CASE 209: SOLIS v.

BARROSO
FACTS: On June 1919, spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propter nuptias of
certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in
consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case one of the donees
dies, half of the lands donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other
half. On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married and the donors immediately delivered the
possession of the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After
Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an
action against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and demanded: the execution of the proper deed of donation
according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and to proceed to the partition of the donated
property and its fruits.

The lower court granted the plaintiffs prayer, basing its judgment on article 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered
the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her the legal
title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation.

ISSUE: WON one-half of the donated lands should properly be awarded to Solis

HELD: No, the CFIs judgment is reversed and the defendants absolved from complaint

RATIO: Article 1279 provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or any other
special form in order to make the obligations of contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each
other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other
requirements for the validity of the contract to exist.

Art 1279 is not applicable because (1) it refers to contracts; (2) the donation in question requires the
execution of an instrument in the form required to make it valid, while article 1279 refers to the execution of
an instrument that is in the form required to make the obligation in the contract effective

In the case at bar, what is of concern is a donation propter nuptias. According to article 1328, CC, donation
propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in articles 618 to 656 of the CC, on donations.

The donation propter nuptias by the spouses were made in a private instrument. It is not valid because the
law requires donations of real property to be made in a public instrument. A donation propter nuptias is not
onerous and must necessarily be contained in a public instrument. While the marriage is indeed its
consideration it is not so in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. In fact, a donation
propter nuptias remains valid even if the marriage does not take place provided it is not revoked within the
period allowed by law. The marriage in donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which
presupposes the existence of the birth of the obligation.

Note: onerous means having legal obligations that outweigh the advantages

CASE 214: CHING v. GOYANKO
FACTS: Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. (seven children out of the legal union of Joseph Goyanko, Sr.
and Epifania dela Cruz) filed with the RTC of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages
against Maria Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of transfer certificate and the
issuance of a new one. Respondents Goyanko claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a real property in
Cebu which was first registered in the name of their aunt as their parents was still Chinese citizens at that
time. Their aunt executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of their father. In turn,
respondents father executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the petitioner, Maria Ching, his common-
law wife. Goyanko et al. aver that they are the real owners of the property involved. They further contended
that it was after their fathers death that they found out that a contract of sale involving the same property
has been executed by their father and common-law wife Ching. However, Ching claimed that she is the
actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price. The RTC dismissed the
complaint against Ching, declaring that there is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and
void, fictitious and simulated.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared null and void the
questioned deed of sale

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ching was void and inexistent

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals
and public policy because the sale was made by a husband in favor of his concubine

RATIO: Article 1409 provides Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning. Article 1352, NCC,
also says that Contracts without cause or with unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is
unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or pubic policy.

The sale of the property in favor of Ching also fell under the prohibition of sale of property between
the spouses provided for by Art 1490 of the New Civil Code. This provision also applies to common law
relationship. Ruling otherwise would mean, The condition of those who incurred guilt would be better than
those in legal union. The reason behind this is because if transfers and conveyances are allowed between
spouses during marriage would destroy the system of conjugal partnership and it seeks to prevent the
exercise of undue influence of one spouse over the other and to protect the institution of marriage, which is
the foundation of family law.

CASE 219: ARCABA v. TABANCURA vda. BATOCAEL
FACTS: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in
Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share of the property.
Subsequently, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latters cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to
take care of his house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia
said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that
Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila argued she was a mere helper who
could enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She
denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-
old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages
as house helper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and
became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his lot
near the public streets.

A few months before Franciscos death, he executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with his house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in
the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the faithful
services she had rendered over the past ten years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a
complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession
and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco,
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article
87 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: WON the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the deceased Comille be declared void under
Article 87 of the Family Code

HELD: Yes, the donation inter vivos is considered null and void.

RATIO: The court considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of
Cirila Comille such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver employee.

In Bitacor v Tan, the court held that the term cohabitation or living together as husband and wife means
not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation means more
than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation,
and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret
meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of
common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence
of illegitimate children.

CASE 225: Spouses Erlando and Joena ABRENICA v. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and
TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N. TUNGOL

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N.
Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan (the firm). In 1998,
respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The
first was for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With Damages and Application for
Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged petitioner Erlando refused to return partnership
funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas. The second was for
Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondent Law firm sought to recover
from petitioner Erlando retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash
advance that he obtained in 1997. The court ruled in favor of respondents.

Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision, petitioners Erlando and Joena filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order but court dismissed the petition. Petitioners did not give up.
They once again filed a 105-page Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA dated 25 May 2007.
However, CA issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition, which held the Petition to be
insufficient in form and substance. On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim alleging
that she and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also
insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot which formed part of
the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family home, and
the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated combined value of one
hundred thousand pesos (100,000) were exempt from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and release and likewise the immediate remittance to her
of half of the proceeds, if any.

ISSUE: WON Joenas contention that, the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as
the house and lot formed part of the absolute community regime

HELD: No, neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage

RATIO: When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
common mass of the couples properties.

Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if
any, of that property.

CASE 230: BUADO v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Erlinda Nicol was held liable for damages for the crime of slander against spouses Roberto and
Venus Ruado. On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the
petitioners. The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages. The sheriff levied and
auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. The conjugal property of Erlinda, which was
valued at Php 500,000, was auctioned, bided and won by the spouses Buado for only Php 51,685. A year
after, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against the spouse and the sheriff. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of
Romulo Nicol. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has
jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners Buado filed a petition
where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision
given by the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal property can be levied for the personal obligation of the wife

HELD: No. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership

RATIO: The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse. The Court held in the case of Naguit v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya that a spouse is
deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in
bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal
property. Pursuant to Mariano vs. CA, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment
debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not; and the court ruled that the conjugal
property of Erlinda and Romulo is not chargeable to the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability.

The conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless
some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. (Unlike in the system of
absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi -delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse) Moreover it cannot be said that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

CASE 235: QUIAO v. QUIAO
FACTS: On October 26, 2000, respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against
petitioner Brigido B. Quiao. RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation and awarding the
custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid
conjugal liabilities.

Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal
within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision; the
petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits
Earned.

RTC defined NET PROFIT EARNED as the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting
the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending
spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and
43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article
129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there
is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result
of legal separation.

Issues: (235 and 242) WON Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community should have been applied
instead of Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains
(260) WON Art 125 shall be applied in the consequent liquidation of the common properties of the husband
and wife by virtue of the decree of legal separation
(305) WON the offending spouse acquired vested rights over of the properties in the conjugal partnership

HELD: (235 and 242) No, Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership is the prevailing provision
(260) No, Art 129 shall apply, not Art 125.
(305) No, the guilty spouse is not entitled to acquire of the properties in the conjugal partnership

RATIO: (235 and 242) Since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code,
Art 129 was correctly applied. The general rule is that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established of the
Family Code shall govern the property relations between husband and wife and at the time of the dissolution
of the spouses marriage.
(260) No, Art 129 shall apply. The applicable law in the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.
(305) The petitioner alleges that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime
of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, he (respondent) acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which
provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.

It is clear that while one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In this case, the petitioner was given his
right to due process. First, he was well aware that the respondent Rita prayed in her complaint that all of the
conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact petitioner Brigido prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after
the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for
legal separation became final and executory, petitioner Brigido never questioned the trial courts ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Hence,
petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

CASE 240: BELCODERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while
living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The husband, Alayo D. Bosing,
married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and
Gaido. In 1946 he abandoned them and lived with Josefa Rivera (whom he acknowledged as common law
wife Josefa Bosing). They had one child, Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero. He married Josefa
Bosing in 1958, while still married to Juliana. Alayo acquired a parcel of land on installment basis in1949 and
his deed he named Josefina Bosing as his wife and transferred lot in her name. The final deed was
executed in1959. Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extra-
judicial partition and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal property. Josefas share went to
Josephine for P10, 000, so Josephine Belcodero had full ownership. Notice was published. On 30 October
1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an
action for reconveyance of the property. Trial Court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.

ISSUE: WON property belongs to conjugal partnership of Alayo and legal wife Juliana

HELD: Yes, the property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana

RATIO: Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.

Alayo unquestionably acquired the property and it was just transferred to Josefa. Art 147 and 148 of Family
Code did not deviate from old rules. Art 148 says that when one of the parties is validly married to another,
his or her share of the co-ownership shall accrue to the conjugal property of the valid marriage.
The adjudication of ownership was made following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the
property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not intended to be adversarial to Alayo's interest),
that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created by operation of law under the provisions of
Article 1456 of the Civil Code. Article 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.
CASE 246: IMANI v. METROBANK
FACTS: On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of
respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto
C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they
bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but
not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6, 000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100, 000.00 and P63,
825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo.
CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI,
but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including
herein petitioner. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank.

Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution which was granted on December 7, 1999. A writ of
execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the
property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.

Metrobank started to consolidate the title covering the subject property in its name, and filed a Manifestation
and Motion, praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani to surrender the owners copy of TCT No. T-
27957 P(M) for cancellation. Petitioner Imani opposed the motion and filed her Comment with Urgent Motion
to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale Over TCT No. T-27957
P(M). She argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution
or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale,
as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank.

ISSUE: WON the property is conjugal

HELD: No, the petitioner fails to prove that the property is owned by conjugal partnership.
RATIO: All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the
party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. To support her assertion that the
property belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, attesting
that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the checks
allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.
Unfortunately the said Affidavit submitted by petitioner can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove
her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no
evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his
Affidavit. In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value.

CASE 251: BERCILES v. GSIS
FACTS: Judge Pascual G. Berciles died on cardiac arrest on August 21, 1979. He had GSIS pension for
serving in the government for 36 yrs, of which 26 yrs. were in judiciary. He was also entitled to other benefits
from his employer as well as return of the premium paid to GSIS. 2 families are now claiming such benefits.
Flor had been living abroad since 1972 and Iluminada and the deceased have been living together at the
time of the death of the judge. GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural child and
other private respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, Mercy Berciles, Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as
illegitimate children of Judge Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his retirement
benefits - this was then contested by the late judges wife Iluminada Ponce and their children.

ISSUE: WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion for considering Pascual Voltaire Berciles as
acknowledged nature child, and Maria, Mercy and Rhoda as illegitimate children

HELD: Yes because there is no substantial evidence through competent and admissible proof of
acknowledgement of filiation by the late judge

RATIO: The court ruled to divide the GSIS pension equally to 5 heirs (Iluminada and her 4 children) and one
half of the retirement premium of P9, 700 (being conjugal) to Iluminada with the remaining half divided into 5
(Iluminada and her 4 children.

According to Art 287 of the New Civil Code, illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support
and such successional rights are granted in the code, but for the article to be applicable, there must be
admission or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child. However, there was no evidence of admission.
There was no evidence that he intervened when his name was put in the birth certificate of Pascual Berciles,
thus his part in the birth certificate is null and void, baptismal certificate has no weight as well, living together
does not prove filiation, pictures are not proof of filiation and their mother was not recognized to be married
to the deceased

The retirement benefits are then distributed equally to the five recognized heirs from his marriage to
Iluminda Ponce who is also an heir. Art 966 of NCC provides that if a widow or widower and legit children or
descendants are left, surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.
Art 980 of NCC also states that children of deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing
the inheritance in equal share

CASE 257: WONG ET AL v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda are married with three children but have since lived
separately. During their marriage the husband bought a parcel of land from his father paid for by a loan from
his officemate. Katrina on the other hand consigned jewelries from Anita Chan worth P321, 830 which she
failed to return within 20-day period. Thus Anita Chan and her husband filed an action for collection of
money wherein the trial court ordered Remerico and Katrina to pay the Wongs the amount plus interest.

A writ of execution was thus levied involving four lots all in the name of Romarico. The lands was sold in a
public auction and was individually both by Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson. A month before such
redemption Romarico filed an action for annulment of the said decision as well as the writ and levy if
execution and the auction of sale of the properties because he was not given his day in court. The court
ruled in favor of Romarico and as he had nothing to do with the transactions and ruled for reconveyance .

ISSUE: WON the conjugal property be levied for Katrinas nonpayment of her obligation

HELD: No. The conjugal property cannot be levied for Katrinas nonpayment of her obligation

RATIO: The properties are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership as it was acquired during their
marriage but even if they are conjugal they cannot answer for Katrinas obligation, as it did not have the
consent of the husband or the administration of conjugal properties conferred to her. Furthermore Romarico
did not act or failed to act on the belief that he was not involved in the dealings of his estranged wife. The
court also found that he was not represented by Katrinas counsel and was not given the opportunity to
defend himself in court.

The decision in the civil case is null and void as it was rendered without jurisdiction for having failed to
observe the notice requirement prescribed by law. The writ of execution cannot be issued against him for he
has not been given his day in court thus the auction sale is null and void. Katrinas rights over the properties
are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; the consent of her husband and her
authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven in the trial . Moreover,
the wife may only bind the conjugal partnership when she purchases things necessary for the support of the
family or when she borrows money necessary for the support of the family. The Spouses Wong must return
to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson the purchase prices of P145, 000 and P119, 000 respectively,
received by said spouse from the public auction sale.