carries forward this Court's practice of giving
abortion-rights advocates a pass when it comes to suppressing the
free-speech rights of their opponents. There is an entirely separate, abridged
edition of the First Amendment applicable to speech against abortion. See,
e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S.________(2014)
(Scalia, J. Concurring in judgment) at 1.
In its zeal to treat abortion-related speech as a special category, the
majority distorts not only the First Amendment but also the ordinary logic
of probative inferences id at 7-8.
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56,000,000+ preborn boys and girls have been condemned to death before they
even escape the womb, as a direct result of the decision rendered in Roe.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
It is a judges duty to protect unborn children from being slaughtered at abortion
clinics across our wicked country, but the wicked judges do not.
How long will it be until we start putting unproductive grandmas and grandpas
to sleep while wicked judges issue the orders to do so and/or look the other
way?
Can wicked rulers be allied with you, those who frame injustice by statute? They
band together against the life of the righteous and condemn the innocent to death.
(See Psalm 94:20-21)
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The outrageous partiality and extreme bias from Magistrate Apostoli started on
June 10, 2013 at the temporary protection order hearing when she learned that Mr.
Massey is a peaceful pro-life protester of abortion at the Planned Parenthood
abortion Facility. (June 10 Transcript, PP4, LL22-23)
Open your mouth for the speechless, In the cause of all who are appointed
to die. Open your mouth, judge righteously, And plead the cause of the poor
and needy. - Proverbs 31:8-9
Rescue those who are being taken away to death; hold back those who are
stumbling to the slaughter. - See Proverbs 24:1
At the June 10 hearing, When Pryor described the alleged white van chase
incident, Magistrate Apostoli asked no questions about this, showing little to no
interest in it - even though it was a pretty vague and convoluted version of the
story that Pryor had been telling for months. Apostoli made no attempts to square
it with the allegations of stalking and harassment made by Pryor. However, when
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Magistrate heard that Massey and Scott scream at everyone at the abortion
clinic, she immediately granted the temporary civil protection orders against
Massey and Scott.
The District Court erroneously declared There is nothing in the record to support
a finding of partiality and bias (See App 1 PP11, LL11) The record is full of
examples of partiality and bias, and the refusal of Judge Horton to recognize it
shows that he too shares that same bias against anti abortion protestors.
The district court furthers the bias by relying heavily upon the foundation of the
false March 07, 2013 incident and other false testimony of Pryor, to build,
formulate, and support its order. Predictably, the foundation upon which the
district courts order rested has now rotted away and collapsed.
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CONCLUSION
The proper use of a Civil Protection Order is clearly defined within the statute. A
civil protection order is to restrain against imminent dangers, assaults, threatened
bodily harm, emotional abuse, and stalking. The trial court clearly stepped
outside of the statute when it issued the protection orders. The District Court failed
to correct this and made many other clear errors.
Further, the abortion distortion clearly resulted in significant negative bias against
Massey in this case.
For the reasons shown in this petition, the civil protection orders should be
dismissed. At a bare minimum, Massey deserves a new trial.
Mr. Massey therefore requests the court grant his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
__________________________ _________________________________
Anthony Massey, Pro Se
Ambassador for the Lord Jesus Christ on behalf of the unborn children.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the __________________________, 2014 I
______ placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, properly sealed and
addressed,
______ sent by facsimile, with original mailed,
______ hand delivered
a true and complete copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI to:
Christa Renee Pryor
By: _____________________________________________________
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APPENDIX
1. Arapahoe District Court Ruling Case No: 13CV940 - April 02, 2014
2. Motion to Reconsider - Denied June 07, 2014
3. Verified Complaint for Civil Protection Order
4. Hearing Transcript - June 10, 2013
5. 2012 version of C.R.S. 13-14-102
6. Hearing Transcript - November 12, 2013
7. 2012 version of C.R.S. 18-3-601
8. Pryor written statement
9. Map of Planned Parenthood facility
10. Word Count
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