A Note On Portuguese Reactions To The Revival of The Red Sea Spice Trade and The Rise Ofatjeh PDF

Department of History, National University of Singapore
A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of
Atjeh, 1540-1600
Author(s): C. R. Boxer
Source: Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 10, No. 3, International Trade and Politics in
Southeast Asia 1500-1800 (Dec., 1969), pp. 415-428
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National University
of Singapore
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A NOTE ON PORTUGUESE REACTIONS TO THE
REVIVAL OF THE RED SEA SPICE TRADE AND
THE RISE OF
ATJEH,
1540-1600
C. R. Boxer
No
reputable
historian
nowadays
maintains that the
Portuguese
16th-
century thalassocracy
in the Indian Ocean was
always
and
everywhere completely
effective. In
particular,
it is
widely accepted
that there was a
marked if erratic revival in the Red Sea
spice-trade
shortly
after the first Turkish
occupation
of Aden in
1538,
though
much work remains to be done
on the causes and effects of this
development.
The
Portuguese
reactions to the rise of
Atjeh
have
been studied
chiefly
in connection with the
frequent fighting
in
the Straits of
Malacca;
and the economic side of the
struggle
has
been less considered. The connection of
Atjeh
with the revival of
the Red Sea
spice-trade
has been
insufficiently
stressed;
though
Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz and Dr. V.
Magalh?es
Godinho have some
relevant observations
on
this
point
in their recent and well docu
mented works
(Asian
Trade and
European Influence
in the
Indonesian
Archipelago,
1500-1630,
The
Hague,
1962,
pp.
142-46;
Os Descobrimentos
e a Econom?a
Mundial,
Vol.
II, Lisboa, 1967,
pp.
Ill
-
171).
The
purpose
of this
paper
is to
amplify
the facts and
figures
which
they give
there,
in the
hope
that someone with the
necessary linguistic qualifications
will be incited to make
comple
mentary
researches in the relevant
Indonesian, Arabian,
or Turkish
sources.
I am not concerned here with the
origins
of
Atjehnese-Portuguese
enmity,
nor
with the
founding
of the
Atjehnese empire by
Sultan
Ali
Mughayat
Shah,
who
conquered Daya
to the west and Pedir
(Pidie)
and Pase to the east.1
By
the time of his death in or about
the
year
1530,
the
Atjehnese
had
captured
so
many
cannon from
the
P'ortuguese
that the
contemporary
chronicler,
Fern?o
Lopes
de
Castanheda,
averred that the Sultan "was much better
supplied
with
1. Cf.
Jo?o
de
Barros,
Decada III
(Lisbon, 1563),
Livro
5,
cap.
iii;
R. S.
Whiteway,
The Rise of
the
Portuguese
Power in
India,
1497-1550
(London, 1899;, pp.
329
330;
G.
Schurhammer,
S.J.,
Franz
Xaver,
seine Leben und seine
zeit, II,
Asien
1541-1552
(1)
Indien und
Indonesien,
1541-1547
(Freiburg, 1963),
p.
601,
and
the sources there
quoted.
415
PORTUGUESE REACTIONS TO RED SEA SPICE TRADE
artillery
than was the fortress of Malacca".2 The
Atjehnese popula
tion was not
yet
a
homogeneous
one,
since it was
composed
of different
groups brought together by
force
during
the successive
conquest
of other
petty kingdoms along
the east and
(principally)
west coasts of Sumatra
during
the course of the 16th
century.
There was also a
considerable mixture of Indian blood in the
populous capital
of
Kutaraja,
with the
increasing importance
of the
trade with India
during
the
reign
of Sultan Ala' al-Din
Ri'ayat
Shah al-Kahh?r
(c. 1537-1571),
with which we are
primarily
con
cerned.
Atjeh
was and
long
remained an
essentially
coastal
state
and seaborne
empire.
No serious
attempt
was made to
occupy
the
interior of the
island,
where the Sultan's rule was
purely
nominal.
The
export
of Sumatra
pepper
to the west coast of India and
thence to the Red Sea in
Gujarati shipping
was
only temporarily
interrupted by
the
Portuguese conquest
and
occupation
of Malacca.
Pedir
was for some time the
principal port
whence this
pepper
was
shipped,
but the
Atjehnese
may
have
participated
in this trade
even
before their
conquest
of
Pedir,
whose
dispossessed
ruler died
as a
refugee
at Malacca.:? However that
may
be,
the earliest reference
to
Atjehnese participation
in the
pepper
trade which I have been
able to find in the
Portuguese
sources,
dates from 1534. In that
year
a
Portuguese squadron
commanded
by Diogo
da Silveira inter
cepted
a number of
ships
from
Gujarat
and from
Atjeh
off the
straits of Bab-el-mandib
at the entrance to the Red Sea.4 In the
year
1545,
Pero de
Faria,
who had twice served
as
captain
of
Malacca,
wrote to the Crown from Goa that the
Gujaratis
were
exporting
pepper
from
Atjeh
and
Kedah,
a
piece
of information
confirmed
by
Manuel Godinho in the same
year.5 Just
about the
same time
(8
March
1546), King
Dom
Jo?o
III
wrote to the
Governor
at Goa
complaining
about the
reports
which he had
2. "...c
com esta artelharia ficou
muyto
mais abastado del? do
que
estava a
fortaleza de Malaca"
(Fern?o Lopez
de Castanheda,
Historia do descobrimento
e
conquista
da India
pelos
Portugueses,
Livro VII
(Coimbra,,
1554), caps.
84,
85,
100),
R. Feiner
(ed.), Subsidios para
a historia da India
Porgutueza:
Lem
bran?as
das cousas da India em 1525
(Lisbon, 1968), p.
16;
G. Schurhammer,
S.J.,
Die
Zeitgenossischen Quellen
zur
geschichte
Portugiesisch-Asiens
und seiner
nachbarl?nder,
1538-1552
(2nd
ed.,
Rome
1962), p.
108,
nr. 1629.
3. Ex-Sultan Mahamat to
King
of
Portugal,
letter d. Malacca,
15 Nov.
1543,
in
Arthur Basilio de Sa
(ed.),
Documentado para
a historia das
miss?es
do Padroado
Portuguesa
do Oriente.
Iisul?ndia, I,
1506-1549
(Lisbon,
1954), pp.
382-84. Cf.
G. Schurhammer,
Quellen (7962),
nos. 1132-1133. Sim?o
Alvares in his
report
on the
spice
trade diawn
up
in 1548,
states that he had
personally
examined
large quantities
of white
pepper captured
in
ships
bound from Pedir and
Martaban before the
vear 1530
(apud
Studia. Revista
Semestral,
Vol.
X, Lisbon,
1962,
p. 142;.
4.
Diogo
do Cou to,
D?cada IV
(Lisbon, 1602),
Livro
8, cap.
10.
5. Pero de Faria to the Crown, Goa,
19 Nov. 1545,
and Manuel Godinho
to the
Crown,
28 Nov.
1545,
in G. Schurhammer,
Quellen (1962),
nrs.
1709,
1746.
416
received
concerning
the marked revival of the Red Sea
spice-trade.6
This
dispatch
must have crossed one from D.
Jo?o
de Castro to
the
king, stating
that he had ordered all
Portuguese ships
bound
from
India to Malacca to sail in
convoy thenceforward,
owing
to
the recent
capture
of Antonio de Sousa's
junk by
the
Atjehnese.7
A further
report
of 1547
specifically
mentions two
ships
from Surat
lading pepper
at
Atjeh.8
It seems safe to
assert, therefore,
that
in the Red Sea
Spice-trade
dates from the
late fifteen-thirties and
early
fifteen-forties;
and that it did not
originate
in the
fifteen-sixties,
as is
usually
stated
or
implied.9
in the Red Sea
spice-trade
was undeniab
ly
in full
swing by
the mid-sixteenth
century.
In
1554-55,
two
successive
Portuguese
fleets were sent to cruise off the entrance to
the Red Sea in the
hope
of
intercepting ships
from
Atjeh
and
Gujarat;
while another
squadron
blockaded
Swally (Suahli),
the
roadstead of
Surat,
for the same
purpose
of
capturing Gujarati ships
from
Atjeh
"which had not taken out
Portuguese passports"
(cartaxes).10
These
expeditions
do not seem to have achieved
any
thing;
and a
projected
attack
on
Atjeh
itself,
for which the
Governor,
Francisco
Barreto,
had
organised
an armada of 25
galleons
and
caravels,
with over
seventy galliots
and
foists,
was can
celled in
September
1558,
when Barreto was
superseded by
the
newly
arrived
viceroy,
Dom Constantino de
Bragan?a.11
In 1559
this
viceroy
sent a
squadron
of two
galleons
and
eighteen
oared
craft to the Red
Sea,
"to
intercept
and
capture
the
ships
from
Atjeh'',
but
they
likewise failed to meet them.12
The
Portuguese
had
long
since
acquired
a wholesome
respect
for
the
Atjehnese
as formidable
fighters
who formed the
greatest
threat
to Malacca for over a
century.
A
contemporary
account of the
misadventures of the
castaways
from the outwardbound Indiaman
S?o
Paulo,
wrecked
on the west coast of Sumatra in the latitude of
the
equator
in
January
1561,
described the "Dachens"
as
being
"a
6.
King
D.
Jo?o
III to D.
Jo?o
de Castro, Almeirim,
8 March 1546,
in Antonio
da Silva
Reg? (ed.), Documenta?ao para
a historia das
miss?es
do
padroado
portugu?s
do Oriente.
India, III,
1543-1547
(Lisbon, 1950), p.
274.
7. D.
Jo?o
de Castro to the
Crown, Goa,
16 Dec.
1546,
in Elaine Sanceau
(ed.),
Cartas de D.
Jo?o
de Castro
(Lisbon, 1954), p.
233.
8. Antonio de Sousa to D.
Jogo
de
Castro, Chaul, 28 Mav 1547,
in G. Schurhammer,
S.J., Quellen (1962),
n.
3102.
9. M. A.
Meilink-Roelofsz,
Asian Trade and
European Influence, p.
145,
has noticed
that
ships
from
Atjeh
were
reaching
the Red Sea
shortly
after 1526. A
good
discussion of the vicissitudes of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf
spice-trade
routes
during
the 16th
century
will be found in V.
Magalh?es
Godinho,
Os Descobri
mentos e a Econom?a Mundial
(2
vols., Lisboa,
1963-67), especially
Vol.
II,
pp.
111-171. He also comments on the
importance
of
Atjeh
in this connection.
10.
Diogo
do
Couto,
D?cada
VI,
Livro
10,
cap. 18; Ibid.,
D?cada
VII,
Livro 1,
caps.
7-8.
11.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada
Vil,
Livro
5,
cap.
8.
12.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada
Vil,
Livro
6,
cap.
7; Ibidem, op.
cit.,
Livro
7,
cap.
6.
117
roving
and
piratical people,
formed from
many
nations,
and most
bitter enemies of the
Portuguese,
and
very courageous
warriors."lr>
The survivors of the S?o Paulo
personally experienced
the
fighting
qualities
of the
Atjehnese
in a
fierce encounter which
they
had with
the crew of a
trading-junk;
and another instance was afforded
by
a
naval
engagement
off the South Arabian coast in March or
April
of the same
year.
A
large 50-gun ship, comparable
in size and
appearance
to one of the
great Portuguese
Indiamen
(Naos,
or
carracks),
was
intercepted
off
Qishn ("Caxem")
by
two
Portuguese
galleons
and some foists. This vessel came from
Atjeh
and was
manned
by
500
warriors,
including
Turks,
Arabs and
Abyssinians,
as well as
Atjehnese.
A tremendous
all-night long
battle
ensued,
in which both the
Portuguese galleons
and the
Atjehnese ship
fell
aboard of each other and
caught
fire. One of the
Portuguese
galleons eventually got
clear and
extinguished
the flames on
board;
but the other two vessels
were burnt to the water's
edge.
Casualties
were
heavy
on both
sides,
and the
Atjehnese ship
was
reportedly
worth "over
a
million in
gold",
as her
lading
included
200,000
cruzados' worth of
gold
and
jewelry
for the Sultan of
Turkey.
Next
day,
her consort was
sighted;
but
though
the
Portuguese
even
tually caught up
with her and forced her to
strike,
she
managed
to
give
them the
slip
in the darkness of the
ensuing night.
Baulked
of their
prey,
the
Portuguese squadron
remained
cruising
off the
approaches
to the Red Sea for
just
over a
month,
in the
hope
of
intercepting
other vessels bound for
Mocha,
Jidda
and
Suez;
but
though they sighted
no fewer than
fifty large ships (Naos), they
were not able to
intercept
any
of them. The fact that
fifty big
ships escaped
them in such
a short
space
of
time,
is in itself
striking
evidence of the extent to which the
spice-trade
route to the Red
Sea had recovered.14
Diogo
do
Couto,
who- is our most reliable
Portuguese authority
for this
period,
states that the
ships
bound from
Atjeh
to the Red
Sea were now
taking
their course
through
the channels of the
Maldive
Islands,
and that the
Portuguese
tried to
intercept
them
there,
as well as
cruising
between
Capes
Ras Fartak and Guardafui
("Mount Felix")
off the Hadramaut and Somaliland coasts. In
March
1565,
a
Portuguese squadron
of two
galleons
and four
13.
Castaways'
accounts in A.B. de
Sa, Documentac?o, Insulindia, II, 1550-1562,
pp. 394, 405, 425,
and in C.R. Boxer
(ed.),
Further Selections
from
the
"Tragic
History of
the
Sea,"
1559-1565
(Cambridge, 1967), pp.
91-93.
14.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada VII. Livro
10,
caps. 2-3,
for a
graphic
account. This
is
obviously
the same
light
as that
briefly
described on
p.
110 of R. B.
Serjeant,
The
Portuguese off
the South Arabian Coast
[according
to
the]
Hadrami
Chronicles
(Oxford 1963).
Dr.
Serjeant
notes
(op.
et loe.
cit.),
"It is
surprising
how
frequently
Atcheh
appears
in Arabic works of this
period,
as
e.g.
in al
Djaruruz?,
Mukall?
MS.,
p.
12, which includes a
description
of the island and
its
produces."
Cf. also
Studia,
Vol. Ill
(Lisboa, 1959), pp. 80-81,
for the
Vicerov of India's relevant
report.
418
galliots
was sent to
intercept
the
ships expected
from
Atjeh.
This
led to another fierce
engagement,
reminiscent in
many ways
of the
1562 battle off the Hadramaut coast. The
Portuguese galleon
S?o
Sebasti?o fell in with
a
"fine
ship
from
Achem,
which carried more
than 400 white
men,
of Turks and other
nations,
and mounted
many good guns".
The S?o Sebasti?o boarded the
Atjehnese ship,
but both vessels
caught
fire and were
destroyed
after
a homeric
duel,
nothing being
saved of the former's
"very
rich"
lading.15
Subse
quent
efforts made to
intercept
the
ships
bound from
Atjeh
to the
Red Sea in the
years
1566 and
1567,
did not result in the
capture
of
any prizes, though
one Muslim
ship
was forced ashore and
wrecked on the island of Socotora.10
Venetian sources at Cairo
reported
the arrival of three
ships
from
Atjeh
in
1565,
with another two
expected
in the same
year;
but one
of these
was,
as we have seen,
intercepted
and
destroyed
in the
Maldive
passage by
the
Portuguese.
In addition to the five
Sumatran
ships,
another
twenty
from various
ports
in India reached
Jidda.
In
1566,
another five
ships
reached
Jidda
from
Atjeh,
together
with three vessels from
Baticalao,
bringing
a total of some
24,000
cantara of
pepper (1
cantara
being presumably
the Portu
guese
quintal
of 112
lbs.).17
Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz considers that
"these must have been
exceptionally large shipments" (Asian
Trade
and
European Influence, p. 363);
but I do not think that this was
necessarily
so,
since
very large ships, comparable
in size
to
the
great
Portuguese
India
carracks,
were
employed
in this
trade,
as
Diogo
do Couto and other
Portuguese
sources
emphasize.18
In
any
event,
the
costly
annual
expeditions
mounted
by
the
Portuguese
to
try
and
intercept
these
ships
on their
way
to the Red Sea in the
period
1554-1567,
clearly
failed in their
purpose.
This failure
presumably
accouts for the fact that
they
were
apparently
abandoned about
1569,
since notices of
Portuguese expeditions
to
the Red Sea after
that date
are
relativeely
few and far between.
Diogo
do
Couto,
recording
the
organisation
of
an
expedition
to the Red Sea in
1585-86,
observed that its failure was forecast
by
the
gossips
of
Goa,
15.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada
VIH, cap.
8.
16.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada
VIII, caps.
11 and 17.
17. M. A.
Meilink-Roelofsz^
Asian Trade and
European Influence, pp.
134-135, 363.
Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz's tentative identification of "Assi"
(mentioned
in the Vene
tian
source)
with
Atjeh
is confirmed
by
reference to R. B.
Serjeant, Portuguese
off
the South Arabian
Coast, p.
110,
where the Ashl of the
contemporary
Arabic
chronicles is identified as
Atjeh.
18. D.
Ant?o
de
Noronha,
the
Viceroy
of
Goa,
writing
to the Crown in December
1566,
stated that
20,000
or
25,000
quintals
of
pepper
were
reaching
the Red Sea
annually
in
Atjehnese
and other Muslim
ships,
whereas the
Portuguese
Indiamen
were
only carrying
10,000
or
12,000
round the
Cape
of Good
Hope
to Lisbon
(A.
da Silva
Reg?,
Documenta??o. India, X, 1566-1568,
pp.
157-58, 160, 163;
A. B. De
S?, Documenta??o. Insulindia, III, 1563-67,
pp. 172-177).
419
who recalled that
just
as all the Turkish naval
expeditions
against
the
Portuguese
in the Indian Ocean had
miscarried,
so had all the
Portuguese expeditions
to the Red Sea. Francisco
Rodrigues
da
Silveira,
who served in this fruitless
expedition,
recalled in his
-memoirs that "as
many years
had
elapsed
since
any
fleet of ours had
sailed in the Red
Sea,
we had no accurate
knowledge
of the
prevail
ing
winds,
nor
of the
ports, anchorages,
and
watering-places."19
The
development
of the
Atjeh
-
Red Sea
spice-trade
was
paralleled
by
increased
Atjehnese pressure
on Malacca
during
the
reign
of
Sultan
Ri'ayat
Shah
al-Kahhar, who,
in Couto's
expressive phrase,
"never turned
over
in his bed without
thinking
how he could
encompass
the destruction of Malacca". The
Portuguese
were
particularly
worried
by
the
prospect
of an
offensive alliance between
the
Atjehnese
and the Ottoman
Turks,
as indeed
they
had
every
reason to be. The
Viceroy
of Goa was informed in 1564 that the
Sultan of
Atjeh
had sent an
embassy
to
Constantinople,
to ask for
Turkish
military
assistance,
and
especially
for
cannon,
gun-founders
and
gunners.
This
embassy brought
rich
gifts
of
gold, pepper
and
spices,
besides
large proffers
of future wealth
to be derived from
the Indonesian
spice-trade
if the
Portuguese
were
expelled
from
Malacca and elsewhere with Turkish
help.
A
dispatch
from two
Portuguese spies
at
Venice,
dated 27th
August
1564,
informed the
King
of
P'ortugal
that letters had been received
by
the
Seignory
from
Cairo with news of the arrival there in
June
of over
1,800
quintals
of
pepper
and
3,000
quintals
of other
spices.
These
spices
had
been landed at
Jidda
from
a total of 23
ships,
some of them from
Atjeh
and some from Baticaloa on the Malabar coast. "These
Atjehnese
are those who most
frequent
this commerce and
naviga
tion",
and
they
had sent ambassadors with
gifts
to the Sultan of
Turkey
at
Constantinople.
This information had been received at
Venice from
Jews
and from the Venetian
envoy
at the Sultan's court.
The
Atjehnese
ambassadors were
asking
for
expert gunfounders
to
be sent
over,
"and
up
till now
they
have
only
been
given
six
gunners
and another six
military experts.
And this in return for the
present
which
they gave
to the Turkish
Pasha,
which was a casket contain
ing
a
large
necklace of valuable
pearls
and
many
diamonds and
rubies." It is not
clear from the context of the letter whether the
Atjehnese envoys
had
already proceeded
to
Constantinople
in
June
1564,
or whether
they
were still at Cairo or at
Jidda.
The writer
added that the arrival of these
spices
had lowered the
price
for them
everywhere.20
The
Atjehnese envoys
were
apparently
detained for
19.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada
X,
Livro
7,
caps.
7, 15-17;
A. de S.S. Costa Lobo
(ed.),
Memorias de um soldado da
India,
1585-1598
(Lisboa, 1877), pp.
27-30.
20.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada
VIH,
cap.
21; letter of
Gaspar
and
Jo?o
Ribeiro,
Venice
27
August
1564
(Torre
do
Tombo, Lisbon,
Corpo Chronologico,
Maco
107,
doc.
9,
no. 14198.
Copy kindly supplied by
Mr. S.
Osbaran).
420
about two
years
in
Turkey by
the death of Sultan
Suleyman
"The
Magnificent"
after their
arrival,
and
by
other matters which dis
tracted the attention of the Sublime Porte. Orders were
eventually
given
for an
expeditionary-force
to be
organised
in
Egypt;
but this
force,
embarked in nineteen
galleys,
was diverted to the Yemen
when
a revolt broke out there
just
as it was
ready
to leave for
Atjeh.
Only
two
ships carrying
500
Turks,
including gun-founders,
gunners
and
engineers, together
with
a number of
heavy
bronze
guns
and
other war
material,
reached
Atjeh
in 1566 or
1567. In addition
to
soliciting
Turkish
military
aid,
Sultan
Ri'ayat
Shah al-Kahhar
also tried to obtain the
help
of various Indian and Indonesian
rulers;
but in the
upshot
he
only
secured
some limited assistance
from the rulers of Calicut and
Japara
for the
major
attack
on
Malacca which he mounted in 1568.-1
Although
the
frequent Atjehnese
attacks on Malacca were not
countered
by
any Portuguese
invasion of
Atjeh during
the 16th
century,
such
a move was
frequently
canvassed in
government
circles
at Goa for
many years
after the abandonment of Francisco Barreto's
abortive
expedition
of
1558,
to which reference has been made above.
Prominent
among
the arm-chair
strategists
of this school of
thought,
was the
Archbishop
of
Goa,
D.
Jorge
Temudo,
who warm
ly
commended this
project
to the Crown in 1569. He stressed that
the Sultan of
Atjeh
was the most
dangerous enemy
that the Portu
guese
had in
Asia,
and that he was
actively seeking
alliance with
their other
principal
foes in India and
Ceylon.
In
exchange
for
the
military
and technical aid which he was
receiving
from
Turkey,
the
Atjehnese
ruler
was
sending
such vast
quantities
of
pepper
to
the Red
Sea,
"that it must
help
to lower the
price
of
pepper
in
Flanders. So much
pepper
is
now
going
to Mecca
[Jidda]
from
Atjeh,
that this
year
there was a
surplus
there,
which was
re-exported
to
Gujarat."
The
Archbishop
recommended that the harbours of
Atjeh (and
particularly
that of
Kutaraja)
should be blockaded for three succes
sive
years
by
a naval force
comprising
four or five
strong galleons
and twice as
many galleys, carrying
a
thousand men under
a
specially
selected commander. This task-force would be based on
Malacca,
and
equally
well
placed
to
prevent any
ships
from
leaving
Atjeh,
to
disrupt
its maritime
trade,
and to
intercept any
Turkish
galleys coming
from the Red Sea. This
campaign
would be much
simpler, cheaper,
and more effective than the actual
system
of
trying
21.
Diogo
do
Couto,
Decada
VIH, cap.
21;
Encyclopedia of
Islam
(new
ed.,
1960),
Vol.
I, 743,
quoting
Ottoman archival sources. For the Turkish bronze cannon
brought
to or cast in
Atjeh
at this
period
see the articles
by
K. C.
Crucq
in
the
Tijdschrift
Bataviasche
Genootschap,
Vol. LXXI
(1941), pp.
545-552.
22. Studia,
Vol. XIII
(Lisboa, 1961), pp.
207-09 for the above and what follows.
421
to
intercept
the
ships
from
Atjeh
in the Maldive channels
or off
the coast of the
Hadramaut,
which
only happened by
luck once in
while. An effective blockade of
Kutaraja
would
completely
ruin
the
Atjehnese
maritime trade and the Sultanate's
economy,
thus
sapping
the
strength
of this
upstart
coastal
kingdom
to such
an
extent that its
subsequent conquest
would be
easy.
Rather
sur
prisingly,
the
Archbishop argued
that this
conquest
would be
greatly
facilitated
by
the fact that the
Atjehnese
were
merely
"a
bunch of
pirates
and of all kinds of
peoples,
feeble and unwarlike"
("hum ajuntamento
de ladr?es e de muitas
castas,
fracos e
pouco
bellicosos"). Perhaps
he was
unduly
influenced
by
the fact that
Sultan
Ri'ayat
Shah al-Kahh?r's
long-planned
attack
on Malacca
had been
decisively repulsed
in
1568;
but even
so,
virtually
all other
contemporary Portuguese
accounts are unanimous in
stressing
the
courage
and
bellicosity
of the
Atjehnese.
This
project
never
materialised,
and on the
contrary
it was the
Atjehnese
who took the offensive
again
in the
ensuing
decade,
though they
met with naval reverses in 1571 and
1577-78,
and their
all-out attacks on Malacca in 1571-75
were
again repulsed.23
But
the
Archbishop's suggestions
wrere
probably largely responsible
for
the
projected
division of
Portuguese
Asia into three
separate
governments,
which was decreed
(though
never
implemented) by
the Crown in 1571.
By
the terms of this
decree,
Antonio Moniz
Barreto,
one of the most
experienced
and successful
Portuguese
conquistadores
in the
East,
was made Governor-General of the
region
between
Pegu
and
China,
with his seat at Malacca and the
task of
containing
or
conquering Atjeh.24
He never took
up
this
post,
and he refused to let
anyone
do so when he became
governor
general
at Goa in
1573;
but the idea of
attacking Atjeh
was never
lost
sight
of,
as we know from Couto and other
contemporary
sources. An
interesting map
of
Kutaraja
and its
approaches,
made
by
the famous
cartographer,
Fern?o Vaz
Dourado,
at Goa in
1568,
was
specifically prepared
for this abortive
invasion,
and it marks
the site where the
Portuguese siege-batteries
should be
planted.25
Padre Alexandre
Valignano, S.J.,
the
great reorganizer
of the
Jesuit
23.
J?rge
de
Lemos,
Hystoria
dos cercos
que
em
tempo
de Antonio Monis
Barreto,
Governador
que foi
dos Estados da
ludia,
os Achens e
J?os puzeram
?
fortaleza
de
Malaca,
sendo Tristao Vaz da
Veiga Capitjo
delta
(Lisboa, 1585), J.
M.
Macgregor's
article in
JMBRAS,
XXIX
(1956), pp.
5-21;
Marion
Ehrhardt,
Um
Op?sculo
Alemiio
do scculo XVI sobre a historia
portuguesa
do Oriente
(Frank
furt am
Main,
1964^,
for details of the naval actions and
sieges
of Malacca
in 1570-1580.
24.
Diogo
do Couto,
D?cada
IX,
cap.
1;
G. H. Cunha Rivara
(ed.),
Archivo Port.
Or.
Ill,
p.
597.
25.
Reproduced
from the
original
in the collection of the Duke of Alba in A.
Cortes?o
&: A. Teixeira da Mota,
Tabularum
Geographicorum
Lusitaniorum
Specimen (Lisboa, 1960), p.
16,
and
Portugaliae
Monumenta
Cartographica,
Vol.
Ill,
p.
245.
422
missions in Asia
during
the last
quarter
of the 16th
century,
asserted
in his Sumario of
1579/80,
that Malacca was "a
very poor
and small
thing" (es
cosa
muy peque?a y
pobre),
and would remain so unless
and until
Atjeh
was
conquered.26
A similar
opinion
was
expressed
by Diogo
do Couto in his
"Dialogue
of the veteran
soldier",
written
about the same
time,
and to which further reference is made below.
Proposals
for the invasion and
conquest
of
Atjeh
continued to
be discussed
throughout
the 1580's
by
the
responsible
authorities
at
Lisbon, Goa,
and
Malacca;
but in the
upshot nothing
concrete
came of
them,
as was
duly
noted
by
Linschoten in his Itinerario.
"It was
long
since concluded and determined
by
the
King
of
Portugal
and his
Viceroy,
that the isle of Sumatra should be con
quered,
and at this
present
there are certain
captains,
that to the
same end have the
King's pay,
with the title of Generals and Chief
Captains,
or Adelantado of this
conquest,
but as
yet
there is
nothing
done therein
although they
do still talk thereof but do it not."27
The most enthusiastic advocate of the
conquest
of
Atjeh,
and
for that matter of the whole island of
Sumatra,
was
Jorge
de
Lemos,
one-time
Viceregal secretary
at
Goa,
and author of the Cercos de
Malacca
published
at Lisbon in 1585. He reminded the Crown
that the rulers of
Atjeh
were
actively negotiating
with the Sultans
of
Turkey
with
a view to
mounting
a combined offensive
against
the
Portuguese
in Asia.
Every year (so
he
said) richly
laden
ships
from
Atjeh brought
vast
quantities
of
spices, gold
and
jewels,
to
the Red Sea. The Turks had
already supplied
the
Atjehnese
with
bronze cannon of all
calibres,
as also with
gunners,
naval
personnel,
and
engineers capable
of
"fortifying
and of
besieging
fortresses."
The Sultan of
Atjeh
had even sent a sum of
money
sufficient to
cover double the estimated cost of the
auxiliary
fleet of Turkish
galleys
for which he had asked. If the Sultan of
Turkey
had not
yet complied
with this
request,
it was
only
because Turkish efforts
and resources were
fully
committed to
fighting
the Christian
powers
in the Balkans and in the
Mediterranean,
and
against
the Persians
on the
Mesopotamian
front. But times
might change;
and the
Turks would then
gladly supply
the naval assistance which the
Atjehnese required.28
Jorge
de Lemos calculated
(with
evident
exaggeration)
that the
Sultan of
Atjeh
derived
an annual income of three or four million
26. A. de
Silva,
Reg?,
Documentac?o, India, XII,
1572-1582
(Lisboa, 1958), pp.
514-16, 550-51;
A.B. de
S?, Documentac?o, Insulindia, IV,
pp.
155-56.
27. lohn
Hughen
van
Linschoten,
his Discours
of Voyages
into
ye
Easte and West
Indies
(London, 1598),
fis. 32-33. I have modernised the
spelling
in the extract
in the text. Linschoten was
Secretary
to the
Archbishop
of
Goa,
1584-88.
28.
Jorge
de
Lemos,
Hystoria
dos cercos
(Lisboa, 1585),
Part
III,
fis. 1-64 for the
above and for what follows. Lemos also served as
Escriv?o
da Fazenda or
Secretary
of the
Treasury
at Goa in the 1590's.
423
gold
ducats from his trade with the Red
Sea,
"in return for the
30,000
or
40,000
quintals
of
pepper
and other
spices
and merchan
dise which he sends there in his
ships."
De Lemos also tried to
stimulate the
royal cupidity by extolling
the
great
actual wealth
and the still
greater potential
richness of Sumatra's natural resources.
He claimed that these included
great
quantities
of
gold, camphor,
benzoin, cinnamon,
ginger
"better than that of
Malabar",
sandal
wood,
silk "like that of
P'ersia",
and
sulphur.
Last not
least,
the
island "was
naturally very healthy
and well stocked with wild and
domesticated cattle." Somewhat
oddly,
he added: "Sumatra is
such a wonderul
thing,
and contains such
great
riches
,that
I dare
to affirm
(according
to what
many experienced
old men
related,
whom I overheard when
they
were
conversing
with the
viceroy
of
India)
that it could well be considered as the
equal
of
England,
of
which the
scriptures speak
so
highly."29
In a final
flight
of
fancy,
Jorge
de Lemos claimed that the
conquest
of
Atjeh
would
give
the
Spanish-Portuguese
Crown the economic resources wherewith to
destroy
not
only
"the Heresiarchs and their
followers",
but to
recover all Christian
territory
lost to the Muslims
(including
Jerusalem),
and to overthrow the Ottoman
Empire.
Coming
down
to earth in the last
chapter
of the Cercos
(1585),
Jorge
de Lemos
argued
that now was the time to launch an invasion
of
Sumatra,
since after the death of Sultan Ali
Ri'ayat
Shah or
Husayn (reigned 1571-1579),
four
or
five
years
of confusion and
civil strife had ensued in
Atjeh.
An
expeditionary-force
of
3,000
men
would
probably
be
enough
to ensure
success,
"as was
agreed
in the
reign
of Dom Sebasti?o." If the
present fleeting opportu
nity
was
neglected,
and
Atjeh
was
allowed to recover its
unity
and
strength,
then the Sultan
might easily
"blockade the mouth of the
strait of
Singapore, by
which route our carracks sail to and from
China and
Japan,
and which is so narrow that the
tips
of their
yards
touch the land on either side."30 This blockade would be all the
more effective if
Atjeh got help
from
Johore.
Malacca had
only
survived its
previous sieges by
a series of
miracles;
but even
a merciful God could not be relied
on to continue this benevolence
indefinitely,
and Malacca would
never be secure until
Atjeh
fell.
An almost
hysterical
note of
urgency
echoed
through Jorge
de
Lemos'
proposals
for an attack on
Atjeh;
but there were not want
ing
more
soberly
worded
suggestions
for this
oft-projected campaign.
I need
only
mention two of them here. Dom
Jo?o
Ribeiro
Gaio,
29. "...
que
se
pode
bem
paragonar
com a
Inglaterra,
de
que
as
escripturas
tanto
falam"
(Cercos,
fl.
61). Perhaps ''Inglaterra"
is a
slip
of the
pen
for some
biblical land of milk and
honey.
30. For discussion as to
what
was meant
by,
"the strait of
Singapore"
in the 16th
century,
see Gibson-Hill in
JMBRAS,
XXVII
(1),
pp.
163-214, and
Macgregor
in
JMBRAS,
XXVIII
(2), pp.
95-96
n.
424
Bishop
of Malacca from 1581 to
1601,
put
forward
some detailed
proposals
in
1584,
based
partly
on
intelligence-reports
which he had
received about
Atjeh
from
Portuguese
who had
long
been
captives
there. He further
suggested
that this attack should be mounted in
cooperation
with the
Spaniards
from the
Philippines,
where
a
previous
governor,
Dr. Francisco de
Sande,
had
already envisaged
such a move in 1578.31 As indicated
above,
Diogo
de
Couto,
the
famous soldier-chronicler of
Portuguese
India,
was another advocate
of the
conquest
of
Atjeh,
both in his D?cadas and in his two versions
of the
"Dialogue
of the Veteran soldier".32 Couto was more
cautious than
Lemos,
recommending
that the
expeditionary-force
should
comprise
4,000
Portuguese
soldiers,
apart
from sailors and
2,000
or
3,000
Indian
auxiliaries,
commanded
by
the
viceroy
in
person.
It would be
easy
to
quote
other
Portuguese
advocates of
the
conquest
of
Atjeh;
but the
point
I wish to
emphasize
is that
not
only
did such
proposals
stress the
ever-present
threat to
Malacca,
but
they
also
pointed
out that the
Atjehnese spice-trade
with the
Red Sea was
undermining
the
Portuguese
claim to the
monopoly
of
the
'conquest, navigation,
and commerce" of the Indian Ocean.
If these
projects
were not translated into action
during
the 16th
century,
it was because the
government
at Goa could not find the
necessary
men and
ships.
This fact was
ruefully
admitted
by
an
anonymous
commentator of
1582,
apropos
of the
Javanese bringing
Moluccan
spices
to
Atjeh,
"which we cannot
stop
them
doing,
as
we have no fleet
strong enough
in those
parts
to
prevent
them,\33
Far from the
Portuguese mounting
an all-out attack
on
Atjeh
during
the last decade of the
16th-century,
this
period
witnessed
a
decided,
if
temporary,
relaxation of tension. Distracted
by
such
major European
involvements as the revolt of the
Netherlands,
the
failure of the
Spanish
Armada,
and the renewal of war with
France,
the dual
monarchy
of
Spain
and
Portugal
had neither the
time,
the
money,
nor the men to
spare
for adventures in Southeast Asia.
On the other
hand,
the Sultan Ala'al-Din
Ri'ayat
Sh?h who came
to the throne of
Atjeh
in or about the
year
1588,34
after several
years
of civil
turmoil,
was so hard
pressed
at times
by Johore,
that
he could not afford to undertake
any major campaign against
Portuguese
Malacca. Dom Leonardo de
S?,
the
Bishop
of China
31. "Derrotero
y
Relaci?n
que
don
joan
ribero
gayo obispo
de Malaca hizo de las
cosas de ach en
para
El
Rey
Nuestro
Se?or",
d.
Malacca, 1584,
for which see
my
article in
Journal of
the
Royal
Asiatic
Society, April,
1950,
pp.
40-41.
32.
Dialogo
do soldado
pratico portuguez (ed.
Lisboa,
1790), pp.
72-77;
Diogo
do
Couto: O Soldado
Pr?tico
(ed.
M.
Rodrigues Lapa,
Lisboa,
1937), pp.
221, 224.
33.
Apud J.
Gentil da
Silva,
Alguns
Elementos
para
a
historia
do
comercio
da India
de
Portugal
existentes na Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid
(Lisboa, 1950), p.
31.
34.
Reigned
c.
1588-1604,
and not to be confused with his earlier and near name
sake,
'Ai?'cl-Din
Ri'?yat
Sh?h
al-Kahh?r,
c.
1537-1571,
according
to the table
given
in the latest
(1960)
edition of the
Encyclopedia of Islam, I, 743.
425
who
was
wrecked off
Atjeh
in 1587
on
his
way
to
Macao,
was
detained for some
years by
the
Sultan;
but he was well treated and
eventually
released with all save one of his
surviving companions
in 1594.35 The Sultan took this
opportunity
to
try
to effect
a
rapprochement
with the
Portuguese;
and
though
the
viceroy
gave
him no
encouragement,
the Crown of
Portugal, perhaps
at
the
prompting
of the Goa Senate or
municipal
council,
later
repri
manded him for
neglecting
this
opportunity.
The
change
from a
hot war to a
cold one
(as
we would
say
nowadays)
did not come
about
immediately;
and it was due more to mutual
exhaustion,
and to
greater
preoccupations
elsewhere,
than to
anything
else.
Thus we
find the Crown
writing
to the
viceroy
in March
1596,
that the
peace
with
Atjeh
should be utilised
merely
as a
breathing
space
before
launching
the inevitable
attack,
which should be
mounted as soon as an
opportunity
occurred. But two
years
later,
Lisbon
changed
its
tune,
and authorised the
viceroy
to maintain
friendly,
if
duly
cautious,
relations with
Atjeh.a(i
At this
period,
the total amount of
pepper
exported
from
Atjeh
was estimated
by
the
Portuguese
at
"15,000
bares each
year,
each
bar
being equivalent
to three and a
half
quintals
's1 Unfortunate
ly,
this
report
does not state
how much of this
pepper
was
exported
to the Red
Sea,
and how much to other
markets,
such as
China,
India,
and even to Malacca
itself,
as some of it
certainly
was. But
even if we assume that
Jorge
de Lemos*
slightly
earlier estimate
(1585)
of
40,000-50,000
quintals
of
pepper
and other
spices
from
Atjeh
to the Red Sea was
exaggerated,
it seems certain that the
Atjehnese
were
exporting
much more
pepper
to
Jidda
at the end of
the
century,
than the
Portuguese
were
taking
round the
Cape
of
Good
Hope
to Lisbon.38
By
this
time,
the
Portuguese
had aban
doned their efforts
to
intercept
the
ships
from
Atjeh
bound for
Jidda.
Willem
Lodewijcks,
one of the Dutch
pioneers
who visited
Atjeh,
noted on his
map published
at Amsterdam in 1598: "We
should be able to drive
a
good
trade in Achern: because
they
have
35.
Biography
of D. Leonardo de
S?
in Manuel
Teixeira,
Macau e a sua
diocese,
Vol. II
(Macao, 1940), pp.
86-88.
36. For the release of D. Leonardo de S? and the
gradual rapprochement
between
Portugal
and
Atjeh during
the
1590's,
see the relevant
correspondence
between
Lisbon and Goa
printed
in
J.
H. da Cunha Rivara
(ed.),
Archivo
Portugu?s
Oriental,
III
(Nova-Goa, 1861), pp.
276, 380-81, 597-98, 627, 669-70, 824, 848,
926, Ibidem,
op.
cit.,
I
(1877), pp.
188;
op.
cit.,
II
(34)-(35).
Cf. also A. B.
de
S?, Documenta??o. Insulindia,
V
(Lisboa, 1958), pp.
63, 189-90, 194-95, 216-17.
37. Archivo
Portuguez-Oriental,
III,
p.
627,
Crown to
Viceroy,
Lisbon,
March 1596.
38. V.
Magalhges
Godinho,
O is descobrimentos e a econom?a
mundial,
II
(Lisbon,
1967), pp.
105-106,
gives
the
figures
for the amounts of
pepper imported
an
nually
into Lisbon
by
the
Cape
route between 1587 and 1599. In the
years
1592-98,
they averaged only
9,110
quintals.
Cf. also his remarks on the revival
of the Red Sea
spice
route in
op.
cit.,
pp.
164-171.
426
great
store of
pepper,
which the
ships
from Suratte and
Cambaye
come
yearly
to
fetch and take to the Red Sea'.39
With
regard
to the
shipping employed
in this trade between
Atjeh
and the Red
Sea,
it is
ambiguously
described in the contem
porary Portuguese
sources as
"Naos de
Achem",
which means
"great
ships
of
(or from) Atjeh",
and it is seldom clear from the context
whether "of" or "from" is intended. But the
Atjehnese
fleets
which so often attacked the
Portuguese
in the straits of Malacca were
almost
entirely composed
of oared craft and small swift
sailing
vessels such as
galleys
and lancharas:10 When
larger junks
and
merchant
ships
were
employed, they
had been
pressed
or
embargoed
from Indian and other
shipping
in
Atjehnese
harbours. It is
virtually
certain that the
large
and
well-gunned
merchant
ships
which traded to
Jidda
were of
Indian, Arabian,
or
Turkish
origin.
In
fact,
the
great majority,
and
perhaps
all of
them,
were
probably
Gujarati.
The
part played by
the
Gujaratis
in the maritime trade
of Malacca before 1511 is
well-known,
and there are numerous if
scattered references to their
presence
in
Atjeh during
the
period
with which we are
concerned. It is evident from Couto and other
contemporary Portuguese
sources,
that
Cambay,
Surat,
and other
Gujarati ports
were
directly
concerned in the trade with
Atjeh
and
the Red
Sea,
with
or
without the
Portuguese
cartazes which
they
were
supposed
to
carry.
We have seen that Couto also remarks on the close resemblance
of these
Gujarati
"tall
ships" (to
use the
English 16th-century
equivalent
of naos de alto
bordo)
with the
large Portuguese
carracks
of the carreira da
India,
which
ranged
between 500 and
2,000
tons.
He also mentions
admiringly
the "most beautiful
great
ship (r?o)
called
Rupiya,
which is to
say
'the
great
silver
ship';
for each
year
she came from Mecca
[-Jidda]
with
a
great quantity
of
it,
and with
many
other
riches,
as it was the vessel in which the wealthiest mer
chants of the whole
kingdom
of
Cambay
embarked. And all of us
in the fleet
thought
that she was
larger
than
any
of the carracks
employed
in the carreira da India
f*1*1
when he and his comrades
inspected
this
ship
after her
capture
off Surat in 1560. W. H.
Moreland has shown that as
early
as
1507
an Arab merchant had
built a
galleon
in
Portuguese style
in
Gujarat;
and two
years
later
Albuquerque reported
that Indian builders were
imitating
Portu
39.
Beschrijvinge
vande Straten
ofte engten
van
Malacca ende Sunda met haer
omligghende Eylanden jBancken j Ondiepten
ende
Sauden,
reproduced
in facsimile
on
p.
32 of Colleclie Dr. W. A.
Engelbrecht. Lof
der
Zeevaart,
catalogue
of an
exhibition held at the Maritiem
Museum, Rotterdam, 1966-67.
40. For lancharas and other
types
of
ships
used
by
the
Atjehnese
in the 16th
century,
see Godinho de Eredia's
"Description
of
Malacca,
Meridional
India,
and
Cathay",
as translated and annotated
by J.
V. Mills in
JMBRAS,
Vol. VIII
(Singapore, 1930), pp. 36-38, 158-162.
41.
Diogo
do
Couto,
D?cada
VII,
Livro IX
cap.
12
(fl.
201 of the 1616 edition).
427
guese techniques
in some of the
ships
which he found
on the stocks
at Goa.42 There is no doubt tut that Indian
shipwrights
continued
to
incorporate
or
adapt European
features in their
own construc
tion,
whenever
they
found it convenient to do
so. For that
matter,
the same
applied
to the masts and
rigging,
as Peter
Mundy
noted
of the
eight
Indian
ships
which he saw on his visit to
Atjeh
in
1638.
"Except
a man
knew what
they
were,
he would
hardly judge
them to be other than some
Europe
fleet
by
their
form, beak-heads,
tops, rigging,
etc."43 I think it safe to
suggest,
therefore,
that the
development
of
Atjeh's spice-trade
with the Red Sea was
largely,
perhaps mainly,
due to the initiative and
cooperation
of the
Gujaratis.
42. W. H. Moreland,
"The
ships
of the Arabian Sea about A.D. 1500"
(Journal
of
the
Royal
Asiatic
Society, January
$c
April, 1939), pp.
179-181,
quoting
Gaspar
Correia and Fernso
Lopes
da Castanheda.
43. R. C.
Temple (ed.),
Travels
of
Peter
Mundy,
III, 1634-1638,
Part
II, p.
338
(London,
Hak. Soc,
ed.
1919).
The
Portuguese
made extensive
use of Indian
shipwrights
in their
yards
at
Goa, Cpchim,
and Dam?o,
as the
English
did later
at
Bombay,
where Governor Oxenden wrote as
early
as 1668: "here are
many
Indian vessels that in
shape
exceed those that come, either out of
England
or Holland". W.
Foster, ed.,
The
English
Factories in
India,
1668-1669
(Oxford,
1927), p.
80.
428

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